HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, February
3, 1862.
SIR: I ask your indulgence for the following paper, rendered
necessary by circumstances.
I assumed command of the troops in the vicinity of Washington
on Saturday, July 27, 1861, six days after the battle of Bull Run.
I found no army to command – a mere collection of regiments
cowering on the banks of the Potomac, some perfectly raw, others dispirited by
the recent defeat.
Nothing of any consequence had been done to secure the
southern approaches to the capital by means of defensive works; nothing
whatever had been undertaken to defend the avenues to the city on the northern
side of the Potomac. The troops were not only undisciplined, undrilled, and
dispirited; they were not even placed in military positions. The city was
almost in a condition to have been taken by a dash of a regiment of cavalry.
Without one day's delay I undertook the difficult task
assigned to me; that task the honorable Secretary knows was given to me without
my solicitation or foreknowledge. How far I have accomplished it will best be
shown by the past and the present.
The capital is secure against attack, the extensive
fortifications erected by the labor of our troops enable a small garrison to
hold it against a numerous army, the enemy have been held in check, the State
of Maryland is securely in our possession, the detached counties of Virginia
are again within the pale of our laws, and all apprehension of trouble in
Delaware is at an end; the enemy are confined to the positions they occupied
before the disaster of the 21st July. More than all this, I have now under my
command a well-drilled and reliable army, to which the destinies of the country
may be confidently committed. This army is young and untried in battle, but it
is animated by the highest spirit and is capable of great deeds.
That so much has been accomplished, and such an army created
in so short a time from nothing, will hereafter be regarded as one of the
highest glories of the administration and the nation.
Many weeks, I may say many months, ago, this Army of the
Potomac was fully in condition to repel any attack; but there is a vast
difference between that and the efficiency required to enable troops to attack
successfully an army elated by victory and intrenched in a position long since
selected, studied, and fortified.
In the earliest papers I submitted to the President I asked
for an effective and movable force far exceeding the aggregate now on the banks
of the Potomac. I have not the force I asked for.
Even when in a subordinate position I always looked beyond
the operations of the Army of the Potomac. I was never satisfied in my own mind
with a barren victory, but looked to combined and decisive operations. When I
was placed in command of the Armies of the United States I immediately turned
my attention to the whole field of operations, regarding the Army of the
Potomac as only one, while the most important, of the masses under my command.
I confess that I did not then appreciate the total absence of a general plan
which had before existed, nor did I know that utter disorganization and want of
preparation pervaded the Western armies. I took it for granted that they were
nearly, if not quite, in condition to move towards the fulfillment of my plans.
I acknowledge that I made a great mistake
I sent at once, with the approval of the Executive, officers
I considered competent to command in Kentucky and Missouri. Their instructions
looked to prompt movements. I soon found that the labor of creation and
organization had to be performed there; transportation, arms, clothing,
artillery, discipline, all were wanting. These things required time to procure
them.
The generals in command have done their work most
creditably, but we are still delayed. I had hoped that a general advance could
be made during the good weather of December. I was mistaken. My wish was to
gain possession of the Eastern Tennessee Railroad as a preliminary movement,
then to follow it up immediately by an attack on Nashville and Richmond, as
nearly at the same time as possible.
I have ever regarded our true policy as being that of fully
preparing ourselves, and then seeking for the most decisive results. I do not
wish to waste life in useless battles, but prefer to strike at the heart.
Two bases of operation seem to present themselves for the
advance of the Army of the Potomac:
I. That of Washington – Its present position – involving a
direct attack upon the intrenched positions of the enemy at Centreville,
Manassas, &c., or else a movement to turn one or both flanks of those
positions, or a combination of the two plans.
The relative force of the two armies will not justify an
attack on both flanks; an attack on his left flank alone involves a long line
of wagon communication, and cannot prevent him from collecting for the decisive
battle all the detachments now on his extreme right and left.
