Gustavus V. Fox to John M. Forbes, April 1, 1863

Navy Department, April 1,1863.

I have your letter from near Halifax. Every steamer we capture that will carry one gun is invariably taken by the department and sent to the blockade. The Atlantic and Baltic are pretty nearly gone, boilers entirely so. The old Cunarders have not the speed. Earl Russell has written a letter to our government (received yesterday) which, in plain English, is this: “We have a right to make and sell. We are merchants; we sell to whoever will buy; you can buy as well as the South. We do not ask any questions of our purchasers. We shall not hound down our own industry. We are not responsible for anything. You can make the most of it.”

We infer from this bombshell that the government would be glad to have the South get out these ironclads, and that they will not afford us any aid. You can act accordingly. You must stop them at all hazards, as we have no defense against them. Let us have them in the United States for our own purposes, without any more nonsense, and at any price. As to guns, we have not one in the whole country fit to fire at an ironclad. If you dispose of their ironclads, we will take care of the whole Southern concern; and it depends solely upon your action in this matter; and if you have the opportunity to get them, I hope you will not wait for any elaborate instructions.

It is a question of life and death. Charleston will be attacked within ten days, and I hope we shall strengthen you with successes in other quarters. The Georgiana is disposed of.

Regards to Mr. A.

SOURCE: Sarah Forbes Hughes, Letters and Recollections of John Murray Forbes, Volume 2, p. 22-3

Result Of Gustavus V. Fox's Plan For Reinforcing Fort Sumpter; In His Own Writing

My plan for reinforcing Fort Sumpter was this—

From the outer edge of the bar to Sumpter through the swash channel it is four miles in a straight line, with no shoal spots less than nine feet at high water. The batteries of the enemy on Morris and Sullivan Islands are one and one third of a mile distant from each other, between which the reinforcements must pass.

I proposed to anchor three small men of war at the entrance of the swash channel to afford a safe base of operations. The soldiers and provisions to be taken down in a large steamer, having on board boats for the whole, with three hundred sailors, and accompanied with three steam tugs having a draft of only six feet of water. The entrance to be effected at night with the tugs or boats as circumstances might dictate.

Rough weather would render the attempt impossible in boats but favorable for tugs. Whereas a fine clear night would be more favorable for the smaller objects — boats. This plan was brought to the Pres^ts notice early in March and its practicability assured by his own convictions and concurrent naval testimony.

The military authorities seemed to think it impossible to pass their batteries, but assured the Pres^t that if reinforcements and provisions were thrown in the fort it could not be taken.

I visited Major Anderson on the 21st of March under an open order from the War Dpt, which was shown to Govr Pickens who gave me a pass, without restriction, and I confined my conversation with Major Anderson entirely to objects embraced in that order. Notwithstanding the earnest desire of the Pres^t to reinforce and provision Fort Sumpter, Mr. Seward seems to have been under obligations to oppose the attempt, and his great influence over Genl Scott, brought the military power against the plan.

As Major Anderson's supplies would be utterly exhausted on the 15th of April every effort was made by some strong hand to delay the expedition until its supporters must give it up. The last card was to send for a Union man from the Virginia Convention and say to him that Sumpter would be evacuated at once if the Union people, who were in a majority in the Convention, would adjourn it. This Union man declined the proposition and made so many preposterous demands  that the Pres^t decided the expedition should go forward. The order was given to me late the night of April 4th. The 5th was consumed in getting to N. York, and I sailed the 8th, leaving only three days to get up and dispatch the expedition. Most of those who had favored the expedition and in whom I depended for assistance to fit it out, abandoned it at this period as too late.

Unwilling to mention to the Pres^t the misgivings of those around me I determined to go forward alone.

Instead of the 300 sailors I asked for on board the steamer, the Sec'y of the Navy proposed to send down the Powhatan stm'r of war with that number of men, which was satisfactory to me. Therefore I sailed in the Baltic the 8th inst. without the sailors. The Powhatan having sailed the 6th. The revenue cutter H. Lane, the 8th, the Pawnee the 9th and the Pocahontas the 10th. The Baltic and Pawnee arrived off Charleston the 12th inst. after hostilities had commenced. The H. Lane the evening previous, and the Pocahontas the 13th at the surrender of Sumpter. The passage to Charleston and the day and night of our arrival was severe weather, preventing the tugs reaching the rendezvous. The next day, the 13th inst, seeing no part of my proposed means of effecting an entrance had arrived, a schooner loaded with ice was captured and means undertaken to effect an entrance in her the following night, but at 8 A.M. the wood work of the fort was set on fire by hot shot and by 3 P.M. the place was rendered untenable, and consequently it was surrendered.

