Showing posts with label 7th PA CAV. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 7th PA CAV. Show all posts

Wednesday, May 9, 2018

Official Reports of the Action at and Surrender of Murfreesborough, Tenn., July 13, 1862

Official Reports of the Action at and Surrender of Murfreesborough, Tenn., July 13, 1862: No. 1. — Reports of Major-General Don Carlos Buell, U.S. Army, commanding Army of the Ohio, including General Orders, No. 32.

No. 1.

Reports of Maj. Gen. D.C. Buell, U.S. Army, commanding Army of the Ohio, including General Orders, No. 32.

HUNTSVILLE, ALA., July 15, 1862.

My information, up to the night of the 13th, from Murfreesborough was that the Ninth Michigan had been captured, but that Colonel Lester's regiment and Hewett's battery were doing well, and felt confident of being able to hold out. Re-enforcements were being started from Nashville. It appears that before they arrived Colonel Lester surrendered, at 4 p.m. the same day. I have no particulars, and at present no remarks to make upon what appears to be a most disgraceful affair. Of course it may embarrass me considerably. I have been busy to counteract it. The worst is the interception of the Chattanooga road, which was just completed. I had taken the precaution to place some twelve regiments on that route until it should be securely established. We will go to work again.
D. C. BUELL,                       
Major-General.
General HALLECK.
_______________

HUNTSVILLE, ALA., July 19, 1862.

As nearly as I can ascertain the force captured at Murfreesborough on the 13th consisted of nine companies of the Third Minnesota, under Colonel Lester; six companies of the Ninth Michigan, four companies of the Fourth Kentucky Cavalry, three companies of the Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry, and two sections of Hewett's Kentucky battery. All except Colonel Lester's regiment and the artillery, including Colonel Duffield and General T. T. Crittenden, seem to have been completely surprised in the town and captured without time or opportunity for resistance. The case of the rest of the command was but little better. They maintained their position until 4 o'clock and then surrendered. I had concentrated a larger force at that point to occupy McMinnville, but a considerable portion of it had been sent away a day or two before to Kentucky to meet the difficulties there. I regard the whole affair as most disgraceful and demanding prompt and vigorous treatment. It has also caused serious delay in the means of supplying the army so that it can move on the Decatur route. The difficulty has been increased by damages to bridges by swollen streams. Every effort is being made to remove these difficulties and I hope to have the Murfreesborough road repaired and in working order in a very few days. It is not my habit to plead difficulties or represent them even; but it is important that they should be somewhat understood, lest impossible expectations should be formed, and the opinion taken up that this army is idle and has nothing to do but march rapidly along the road. Our lines of supply are very long and difficult to protect; for, without ascribing hostility to the mass of the people, there is still enough of hostile and bad element to involve us in all the difficulties of operating in an enemy's country.

D.C. BUELL,            
Major - General, Commanding.
Major-General HALLECK, or
ADJUTANT-GENERAL U.S. ARMY.
_______________

GENERAL ORDERS No. 32.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,         
In Camp, Huntsville, Ala., July 21, 1862.

On the 13th instant the force at Murfreesborough, under command of Brig. Gen. T. T. Crittenden, late colonel of the Sixth Indiana Regiment, and consisting of six companies of the Ninth Michigan, nine companies of the Third Minnesota, two sections of Hewett's (Kentucky) battery, four companies of the Fourth Kentucky Cavalry, and three companies of the Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry, was captured at that place by a force of the enemy's cavalry variously estimated at from 1,800 to 3,500. It appears from the best information that can be obtained that Brigadier-General Crittenden, and Colonel Duffield, of the Ninth Michigan, with the six companies of that regiment and all of the cavalry, were surprised and captured early in the morning in the houses and streets of the town or in their camp near by, with but slight resistance and without any timely warning of the presence of an enemy. The rest of the force, consisting of the Third Minnesota and the artillery, under Colonel Lester, left its camp and took another position, which it maintained with but few casualties against the feeble attacks of the enemy until about 3 o'clock, when it was surrendered and marched into captivity.

Take it in all its features, few more disgraceful examples of neglect of duty and lack of good conduct can be found in the history of wars. It fully merits the extreme penalty which the law provides for such misconduct. The force was more than sufficient to repel the attack effectually. The mortification which the army will feel at the result is poorly compensated by the exertion made by some — perhaps many — of the officers to retrieve the disgrace of the surprise. The action fit to be adopted with reference to those who are blamable, especially the officers highest in command, cannot be determined without further investigation.