Should we attack his right flank by the line of the
Occoquan, and a crossing of the Potomac below that river, and near his
batteries, we could perhaps prevent the junction of the enemy's right with his
center (we might destroy the former); we would remove the obstructions to the
navigation of the Potomac, reduce the length of wagon transportation by
establishing new depots at the nearest points of the Potomac, and strike more
directly his main railway communication.
The fords of the Occoquan below the mouth of the Bull Run
are watched by the rebels; batteries are said to be placed on the heights in
the rear (concealed by the woods), and the arrangement of his troops is such
that he can oppose some considerable resistance to a passage of that stream.
Information has just been received to the effect that the enemy are intrenching
a line of heights extending from the vicinity of Songster’s (Union Mills)
towards Evansport. Early in January Spriggs' Ford was occupied by General Redes
with 3,600 men and eight guns. There are strong reasons for believing that
Davis' Ford is occupied. These circumstances indicate or prove that the enemy
anticipates the movement in question and is prepared to resist, it. Assuming
for the present that this operation is determined upon, it may be well to
examine briefly its probable progress. In the present state of affairs our
column (for the movement of so large a force must be made in several columns,
at, least five or six) can reach the Accotink without danger. During the march
thence to the Occoquan our right flank becomes exposed to an attack from
Fairfax Station, Sangster's, and Union Mills. This danger must be met by
occupying in some force either the two first-named places, or, better, the
point of junction of the roads leading thence to the village of Occoquan. This
occupation must be continued so long as we continue to draw supplies by the
roads from this city or until a battle is won.
The crossing of the Occoquan should be made at all the fords
from Wolf Run to the mouth, the points of crossing not being necessarily
confined to the fords themselves. Should the enemy occupy this line in force,
we must, with what assistance the flotilla can afford, endeavor to three the
passage near the mouth, thus forcing the enemy to abandon the whole line, or be
taken in flank himself.
Having gained the line of the Occoquan, it would be
necessary to throw a column by the shortest route to Dumfries, partly to force
the enemy to abandon his batteries on the Potomac, partly to cover our left
flank against an attack front the direction of Aquia, and lastly, to establish
our communications with the river by the best roads, and thus give us new
depots. The enemy would by this time have occupied the line of the Occoquan
above Bull Run, holding Brentsville in force, and perhaps extending his lines
somewhat farther to the southwest.
Our next step would then be to prevent the enemy from
crossing the Occoquan between Bull Run and Broad Run, to fall upon our right
flank while moving on Brentsville. This might be effected by occupying Bacon Race
Church and the cross-roads near the mouth of Bull Run, or still more
effectually by moving to the fords themselves, and preventing him from
debouching on our side.
These operations would possibly be resisted, and it would
require some time to effect them, as nearly at the same time as possible we
should gain the fords necessary to our purposes above Broad Run. Having secured
our right flank, it would become necessary to carry Brentsville at any cost;
for we could not leave it between our right flank and the main body. The final
movement on the railroad must be determined by circumstances existing at the
time.
This brief sketch brings out in bold relief the great
advantage possessed by the enemy in the strong central position he occupies,
with roads diverging in every direction, and a strong line of defense enabling
him to remain on the defensive, with a small force on one flank, while he
concentrates everything on the other for a decisive action.
Should we place a portion of our force in front of Centreville,
while the rest crosses the Occoquan, we commit the error of dividing our army
by a very difficult obstacle, and by a distance too great to enable the two
parts to support each other, should either be attacked by the masses of the
enemy while the other is held in check.
I should perhaps have dwelt more decidedly on the fact that
the force left near Sangster's must be allowed to remain somewhere on that side
of the Occoquan until the decisive battle is over, so as to cover our retreat
in the event of disaster, unless it should be decided to select and intrench a
new base somewhere near Dumfries, a proceeding involving much time.
