Showing posts with label Robert Anderson. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Robert Anderson. Show all posts

Tuesday, March 5, 2024

Edwin M. Stanton to James Buchanan, March 16, 1861

WASHINGTON, March 16, 1861.

Every day affords proof of the absence of any settled policy or harmonious concert of action in the administration. Seward, Bates and Cameron form one wing; Chase, Miller, Blair, the opposite wing; Smith is on both sides, and Lincoln sometimes on one and sometimes on the other. There has been agreement in nothing. Lincoln, it is complained in the streets, has undertaken to distribute the whole patronage, small and great, leaving nothing to the chiefs of departments. Growls about Scott's "imbecility" are frequent The Republicans are beginning to think that a monstrous blunder was made in the tariff bill, and that it will cut off the trade of New York, build up New Orleans and the Southern ports, and leave the government no revenue; they see before them the prospect of some being without money and without credit. But with all this it is certain that Anderson will be withdrawn.

SOURCE: Lyon Gardiner Tyler, The Letters and Times of the Tylers, Volume 2, p. 636

Monday, April 10, 2023

Diary of George Mifflin Dallas, February 2, 1861

A slight solace to one's anxieties about home is found in the circumstances brought by successive steamers during the week. 1. The proposition of Mr. Crittenden, or "The Border States," seems growing into favour. 2. There was a large minority on the question of secession before next 4th of March in the Georgia Convention. 3. The Alabama members of Congress have been instructed not to quit, but to wait further advices. 4. The South Carolina Commissioner, Colonel Hayne, has suspended his demand for the evacuation of Fort Sumter. 5. Charleston is suffering greatly from want of supplies. 6. Major Anderson is universally applauded. 7. Virginia has adopted as satisfactory the compromise of Crittenden. 8. Financial affairs are improving; the United States stock rose one per cent.

There would seem to be a most extraordinary departure from the chivalric honour in public life which has heretofore characterized Southern gentlemen in the disloyal treachery with which Cobb, Floyd, Thomson, Thomas, and Trescott have pursued secession in the very penetralia of Mr. Buchanan's Cabinet. Nothing can relieve them from the charge of deceit and treachery but their having apprised the President, on entering his counsels, that, instead of recognizing as paramount their allegiance to the Union, they were governed by "a higher law" of duty to Georgia, Virginia, Mississippi, Maryland, and South Carolina respectively.

Persigny, recently appointed to the Ministry of the Interior in Paris, made a popularity-seeking plunge at his outset in relaxing restrictions on the Press. Suddenly he has turned a corner; giving, three days ago, an "avertissement" to the Courrier de Dimanche, and arbitrarily ordering the offensive writer, Ganeseo, out of the Kingdom! He says that Ganeseo is a foreigner, and cannot be allowed to criticise the principle of the Imperial Government.

SOURCE: George Mifflin Dallas, Diary of George Mifflin Dallas, While United States Minister to Russia 1837 to 1839, and to England 1856 to 1861, Volume 3, p. 432-3

Monday, March 20, 2023

Diary of George Mifflin Dallas, January 16, 1861

I have been kept for a week, and am still, in a state of great anxiety about the dangerous political excitements at home. The President has taken an attitude less friendly to the secessionists. This has been owing, it would seem, to the occupation of Fort Moultrie and the seizure of a revenue cutter, in the harbour of Charleston, by the South Carolina authorities. General Floyd, as Secretary of War, had pledged his honour to Governor Pickens that there should be no change in the status of the fortifications in the harbour.

Major Anderson, in command, with prudent strategy, shifted his little garrison of twenty men from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter. The South Carolina Commissioners at Washington protested, alleging breach of faith. Floyd demanded orders to Anderson to go back. The President declined. Governor Pickens sent militia into Fort Moultrie and seized a United States cutter. Floyd resigned on 29th of December, and his resignation was quietly accepted on the 31st by the President, who appointed Postmaster-General Holt to conduct the department until a successor was named. The President has addressed Congress, announced his determination to protect the property and collect the revenue of the United States with all the power at his disposal, and is said to have directed the frigate Brooklyn to be held in readiness at Norfolk, while two revenue cutters are proceeding to Charleston harbour, on board which a new Collector, McIntyre, of Pennsylvania, will exact the duties on imports. In the interim reinforcements are being sent to Southern garrisons, as a determination to seize them has shown itself in Georgia, Alabama, and North Carolina. These facts, if well founded, place the country in imminent risk of civil war; and if, at the bottom of the whole, there exist, as Mr. Daniel, our Minister to Turin, vehemently assured me on Monday last was the case, an immense majority in the South who desire disunion and have been preparing to accomplish it for twenty years, it would seem that a sanguinary convulsion is unavoidable. Perhaps a large movement of militia, similar to the one made by Washington in 1794 against our Whiskey Insurrection, would overawe the disaffected and restore tranquillity. Certainly, South Carolina has taken, by capturing forts and cutters, a more decisively insurrectionary character than could be attributed to the disorderly riots of Pennsylvania.

My old friend "Betsey Bonaparte" and her son have enlisted Berryer and Legrand in a trial to come off on the 25th inst., before the Court of First Instance in Paris, asserting the validity of the marriage of Jerome in Baltimore in 1803, and claiming to share in the property he has left. If the marriage be sustained, the necessary result would be the illegitimacy of Prince Napoleon and Princess Mathilde. Here is fine garbage for Imperial scandal! and "Betsey" is not one, though she can't lack much of eighty, to shrink in the pursuit of money or to be scared by a crown.

SOURCE: George Mifflin Dallas, Diary of George Mifflin Dallas, While United States Minister to Russia 1837 to 1839, and to England 1856 to 1861, Volume 3, p. 428-30

Saturday, March 18, 2023

Diary of George Mifflin Dallas, January 20, 1861

If we are in turmoil on the western side of the Atlantic, they are not much better off on this eastern side. The King of Prussia has just said to his general officers in Berlin: “The aspect of the times is very serious, and menaces great dangers. Gentlemen, there is a distinct prospect of struggles in which I shall need the entire devotion of your hearts. If I and those other sovereigns wishing for peace do not succeed in dissipating beforehand the coming thunder-storm, we shall want the whole of our strength in order to stand our ground. You will have to strain every nerve if you wish to render the army adequate to the future calls of the country. Gentlemen, do not allow yourselves to be subject to any self-delusion respecting the magnitude of coming struggles. If I do not succeed in obviating war, the war will be one in which we shall have either to conquer or be lost to our position in the world!” What convulsion is it that thus thunders in the index? We hear the cry of “Peace, peace,” in every direction, but we see specially dark clouds in various quarters. Hungary is on the eve of revolt, Denmark is arming to maintain her rights in Schleswig and Holstein, Italy, under the magical inspiration of Garibaldi, will insist upon having, as parts of the temporal sovereignty of Victor Emmanuel, both Rome and Venice. War upon Austria then would seem inevitable, and it cannot fail to draw into its vortex Russia, Prussia, Germany, and, not impossibly, Turkey. But the words of solemnity used by the monarch involve a deeper meaning. They refer to the military avalanche which a breath from Louis Napoleon may precipitate across the Rhine,—his vast force of six or eight hundred thousand, his numerous and formidable ships of war, and his actual position as the chief of the revolutionary movement. The language is portentous, infinitely more so than the address of Baron Hubner on 1st of January, 1859. Where on the face of the earth can the stranger, Peace, take up her permanent abode?