In contrast to this shameful affair the general commanding takes pleasure in making honorable mention of the conduct of a detachment of 22 men of Companies I and H, Tenth Wisconsin Regiment, under the command of Sergts. W. Nelson and A. H. Makinson. The detachment was on duty guarding a bridge east of Huntsville, when it was attacked on April 28 by a force of some 200 or 300 cavalry, which it fought for two hours and repulsed in the most signal manner. Such is the conduct that duty and honor demand of every soldier; and this example is worthy of imitation by higher officers and larger commands.

By command of Major-General Buell:

JAMES B. FRY,        
Colonel and Chief of Staff.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 16, Part 1 (Serial No. 22), p. 792-4

Official Reports of the Action at and Surrender of Murfreesborough, Tenn., July 13, 1862: No. 2. — Report of Brigadier-General Thomas T. Crittenden, U.S. Army, commanding at Murfreesborough.

No. 2.

Report of Brig. Gen. T. T. Crittenden, U.S. Army, commanding at Murfreesborough.

I submit the following report of the affair of July 13, 1862, at Murfreesborough, Tenn.:

While at Athens, Ala., I received the special order of Major-General Buell assigning me to the command of the post of Murfreesborough, and went there as speedily as possible. I arrived there on the same train with Colonel Duffield, of the Ninth Michigan, on July 11. The next day I assumed command of the post and Colonel Duffield of the Twenty-third Brigade. Having no instructions, and knowing nothing of the affairs at the post, I had several interviews with Col. [Henry C.] Lester [Third Minnesota], then in command, and from his statements, made both to myself and Colonel Duffield, it was evident that he apprehended no danger. He stated that the only points from which the enemy could approach were McMinnville and Lebanon, that there was no force between Chattanooga and Murfreesborough, and that Morgan's force was far beyond Lebanon, en route for Kentucky.

Colonel Lester had separated his forces on or about June 23, 1862, leaving five companies of the Ninth Michigan and about 80 men of the Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry at the old camp, and removing the Third Minnesota Regiment and Hewett's First Kentucky Battery (four guns) about 1¼ miles northwest of the former camp. This was the whole force there on July 13, except one company Ninth Michigan posted in the court-house as provost-guard, altogether numbering about 950 effective men.

I appointed Lieut. [Henry M.] Duffield, Ninth Michigan, acting assistant adjutant-general, Lieut. C. H. Blakey, who had been previously acting, having left for Minnesota on recruiting service on July 12.

Lieutenant Duffield, under my orders, proceeded at once to prepare a morning report, but did not complete it that day.

I then went with Colonel Duffield to look for a proper camp for the whole force, as I would not permit it to remain separated. I found the water, the scarcity of which Colonel Lester assigned as the reason for such division, abundant to supply 5,000 men and a good camp ground within a quarter of a mile of the former camp. I examined other camp sites, but preferred the first, and ordered Colonel Duffield to concentrate his force there.

The same day I rode out with the officer of the day and made an examination of the pickets. Being dissatisfied with its strength and locations, I directed Major Seibert, commanding the cavalry, to double his cavalry force on all the roads to Lebanon and McMinnville, which he did, but withdrew them at night, in accordance with the custom and orders of Colonel Lester under which he had previously acted, of which custom and order I was entirely ignorant. There was no such order on the order-book, it being merely verbal. I had doubled the cavalry on the points of danger, as a temporary strengthening of the pickets, until next day, when I had ordered a much larger detail for picket duty from the infantry. My temporary headquarters were opposite to and about 75 yards from the court-house.

I have been informed that Colonel Lester had some intelligence of a cavalry force of the enemy assembling near McMinnville, but he did not inform me nor did I have any information of impending danger. I found things negligently and loosely done at the post and attempted to remedy all the negligence I saw there.

At daylight of July 13 General Forrest, with 2,500 cavalry, consisting of four regiments and one battalion — among them the First and Second Georgia and Seventh Texas, having marched 48 miles between noon of the 12th and that time — surrounded and captured the pickets on one of the roads to McMinnville without the firing of a gun, rushed at full speed into the camp of the Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry and into the court-house square and streets of the town. Passing through the cavalry camp they attacked the Ninth Michigan, which was ready to receive them. Severe fighting at this point resulted in driving the enemy back some 300 yards after repeated assaults, both sides losing heavily.

