Head Quarters of the
Army
Washington January 31st
1862
Hon E M Stanton
Secty of War
Sir:
I ask your indulgence for the following paper, rendered
necessary by circumstances. I assumed command of the troops in the vicinity of
Washington on Saturday July 27 1861, 6 days after the battle of Bull Run.
I found no army to command, a mere collection of regiments
cowering on the banks of the Potomac, some perfectly raw, others dispirited by
their recent defeat.
Nothing of any consequence had then been done to secure the
Southern approaches to the capital by means of defensive works; nothing
whatever had been undertaken to defend the the [sic] avenues to the city on the northern side of the Potomac.
The troops were not only undisciplined, undrilled &
dispirited – they were not even placed in military positions – the city was
almost in a condition to have been taken by a dash of a single regiment of
cavalry.
Without one day's delay I undertook the difficult task
assigned to me – that task the Hon Secty knows was given to me without my
solicitation or foreknowledge. How far I have accomplished it will best be
shown by the past & present. The capital is secure against attack, – the
extensive fortifications erected by the labor of our troops enable a small
garrison to hold it against a numerous army; the enemy have been held in check;
the State of Maryland is securely in our possession; the detached counties of
Virginia are again within the pale of our laws, & all apprehension of
trouble in Delaware is at an end; the enemy are confined to the positions they
occupied before 21 July; – more than all this, I have now under my command a
well drilled & reliable army to which the destinies of the country may be
confidently committed. This army is young, & untried in battle, but it is
animated by the highest spirit, & is capable of great deeds. That so much
has been accomplished, & such an army created in so short a time from
nothing will hereafter be regarded as one of the highest glories of the
administration & the nation.
Many weeks, I may say many months, ago this Army of the
Potomac was fully in condition to repel any attack; – but there is a vast
difference between that & the efficiency required to make troops to attack
successfully an army elated by victory, and entrenched in a position long since
selected, studied, & fortified. In the earliest papers I submitted to the
Presdt I asked for an effective movable force far exceeding the aggregate now
on the banks of the Potomac – I have not the force I asked for. Even when in a
subordinate position I always looked beyond the operations of the Army of the
Potomac; I was never satisfied in my own mind with a barren victory, but looked
to combined & decisive operations.
When I was placed in command of the armies of the U. S. I
immediately turned my attention to the whole field of operations – regarding
the Army of the Potomac as only one, while the most important, of the
masses under my command.
I confess that I did not then appreciate the absence of a
general plan which had before existed, nor did I know that utter
disorganization & want of preparation pervaded the western armies. I took
it for granted that they were ready, if not quite, in condition to move towards
the fulfillment of my plans – I acknowledge that I made a great mistake.
I sent at once, with the approval of the Executive, officers
I considered competent to command in Kentucky & Missouri – their
instructions looked to prompt movements. I soon found that the labor of
creation & organization had to be performed then – transportation, arms,
clothing, artillery, discipline – all were wanting; these things required time
to procure them; the Generals in command have done their work most creditably –
but we are still delayed. I had hoped that a general advance could be made
during the good weather of December – I was mistaken.
My wish was to gain possession of the Eastern Tennessee
Railroads as a preliminary movement, – then to follow it up immediately by an
attack on Nashville & Richmond as nearly at the same time as possible.
I have ever regarded our true policy as being that of fully
preparing ourselves & then seeking for the most decisive results; – I do
not wish to waste life in useless battles, but prefer to strike at the heart.
Two bases of operations seem to present themselves for the
advance of the Army of the Potomac.—
I. That of Washington – its present position – involving a
direct attack upon the enemy's entrenched positions at Centreville, Manassas
etc, or else a movement to turn one or both flanks of those positions, or a
combination of the two plans.
The relative force of the two armies will not justify an
attack on both flanks.
An attack on his left flank alone involves a long line of
wagon communication & cannot prevent him from collecting for the decisive
battle all the detachments now on his extreme right & left.
Should we attack his right by the line of the Occoquan &
a crossing of the Potomac below the Occoquan & near his batteries, we could
perhaps prevent the junction of the enemy's extreme right with his centre (we might
destroy the former), we would remove the obstructions to the navigation of the
Potomac, reduce the length of wagon transportation by establishing new depots at
the nearest points of the Potomac, & strike more directly his main railway
communications.