The news from home during this week has been deplorable. On the 10th inst. the President sent a message to Congress which depicts the state of things in the gloomiest colours. South Carolina, at Charleston, has fired repeated volleys at a United States transport carrying troops for Major Anderson at Fort Sumter, and has compelled her to retire. The Brooklyn, a second-class screw steamer of fourteen guns, and the revenue cutter Harriet Lane are about to convoy the troops back again to Charleston on board the Star of the West, and we may expect our next news to announce a bloody fight, possibly a bombardment of the city. Seward has made a speech in the Senate which the Times calls “grand and conciliatory,” but which obviously asserts a determination to enforce the laws. Servile insurrection, too, seems. contemplated in Virginia, some twenty-five barrels of gunpowder having been disinterred from secret hiding places.

SOURCE: George Mifflin Dallas, Diary of George Mifflin Dallas, While United States Minister to Russia 1837 to 1839, and to England 1856 to 1861, Volume 3, p. 430-2

Friday, February 3, 2023

William T. Sherman to Senator John Sherman, February 1, 1861

February 1, 1861.

. . . It is war to surround Anderson with batteries, and it is shilly-shally for the South to cry “Hands off! No coercion!” It was war and insult to expel the garrison at Baton Rouge, and Uncle Sam had better cry “Cave!” or assert his power. Fort Sumter is not material, save for the principle; but Key West and the Tortugas should be held in force at once, by regulars, if possible, if not, by militia. Quick! They are occupied now, but not in force.

Whilst maintaining the high, strong ground you do, I would not advise you to interpose an objection to securing concessions to the middle and moderate states — Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri. Slavery there is local, and even if the world were open to them, its extension would involve no principle. If these states felt the extreme South wrong, a seeming concession would make them committed. The cotton states are gone, I suppose. Of course, their commerce will be hampered. . .

I sent you a copy of my letter to the governor. Here is his answer [see pages 350-351].

This is very handsome, and I do regret this political imbroglio. I do think it was brought about by politicians. The people in the South are evidently unanimous in the opinion that slavery is endangered by the current of events, and it is useless to attempt to alter that opinion. As our government is founded on the will of the people, when that will is fixed, our government is powerless, and the only question is whether to let things slide into general anarchy, or the formation of two or more confederacies, which will be hostile sooner or later. Still, I know that some of the best men of Louisiana think this change may be effected peaceably. But even if the Southern States be allowed to depart in peace, the first question will be revenue.

Now, if the South have free trade, how can you collect revenues in the eastern cities? Freight from New Orleans to St. Louis, Chicago, Louisville, Cincinnati, and even Pittsburg, would be about the same as by rail from New York, and importers at New Orleans, having no duties to pay, would undersell the East if they had to pay duty. Therefore, if the South make good their confederation and their plan, the northern confederacy must do likewise or blockade. Then comes the question of foreign nations. So, look on it in any view, I see no result but war and consequent changes in the form of government. . .

SOURCE: Walter L. Fleming, General W.T. Sherman as College President, p. 357-8

William T. Sherman to Ellen Ewing Sherman, February 1, 1861

SEMINARY, Feb. 1, 1861.

 . . . I suppose you are impatient to hear what next. Last night I got full letters from Baton Rouge. Governor Moore's is in these words [see pages 350-351].

Dr. Smith, also at Baton Rouge, writes me at length. He says [see page 353].

So you see I have at least the good will of all my associates. I have called the Board for February 9, and expect to leave here by or before February 20. I shall delay a while in New Orleans, not long, and get to Lancaster by March. . . If you really desire me to settle in Ohio you must make some exertions for I cannot abide there long in inactivity, and loafing. . .

I have a good letter from Turner in which he infers I cannot stay here and advises me to come to St. Louis, but points out nothing definite. He thinks Missouri will not secede, but if she do not they will have a severe contest there, for men who own negroes are blind to all interests other than those of slavery. Reason has nothing to do in these times of change and revolution. Politicians start the movement and keep it alive by a process known to themselves, and the poor innocent people have nothing to do but follow their lead. It may not be so there, but I am not convinced.

I see John takes bold ground. He is right. If the government be a reality it should defend its flag, property and servants. Anderson should be reinforced if it cost ten thousand lives and every habitation in Charleston. Also the seizure of these arsenals should be resented and the actors made to feel that the United States is a reality. But the time is not yet. . .

SOURCE: Walter L. Fleming, General W.T. Sherman as College President, p. 359-60

Friday, September 9, 2022

William T. Sherman to Ellen Ewing Sherman, January 1861

[January, 1861.]

 . . . Louisiana will surely secede this month, but no hostile movements will take place for some time, and about the 4th of March the plots and counterplots of the politicians, who save the people of this country the trouble of government, will become manifest; then something must be done or all this confusion will become a farce.

I happened to stumble on an article in the papers saying that Mrs. Anderson had appealed to the president in behalf of her husband. Her appeal would have moved any man of feeling, I know that well. Anderson is the very man for the place, and will do his duty, and if communication be opened to the sea, the war may be narrowed down to that point as it should. Otherwise it may spread all over the country. We must wait as patiently as possible. . .

SOURCE: Walter L. Fleming, General W.T. Sherman as College President, p. 325-6

George Mason Graham to William T. Sherman, January 4, 1861

TYRONE, Friday Night, Jan. 4, 1861.

DEAR COLONEL: Your Christmas letter came duly to hand, and I beg to make you my acknowledgements for it, although it added fuel to the flame of the sad thoughts and feelings with which I am now constantly oppressed.

First of all, I thought of your little circle at Lancaster and felt provoked that instead of being absorbed in the enjoyment of their society you should have no better occupation on that day than in writing to me.

Then the already almost realized certainty that we shall lose you, for I feel as confident as I possibly can of any event not yet transpired, than an ordinance of secession will be rushed through the convention with breathless haste. The tone of the Louisiana Democrat ever since the presidential election has satisfied me of that — its last issue confirms it. Less than four weeks ago I proclaimed from the steps of the post-office, to an unusually large crowd awaiting the opening of the mail, that “I stood by the Union, that secession was treason, and no man in the crowd opened his mouth affirmatively or negatively, although I saw men there — lifelong Democrats, too — who, I knew, felt and thought as I did about it. A few days afterward a man who was in that crowd, and whose breath smells of whatever Governor Moore chews, told me that he was opposed to sending men of extreme views either way to the convention on Dec. 26. The same man said in my presence in Alexandria that he would not vote for any man for the convention who would not pledge himself beforehand to put the state out of the Union before the 4th of March.