After the passage of the Occoquan by the main army, this
covering force could be drawn into a more central and less exposed position – say
Brimstone Hill or nearer the Occoquan. In this latitude the weather will for a
considerable period be very uncertain, and a movement commenced in force on
roads in tolerably firm condition will be liable, almost certain, to be much
delayed by rains and snow. It will therefore be next to impossible to surprise
the enemy or take him at a disadvantage by rapid maneuvers. Our slow progress
will enable him to divine our purposes and take his measures accordingly. The
probability is, from the best information we possess, that the enemy has
improved the roads leading to his lines of defense, while we will have to work
as we advance.
Bearing in mind what has been said, and the present
unprecedented and impassable condition of the roads, it will be evident that no
precise period can be fixed upon for the movement on this line, nor can its
duration be closely calculated; it seems certain that many weeks may elapse
before it is possible to commence the march. Assuming the success of this
operation, and the defeat of the enemy as certain, the question at once arises
as to the importance of the results gained. I think these results would be
confined to the possession of the field of battle, the evacuation of the line
of the Upper Potomac by the enemy, and the moral effect of the victory – important
results, it is true, but not decisive of the war, nor securing the destruction
of the enemy's main army; for he could fall back upon other positions and fight
us again and again, should the condition of his troops permit. If he is in no
condition to fight us again out of the range of the intrenchments at Richmond,
we would find it a very difficult and tedious matter to follow him up there, for
he would destroy his railroad bridges and otherwise impede our progress through
a region where the roads are as bad as they well can be, and we would probably
find ourselves forced at last to change the whole theater of war, or to seek a
shorter land route to Richmond, with a smaller available force, and at an
expenditure of much more time than were we to adopt the short line at once. We
would also have forced the enemy to concentrate his forces and perfect his
defensive measures at the very points where it is desirable to strike him when
least prepared.
II. The second base of operations available for the Army of
the Potomac is that of the Lower Chesapeake Bay, which affords the shortest
possible land route to Richmond, and strikes directly at the heart of the
enemy's power in the east.
The roads in that region are passable at all seasons of the
year. The country now alluded to is much more favorable for offensive
operations than that in front of Washington (which is very unfavorable), much
more level, more cleared land, the woods less dense, the soil more sandy, and
the spring some two or three weeks earlier. A movement in force on that line
obliges the enemy to abandon his intrenched position at Manassas, in order to
hasten to cover Richmond and Norfolk. He must do this; for should he permit us
to occupy Richmond; his destruction can be averted only by entirely defeating
us in battle, in which he must be the assailant. This movement, if successful,
gives us the capital, the communications, the supplies of the rebels. Norfolk
would fall, all the waters of the Chesapeake would be ours, all Virginia would
be in our power, and the enemy forced to abandon Tennessee and North Carolina.
The alternative presented to the enemy would be to beat us in a position selected
by ourselves, disperse, or pass beneath the Caudine Forks.
Should we be beaten in battle, we have a perfectly secure
retreat down the Peninsula upon Fort Monroe, with our flanks perfectly covered
by the fleet. During the whole movement our left flank is covered by the water.
Our right is secure, for the reason that the enemy is too distant to reach us
in time. He can only oppose us in front. We bring our fleet into full play.
After a successful battle our position would be: Burnside
forming our left, Norfolk held securely; our center connecting Burnside with
Buell, both by Raleigh and Lynchburg; Buell in Eastern Tennessee and North
Alabama; Halleck at Nashville and Memphis. The next movement would be to
connect with Sherman on the left, by reducing Wilmington and Charleston; to
advance our center into South Carolina and Georgia; to push Buell either
towards Montgomery or to unite with the main army in Georgia; to throw Halleck
southward to meet the naval expedition from New Orleans. We should then be in a
condition to reduce at our leisure all the Southern sea ports; to occupy all
the avenues of communication; to use the great outlet of the Mississippi; to
re-establish our Government and arms in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas; to
force the slaves to labor for our subsistence instead of that of the rebels; to
bid defiance to all foreign interference. Such is the object I have ever had in
view; this is the general plan which I hope to accomplish.