Colonel Duffield, commanding Twenty-third Brigade, was severely wounded early in the action and carried from the field. He was paroled at once, and I have had no report from him.

Lieutenant-Colonel Parkhurst, commanding the Ninth Michigan, after holding his camp nearly eight hours against superior numbers, finding the enemy were surrounding him with their whole force and having no hope of re-enforcement (not receiving any reply to several messages for assistance sent by him to Colonel Lester), surrendered his force, then reduced to 134 men. This fragment of a regiment, under its gallant lieutenant-colonel (Parkhurst), fought splendidly, and deserves honorable mention. Their loss was 11 killed, 86 wounded, and 36 missing.

Company B, Ninth Michigan, the provost guard, made a resolute defense of the court house for three hours during repeated assaults, killing 12 and wounding 18 of the enemy. They did not surrender until the court-house was set on fire. During these hours of suspense only an occasional shot was heard from the Third Minnesota and Hewett's battery. Of course their comparative quiet showed that they were not attacked in three. From the reports of Colonel Lester and Captain Hewett and from other sources I learned that their commands turned out promptly, marched unattacked nearly half a mile, and were there halted by Colonel Lester. Except slight changes of position, they remained there from 4.30 a.m. until 2.30 p.m., twice or three times menaced by small squads and once attacked by about 300 cavalry. The latter were repulsed by the fire of the skirmishers and one volley from two companies on the left flank of the regiment. Within three-quarters of a mile of their position they heard the fighting at the court-house for three hours and during seven hours and a half' the fight at the Michigan camp.

The Third Minnesota was a splendidly drilled regiment. The officers and men were anxious to fight, but Colonel Lester held them there without seeing any enemy in force. Colonel Lester received two dispatches from Lieutenant-Colonel Parkhurst, begging for aid, but would afford none. When all was lost except his own command Colonel Lester went under a flag of truce to see Colonel Duffield, and there saw the enemy, who had not dared to come within range of his artillery, and was so impressed with what he saw that he returned, determined to surrender. This is proved by his calling a council of his company commanders and his lieutenant-colonel [Chauncey W. Griggs]. They, by a viva-voce vote, decided to fight. Part of them went from the council. Colonel Lester reopened and reargued the matter. A ballot vote was taken and the force was surrendered. This was done by the statements and influence of Colonel Lester. Lieutenant-Colonel Griggs bitterly opposed the surrender and voted against it to the last. Not a man was killed in the line of the Third Minnesota during the day. I state the facts without comment.

With a few men I held my headquarters until after the court-house was taken. I early sent a messenger, in citizen's clothes, with orders to Colonel Duffield, but he could not pass through the enemy's lines. They had my quarters surrounded from the time they entered the square. I submit copies of reports made to me and refer to them. I respectfully demand a court of inquiry into the disaster at Murfreesborough.

T. T. CRITTENDEN,            
Brigadier-General, late Commanding Post.
Lieut. Col. J.P. GARESCHÉ,
Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff.

[Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Nashville, Tenn., November 26, 1862.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army, with the request that this case may receive prompt attention and that Colonel Lester be ignominiously dismissed the service.* As Capt. [John A.]  Tanner is under my command, I propose to avail myself of the authority delegated to me by the Secretary of War and shall dismiss him. General Crittenden I will order to duty.

W. S. ROSECRANS,            
Major-General, U.S. Volunteers, Comdg. Department.
_______________

* Dismissed December 1, 1862.

Dismissed to date September 22, 1862.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 16, Part 1 (Serial No. 22), p. 794-6

Official Reports of the Action at and Surrender of Murfreesborough, Tenn., July 13, 1862: No. 3. — Findings of a Court of Inquiry.

GENERAL ORDERS,
No. 4.

HDQRS. DEPT. OF THE CUMBERLAND,                      
Murfreesborough, Tenn., January 24, 1863.

