Diary of Orville Hickman Browning, Monday March 4, 1861

Quincy, [Illinois]. Bright, beautiful morning — Lincoln is to be inaugurated President to day, and we all feel great solicitude to hear that it has been safely and peacefully done. Court commences to day at Carthage and I am busy getting ready to go up tomorrow — Cloudy, cool afternoon *Got the inaugural at night by telegraph

SOURCE: Theodore Calvin Pease & James G. Randall, Editors, Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library, Volume XX: Lincoln Series, Volume II, The Diary of Orville Hickman Browning, Volume 1, p. 458

Diary of Orville Hickman Browning, Wednesday, April 2, 1862.

Mrs Browning and Emma went this morning to Mount Vernon, with a party from the Presidents

*I was in the Senate all day At night I went up to the Presidents and had a talk with him about Genl McClelland whose loyalty is beginning to be questioned in some quarters I asked him if he still had confidence in McClellands fidelity. He assured me he had, and that he had never had any reason to doubt it. That he had now gone to Fortress Monroe with his Command, with orders to move on Richmond without delay, and that only on yesterday when McClelland came to take leave of him preparatory to marching, he shed tears when speaking of the cruel imputations upon his loyalty, and defending himself against them The President added that Genl Scott, and all the leading military men around him, had always assured him that McClelland possessed a very high order of military talent, and that he did not think they could all be mistaken — yet he was not fully satisfied with his conduct of the war — that he was not sufficiently energetic and aggressive in his measures — that he had studied McClelland and taken his measure as well as he could — that he thought he had the capacity to make arrangements properly for a great conflict, but as the hour for action approached he became nervous and oppressed with the responsibility and hesitated to meet the crisis, but that he had given him peremptory orders to move now, and he must do it.  *Whilst we were in conversation Secretary Stanton came in.

Supposing he had private business I proposed to leave, but both he and the President insisted that I should remain, and I did so. Stanton then commenced a conversation about McClelland, saying that there was a very general distrust of his loyalty growing up in the Country. He then took from his pocket a letter, which he said he had just received from one of the first men of the Nation, who was known to both the President and myself, but whose name he would not mention, and read from it a passage stating that McClelland some time in 1860 had been  initiated as a Knight of the Golden Circle by Jeff Davis — that Davis still had great power and influence over him, and that he would do nothing against the rebels which would be inconsistent with his obligations as a Knight of the golden Circle, and that disaster would come upon us as long as he was continued in the Command. Stanton added that he did not believe these* imputations of disloyalty, but they were believed extensively and did us injury¹ When we left the President Stanton took me in his carriage and brought me home. As we rode down the Avenue he expressed the opinion that McClelland ought to have been removed long ago, and a fear that he was not in earnest, and said that he did not think he could emancipate himself from the influence of Jeff Davis, and feared he was not willing to do any thing calculated greatly to damage the cause of secession, *and that if I would propose to the President to appoint Col N B Buford of Illinois, a Majr Genl. and give him the Command of the army here he would second my application.

He said that when McDowell was appointed he was greatly dissatisfied — thought him unfit for the place, and when he lost the battle of Bull Run he denounced him fiercely; but since he became Secy of War, and had had much official communication with McDowell, and heard his explanations of the battle of Bull Run he was satisfied he had done him injustice, and with shame

for having said it, he took back all he had said That he was now satisfied that he was an able officer, more able than any on the Potomac, and an earnest, gallant man intent upon doing his duty &^c.

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¹ From various sources suggestions may be derived connecting McClellan with the treasonable organization known as the "Knights of the Golden Circle." In the diary of Edward Bates, under date of October 28, 1864, there is inserted a pamphlet entitled "General McClellan's Record: His Sympathy with the South — Read for Yourselves." This pamphlet consists of twelve pages and is made up of communications from various parties denouncing McClellan as a traitor and comparing him with Benedict Arnold. Says a correspondent of the Cincinnati Times, October 20, 1864: "It is rumored that McClellan is known to be a member of the . . . Knights of the Golden Circle and that after due deliberation by that order they decided that Mac should fight for the South on free soil, that Mac said he never intended to order an engagement . . . that Mac received Rebel letters during the engagement at Antietam and was in Lee's lines," etc. On the same date Bates pastes in his diary a newspaper clipping which is evidently taken from the Cincinnati Times. It is a communication to "Mr. Editor," signed by Edgar Conkling and dated Cincinnati, October 24, 1864. The writer mentions the "conclusive testimony . . . of General McClellan's treason," and demands a full publication of the facts in order to defeat the "election of the traitor to the Presidency." Bates writes this comment in the margin: "These fierce denunciations do no good, but great harm. McClellan has faults enough, both negative and affirmative, and his party is in the same condition. These charges of treachery and treason, not well established by proof, do but take off the edge from other accusations which cannot be defended, thus discrediting the best-founded objections against him, and exciting a popular sympathy for him as a persecuted man." It should be added that membership in the Knights of the Golden Circle, if such membership antedated the Civil War, would not necessarily imply treason. A convention of the "Knights," held at Raleigh, N. C, in May, 1860, issued an Address to Citizens of the Southern States, which shows that the order originated at Lexington, Ky., July 4, 1854, and that its early purpose was to combat emigrant aid societies and similar abolition activities, to anticipate the North in the settlement of Mexico, and to acquire that country for the purpose of increasing the area of the South which otherwise could no longer hope to obtain beneficial laws through Congress. For the privilege of examining the diary of Edward Bates in manuscript the editors are indebted to the courtesy of Miss Helen Nicolay, of Washington, D. C. The Address to Citizens of the Southern States, issued by order of a convention of the Knights of the Golden Circle, Raleigh, N. C, May 7-11, 1860, is to be found among the broadsides in the Manuscripts Division of the Library of Congress, Washington.

