William T. Sherman to Senator John Sherman, February 1, 1861

February 1, 1861.

. . . It is war to surround Anderson with batteries, and it is shilly-shally for the South to cry “Hands off! No coercion!” It was war and insult to expel the garrison at Baton Rouge, and Uncle Sam had better cry “Cave!” or assert his power. Fort Sumter is not material, save for the principle; but Key West and the Tortugas should be held in force at once, by regulars, if possible, if not, by militia. Quick! They are occupied now, but not in force.

Whilst maintaining the high, strong ground you do, I would not advise you to interpose an objection to securing concessions to the middle and moderate states — Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri. Slavery there is local, and even if the world were open to them, its extension would involve no principle. If these states felt the extreme South wrong, a seeming concession would make them committed. The cotton states are gone, I suppose. Of course, their commerce will be hampered. . .

I sent you a copy of my letter to the governor. Here is his answer [see pages 350-351].

This is very handsome, and I do regret this political imbroglio. I do think it was brought about by politicians. The people in the South are evidently unanimous in the opinion that slavery is endangered by the current of events, and it is useless to attempt to alter that opinion. As our government is founded on the will of the people, when that will is fixed, our government is powerless, and the only question is whether to let things slide into general anarchy, or the formation of two or more confederacies, which will be hostile sooner or later. Still, I know that some of the best men of Louisiana think this change may be effected peaceably. But even if the Southern States be allowed to depart in peace, the first question will be revenue.

Now, if the South have free trade, how can you collect revenues in the eastern cities? Freight from New Orleans to St. Louis, Chicago, Louisville, Cincinnati, and even Pittsburg, would be about the same as by rail from New York, and importers at New Orleans, having no duties to pay, would undersell the East if they had to pay duty. Therefore, if the South make good their confederation and their plan, the northern confederacy must do likewise or blockade. Then comes the question of foreign nations. So, look on it in any view, I see no result but war and consequent changes in the form of government. . .

SOURCE: Walter L. Fleming, General W.T. Sherman as College President, p. 357-8

William T. Sherman to George Mason Graham, January 16, 1861

ALEXANDRIA, Jan. 16, 1861.

DEAR GENERAL: It was my purpose to wait patiently for the development of events, with my mind firmly resolved to do no act hostile to the United States. I had given full notice of such resolution to Dr. Smith and Governor Moore. The seizure of the forts, and worse still the capture of the company of U.S. soldiers at Baton Rouge, where they were stationed by invitation of the state authority for the protection of the arms and munitions of war placed there for the safety of the state, are regarded by me as acts of war and a breach of common decency. I forthwith repaired to Alexandria and notified Dr. Smith of my opinion and that my longer stay here was wrong. He thinks Governor Moore had reasons for his conduct not known to the public and as he is on the point of going to Baton Rouge he asked me to forbear till he could consult, and see what is to be done. He says he has consulted with many, and that all understand my opinions, that as I am entrusted with the moneys and management of the institution he cannot arrange for my relief till time is given to provide a successor. He is unwilling that Vallas should succeed to my power as superintendent — or that any one else to the care of the moneys. But he pledged me his word that I should in no wise be compromised in any act of hostility to the general government.

If I had in view any occupation, by which I could maintain my family I would not stay, but as I have no such employment in view, and as I cannot receive the compensation fixed by law for me as superintendent of the central arsenal, and as I have laid by little or nothing I have consented to await awhile, to allow the legislature to appropriate the five hundred dollars due for last year* and for a little salary to accumulate to give me the means of retiring to Ohio, and cast around for some means of support.

These are my reasons. They may be improper and unsuited to the occasion, but such they are. But I do think that the haste with which this revolution is pushed must produce sad and bitter fruits. I feel no wish to take part in the civil strife that seems inevitable. I would prefer to hide myself, but necessity may force me to another course. Here in Louisiana you must sustain a large army, and its commander will soon dispose of your governor and legislature, and will keep them to the simple task of providing "ways and means.” Then Governor Moore will maybe see that it is not so simple a game to play. Our friend Bragg seems to be alert, and most likely he will soon be your king. You could not have a better. However secession may be regarded as to South Carolina, it becomes a far more serious matter when we know that some of the most populous states are on the tributaries of the Mississippi whose mouth is now held by a foreign and hostile state. This of itself will turn their commerce by lakes and railroads eastward, and moreover a new feeling of interest will arise in New York and Baltimore to embarrass the exports from New Orleans. The facility of closing the Mississippi by a single frigate, or by the possession of Key West or Tortugas will and must paralyze the trade of New Orleans. It may be that Louisiana honor compelled her to this course, but I see it not and must think it is the rash result of excited men. Men have ceased to reason and war seems to be courted by those who understand not its cost and demoralizing results. Civilians are far more willing to start a war than military men, and so it appears now.

