Major-General Philip Kearny to Oliver S. Halsted Jr., August 4, 1862

HARRISON’S LANDING, 4th August, 1862.

DEAR PET: I thank you for your kind, long letter. You extend me hope.  You suggest withdrawing me and my division out of this ignoble position.  With Pope’s army I would breathe again.

We have no generals.  McClellan is the failure I ever proclaimed him.  He has been punished, just as I at once comprehended the moves of the parties. He will only get us in more follies, more waste of blood, fighting by driblets.  He has lost the confidence of all.  Nor has he a single officer about him capable of bettering us.  Sumner is a “bull in a china shop,” and a sure enough blunderer.  ––– lost his corps gratuitously at Fair Oaks.  He is not now in his right place, and will be much worse.  ––– is a small brain, ossified in a ‘4 company’ garrison on the frontier.  He was not ‘of us’ in Mexico, but in a rear column once saw a distant flash in a guerilla fight.  His skill is a myth, a poetical version of his own part at Bull’s Run. Porter is good in nature, but weak as water – the apparent of all this disaster for his want of generalship on the Chickahominy. ––– and Franklin are talented engineers.  They might make good generals if they understood the value of elements in their calculations; as it is, they are dangerous failures.

When ––– was drunk, he had some few men drowned before Yorktown.  I know of no other feat of his.  Franklin’s battle of West Point was a most runaway picket fight of our.  His part on the Chickahominy was unpardonable.  He sent over a division, (his own,) was present on that side out of fire, and never interfered to prevent them from being sacrificed by driblets and rendered prey to their false position.  I was horrified at it, as described by Gen. Taylor, and all others.  Is it surprising that I want to get out of this mess?  Besides, they have sent me a major generalship, like all these others, dating from 4th July, muddled in a batch of new and very ordinary junior officers.  Do they forget that I was appointed twelfth on the original list?  That I, on the heels of Bull’s Run, faced the enemy with a Jersey brigade in advance of all others, McClellan, McDowell, et id omne genus, nearly forcing me to come back of the “Seminary.”  Do they forget me at Manassas?  My Jersey brigade, that infected with panic the retiring enemy?  Has Williamsburg never come to their ears?  Oh, no!  I really feel aggravated beyond endurance.  Discipline becomes degradation if not wielded with justice.  Patriotism cannot amid all her sacrifices, claim that of self respect.  Generals, victorious in the past are not called on to expose their troops, unless those brave men are acknowledged.  Their identity in their chief’s promotion, claims a date of their own high acts.  Oh, No, I am nearer returning to the home I have given up, to the interests I have sacrificed, to my cherished wife, whose anxiety oppresses me, than I ever dreamt of in a war for the union.  But if the infatuated North are weak enough to let this crisis be managed by ‘small men of small motives,’ I am not willing to be their puppet.

My dear Pet, I am too lazy, and too little interested, to give into the future of this ‘little box of heresies,’ so do tell me – what do the people at the North look forward to in the future?  I fear lest the war will die out in rapid imbecility.

For McClellan, he is burnt out.  Never once on a battlefield, you have nothing to hope from him as a leader of a column.  How do they expect Pope to beat, with a very inferior force, the veterans of Ewell and Jackson?  But these are episodes.  We deceive ourselves.  There was a people of old – it was the warrior Spartan, with his Helot of the field.  The South have realized it.  There was an ambitious people of recent times, and a conscription pandered to her invasions .  At this moment the South exemplifies them both.  “Peace, peace,” but there is no peace.  No, not even with a disruptured Union.  Let the North cast away that delusion.

Draft we must, or the disciplined THOUSANDS of the South will redeem scrip in Philadelphia, and yet the true North must accept it, and quickly, to a man, or the moment it draggles in debate, Maryland, Tennessee, and Kentucky will cast past victories to the winds and rise with their nearly allied rebel kin.  My dear Pet, I shall be delighted when Henry can come on.  As to Col. Halstead, I think that his case is a type of the insane and unnecessary despotism introduced into the army, under the auspices of McClellan and his very weak aids.  It is now too late, but why was not the cavalry put in my charge at the commencement?  Two nights ago the rebel batteries fired across the river, and killed and wounded some thirty men.  Last night Hooker started out on a crude expedition to Malvern Hills.  He went out four miles and came back again.  Still a “false fuss” injures the whole army.  McClellan is dangerous, from the want of digesting his plans.  He positively has no talents.  Adieu.  Get me and my “fighting division” with Pope.  With best regards,

Yours,

KEARNY.

To Mr. O. S. HALSTEAD, JR., Newark, N. J.

