Diary of Gideon Welles: Wednesday, May 20, 1863

Admiral Lee has been here for two or three days consulting in regard to Wilmington. The blockade of Cape Fear is difficult and gives infinite trouble, but the War Department has manifested no desire to relieve us and prevent that means of Rebel communication. To-day we had a long conference. Lee has seen General Totten, and the conclusion is that the army must capture the place, assisted by the Navy, which will cover the landing. The practice of relying upon the Navy to do the principal fighting when forts or batteries are to be taken has had a bad effect in some respects and is vitiating the army.

Admiral Du Pont sends forward charges against Chief Engineer Stimers, who, on his passage from Charleston to New York after the late demonstration, expressed an opinion that Sumter might have been passed or taken. Du Pont requested Stimers to be sent to Port Royal for trial. Every officer under Du Pont has expressed a different opinion from Stimers and they would constitute the court. It is a strange request, and it would be quite as strange were I to comply with it. I would not trust Stimers, or any one whom Du Pont wished to make a victim, in his power. If not a little deranged, D. is a shrewd and selfish man. I think he is morbidly diseased. Drayton expresses this opinion. His conduct and influence have been unfortunate in many respects on his subordinates. Instead of sending Stimers to Port Royal to be sacrificed, I will order a court of inquiry at New York, where the facts may be elicited without prejudice or partiality. The alleged offense hardly justifies an inquiry in form, but nothing less will satisfy Du Pont, who wants a victim. More than this, he wants to lay his failure at Charleston on the ironclads, and with such a court as he would organize, and such witnesses as he has already trained, he would procure both Stimers and vessels to be condemned. It would be best for the ends of truth and justice to have an inquiry away from all partisanship, and from all unfair influences and management.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 306-7

Captain John G. Foster to Brevet Brigadier-General Joseph G. Totten, April 8, 1861

Fort Sumter, S. C. April 8, 1861.

General Joseph G. Totten,

Chief Engineer U. S. Army, Washington, D. C:

General: The increased activity and vigilance of the investing force, as reported yesterday, still continues. Three large traverses are nearly completed on the front, from battery Nos. 3 to 5, on Morris Island, and traverses are also being erected in the interior of battery No. 5. Additions of sand-bags are being made to the covering of the magazine, between Nos. 2 and 3, and to the left flank of No. 1, where I think they are constructing a service magazine.

I am busily at work constructing splinter-proof shelters on the terreplein. I obtain timber by taking the gun-carriages to pieces, and form the covering of the 2-inch iron pieces for embrasures, as seen below. The plates are spiked on, so as to be securely retained in their places, even if struck by a shell, which I am confident it will turn.

Our supplies are entirely cut off from the city, and those on hand are very limited.

The besieging forces worked all day yesterday, whenever the intervals between the showers of rain would allow.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. G. Foster, Captain Engineers.

P. S. — I received yesterday a letter from the Secretary of War to Major Anderson, which, by mistake, had been enveloped to me. I handed it to Major Anderson without reading.

Respectfully, &c.,

J. G. Foster, Captain Engineers.

SOURCES: Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 385-6

Colonel Joseph G. Totten to Simon Cameron, April 3, 1861

WASHINGTON, April 3, 1861.

To the SECRETARY OF WAR:

Under the strongest convictions on some military questions upon which great political events seem about to turn, I feel impelled to state them, since they are of a nature to derive, possibly, a little weight from my official relation to them, and since, moreover, circumstances might cause my failing to make the statement in time to be considered as a grave delinquency. I refer particularly to the question of defending or abandoning Fort Sumter and Fort Pickens.

Fort Sumter. – In addition to what I have heretofore said as to the impracticability of efficiently re-enforcing and supplying this fort, I will now say only that if the fort was filled with men and munitions it could  hold out but a short time. It would be obliged to surrender with much loss of life, for it would be bravely and obstinately defended, and the greater the crowd within the greater the proportionate loss. This issue can be averted only by sending a large army and navy to capture all the surrounding forts and batteries, and to assemble and apply these there is now no time. If we do not evacuate Fort Sumter it will be wrested from us by force.

Fort Pickens. – Were this fort provided with a garrison of eight hundred or one thousand good soldiers, fully supplied with everything necessary to the best defense, and ably commanded, its utmost term of resistance would be about three weeks – rather less than more. Were the besieging army practiced in the war of sieges, it would hardly be maintained for a fortnight. With a garrison of three hundred to five hundred men only, and in its present destitution of essential means, its siege supplies consisting of guns and ammunition merely, and these scanty and not of the best kind, the siege must be a very short one. But even the making good the deficiencies would, as stated above, only defer the issue for a week or so. In any case a quick surrender would be inevitable.

