Showing posts with label Keyes. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Keyes. Show all posts

Tuesday, March 27, 2018

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: September 5, 1863

It is believed that Lee, with a large portion of his army, will proceed immediately to Tennessee against Rosecrans; and it is ascertained that Meade is sending reinforcements thither. But I fear for Virginia when Lee is away! Meade must have a large army left behind, else he would not send reinforcements to Rosecrans. This move will excite the fear of the extortionate farmers, at all events, and make them willing to sell their surplus produce. But if Richmond should fall, and the State be overrun, it is possible it would secede from the Confederacy, which would be a virtual dissolution of it. She would then form alliances with other Southern States on a new basis, and create a new provisional government, and postpone the formation of a permanent one until independence be achieved. However, I am incredulous about the abandonment of Virginia.

Meantime, I hope France will intervene, and that Mexico will recognize the independence of the Southern Government.

Another letter from Hon. Mr. Miles, of Charleston, in reply, as it seems, to a pretty severe rebuke by the Secretary of War, for asking Jenkins's brigade of South Carolinians for the defense of South Carolina, was received to-day. Knowing the honorable gentleman's intimate relations with Beauregard, the Secretary criticises the conduct of the general in permitting the enemy to establish himself on the lower end of Morris Island — allowing a grove to remain, concealing the erection of batteries, etc. etc. Mr. Miles in reply asserts the fact that Gen. B. did the utmost that could be accomplished with the force and means left at his disposal by the government; and that the grove would have been felled, if he had been authorized to impress labor, etc. It is sad to read these criminations and recriminations at such a time as this; but every Secretary of War is apt to come in conflict with Beauregard.

Gen. Whiting asks, as second in command, Brig.-Gen. Herbert, and reiterates his demand for troops, else Wilmington will be lost. This letter came open — having been broken on the way. If a spy did it, which is probable, the army will soon learn what an easy conquest awaits them.

Mr. C. C. Thayer, clerk in the Treasury Department, leaves on the 9th, with $15,000,000 for the trans-Mississippi Department; another clerk has already gone with $10,000,000.

After all, I am inclined to think our papers have been lying about the barbarous conduct of the enemy. A letter was received to-day from C. N. Hubbard, a respectable farmer of James City County, stating that when Gen. Keyes came up the Peninsula about the 1st of July, he sent guards for the protection of the property of the people living along the line of march; and they remained, faithfully performing that duty, until the army retired. Mr. H. complains that these guards were made prisoners by our troops, and, if exchanges be demanded for them, he fears the next time the hostile army approaches Richmond, their request for a guard will be refused. What answer the Secretary will make to this, I have no means of conjecturing; but Mr. Hubbard recommends him to come to some understanding with the enemy for the mutual protection of the persons and property of non-combating civilians; and he desires an answer directed to the care of Col. Shingler, who, indeed, captured the guard. The Secretary consented to the exchange.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2p. 33-4

Sunday, March 25, 2018

Brevet Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott to Brevet Colonel Harvey Brown, April 1, 1861

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,         
Washington, April 1, 1861.
Bvt.. Col. HARVEY BROWN,
U. S Army, Washington, D. C.:

SIR: You have been designated to take command of an expedition to re-enforce and hold Fort Pickens, in the harbor of Pensacola. You will proceed with the least possible delay to that place, and you will assume command of all the land forces of the United States within the limits of the State of Florida. You will proceed to New York, where steam transportation for four companies will be engaged, and, putting on board such supplies as you can ship, without delay proceed at once to your destination. The engineer company of Suppers and Miners; Brevet Major Hunt's Company M, Second Artillery; Captain Johns' Company C, Third Infantry, Captain Clitz's Company E, Third Infantry, will embark with you in the first steamer. Other troops and full supplies will be sent after you as soon as possible.

Captain Meigs will accompany you as engineer, and will remain with you until you are established in Fort Pickens, when he will return to resume his duties in this city. The other members of your staff will be Asst. Surg. John Campbell, medical staff; Capt. Rufus Ingalls, assistant quartermaster; Capt. Henry F. Clarke, assistant commissary of subsistence; Bvt. Capt. George L. Hartsuff, assistant adjutant-general; and First Lieut. George T. Balch, ordnance officer.

The object and destination of this expedition will be communicated to no one to whom it is not already known. The naval officers in the Gulf will be instructed to co-operate with you, and to afford every facility in their power for the accomplishment of the object of the expedition, which is the security of Fort Pickens against all attacks, foreign and domestic. Should a shot be fired at you, you will defend yourself and your expedition at whatever hazard, and, if needful for such defense, inflict upon the assailants all the damage in your power within the range of your guns.

Lieutenant-Colonel Keyes, military secretary, will be authorized to give all necessary orders, and to call upon the staff department for every requisite material and transportation, and other steamers will follow that on which you embark, to carry re-enforcements, supplies, and provisions for the garrison of Fort Pickens for six months. Captain Barry's battery will follow as soon as a vessel can be fitted for its transportation. Two or three foot companies will embark at the same time with the battery. All the companies will be filled up to the maximum standard, those to embark first from the recruits in the harbor of New York. The other companies will be filled, if practicable, with instructed soldiers.

You will make Fort Jefferson your main depot and base of operations. You will be careful not reduce too much the means of the fortresses in the Florida Reef, as they are deemed of greater importance than even Fort Pickens. The naval officers in the Gulf will be instructed to cooperate with you in every way, in order to insure the safety of Fort Pickens, Fort Jefferson, and Fort Taylor. You will freely communicate with them for this end, and will exhibit to them the authority of the President herewith.

The President directs that you be assigned to duty from this date according to your brevet rank in the Army.

With great confidence in your judgment, zeal, and intelligence, I remain, respectfully,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

APRIL 2, 1861.
Approved:
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.


SOURCES: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 15; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 365-6;

Wednesday, October 4, 2017

Major-General George B. McClellan to Edwin M. Stanton, June 24, 1862 – 3:15 p.m.

REDOUBT NO. 3, June 25, 1862 3.15 p.m.

The enemy are making a desperate resistance to the advance of our picket lines. Kearny's and one-half of Hooker's are where I want them.

I have this moment re-enforced Hooker's right with a brigade and a couple of guns, and hope in a few minutes to finish the work intended for to-day. Our men are behaving splendidly. The enemy are fighting well also. This is not a battle; merely an affair of Heintzelman's corps, supported by Keyes, and thus far all goes well. We hold every foot we have gained.

If we succeed in what we have undertaken it will be a very important advantage gained. Loss not large thus far. The fighting up to this time has been done by General Hooker's division, which has behaved as usual — that is, most splendidly.

On our right Porter has silenced the enemy's batteries in his front.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.
Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 11, Part 1 (Serial No. 12), p. 50

Wednesday, August 16, 2017

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: June 29, 1863

There is no confirmation of the report of the fall of Vicksburg, but it may be so; nor is it certain that we have advanced to Harrisburg, but it is probable.

Gen. D. H. Hill writes (on Saturday) from Petersburg that 40,000 of the enemy could not take Richmond; but this may be fishing for the command. He says if Gen. Dix comes this way, he would make him a subject of the cartel of exchange which he (Dix) had a hand in negotiating.

J. M. Botts writes, from his farm in Culpepper, that our men are quartered on his premises, and do as much injury as a hostile army could. He is neutral. They pay him ten cents per day for the grazing of each horse.

The Commissary-General is again recommending the procuring of bacon from within the enemy's lines, in exchange for cotton. Why not get meat from the enemy's country for nothing?
Hon. R. M. T. Hunter writes to the Secretary of War to let the Quartermaster-General alone, that he is popular with Congress, and that his friends are active. It might be dangerous to remove him; the President had better commission him a brigadier-general. He says Judge Campbell wants the President to go to Mississippi; this, Mr. H. is opposed to. Mr. H. is willing to trust Johnston, has not lost confidence in him, etc. And he tells the Secretary to inform the President how much he (H.) esteems him (the President).