The defects of the fort, and its injuries, such as were never anticipated by the engineers, are such, that had the place been provisioned and reinforced, the final result would have been delayed but a few days. The Powhatan, with her sailors, was the whole strength of my proposed plan because both tugs and boats were to be manned by these sailors. Yet the Powhatan sailed from N. York the 6th two days before I did, with an officer who bore an order from the Pres^t of the U. S. to carry her directly to Pensacola. Her regular Captn having the orders of the Navy Dept to cooperate with me at Charleston. This order of the Pres^t was unknown to the war or navy departments and was signed by him in ignorance that the Powhatan was one of my vessels. She was sent off on an expedition got up by the Sec'y of State who thus interfered with the other depts as the last hope of preventing the reinforcing of Sumpter. And it did prevent it, and I had the mortification of witnessing the surrender of the Fort with no part of my proposed plan arrived, in fact deprived by treachery of all power of accomplishing it, and losing reputation with the general public for the failure because I cannot state the facts at this crisis of our affairs without injury to the Govt.

The Charleston people assumed that the merchant vessels detained outside of their bar were the various expeditions which had sailed from N. York about the period of our departure and therefore they concentrated a large force on the islands and abused us for not landing and attacking the batteries. But they were vessels detained by the bombardment. Our military force consisted of 200 recruits of no earthly use to Fort Sumpter in such an emergency because they were undrilled. The S. C. authorities had 13,000. I believe every officer of the army or navy present were entirely satisfied of the feasibility of either of my plans.

In fact their fire upon Sumpter was precipitated because they intercepted my plan and were assured by their best naval authority that it was perfectly practicable.

G. V. Fox.

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 38-41

Montgomery Blair to Gustavus V. Fox, April 26, 1861

Dear Fox

I have not written you because it was easy for you to understand what I thought of the Fort Sumpter business and not agreeable for me to express what I thought. We are now fairly launched in a big war and I think you can have a command if you want one. A proposition was made yesterday to convert some merchant vessels into armed ships and during the talk the President said he wanted you to have a command tho you did not get into Fort Sumpter. He thought very highly of you. We propose to take on naval volunteers as well as Soldier volunteers.

I am warring on fogyism of all kinds, I think the best thing now to be done is to disband both army and navy and reconstruct. We shall never get on I am afraid with the present officers.

Apl 26. I wrote the above some days ago and was disturbed and have not had an opportunity to resume till this moment. In the mean time last night I have yours of 20th. I shall mention its contents to Welles and Lincoln. I gave yrs from the Baltic both to Welles and Seward to read. Seward read a part of it and handed it back without remark. Welles said when he handed it back that you knew he supposed that he had nothing to do with the diversion of the Powhatan from her Charleston mission. But the President has never had an opportunity to read or talk about the affair, except on the occasion mentioned, and indeed events of such magnitude are crowding on us that Sumpter and Anderson are not thought of for the moment. I want you here very much to help us along, and must try and manage it. I see however that Com. Paulding is mightily set up himself and wants nobody in the Dept, but himself. I think I will fix his flint shortly.

Yrs truly

M. Blair     

Wash. Apl 26, 1861

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 37-8

Gustavus V. Fox to Montgomery Blair, April 17, 1861

Baltic, 17th April

At Sea, 1861  

Dr Blair,

As I have no writing materials and wish to save tomorrow's mail I use a pencil.

Monday at 6 P.M. of the 8th we dropped down to Sandy Hook and anchored for the night, being too late for the tide. One of my tugs went to sea Sunday night, another one followed the Baltic, and the 3d I left in the hands of Russell Sturgis, to send on if he could charter her, the owner, like many others, being shaky at the last moment. At 8 A.M. of the 9th inst. we discharged the pilot and had constant steady bad weather and heavy sea. At 3 A.M. of the 12th reached the rendezvous 10 miles east of Charleston light — found only the H. Lane. At 6 A.M. saw the Pawnee coming in; boarded her and intimated to her Comdr that I was going in to offer to land provisions, asked him to stand in with me. He said his orders were to remain 10 miles east of the light and await the Powhatan. I took the H. Lane as an escort, and as we drew in saw that the forts had all opened fire upon Sumpter and that Major Anderson was replying gallantly. Seeing a stm'r off the bar, supposed to be the Isabel, I notified Capt. Faunce of the H. Lane and he started after her. It proved to be the Nashville from N. York.