Regarding the fort independently of co-operation on one side or the other of a naval force, or of other fortifications in the harbor, these conclusions are not to be doubted, without disregarding all military experience. The occupation by the investing forces of the shore opposite, with numerous batteries pouring their showers of shot and shell into the fort, while the regular siege operations upon Santa Rosa Island were going on, would materially abridge the term of resistance. A naval force uniting in the defense, but confined to the waters outside of the harbor, might, to a certain extent, increase the casualties of the besiegers, but would not materially retard the operations. In that case the approaches would be pushed along the inshore face of the island, leaving the breadth of the island, with its sand hills and ridges, between them and the ships; and, moreover, two or three batteries planted on the out-shore face, and sheltered from the fire of the fort by sand hills and traverses, would compel ships to keep an out-of-range offing. Could this naval force act upon the bay side of Santa Rosa Island as well as upon the sea side, the progress of a siege, if practicable at all, might be greatly retarded. Under such circumstances this kind of attack would hardly be undertaken. Were the investing forces numerous and enterprising they might, nevertheless, even then attempt a coup de main; and, provided the garrison were weak in numbers, and worn out by a protracted cannonade and bombardment from the opposite shore, the chances of success would warrant the attempt.

But I consider that the passing of vessels of war into the bay would be a very hazardous proceeding in the face of Fort McRee, Fort Barrancas, its advanced battery, and several other batteries that all accounts agree in stating have been erected and mounted along the shore, from the navy-yard inclusive to and beyond the light-house. It is possible, however, that this channel might be passed at night by swift war steamers without utter destruction, and there might be retained by one or more of them enough efficiency to prevent the hostile occupation of the lower part of Santa Rosa Island, and the prosecution there of siege operations against Fort Pickens. In such event resort would certainly be had to cannonade and bombardment from the batteries on the opposite shore, and these plied with vigor and perseverance would at last reduce the fort to a condition incapable of resisting vigorous assault, since the garrison would be exhausted, and the means of defense on the cannonaded side have little efficiency left to them. The masonry on that part of the fort is exposed to sight, and to battering from top to bottom, and is pierced besides by a gateway and numerous embrasures, greatly weakening it. Every shot fired from the other shore would strike the walls, and every shell fall within them. With a brave and well-supplied garrison there would be an obstinate holding out, no doubt, but a surrender would at last close a scene in which on our side no other military virtues had room for display but fortitude and patience. The response of the fort to shot and shell would be by shot and shell, but with little proportionate chance of injury to the enemy's impassive batteries of sand.

This last mode of attack could be prevented, even with the command of the inner waters only, by landing upon the main shore a military force sufficient to capture all these forts and batteries, including the navy-yard. Admitting the supposition (quite unreasonable as I estimate our available army force) that we can before it is too late disperse the 3,000 or 5,000 men now in hostile array there and regain these possessions, what then? The Confederate States can assemble a large additional military force at Montgomery by railroad, and throw it down also by railroad upon Pensacola. Here there would be the struggle between the two armies – on land, and not between forts and batteries.

The question that next arises is not whether this great nation is able with time to supply ample means in soldiers and munitions for such conflict, but whether, having expended nearly all its ready strength in reconquering the harbor fortifications and navy-yard, it could send timely and adequate re-enforcements. With our present military establishment and existing military laws I do not see how this would be possible before all that had been gained would be lost.

The seceded States, considering themselves as in a state of quasi warfare, see that if there is to be a struggle the very utmost of their military energies and resources will be called for. They see, besides, that to contend with the greater chance of success they must profit by our present state of military weakness, and under the first glow of a great political change they rush ardently into the requisite preparations. Upon the battle-field of Pensacola or its environs they are now stronger than we can become without the help of Congress, and they can and will augment their strength there if necessary beyond anything we can hope to do for yet many months.

The above and much like reasoning convince me that we cannot retain Fort Pickens, provided the other side is really in earnest, and follows up with like promptitude and energy their early military preparations. If we do not vacate this fort the result predicted as to Fort Sumter will certainly be realized here also – it will be taken from us by violence.

Should the above reasoning not meet acceptance, or for political reasons should it be decided to hold and defend this fort to the last; then I have to say that every soldier that can be spared should be sent to its relief with the utmost dispatch, accompanied by military supplies of every kind and in the greatest abundance.

To supply in some sort the want of a naval force within the bay as large a force as can be spared from the immediate protection of the fort should be encamped upon Santa Rosa Island at some distance from the fort, maintaining communication with it and detaching parties to watch the upper part of the island. These will give timely notice of the entrance thereupon of hostile troops, and will prevent the erection of batteries against our ships lying off shore, through which all supplies for the fort must be derived.

While the fort is uninjured many men need not remain within its walls to secure it from surprise or escalade. Of course the detached troops must be kept within reach of quick recall. Such measures may delay somewhat, though neither these nor any others now within our reach will, in my opinion, prevent the loss of Fort Pickens.

I present these thoughts to the consideration of the Secretary of War, and, if he thinks them of sufficient interest, to the perusal of the President, because they force themselves from me by the vehemence of the convictions.

Treating it purely as a professional question, I do not presume to advise as to the policy of the Government in this connection, merely presenting what seem to me to be incontrovertible facts and inevitable consequences of a military nature, that may, perhaps, be allowed to bear upon the political question.