The New York Times publishes an account of one of their raids on the Peninsula, below this city, as follows:

“Within the past three days a most daring raid has been made into one of the richest portions of the enemy's country, and the success was equal to the boldness of the undertaking.

“The expedition, which was conducted by both land and water, was commanded by Col. Kilpatrick. It started from the headquarters of Gen. Keyes on Wendesday, and returned yesterday. In the interim the Counties of Matthews and Gloucester were scoured. All the warehouses containing grain were sacked, the mills burned, and everything that could in any way aid the rebels were destroyed or captured. Three hundred horses, two hundred and fifty head of cattle, two hundred sheep, and one hundred mules, together with a large number of contrabands, were brought back by the raiders.

“The rebel farmers were all taken by surprise. They had not expected a demonstration of the kind. Not only were they made to surrender everything that could be of the least use to us, but they were compelled to be silent spectators to the destruction of their agricultural implements.”

No doubt we shall soon have some account in the Northern papers of our operations in this line, in their country.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 364-5

Wednesday, August 9, 2017

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: June 27, 1863

An officer of the Signal Corps reported, yesterday, the force of Gen. Keyes, on the Peninsula, at 6000. To-day we learn that the enemy is in possession of Hanover Junction, cutting off communication with both Fredericksburg and Gordonsville. A train was coming down the Central Road with another installment of the Winchester prisoners (some 4000 having already arrived, now confined on Belle Island, opposite the city), but was stopped in time, and sent back.

Gen. Elzey had just ordered away a brigade from Hanover Junction to Gordonsville, upon which it was alleged another raid was projected. What admirable manoeuvring for the benefit of the enemy!

Gen. D. H. Hill wrote, yesterday, that we had no troops on the Blackwater except cavalry. I hope he will come here and take command.

Gen. Whiting has arrested the Yankee crew of the Arabian, at Wilmington. It appears that she is owned by New Yorkers, sailed from New York, and has a Yankee cargo!

Capt. Maury writes from London that R. J. Walker, once a fire-and-fury Mississippi Senator (but Yankee-born), is in Europe trying to borrow £50,000,000 for the United States. Capt. Maury says the British Government will not willingly let us have another “Alabama;” but that it is also offended at the United States for the atrocities of Wilkes, and this may lead to war. The war, however, would not be intended as a diversion in our behalf.

Nothing is heard to-day from Lee, except what appears in Northern papers several days old, when our troops were occupying Hagerstown, Cumberland, etc., in Maryland, and foraging pretty extensively in Pennsylvania.

Nothing from Vicksburg.

Just as I apprehended! The brigade ordered away from Hanover to Gordonsville, upon a wild-goose chase, had not been gone many hours before some 1200 of the enemy's cavalry appeared there, and burnt the bridges which the brigade had been guarding! This is sottishness, rather than generalship, in our local commanders.

A regiment was sent up when firing was heard (the annihilation of our weak guard left at the bridges) and arrived just two hours too late. The enemy rode back, with a hundred mules they had captured, getting under cover of their gun-boats.

To-day, it is said, Gen. Elzey is relieved, and Gen. Ransom, of North Carolina, put in command; also, that Custis Lee (son of Gen. R. E. Lee) has superseded Gen. Winder. I hope this has been done. Young Lee has certainly been commissioned a brigadier-general. His brother, Brig.-Gen. W. H. F. Lee, wounded in a late cavalry fight, was taken yesterday by the enemy at Hanover Court House.

Gen. Whiting's letter about the “Arabian” came back from the President, to-day, indorsed that, as Congress did not prohibit private blockade-running, he wouldn't interfere. So, this is to be the settled policy of the government.

This morning the President sent a letter to the Secretary of War, requesting him to direct all mounted officers — some fifty A. A. G.'s and A. D.'s — to report to him for duty around the city. Good! These gentlemen ought to be in the saddle instead of being sheltered from danger in the bureaus.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 360-1

Thursday, June 22, 2017

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: May 17, 1863

The last few days have been cool and dry; fine weather for campaigning. And yet we hear of no demonstrations apparently, though I believe Lee's army is moving.

Mr. Lamar, of Savannah (formerly president of the Bank of the Republic, New York), writes that he and others are organizing an Exporting and Importing Company, and desires the government to take an interest in it. So far the heads of bureaus decline, and of course the Secretary will do nothing. But the Secretary has already engaged with Mr. Crenshaw in a similar enterprise, and so informed Mr. Mason, at London.

About 10 A.M., some 2500 men of all arms arrived at “double quick,” having left Ashland, eighteen miles distant, at 5 o'clock this morning. That was brisk marching. The guns were sent down on the railroad. The government has information that Gen. Keyes, with a full division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry, had marched up to West Point, to threaten Richmond. The troops, however, which arrived from Ashland, had been taken from the batteries here, and did not belong to Gen. Lee's army.

Messrs. Davenport & Co., Mobile, charge Gen. Buckner with permitting 1000 bales of cotton to be shipped to New Orleans.

The president of the Fredericksburg Road states, in a letter to the Secretary, that, after the battle, by military authority, the cars were appropriated by the Federal officers (prisoners), while our wounded soldiers had to remain and await the return of the trains.

Hon. Mr. Dargin, of Alabama, writes to the Secretary, to procure from the President a disavowal of the “organship” of the Enquirer, as that paper, under the belief that it speaks for the government, is likely to inflict much mischief on the country. He alluded to the bitter articles against the Democrats and peace men of the North, who would soon have been able to embarrass, if not to check the operations of the Republican war party. He says now, that they will write against us, and deal destruction wherever they penetrate the land.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 326-7

Sunday, June 18, 2017

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: May 14, 1863

We have been beaten in an engagement near Jackson, Miss., 4000 retiring before 10,000. This is a dark cloud over the hopes of patriots, for Vicksburg is seriously endangered. Its fall would be the worst blow we have yet received.

Papers from New York and Philadelphia assert most positively, and with circumstantiality, that Hooker recrossed the Rappahannock since the battle, and is driving Lee toward Richmond, with which his communications have been interrupted. But this is not all: they say Gen. Keyes marched a column up the Peninsula, and took Richmond itself, over the Capitol of which the Union flag “is now flying.” These groundless statements will go out to Europe, and may possibly delay our recognition. If so, what may be the consequences when the falsehood is exposed? I doubt the policy of any species of dishonesty.

Gov. Shorter, of Alabama, demands the officers of Forrest's captives for State trial, as they incited the slaves to insurrection.

Mr. S. D. Allen writes from Alexandria, La., that the people despair of defending the Mississippi Valley with such men as Pemberton and other hybrid Yankees in command. He denounces the action also of quartermasters and commissaries in the Southwest.

A letter from Hon. W. Porcher Miles to the Secretary of War gives an extract from a communication written him by Gen. Beauregard, to the effect that Charleston must at last fall into the hands of the enemy, if an order which has been sent there, for nearly all his troops to proceed to Vicksburg, be not revoked. There are to be left for the defense of Charleston only 1500 exclusive of the garrisons!