The fords of the Occoquan below the mouth of Bull Run are
watched by the rebels, batteries are said to be placed on the heights in rear
(concealed by the woods), & the arrangement of his troops is such that he
can oppose some considerable resistance to a passage of the stream. Information
has just been received to the effect that the enemy are entrenching a line of
heights extending from the vicinity of Sangster's (Union Mills?) towards
Evansport. Early in Jany. Sprigg's ford was occupied by Genl Rhodes with 3600
men & 8 guns; there are strong reasons for beleiving that Davis' Ford is
occupied.
These circumstances indicate, or prove, that the enemy
anticipate the movement in question & are prepared to resist it. Assuming
for the present that this operation is determined upon, it may be well to
examine briefly its probable progress.
In the present state of affairs our columns (for the
movement of so large a force must be made in several columns, at least 5 or 6)
can reach the Accotinck without danger; during the march thence to the Occoquan
our right flank becomes exposed to an attack from Fairfax Station, Sangster's
& Union Mills; – this danger must be met by occupying in some force either
the two first named places, or, better, the point of junction of the roads
leading thence to the village of Occoquan – this occupation must be continued
so long as we continue to draw supplies by the roads from this city, or until a
battle is won.
The crossing of the Occoquan should be made at all the fords
from Wolf's Run to the mouth, the points of crossing not being necessarily
confined to the fords themselves. Should the enemy occupy this line in force we
must, with what assistance the flotilla can afford, endeavor to force the
passage near the mouth, thus forcing the enemy to abandon the whole line or be
taken in flank himself.
Having gained the line of the Occoquan, it would be
necessary to throw a column by the shortest route to Dumfries, partly to force
the enemy to abandon his batteries on the Potomac, partly to cover our left
flank against an attack from the direction of Acquia, & lastly to establish
our communication with the river by the best roads, & thus give us new
depots.
The enemy would by this time have occupied the line of the
Occoquan above Bulls Run, holding Brentsville in force & perhaps extending
his lines somewhat farther to the S. W.
Our next step would be to prevent the enemy from crossing
the Occoquan between Bull Run & Broad Run, to fall upon our right flank
while moving on Brentsville; this might be effected by occupying Bacon-race
direct & the cross roads near the mouth of Bull Run, or still more
effectually by moving to the fords themselves & preventing him from
debouching on our side. These operations could probably be resisted, &
would require some time to effect them. As nearly at the same time as possible
we should gain the fords necessary to our purposes above Broad run.
Having secured our right flank it would become necessary to
carry Brentsville at any cost, for we could not leave it between our right
flank & main body. The final movement on the Railroad must be determined by
circumstances existing at the time
This brief sketch brings out in bold relief the great
advantage possessed by the enemy in the strong central position he occupies,
with roads diverging in every direction, & a strong line of defence
enabling him to remain on the defensive with a small force on one flank, while
he concentrates everything on the other for a decisive action. Should we place
a portion of our force in front of Centreville while the rest crosses the
Occoquan or commit the error of dividing our army by a very difficult obstacle
& by a distance too great to enable the two portions to support each other,
should either be attacked by the masses of the enemy while the other is held in
check.
I should perhaps have dwelled more decidedly on the fact
that the force left near Sangster's must be allowed to remain somewhere on that
side of the Occoquan, until the decisive battle is over, to cover our retreat
in the event of disaster, unless it should be decided to select & entrench
a new base somewhere near Dumfries – a proceeding involving much time.
After the passage of the Occoquan by the main army, this
covering force could be drawn in to a more central & less exposed position,
say Brimstone Hill or nearer the Occoquan. In this latitude the weather will
for a considerable period be very uncertain, & a movement commenced in
force on roads in tolerably fair condition will be liable, almost certain, to
be much delayed by rains & snow. It will therefore be next to impossible to
surprise the enemy, or take him at a disadvantage by rapid manoeuvres; – our
slow progress will enable him to divine our purposes & take his measures
accordingly. The probability is, from the best information we possess, that he
has improved the roads leading to his lines of defence, while we must work as
we advance.
Bearing in mind what has been said, & the present
unprecedented & impassable condition of the roads, it will be evident that
no precise period can be fixed upon for the movement on this line, nor can its
duration be closely calculated; it seems certain that many weeks may
elapse before it is possible to commence the march.