Having no personal ambition or party feeling to lead or mislead me to conclusions, I have maturely studied the subject as a soldier bound to give all his faculties to his country, which may God preserve in peace!

Respectfully submitted.

 JOS. G. TOTTEN,

Chief Engineer.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 232-5

Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott's Memoranda for the Secretary of War, March 15, 1861

It seems from the opinions of the Army officers who have expressed themselves on the subject – all within Fort Sumter, together with Generals Scott and Totten – that it is perhaps now impossible to succor that fort substantially, if at all, without capturing, by means of a large expedition of ships of war and troops, all the opposing batteries of South Carolina. In the mean time – six or ten months – Major Anderson would almost certainly have been obliged to surrender under assault or the approach of starvation; for even if an expedition like that proposed by G. V. Fox should succeed once in throwing in the succor of a few men and a few weeks' provisions, the necessity of repeating the latter supply would return again and again, including the yellow-fever season. An abandonment of the fort in a few weeks, sooner or later, would appear, therefore, to be a sure necessity, and if so, the sooner the more graceful on the part of the Government.

It is doubtful, however, according to recent information from the South, whether the voluntary evacuation of Fort Sumter alone would have a decisive effect upon the States now wavering between adherence to the Union and secession. It is known, indeed, that it would be charged to necessity, and the holding of Fort Pickens would be adduced in support of that view. Our Southern friends, however, are clear that the evacuation of both the forts would instantly soothe and give confidence to the eight remaining slaveholding States, and render their cordial adherence to this Union perpetual.

The holding of Forts Jefferson and Taylor, on the ocean keys, depends on entirely different principles, and should never be abandoned; and, indeed, the giving up of Forts Sumter and Pickens may be best justified by the hope, that we should thereby recover the State to which they geographically belong by the liberality of the act, besides retaining the eight doubtful States.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 200-1;  Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 363

Memorandum of Different Plans for Re-Enforcing Fort Sumter

Memoranda read before the President and Cabinet, General Scott and Commodore Stringham, and Mr. Fox, late of the Navy, Washington, March 15, 1861, by Bvt. Brig. Gen. Joseph G. Totten, Chief of Engineers.*

The obstacles to the relief of Fort Sumter are natural or artificial obstacles to navigation, and military opposition.

The main channel in its best natural state would not admit the passage of vessels larger than sloops of war; so that, before it was obstructed, a naval attack, to be very formidable, must have consisted of many vessels of this kind.

In designing the defenses of Charleston Harbor, therefore, it was considered that Fort Sumter, with Castle Pinckney, would suffice, with some improvement of Fort Moultrie, and the erection of batteries in time of war on James Island at the position called Fort Johnson. A deeper entrance would have demanded a stronger system.

The South Carolina troops have strengthened Fort Moultrie and added batteries thereto; they possess Castle Pinckney; they have erected batteries at Fort Johnson, and, not having Fort Sumter, they have planted a number of guns (number not known) on Morris Island.

These last do not, certainly, bring their system up to that which included Fort Sumter; but they, as is represented, have also so blocked the main channel, or made its navigation so intricate, that only vessels light in draught can enter – vessels unavoidably weak to resist and impotent to assail.

If we suppose a squadron of war vessels as large as can be forced through the impediments of the main bar to have overcome that difficulty, and, under pressure of steam, to advance in daylight (as I think would be indispensable), they would suffer greatly from the fire of Morris Island, Fort Moultrie, and its adjacent batteries – but they would suffer much less than the small vessels, because much stronger and with vital parts better secured, and because their own fire would, to a certain extent, keep under, and, to a great degree, render uncertain the fire of the batteries. But whether larger or smaller, the vessels have not merely to pass the fire of the batteries – they must remain exposed to it. Because, before getting beyond the fire of Fort Moultrie, they come within scope of Fort Johnson, and while yet under the guns of these batteries they will be reached by Castle Pinckney. There is no point of shelter within these waters; and although the squadron of heavy sloops might survive the dangers of the passage, they could not long endure the cannonade that would be concentrated on any anchorage. In these very waters, this problem was settled in the Revolutionary War by the contest between the squadron of Sir Peter Parker and the single work of Fort Moultrie – then certainly not more powerful than now.

To enable the supposed squadron to remain, it is indispensable that a military force should capture the batteries from the land, and be strong enough, besides, to hold possession against the troops now assembled in and around them, and those that would rapidly come from the interior.

Should small vessels attempt this entrance by daylight, their destruction would be inevitable; at any rate, the chances of getting through would be too slender to justify any such enterprise. We have certain information that there is much practice with these guns, and that the practice now is good. If this risk were to be run by daylight, the vessels might have a draught of about eight feet, and could use the “Swash Channel,” or a passage between this and the main channel, or, finally, the latter. But I must repeat that unless we were to find a degree of inaptness and imbecility, and a want of vigilance and courage that we have no right to assume, this attempt by daylight with small vessels, even of great speed, must fail.