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 324

Wednesday, June 14, 2017

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, July 4, 1863

I was called up at midnight precisely by a messenger with telegram from Byington, dated at Hanover Station, stating that the most terrific battle of the War was being fought at or near Gettysburg, that he left the field at half-past 6 P.M. with tidings, and that everything looked hopeful. The President was at the War Department, where this dispatch, which is addressed to me, was received. It was the first word of the great conflict. Nothing had come to the War Department. There seems to have been no system, no arrangement, for prompt, constant, and speedy intelligence. I had remained at the War Department for news until about eleven. Some half an hour later the dispatch from Byington to me came over the wires, but nothing from any one to Stanton or Halleek. The operator in the War Department gave the dispatch to the President, who remained. He asked, “Who is Byington?” None in the Department knew anything of him, and the President telegraphed to Hanover Station, asking, “Who is Byington?” The operator replied, “Ask the Secretary of the Navy.” I informed the President that the telegram was reliable. Byington is the editor and proprietor of a weekly paper in Norwalk, Connecticut, active and stirring; is sometimes employed by the New York Tribune, and is doubtless so employed now.

The information this morning and dispatches from General Meade confirm Byington's telegram. There is much confusion in the intelligence received. The information is not explicit. A great and bloody battle was fought, and our army has the best of it, but the end is not yet. Everything, however, looks encouraging.

Later in the day dispatches from Haupt and others state that Lee with his army commenced a retreat this A.M. at three o'clock. Our army is waiting for supplies to come up before following, — a little of the old lagging infirmity. Couch is said to be dilatory; has not left Harrisburg; his force has not pushed forward with alacrity. Meade sent him word, “The sound of my guns should have prompted your movement.” Lee and the Rebels may escape in consequence. If they are driven back, Halleck will be satisfied. That has been his great anxiety, and too many of our officers think it sufficient if the Rebels quit and go off, — that it is unnecessary to capture, disperse, and annihilate them.

Extreme partisans fear that the success of our arms will be success to the Administration. Governor Curtin is in trepidation, lest, if our troops leave Harrisburg to join Meade, the Rebels will rush in behind them and seize the Pennsylvania capital. On the other hand, Stanton and Halleck ridicule the sensitiveness of the Governor, and are indifferent to his wishes and responsibilities. Of course, matters do not work well.

Received this evening a dispatch from Admiral Lee, stating he had a communication from A. H. Stephens,1 who wishes to go to Washington with a companion as military commissioner from Jefferson Davis, Commanding General of Confederate forces, to Abraham Lincoln, President and Commanding General of the Army and Navy of the United States, and desires permission to pass the blockade in the steamer Torpedo on this mission, with Mr. Olds, his private secretary. Showed the dispatch to Blair, whom I met. He made no comment. Saw Stanton directly after, who swore and growled indignantly. The President was at the Soldiers' Home and not expected for an hour or two. Consulted Seward, who was emphatic against having anything to do with Stephens or Davis. Did not see the President till late. In the mean time Stanton and others had seen him, and made known their feelings and views. The President treats the subject as not very serious nor very important, and proposes to take it up to-morrow. My own impression is that not much good is intended in this proposition, yet it is to be met and considered. It is not necessary that the vessel should pass the blockade, or that Stephens should come here, but I would not repel advances, or refuse to receive Davis's communication.

I learn from Admiral Lee that General Keyes with 12,000 men has moved forward from the “White House” towards Richmond, and other demonstrations are being made.

Two intercepted dispatches were received, captured by Captain Dahlgren. One was from Jeff Davis, the other from Adjutant-General Cooper, both addressed to General Lee. They disclose trouble and differences among the Rebel leaders. Lee, it seems, had an understanding with Cooper that Beauregard should concentrate a force of 40,000 at Culpeper for a demonstration, or something more, on Washington, when the place became uncovered by the withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac in pursuit of Lee. Davis appears not to have been informed of this military arrangement, nor satisfied with the programme when informed of it. Lee is told of the difficulty of defending Richmond and other places, and that he must defend his own lines, instead of relying upon its being done from Richmond.
_______________

1 Vice-President of the Confederacy.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 357-9

Thursday, March 17, 2016

Diary of Salmon P. Chase: Monday, October 6, 1862

Maj. Garrard called to speak about North Carolina and Genl. Foster. Foster has now 3d. N. Y. Cav., and of Infantry, 17, 21 and 25 Mass, 9 N. J., 2 Md., and 5 R. I., supported by Albemarle and Pamlico Fleet, say ten gunboats. Foster wants reinforcements, — several regiments of Infantry and another Regiment of Cavalry. Maj. Garrard desires that if another regiment of Cavalry is sent, Col. Mix should be made Brigadier.

Genl. Keyes and Maj. Bannister, with Genl. Garfield and Maj. Garrard, formed our breakfast party. Genl. Keyes spoke of the disposition in the army (McClellan, etc.) to disfavor. Republican officers. Genl. Garfield mentioned the case of a young Republican officer ordered to Kansas in 1856, who was told by his Colonel that he would not allow him to remain in the Regiment if he remained Republican. Genl. Keyes spoke of the chaplain at West Point as the most perfect specimen of a Northern man with Southern principles he ever knew, and said that when the new Regiments were organizing under Jeff Davis, as Secretary of War to Pierce, eleven out of fifteen officers were appointed from the South, and when he remarked upon it he was challenged to select the eleven better men.

Went to Department, and with Gov. Morton to see the President about [furlough] to enable Indiana soldiers in camp to vote; which he promised. Left the Governor with the President. Saw Col. Hamilton and arranged interview for him. Met Wadsworth and Cochrane. Asked Cochrane to breakfast.

Genl. Cochrane breakfasted with me, and after breakfast conversed freely about McClellan. He said McClellan would like to retire from active command if he could do so without disgrace, which could be accomplished and a more active General secured by restoring him to chief command, where he would now act in unison with myself. I explained frankly my relations to McClellan — my original admiration and confidence—my disappointment in his inactivity and irresolution — my loss of confidence and conviction that another General should replace him — my constant endeavor to support him by supplies and reinforcements, notwithstanding my distrust, when the President determined to keep him in command — my present belief that I had not judged incorrectly, but my entire willingness, also, to receive any correction which facts would warrant; and my absolute freedom from personal ill will, and my entire readiness to do anything which would insure the earliest possible suppression of the rebellion. He said that Col. Key had often expressed his regret that MeClellan had not conferred with me and acted in concert with me. I replied that I thought, if he had, the rebellion would be ended now; but that I feared concert between us impossible, our views, dispositions, and principles harmonizing so little. He said he would talk with McClellan and write me. I answered that I should be glad to hear from him, and was quite willing he should report to McClellan what I had said.

At Cabinet, the President spoke of his visit to the Army at Sharpsburgh, and the battle fields of Antietam and South Mountain. He said he was fully satisfied that we had not over 60,000 men engaged; and he described the position of the enemy and our own — the enemy's being much the best, his wings and centre communicating easily by the Sharpsburgh road parallel with the stream. He expressed no opinion as to Generalship, nor of results.

Seward asked what news of the Expedition to Charleston? Secretary Welles [said] the necessary iron-clads could not be ready in less than a month. I was much disappointed by this statement, remembering that ten days of a month were up; and said at once that I hoped then we should not wait for the Navy but at once organize a land force sufficient to take the city from James Island. Mr. Stanton agreed in the importance of this, and proposed to order Mitchell's and Garfield's Brigades from the West — send Garfield at once to South Carolina with these Brigades and two more Regiments—and let Mitchell go to work immediately. He said also that he proposed at once to organize an Expedition to open the Mississippi, and give the command of it to McClernand. The President seemed much pleased with both movements—but Halleck remained to be consulted. Would he oppose the President and Stanton? I thought not.

I left the Cabinet with more hope than I have felt for months.

At the President's, I met W. H. Aspinwall and invited him to come and dine with me; which he did. In conversation, I enquired what he thought of the idea of selling some $50,000,000 of Five-twenties at about the market rate? He thought it should be done but doubted whether more than 97½ could be obtained. I said I hoped to get 99 or 99½. He then spoke of his visit to McClellan and seemed greatly to desire my cooperation with him. He mentioned that Burnside had heard that I blamed him for having Porter restored to command; but thinks I would not if I understood all the circumstances.