I. At a court of inquiry, convened at the city of Nashville, December 17, 1862, by Special Field Orders, No. 19, Headquarters Fourteenth Army Corps, Department of the Cumberland, on the request of Brig. Gen. T. T. Crittenden, to investigate and give an opinion on the facts connected with the surrender of the troops at Murfreesborough, under his command, of which court Brig. Gen. James G. Spears was president, and Col. Joseph R. Scott, Nineteenth Regiment Illinois Volunteers, was recorder, the following facts were found upon the testimony:

1st. That he (General Crittenden) assumed command of the post at Murfreesborough on the 12th day of July, 1862, between the hours of 9 and 10 o'clock a.m.

2d. That he found the camp had been divided for three weeks previous and the forces separated.

3d. That he rode out on the morning of the 12th July, with Colonel Duffield, commanding the Twenty-third Brigade, and selected a camp, and told Colonel Duffield to concentrate the whole force there at once.

4th. That he rode out and inspected the pickets with the field officer of the day, and not being satisfied with their strength and location, ordered Major Seibert, commanding the cavalry, to double his cavalry patrol on the roads leading to Lebanon and McMinnville.

5th. That the pickets on these roads were re-enforced, but were withdrawn at night without the knowledge of General Crittenden, as was the custom of the post by order.

6th. That he ordered morning reports to be made out and one-fifth of the entire effective force to be detailed as grand guards.

7th. That he examined the brigade order books, and ordered a plot of the town and its approaches to be made.

8th. That he consulted fully and freely with Colonels Lester and Duffield, did a large amount of executive business, and was constantly employed until 9 p.m. July 12.

9th. That he was informed, on what should have been good authority, that there was no force of the enemy nearer than Chattanooga, with the exception of small parties of guerrillas, and that there was no danger of an immediate attack.

10th. That the attack was made upon the Ninth Michigan Infantry and Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry and the town at daylight on the morning of the 13th July.

11th. That the Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry was immediately overpowered. That the Ninth Michigan Infantry was promptly formed and repeatedly repulsed the enemy. That about 8 o'clock a.m. they took a more sheltered position, which they held until 12 o'clock, when they surrendered; their commanding officer being wounded and having lost nearly one-half their number in killed and wounded.

12th. That one company of the Ninth Michigan Infantry, acting as provost guards, held the court-house in the town until 8 o'clock, when they surrendered after it was set on fire.

13th. That General Crittenden surrendered himself and staff at 8 o'clock, having endeavored to communicate with the troops, but failed, owing to the stopping of his message by rebel guards.

14th. That the Third Minnesota Infantry and Hewett's battery of four guns, under command of Colonel Lester, being 1¼ miles from town and about the same distance from the Ninth Michigan Infantry and cavalry, immediately on hearing the attack on these places marched up the turnpike and took position in an open field, with woods in front, about 600 yards distant, where they remained until about 12 o'clock, cavalry occasionally appearing in their front in small parties, which were driven off with shot and shell from the battery, after which they fell back about one-half mile, near their camp, and remained there until they surrendered.

15th. That the estimated number of troops at the post was about 1,040; that of the enemy 2,600. Upon which statement of facts the court give the following opinion:

“We therefore are of the opinion from the evidence that Brig. Gen. T. T. Crittenden did all that should be expected of a vigilant commander from the time he took command until the surrender. We find  no evidence that impugns his skill or courage; on the contrary, he was very active on the day before the attack up to 9 p.m. in obtaining information and placing the post in a proper state of defense. Although it may be said that he should have immediately concentrated his forces and that any delay in so doing was dangerous, yet we find all ample apology for the delay in the facts that he was an entire stranger to the place and country, and that he was assured by Colonel Lester, who had preceded him in the command for two months, that there was no danger of an attack and that no enemy of importance was nearer than Chattanooga.”

All which is published for the information of the army.

II. The general commanding, after a careful examination of the testimony adduced before the court of inquiry, is of opinion that the defeat of our forces under Brig. Gen. T. T. Crittenden at Murfreesborough was chiefly owing to the withdrawal of picket guards from the roads leading to the town during the night and to the separation of the forces at the post; that the post was taken by surprise and the forces overpowered by being attacked in detail, all which would have been provided against had the timely orders of General Crittenden been obeyed.

By command of Major-General Rosecrans:

C. GODDARD,         
Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 16, Part 1 (Serial No. 22), p. 796-8

Saturday, September 27, 2014

Official Reports of the Action at and Surrender of Murfreesborough, Tenn., July 13, 1862: No. 8. – Report of Lieut. Col. John G. Parkhurst, Ninth Michigan Infantry.