There remains another project, namely, to enter at night by the “Swash” Channel with a few (two or three) fast steam-tugs, having a draught of only (or about)five feet. To do this it will be necessary to take position before dark off this channel, so as to get upon the proper leading line to be followed after dark by the ascertained course, or, possibly, by the bearing of the lights of Fort Sumter. With proper precautions in screening the lights and fires of the boats, &c., I think the risk would not be so great, considering only the batteries, as to deter from this attempt, provided the object were of very great importance. I should expect one or two, perhaps all, of these vessels to reach Fort Sumter, and the shoal upon which they must be grounded – provided no other impediments awaited them.

But, in the first place, it is a necessary condition that the boats arrive off the harbor before night. If they can see to take these bearings, they can be seen from the shore. In the next place, it seems impossible to fit out any expedition, however small and unobtrusive, without arousing inquiry, and causing the intelligence to be transmitted by telegraph. We may be certain, therefore, that these tugs will be waited for by steamers lying in the channelway, full of men.

This mode of relieving Fort Sumter, or another by men in rowboats passing up the same channel, is so obvious that it is unreasonable to suppose it has not been duly considered and provided for, where so much intelligence and resource in military means have been displayed in the scheme of defense, and so much earnestness and energy in execution. We know that guard rowboats and steamers are active during the night; and that they have all the means of intercepting with certainty this little expedition, and overpowering it, by boarding – a commencement of war.

This attempt, like any other, will inevitably involve a collision.

This raises a question that I am not called on to discuss, but as to which I may say that if the General Government adopts a course that must be attended with this result, its first measure should not be one so likely to meet disaster and defeat; nor one, I may add, which, even if successful, would give but momentary relief, while it would open all the powers of attack upon the fort, certainly reducing it before the means of recovering Charleston Harbor, with all its forts and batteries and environs, can possibly be concentrated there.

Respectfully submitted.

J. G. T.

_______________

* See also General Totten to Secretary of War, April 3, 1861, post.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 198-200

Caleb B. Smith to Abraham Lincoln, March 16, 1861

Department of the Interior

March 16, 1861,

President United States

Sir.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of yesterday, requesting my opinion in writing upon the question whether assuming it to be possible to now provision Fort Sumpter, under all the circumstances is it wise to attempt it."

After a careful consideration of the opinions of Gens Scott and Totten, and also those of Commodore Stringam and Mr Fox, as presented to the President and his Cabinet on yesterday. I have arrived at the conclusion that the probabilities are in favor of the success of the proposed enterprise, so far as to secure the landing of the vessels at the Fort, but there would be great danger of their destruction, and of the loss of many lives, before their cargoes could be secured within the Fort.

It would be impossible in my judgement to fit out and conduct the expedition with such secrecy as to keep those who have control of the harbor of Charlestown in ignorance of their object, and of the mode and time of their approach. I do not therefore attach any importance to the proposition to approach the fort under the cover of night, but I should expect the expedition to meet with all the ressistance which the authorities of South Carolina may be able to command.

The landing supplies at Fort Sumpter, if successfully accomplished, would of itself be of no practical value, as it is quite clear, that Maj Anderson with his present inadequate force, could not long maintain the fort against the means of attack now concentrated there.

As the attempt to supply the fort with provisions without the consent of the authorities of South Carolina, would doubtless induce an attack by them, the effect of such an attempt, whether successful or not, would be the early loss of the Fort, and the destruction, or capture of Maj Andersons command. It would therefore in my judgment be unwise to attempt to supply the fort with provisions, unless they were sent with such a force, as would place beyond all doubt or contingency the success of the enterprise, and also with such re-inforcements of men as would insure a successful defence of the fort against any attack, which can be made upon it.

The occupation of Fort Sumpter is not essential to the performance of any of the duties imposed upon the government. It cannot be used as a means of enforcing the laws, or of compelling the people of South Carolina to perform the duties they owe to the Federal Government. Viewing the question only as a military one, I cannot doubt that it would be expedient to abandon a position which can only be held at a great expense of life, and money, and which while held cannot be used as a means of aiding the government in the performance of its duties.

But the most important question connected with this subject is one of a political character. The State of South Carolina, is in open rebellion against the government. Her authorities have seized the public property, have wholly disregarded the laws of the United States, and have openly defied the government. If the evacuation of Fort Sumpter could be justly regarded as a measure which would even by implication, sanction the lawless acts of the authorities of that State, or indicate an intention on the part of the government to surrender its constitutional authority over them, or if it could be regarded as an acknowlegement by the government of its inability to enforce the laws, I should without hesitation advise that it should be held without regard to the sacrifices which its retention might impose. I do not believe however, that the abandonment of the Fort would imply such an acknowledgment on the part of the government. There are other means by which the power and the honor of the Government may be vindicated, and which would in my judgment be much more effective to compel the people of South Carolina to render obedience to the laws, and which would at the same time avoid the sacrifice of life which must result from a conflict under the walls of the Fort.

