HEADQUARTERS,
Camp near Rockville, Md., September 11, 1862. (Received 6 p.m.)
Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
General-in- Chief:
GENERAL: At the time this army moved from Washington, it was
not known what the intentions of the rebels were in placing their forces on
this side of the Potomac. It might have been a feint to draw away our troops
from Washington, for the purpose of throwing their main army into the city as
soon as we were out of the way, or it might have been supposed to be precisely
what they are now doing. In view of this uncertain condition of things, I left
what I conceived to be a sufficient force to defend the city against any army
they could bring against it from the Virginia side of the Potomac. This
uncertainty, in my judgment, exists no longer. All the evidence that has been
accumulated from various sources since we left Washington goes to prove most
conclusively that almost the entire rebel army in Virginia, amounting to not
less than 120,000 men, is in the vicinity of Frederick City. These troops, for
the most part, consist of their oldest regiments, and are commanded by their
best generals. Several brigades joined them yesterday, direct from Richmond,
two deserters from which say that they saw no other troops between Richmond and
Leesburg. Everything seems to indicate that they intend to hazard all upon the
issue of the coming battle. They are probably aware that their forces are
numerically superior to ours by at least 25 per cent. This, with the prestige
of their recent successes, will, without doubt, inspire them with a confidence
which will cause them to fight well. The momentous consequences involved in the
struggle of the next few days impels me, at the risk of being considered slow
and overcautious, to most earnestly recommend that every available man be at
once added to this army.
I believe this army fully appreciates the importance of a
victory at this time, and will fight well; but the result of a general battle,
with such odds as the enemy now appears to have against us, might, to say the
least, be doubtful; and if we should be defeated the consequences to the
country would be disastrous in the extreme. Under these circumstances, I would
recommend that one or two of the three army corps now on the Potomac, opposite
Washington, be at once withdrawn and sent to re-enforce this army. I would also
advise that the force of Colonel Miles, at Harper's Ferry, where it can be of
but little use, and is continually exposed to be cut off by the enemy, be
immediately ordered here. This would add about 25,000 old troops to our present
force, and would greatly strengthen us.
If there are any rebel forces remaining on the other side of
the Potomac, they must be so few that the troops left in the forts, after the
two corps shall have been withdrawn, will be sufficient to check them; and,
with the large cavalry force now on that side kept well out in front to give
warning of the distant approach of any very large army, a part of this army
might be sent back within the intrenchments to assist in repelling an attack.
But even if Washington should be taken while these armies are confronting each
other, this would not, in my judgment, bear comparison with the ruin and disaster
which would follow a signal defeat of this army. If we should be successful in
conquering the gigantic rebel army before us, we would have no difficulty in
recovering it. On the other hand, should their force prove sufficiently
powerful to defeat us, would all the forces now around Washington be sufficient
to prevent such a victorious army from carrying the works on this side of the
Potomac, after they are uncovered by our army? I think not.
From the moment the rebels commenced the policy of
concentrating their forces, and with their large masses of troops operating
against our scattered forces, they have been successful. They are undoubtedly
pursuing the same now, and are prepared to take advantage of any division of
our troops in future. I, therefore, most respectfully, but strenuously, urge
upon you the absolute necessity, at this critical juncture, of uniting all our
disposable forces. Every other consideration should yield to this, and if we
defeat the army now arrayed before us, the rebellion is crushed, for I do not
believe they can organize another army. But if we should be so unfortunate as
to meet with defeat, our country is at their mercy.
Very respectfully,
your obedient servant,
GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-general.
SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of
the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume
19, Part 2 (Serial No. 28), p. 254-5
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