No. 8.

LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to make the following report of the battle of Murfreesborough, Tenn., on July 13, 1862. Before giving the particulars of the battle I beg leave to report the strength and condition of the Ninth Regiment Michigan Infantry at the time of the attack:

This regiment, with the Third Regiment of Minnesota Infantry, Hewett's Kentucky battery, and a portion of the Seventh Pennsylvania  Cavalry, had been encamped in one encampment, in the city of Murfreesborough, for some months, under the command of Colonel Duffield, when, on May 9, he was assigned to command of the troops of Kentucky, and Colonel Lester, of the Third Minnesota, assumed command of the forces at Murfreesborough.

On June 26 the force at Murfreesborough was divided and its strength greatly reduced by the Third Minnesota Regiment and Hewett's battery being sent 1½ miles north of the city of Murfreesborough, on the Nashville pike, leaving the Ninth Michigan and a squadron of the Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry occupying the old camping ground, and the only troops in the city.

On June 30, agreeably to an order received from Colonel Lester, this force was further reduced, and Companies D, E, F, and I, of the Ninth Michigan, were sent to Tullahoma. Company B, Capt. [Oliver C.] Rounds, of the Ninth Michigan, was occupying the court-house, situated three-fourths of a mile from camp, and acting as provost guard for the city, leaving only five companies of my regiment in camp. From these companies heavy details for picket and other duties were constantly made, so that the force in camp was about 250 strong.

The weakness of my camp and the divided condition of the forces at Murfreesborough were observed by General Crittenden upon his arrival and viewing of the camp on the 12th, and the danger to be apprehended in consequence of such division was remarked upon by both General Crittenden and Colonel Duffield, who returned to Murfreesborough in company with General Crittenden, and it was by them determined to reunite the forces at once.

At 4 o'clock on the morning of the 13th I was aroused by the sentinel at my tent and informed that the enemy was advancing upon the camp. I at once turned out an[d] gave the alarm in camp. The companies in camp turned out with alacrity, but before they had time to form square the enemy, mounted and some 1,200 strong, with terrific yells, dashed upon us from three directions, armed with double-barreled shot-guns and Colt's navy revolvers. Some of my men gave way under this charge, but the majority of them stood firm and returned the first fire with great precision and fatal effect. After discharging their pieces the enemy retired and dismounted a part of his force and advanced upon us mounted and on foot. I rallied my force, and, although the effect of the fire of the enemy was terribly severe, my officers and men stood their ground with heroic courage and poured a destructive fire into the enemy's ranks until he began to yield. Seeing this, I took advantage of it and ordered my force to advance and charge upon him. In obedience to this order my men, with a yell equal to that of the Texans, made a charge, driving the enemy before them until he was completely routed from my camp and driven out of and beyond reach of the camp of the Pennsylvania cavalry and brigade headquarters. I immediately ordered Company C; Capt. [Charles V.] De Land, to advance in pursuit, as skirmishers, as far as the second street in our front, which he did in good style, doing good execution and holding the line I had indicated to him and driving the enemy still farther in retreat.

Finding an opportunity I immediately occupied my time in preparing for another attack, and marched my force into a garden in front of camp, which was inclosed by a cedar-post fence, and made use of such forage as I had in camp to barricade Maney avenue, which led to our right, and made use of the transportation wagons for a protection on our left, thus securing quite a formidable position. After having secured  this position and learning that Colonel Lester had not advanced upon the enemy I dispatched a courier to Colonel Lester, informing him of the fight and of the superior force of the enemy and that Colonel Duffield was wounded and had left the field and that my loss had been very heavy, but that we were then in a good position and could make a successful defense if we could be re-enforce, and asked him to send re-enforcements.

The enemy kept up a series of attacks and feints and he was as often repulsed.

Not hearing from the courier, I dispatched a second courier with similar information as to our position and urged Colonel Lester to advance to our relief, informing him that we were receiving frequent attacks from a vastly superior force, but that we could hold out if he would re-enforce us. After some four hours’ time I received information that my couriers had been arrested by order of Colonel Lester as spies and that a courier from Colonel Lester had come over to ascertain our position. About 9.30 o’clock I sent by the courier who came from Colonel Lester a written statement of our position and requesting re-enforcements at once, knowing that if Colonel Lester would join us with his force we could drive the enemy from the city or capture his command.