Assuming the success of this operation & the defeat of
the enemy as certain, the question at once arises as to the importance of the
results gained.
I think these results would be confined to the possession of
the field of battle, the evacuation of the line of the upper Potomac by the
enemy, & the moral effect of the victory – important results it is true,
but not decisive of the war, nor securing the destruction of the enemy's main
army; for he could fall back upon other positions, & fight us again &
again, should the condition of his troops permit.
If he is in no condition to fight us again out of range of
the entrenchments at Richmond we would find it a very difficult & tedious
matter to follow him up there – for he would destroy the railroad bridges &
otherwise impede our progress through a region where the roads are as bad as
they well can be; & we would probably find ourselves forced at last to
change the whole theatre of war, or to seek a shorter land route to Richmond
with a smaller available force & at an expenditure of much more time than
were we to adopt the short line at once.
We would also have forced the enemy to concentrate his
forces & perfect his defensive measures at the very points where it is
desirable to strike him when least prepared.
II. The second base of operations available for the Army of
the Potomac is that of the lower Chesapeake Bay, which affords the shortest
possible land routes to Richmond, & strikes directly at the heart of the
enemy's power in the East.
The roads in that region are passable at all seasons of the
year.
The country now alluded to is much more favorable for
offensive operations than that in front of Washington (which is very
unfavorable) – much more level – more cleared land – the woods less dense –
soil more sandy – the spring some two or three weeks earlier.
A movement in force on that line obliges the enemy to
abandon his entrenched position at Manassas, in order to hasten to cover
Richmond & Norfolk.
He must do this, for should he permit us to occupy
Richmond his destruction can be averted only by entirely defeating us in a
battle in which he must be the assailant.
This movement if successful gives us the capital, the
communications, the supplies of the rebels; Norfolk would fall; all the waters
of the Chesapeake would be ours; all Virginia would be in our power; & the
enemy forced to abandon Tennessee & North Carolina. The alternatives
presented to the enemy would be to beat us in a position selected by ourselves;
– disperse; – or pass beneath the Caudine Forks. Should we be beaten in a
battle, we have a perfectly secure retreat down the Peninsula upon Fort Monroe,
with our flanks perfectly secured by the fleet. During the whole movement our
left flank is covered by the water, our right is secure for the reason that the
enemy is too distant to reach us in time – he can only oppose us in front; or
bring our fleet into full play.
After a successful battle our position would be – Burnside
forming our left, Norfolk held securely, our centre connecting Burnside with
Buell, both by Raleigh & Lynchburg, Buell in Eastern Tennessee &
Northern Alabama, Halleck at Nashville & Memphis.
The next movement would be to connect with Sherman on the
left, by reducing Wilmington & Charleston; to advance our centre into South
Carolina & Georgia; to push Buell either towards Montgomery, or to unite
with the main army in Georgia; to throw Halleck southward to meet the Naval
Expedition from New Orleans.
We should then be in a condition to reduce at our leisure
all the southern seaports; to occupy all the avenues of communication; to use
the great outlet of the Mississippi; to reestablish our Gvt & arms in
Arkansas, Louisiana & Texas; to force the slaves to labor for our
subsistance instead of that of the rebels; – to bid defiance to all foreign
interference.
Such is the object I have ever had in view; this is the
general plan which I have hoped to accomplish. For many long months I have
labored to prepare the Army of the Potomac to play its part in the programme;
from the day when I was placed in command of all our armies, I have exerted
myself to place all the other armies in such a condition that they too could
perform their allotted duties. Should it be determined to operate from the
lower Chesapeake, the point of landing which promises the most brilliant
results is Urbana on the lower Rappahanock.
This point is easily reached by vessels of heavy draught, it
is neither occupied nor observed by the enemy; it is but one long march from
West Point, the key of that region, & thence but two marches to Richmond. A
rapid movement from Urbana would probably cut off Magruder in the Peninsula,
& enable us to occupy Richmond before it could be strongly reinforced.
Should we fail in that we could, with the cooperation of the Navy, cross the
James & throw ourselves in rear of Richmond, thus forcing the enemy to come
out & attack us – for his position would be untenable, with us on the southern
bank of the river.
