Showing posts with label Frederick Steele. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Frederick Steele. Show all posts

Thursday, June 2, 2022

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 231. — Report of General G. T. Beauregard, C. S. Army, commanding Military Division of the West.

No. 231.

Report of General G. T. Beauregard, C. S. Army, commanding Military Division of the West.

HEADQUARTERS, &c.,        
Greensborough, N. C., April 15, 1865.

GENERAL: I have read in the Richmond Enquirer of the 25th ultimo the report of General J. B. Hood touching the operations of the Army of Tennessee from July 18, 1864, to January 23, 1865. During a portion of the period embraced in that report, General Hood having been under my command, his report should have passed through me for my consideration and remarks before it reached the War Department. The regular channel of communication should have been observed, as my own acts and conduct as his commanding officer are referred to by him. I am the more surprised at this irregularity, as I informed General Hood, at Tupelo, a few days previous to his being relieved that I desired and expected his report to be addressed to and pass through me to the Department. At that time he expressed his intention of making through me a report covering the operations of the Army of Tennessee from the date of his assumption of command, to which I objected, as I only had a right to call for one embracing his operations from the time I took command. There are several errors and inaccuracies in the report which I cannot leave unnoticed, while reserving for some more suitable occasion a more extended report of operations in the Military Division of the West while under my command.

Unexpectedly to me His Excellency the President, on October 2, 1864, called me to the command of the departments then under General J. B. Hood and Lieut. Gen. R. Taylor, respectively, embracing together the States of Mississippi, Alabama, East Louisiana, Tennessee, and Georgia, with my headquarters to be established at the most convenient point for purposes of communication, but with the understanding that my personal presence would be given wheresoever in my judgment the interest of my command rendered it necessary, and that when present with an army in the field I should exercise the immediate command.

On the 1st of November, the President, repeating his instructions that I should exercise immediate command when present with the troops, added: That in order to retain freedom of motion it was expected I would not relieve the commander of the particular army, but by retaining the existing organization be enabled to leave it when expedient at any moment without impairing its administration and efficiency.

In pursuance of orders I repaired to the headquarters of General Hood, at Cave Spring, Ga., on or about the 9th of October, and there conferred with him in regard to his future movements. General Hood is, therefore, in error in saying that I joined the army at Gadsden, Ala. Being at the time unprovided with my staff and horses, and desirous also to confer with Lieutenant-General Taylor, I hastened thence to Jacksonville, Ala., which had then become the new base of operations, intending to return in the event a battle should become probable.

On the 19th of October, supposing that General Hood was near Alpine or Summerville, Ga., I proceeded to rejoin the Army of Tennessee. In the meantime, however, he had commenced his movement toward Middle Tennessee without advising me, and had marched as far as Gadsden—

a fact which I ascertained at Round Mountain Iron-Works (in advance of Center)—when, retracing my steps, I joined him on the 21st of October.

In an interview with General Hood he informed me that he was then en route to Middle Tennessee, via Gunter's Landing, on the Tennessee River. At Gadsden I had conferences during two days with him in relation to the future operations of the army, in the course of which he stated that his general plan had been submitted to and approved by General Bragg, then commanding the Armies of the Confederate States. In view of existing condition of affairs the movement then in progress met my approval also, for reasons, some of which are as follows:

First. General Hood alleged that Sherman was short of provisions and forage at Atlanta, while his wheel transportation was in wretched condition.

Second. That the destruction of the railroad near Marietta and Dalton by our forces had been so thorough it would require at least five or six weeks to repair it, during which the Army of Tennessee could be thrown into Middle Tennessee, via Gunter's Landing, distance about forty miles from Gadsden, and destroy the railroad bridges at Bridgeport and across the Elk and Duck Rivers before Sherman could finish the repairs of the road below Chattanooga, thus forcing him to return to Tennessee to protect his communications and obtain supplies.

To add to the chances of success I remained two days at Gadsden after the departure of the army, to issue the necessary orders to secure railroad communications in Mississippi and Middle Alabama for the transportation of supplies, and to direct Major-General Forrest, who was then operating in West Tennessee, to report to General Hood with his command.

While en route to Gunter's Landing I learned, casually and to my surprise, that the line of march of our forces had been changed to one in the direction of Decatur, at which point I overtook it, and where the enemy was found strongly intrenched. As it was impossible to effect a crossing without great and unnecessary sacrifice of life, it was now judged proper by General Hood to attempt a passage, first, at Lamb's Ferry, that failing, then at Bainbridge, or, finally, at Tuscumbia, which had become our base of supplies. He determined, however, soon after leaving Decatur, to undertake the passage of the river at the latter point, which he reached on the 30th of October. There and at Florence, on the opposite or north bank of the Tennessee, he remained until the 21st of November.

The effective strength of the force at this date was as follows: Three corps—infantry, 25,085; artillery, 2,200; total, 27,285.

No report has been received of the strength of the cavalry. Jackson's division consisted of three brigades, estimated at 2,000 men; General Forrest's command estimated at 3,500 men, and General Roddey's at 2,000; making an aggregate of 34,785.

General Roddey with his command was to cover the line of communication from Tuscumbia to Corinth, and thence toward Meridian.

When it became apparent that Sherman (still at Atlanta) was dividing his army by assembling two corps, the Fourth and Twenty-third, (about 20,000 infantry and artillery), at Pulaski, Huntsville, and Decatur, it was determined by General Hood, after a discussion between us, that our army should move promptly into Tennessee and strike the enemy before a junction could be effected with the forces of A. J. Smith (about 8,000 effectives), known to be moving from Missouri, and of Steele (about the same strength), from Arkansas. To this end our forces were to be thrown forward as speedily as possible from Florence to Lawrenceburg, and thence either to Pulaski or Columbia, as circumstances might indicate; and I repeated my orders to General Forrest to form a junction with the Army of Tennessee in the direction of Lawrenceburg or Waynesborough, making first, however, a demonstration toward Columbia to distract and harass the enemy. The movement of the Army of Tennessee did not commence, however, on the 9th of November, as arranged, and I addressed General Hood, on the 15th of that month, a communication, from which the following are extracts:

My purpose was to call again your attention, as I did yesterday, first, to the necessity of guarding well your right flank and rear in advancing toward Lawrenceburg and Pulaski against a sudden movement of the enemy from Huntsville or Athens across the Elk River; second, to the necessity of securing from the passage of the enemy's gun-boats another point above Savannah or Clifton, besides Florence, for the army to recross the Tennessee in case of disaster; third, to the necessity of giving still greater protection to Corinth and the Mobile and Ohio Railroad to that point. * * *


I was aware that those points had already been discussed between us, but my anxiety for the safety of the troops under your command made it incumbent upon me to call again your attention to those important matters. * * *


General Taylor and myself will always be anxious to aid you in your present campaign with all the means at our control; but these being limited, ample previous notice for what may be required should be given, to enable us to make all necessary preparations. * * *


G. T. BEAUREGARD,          

General.