SOURCE: Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 101-4

Friday, January 22, 2016

Major-General John A. Dix to Major General Henry Halleck, Received July 18, 1863

HDQRS. DEPT. OF VIRGINIA, SEVENTH ARMY CORPS,
Fort Monroe, Va., July –, 1863.
(Received July 18.)

GENERAL: On the 14th of June, I received from you the following dispatch by telegraph:

Lee's army is in motion toward the Shenandoah Valley. All your available force should be concentrated to threaten Richmond by seizing and destroying their railroad bridges over the South and North Anna Rivers, and do them all the damage possible. If you cannot accomplish this, you can at least occupy a large force of the enemy. There can be no serious danger of an attack on Norfolk now.

I had at the time this dispatch was received a force of about 5,000 men moving up the Peninsula. The advance was near the left bank of the Chickahominy, above Diascund Bridge. I had also a considerable force on the Blackwater. These movements had been made to prevent the enemy from sending re-enforcements to General Lee from this department:

At the same time all the transports in the department had been ordered to Aquia Creek, to remove the sick and convalescent of the Army of the Potomac and the public property to Washington. On the 15th, I had not a single transport left. I went on the evening of the 14th to Suffolk, and ordered General Peck to have his command in readiness to move.

On the 17th, transports returned, and were sent to Norfolk to receive Wistar's brigade, which had been ordered there from Suffolk. I advised you on the 18th that part of this brigade went up the York River that morning. The transports came in very slowly, and when they were all here, they were only sufficient to move Colonel Spears regiment of cavalry from Norfolk to the White House.

From my inability to move a larger force at once, General Getty's division, Terry's and Wistar's brigades, were landed at Yorktown.

It was not until the 24th that I could send Colonel Spear with the Eleventh Pennsylvania Cavalry and about 200 men, mounted, of different regiments, under Lieutenant-Colonel Davis, of the Twelfth Illinois Cavalry, to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad bridge over the South Anna. He landed at the White House on the 25th, after constructing a wharf, for which I had ordered up materials from Fort Monroe. The same evening, on the return of the transports to Yorktown, I sent General Wistar with a part of his brigade and a battery of artillery to West Point. He pulled down two small buildings, built a wharf, and landed during the night.

On the 26th, in the evening, I reached the White House, General Getty having arrived immediately before me, and being then engaged in landing his division. Major-General Keyes, with Gordon's division and Terry's brigade, and some other troops, amounting to about 9,000 men, arrived at Cumberland on the same evening, and at the White House on the 27th.

Brigadier-General Foster's brigade arrived on the 28th, making an aggregate force at the White House for duty of 18,730.

Brigadier-General Spinola arrived two days afterward from North Carolina with 1,718 drafted Pennsylvania militia, whose term of service was about to expire, with directions that they be sent to Washington, if they would consent to serve until the insurgent forces were driven out of Pennsylvania and Maryland. They gave the requisite consent, and were embarked for Washington on the 7th July.

On the 27th June, in the morning, Colonel Spear returned from the South Anna, having destroyed the bridge of the Virginia Central Railroad over that river and the quartermaster's depot at Hanover Court-House, secured and brought away 700 animals, 35 army wagons, $15,000 in Confederate bonds, and other property, and captured Brig. Gen. W. H. F. Lee, a son Of the general-in-chief of the insurgent army. A detailed report of the movement was forwarded from the White House.

To facilitate anticipated movements at the White House, I ordered a light locomotive and half a dozen platform cars to be sent from Norfolk. They arrived on the 28th, and were landed on the 29th, and put in operation on the railroad. The railroad bridge over the Pamunkey at the White House was left uninjured, but the rails from that point to West Point had been taken up, probably to be laid down on other roads in the seceded States, where there was urgent need for them.

On Colonel Spear's return, I organized an expedition, under General Getty, to seize and destroy the bridge of the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad over the South Anna. It consisted of his division, excepting a regiment retained for provost duty at the White House, General Foster's brigade, a provisional brigade (part of Wistar's), under Colonel Wardrop, of the Ninety-ninth New York Volunteers, and the cavalry under Colonel Spear; in all, about 10,000 men. His artillery and wagons were passed over the river on platform cars, the time occupied for the passage of the entire column being fifteen hours – from 5 p.m. on the 30th June to 8 a.m. on the 1st of July.

A copy of my instructions to General Getty is annexed.* I advised you of the movement on the 29th June and 1st July.

On the day General Getty commenced his march (the 1st July), I received a dispatch from you, directing me, as soon as my forces returned from their present expedition, to report before sending out any more; and, on the 3d, another, with the following directions:

As soon as the expedition now out terminates, you will draw in all your forces to Yorktown, Fort Monroe, and the defenses of Norfolk, and send to this place (Washington) all the troops not absolutely required for the defense of those places.

To cover General Getty's movement and insure its success, I ordered Major-General Keyes, with Terry's and West's brigades and one of the brigades of Gordon's division, to advance on the Richmond road, and attack the enemy, who was understood to be in considerable force on the right bank of the Chickahominy, a short distance from Bottoms Bridge. General Keyes was to post his artillery in position so as to command the bridge, and open fire on the enemy. He was also directed to hold his position for two or three days, until there was reason to believe that General Getty had accomplished his object. Major-General Keyes was chosen to command the troops by which this demonstration was to be made on account of his rank, and more especially on account of his supposed familiar acquaintance with the country, gained with the Army of the Potomac during the campaign on the Chickahominy.


GENERAL GETTY'S EXPEDITION.

General Getty moved from the left bank of the Pamunkey, opposite the White House, at 8 a.m. on the 1st July. The weather was intensely hot, and, on his arrival at Littlepage's Bridge, near the junction of the South Anna with the Pamunkey, on the 4th of July, a large number of his men were found unfit for active duty. The road from Taylor's Ferry is very narrow, and difficult for artillery and heavy wagons. It passes over high hills, and is very unfavorable to the movements of troops.

Colonel Spear, agreeably to my orders, had destroyed all the bridges and ferry-boats below Littlepage's Bridge.

The column was crossed on the evening of the 4th, and the advance was immediately made to the bridge of the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad across the South Anna. It was found to be held by a very large force, covered by earthworks. From the best information, this force was believed to be about 8,000 men, with fourteen pieces of artillery. Three regiments had been brought down from Fredericksburg. From the evening of the 1st to the evening of the 4th, cars were coming from Richmond with troops inside and outside. Three trains passed up on the morning of the 4th with troops and with eight pieces of artillery. Believing that his own force would not justify an attack on the bridge, that he would sustain very heavy loss, and that success would be doubtful, he decided to destroy as much of the track as possible, and render the railroad unserviceable. General Foster was, therefore, directed to remove the rails, bend them, and burn the ties. This was accomplished from a point near the bridge to a road some 3 miles below.

Major Stratton was sent with a detachment of cavalry to Ashland Station, on the same railroad, about 11 miles from Richmond, where he destroyed the railroad depot, brought off the telegraph instrument, and tore up the track above and below the place, burning the ties and bending the rails. He also destroyed a trestle bridge a mile below Ashland, and a number of cars loaded with materials for the reconstruction of the railroad bridge over the South Anna destroyed by Colonel Spear. He also tore up the track and disabled the rails.

It is the opinion of Major Stratton, who is a very judicious man, and who was a railroad engineer before the rebellion, that the injury he did could not be repaired in less than a week, and it is the opinion of General Getty that, considering all the injuries done to the road, a fortnight will be necessary to put it in running order.

The position of General Getty on the right bank of the Pamunkey, with Richmond in his front, a large force on his right, and a narrow bridge to recross the river, was a critical one, and if he had been attacked by a superior force he would have been in great danger.