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* For the salary of superintendent of the Arsenal. - Ed.

SOURCE: Walter L. Fleming, General W.T. Sherman as College President, p. 338-40

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, July 17, 1865

Last Tuesday, when on board the Pawnee with the President and Cabinet, Stanton took me aside and desired to know if the Navy could not spare a gunboat to convey some prisoners to Tortugas. I told him a vessel could be detailed for that purpose if necessary, but I inquired why he did not send them by one of his own transports. He then told me he wanted to send the persons connected with the assassination of President Lincoln to Tortugas, instead of a Northern prison, that he had mentioned the subject to the President, and it was best to get them into a part of the country where old Nelson or any other judge would not try to make difficulty by habeas corpus. Said he would make further inquiries and see me, but wished strict secrecy. On Friday he said he should want a boat and I told him we had none here, but the Florida might be sent to Hampton Roads, and he could send his men and prisoners thither on one of the army boats in the Potomac. I accordingly sent orders for the Florida. Yesterday General Townsend called on me twice on the subject, and informed me in the evening that General Hancock would leave in a boat at midnight to meet the Florida. I suggested that General H. had better wait; we had no information yet that the Florida had arrived, and she would be announced to us by telegraph as soon as she did arrive. To-day I learn the prisoners and a guard went down last night, and I accordingly sent orders by telegraph, by request of Secretary of War, to receive and convey the guard and prisoners to Tortugas.

Seward sent to see me. Had dispatches from the Spanish government that the Stonewall should be given up. Is to send me copies, but the yellow fever is prevalent in Havana and it would be well to leave the Stonewall there until fall.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 334-5

Diary of John Hay: August 22, 1861

A long hiatus! The nights have been too busy for jottings.

. . . . We went over to Seward’s, found him comfortably slippered, and after talking about consular nuisances, went over to McClellan’s. Everything seems going right. Discipline is perfecting. The Dry Tortugas have squelched mutiny. The drills and reviews keep the men alive. Hunter is soon to go to Illinois as they need a head. At first he wanted to take McDowell but Scott objected. Regiments are constantly coming in, and arms for them. McClellan is growing jolly. Seward is in better humor than I have lately seen him.

SOURCES: Clara B. Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary, Volume 1, p. 40; Tyler Dennett, Lincoln and the Civil War in the Diaries and Letters of John Hay, p. 25.

Major Charles Fessenden Morse: July 16, 1864

Near Vining Station, Ga.,

July 16, 1864.

The President, in his wisdom or his weakness, has stopped all capital punishment in the army. The greatest penalty for the crime of desertion now is confinement during the war at the Dry Tortugas; that may be for a longer or shorter period than the term of their enlistment, but during the whole time the deserters are not under fire, their hard labor is probably less than that which troops in the field have to perform, and the chance of escape is always before them. Is it humanity for a man virtually to pardon all these deserters, who have committed one of the greatest military crimes, when, by so doing, the life of every soldier who does his duty and goes into battle is endangered to a greater extent? I do not say that shooting deserters would stop all desertion, but I believe that with such a penalty before them, only the most reckless would attempt it. These men who desert are of no value to society, and no one would regret them if they were justly shot.

This war is now in its fourth year; no one doubts that it has got to go on in some shape or other, either well or poorly managed, till it is brought to a definite conclusion; that end may be in one year and it may be in five years, but should not there be some regard to economy in its conduct? Should it be possible for ten out of every fifteen thousand men, raised at an expense of four or five hundred dollars apiece, to escape their term of service due the Government? Why, at every little scare, are we raising hundred-day men and telling them, as a strong inducement to serve, that they will be exempt from any drafts during that period? A man cannot become a soldier in a hundred days; he can't learn in that time how to take care of his health and rations. The shorter the term of service the greater will be the proportion of deaths. No man in this war can look ahead for one hundred days and calculate on any great and decided success within that time. The chances are that at the end of that term, the occasion for men will be as great as at the beginning.

These calls for men for short terms are farces which have been repeated too often. They are made as concessions to a people who would as cheerfully stand a practical order for men. In the case of these bounty-jumpers, substitutes, and all other unreliable men, there should be an order obliging them to deposit their bounties in some bank, payable only by small instalments, or at the end of their term of service. A man furnishing a substitute should be held responsible for him during the whole three years. I am willing and have made up my mind to serve through this war, no matter how long it lasts, with pay or without pay; and I do want to see a little more practical earnestness in the conduct of affairs, and not so much shirking of responsibility.

SOURCE: Charles Fessenden Morse, Letters Written During the Civil War, 1861-1865, p. 178-80