And what men are we to vote for to that convention! So far as the talent and ability requisite for the occasion are concerned I look upon both tickets as sphinxs, having a common head. I shall vote for the courthouse sphinx, because that was made publicly in open day, by the people, where everybody had a chance to take a part whilst the dark lantern sphinx was made nobody knows by whom, nobody knows where, but popped on to the Democratic stage by Locofoco jugglery.

The course you have marked out for yourself I had anticipated. There is none other left for you. In the event of the convention passing an ordinance of abrupt secession, I do not see that there will be the slightest obligation on (you), or propriety in your allowing time for a successor. Where is he to come from at this time except temporarily out of the present Academic Board? Some of our friends will be apt to think that they have accomplished more than they ever contemplated, and may come, possibly, to the conclusion that there are more things between heaven and earth than were ever dreamt of in their philosophy.

Having no papers or letters by yesterday's mail, I am very much in a mist in regard to Bob Anderson's situation (in Fort Sumter). I have heard that Mr. Floyd has resigned because he was not allowed to reinforce him. Am looking with intense anxiety for the mail of to-morrow night. I really think that Mr. Van Buren would have made longer strides after Gen. Jackson than poor old Buck.

I have been greatly engrossed during the Holy Days (?). The overseer for "Forked-Deer"1 has only now arrived, having been to Mississippi for his wife, and I have no overseer at Tyrone yet, though almost hourly pestered with applications — so that I have the cares and troubles of both plantations on my hands, for it will take several days yet to get rid of "Forked-deer.” Onze Heurs, et mes yeux beaucoup fatigues.

To-morrow I must work to get all the votes I can for the courthouse sphinx. . .

_______________

1 One of General Graham's plantations. – ED

SOURCE: Walter L. Fleming, General W.T. Sherman as College President, p. 326-8

William T. Sherman to Ellen Ewing Sherman, January 5, 1861

LOUISIANA STATE SEMINARY                
of Learning and Military Academy,        
Alexandria, Jan. 5, 1861.

 . . . I have finished my report and placed all the papers in the hands of Dr. Smith the vice-president. I walked into town the day before yesterday, poor Clay being dead and buried. Dr. Smith was away and I only remained a few hours. Alexandria at best is not a cheerful town, but now decidedly the reverse. Everybody naturally feels the danger which envelopes us all in one common cause. I have had nothing said to me at all, and I discuss the questions of the day freely with my equals, and try to keep my peace with loungers about the street corners and ferry-boat landing. I always say what is my real belief, that though the slavery question seems to be the question soon it will sink into insignificance.

Our country has become so democratic that the mere popular opinion of any town or village rises above the law. Men have ceased to look to constitutions and law books for their guides, but have studied popular opinion in bar rooms and village newspapers, and that was and is law. The old women and grannies of New England, reasoning from abstract principles, must defy the constitution of the country, the people of the South not relying on the federal government must allow their people to favor filibustering expeditions, against the solemn treaties of the land; and anywhere from California to Maine any man could do murder, robbery or arson if the people's prejudice lay in that direction. And now things are at such a pass that no one section believes the other, and we are beginning to fight.

The right of secession is but the beginning of the end; it is utterly wrong and the president ought never for one moment to have permitted the South Carolinians to believe he would not enforce the revenue laws and hold the public property in Charleston Harbor. Had he promptly reinforced Maj. Anderson the Charlestonians would have been a little more circumspect. My only hope is that Maj. Anderson may hold out, that more reinforcements may reach him, and that the people may feel that they can't always do as they please. Or in other words that they are not so free and independent as they think. In this view I am alone here, but I do so think, and will say it. . .

If still this Civil War should pass over I shall require you all to come down regardless of consequences, for here I must stay summer and winter, or else give it up. . .

St. Louis will be paralyzed with Civil War, and California will be a foreign country. My only hope is that bad as things now look there may occur some escape, or if dissolution is inevitable that Ohio and Louisiana may belong to the same confederacy. I am so far out of the current here that I can only judge by newspapers and they all indicate a bias. The Louisiana convention will surely secede, but then the reconstruction. At all events I cannot do anything till that is over, if they turn me out I must stay and get my dues, and I will send you every cent I can. The house is now done and the carpenters leave it to-day for good. People begin to wonder why you don't come down, and the fact is operating to my prejudice, but at this time it would be imprudent to do so. Maybe a change may yet occur. . .

SOURCE: Walter L. Fleming, General W.T. Sherman as College President, p. 329-31

William T. Sherman to Ellen Ewing Sherman, January 8, 1861

ALEXANDRIA, Jan. 8, 1861.

 . . . Things are moving along with the rapidity of revolutions. The papers announce that the people of Alabama have seized the arsenals at Mobile Point, Fort Morgan, and above Mobile. I think similar steps will soon follow at the forts at the mouth of the Mississippi and Lake Pontchartrain. I have been in town today and had a long talk with Dr. Smith who goes next week to Baton Rouge to attend the meeting of the legislature and convention. He knows well my opinions; I have not concealed them, that I cannot do any act hostile to the United States. . .

The Board is unwilling to entrust the management here to any one of the other professors. It takes me all I can do to suppress disorder and irregularity. I had a cadet threaten me yesterday with a loaded pistol because I detected a whiskey jug in his room and threatened him with dismissal. He did not await trial but went off. Although a large majority of the cadets are good boys still we have some hard cases.

From what I see in the New Orleans papers Anderson is still in possession of Fort Sumpter, and the general government has failed to reinforce him and will wait till he is attacked. This disgusts me and I would not serve such a pusillanimous government.

It merits dissolution. This fact will increase the chances of an attempt to prevent Lincoln's installation into office, and then we shall see whether the wideawakes will fight as well as carry cheap lamps of a night zigzagging down the streets.

I see every chance of long, confused, and disorganizing Civil War, and I feel no desire to take a hand therein. When the time comes for reorganization then will come the time. I feel anxious for your comfort and safety but these cannot be threatened. . .

SOURCE: Walter L. Fleming, General W.T. Sherman as College President, p. 331-2

William T. Sherman to Ellen Ewing Sherman, January 13, 1861

SEMINARY, Jan. 13, 1861.

 . . . I see no change to note here in public sentiment, the fact that Seward has been named as secretary of state to Lincoln enables the leaders to show that their suspicions were right that the Republicans and abolitionists are identical. I am therefore confirmed in my opinion that the cotton states are off and it is an even chance with all the slave states. I take the Missouri Republican and National Intelligencer which seem to oppose secession but they cannot stem the torrent.

The revolution has begun and the national government has shown weakness in all its attempts. Anderson is the only one who has acted. General Scott in sending reinforcements ought not to have trusted the Star of the West, the same in which we went to California some [seven?] years ago. She could not venture to receive a fire. Frigates and strong war steamers should have gone, which could have forced their way past the land batteries. I hope still this will be done. It will be a triumph to South Carolina to beat Uncle Sam.