The commencement of a civil war would be a calamity greatly to be deplored, and should be avoided, if the just authority of the government may be maintained without it. If such a conflict should become inevitable, it is much better that it should commence by the resistance of the authorities, or the people of South Carolina, to the legal action of the government, in enforcing the laws of the United States.

The public sentiment of the North would then be united in the support of the government, and the whole power of the country would be brought to its aid. If a conflict should be provoked by the attempt to re-inforce Fort Sumpter, a divided sentiment in the North would paralize the arm of the Government, while treason in the Southern States would be openly encouraged in the North. It is well known that this question has already been much discussed throughout the Country, and that even among the friends of the Administration many of those who demand that the laws shall be enforced, urge the propriety of the withdrawal of our troops from Fort Sumpter, believing that the retention of that Fort is not essential to the honor of the of the Government, or its power to enforce the laws.

While the abandonment of the Fort would doubtless to some extent create surprise and complaint, I believe that public sentiment would fully justify the action of the Government, when the reasons which prompt it shall be explained and understood.

I therefore respectfully answer the enquiry of the President by saying, that in my opinion, it would not be wise under all the circumstances to attempt to provision Fort Sumpter

I am with respect

Your Obt Servt

Caleb B Smith

SOURCE: Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott to Abraham Lincoln, March 12, 1861

The President has done me the honor to propose certain military questions, concerning Fort Sumter to which he desires replies.

“1st.” To what point of time can Major Anderson maintain his position at Fort Sumter without fresh supplies or reinforcements?

Answer. In respect to subsistence he has bread, flour, and rice for about 26 days, and salt meat (pork) for about forty eight days. Without additional supplies of provisions he may hold out some forty days without much suffering from hunger.

The besiegers are understood to be about 3,500 men, now somewhat disciplined, and they have four powerful batteries on land, and one floating battery, all mounting guns and mortars of large calibre and of the best patterns, bearing on Fort Sumter. Supposing Major Anderson not to be reinforced and the means of the assailants to be skilfully and vigorously employed – Fort Sumter being defended by less than 100 men, including common laborers and musicians – it might be taken, at any time, by a single assault, and easily, if previously harassed, perseveringly, for many days and nights; the assailants having the ability (by the force of numbers) of converting one out of every three or four of those demonstrations, into a real attack.

“2d.” Can you, with all the means now in your control, supply or reinforce Fort Sumter within the period you specify as the time, within which Major Anderson may hold out without fresh supplies?”

Answer. No, not within many months; But not to speak of October or November, when the proposition was first made, and repeated, in writing, the third time, December 30th – it would have been easy to reinforce Fort Sumter, with war vessels, down to about the 12th of February. In this long delay, twice that time, Fort Moultrie has been re-armed and greatly strengthened, in every way, and many powerful new land batteries (besides rafts) have been constructed. Hulks have also been sunk in the principal channel, so as to render access to Fort Sumter, from the sea, impractical, without first carrying all the batteries of the secessionists. The difficulty of reinforcing has thus, by delay, been increased 1[0] or 12 fold. First, the late President refused to allow any attempt to be made, because he was holding negotiations with South Carolina Commissioners. Afterwards, Secretary Holt and myself endeavored to obtain a ship of war for the purpose; but failing in this we were obliged to employ the steamer Star of the West. That vessel, but for the hesitation of the commander, might then have landed, it is generally believed, men and subsistence. That attempt having failed, I next, before the late Cabinet, submitted, orally, either that succor be sent by ships of war, fighting their way to the Fort, or, that Major Anderson should ameliorate his condition by the muzzles of his guns; that is, enforcing supplies by bombardment, and by bringing-to merchant vessels and helping himself (giving orders for payment) or else should be allowed to surrender, as, sooner or later, had then become inevitable.

But before any resolution was taken – the late Secretary of the Navy making difficulties about the want of suitable vessels; – another commissioner from South Carolina arrived, causing further delay. When that had passed away, Secretaries Holt & Toucy, Capt. Ward of the Navy and myself, with the knowledge of President Buchanan, settled upon the employment, under the Captain (who was eager for the expedition) of four or more small steamers belonging to the Coast Survey.- At that time, I have no doubt Captain Ward would have suceeded with all his vessels. But he was kept back by something like a truce established between the late President and a number of principal seceders, here, in the Senate, & from South Carolina, Florida, Louisiana &c., and this truce continued to the termination of that administration. That plan and all others like it, are now pronounced, from the change of circumstances, impracticable, by Major Anderson Captain Foster and all the other officers of the Fort, as well as by Brig. General Totten, Chief of the Corps of Engineers: and, in this opinion, I fully concur. The three or four steamers would have been obliged to attempt to make their way past the hostile batteries in an obstructed channel. Possibly one of them might have reached the fort, with (being small) a few days subsistence, but would, certainly probably, have been destroyed on arriving at the entrance (by the concentrated fire of three or four powerful batteries), before landing a man or a ration. In this opinion Captain Ward finally concurred.

“3d.” If I could not supply or reinforce Fort Sumter, within the time specified, with all the means in my control, then what amount of means and of what description, in addition to that already at my control, would enable me to supply and reinforce the fortress within that time.”