Should circumstances render it not advisable to land at
Urbana we can use Mob Jack Bay, – or – the worst coming to the worst – we can
take Fort Monroe as a base, & operate with complete security, altho' with
less celerity & brilliancy of results, up the Peninsula.
To reach whatever point may be selected as the base, a large
amount of cheap water transportation must be collected – consisting mainly of
canal boats, barges, wood boats, schooners etc towed by small steamers – all of
a very different character from those required for all previous expeditions.
This can certainly be accomplished within 30 days from the time the order is
given.
I propose, as the best possible plan that can, in my
judgment be adopted, to select Urbana as the landing place of the first
detachments. To transport by water four (4) Divisions of Infantry, with their
batteries, the Regular Infty, a few wagons one bridge train & a few
squadrons of cavalry – making the vicinity of Hooker's position the place of
embarkation for as many as possible. To move the Regular Cavalry, & Reserve
Artillery, the remaining bridge trains, & wagons to a point somewhere near
Cape Lookout, then ferry them over the river by means of North River ferry
boats, march them over to the Rappahannock (covering the movement by an
Infantry force placed near Keattsville), cross the Rappahannock in a similar
way.
The expense & difficulty of the movement will thus be
much diminished (a saving of transportation of about 10.000 horses!), & the
result none the less certain.
The concentration of the cavalry etc in the lower counties
of Maryland can be effected without exciting suspicion, & the movement made
without delay from that cause.
This movement, if adopted, will not at all expose the city
of Washington to danger. The total force to be thrown upon the new line would
be (according to circumstances) from 110.000 to 140.000 – I hope to use the
latter number, by bringing fresh troops into Washington, & still leaving it
quite safe.
I fully realize that, in all projects offered, time is
probably the most valuable consideration – it is my decided opinion that in
that point of view the 2nd plan should be adopted. It is possible, very highly
probable, that the weather & state of the roads may be such as to delay the
direct movement from Washington, with its unsatisfactory results & great
risks, far beyond the time required to complete the second plan. In the
first case, we can fix no definite time for an advance – the roads have
gone from bad to worse – nothing like their present condition has ever been
known here before – they are impassable at present, we are entirely at the
mercy of the weather! In the second plan, we can calculate almost to a day,
& with but little regard to the season.
If at the expense of 30 days delay we can gain a decisive
victory which will probably end the war, it is far cheaper than to gain a
battle tomorrow that produces no final results, & may require years of
warfare & expenditure to follow up.
Such, I think, is precisely the difference between the two
plans discussed in this long letter. A battle joined at Manassas will result
mainly in the possession of the field of combat – at best we can follow it up
but slowly, unless we do what I now propose, viz; – change the line of
operations.
On the Manassas line the rebels can, if well enough
disciplined (& we have every reason to suppose that to be the case) dispute
our advance, over bad roads, from position to position.
When we have joined the battle, if we do join it, the
question will at once arise – “What are we to do next?” —
It is by no means certain that we can beat them at Manassas.
On the other line I regard success as certain by all the
chances of war.
We demoralize the enemy, by forcing him to abandon his
prepared position for one which we have chosen, in which all is in our favor,
& when success must produce imminse results. My judgment as a General is
clearly in favor of this project.
Nothing is certain in war – but all the chances are
in favor of this movement.
So much am I in favor of the southern line of operations,
that I would prefer the move from Fort Monroe as a base, as a certain, tho'
less brilliant movement than that from Urbana, to an attack upon Manassas.
I know that his Excellency the President, you & I all
agree in our wishes – & that our desire is to bring this war to as prompt a
close as the means in our possession will permit. I believe that the mass of
the people have entire confidence in us – I am sure of it – let us then look
only to the great result to be accomplished, & disregard everything else.
In conclusion I would respectfully, but firmly, advise that
I may be authorized to undertake at once the movement by Urbana.
I believe that it can be carried into execution so nearly simultaneously
with the final advance of Buell & Halleck that the columns will support
each other. I will stake my life, my reputation on the result – more than that,
I will stake upon it the success of our cause.
I hope but little from the attack on Manassas; – my judgment
is against it. Foreign complications may entirely change the state of affairs,
& render very different plans necessary. In that event I will be ready to
submit them
I am sir very respectfully
your obedient servant
Geo B McClellan
Maj Gnl Comdg U.S.A.