Having substantially accomplished the object of breaking up the direct railroad connection between Richmond and General Lee's army in Pennsylvania, he recrossed the Pamunkey, destroyed Littlepage's Bridge, and returned to the White House, bringing with him 21 prisoners, one a commissioned officer, and having lost 2 killed and 7 wounded. The information in regard to the strength of the enemy at the bridge is fully confirmed by the prisoners.


GENERAL KEYES' DEMONSTRATION.

General Keyes, agreeably to his orders to attack Bottom's Bridge, advanced on the 1st of July to Baltimore, or Crump's, Cross-Roads, where he halted for the night, sending his advance, under Colonel West, 3 or 4 miles farther on. Bottom's Bridge is but 13 miles from the White House, and it was expected that General Keyes would take, on the evening of the 1st, a position which should command it, and prevent the enemy from crossing. The correspondence forwarded to you on the 12th instant shows that he proposed to me the same night to fall back to the White House; that I directed him to hold his position, unless the enemy showed himself in such force as to make it necessary to fall back, and that at daybreak on the 2d he fell back to Baltimore Store, or Talley's, though no enemy had appeared, with the exception of some skirmishers on the 1st. His letter, No. 5,­** advising me of his intention, did not reach me till after daylight, when it was too late to arrest the movement.

On the afternoon of the 2d, the enemy advanced, with eight pieces of artillery and an infantry force, on Baltimore Cross-Roads, and Colonel West, who had been left there with the advance, fell back, to avoid being outflanked. The enemy's field pieces were brought within a mile of Baltimore Store, to which General Keyes had retired, and fired from 100 to 150 shots during the night, without doing any injury whatever. From information derived from Colonel West, who is an experienced officer and a man of cool judgment, the enemy's whole force could not at any time have exceeded 3,000 men. General Keyes had 6,000, and fourteen pieces of artillery.

After the night firing, which was manifestly intended for intimidation, the enemy withdrew nearly his whole force before daybreak, and there is little doubt that it was hurried back to Richmond, and sent up to the South Anna by railroad, to oppose General Getty.

From the morning of the 3d to the 7th, when General Getty returned, I am now satisfied that there was at no time more than a regiment of infantry and some small parties of cavalry between the Chickahominy and the White House.

On the correspondence between General Keyes and myself, I make no comment, but leave it to speak for itself. I desire, however, to say, that after the letter, No. 24, showing a concurrence of opinion and feeling on the part of General Keyes and his brigade commanders, I deemed it most prudent to suspend the movement, and leave his command where it was in no danger of molestation.

It is my opinion that if a prompt and vigorous attack had been made on the 1st July on Bottom's Bridge, it would have been regarded as a real movement and not a mere demonstration; that the enemy's troops would have been retained in Richmond, and that General Getty would have succeeded in destroying the railroad bridge over the South Anna. But when General Keyes fell back on the morning of the 2d without being attacked, and it became manifest that the movement was a mere feint, a large portion of the force in Richmond was sent against General Getty.

THE ENEMY'S FORCE IN RICHMOND.

On the 28th of June, the day the last of my force arrived at the White House, Jeff. Davis wrote to General Lee that there were three brigades in Richmond, and part of Hill's division, besides Wise's brigade, on the east side of the city. These different corps could not well have numbered less than 12,000 men. There were, in addition, a body of trained artillerists in the intrenchments, which are very strong; the Home Guard, embracing all males capable of bearing arms, a convalescent brigade, and the Home Guard called in from Petersburg. My information, corroborated from a variety of sources, is, that there were in Richmond on the 1st July not less than 20,000 persons under arms, a majority of whom were regularly organized and trained troops.

On the 2d July, Mr. Ould declared 1,800 paroled prisoners of war at Richmond exchanged, and they were no doubt immediately put in service there. My information that there were about 8,000 men at the South Anna, prepared for General Getty's attack, is, therefore, perfectly consistent with the letter of Jefferson Davis and corroborating intelligence from other sources.

In review, I beg leave to say that the objects in contemplation of your order of the 14th June were substantially accomplished; that the railroad connection between General Lee and Richmond was effectually broken; that a large force of the enemy was occupied, and that very severe injury was inflicted on him.

My position at the White House was one from which the enemy could have been greatly annoyed had the public necessities elsewhere allowed me to retain it. The time required to pass General Getty's column across the river led me to plank over the railroad for the passage of supply trains and artillery, and by means of this facility the whole country could have been controlled from the Pamunkey to the Rappahannock, either by holding the bridge and operating from the White House, or by crossing my whole force, destroying the bridge, making West Point the base of my movement, and avoiding the long and circuitous navigation of the Pamunkey below the White House. With the aid of a pontoon bridge, the Pamunkey can be crossed at New Castle Ferry or Hanovertown, each about 15 or 16 miles from Richmond, 8 or 9 miles nearer than the White House.

I inclose herewith the reports of Major-General Keyes and Brigadier-General Getty, giving a detailed account of their movements.

The loss of General Keyes was 25 killed, wounded, and missing, and of General Getty, 2 killed and 7 wounded.

I desire to acknowledge the zeal and promptitude of the officers and men under my command in the performance of all their duties.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 JOHN A. DIX,
Major-General.
 General H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.
_______________

* See Addenda to Getty’s report, p. 840.
** See p. 826.
See p. 832.

SOURCES: Morgan Dix, Memoirs of John Adams Dix, Volume 2, p. 57; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 2 (Serial No. 44), p. 820-4

Sunday, May 31, 2015

Diary of Salmon P. Chase, Monday, September 8, 1862


Jay Cooke came to breakfast, after which we talked financial matters. He thought gold could be easily obtained on deposit at 4%; and that, by and by, on a more favorable turn of affairs, 5-20s could be negotiated. Clay came in and Cooke left. Clay and I rode towards Department in wagon. Clay said he had made up his mind to take Department and that the President and Stanton were willing he should take that beyond the Mississippi. “Would I go with him to see Halleck?” “Certainly.” Halleck received us kindly but was unwell. Showed no favor to the new Department project.

Returned to Department and attended to general business. Nothing of special financial moment. Barney came in, and said that Stanton and Wadsworth had advised him to leave for New York this evening, as communication with Baltimore might be cut off before to-morrow. He would be governed by my advice. Told him I did not think the event probable, but he had best govern himself by the advice received.

After he had gone, Genl. Mansfield came in, and talked very earnestly about the necessity of ordering up, from Suffolk, 1st. Delaware and 3 and 4 New York, trained and disciplined now 14 months, each 800 strong, say 2,400 men; and from Norfolk 19th Wisconsin and 48th. Pennsylvania, say 1,600 men; leaving at Suffolk, Forey's Brigade of four diminished Regiments, say 1,800 men in all, late of Shield's division, — 11th. Pennsylvania Cavalry (a full and good Regiment) say 900 men;—and Dodge's Regiment of mounted Rifles except one Company; and at Norfolk, 99th NewYork, and one Company of Dodge's, sufficient for military police. He favored leaving Keyes and Peck at Yorktown. — He said the defences of the city were weak on the Eastern side; and that there ought to be at least 65,000 good men to hold it if McClellan is defeated — to improve victory if he is successful — He referred to old times. Was in Texas the Winter before the Rebellion broke out. Saw Twiggs who hated him because he was on Court-Martial. Was then told by officer in Council of War of K. G. C.1 that Floyd and Cobb in Cabinet and Jeff. Davis and Breckinridge, were members. In this Council of War, Orders were given to seize Navy Yards, Forts, etc. while its members were yet Cabinet officers and Senators. The Order of the K. G. C. ramified throughout the South. First offered services to Juarez, who refused them because too dangerous. They then plotted the invasion of Cuba, which failed. Then declared themselves Protectors of Southern Rights and levied a contribution upon all planters and slaveholders — some giving $5 and some $10, and some more or less. In this way they got large sums and commenced operations. They designed to seize Washington and inaugurate Breckinridge; and in reference to this Mason wrote Faulkner advising him not to resign — this letter being now in Seward's possession. This plot only failed through the bringing of troops to Washington, and the unwillingness of leaders to make a bloody issue so early. — He spoke of Genl. Scott. Said he had not treated him well — had placed McDowell in command over the river last year, superseding himself, and when he had asked for explanation he simply replied that his orders had been given. He felt himself wronged, but did his duty to the best of his ability. He was afterwards treated badly by Genl. Wool who did not like him, though he treated him civilly. Had lately been in command at Suffolk (an insignificant post) until summoned here to Court of Inquiry. Wanted active employment but was unable to get any. Had sent for his horses, and proposed to visit all the fortifications around the city on his own account. — I was a good deal affected by the manifest patriotism and desire to do something for his country manifested by the old General; and could not help wishing that he was younger and thinking that, perhaps, after all, it would have been better to trust him.