Answer. I should need a fleet of war vessels and transports which, in the scattered disposition of the Navy (as understood) could not be collected in less than four months; – 5,000 additional regular troops, and 20,000 volunteers – that is, a force sufficient to take all the batteries both in the harbour (including Ft. Moultrie) as well as in the approach or outer bay. To raise, organize and discipline such an army (not to speak of necessary legislation by Congress, not now in session) would require from six to eight months. As a practical military question, the time for succoring Fort Sumter, with any means at hand, had passed away nearly a month ago. Since then a surrender under assault, or from starvation, has been merely a question of time.

It is, therefore, my opinion and advice that Major Anderson be instructed to evacuate the Fort – so long gallantly held by him and his companions – immediately on procuring suitable water transportation, and that he embark, with his command, for New York.

I have the honor to return, herewith, the reports and communications of Major Anderson and his officers, submitted to me by the President. These papers of themselves demonstrate how the Fort has become untenable during the delays I have described above.

Respectfully Submitted.

Winfield Scott.

Head Qrs. of the Army

Washington, March 12, 1861.

SOURCE: Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Simon Cameron to Abraham Lincoln, March 16, 1861

War Department

March 16th 1861

Sir,

In reply to the letter of inquiry, addressed to me by the President, whether “assuming it to be possible now to provision Fort Sumter, under all the circumstances, it is wise to attempt it,” I beg leave to say, that it has received the careful consideration, in the limited time I could bestow upon it, which its very grave importance demands, and that my mind has been, most reluctantly, forced to the conclusion that it would be unwise now to make such an attempt.

In coming to this conclusion, I am free to say, I am greatly influenced by the opinions of the Army officers who have expressed themselves on the subject, and who seem to concur that it is, perhaps, now impossible to succor that fort, substantially, if at all, without capturing, by means of a large expedition of ships of war and troops, all the opposing batteries of South Carolina. All the officers within Fort Sumter, together with Generals Scott and Totten, express this opinion, and it would seem to me that the President would not be justified to disregard such high authority without over-ruling considerations of public policy.

Major Anderson, in his report of the 28 ultimo, says, “I confess that I would not be willing to risk my reputation on an attempt to throw reinforcements into this harbor, within the time for our relief rendered necessary by the limited supply of our provisions, and with a view of holding possession of the same, with a force of less than twenty thousand good and well disciplined men.”

In this opinion, Major Anderson is, substantially, sustained by the reports of all the other officers within the fort, one of whom, Capt. Seymour, speaks thus emphatically on the subject: “It is not more than possible to supply this fort by ruse, with a few men or a small amount of provisions. Such is the unceasing vigilance employed to prevent it. To do so, openly, by vessels alone, unless they are shot proof, is, virtually impossible, so numerous and powerful are the opposing batteries. No vessel can lay near the fort without being exposed to continual fire, and the harbor could, and probably would, whenever necessary, be effectually closed, as one channel has already been. A projected attack, in large force, would draw to this harbor all the available resources, in men and materiel, of the contiguous States. Batteries of guns of heavy calibre, would be multiplied rapidly and indefinitely; at least 20,000 men, good marksmen and trained for months past with a view to the this very contingency, would be concentrated here before the attacking force could leave Northern ports. The harbor would be closed; a landing must be effected at some distance from our guns, which could give no aid. Charleston harbor would be a Sebastopol in such a conflict, and unlimited means would probably be required to ensure success, before which time the garrison of Fort Sumter would be starved out.”

General Scott, in his reply to the question, addressed to him by the President, on the 12th instant, what amount of means and of what description, in addition to those already at command, it would require to supply and reinforce the fort, says, “I should need a fleet of war vessels and transports, which, in the scattered disposition of the Navy (as understood) could not be collected in less than four months; 5000 additional regular troops, and 20.000 volunteers – that is, a force sufficient to take all the batteries, both in the harbor (including Fort Moultrie) as well as in the approach or outer bay. To raise, organize and discipline such an army (not to speak of necessary legislation by Congress not now in session) would require from six to eight months. As a practical military question, the time for succoring Fort Sumter, with any means at hand had passed away nearly a month ago. Since then, a surrender under assault, or from starvation, has been merely a question of time.”

It is true, there are those whose opinions are entitled to respectful consideration, who entertain the belief that Fort Sumter could yet be succored to a limited extent, without the employment of the large army and naval forces believed to be necessary by the Army officers whose opinions I have already quoted. Captain Ward, of the Navy, an officer of acknowledged merit, a month ago, believed it to be practicable to supply the fort with men and provisions to a limited extent, without the employment of any very large military or naval force. He then proposed to employ four or more small steamers belonging to the coast survey to accomplish the purpose, and we have the opinion of General Scott that he has no doubt that Captain Ward, at that time, would have succeeded with his proposed expedition, but was not allowd by the late President to attempt the execution of his plan. Now it is pronounced, from the change of circumstances, impracticable, by Major Anderson, and all the other officers of the Fort, as well as by Generals Scott and Totten, and in this opinion Captain Ward, after full consultation with the latter named officers and the Superintendent of the Coast Survey, I understand now reluctantly concurs.