Lieutenant-General Taylor was then directed to repair to Georgia to assume command of all forces there, with instructions to call on the Governors of Georgia and South Carolina for the militia of their respective States; and General Hood, in view of the fact that General Sherman had divided his army, was directed to hasten his movement and strike the enemy a vigorous blow before he could unite with his re-enforcements. He was likewise ordered to send to Major-General Wheeler, who was closely watching General Sherman, the cavalry division of Brigadier-General Jackson. In consequence, however, of the urgent solicitation of General Hood, who represented his deficiency in cavalry, the order for Jackson's division was countermanded so far as to direct only one brigade to be detached.

On the 17th of November the following order was given General Hood:

General Beauregard directs me to say he desires that you will fake the offensive at the earliest practicable moment and deal the enemy rapid and vigorous blows, striking him while thus dispersed, and by this means distract Sherman's advance into Georgia. To relieve you from any embarrassment while operating in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, he authorizes you to issue all such orders in General Taylor's department you may deem necessary to secure the efficient and successful administration and operations of your army, sending to Lieutenant-General Taylor, or whosoever may be in command, copies of all such orders. He wishes you to send forthwith to Major-General Wheeler one brigade of cavalry of Jackson's division, and the balance of that division, as soon as it can be spared, should Sherman advance into Georgia, and also to advise General Wheeler that in such a case Clanton's brigade is subject to his orders. * * *


GEO. WM. BRENT,              

 Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General.

General Hood in his report states:

General Beauregard left it optional with me either to divide the army, sending a part after Sherman and to push on with the remainder, or to move at once against Thomas with the entire force. The army I thought too small to divide. I so informed him, when he directed me by telegraph to push forward at once.

General Hood's request to retain all the cavalry having then been repeated, I adhered to the order for the one brigade and telegraphed him accordingly, leaving him with his three corps and artillery intact, as well as a large cavalry force. He was confronted in Middle Tennessee by General Thomas with only two corps (about 20,000 infantry and artillery) and about 6,000 cavalry, General Sherman being in Georgia with four corps (about 40,000 infantry and artillery) and about 4,000 cavalry, at a long distance from us, with muddy roads, burned bridges, and broad devastated districts between the two armies. It was, therefore, our clear policy to strike Thomas with the utmost celerity before he could be re-enforced, rather than to retrace our march and pursue Sherman. But the offensive in Middle Tennessee could only be successful if undertaken at once and executed with energy, without any division or material diminution of our forces. I certainly contemplated in that event no such division, for I could not regard it as compatible with the plan of the campaign, though under existing circumstances a division and active employment of forces would doubtless have been preferable to inaction.

On the 6th day of December, in answer to a telegram from the President, I addressed him, from Augusta, a communication, stating that all had been done practicable under existing conditions, with the limited means at command, to oppose the advance of Sherman toward the Atlantic coast, and that I had deemed it inexpedient to countermand the campaign of General Hood into Tennessee to attempt the pursuit of Sherman, for the following reasons, namely:

First. The roads and creeks from the Tennessee to the Coosa River across Sand and Lookout Mountains had been rendered impassable by the prevailing rains.

Second. Sherman, with an army better appointed and of superior numbers, had the start of about 275 miles on comparatively good roads.

Third. To pursue Sherman, the march of the Army of Tennessee would necessarily have been over roads with all the bridges destroyed, and through a desolated country, affording neither subsistence nor forage, while a retrograde movement of the army must have seriously depleted its ranks by desertions.

Fourth. Moreover, to have recalled the army to follow Sherman, would have opened to Thomas the richest portions of Alabama. Montgomery, Mobile, and Selma would have easily fallen, without insuring the defeat of Sherman.

Fifth. From the assurances of Governor Brown and Major-General Cobb, it was a reasonable supposition that about 17,000 men would be furnished in a great emergency by the State of Georgia, which force, added to thirteen brigades of cavalry, under Major-General Wheeler, and some 5,000 men, who, it was thought, might be drawn from the States of North and South Carolina, would have given us about 29,000 men to throw across Sherman's path. Although the delays and changes of line of march were not satisfactory to me, nevertheless, I had not felt it to be necessary to assume, as authorized to do, the immediate command of the Army of Tennessee, because I had found it in good spirits, resulting in part from its recent successful blows at the enemy's railroad communications from Dalton to Atlanta; all appeared confident of a successful issue to the impending campaign, and the commanders immediately subordinate to General Hood seemed to regard him as capable to lead them. Moreover, I knew that he possessed in a high degree the confidence of the Government as likewise of General Bragg, at the time commander of the Armies of the Confederate States. Nevertheless, I thought it proper, so long as my presence elsewhere was not exigent, that I should accompany the troops; but as soon as Sherman's purposes were fully developed in Georgia I deemed myself called on to repair at once to that theatre of operations, to do what I might to baffle them, assured that I left General Hood quite strong enough for the proposed campaign. On reaching there the forces I had been led to expect were not available. The cavalry of Major-General Wheeler and a small force of Georgia militia, under Major-General Smith, with the detailed men from our workshops, and State reserves, were all that could be organized and brought into the field against the overwhelming numbers of the thoroughly organized, disciplined, and equipped veterans of the enemy.

In January, 1865, General Hood furnished me with a copy of a letter from him to the War Office giving a general summary of his campaign from the 29th of September, 1864, to the 7th of January, 1865; but although repeatedly called for, no official detailed report either from General Hood or his subordinate officers has passed through me, as required by the regulations of the service.