After the General left, went to War Department, where found the President, Stanton and Wadsworth. The President said he had felt badly all day. Wadsworth said there was no danger of an attack on Washington, and that the men ought to be severely punished who intimated the possibility of its surrender. The President spoke of the great number of stragglers he had seen coming into town this morning; and of the immense losses by desertion.

Returned home. Maj. Andrews and others called.
_______________

1 Knights of the Golden Circle.

SOURCE: Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 69-71

Friday, October 10, 2014

John M. Forbes to Colonel Erasmus D. Keyes, April 16, 1861

Boston, April 16,1861.
Colonel Keyes, General Scott's Headquarters, N. Y.:

Pray examine chart of the Chesapeake. Consider availability of Annapolis for rendezvous of our Massachusetts troops bound for Washington.

J. M. Forbes

SOURCE: Sarah Forbes Hughes, Letters and recollections of John Murray Forbes, Volume 1, p. 207

Saturday, March 1, 2014

Abraham Lincoln to Major General George B. McClellan, May 9, 1862


FORT MONROE, VA., May 9, 1862.
Major-General McCLELLAN:

MY DEAR SIR: I have just assisted the Secretary of War in framing the part of a dispatch to you relating to army corps, which dispatch of course will have reached you long before this will.

I wish to say a few words to you privately on this subject. I ordered the army corps organization not only on the unanimous opinion of the twelve generals whom you had selected and assigned as generals of divisions, but also on the unanimous opinion of every military man I could get an opinion from, and every modern military book, yourself only excepted. Of course I did not on my own judgment pretend to understand the subject. I now think it indispensable for you to know how your struggle against it is received in quarters which we cannot entirely disregard. It is looked upon as merely all effort to pamper one or two pets and to persecute and degrade their supposed rivals. I have had no word from Sumner, Heintzelman, or Keyes. The commanders of these corps are of course the three highest officers with you, but I am constantly told that you have no consultation or communication with them; that you consult and communicate with nobody but General Fitz John Porter and perhaps General Franklin. I do not say these complaints are true or just, but at all events it is proper you should know of their existence. Do the commanders of corps disobey your orders in anything?

When you relieved General Hamilton of his command the other day you thereby lost the confidence of at least one of your best friends in the Senate. And here let me say, not as applicable to you personally, that Senators and Representatives speak of me in their places as they please without question, and that officers of the Army must cease addressing insulting letters to them for taking no greater liberty with them.

But to return: Are you strong enough – are you strong enough, even with my help – to set your foot upon the necks of Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes all at once? This is a practical and very serious question for you.

The success of your army and the cause of the country are the same, and of course I only desire the good of the cause.

Yours, truly,
 A. LINCOLN.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 11, Part 3 (Serial No. 14), p. 154-5

Monday, December 2, 2013

Brigadier General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Meade, March 18, 1862

CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA, March 18, 1862.

I note all you write about McClellan. I fear it is all true, and that the most desperate efforts have been made and are still being made to take away his command and destroy him. Franklin told me that McClellan said to him, as they followed Lander's corpse, that he almost wished he was in the coffin instead of Lander. It is reported that they were about to introduce into the House of Representatives a vote of want of confidence in him, but were restrained by fearing it would not pass. It is said the President remains his friend.

McClellan is not the man to make himself popular with the masses. His manners are reserved and retiring. He was not popular either in Chicago or Cincinnati, when at the head of large railroad interests. He has never studied or practiced the art of pleasing, and indeed has not paid that attention to it which every man whose position is dependent on popular favor must pay, if he expects to retain his position. Now, you know long before the tide turned, I told you of ill-advised acts on his part, showing a disposition to gratify personal feelings, at the expense of his own interests. I have no doubt now that the enmity of Heintzelman, Sumner, McDowell and Keyes can all be traced to this very cause — his failure to conciliate them, and the injustice they consider his favoritism to others has been to them. So long as he had full swing, they were silent, but so soon as others had shaken the pedestal he stood on, they join in to lend their hands.

Don't you remember as early as last September, telling us how indignant Charles King was at the treatment of General Scott by McClellan, and that the General had said he would have arrested him for disrespect if he had dared to? In the selection of his staff he has not shown the judgment he might have done. There are too many men on it that are not worthy to be around a man with McClellan's reputation. Again, you know my opinion of his treatment of the Ball's Bluff affair, through personal regard for Stone. All these little things have combined, with his political foes, to shake his position. I think, however, it is pretty well settled that Old Abe has determined he will not cut his head off till he has had a chance, and as I wrote you before, all will depend now on the hazard of a die. Any disaster, never mind from what cause, will ruin him, and any success will reinstate him in public favor.

It is very hard to know what is going to be done, or what the enemy will do. My opinion is that they are concentrating all their available forces around Richmond, and that they will make there a determined and desperate resistance. Of course, this defense will be made at first in advance, as far as they deem it prudent to go, or as they can readily retire from, as for instance, the Rappahannock on the north, Fredericksburg and the Potomac on the east, Yorktown and Norfolk on the southeast. Where McClellan will attack them is not known, but before many days are over it will be settled, and we will have a fight either at Fredericksburg, Yorktown or Norfolk. For my part, the sooner we meet them the better. The thing has to be done, and there is nothing gained by delay. The morale is on our side; our recent victories, their retreat from Manassas, all combine to inspirit us and demoralize them; and if our men only behave as we hope and believe they will, I think before long we shall have Richmond.

I rode over this morning and saw Willie.1 I found on my arrival that there was in camp a party of ladies and gentlemen, consisting of Mr. Charles King, of New York, and his daughter, Mrs. Captain Ricketts, and her sister, who is married to a son of Charles King, a captain in the Twelfth (Willie's) Regiment. These ladies had come out to see Captain King, accompanied by Colonel Van Rensselaer, who you remember married a niece of Charles King. They had prepared a lunch, and all the officers were partaking of it, and having, as is usual, a merry time. Soon after I rode up, Miss King recognized Kuhn, who was with me, and sent Captain Wister,2 of the regiment after him, and in a few minutes Colonel Van Rensselaer came up to me, and, after the usual salutations, politely asked me to permit him to present me to the party. Of course I had to say yes, and went up with him and joined the party. Mrs. Ricketts, you know, was a Miss Lawrence. I had known her mother and family all my life. She is now a great heroine. After doing the civil to the party I retired.
__________

1 William Sergeant, brother of Mrs. Meade.
2 Francis Wister, captain 12th U. S. Infantry.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 1, p. 253-4

Wednesday, November 27, 2013

Brigadier General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Meade, March 9, 1862

CAMP PIERPONT, VA., March 9, 1862.