SOURCE: Theodore Calvin Pease, editor, The Diary of Orville Hickman Browning: Volume 1, 1850-1864, p. 537-9

Abraham Lincoln to Orville Hickman Browning, September 22, 1861

Executive Mansion,

Washington, Sep. 22. 1861

Hon. O. H. Browning.

My dear Sir:

Yours of the 17th is just received; and, coming from you, I confess it astonishes me. That you should object to my adhering to a law which you had assisted in making, and presenting to me less than a month before, is odd enough– But this is a very small part– Genl Fremont's proclamation, as to confiscation of property, and the liberation of slaves, is purely political, and not within the range of military law, or necessity. If a commanding General finds a necessity to seize the farm of a private owner, for a pasture, an encampment, or a fortification, he has the right to do so, and to so hold it, as long as the necessity lasts; and this is within military law, because within military necessity– But to say the farm shall no longer belong to the owner, or his heirs forever; and this as well when the farm is not needed for military purposes, as when it is, is purely political, without the savor of military law about it– And the same is true of slaves– If the General needs them, he can seize them and use them; but when the need is past, it is not for him to fix their permanent future condition– That must be settled according to laws made by law-makers, and not by military proclamations– The proclamation, in the point in question, is simply "dictatorship"– It assumes that the General may do anything he pleases – confiscate the lands and free the slaves of loyal people, as well as of disloyal ones– And going the whole figure I have no doubt would be more popular with some thoughtless people, than what has been done! But I can not assume the reckless position; nor allow others to assume it on my responsibility. You speak of it as being the only means of saving the government– On the contrary, it is itself the surrender of the government– Can it be pretended that it is any longer the government of the U. S. – any government of constitution & laws, – wherein a General, or a President may make permanent rules of property by proclamation–

I do not say Congress might not with propriety, pass a law, on the point, just such as Genl. Fremont proclaimed– I do not say I might not, as a member of Congress, vote for it– What I object to, is that I, as President, shall expressly, or impliedly, seize and exercise the permanent legislative functions of the government–

So much as to principle– Now as to policy– No doubt the thing was popular in some quarters, and would have been more so, if it had been a general declaration of emancipation– The Kentucky Legislature would not budge till that proclamation was modified; and Gen. Anderson telegraphed me, that on the news of Gen. Fremont having actually issued deeds of manumission, a whole company of our volunteers, threw down their arms and disbanded– I was so assured, as to think it probable, that the very arms we had furnished Kentucky, would be turned against us– I think to lose Kentucky, is nearly the same as to lose the whole game– Kentucky gone, we can not hold Missouri, nor as I think, Maryland–

These all against us, and the job on our hands is too large for us– We would as well consent to separation at once, including the surrender of the capital. On the contrary, if you will give up your restlessness for new positions, and back me manfully on the grounds upon which you & other kind friends gave me the election, and have approved in my public documents, we shall go through triumphantly–

You must not understand I took my course on the proclamation, because of Kentucky– I took the same ground, in a private letter to the General Fremont before I heard from Kentucky–

You think I am inconsistent because I did not also forbid Gen. Fremont to shoot men under the proclamation–

I understand that part to be within military law; but I also think, and so privately wrote Gen. Fremont, that it is impolitic in this, that our adversaries have the power, and will certainly exercise it, to shoot as many of our men as we shoot of theirs– I did not say this in the public letter, because it is a subject I prefer not to discuss in the hearing of our enemies–

There has been no thought of removing Gen. Fremont on any ground connected with his proclamation; and if there has been any wish for his removal on any ground, our mutual friend, Sam. Glover can probably tell you what it was– I hope no real re necessity for it exists on any ground–

Suppose you write to Hurlbut, and get him to resign–

Your friend as ever

A. Lincoln

SOURCE: The Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress

Diary of Orville Hickman Browning, Saturday, November, 29, 1862

Sheffield arrived this morning be­fore breakfast. At 12 I called on the President. He was appar­ently very glad to see me, and received me with much cordiality. We had a long familiar talk. When speaking of the result of the recent elections I told him that his proclamations had been disasterous to us. That prior to issuing them all loyal people were united in support of the war and the administration. That the masses of the democratic party were satisfied with him, and warmly supporting him, and that their disloyal leaders could not rally them in opposition — They had no issue without tak­ing ground against the war, and upon that we would annihilate them. But the proclamations had revived old party issues — given them a rallying cry — capitol to operate upon and that we had the results in our defeat. To this he made no reply.