Still Charleston is nothing to New Orleans and I am satisfied the forts at the mouth1 and the lakes2 will be taken by order of Governor Moore of this state before they can be occupied by the U.S. All these are acts of War has begun. And it is idle to say the South is not in earnest. Louisiana has not yet seceded, yet the delegates favorable to such a course are elected, even in New Orleans where the Union feeling is thought to be strongest. I have no doubt that ultimately I will be turned off as unfaithful, but I must see my way clearer than I yet can before I leave from choice. . .
_______________

1 Of the Mississippi. – ED.

2 Lake Pontchartrain and Lake Borgne. – ED.

SOURCE: Walter L. Fleming, General W.T. Sherman as College President, p. 332-3

Thursday, August 11, 2022

William T. Sherman to Ellen Ewing Sherman, December 15, 1860

December 15[?], 1860.

. . . I started to write a letter to Minnie but got drawn into this political strain that is not for her but you. Read her so much of the letter as you please and the rest to yourself.

Governor Moore has assembled the legislature in extra session at Baton Rouge and I have seen his message which is positive on the point of secession. You will doubtless have the substance of it before you get this; and I observe such men as Dick Taylor, the general's son, are in favor of immediate secession. I have scarce room now to doubt that Louisiana will quit the Union in all1 January. The governor recommends the establishment of a large arsenal here. We now have a limited supply of arms.

I have announced my position; as long as Louisiana is in the Union I will serve her honestly and faithfully, but if she quits I will quit too. I will not for a day or even hour occupy a position of apparent hostility to Uncle Sam. That government is weak enough, but is the only thing in America that has even the semblance of a government. These state governments are ridiculous pretences of a government, liable to explode at the call of any mob. I don't want to be premature and will hold on to the last moment in hopes of change, but they seem to be pushing events ridiculously fast.

There is an evident purpose, a dark design, not to allow time for thought and reflection. These southern leaders understand the character of their people and want action before the spirit subsides. Robert Anderson commands at Charleston, and there I look for the first actual collision. Old Fort Moultrie, every brick of which is as plain now in my memory as the sidewalk in Lancaster, will become historical. It is weak and I can scale any of its bastions. If secession, dissolution and Civil War do come South Carolina will drop far astern and the battle will be fought on the Mississippi. The Western States never should consent to a hostile people holding the mouth of the Mississippi. Should I be forced to act promptly I will turn up either at St. Louis or at Washington. T. knows full well where I am but he is angry at me about his charge against Ohio of nigger stealing. You remember my answer from Lancaster. I am very well. Weather cold and overcast. . .
_______________

1 "In all January" means "all in January.” Sherman made frequent use of this peculiar construction. – ED.

SOURCE: Walter L. Fleming, General W.T. Sherman as College President, p. 314-6

William T. Sherman to Ellen Ewing Sherman, December 18, 1860

ALEXANDRIA, Dec. 18, 1860.

. . . I cannot remain here much beyond January 23, the time set for the state convention to dissolve the connection of this state with the U.S. The legislature only sat three days and passed unanimously the bills for arming the state and calling a convention. That convention has only to decree what has already been resolved on and proclaimed by the Governor, that Louisiana cannot remain under a Black Republican president. The opinion is universal that disunion is resolved on, and the only open questions are what states will compose the Southern Confederacy.

I regard the failure of Buchanan to strengthen Maj. Anderson at Ft. Moultrie as absolutely fatal, as the evidence of contemptible pusilanimity of our general government, almost convincing me that the government is not worth saving. No wonder Gen. Cass forthwith resigned. . .

SOURCE: Walter L. Fleming, General W.T. Sherman as College President, p. 316

William T. Sherman to George Mason Graham, December 25, 1860

SEMINARY, Christmas, 1860.

DEAR GENERAL: They [the cartridges] are a most appropriate present, and I hope they may all be used for holiday salutes, or mere practice. As you request I will not put them on my returns. Else they would have certainly gone on the books. When did you get cartridges? I could procure none in Washington or in New Orleans, and when the Parish Jury appropriated two hundred fifty dollars for ammunition to be stored here, I invested the money in twenty kegs of powder, lead, and fifteen thousand percussion caps: and now wait for the return of the Rapides for balls and buck-shot, intending if necessity should arise to use our powder flasks and pouches till we have leisure for making cartridges. The mere fact of our having here these arms and munitions will be a great fact. Still, should unfortunately an occasion arise I could leave a strong guard here, and with a part of the cadets could move promptly to any point.

I have to Governor Moore, to Dr. Smith, and to the magistrate of this precinct defined my position. As long as Louisiana is in the Union and I occupy this post I will serve her faithfully against internal or external enemies. But if Louisiana secede from the general government, that instant I stop.

I will do no act, breathe no word, think no thought hostile to the government of the United States. Weak as it is, it is the only semblance of strength and justice on this continent, as compared with which the state governments are weak and trifling If Louisiana join in this unhallowed movement to dismember our old government, how long will it be till her parishes and people insult and deride her? You now profess to have a state government and yet your people, your neighbors, good, intelligent, and well-meaning men have already ignored its laws and courts, and give to an unknown, irresponsible body of citizens the right to try, convict, and execute suspected persons. If gentlemen on Rapides Bayou have this absolute right and power to try and hang a stranger, what security have you or any stranger to go into these pine woods where it may become a popular crime to own a good horse or wear broadcloth?

My dear General, we are in the midst of sad times. It is not slavery — it is a tendency to anarchy everywhere. I have seen it all over America, and our only hope is in Uncle Sam. Weak as that government is, it is the only approach to one. I do take the [National] Intelligencer and read it carefully. I have read all the items you call my attention to, and have offered them to cadets but they seem to prefer the [New Orleans] Delta.

I do think Buchanan made a fatal mistake. He should have reinforced Anderson, my old captain, at my old post, Fort Moultrie and with steam frigates made Fort Sumpter [sic] impregnable. This instead of exciting the Carolinians would have forced them to pause in their mad career. Fort Sumpter with three thousand men and the command of the seas would have enabled the government to execute the revenue laws, and to have held South Carolina in check till reason could resume its sway. Whereas now I fear they have a contempt for Uncle Sam and will sacrifice Anderson. Let them hurt a hair of his head in the execution of his duty, and I say Charleston must [be] blotted from existence. 'Twill arouse a storm to which the slavery question will be as nothing else I mistake the character of our people.

Of course I have countermanded my orders for Mrs. Sherman to come south, and I feel that my stay here is drawing to a close. Still I will not act till I conceive I must and should, and will do all that a man ought, to allow time for a successor. Smith and Dr. Clarke are up at Judge Boyce's, St. Ange lives in Alexandria. Boyd and I are alone. I have provided for a Christmas dinner to the cadets. Still your present to them is most acceptable, and what was provided by Jarreau can be distributed along. . .

SOURCE: Walter L. Fleming, General W.T. Sherman as College President, p. 317-9

Monday, January 3, 2022

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, April 3, 1865

Intelligence of the evacuation of Petersburg and the capture of Richmond was received this A.M., and the city has been in an uproar through the day.