For many long months I have labored to prepare the Army of
the Potomac to play its part in the programme. From the day when I was placed
in command of all our armies I have exerted myself to place all the other
armies in such a condition that they, too, could perform their allotted duties.
Should it be determined to operate from the Lower
Chesapeake, the point of landing which promises the most brilliant result is
Urbana, on the Lower Rappahannock. This point is easily reached by vessels of
heavy draught; it is neither occupied nor observed by the enemy; it is but one
march from West Point, the key of that region, and thence but two marches to
Richmond. A rapid movement from Urbana would probably cut off Magruder in the
Peninsula, and enable us to occupy Richmond before it could be strongly
re-enforced. Should we fail in that, we could, with the co-operation of the
Navy, cross the James and throw ourselves in the rear of Richmond, thus forcing
the enemy to come out and attack us, for his position would be untenable with
us on the southern bank of the river. Should circumstances render it not
advisable to land at Urbana, we can use Mob Jack Bay; or, the worst coming to the
worst, we can take Fort Monroe as a base, and operate with complete security,
although with less celerity and brilliancy of results, up the Peninsula.
To reach whatever point may be selected as a base a large
amount of cheap water transportation must be collected, consisting mainly of
canal-boats, barges, wood boats, schooners, &c., towed by small steamers,
all of a very different character from those required for all previous
expeditions. This can certainly be accomplished within thirty days from the
time the order is given. I propose, as the best possible plan that can, in my
judgment, be adopted, to select Urbana as a landing place for the first
detachments; to transport by water four divisions of infantry with their
batteries, the regular infantry, a few wagons, one bridge train, and a few
squadrons of cavalry, making the vicinity of Hooker's position the place of
embarkation for as many as possible; to move the regular cavalry and reserve
artillery, the remaining bridge trains and wagons, to a point somewhere near
Cape Lookout; then ferry them over the river by means of North River
ferry-boats, march them over to the Rappahannock (covering the movement by an
infantry force near Heathsville), and to cross the Rappahannock in a similar
way. The expense and difficulty of the movement will then be very much
diminished (a saving of transportation of about 10,000 horses), and the result
none the less certain.
The concentration of the cavalry, &c., on the lower
counties of Maryland can be effected without exciting suspicion, and the
movement made without delay from that cause.
This movement, if adopted, will not at all expose the city
of Washington to danger. The total force to be thrown upon the new line would
be, according to circumstances, from 110,000 to 140,000. I hope to use the
latter number by bringing fresh troops into Washington, and still leaving it
quite safe. I fully realize that in all projects offered time will probably be
the most valuable consideration. It is my decided opinion that, in that point
of view, the second plan should be adopted. It is possible, nay, highly
probable, that the weather and state of the roads may be such as to delay the
direct movement from Washington, with its unsatisfactory results and great
risks, far beyond the time required to complete the second plan. In the first
case we can fix no definite time for an advance. The roads have gone from bad
to worse. Nothing like their present condition was ever known here before; they
are impassable at present. We are entirely at the mercy of the weather. It is
by no means certain that we can beat them at Manassas. On the other line I
regard success as certain by all the chances of war. We demoralize the enemy by
forcing him to abandon his prepared position for one which we have chosen, in
which all in our favor, and where success must produce immense results.
My judgment as a general is clearly in favor of this
project. Nothing is certain in war, but all the chances are in favor of this
movement. So much am I in favor of the southern line of operations, that I
would prefer the move from Fortress Monroe as a base as a certain though less
brilliant movement than that from Urbana to an attack upon Manassas.
I know that his excellency the President, you, and I all
agree in our wishes, and that these wishes are to bring this war to a close as
promptly as the means in our possession will permit. I believe that the mass of
the people have entire confidence in us. I am sure of it. Let us then look only
to the great result to be accomplished and disregard everything else.
I am, very
respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.
SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of
the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume
5 (Serial No. 5), p. 42-5