And now, in conclusion, I deem it in place to give expression to my conviction that the campaign, instead of the unhappy day at Franklin and the disastrous culmination at Nashville, would have led to the signal defeat of Thomas, and such troops as might have been hurriedly brought up to his assistance, had the original plan been executed without undue delay and modifications and with vigor and skill; Sherman most probably would have been compelled to return to Middle Tennessee to repair and protect his line of communications before he could have collected sufficient supplies for the march from Atlanta to the sea-coast, or, in the event that he had been able to reach the coast of Georgia, he must have been forced to abandon it and hasten to the rescue of Kentucky, or perchance, the defense of Ohio, and thus have been prevented from attempting any operations looking to a junction on his part with Grant in Virginia, or any substantial diversion in favor of that commander; meantime, too, we would have been enabled to glean and send supplies from Middle and East Tennessee to Virginia, and re-establish our railway communications between our capital and those well-stored sections of the country. But instead of crossing the Tennessee River at Gunter's Landing, as General Hood intended at Gadsden, he suddenly changed his line of march, as mentioned hereinbefore, and repaired to Tuscumbia and Florence, where the want of supplies, due to the bad condition of the Mobile and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston Railroads and prevailing rains, delayed his advance for nearly three weeks, whereby Sherman was given time to repair the damage done to the Chattanooga and Atlanta Railroad and to collect sufficient supplies for his march across Georgia. It is clear, also, to my mind that after the great loss and waste of life at Franklin, the army was in no condition to make a successful attack on Nashville—a strongly fortified city, defended by an army nearly as strong as our own, and which was being re-enforced constantly by river and railroads. From Franklin, General Hood should have marched, not on Nashville, but on Murfreesborough, which could doubtless have been captured, with its garrison of about 8,000 men; and after having destroyed the railroad bridges across Duck and Elk Rivers, which surely would have caused the evacuation of Bridgeport and Chattanooga, he might have returned, with the prestige of success, into winter quarters behind the Duck or Tennessee Rivers, as circumstances might have dictated, detaching then a force for the protection of South Carolina.

Untoward and calamitous as were the issues of this campaign, never in the course of this war have the best qualities of our soldiery been more conspicuously shown; never more enthusiasm evinced than when our troops once more crossed the Tennessee River; never greater gallantry than that which was so general at Franklin; and never higher fortitude and uncomplaining devotion to duty than were displayed on the retreat from Nashville to Tupelo.

The heroic dead of that campaign will ever be recollected with honor by their countrymen, and the survivors have the proud consolation that no share of the disaster can be laid to them, who have so worthily served their country, and have stood by their colors even to the last dark hours of the republic.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. BEAUREGARD,        
General.
General SAM. COOPER,
        Adjutant and Inspector-General, C. S. Army.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 646-51

Thursday, February 24, 2022

Major-General Ulysses S. Grant to Major-General William T. Sherman, July 3, 1863

NEAR VICKSBURG, July 3, 1863.
Major-General SHERMAN:

Pemberton wants conditions to march out paroled, &c. The conditions wanted are such as I cannot give; I am to submit my propositions at 10 o'clock to-night. I have directed Steele and Ord to be in readiness to move, as you suggested, the moment Vicksburg is surrendered. I want Johnston broken up as effectually as possible, and roads destroyed. I cannot say where you will find the most effective place to strike; I would say move so as to strike Canton and Jackson, whichever might seem most desirable.

U.S. GRANT.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 24, Part 3 (Serial No. 38), p. 460

Wednesday, February 23, 2022

Major-General William T. Sherman to Major-General Ulysses S. Grant, July 4, 1863

CAMP ON BEAR CREEK,
July 4, 1863.
Major-General GRANT:

MY DEAR GENERAL: The telegraph has just announced to me that Vicksburg is ours; its garrison will march out, stack arms, and return within their lines as prisoners of war, and that you will occupy the city only with such troops as you have designated in orders. I can hardly contain myself. Surely will I not punish any soldier for being "unco happy" this most glorious anniversary of the birth of a nation, whose sire and father was a Washington. Did I not know the honesty, modesty, and purity of your nature, I would be tempted to follow the examples of my standard enemies of the press in indulging in wanton flattery; but as a man and soldier, and ardent friend of yours, I warn you against the incense of flattery that will fill our land from one extreme to the other. Be natural and yourself, and this glittering flattery will be as the passing breeze of the sea on a warm summer day. To me the delicacy with which you have treated a brave but deluded enemy is more eloquent than the most gorgeous oratory of an Everett.

This is a day of jubilee, a day of rejoicing to the faithful, and I would like to hear the shout of my old and patient troops; but I must be a Gradgrind—I must have facts, knocks, and must go on. Already are my orders out to give one big huzza and sling the knapsack for new fields. Tuttle will march at once to Messinger's, Parke to Birdsong, and I will shift my headquarters to Fox's. McArthur will clear the road of obstructions made against the coming of the unseen Johnston, and as soon as Ord and Steele's columns are out, I will push ahead. I want maps, but of course the first thing is to clear the Big Black River and get up on the high ground beyond, when we move according to developments. I did want rest, but I ask nothing until the Mississippi River is ours, and Sunday and 4th of July are nothing to Americans till the river of our greatness is free as God made it. Though in the background, as I ever wish to be in civil war, I feel that I have labored some to secure this glorious result.

I am, with respect, your friend,
W. T. SHERMAN.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 24, Part 3 (Serial No. 38), p. 472

Monday, February 21, 2022

Major-General William T. Sherman to Major-General Ulysses S. Grant, July 17, 1863—6 a.m.

HEADQUARTERS,        
Army before Jackson, July 17, 1863—6 a.m.

General Johnston, evacuated Jackson last night. I will occupy it with one division of Steele, and hasten the enemy on his way east, but, in the mean time, the weather is too hot for a vigorous pursuit. Railroad north and south is being absolutely annihilated.

W. T. SHERMAN,        
Major-General.
Maj. Gen. U.S. GRANT,
        Commanding Department of the Tennessee, Vicksburg, Miss.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 24, Part 2 (Serial No. 37), p. 528

Wednesday, December 29, 2021

Major-General William T. Sherman: General Orders, No. 44, June 9, 1863

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 44.}
HDQRS. FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,        
Walnut Hills, Miss., June 9, 1863.

To prevent communication between the enemy, now closely invested in Vicksburg, and their friends and adherents without, the following rules must be observed on the north front:

A continuous chain of sentinels must extend from the Mississippi River to the main Jackson road, along our front trenches. These sentinels will act as sharpshooters or pickets, and must be posted daily, and be instructed that no human being must pass into or out of Vicksburg, unless on strictly military duty, or as prisoners.

These sentinels must connect, one with another, the whole line; but division commanders may prescribe the posts, so that the length of line for each sentinel will depend on its nature.