I received no reply from this dispatch nor from any that I sent to Colonel Lester, though he has since informed me that my couriers as well as my dispatch through his own courier reached him and that his courier had no trouble in returning to his camp. I leave Colonel Lester to account in his report or otherwise for his neglecting my repeated calls upon him for re-enforcements.

The forces attacking my camp were the First Regiment Texas Rangers, Colonel Wharton, and a battalion of the First Georgia Rangers, Colonel Morrison, and a large number of citizens of Rutherford County, many of whom had recently taken the oath of allegiance to the United States Government. There were also quite a number of negroes attached to the Texas and Georgia troops, who were armed and equipped, and took part in the several engagements with my forces during the day.

Simultaneously with the attack upon my camp Company B, Captain Rounds, was attacked at their quarters in the court-house by a large force of Georgia, Tennessee, and Kentucky cavalry. This company fought nobly and held their position for two and a half hours, killing and wounding a large number of the enemy's forces, and until the enemy set fire to the lower part of the court-house, when they were compelled to surrender.

We maintained our position, despite the frequent attacks and desperate efforts of the enemy to destroy us, until 11.30 o'clock, when a flag of truce was sent to us, with a demand for a surrender, of which the following is a true copy, viz:


MURFREESBOROUGH, July 13, 1862.

COLONEL: I must demand an unconditional surrender of your force as prisoners of war or I will have every man put to the sword. You are aware of the overpowering force I have at my command, and this demand is made to prevent the effusion of blood.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. B. FORREST,
 Brigadier-General of Cavalry, C. S. Army.
Col. J. G. PARKHURST.


This communication I forwarded to Colonel Duffield, who had been wounded in the first charge and removed from the field, asking for his order or advice in relation thereto. Colonel Duffield returned the communication with a message that he should leave the matter entirely to my discretion. Meantime I had ascertained that General Forrest had concentrated his entire force, save one squadron, which he had stationed on the Nashville pike, near the camp of the Minnesota regiment, in the immediate vicinity of my camp, hemming us in on all sides, and was preparing to make a charge upon us with his entire command, having surrounded us, and evidently intending, with this overwhelming force, to execute the threat contained in his demand for a surrender. Seeing our position, and concluding that I had nothing to hope for from Colonel Lester, having vainly looked for aid from him for seven hours, and ascertaining from actual count that I had but 134 men, including a few of Major Seibert's Pennsylvania cavalry, who had retreated to our lines, I called a meeting of my officers to consider the demand for a surrender. The officers of the regiment, after considering our position, deemed it rashness to attempt to withstand the forces now brought against us, numbering over 1,800, and unanimously voted to surrender, and at 12 o'clock, eight hours after the commencement of the battle, I surrendered my command as prisoners of war.

My loss in the battle was as follows: Of the five companies in camp, killed, 11; wounded, 86; missing, 36; total, 133. Of Company B, at the court-house, wounded, 3; missing, 1; total, 4. Making a total loss of 137. I append hereto a correct list of the killed, wounded, and missing.*

In the engagement I received a shot below the knee of my left leg, but no injury resulted from it.
The loss of the enemy was very much greater than mine. Among their killed is Colonel Anderson, of one of the Georgia regiments, and among their wounded is Colonel Wharton, of the Texas Rangers. A large portion of their officers were either killed or wounded.

I cannot speak in too high terms of the conduct of my officers and men, who, with only one exception, behaved nobly, fought like heroes, and conducted themselves like veteran soldiers; and where all behaved so well it would be invidious to attempt to discriminate. The exception I feel it my duty to mention. Capt. John A. Tanner, of Company K, at the first fire of the enemy retreated to the woods. This conduct needs no comment. Justice will overtake him.

Subsequent to the surrender my command, including many of the wounded and sick from the hospital, were marched to McMinnville, some 40 miles from Murfreesborough, where the non-commissioned officers and privates were paroled. The commissioned officers were marched to Knoxville, Tenn., and sent thence to Madison, Ga., where we were confined in an old filthy cotton factory, which was alive with vermin and we were there compelled to provide ourselves with food, which was furnished, through the guard at the rate of $2 per diem per man.