Most of the clerks and others left the Departments, and there were immense gatherings in the streets. Joy and gladness lightened every countenance. Secessionists and their sympathizers must have retired, and yet it seemed as if the entire population, the male portion of it, was abroad in the streets. Flags were flying from every house and store that had them. Many of the stores were closed, and Washington appeared patriotic beyond anything ever before witnessed. The absence of the Assistant, Chief Clerk, and Solicitor compelled my attendance until after 3 P.M. close of mail.

Attorney-General Speed and myself met by agreement at Stanton's room last night at nine, to learn the condition of affairs with the armies. We had previously been two or three times there during the day. It was about eleven before a dispatch was received and deciphered. The conversation between us three was free, and, turning on events connected with the Rebellion, our thoughts and talk naturally traveled back to the early days of the insurrection and the incipient treason in Buchanan's cabinet. Stanton became quite communicative. He was invited, as I have previously understood, through the influence of Black. Says Buchanan was a miserable coward, so alarmed and enfeebled by the gathering storm as to be mentally and physically prostrated, and he was apprehensive the President would not survive until the fourth of March. The discussion in regard to the course to be pursued towards Anderson and the little garrison at Sumter, became excited and violent in December, 1860. On the 27th or 29th of that month there were three sessions of the Cabinet in council. Sitting late at night, Buchanan, wrapped in an old dressing-gown or cloak, crouched in a corner near the fire, trembled like an aspen leaf. He asked what he should do. Declared that Stanton said he ought to be hung and that others of the Cabinet concurred with him. This, Stanton said, grew out of his remarks that if they yielded up Sumter to the conspirators it was treason, and no more to be defended than Arnold's. In the discussion Holt was very emphatic and decided in his loyalty, Toucey the most abject and mean. When called upon by the President for his opinion, Toucey said he was for ordering Anderson to return immediately to Fort Moultrie. He was asked if he was aware that Moultrie was dismantled, and replied that would make no difference, Anderson had gone to Sumter without orders, and against orders of Floyd, and he would order him back forthwith. Stanton says he inquired of Toucey if he ever expected to go back to Connecticut after taking that position, and Toucey said he did, but asked Stanton why he put the question. Stanton replied that he had inquired in good faith, that he might know the character of the people in Connecticut or Toucey's estimate of them, for were he, S., to take that position and it were known to the people of Pennsylvania, he should expect they would stone him the moment he set foot in the State, stone him through the State, and tie a stone around his neck and throw him in the river when he reached Pittsburg. Stanton gives Toucey the most despicable character in the Buchanan cabinet, not excepting Floyd or Thompson.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 272-4

Monday, January 4, 2021

Emory Upton to his Sister, December 21, 1860

WEST POINT, December 21, 1860

DEAR SISTER:  We are on general review in mineralogy and geology preparatory to our last January examination, and, possibly, our very last.  These are delightful studies, and the method of instruction here renders us very familiar with minerals.  Each rock has now its story for us. . . . The political horizon is very black.  Today’s papers inform us that South Carolina has seceded.  The veil behind which Webster sought not to penetrate has been “rent in twain,” and secession, with its evils, is now a reality.  Let her go.  She has been a pest, an eye-sore, an abomination ever since she entered the Union.  Were it not that her example may become contagious, few would regret her course; but, in the present excited state of feeling at the South, there is imminent danger that the whole South will drift into the terrible gulf which secession opens before them.  I believe in Union, but South Carolina has taken the initiative, and she is responsible for whatever follows, and posterity will hold her Every friend of freedom will execrate her course. War, I believe, must speedily follow, and by her act. The papers say, “Buchanan has ordered the commandant of Fort Moultrie to surrender if attacked”; if true, what a traitor! Floyd has sent twenty-five thousand stand of arms to different Southern posts within the past year, and for what? Certainly not for the use of soldiers garrisoning them. What, then, is the inference? That they shall be convenient for secession. The Administration must be deeply implicated in this plot to destroy the government. Its conduct can not be explained otherwise. I heartily rejoice that Abraham Lincoln is elected, and that we have such a noble set of Republicans at Washington to meet this critical emergency. As for myself, I am ambitious, and desire fame, but I will stand by the right; for what is the worth of fame when purchased by dishonor? God orders or suffers all things.

SOURCE: Peter Smith Michie, The Life and Letters of Emory Upton, p. 29-30

Sunday, April 26, 2020

Brigadier-General William T. Sherman to Brigadier-General Lorenzo Thomas, November 6, 1861

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,            
Louisville, Ky., November 6, 1861.
General L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General:

SIR: General McClellan telegraphs me to report to him daily the situation of affairs here.

The country is so large that it is impossible to give clear and definite views. Our enemies have a terrible advantage in the fact that in our midst, in our camps, and along our avenues of travel they have active partisans, farmers and business men, who seemingly pursue their usual calling, but are, in fact, spies. They report all our movements and strength, while we can procure information only by circuitous and unreliable means. I inclose you the copy of an intercepted letter, which is but the type of others.* Many men from every part of the State are now enrolled under Buckner, have gone to him, while ours have to be raised in the neighborhood, and cannot be called together except at long notice. These volunteers are being organized under the laws of the State, and the 10th of November is fixed as the time for consolidating them into companies and regiments. Many of them are armed by the United States as Home Guards, and many of them by General Anderson and myself, because of the necessity of being armed to guard their camps against internal enemies. Should we be overwhelmed, these would scatter and their arms and clothing will go to the enemy, furnishing the very material they so much need.

We should have here a very large force, sufficient to give confidence to the Union men of the ability to do what should be done—possess ourselves of all the State; but all see we are brought to a stand-still, and this produces doubt and alarm. With our present force it would be simple madness to cross Green River, and yet hesitation may be as fatal. In like manner other columns are in peril; not so much in front as rear. The railroad over which our stores must pass being much exposed, I have the Nashville Railroad guarded by three regiments; yet it is far from being safe, and the moment actual hostilities commence these roads will be interrupted, and we will be in a dilemma To meet this in part I have put a cargo of provisions at the mouth of Salt River, guarded by two regiments. All these detachments weaken the main force and endanger the whole.

Do not conclude, as before, that I exaggerate the facts. They are as stated, and the future looks as dark as possible. It would be better if some more sanguine mind were here, for I am forced to order according to my convictions.

Yours, truly,
 W. T. SHERMAN,               
 Brigadier-General, Commanding.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 4 (Serial No. 4), p. 340-1

Wednesday, October 30, 2019

Diary of Corporal David L. Day: December 2, 1861


THE TROOPS BRIGADED.

The troops encamped around here have been formed into three brigades, and will be commanded by Brigadier Generals Foster, Reno and Parke; the whole to be under command of Gen. A. E. Burnside and known as Burnside's coast division. Our regiment has been assigned the right of the first brigade, comprising the 25th, 23d, 24th and 27th Massachusetts and 10th Connecticut regiments, under command of Brig. Gen. John G. Foster, U. S. A. I think we are fortunate in our commander, as he appears to me like a man who understands his business. Gen. Foster is a regular army officer, ranking as captain of engineer!. He served in the Mexican war, and was with Major Anderson at the storming and surrender of Fort Sumpter. He has recently been commissioned brigadier general of volunteers. Judging from appearances, I have great faith in him as an able commander.