All the ground, no matter how seemingly impracticable, must be watched.

The reserves and reliefs will be by brigades or divisions, according to the nature of the ground; but the post of his reserve must be known to each sentinel, and be within call.

I. General Steele will be held responsible for the front, from the Mississippi to the valley now occupied by General Thayer, to be known as "Abbott's Valley."

II. General Tuttle, from Abbott's Valley to the Graveyard road, at the point near the head of our "sap," to be known as "Washington Knoll?

III. General Blair, from Washington Knoll to where he connects with General McPherson's troops, at or near the point now occupied by General Ransom's advanced rifle-pits, to be known as "Ransom's Hill."

IV. The battalion of regulars, commanded by Captain Smith, will keep guards along all the roads leading to the front, and will arrest all soldiers absent from their regiments without proper authority, and turn back all officers not provided with written orders or passes from the commanders of their brigades or divisions.

Soldiers or citizens (not regular sutlers within the proper limits of their regiments) found peddling will be put under guard, and set to work on roads or trenches, and their wares turned into the hospital or distributed among the soldiers on duty.

Horses, mules, or any species of property found in possession of stragglers or absentees from duty, will be turned in to the corps quartermaster, a memorandum receipt taken, and sent to the corps inspector-general.

V. Colonel Eldridge, One hundred and twenty-seventh Illinois, will guard the Yazoo City road, at Chickasaw Creek, and also the bridges across the bayou, and will enforce at those points the same general orders as above prescribed.

VI. Colonel Judy, of the One hundred and fourteenth Illinois, will guard the road at the picket station near Templeton's, with vedettes on the by-roads leading therefrom north and east, and enforce similar general orders.

VII. In every regiment, troop, or company there must be at least three roll-calls daily—at reveille, retreat, and tattoo, and any commander who cannot account for every man in his command, at all times, will be liable for neglect of duty. He cannot shift his responsibility to an orderly sergeant.

The inspector-general of the corps may, and will, frequently visit camps, call for the rolls, and see that captains and colonels can account for every man.

VIII. Surgeons in charge of corps and division hospitals will notify regimental commanders of the admission and discharge of men at their hospitals, and furnish lists of men so admitted or discharged to the proper military commander.

Corps and division inspector-generals may, and will, frequently visit such hospitals, and satisfy themselves that no officers or soldiers are in hospital, except such as are admitted for treatment or regularly detailed as nurses.

IX. All commanders of divisions, brigades, regiments, and detached companies will be held responsible that their camps are not encumbered with surplus wagons, tents, horses, mules, tools, sutlers' trash, or anything that will prevent their raising camp at a moment's notice and taking up the march against an enemy to our front, flank, or rear.

X. The magnificent task assigned to this army should inspire every officer and soldier to sacrifice everything of comfort, ease, or pleasure to the one sole object, "success," now apparently within our grasp. A little more hard work, great vigilance, and a short struggle, and Vicksburg is ours.

By order of Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman:
R. M. SAWYER,        
Assistant Adjutant-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 24, Part 3 (Serial No. 38), p. 394-5

Tuesday, December 7, 2021

Major-General William T. Sherman to Lieutenant Colonel John A. Rawlins, June 17, 1863

HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,        
Camp on Walnut Hills, June, 17, 1863.
Lieut. Col. JOHN A. RAWLINS,
        Assistant Adjutant-General, Department of the Tennessee:

SIR: On my return last evening from an inspection of the new works at Snyder's Bluff, General Blair, who commands the Second Division of my corps, called my attention to the inclosed publication in the Memphis Evening Bulletin of June 13, instant, entitled “Congratulatory Order of General McClernand,” with a request that I should notice it, lest the statements of fact and inference contained therein might receive credence from an excited public. It certainly gives me no pleasure or satisfaction to notice such a catalogue of nonsense—such an effusion of vain-glory and hypocrisy; nor can I believe General McClernand ever published such an order officially to his corps. I know too well that the brave and intelligent soldiers and officers who compose that corps will not be humbugged by such stuff.

If the order be a genuine production and not a forgery, it is manifestly addressed not to an army, but to a constituency in Illinois, far distant from the scene of the events attempted to be described, who might innocently be induced to think General McClernand the sagacious leader and bold hero he so complacently paints himself; but it is barely possible the order is a genuine one, and was actually read to the regiments of the Thirteenth Army Corps, in which case a copy must have been sent to your office for the information of the commanding general.

I beg to call his attention to the requirements of General Orders, No. 151, of 1862, which actually forbids the publication of all official letters and reports, and requires the name of the writer to be laid before the President of the United States for dismissal. The document under question is not technically a letter or report, and though styled an order, is not an order. It orders nothing, but is in the nature of an address to soldiers, manifestly designed for publication for ulterior political purposes. It perverts the truth to the ends of flattery and self-glorification, and contains many untruths, among which is one of monstrous falsehood. It substantially accuses General McPherson and myself with disobeying the orders of General Grant in not assaulting on May 19 and 22, and allowing on the latter day the enemy to mass his forces against the Thirteenth Army Corps alone. General McPherson is fully able to answer for himself, and for the Fifteenth Army Corps I answer that on May 19 and 22 it attacked furiously, at three distinct points, the enemy's works, at the very hour and minute fixed in General Grant's written orders; that on both days we planted our colors on the exterior slope and kept them there till nightfall; that from the first hour of investment of Vicksburg until now my corps has at all times been far in advance of General McClernand's; that the general-in-chief, by personal inspection, knows this truth; that tens of thousands of living witnesses beheld and participated in the attack; that General Grant visited me during both assaults and saw for himself, and is far better qualified to judge whether his orders were obeyed than General McClernand, who was nearly 3 miles off; that General McClernand never saw my lines; that he then knew, and still knows, nothing about them, and that from his position he had no means of knowing what occurred on this front. Not only were the assaults made at the time and place and in the manner prescribed in General Grant's written orders, but about 3 p.m., five hours after the assault on the 22d began, when my storming party lay against the exterior slope of the bastion on my front, and Blair's whole division was deployed close up to the parapet, ready to spring to the assault, and all my field artillery were in good position for the work, General Grant showed me a note from General McClernand, that moment handed him by an orderly, to the effect that had carried three of the enemy's forts, and that the flag of the Union waved over the stronghold of Vicksburg, asking that the enemy should be pressed at all points lest he should concentrate on him. Not dreaming that a major-general would at such a critical moment make a mere buncombe communication, I instantly ordered Giles A. Smith's and Mower's brigades to renew the assault under cover of Blair's division and the artillery, deployed as before described, and sent an aide to General Steele, about a mile to my right, to convey the same mischievous message, whereby we lost, needlessly, many of our best officers and men.