SOURCES: George Congdon Gorham, Life and Public Services of Edwin M. Stanton, Volume 2, p. 21; Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 172-4; “A Letter from Gen. Kearney,” National Republican, Washington, DC, Thursday, October 16, 1862, p. 2; “Letter From General Kearny,” The Liberator, Boston, Massachusetts, Friday, October 24, 1862, p. 1; “Letter From General Kearney,” Alexandria Gazette, Alexandria, Virginia, October 16, 1862, p. 4; “The Famous Criticism of the late General Kearny on M'Clellan,” Richmond Times Dispatch, Richmond, Virginia, October 21, 1862;

John Watts De Peyster Sr. to Oliver S. Halstead Jr., September 9, 1862

I think things are rapidly hurrying to a crisis of one kind or another, and it depends now not in the ability of those who have proved deficient, and are behind, but in the courage, energy and ability of the enemy, who are before. All my fears are realized, my foretelling come true, and I await the result of the last month's mistakes and crimes, unable or not permitted, by health or position, to assist or resist.

SOURCE: Frank Allaben, John Watts De Peyster, Volume 2, p. 44

Diary of Gideon Welles: Wednesday, October 15, 1862

General Dix came to see me in relation to the blockade of Norfolk. Says Admiral Lee is extremely rigid, allows no traffic; that the people of Norfolk are suffering, though in his opinion one half the people are loyal. The place, he says, is in the military occupation of the Government and therefore is not liable to, and cannot, be blockaded. Tells me he has been reading on the question, and consulting General Halleck, who agrees with him. I told him if Norfolk was not, and could not be, a blockaded port, I should be glad to be informed of the fact; that the President had declared the whole coast and all ports blockaded from the eastern line of Virginia to the Rio Grande, with the exception of Key West. Congress, though preferring the closing of the ports, had recognized and approved the fact, and authorized the President from time to time, as we recovered possession, to open ports at his discretion by proclamation. That he had so opened the ports of Beaufort, Port Royal, and New Orleans, but not Norfolk. If he was disposed to raise the blockade of that port, I should not oppose it but be glad of it. That I had so informed the President and others, but there was unqualified and emphatic opposition in the War Department to such a step. If he would persuade the Secretary of War to favor the measure, there would be little resistance in any other quarter. Perhaps he and General Halleck could overrule the objections of the Secretary of War. That I intended to occupy no equivocal attitude. This was not to be a sham blockade, so far as I was concerned. I thought, with him, that as Norfolk was in the military occupancy of our armies and to continue so, there was no substantial reason for continuing the blockade; that not only humanity towards the people but good policy on the part of the Administration required we should extend and promote commercial intercourse. Commerce promotes friendship. It would induce the people in other localities to seek the same privileges by sustaining the Union cause. That, as things were, Admiral Lee was doing his duty and obeying instructions in rigidly enforcing the blockade. That I was opposed to favoritism. There should be either intercourse or non-intercourse; if the port was open to trade, all our citizens, and foreigners also, should be treated alike.

“But,” said General Dix, “I don't want the blockade of Norfolk raised; that won't answer.”

“Yet you tell me there is no blockade; that it has ended, and cannot exist because we are in military possession.”

“Well,” said he, “that is so; we are in military occupancy and must have our supplies.”

“That,” I replied, “is provided for. Admiral Lee allows all vessels with army supplies, duly permitted, to pass.”

“But,” continued he, “we must have more than that. The people will suffer.”

“Then,” said I, “they must return to duty and not persist in rebellion. The object of the blockade is to make them suffer. I want no double-dealing or false pretenses. There is, or there is not, a blockade. If there is, I shall, until the President otherwise directs, enforce it. If there is not, the world should know it. Should the blockade be modified, we shall conform to the modifications.”

The General thought it unnecessary to tell the world the blockade was modified or removed. I thought we should make the changes public as the declaration of blockade itself, if we would maintain good faith. He seemed to have no clear conception of things; thought there ought to have never been a blockade. In that I concurred. Told him I had taken that view at the commencement, but had been overruled; we had placed ourselves in a wrong position at the beginning, made the Rebels belligerents, given them nationality, — an error and an anomaly. It was one of Mr. Seward's mistakes.

A letter has been shown about, and is to-day published, purporting to be from General Kearny, who fell at Chantilly. The letter is addressed to O. S. Halstead of New Jersey. It expresses his views and shows his feelings towards McClellan, who, he says, “positively has no talents.” How many officers have written similar private letters is unknown. “We have no generals,” says this letter of Kearny.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 172-4