SOURCE: David L. Day, My Diary of Rambles with the 25th Mass. Volunteer Infantry, p. 13-4

Saturday, August 18, 2018

Statement of Messrs. Miles And Keitt, of what Transpired Between the President and the South Carolina Delegation, between January 1 & 14, 1861

In compliance with the request of the Convention, we beg leave to make the following statement:

On Saturday, the 8th of December, several of the South Carolina delegation, including ourselves, waited upon the President. At this time, there was a growing belief that reinforcements were on the eve of being sent to the forts in Charleston harbor. It was known that the subject was frequently and earnestly discussed in the Cabinet. It was rumored that General Cass and Mr. Holt were urgent that reinforcements should be sent. Upon our being announced, the President, who was then in Cabinet Council, came out to us in the ante-room. We at once entered into a conversation upon the topic, which was so closely occupying his thoughts as well as ours. The President seemed much disturbed and moved. He told us that he had had a painful interview with the wife of Major Anderson, who had come on from New York to see him. She had manifested great anxiety and distress at the situation of her husband, whom she seemed to consider in momentary danger of an attack from an excited and lawless mob. The President professed to feel a deep responsibility resting upon him to protect the lives of Major Anderson and his command. We told him that the news that reinforcements were on their way to Charleston, would be the surest means of provoking what Mrs. Anderson apprehended, and what he so much deprecated. We said, further, that we did not believe that Major Anderson was in any danger of such an attack; that the general sentiment of the State was against any such proceeding. That, prior to the action of the State Convention, then only ten days off, we felt satisfied that there would be no attempt to molest the forts in any way. That, after the Convention met, — while we could not possibly undertake to say what that body would see fit to do, — we yet hoped and believed that nothing would be done until we had first endeavored, by duly accredited Commissioners, to negotiate for a peaceful settlement of all matters, including the delivery of the forts, between South Carolina and the Federal Government. At the same time, we again reiterated our solemn belief that any change in the then existing condition of things in Charleston harbor, would, in the excited state of feeling at home, inevitably precipitate a collision. The impression made upon us was, that the President was wavering, and had not decided what course he would pursue. He said he was glad to have had this conversation with us, but would prefer that we should give him a written memorandum of the substance of what we had said. This we did on Monday, the 10th. It was in these words:


The President did not like the word “provided,” because it looked as if we were binding him while avowing that we had no authority to commit the Convention. We told him that we did not so understand it. We were expressing our convictions and belief, predicated upon the maintenance of a certain condition of things, which maintenance was absolutely, and entirely in his power. If he maintained such condition, then we believed that collision would be avoided until the attempt at a peaceable negotiation had failed. If he did not, then we solemnly assured him that we believed collision must inevitably, and at once, be precipitated. He seemed satisfied, and said it was not his intention to send reinforcements, or make any change. We explained to him what we meant by the words '”relative military status,” as applied to the forts; mentioned the difference between Major Anderson's occupying his then position at Fort Moultrie, and throwing himself into Fort Sumter. We stated that the latter step would be equivalent to reinforcing the garrison, and would just as certainly as the sending of fresh troops, lead to the result which we both desired to avoid. When we rose to go, the President said in substance, “After all, this is a matter of honor among gentlemen. I do not know that any paper or writing is necessary. We understand each other.” One of the delegation, just before leaving the room, remarked, “Mr. President, you have determined to let things remain as they are, and not to send reinforcements; but, suppose that you were hereafter to change jour policy for any reason, what then? That would put us, who are willing to use our personal influence to prevent any attack upon the forts before Commissioners are sent on to Washington, in rather an embarrassing position.” “Then,” said the President, “I would first return you this paper.” We do not pretend to give the exact words on either side, but we are sure we give the sense of both.

The above is a full and exact account of what passed between the President and the delegation. The President, in his letter to our Commissioners, tries to give the impression that our “understanding” or “agreement” was not a “pledge.” We confess, we are not sufficiently versed in the wiles of diplomacy to feel the force of this “distinction without a difference.” Nor can we understand how, in “a matter of honor among gentlemen,” in which “no paper or writing is necessary,” the very party who was willing to put it on that high footing can honorably descend to mere verbal criticism, to purge himself of what all gentlemen and men of honour must consider a breach of faith. The very fact that we (the representatives from South Carolina) were not authorized to commit or “pledge” the State, were not treating with the President as accredited ministers with full powers, but as gentlemen assuming, to a certain extent, the delicate task of' undertaking to foreshadow the course and policy of the State, should have made the President the more ready to strengthen our hands to bring about and carry out that course and policy which he professed to have as much at heart as we had. While we were not authorized to say that the Convention would not order the occupation of the forts immediately after secession, and prior to the sending on of Commissioners, the President, as Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, could most positively say, that so long as South Carolina abstained from attacking and seizing the forts, he would not send reinforcements to them, or allow their relative military status to be changed. We were acting in the capacity of gentlemen holding certain prominent positions, and anxious to exert such influence as we might possess, to effect a peaceful solution of pending political difficulties, and prevent, if possible, the horrors of war. The President was acting in a double capacity; not only as a gentleman, whose influence in carrying out his share of the understanding, or agreement, was potential, but as the head of the army, and, therefore, having the absolute control of the whole matter of reinforcing or transferring the garrison at Charleston. But we have dwelt long enough upon this point. Suffice it to say, that considering the President as bound in honor, if not by treaty stipulation, not to make any change in the forts, or to send reinforcements to them, unless they were attacked, we of the delegation who were elected to the Convention, felt equally bound in honor to do everything on our part to prevent any premature collision. This Convention can bear us witness as to whether or not we endeavored honorably to carry out our share of the agreement.