I would never have revealed so unwelcome a truth had General MCClernand, in his process of self-flattery, confined himself to facts in the reach of his own observation, and not gone out of the way to charge others for results which he seems not to comprehend. In cases of repulse and failure, congratulatory addresses by subordinate commanders are not common, and are only resorted to by weak and vain men to shift the burden of responsibility from their own to the shoulders of others. I never make a practice of speaking or writing of others, but during our assault of the 19th several of my brigade commanders were under the impression that McClernand's corps did not even attempt an assault.

In the congratulatory order I remark great silence on the subject. Merely to satisfy inquiring parties, I should like to know if McClernand's corps did or did not assault at 2 p.m. of May 19, as ordered. I do not believe it did, and I think General McClernand responsible.

With these remarks I leave the matter where it properly belongs, in the hands of the commanding general, who knows his plans and orders, sees with an eye single to success and his country's honor, and not from the narrow and contracted circle of a subordinate commander, who exaggerates the importance of the events that fall under his immediate notice, and is filled with an itching desire for "fame not earned."

With great respect, your obedient servant,
W. T. SHERMAN,        
Major-General, Commanding.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 24, Part 1 (Serial No. 36), p. 162-3

Sunday, August 23, 2020

Lieutenant-General Ulysses S. Grant to Major-General George G. Meade, April 9, 1864

CULPEPER COURT-HOUSE, VA.,                       
April 9, 1864.
Maj. Gen. G. G. MEADE,
Commanding Army of the Potomac:

For information, and as instructions to govern your preparations for the coming campaign, the following is communicated confidentially, for your own perusal alone:

So far as practicable, all the armies are to move together and toward one common center. Banks has been instructed to turn over the guarding of the Red River to General Steele and to the navy, to abandon Texas with the exception of the Rio Grande, and to concentrate all the force he can—not less than 25,000 men—to move on Mobile. This he is to do without reference to any other movements. From the scattered condition of his command, however, he cannot possibly get it together to leave New Orleans before the 1st of May, if so soon.

Sherman will move at the same time you do, or two or three days in advance, Joe Johnston's army being his objective point and the heart of Georgia his ultimate aim. If successful, he will secure the line from Chattanooga to Mobile, with the aid of Banks.

Sigel cannot spare troops from his army to re-enforce either of the great armies, but he can aid them by moving directly to his front. This he has been directed to do, and is now making preparations for it. Two columns of his command will move south at the same time with the general move, one from Beverly, from 10,000 to 12,000 strong, under Major-General Ord; the other from Charleston, W. Va., principally cavalry, under Brigadier-General Crook. The former of these will endeavor to reach the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad about south of Covington, and if found practicable will work eastward to Lynchburg and return to its base by way of the Shenandoah Valley or join you. The other will strike at Saltville, Va., and come eastward to join Ord. The cavalry from Ord's command will try to force a passage southward; if they are successful in reaching the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, to cut the main lines of the road connecting Richmond with all the South and Southwest.

Gillmore will join Butler with about 10,000 men from South Carolina. Butler can reduce his garrison so as to take 23,000 men into the field directly to his front. The force will be commanded by Maj. Gen. W. F. Smith. With Smith and Gillmore, Butler will seize City Point and operate against Richmond from the south side of the river. His movement will be simultaneous with yours.

Lee's army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also. The only point upon which I am now in doubt is whether it will be better to cross the Rapidan above or below him. Each plan presents great advantages over the other, with corresponding objections. By crossing above, Lee is cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond and going north on a raid: but if we take this route all we do must be done while the rations we start with hold out; we separate from Butler, so that he cannot be directed how to co-operate. By the other route, Brandy Station can be used as a base of supplies until another is secured on the York or James River. These advantages and objections I will talk over with you more fully than I can write them.

Burnside, with a force of probably 25,000 men, will re-enforce you. Immediately upon his arrival, which will be shortly after the 20th instant, I will give him the defense of the road from Bull Run as far south as we wish to hold it. This will enable you to collect all your strength about Brandy Station and to the front.

There will be naval co-operations on the James River, and transports and ferries will be provided, so that should Lee fall back into his intrenchments at Richmond Butler's force and yours will be a unit, or at least can be made to act as such.

What I would direct, then, is that you commence at once reducing baggage to the very lowest possible standard. Two wagons to a regiment of 500 men is the greatest number that should be allowed for all baggage, exclusive of subsistence stores and ordnance stores. One wagon to brigade and one to division headquarters is sufficient, and about two to corps headquarters.

Should by Lee's right flank be our route, you will want to make arrangements for having supplies of all sorts promptly forwarded to White House, on the Pamunkey. Your estimates for this contingency should be made at once. If not wanted there, there is every probability they will be wanted on the James River or elsewhere.

If Lee's left is turned, large provision will have to be made for ordnance stores. I would say not much short of 500 rounds of infantry ammunition would do. By the other, half the amount would be sufficient.

U. S. GRANT,                       
Lieutenant-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 33 (Serial No. 60), p. 827-9

Sunday, February 11, 2018

Edwin M. Stanton to Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant, December 7, 1864 – 10:20 a.m.

WAR DEPARTMENT,         
Washington, December 7, 1864 10.20 a.m.
Lieutenant-General GRANT:

You remember that when Steele was relieved by Canby he was ordered to Cairo to report to this Department. What shall be done with him? The order superseding Rosecrans by Dodge has been issued. Thomas seems unwilling to attack because it is hazardous, as if all war was anything but hazardous. If he waits for Wilson to get ready, Gabriel will be blowing his last horn.