I am very much afraid there is a great deal of truth in what told you, and that the President is at length yielding to the immense pressure that has been brought to bear to influence him to remove McClellan. McClellan, I understand, continues firm and undaunted. He says they may supersede him whenever they please, but so long as he is responsible, he intends to do what he thinks right, and not what others dictate.

This morning's paper announces the evacuation of Leesburg and its occupation by a part of Banks' force. I never expected they would attempt to hold either Winchester or Leesburg after we were ready to move in force.

I hear we are to be divided into four corps d' armee, to be commanded respectively by Sumner, McDowell, Heintzelman and Keyes. Into which of these commands McCall's Division will be incorporated is not yet decided. I don't think there is much choice between them. The selection of these men, by virtue of the seniority of their commissions, was, I understand, opposed by McClellan, who, finding he could not designate his commanders, objected to corps d' armee, and said he only wanted divisions and their commanders. He has been overruled, and these officers selected in opposition to his openly expressed views. All this is confidential, though it is a matter of absolute fact. Public opinion in this country is so wayward and so whimsical that I should not be surprised to see the same people who the other day called McClellan a demi-god, to-morrow applauding his removal.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 1, p. 250-1

Thursday, September 26, 2013

Colonel William T. Sherman to Ellen Ewing Sherman, July 28, 1861


FORT CORCORAN, July 28, Sunday.

I have already written to you since my return from the unfortunate defeat at Bull Run. I had previously conveyed to you the doubts that oppressed my mind on the score of discipline.

Four large columns of poorly disciplined militia left this place, the Long bridge and Alexandria, all concentrating at a place called Centreville, twenty-seven miles from Washington. We were the first column to reach Centreville, the enemy abandoning all defences en route.

The first day of our arrival our commander, General Tyler, advanced on Bull Run, about two and a half miles distant, and against orders engaged the batteries. He sent back to Centreville and I advanced with our Brigade, when we lay for half an hour, amidst descending shots, killing a few of our men. The batteries were full a mile distant, and I confess I, nor any person in my Brigade, saw an enemy.

Towards evening we returned to Centreville.

That occurred on Thursday. We lay in camp till Saturday night by which the whole army was assembled in and about Centreville. We got orders for march at 2½ Sunday morning, — our column of three brigades — Schenck, Sherman and Keyes — to move straight along a road to Bull Run; another of about 10,000 men to make a circuit by the right (Hunter’s), and come upon the enemy in front of us; Heintzelman's column of about similar strength also to make a wide circuit to sustain Hunter. We took the road first, and about 6 A.M. came in sight of Bull Run. We saw in the grey light of morning men moving about, but no signs of batteries. I rode well down to the stone bridge which crosses the stream, saw plenty of trees cut down, some bush huts, such as soldiers use on picket guard, but none of the evidences of strong fortifications we had been led to believe.

Our business was simply to threaten, and give time for Hunter and Heintzelman to make their circuit. We arranged our troops to this end, Schenck to the left of the road, and I to the right, Keyes behind in reserve. We had with us two six gun batteries, and a 30 lb. gun. This was fired several times, but no answer. We shifted positions several times, firing whenever we had reason to suppose there were any troops. About ten or eleven o’clock, we saw the cloud of dust in the direction of Hunter's approach, saw one or more regiments of the enemy leave their line and move in that direction, soon the firing of musketry and guns showing the engagement had commenced. Early in the morning I saw a flag flying behind some trees. Some of the soldiers seeing it called out, “Colonel, there's a flag, a flag of truce.” A man in the field with his dog and gun, called out, “No, it is no flag of truce, but a flag of defiance.”  I was at the time studying the ground and paid no attention to him. About nine o’clock I was well down to the Run with some skirmishers, and observed two men on horseback ride along a hill, descend, cross the stream, and ride out towards us. He had a gun in his hand which he waved over his head, and called out to us, “You d----d black abolitionists, come on,” etc. I permitted some of the men to fire on him, but no damage was done. We remained some time thus awaiting the action which had begun on the other side of Bull Run. We could see nothing, but heard the firing and could judge that Hunter's column steadily advanced. About 2 P. M. they came to a stand, the firing was severe and stationary. General Tyler rode up to me and remarked that he might have to send the N. Y. 69th to the relief of Hunter. A short while after, he came up and ordered me with my whole Brigade, some 3,400 men, to cross over to Hunter. I ordered the movement, led off, found a place where the men could cross, but the battery could not follow.

We crossed the stream, and ascended the bluff bank, moving slowly to permit the ranks to close up. When about half a mile back from the stream, I saw the parties in the fight, and the first danger was that we might be mistaken for secessionists and fired on. One of my regiments had on the grey uniform of the Virginia troops. We first fired on some retreating secessionists, our Lieutenant Colonel Haggerty was killed, and my bugler by my side had his horse shot dead. I moved on and joined Hunter’s column. They had a pretty severe fight. Hunter was wounded, and the unexpected arrival of my Brigade seemed a great relief to all. I joined them on a high field with a house, and as we effected the junction the secessionists took to the woods and were seemingly retreating, and General McDowell who had accompanied Hunter’s column ordered me to join in the pursuit. I will not attempt to describe you the scene. Their batteries were on all the high hills overlooking the ground which we had to cross, and they fired with great vigor. Our horse batteries pursued from point to point returning the fire, whilst we moved on, with shot, shell and cannister over and all round us. I kept to my horse and head of the Brigade, and moving slowly, came upon their heavy masses of men, behind all kinds of obstacles.

They knew the ground perfectly, and at every turn we found new ground, over which they poured their fire. At last we came to a stand, and with my regiments in succession we crossed a ridge and were exposed to a very heavy fire. First one regiment and then another and another were forced back, not by the bayonet but by a musketry and rifle fire, which it seemed impossible to push our men through. After an hour of close contest our men began to fall into confusion. One hundred and eleven had been killed, some two hundred and fifty wounded and the soldiers began to fall back in disorder. My horse was shot through the fore leg. My knee was cut round by a ball, and another had hit my coat collar and did not penetrate; an aide, Lt. Bagley, was missing, and spite of all exertions the confusion increased, and the men would not re-form. Similar confusion had already occurred among other regiments, and I saw we were gone. Had they kept their ranks we were the gainers up to that point, only our field batteries, exposed, had been severely cut up by theirs, partially covered. Then for the first time I saw the carnage of battle, men lying in every conceivable shape, and mangled in a horrible way; but this did not make a particle of impression on me, but horses running about riderless with blood streaming from their nostrils, lying on the ground hitched to guns, gnawing their sides in death. I sat on my horse on the ground where Ricketts’ Battery had been shattered to fragments, and saw the havoc done. I kept my regiments under cover as much as possible, till the last moment, when it became necessary to cross boldly a ridge and attack the enemy, by that time gathered in great strength behind all sorts of cover.