The published debates at the very commencement of the session, contain the evidence of our good faith. We trusted the President. We believed his wishes concurred with his policy, and that both were directed to avoiding any inauguration of hostilities. We were confirmed in our confidence, and reassured in our belief by a significant event which took place subsequent to our interview. He allowed his premier Cabinet officer, an old and tried friend to resign, rather than yield to his solicitations for the reinforcement of the garrison at Charleston. We urged this as a convincing proof of his firmness and sincerity. But how have we been deceived! The news of Major Anderson's coup produced a sudden and unexpected change in the President's policy. While declaring that his withdrawal from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter was “without orders, and contrary to orders,” he yet refused, for twelve hours, to take any action in the matter. For twelve hours, therefore, without any excuse, he refused to redeem his plighted word. No subsequent acts on the part of our State — no after reasons — can wipe away the stain which he suffered to rest upon his “honor as a gentleman,” while those hours, big with portentous events, rolled slowly by. His Secretary of War, impatient of a delay, every moment of which he felt touched his own honor, resigned. He did so solely on the ground that the faith of the government — solemly pledged — was broken, if it failed promptly to undo what had been done contrary to its wishes — against its settled policy — and in violation of its distinct agreement. The President accepted his resignation without comment. He did not attempt to disabuse the mind of his Secretary as to what was the true position of the Government. What a spectacle does the President's vacillating and disingenuous course present! He allows one Secretary to resign rather than abandon a policy which he has agreed upon. Scarcely have a few short weeks elapsed, and he accepts the resignation of another, rather than adhere to that very policy. He makes an agreement with gentlemen which, while he admits that they have faithfully kept it on their part, he himself evades and repudiates. And this he does rather than redress a wrong — correct an error — what he himself considers an error — committed by a subordinate, without his orders, and contrary to his wishes! It was at least due to Mr. Floyd, who, as one of his Cabinet, had officially and personally stood by his administration from its very commencement — through good report, and through evil report — to have explained to him that he was, in the President's opinion, laboring under a misapprehension. At least, to have said to him, “you are mistaken about this matter — do not leave me on a false issue.” But no; he coldly, ungraciously, yet promptly, receives the resignation without a syllable of remonstrance, and thus tacitly, but unequivocally, accepts without shame the issue presented. He does not deny that the faith of his government is pledged, but he deliberately refuses to redeem it.

WM. PORCHER MILES.
LAURENCE M. KEITT.

SOURCE: The Correspondence Between the Commissioners of the State of So. Ca. to the Government at Washington and the President of the United States, p. 21-6, Published in The Richmond Daily Dispatch, Richmond, Virginia, January 14, 1861, p. 1

Saturday, August 11, 2018

Commissioners of the State of South Carolina to James Buchanan, January 1, 1861

Washington, D. C,
January 1st, 1861.

Sir: We have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th December, in reply to a note addressed by us to you on the 28th of the same month, as Commissioners from South Carolina.

In reference to the declaration with which your reply commences, that “your position as President of the United States was clearly defined in the Message to Congress of the 3d instant,” that you possess “no power to change the relations heretofore existing” between South Carolina and the United States, “much less to acknowledge the independence of that State;” and that, consequently, you could meet us only as private gentlemen of the highest character, with an entire willingness to communicate to Congress any proposition we might have to make, we deem it only necessary to say, that the State of South Carolina having, in the exercise of that great right of self-government which underlies all our political organizations, declared herself sovereign and independent, we, as her representatives, felt no special solicitude as to the character in which you might recognize us. Satisfied that the State had simply exercised her unquestionable right, we were prepared, in order to reach substantial good, to waive the formal considerations which your constitutional scruples might have prevented you from extending. We came here, therefore, expecting to be received as you did receive us, and perfectly content with that entire willingness of which you assured us, to submit any proposition to Congress which we might have to make upon the subject of the independence of the State. That willingness was ample recognition of the condition of public affairs which rendered our presence necessary. In this position, however, it is our duty, both to the State which we represent and to ourselves, to correct several important misconceptions of our letter into which you have fallen.

You say, “It was my earnest desire that such a disposition might be made of the whole subject by Congress, who alone possesses the power to prevent the inauguration of a civil war between the parties in regard to the possession of the federal forts in the harbor of Charleston; and I, therefore, deeply regret that, in your opinion, ‘the events of the last twenty-four hours render this impossible.’” We expressed no such opinion, and the language which you quote as ours, is altered in its sense by the omission of a most important part of the sentence. What we did say was: “But the events of the last twenty-four hours render such an assurance impossible.” Place that “assurance” as contained in our letter, in the sentence, and we are prepared to repeat it.

Again, professing to quote our language, you say:— “Thus the authorities of South Carolina, without waiting or asking for any explanation, and, doubtless, believing, as you have expressed it, that the officer had acted not only without, but against my orders,” &c. We expressed no such opinion in reference to the belief of the people of South Carolina. The language which you have quoted, was applied solely and entirely to our assurance, obtained here, and based, as you well know, upon your own declaration — a declaration which, at that time, it was impossible for the authorities of South Carolina to have known. But, without following this letter into all its details, we propose only to meet the chief points of the argument.

Some weeks ago, the State of South Carolina declared her intention, in the existing condition of public affairs, to secede from the United States. She called a Convention of her people, to put her declaration in force. The Convention met, and passed the Ordinance of Secession. All this you anticipated, and your course of action was thoroughly considered. In your annual message, you declared you had no right, and would not attempt, to coerce a seceding State, but that you were bound by your constitutional oath, and would defend the property of the United States within the borders of South Carolina, if an attempt was made to take it by force. Seeing very early that this question of property was a difficult and delicate one, you manifested a desire to settle it without collision. You did not reinforce the garrisons in the harbor of Charleston. You removed a distinguished and veteran officer from the command of Fort Moultrie, because he attempted to increase his supply of ammunition. You refused to send additional troops to the same garrison when applied for by the officer appointed to succeed him. You accepted the resignation of the oldest and most eminent member of your Cabinet, rather than allow these garrisons to be strengthened. You compelled an officer stationed at Fort Sumter, to return immediately to the Arsenal, forty muskets which he had taken to arm his men. You expressed not to one, but to many, of the most distinguished of our public characters, whoso testimony will be placed upon the record, whenever it is necessary, your anxiety for a peaceful termination of this controversy, and your willingness not to disturb the military status of the forts, if Commissioners should be sent to the Government, whose communications you promised to submit to Congress. You received and acted on assurances from the highest official authorities of South Carolina, that no attempt would be made to disturb your possession of the forts and property of the United States, if you would not disturb their existing condition until Commissioners had been sent, and the attempt to negotiate had failed. You took from the members of the House of Representatives, a written memorandum that no such attempt should be made, “provided that no reinforcements shall be sent into those forts, and their relative military status shall remain as at present.” And, although you attach no force to the acceptance of such a paper, although you “considered it as nothing more in effect than the promise of highly honorable gentlemen,” as an obligation on one side without corresponding obligation on the other, it must be remembered (if we are rightly informed) that you were pledged, if you ever did send reinforcements, to return it to those from whom you had received it before you executed your resolution. You sent orders to your officers, commanding them strictly to follow a line of conduct in conformity with such an understanding.
Beside all this, you had received formal and official notice from the Governor of South Carolina, that we had been appointed Commissioners, and were on our way to Washington. You knew the implied condition under which we came; our arrival was notified to you, and an hour appointed for an interview. We arrived in Washington on Wednesday, at three o'clock, and you appointed an interview with us at one the next day. Early on that day, Thursday, the news was received here of the movement of Major Anderson. That news was communicated to you immediately, and you postponed our meeting until half-past two o'clock, on Friday, in order that you might consult your Cabinet. On Friday we saw you, and we called upon you then to redeem your pledge. You could not deny it. With the facts we have stated, and in the face of the crowning and conclusive fact, that your Secretary of War had resigned his seat in the Cabinet, upon the publicly avowed ground that the action of Major Anderson had violated the pledged faith of the Government, and that unless the pledge was instantly redeemed, he was dishonored; denial was impossible; you did not deny it. You do not deny it now, but you seek to escape from its obligation on two grounds: 1st, That we terminated all negotiation by demanding, as a preliminary, the withdrawal of the United States troops from the harbor of Charleston; and 2d, That the authorities of South Carolina, instead of asking explanation, and giving you the opportunity to vindicate yourself, took possession of other property of the United States. We will examine both.