EDWIN M. STANTON.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 2 (Serial No. 94), p. 84

Saturday, April 1, 2017

Diary of 1st Lieutenant John S. Morgan: Saturday, June 24, 1865

To Bagdad a. m. for provision for mess, most of streets foot deep in water, return 11. A. M. attend Off’s call. Col sends communication from Capt Lacy, that the 33d would go home, orders would be issued immediately & to prepare the enc papers for muster out, go to Bagdad P. M. with nearly all the offs of Regt return at dark, parade this eve & two offs in the line. Genls Sheridan Steele Weitzel & Granger, pass up river for Brownville per steamer Heroine, (of Mobile), We await Genl Steeles return for transportation. The British ship Wolvernie fired a national salute at daybreak this morning in honor of the aniversity of the Queens Coronation, 2 Brigades of Nigs moved up to White Ranch last night

SOURCE: “Diary of John S. Morgan, Company G, 33rd Iowa Infantry,” Annals of Iowa, 3rd Series, Vol. 13, No. 8, April 1923, p. 606

Wednesday, March 22, 2017

Diary of 1st Lieutenant John S. Morgan: Monday, May 29, 1865

Guard of 60 men around every Regt camp men firing mines, a change in program. thought we will go to City La The Engineer Corps plays out. & an order from War Dept is Recd to muster out Regt in the Field. Genl Steel assigned to an important comd in Texas 6000 men from this Div to go with him. This evening not so much faith in us going out soon.

SOURCE: “Diary of John S. Morgan, Company G, 33rd Iowa Infantry,” Annals of Iowa, 3rd Series, Vol. 13, No. 8, April 1923, p. 604

Sunday, March 12, 2017

Diary of 1st Lieutenant John S. Morgan: Friday, May 12, 1865

Quite cold during the night, find myself almost too lame to walk when I get up foot swelled badly The co is paid at 10.30 A. M. after which have a time settling up old scores I pay out over $50.00 debts, Capt Lacy in camp, says their expedition to Montgomery was a pleasure trip. The Rebel commandant at Montgomery reed a telegram from Genl Dick Taylor announcing an armistice & ordering him to make no hostile demonstrations, when Steeles men took possession of the town the Rebel command marched out with all their arms &c & colors flying, & while Steele remained there citizens & soldiers of both armies went where ever they pleased without passes mixing around most amacably. The citizens invited the Fed officers out to dinners and were as friendly as could be, also that Jeff Davis & his crew passed within 50 miles of Steeles camp & he had plenty of cavalry to have over taken & captured him but could not on account of the armistice he heard from his where abouts daily. Genl Canby has gone to New Orleans & has left orders not to move here until his return, — So says madam R— One Div of Jonstons army 5000 men arrive at Mobile on the morning train from Meridian. Smiths corps is reported arriving & there seems to be a change in affairs, men now go to & return from the city on a pass approved by the Brig. Comd't, & citizens pass the picket line without passes from 9. A. M. to 6 P. M. The 29th Iowa is relieved at the arsenal at Mt. Vernon by one company & have come down to the comd. Stock in Sherman is taking a rise

SOURCE: “Diary of John S. Morgan, Company G, 33rd Iowa Infantry,” Annals of Iowa, 3rd Series, Vol. 13, No. 8, April 1923, p. 600-1

Saturday, March 11, 2017

Diary of 1st Lieutenant John S. Morgan: Thursday, May 11, 1865

Sprinkled a little during the night cloudy & promising ruin this morning. Spend the forenoon making out some Returns. Afternoon spend writing, sprinkled a very little A. M. Pay Master Maj Gifford commences paying the regt at 10.45 pay all the companies except “K” “G” & “B,” which have to lay over until tomorrow. Lt Cory come over this evening when he & I went to the pay master & drew our pay. I was paid in full up to time of discharge Feb 20th 1865, & ree'd $253.30. Genl Steel has arrived with his command & Genl Smith is coming with the 10th Corps. Men visiting the city today had to have passes approved by the Pro Marshal of the Div which had to be approved by the Pro Marshal in the city before they could return on them, evening cool, about 300 of Genl Taylors men come in from Meridian today & the town is alive with grey backs.

SOURCE: “Diary of John S. Morgan, Company G, 33rd Iowa Infantry,” Annals of Iowa, 3rd Series, Vol. 13, No. 8, April 1923, p. 600

Tuesday, February 21, 2017

Diary of 1st Lieutenant John S. Morgan: Sunday, April 23, 1865

Inspection at 9. A. M. Lt Hook comes to the Regt with the sad intiligence of the Assassination of President Lincoln & Sec Seward which is published in the Mobile paper. The news quickly spreads & groups of men can be seen all arond talking in low tones with a look of sadness never worn by them before, at 10, a. m the Div Brass Band plays the “dead march” & is followed by the bands of Regts in order. It is truly a solemn day & the boys one & all vow to take vengance in Southern blood, many who favored peace this morning now favor utter extermination; about noon we are greeted with the arrival of Luit Sharman looking like altogether a different man from the Luit Sharman we left at Little Rock the 14 of Feb he brings an extra which states that it is thought Seward is not mortally wounded & hopes of his recovery is enertained, he spent the night last night with Capt Lacy & reports that Genl Steeles Corps proceeded up the Alabama river this morning, embarked on 15 transports escorted by a fleet of gun boats, says a very fine Gulf steamer was blown up in the channel in the Bay by a torpedo of which there remain some yet. Luit Seevers is detailed to proceed to New Orleans to bring up our Books & Records. Weather cool.

SOURCE: “Diary of John S. Morgan, Company G, 33rd Iowa Infantry,” Annals of Iowa, 3rd Series, Vol. 13, No. 8, April 1923, p. 594-5

Saturday, February 11, 2017

Diary of 2nd Lieutenant John S. Morgan: Friday, April 14, 1865

Spend a pleasant day, have a skiff ride, boys fishing a great deal, plenty of eels in the creek, the train gone in with 3 wounded of the 91st Ill. our whole loss of yesterday, the Rebs lost by accounts of negros who have come in since 10 killed besides the wounded, boys go out to the houses close by & get milk butter & eggs. forage good fat beef & plenty of meal at an old Reb commissary. at 5. P. M. cos B. & G. are relieved & ordered to report to the Regt. 4 miles distant, get our supper over & start at 5.30 making mile heats, it would have been all right had we not tried to take a Short cut across to save a few steps. got lost & marched about in the brush & sloughs for a mile before we found the regt. by which time it was 9 o clock, found Capt with a tent up. Many flying rumors in camp. — that Grant captured 37000 of Lees army then Lee surrendered 40,000 more, — That Thomas has captured Forest & his men. & Thomas men skalped Forest (?) — that Steele captured a train & 5 locomotives which attempted to run out last night. Capt Gibson (Ex Major 33 Iowa) in C. S. Post of Mobile,