Mr. Fox, another gentleman of experience as a seaman, who, having formerly been engaged on the Coast Survey, is familiar with the waters of the Charleston harbor, has proposed to make the attempt to supply the Fort with by the aid of cutters of light draught and large dimensions, and his proposal has, in a measure, been approved by Commodore Stringham; but he does not suppose, or propose, or profess to believe that provisions for more than one or two months could be furnished at a time.

There is no doubt whatever in my mind, that when Major Anderson first took possession of Fort Sumter he could have been easily supplied with men and provisions, and that when Captain Ward, with the concurrence of General Scott, a month ago, proposed his expedition, he would have succeeded, had he been allowed to attempt it, as, I think, he should have been. A different state of things, however, now exists. Fort Moultrie is now re-armed and strengthened in every way; many new land batteries have been constructed; the principal channel has been obstructed; in short, the difficulty of re-inforcing the Fort has been increased ten, if not twenty fold. Whatever might have been done as late as a month ago, it is too sadly evident that it cannot now be done without the sacrifice of life and treasure not at all commensurate with the object to be attained, and as the abandonment of the Fort in a few weeks, sooner or later, appears to be an inevitable necessity, it seems to me that the sooner it be done, the better.

The proposition presented by Mr. Fox, so sincerely entertained and ably advocated, would be entitled to my favorable consideration, if, with all the lights before me, and in the face of so many distinguished military authorities on the other side, I did not believe that the attempt to carry it into effect would initiate a bloody and protracted conflict. Should he succeed in relieving Fort Sumter, which is doubted by many of our most experienced soldiers and seamen, would that enable us to maintain our authority against the troops and fortifications of South Carolina? Sumter could not now contend against these formidable adversaries, if filled with provisions and men. That fortress was intended, as her position on the map will show, rather to repel an invading foe. It is equally clear, from repeated investigations and trials, that the range of her guns is too limited to reach the city of Charleston, if that were desirable. No practical benefit will result to the Country or the Government by accepting the proposal alluded to, and I am, therefore, of opinion that the cause of humanity and the highest obligations to the public interest would be best promoted by adopting the counsels of those brave and experienced men whose suggestions I have laid before you.

I have, sir, the honor to be, very respectfully,

Your Obt. Servt.

Simon Cameron

SOURCE: Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Captain John G. Foster to Brevet Brigadier-General Joseph G. Totten, March 31, 1861

Fort Sumter, S. C, March 31, 1861.

General Jos. G. Totten,

Chief Engineer United States Army, Washington, D. C.:

General: Yesterday the members of the State Convention visited the batteries on Morris Island and Fort Moultrie, and from both places extensive firing took place in honor of the event. This gave me an opportunity of observing what batteries have been increased in strength since my last report on this subject.

The following is the present armament, very nearly, viz.:

Battery No. 1. — Four guns. Embrasures closed by sandbags. Not fired yesterday.

Mortar battery between Nos. 1 and 2. — Three mortars. Fired yesterday. These have practiced much lately, to obtain the range and length of fuse for this fort.

Battery No. 2, iron-clad. — Three heavy guns. Two of them fired yesterday.

Battery No. 3. — Three guns. Embrasures closed with sandbags. Did not fire.

Mortar battery between Nos. 3 and 4. — Two mortars. Fired yesterday.

Battery No. 4. — Three guns. Two fired.

Battery No. 5. — Four heavy guns, one Columbiad or 8-inch seacoast howitzer. Two fired yesterday. I think there are six guns in this battery, although only four have been seen to fire.

Star of the West battery. — Four heavy guns, one of them an 8-inch Columbiad or 8-inch seacoast howitzer. All fired yesterday.

Battery No. 7. — These guns are not all in the same battery, but are distributed along the beach apparently in three batteries. Eleven guns fired yesterday. All were very heavy guns except two, which I think were field-pieces in a sort of second tier.

Above these batteries, on the sand-hills, is a line of intrenchments surrounding a house, and also several tents. The fieldpieces are apparently capable of being used to defend the flanks of this intrenchment, and to fire on the channel. Their rear is covered, each with a traverse.

It was evident in this firing that not all the guns in position were fired.

At Fort Moultrie the firing exhibited the same complete armament as last reported.

The provisions that I laid in for my force having become exhausted, and the supplies of the command being too limited to spare me any more, I am obliged to discharge nearly all my men to-day. I retain only enough to man a boat.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. G. Foster,

Captain Engineers.

SOURCE: Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 302-4

Captain John G. Foster to Brevet Brigadier-General Joseph G. Totten, March 6, 1861

Fort Sumter, S. C,

March 6, 1861.