In the first place, we deny positively, that we have ever, in any way, made any such demand. Our letter is in your possession; it will stand by this on the record. In it, we inform you of the objects of our mission. We say that it would have been our duty to have assured you of our readiness to commence negotiations with the most earnest and anxious desire to settle all questions between us amicably, and to our mutual advantage, but that events had rendered that assurance impossible. We stated the events, and we said that, until some satisfactory explanation of these events was given us, we could not proceed, and then, having made this request for explanation, we added, “and, in conclusion, we would urge upon you the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of Charleston. Under present circumstances they are a standing menace, which renders negotiation impossible,” &c. “Under present circumstances!” What circumstances? Why, clearly, the occupation of Fort Sumter, and the dismantling of Fort Moultrie by Major Anderson, in the face of your pledges, and without explanation or practical disavowal. And there is nothing in the letter, which would or could have prevented you from declining to withdraw the troops, and offering the restoration of the status to which you were pledged, if such had been your desire. It would have been wiser and better, in our opinion, to have withdrawn the troops, and this opinion we urged upon you, but we demanded nothing but such an explanation of the events of the last twenty-four hours as would restore our confidence in the spirit with which the negotiation should be conducted. In relation to this withdrawal of the troops from the harbor, we are compelled, however, to notice one passage of your letter. Referring to it, you say: “This I cannot do. This I will not do. Such an idea was never thought of by me in any possible contingency. No allusion to it had ever been made in any communication between myself and any human being.”

In reply to this statement, we are compelled to say, that your conversation with us left upon our minds the distinct impression that you did seriously contemplate the withdrawal of the troops from Charleston harbor. And, in support of this impression, we would add that we have the positive assurance of gentlemen of the highest possible public reputation, and the most unsullied integrity — men whose name and fame, secured by long service and patriotic achievement, place their testimony beyond cavil — that such suggestions had been made to, and urged upon you by them, and had formed the subject of more than one earnest discussion with you. And it was this knowledge that induced us to urge upon you a policy which had to recommend it, its own wisdom and the weight of such authority. As to the second point, that the authorities of South Carolina, instead of asking explanations, and giving you the opportunity to vindicate yourself, took possession of other property of the United States, we would observe, 1st. That, even if this were so, it does not avail you for defence, for the opportunity for decision was afforded you before these facts occurred. We arrived in Washington on Wednesday. The news from Major Anderson reached here early on Thursday, and was immediately communicated to you. All that day, men of the highest consideration — men who had striven successfully to lift you to your great office — who had been your tried and true friends through the troubles of your administration — sought you, and entreated you to act — to act at once. They told you that every hour complicated your position. They only asked you to give the assurance that, if the facts were so — that, if the commander had acted without, and against your orders, and in violation of your pledges, that you would restore the status you had pledged your honor to maintain.

You refused to decide. Your Secretary at War — your immediate and proper adviser in this whole matter — waited anxiously for your decision, until he felt that delay was becoming dishonor. More than twelve hours passed, and two Cabinet meetings had adjourned before you knew what the authorities of South Carolina had done, and your prompt decision at any moment of that time, would have avoided the subsequent complications. But if you had known the acts of the authorities of South Carolina, should that have prevented your keeping your faith? What was the condition of things? For the last sixty days, you have had in Charleston harbor, not force enough to hold the 2 forts against an equal enemy. Two of them were empty; one of those two, the most important in the harbor. It could have been taken at any time. You ought to know better than any man, that it would have been taken, but for the efforts of those who put their trust in your honor. Believing that they were threatened by Fort Sumter especially, the people were, with difficulty, restrained from securing, without blood, the possession of this important fortress. After many and reiterated assurances given on your behalf, which we cannot believe unauthorized, they determined to forbear, and in good faith sent on their Commissioners to negotiate with you. They meant you no harm; wished you no ill. They thought of you kindly, believed you true, and were willing, as far as was consistent with duty, to spare you unnecessary and hostile collision. Scarcely had their Commissioners left, than Major Anderson waged war. No other words will describe his action. It was not a peaceful change from one fort to another; it was a hostile act in the highest sense — one only justified in the presence of a superior enemy, and in imminent peril. He abandoned his position, spiked his guns, burned his gun-carriages, made preparations for the destruction of his post, and withdrew under cover of the night to a safer position. This was war. No man could have believed (without your assurance) that any officer could have taken such a step, “not only without orders, but against orders.” What the State did, was in simple self-defence; for this act, with all its attending circumstances, was as much war as firing a volley; and war being thus begun, until those commencing it explained their action, and disavowed their intention, there was no room for delay; and, even at this moment, while we are writing, it is more than probable, from the tenor of your letter, that reinforcements are hurrying on to the conflict, so that when the first gun shall be fired, there will have been, on your part, one continuous consistent series of actions commencing in a demonstration essentially warlike, supported by regular reinforcement, and terminating in defeat or victory. And all this without the slightest provocation; for, among the many things which you have said, there is one thing you cannot say — you have waited anxiously for news from the seat of war, in hopes that delay would furnish some excuse for this precipitation. But this “tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act, on the part of the authorities of South Carolina,” (which is the only justification of Major Anderson,) you are forced to admit “has not yet been alleged.” But you have decided. You have resolved to hold by force what you have obtained through our misplaced confidence, and by refusing to disavow the action of Major Anderson, have converted his violation of orders into a legitimate act of your Executive authority. Be the issue what it may, of this we are assured, that, if Fort Moultrie has been recorded in history as a memorial of Carolina gallantry, Fort Sumter will live upon the succeeding page as an imperishable testimony of Carolina faith.

By your course, you have probably rendered civil war inevitable. Be it so. If you choose to force this issue upon us, the State of South Carolina will accept it, and, relying upon Him who is the God of justice as well as the God of hosts, will endeavor to perform the great duty which lies before her, hopefully, bravely and thoroughly.

Our mission being one for negotiation and peace, and your note leaving us without hope of a withdrawal of the troops from Fort Sumter, or of the restoration of the status quo existing at the time of our arrival, and intimating, as we think, your determination to reinforce the garrison in the harbor of Charleston, we respectfully inform you that we propose returning to Charleston on to-morrow afternoon.

We have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully,

Your obedient servants,

R. W. BARNWELL,
J. H. ADAMS,
JAMES L. ORR.
Commissioners.
To his Excellency, the President
of the United States.


[Endorsement.]

Executive Mansion,
3½ o'clock, Wednesday.

This paper, just presented to the President, is of such a character that he declines to receive it.

SOURCE: The Correspondence Between the Commissioners of the State of So. Ca. to the Government at Washington and the President of the United States, p. 12-20