The volunteers up to that time had done well, but they were repulsed regiment by regiment, and I do think it was impossible to stand long in that fire. I did not find fault with them, but they fell into disorder — an incessant clamor of tongues, one saying they were not properly supported, another that they could not tell friend from foe; but I observed the gradual retreat going on and did all I could to stop it. At last it became manifest we were falling back, and as soon as I perceived it, I gave it direction by the way we came, and thus we fell back to Centreville, some four miles. We had with our Brigade no wagons, they had not crossed the river. At Centreville came pouring in the confused masses of men, without order or system. Here I supposed we should assemble in some order the confused masses and try to stem the tide. Indeed I saw but little evidence of being pursued, though once or twice their cavalry interposed themselves between us and our rear. I had read of retreats before, have seen the noise and confusion of crowds of men at fires and shipwrecks, but nothing like this. It was as disgraceful as words can portray, but I doubt if volunteers from any quarter could do better. Each private thinks for himself. If he wants to go for water, he asks leave of no one. If he thinks right, he takes the oats and corn, and even burns the house of his enemy. As we could not prevent these disorders on the way out, I always feared the result, for everywhere we found the people against us. No curse could be greater than invasion by a volunteer army. No Goths or Vandals ever had less respect for the lives and property of friends and foes, and henceforth we ought never to hope for any friends in Virginia. McDowell and all the generals tried their best to stop these disorders, but for us to say we commanded that army is no such thing. They did as they pleased. Democracy has worked out one result, and the next step is to be seen. Beauregard and Johnston were enabled to effect a junction by the failure of Patterson to press the latter, and they had such accurate accounts of our numbers and movements that they had all the men they wanted. We had never more than 18,000 engaged, though some ten or twelve thousand were within a few miles. After our retreat here I did my best to stop the flying masses, and partially succeeded, so that we once more present a front: but Beauregard has committed a sad mistake in not pursuing us promptly. Had he done so, he could have stampeded us again, and gone into Washington.

As it is, I suppose their plan is to produce riot in Baltimore, cross over above Leesburg, and come upon Washington through Maryland. Our rulers think more of who shall get office, than who can save the country. Nobody, no man, can save the country. The difficulty is with the masses. Our men are not good soldiers. They brag, but don't perform, complain sadly if they don't get everything they want, and a march of a few miles uses them up. It will take a long time to overcome these things, and what is in store for us in the future I know not. I purpose trying to defend this place if Beauregard approaches Washington by this route, but he has now deferred it some days and I rather think he will give it up.

The newspapers will tell ten thousand things, none of which are true. I have had no time to read them, but I know no one now has the moral courage to tell the truth. . . .

SOURCE: M. A. DeWolfe Howe, Editor, Home Letters of General Sherman,  p. 204-10.  A full copy of this letter can be found in the William T Sherman Family papers (SHR), University of Notre Dame Archives (UNDA), Notre Dame, IN 46556, Folder CSHR 1/138.

Sunday, June 9, 2013

Have We A General?

MR. EDITOR:  The present rebellion has now been persisted in for more than a year.  It has developed in an unexpected and almost marvelous degree, the before unknown resources of the country.  It has called a larger number of men into the field than any other single nation can muster, and all of them are volunteers.  It has created a navy able to compete with any in the world.  It has appropriated to active military use, novel, scientific and mechanical agencies, unknown to all previous wars.  It has developed financial resources, available and plenteous wealth, and rendered it easily applicable to the needs of the country, as much to our own surprise as it has been to the astonishment of other nations.  Above all, it has proven that the soldiers of the Union, are as gallant and courageous as the most ardent patriot could wish.

One thing, in my opinion, the war has not yet done.  It has found among us an abundance of the very best soldiers that ever fought and died upon the battlefield, but thus far it seems to have failed in giving prominence to any man competent to command a great army.  I cannot doubt that among the numerous officers in the national ranks, there must be some who would prove admirable leaders.  But they remain unknown, being over shadowed by those occupying higher positions – positions unworthily filled.

Our two great armies are commanded by McClellan and Halleck.  The former has been in command of his department for nearly a year, superseding McDowell, who had just fought and lost a great battle which he ought to have won.  He has under his command probably the best army, and the most completely appointed, ever yet led to the field.  His friends that he is a wonderful strategist, how justly events have plainly indicated.  He lay idle all winter before Manassas, with force and means enough to have captured all the rebels there at any time, by a single week’s use of but ordinary military skill.  Yet he allowed them to escape leaving behind them, scarcely enough of war materials to make trophies of.  He has been nearly, or quite, three months on the Yorktown [peninsula], and is now within sight of Richmond.  During the period, we have had the evacuation of Yorktown, without any material loss to the rebels, and several subsequent heavy [skirmishes].  In the most important of these, the rebels have made the attack, and in every instance, have found our forces unprepared and in a great measure uncommanded, and, consequently, in each instance have caused us heavy and intolerable loss of men.  It was so at Williamsburg, and so it was in the affair of last Saturday and Sunday.  In a word, this great strategist displays a remarkable capacity for placing portions of his army in positions which invite attack, without furnishing support, or with support so [distant] as to be able to give it only in time to just avoid absolute defeat and destruction.

At noon, Jun [1st], this strategist, Gen. McClellan, himself telegraphed these words, “We have had a desperate battle, in which the corps of Generals Sumner, Heintzelman and Keyes have been engaged against greatly superior numbers!  What kind of strategy is that which allows a portion of any army to be assailed by “greatly superior numbers”?  Is it any consolation to tell us that, “Our loss is heavy,” but that of the enemy must have been enormous?”  If the fight was a necessary one, it would be endurable.  If he had captured the enemy, we might perceive that something had been gained.  But the fight was “desperate” he says, and the enemy was merely repulsed.  That repulse cost us 1000 killed and 2000 or more wounded.  This is Gen. McClellan’s strategy.  This is a specimen of the battles he fights, and the glory he gives to our army.  A thousand bereaved mothers and widows, nothing gained, and all to display his “strategy.”

Gen. McClellan has had the power to take Richmond any time during the past six weeks. – It is plain that he has not the capacity to move a large army, that he does not know how to plan it; and that he will not be able to fight with it so as to secure all the advantages of victory.  I do not doubt that he will take Richmond.  But I think it safe to predict that but a small portion of the rebel forces will fall into his hands.  The best part of the campaign will be wasted before that city, and a barren possession of it, will be the sum of our gain.  If this is strategy, I do not see it.  I consider McClellan an egregious failure; by the time a few more thousand lives are sacrificed, to satisfy his strategy, I presume it will be thought expedient to try another.

I will not ascribe the folly of the battle of Shiloh to General Halleck.  I think General Grant is responsible for that, and it is a responsibility no one will wish to share with him.  The evacuation of Corinth, by the rebels taking with them all their munitions of war evidences either a marvelous degree of successful strategy on their party, or an equally marvelous want of Generalship on the part of Halleck.  General Grant set down about Pittsburgh Landing with some 40,000 men, and felt so secure that he never tho’t  of the ordinary precaution of entrenching his camp.  Halleck, having the addition of Buell’s, Mitchell’s, Pope’s and Curtis’ Divisions, making his army three of four times as effective as Grant’s, builds entrenchments all the way from Shiloh to Corinth, and when he gets there, obtains the place for his pains!  There is no doubt that Grant ought to have entrenched himself. – It is equally evident that Halleck has been wasting his time.  He could have taken Corinth, and the larger part of the rebel army, had he but moved on it with rapidity and energy, instead of wasting his time in his entrenchments.  The battle of Shiloh appears to have given him a “big scare.”  To avoid Grant’s absurd negligence and recklessness, he adopted the other extreme, and instead of proving a competent General, he has proven merely to be a good ditcher.

These two Generals are the only ones who have had command of large armies.  The ditchers around Corinth and Yorktown are the best evidence they have given of their capacity.  I do not know how well they were dug.  But I submit, that, although ditch digging is good in its place, a General ought to have the ability to do “something else.”  I do not know who should supersede these so-called Generals.  But I am sure some one, possessed of higher qualifications, ought to be found, with ease, by those whose business it is to know the character, and ability of our numerous military officers.  We have had too many evacuations without results.  If this mode of warfare should be persisted in, you and I need not hope to live long enough to see the end of the rebellion.  I repeat it, then, let us have a GENERAL if it be possible to find one.  We have had enough of ditch-digging; let us next have men who will “go in for a fight.”
H.

– Published in The Burlington Weekly Hawk-Eye, Burlington, Iowa, Saturday, June 7, 1862, p. 2