I added that the Republican party could not put down the rebellion — that no party could do it — that it required a union of all loyal men in the free states to give us success, and that without that union we must disasterously fail. To all this he fully assented.

I asked him whether Genl Pope was a failure, or whether he had been sacrificed by the bad faith of his officers. He replied that he knew no reason to suspect any one of bad faith except Fitz John Porter,¹ and that he very much hoped an investiga­tion would relieve him from suspicion, but that at present he believed his disobedience of orders, and his failure to go to Popes aid in the battle of Friday had occasioned our defeat, and deprived us of a victory which would have terminated the war. That all Popes orders, and all his movements had met with the full approval of Genl Halleck and himself with one exception. That during the conflict between Popes and the rebel army, he Pope, had placed a portion of his army in a posi­tion, which he pointed out to me on the map, which alarmed him, but that no bad results followed — in fact it had turned out fortunately

That after the last battle fought by Pope the army was much demoralized, and it was feared the enemy would be down on Washington. In this emergency he had called McClellan here to take upon him the defence of the City — That he soon brought order out of chaos, and got the army in good condi­tion. That for such work McClellan had great talents — Indeed for organizing, disciplining and preparing an army for the field and handling it in the field he was super he was superior to any of our Genls That when the rebels crossed into Maryland he sent for Burn­sides and told him he must take command of our army, march against the enemy and give him battle. Burnsides declined — said the responsibility was too great — the consequences of de­feat too momentous — he was willing to command a Corps under McClellan, but was not willing to take the chief com­mand of the army — hence McClellan was reinstated. The battles of South Mountain and Antietam were fought with ability — as well as any Genl could have fought them, but McClellan was too slow in his movements. He could and ought to have pre­vented the loss of Harper’s Ferry, but was six days marching 40 miles, and it was surrendered. He did not follow up his advantages after Antietam. The army of the enemy should have been annihilated, but it was permitted to recross the Potomac without the loss of a man, and McClellan would not follow. He coaxed, urged & ordered him, but all would not do. At the expiration of two weeks after a peremptory order to that effect he had only 3/4 of his army across the River, and was six days doing that, whereas the rebel army had effected a crossing in one day

He concluded as he has in all the conversations I have had with him about McClellan by saying that his great defect was his excess of caution I asked him about what Butler told me in Springfield that Fitz John Porter & Genl Griffing had sent a despatch to McClellan to hold on, that they had Pope where they could ruin, and that this despatch was in the Presidents hands — He said there was no shadow of foundation for such a story and no truth in it. I asked him about Burnsides army before Fredericksburg, and whether it was likely soon to ac­complish any thing. He answered that Burnsides was now here consulting upon that subject — That he and Halleck had just left the room as I entered. That to get at the enemy he had to cross the Rappanhannock, and that to cross in the face of an opposing army was very hazardous, especially as he did not know its strength, and could not ascertain it. They had just been debating whether to move immediately, or whether to wait a few days till some collateral movement could be made to create a diversion which would render the passage less difficult, and that the question would be decided to day Burnside had then gone with Halleck and would receive his final orders be­fore he left him.

*Sheffield arrived this morning, and Cowan at night. Also Giffin and his wife

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¹ For failure to obey Pope’s orders at the time of the second battle of Manassas, General Fitz-john Porter was cashiered by court martial in 1863, but after a long struggle he secured the reopening of his case by act of Congress and his reinstatement as colonel in the regular army, 1886.

SOURCE: Theodore Calvin Pease, editor, The Diary of Orville Hickman Browning: Volume 1, 1850-1864, p. 588-90

The Slander against Mrs. Lincoln

Stories are being circulated throughout the country reflecting on the loyalty of the President’s wife, some going so far as to aver even that she boldly avows her sympathy with secession!  As to the “avowal part” we can at least speak by authority, and brand it as a whole cloth fabrication.  Mrs. Lincoln does indignantly deny sympathy with secession in any shape or form and is less charitable towards the “peculiar institution” than is her husband.  In this vindictive of the fair fame of our Lady President we have the attest of Senator Browning, and intimately acquainted as he has long been with the President’s family, his opportunity for judging as to Mrs. Lincoln’s loyalty ought to be satisfactory. – Quincy Whig.

– Published in The Davenport Daily Gazette, Davenport, Iowa, Tuesday Morning, February 18, 1862, p. 2