I beg leave to further report that, though assured that our private property would not be taken, everything not worn upon our backs was taken from us. Our trunks, which we were assured we could take with us, were broken open and the contents stolen or appropriated by greedy rebels.

While on the march to Knoxville I was ordered to dismount and surrender my horse, which General Forrest instantly appropriated. Other officers were deprived of their horses.

I remain, lieutenant, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

 J. G. PARKHURST,
 Lieut. Col, Ninth Regiment Michigan Infantry, Comdg.

Lieut. H. M. DUFFIELD,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Murfreesborough, Tenn.
_______________

* Nominal list omitted.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 16, Part 1 (Serial No. 22), p. 803-7

Thursday, September 25, 2014

Official Reports of the Action at and Surrender of Murfreesborough, Tenn., July 13, 1862: No. 4. – Report of Maj. James J. Seibert, Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry.

No. 4.

GENERAL: I respectfully submit the following as my report of the battle at Murfreesborough, Tenn., on Sunday, July 13, 1862:

I first assumed command of the cavalry attached to that command, consisting of the Third Battalion Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry, and one squadron of the Fourth Kentucky Cavalry, on May 29, but was called to Nashville on duty on June 19, returning again on July 6.

When I first assumed command it was the custom, as well as the order, of Colonel Lester, then in command, to send out daily from the cavalry a patrol of 5 men on each of the seven pikes leading to and from the town, starting out in the morning and returning in the evening. This order was not changed while I was in command until the day before the occurrence. When you assumed command you ordered me to double the number of the patrols on the roads to Lebanon and McMinnville, which was done. When the patrols returned in the evening I received the report daily from each of the non-commissioned officers in charge, which, after committing to writing, I handed to Colonel Lester.

The attack was made at daybreak in the morning, and I first saw the enemy when charging on my camp, which was a short distance to the right of the Woodbury pike. I had not over 80 duty men in camp at the time of the attack, most of whom were captured there. We then left my camp and joined the Ninth Michigan and surrendered with them at noon. I lost 5 killed and 20 wounded.

Before closing this report I would state that a report reached me about midnight that several men were seen in the night between our pickets and the town on the Bradyville pike. I immediately mounted  12 men and went to the points named, but after examining the fields and several houses and barns on the Bradyville and Woodbury pikes and discovering no signs of the enemy I returned with the men to camp, having reached it only a little more than an hour before the attack.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

 JAMES J. SEIBERT,
 Major, Seventh Pa. Cav., Comdg. Cav., Twenty-third Brigade.

General T. T. CRITTENDEN,
Commanding Forces at Murfreesborough, Tenn.:

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 16, Part 1 (Serial No. 22), p. 798-9

Saturday, May 18, 2013

Foster Updike, Private, Co. C, 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry

Stones River National Cemetery
Murfreesboro, Tennessee

NOTE: Originally interred at Athens, Alabama.

Monday, May 7, 2012

C. W. Dunlop


Private, Co. L, 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry
Died Oct. 29, 1864

Stones River National Cemetery
Murfreesboro, Tennessee

Sunday, May 6, 2012

John Givler


Private, Co. K, 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry
Died October 21, 1864, Athens Alabama

Stones River National Cemetery
Murfreesboro, Tennessee

Friday, November 11, 2011

George Silver

Private, Co. K, 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry

Stones River National Cemetery
Mufreesboro, Tennessee

Wednesday, September 29, 2010

A Brilliant Skirmish

(Special to Louisville Journal.)

NASHVILLE, - May 4. – Gen. Dumont with portions of Wolford’s and Smith’s Kentucky cavalry, and Wynkoop’s Pennsylvania cavalry attacked Morgan’s and Wood’s cavalry, 800 in number at Lebanon, Tenn. on Monday evening at four o’clock. The rebels were utterly routed, and large numbers slain, and one hundred and fifty five taken prisoners. Nearly all their horses and arms were captured. They fled after fighting one hour and a half.

Gen. Dumont is in pursuit, and will capture the whole force. The prisoners will be here this evening. It was a brilliant affair and managed with great skill by Gen. Dumont.

Morgan is reported killed.

Col. Wolford was wounded in the abdomen seriously and Col. Smith was wounded in the leg. The rebels were completely surprised and outwitted.

– Published in The Burlington Weekly Hawk-Eye, Burlington, Iowa, Saturday, May 10, 1862, p. 4