General: I have the honor to report that during the day, and especially towards night, unusual activity was observed among the South Carolinians around us; several steamer loads of men were landed on Cummings Point. The number was greater than the arrangements for shelter, apparently, for I observe quite a large number grouped about their bivouac fires this morning. Their suffering must have been considerable during the night, for the weather suddenly changed from the warm temperature of the preceding days to a high degree of cold, for this climate, the wind blowing fresh from the north.

I learn that portable hot shot furnaces have been furnished to several, and probably all, of the batteries. The mortar battery on James Island, south of Fort Johnson, is armed, but the number of mortars is not ascertained. The magazine in the flank of this battery is also finished. The mortar battery on Sullivan's Island, west of Fort Moultrie, is also armed. All the batteries on Morris Island are armed. The guns range from 32pounders down, with the exception of the iron bomb-proof, which is (I think, from all reports and observations) armed with 8-inch Columbiads — three of them.

The raft does not meet expectations. It is being covered with railroad strap iron instead of the T rail. This has a crosssection of about three-fourths or one inch by two inches or two and a half inches.

They are now ironing the top portion, the front not being yet commenced. Two 8-inch Columbiads are lying on the wharf ready to be put on board. I do not think this floating battery will prove very formidable.

We have not yet received the inaugural address of President Lincoln, although it is reported from town that it is coercive in its character, and that much excitement prevails.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. G. Foster,

Captain Engineers.

General Jos. G. Totten,

Chief Engineer U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

SOURCE: Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 280-1

Major General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Meade, March 7, 1863

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS, March 7, 1863.

Before this reaches you, you will have seen Alexander Coxe, who left this morning for home. I am most truly sorry to lose him, for he has not only rendered himself most useful to me, but has attached himself to me as a friend, from his manly character and social qualities. I sincerely hope he will be benefited by rest and medical treatment at home, and will be able to return.

Captain Jay has joined me, and seems quite a clever gentleman. We have also had at our mess John Williams, who has been taken away from Ricketts and ordered to report to this army for duty, but who has not yet been assigned to any general.

The bill amalgamating the two corps of Engineers has passed, so the old Topographical Corps is defunct, and I shall have the honor of being borne on the register as a Major of Engineers. The bill makes one brigadier general (Totten), four colonels (of which Bache will be one), ten lieutenant colonels, twenty majors (of whom I shall be the tenth), thirty captains, thirty first lieutenants and ten second lieutenants. It don't make much difference to me, if the war lasts as long as I expect it to and I survive it.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 1, p. 356

From Washington

WASHINGTON, March 16.

From contrabands who have acted as teamsters for the rebels, it is ascertained that the main body of the rebels have crossed the Rappahannock and were making a stand at Fredericksburg in conjunction with the army at Gordonsville.

Tribune Correspondence.

Messrs. Holt and Owen, commissioners to examine and allow or reject all contracts, orders and claims on the War Department for ordnance, arms and ammunition, will commence their labors to-morrow.  They have taken rooms in the War Department.

Gen. Fremont’s department extends, if we are rightly informed, no farther south than Knoxville.

Gen. Totten has advised the division of the seven million dollars appropriated this session for coast defences, to the construction of iron-clad vessels of war.

Com. Smith, the head of the bureau of yards and docks, has been authorized by Secretary Welles to build an iron-clad gunboat within 60 days.

A letter from Newport News, Dated 14^th, in the World, says: About 9 o’clock yesterday morning, companies of the 7^th N. Y. regiment, encamped at this place, started on a reconnnoisance on the Willliamsport road, running parallel with the James river.  About ten miles from camp, they came across 3,500 rebel cavalry stationed at the junction of the Williamsport and Great bethel roads.  When the enemy were discovered, our troops charged upon them. – The enemy after firing a few shots at our skirmishers and setting fire to the house they had lately occupied, turned and fled.

Times’ Correspondence.

Gen. McClellan’s proclamation to his army is the theme of universal conversation and enthusiastic praise.  His popularity with the army is unbounded, and his friends increase by thousands among the people who admire his patience under persecution and his single-hearted devotion to the union.

The docks at Washington begin to be thickly studded with masts of vessels that have reached here with supplies since the blockade has been raised – a vast relief to all who have to buy in Washington.

Messers. Odell and Baker, members from New York, yesterday called upon Secretary Welles and urged that Com. Stringham be assigned to active duty.  It is understood that the Secretary gave them assurance that the meritorious officer would soon have command.

Herald’s Correspondence.

Gen. E. A. Hitchcock, who recently declined the appointment of Major General of volunteers, was summoned here from St. Louis some days ago, when he was visited by the Secretary of War.  What transpired at the interview has not been announced, but it was of sufficient importance to the interests of the country to induce General Hitchcock to reconsider his declination of the Major Generalship.

WASHINGTON, March 17.

Gen. Fremont has had an interview with the President and Secretary of War.  We will press his affairs for promptly starting his department.  His staff will therefore be determined on at an early day.  His headquarters will be in the field.  Col. Shanks will accompany him.

The Senate was four hours in executive session to-day.

– Published in The Davenport Daily Gazette, Davenport, Iowa, Tuesday Morning, March 18, 1862, p. 1