SOURCE: “Diary of John S. Morgan, Company G, 33rd Iowa Infantry,” Annals of Iowa, 3rd Series, Vol. 13, No. 8, April 1923, p. 591

Tuesday, February 7, 2017

Diary of 2nd Lieutenant John S. Morgan: Tuesday, April 11, 1865

No marching orders yet this morning & as our teams had all been called for during the night & sent back to the landing for supplies did not think we would move today. took out the co Books & spent all the forenoon posting the books & making out returns. Some of the men who go to the forts today say the white flag is waving over Mobile. Mr Sperry says he saw it & as near as he could discover from this distance it was a white flag, but the firing in the Bay still continues At 1. P. M. rumors in camp are that Genl Lee has proposed to Genl Grant to surrender the whole so called Southern confederacy with but one condition which is a free pardon to all. Also rumor says Genl Canby has recd orders to make no forward movement until further orders, but the firing in the Bay still continues. A brigade of Steeles men move out at 2. P. M. going I dont know where or how far. The 1st Brig 3d Div 13th A. C. move to Spanish fort. Hear this evening that the Gunboats have advanced to mouth of Spanish river just opposite Spanish fort & are engaging the batteries in the Bay. All the teams are employed today hauling supplies from the landing, a report was arond that Thomas was in Mobile but contradicted as the best glasses show nothing waving above Mobile but the confed flag. Just before dusk without a moments warning the Genl call was blown. Could hear the call all over the corps, & before 15 minutes the 13th A. C. was in the road ready to move not having heard where we were to go I made inquiry & learned it was to Starks Landing below Spanish fort & by the new road across the pontoons 11 miles. At 7. P. M. the column moved & it soon became evident we were on a forced march, when we cross the pontoons at 9. P. M. could see a fire in Mobile which lighted the whole sky. Our Brigade took the wrong road & detained us besides giving us a march of 2 miles extra. men give out almost by companies, we were marched to the landing & there stocked arms at 2. o clock, there were not more than 15 men in my co when we halted remained here about an hour, during which time some of the boys come up. we were moved down on the beech to await transportation, could see the fire yet at Mobile. Regts going on board transports all the while, not certain yet where we are to land.

SOURCE: “Diary of John S. Morgan, Company G, 33rd Iowa Infantry,” Annals of Iowa, 3rd Series, Vol. 13, No. 8, April 1923, p. 588-9

Monday, February 6, 2017

Diary of 2nd Lieutenant John S. Morgan: Monday, April 10, 1865

All the Regts rec orders to be supplied with 5 days rations in their haver sacks. Capt Lacy was in our camp looking well & hearty. Mail is to go out at 10. a. m. until which time spend the time in writing. After dinner Templeton & I go out to see the fortifications, see many pools of blood. Can see Mobile from the forts & see some rebel batteries out in the Bay firing at our gunboats & shelling a pontoon bridge we have across Spanish river See a squad of rebs under guard taking up the torpedos which are thickly strewn, the roads are full, they uncover them & build a fire on them to explode them. the pieces fly about with a wicked noise. Saw one place where in the charge 4 men were Killed by the explosion of one torpdo. The Jonnies had extensive works laid off here which would have taken a year to complete but the works completed are ugly to get to over fallen timber & brush thick abbattis & dead loads of torpedos. About 150 of the men who had been at Spanish fort were captured this morning they not knowing this place had been taken were making their way up here. I was to see them & pronounce them the best looking confeds I ever saw, when the forts here were charged yesterday there were two Genls there, but one was taken & it is supposed the other escaped with some of his men who swam the river, but this evening he was captured. he had secreted himself in an commissary boat & undertook to get out & run for it but there were too many guards with muskets close by to allow that. It is rumored here this evening that about two hundred prisoners were taken, found in their holes close by Spanish fort think this not reliable. A supply train started to Thomas early this morning, saw a small detachment of cavalry from his army who say they saw no rebels between him & no report his men wanting grub. Genl Steeles command is ordered to be ready for a forward movement where to not known, the way to Mobile by land is 130 miles & there is a camp rumor that Steeles corps & Smiths corps are to go to the rear of Mobile & Grangers corps to Thomas Who will opperate somewhere above, heavy firing has been kept up all day in the bay but do not learn with what effect

SOURCE: “Diary of John S. Morgan, Company G, 33rd Iowa Infantry,” Annals of Iowa, 3rd Series, Vol. 13, No. 8, April 1923, p. 588

