We have, yesterday and to-day, broken accounts of a great
fight for three days — and not yet terminated — at Murfreesborough, Tennessee.
All statements say we have the best, that we shall beat the Rebels, that
we have pierced their centre, that we are driving them through M., etc. I hope
to hear we have done instead of we “shall” do. None of our army fights
have been finished, but are drawn battles, — worrying, exhausting, but never
completed. Of Rosecrans I have thought better and hope a good account of his work,
but the best sometimes fail, and he may not be best.
A word by telegraph that the Monitor has foundered and over
twenty of her crew, including some officers, are lost. The fate of this vessel
affects me in other respects. She is a primary representative of a class
identified with my administration of the Navy. Her novel construction and
qualities I adopted and she was built amidst obloquy and ridicule. Such a
change in the character of a fighting vessel few naval men, or any Secretary
under their influence, would have taken the responsibility of adopting. But Admiral
Smith and finally all the Board which I appointed seconded my views, and were
willing, Davis somewhat reluctantly, to recommend the experiment if I would
assume the risk and responsibility. Her success with the Merrimac directly
after she went into commission relieved me of odium and anxiety, and men who
were preparing to ridicule were left to admire.
When Bushnell of New Haven brought me the first model and
plan, I was favorably impressed. I was then in Hartford, proposing to remove my
family, but sent him at once to Washington, following myself within a day or
two. Understanding that Ericsson, the inventor, was sensitive in consequence of
supposed slight and neglect by the Navy Department or this Government some
years ago, I made it a point to speak to Admiral Smith, Chairman of the Board,
and specially request that he should be treated tenderly, and opportunity given
him for full and deliberate hearing. I found Admiral Smith well disposed. The
plan was adopted, and the test of her fighting and resisting power was by an
arrangement between Admiral Smith and myself, without communication with any
other, that she should, when completed, go at once up Elizabeth River to
Norfolk Navy Yard, and destroy the Merrimac while in the dry dock, and the dock
itself. Had she been completed within the contract time, one hundred days, this
purpose would have been accomplished, but there was delay and disappointment,
and her prowess was exhibited in a conflict with her huge antagonist under much
more formidable circumstances. Her career since the time she first entered
Hampton Roads is public history, but her origin, and everything in relation to
her, from the inception, have been since her success designedly misrepresented.
Admiral Smith beyond any other person is deserving of
credit, if credit be due any one connected with the Navy Department for this
vessel. Had she been a failure, he, more than any one but the Secretary, would
have been blamed, and [he] was fully aware that he would have to share with me
the odium and the responsibility. Let him, therefore, have the credit which is
justly his.
SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles,
Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864,
p. 213-5