Friday, January 27, 2017

Diary of 2nd Lieutenant John S. Morgan: Saturday, April 8, 1865

There was tremenduous heavy firing last night from 11 to 1. the sky was lighted with the flash of small arms, could not determine whether it was on the right of Smith or left of Steele, some heavy guns used. After breakfast heavy Guns & rapid firing off to our right. I go out on the left to the bay & take a look at Mobile. The Jonnies throw shells uncomfortably near me out there, returning to camp spent most of this day writing. Capt sent me a paper of the 5th full of good news & rumors of peace propositions from Lee. This afternoon news from Steele is that last night Steele charged on a water battery which the gunboats try to shell him out of & not succeeding the Jonnies charge him 3 times without success he is reported to have taken some prisoners, & later in the evening the report is in that he turned the guns of the captured battery on a ram & brought her in At 5 P. M the batteries all round the line opens on the enemy's work for one hour, the enemy replies quite briskly for a little while but cant stand it long. About 5.30 heavy musketry firing Was heard in front of Smiths Corps & by the yelling it was evident one party or the other was making a charge I was detailed for picket & reported at 7. at Regt Hd Quarters where the detail was formed under the immediate command of Lieut San Cheztereso co F. the picket firing on the right keeps us pretty heavy the Rebs throw a shell occasionally & our batteries throw shells about every 10 minutes. we report with the detail in the pits by the camp of 27th Wis. & wait ½ hour for the coming of the officer of the day whose business it is to relieve the pickets with the new detail, when he come he put part of our detail with a co of the 27th Wis as a reserve & working party. I was ordered to remain with this reserve, we divided the squad into 2 reliefs & making arrangements to work each relief 4 hours the capt lay down leaving me in charge of the 1st relief. Presently. Col Patterson & some other staff officers came through & told us to work with a will for all the saps & paralells must be widened to 6 ft. & finished before morning so that a regt could march through them easily for the works must be carried by assault within three days, the army had been waiting for the fleet to get up & word was it had cleared the channel of torpedos to opposite the fort & would move up in the morning, It is said the engineer who planted the torpedo is taking them out for the fleet. The Off. of the day thinking he needed more men sends in for a detail of two companies. Co D of 27th Wis & Co H. of 35 Iowa came out to work, they bring news that the charge on the right was by Smiths men who took one line of the enemys works & captured 200 prisoners. I rec instructions from the off of the day to work my relief 2 hours as the no of men engaged would finish the work if all worked that long. My 2 hours was up at 11, at which time I waked the capt. & lay down on a rubber blanket to sleep but it was too cold. I went to our camp to get a woolen blanket, & had returned & got into a good nap out of which I was awaked by loud & continued shouting on the right. Could not immagine what was up as the firing had entirely ceased on that part of the line. I looked at my watch which indicated 5 mins after 12, I go forward to the front rifle pits where the picket line is there listen to hear what is said but can distinguish nothing but the commands “cease firing you kill our own men. 2d Brig forward march.” then rose cheering again. The word cease firing passed all along the line. The Off of the day was present. (Capt. Gunn 28th Wis) with whom I jumped the pits and advanced somewhat, but not a jonnie could we hear where not 10 minutes before they had been shooting at us, not yet being satisfied with the looks of things no one was allowed to go to the fort until we see Smiths corps in the middle fort cheering Then Lt. Sanchez, take about a doz of his detail & advances. I did not know he had gone until he was half way over, & followed immediately entering nearly the same time. The Lt. was the first Yank, to mount the work. There was some fear of torpedos which had been reported so thickly strewn about these fortifications which made the men move very carefully for a while, it was half past twelve when we entered the fort. I found it not so strong a position as I had immagined it to be but to assault it would have been an ugly business if resolutely defended. Our shell & shot had handled the inside very rough tearing great holes. The grond nearly every foot of it, was torn up by our Mortar shells & how men could live in there during the heavy cannonading it was several times subjected too is more than I can understand, found 9. pieces of artillery in the fort all in position & spiked. 2 of the guns were splendid 64 lbers. There were bomb proofs enough to about hold the gunners required to work the guns but these were not of the strongest kind, out of one come so strong a stench I was willing to pass it others more inquistive report a no of dead men in it. 8 jonnies come in from the picket line, the Rebs had left in such a hurry they had not taken time to relieve them although they lay within 100 yds of the fort, these say they did not know the forts were to be evacuated, after examining the works to my satisfaction the 94th Ill regt having marched in & unfurled the Stars & stripes I go back to camp bearing no relic but a Reb envelope with stamp on it, on my way in meet floods of yanks going out to see the forts. I was disposed tonight to think the torpedo question on land more talk than cider

SOURCE: “Diary of John S. Morgan, Company G, 33rd Iowa Infantry,” Annals of Iowa, 3rd Series, Vol. 13, No. 8, April 1923, p. 585-7

Thursday, January 26, 2017

Diary of 2nd Lieutenant John S. Morgan: Friday, April 7, 1865

Had bad cold & did not rest any too well last night did not get up until called to breakfast. sky has the appearance of rain. I go to the camp of our teams in the rear to draw clothing for the co, send it over by Bowman & go on to the Commissary to get some grub for our mess see a train starting to Steele who is said to have taken Blakely destroying with his artillery every house but one, he can not hold his army in the town on account of the Reb iron clads shelling him out. A sergent from Steeles comd. says the Mobile paper states their loss the 1st day we came in here at 400 killed & wounded, estimates our loss at double that when in fact it was not over 100 begins to rain while I am at the com. 1 stop at camp of teams to talk to Capt & wait for the rain to cease Capt is getting along finely & expects to be for duty within a week, he tells me of one of the 35th Wis who had his leg blown off by the explosion of a torpedo in the road not far from his camp, ceases raining & I retire to camp at 11 o clock, after dinner issue the clothing & then work on our bomb-proofs except about an hour from 1.30 to 2.30 while it was raining, heavy detail for picket from our regt. co I is out tonight for a reserve & a detail of 2 com. off & 69 men in front with orders to advance the line. Each man takes a spade. At, 11 P. M. heavy firing on the Right of Smiths corp small arms used much there are a great many reports flying about camp, of which the following are some, & I cant say they are true or false. Faragut has arrived & taken comd of the fleet. a chain of 78 torpedos was taken up. a mine is nearly completed under the forts.

SOURCE: “Diary of John S. Morgan, Company G, 33rd Iowa Infantry,” Annals of Iowa, 3rd Series, Vol. 13, No. 8, April 1923, p. 585

Sunday, January 22, 2017

Diary of 2nd Lieutenant John S. Morgan: Monday, April 3, 1865

Go to the rear this A. M. to see Capt who I find keeping pretty quiet, go to the Commissary & draw 30 days rations, as money has played out. Tobacco is issued to the men today. Every thing about the same today along the line, Heavy details out building forts to mount heavy guns behind The enemy shell those working parties so that it is not a safe business. 75 more prisoners arrive from Genl Steele, the night of the 1st Genl Smith tired on a tug towing a barge, the tug cut loose & run leaving the barge to float in to land, it was loaded with hospital supplies & there was found on it a letter from the surgeon of the fort to some friends in Mobile which stated that “the enemy's sharpshooters annoy us a great deal” & “have killed many of our men”

SOURCE: “Diary of John S. Morgan, Company G, 33rd Iowa Infantry,” Annals of Iowa, 3rd Series, Vol. 13, No. 8, April 1923, p. 583

Saturday, January 21, 2017

Diary of 2nd Lieutenant John S. Morgan: Sunday, April 2, 1865

Get the co up at 2. A. M. to get their breakfasts. At 3 take them to the paralel & get our position before daylight, bullets & shell keep a continual screeching & whistling over our heads. About dark Co B which was on the skirmish line bring down a man wonded in the head, his name is William Harris, at 8. we are relieved & return to camp, is after 10. before we get supper over & get to bed. not being right well the day has worn heavy on me. One piece of good news is the arrival of 300 prisoners captured by Steele, one Maj Genl was killed I am told that when the prisoners were captured a soldier presented his gun at the Genl saying to him dismount & surrender, the Genl said I will surrender but will dismount for no one but a commissioned officer Mr. soldier thought he was not safe on horseback & as he still refused to dismount shot him killing him instantly.

SOURCE: “Diary of John S. Morgan, Company G, 33rd Iowa Infantry,” Annals of Iowa, 3rd Series, Vol. 13, No. 8, April 1923, p. 583