I stood out in the Baltic to let Capt. Rowan of the Pawnee know that firing had commenced. I met him, however, coming in. Though he had expressed himself very averse to doing anything to commence the war, he now seemed willing to go in with his vessel if we had a pilot. I advised both vessels to go close in to the swash channel and anchor, which was done, and as the heavy sea and wind had moderated a little, I thought we had better attempt a couple of boats of provisions this night, the 12th, but as the Powhatan and Pocahontas had not arrived and the Pawnee and Lane were both short of hands and we had but one gun launch, the Pawnee's, I was overruled and consented upon the gallant promise of the officers that they would escort me in after daylight in the morning, defying their batteries. This was their proposition. The vessels of war remained at anchor at the Swash whilst I stood out to the rendezvous for the night in hopes of meeting the Powhatan and Pocahontas. It blew very heavy all night with a great swell and towards morning a thick fog. As Capt. Fletcher of the Baltic returned towards the anchorage, near daylight, he ran onto the Rattlesnake Shoal, but soon got off. The waves run so high that we were obliged to anchor some four miles outside of the war vessels, and having this sea it was impossible to load the boats. I took a boat at 8 A.M. 13th inst., and with the senior army officer Lt. Hudson, we pulled in to the Pawnee. As we drew near I saw, with horror, black volumes of smoke issuing from Sumpter. The barbarians, to their everlasting disgrace be it said, redoubled their fire, and through the flames and smoke the noble band of true men continued their response. The severe weather during the forenoon having prevented us using boats, Capt. Rowan captured an ice schooner and offered it to me to carry in the provisions and men. I accepted it and the night of the 13th I should certainly have gone in, and as certainly been knocked to pcs. My tug boats I knew could not have reached Charleston in the weather we had experienced since leaving N. York, and the Powhatan, I now learned, by a note from Capt. Mercer to Capt. Rowan, dated the 7th (I left the 8th, Rowan left the 9th, Gillis the 10th) that the Powhatan was “detached from duty off Charleston.” As she had the 300 sailors I asked for, and the howitzers and fighting launches, and the other ships of war were simply ordered to await her arrival 10 miles off, you will see that some one determined to utterly extinguish the expedition. I do not think I have deserved this treatment, and at present will not speak as I have felt, and now feel. At about 2 P.M. the Pocahontas arrived, just in time to witness the surrender of Fort Sumpter. I immediately suggested a flag of truce to be sent to offer a passage to Major A. and his command, which was done. Had the Powhatan arrived the 12th we should have had the men and provisions into Fort Sumpter, as I had everything ready, boats, muffled oars, small packages of provisions, in fact everything but the 300 sailors promised to me by the dept. A tug would have accomplished it, but with more risk alongside of the Fort. Capt. Foster the Eng. of Fort Sumpter says we would have got in and so does Hartstein of their navy. You know military people all told the Prest we could not get in, but if we did, the Fort was impregnable. In both instances were they wrong. Sumpter's fire had dispersed their naval preparations and they trusted entirely to their batteries and those light boats to illuminate the channel. What can be said of the builders of the fort? The burning of the officers' quarters has almost ruined the gorge wall, so that a few days more fire would have tumbled it all to pcs. One shot from Cummings point (where Cullum said it never could be breached) went entirely through the wall of the gorge. Another shot passed through an inside wall and struck below the door of the magazine, shattering the wall, so as to prevent the opening of the door, at the same time the flames nearly reached this door. In fact they all expected to be blown up. The coupe next to Cummings point is very severely handled and would soon have been a breach. So that this impregnable fort, with 33 guns and 17 mortars, playing upon it for only 34 hours, is injured $400,000 worth and actually burned as much as battered. I think these facts will make a stir, for not one was ever presented in all the discussion we had. The officers and men from the Major down have covered themselves with glory. A fort of 60 fighting men, surrounded by 9000 men, and a circle of fortifications kept up the first day gun for gun with them and on the 2 replied, though from 8 A.M. until 2 P.M. the fort was a mass of smoke through which, and in which, they fought.

I told the Major how anxious the Prest was that they (S.C.) should stand before the civilized world as having fired upon bread, yet they had made the case much worse for themselves as they knew the Major would leave the 15th at noon for want of provisions (see his correspondence), yet they opened upon 60 men and continued it whilst the fort was burning. The "World" (N. Y.) correspondent came down in the H. Lane and is now with us, and as he is the only reporter on board and is continually with the officers I imagine he will have a faithful account. As several ships brigs and schooners and one N. Y. stmr were detained at the bar by the conflict, it was believed to be a whole fleet for the relief of Sumpter with 9000 men on board. Whereas there was the Pawnee and H. Lane with one 12 lb. launch gun and on board the Baltic 200 RECRUITS only two or three of whom ever saw a gun, sent by the Gen1 in Chief, and the flag ship with her power and efficiency sent away without any intimation conveyed to the other vessels, all of which sailed subsequently to this change. Sunday the Major delivered up the fort after saluting his flag with 50 guns, which he intended to be 100, but a premature explosion killed two men and wounded three others, the only casualties of the whole battle. Monday, at noon, he and his command, and the flag (I enclose a pce) came off in the Isabel stmr and were transferred to this vessel when we sailed, all the vessels saluting. Excepting from the time of the surrender to the transfer, we have had a gale of wind just now abating (midnight).

The men in the fort, though on Pork and Rice, never flinched or grumbled, even when fire was added. I think the Prest will keenly approve the Major's course. As for our expedition, somebody's influence has made it ridiculous.

Very truly

G. V. FOX.

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 31-5

• See post script, April 18, 1861

Gustavus V. Fox to Montgomery Blair, Sunday, March 31, 1861, p.m.

Sunday, P.M.

31 Mch. '61

D^r Judge.

I am writing this at Mr. Aspinwall's house. He has just had an interview with Capt. Marshall who declines to have anything to do with the matter. This is serious as he was expected to obtain all the provisions in what is called the desiccated form. These would occupy only half the space of others, could all be carried in bags, in the boats, facilitating the landing and giving the garrison, always, fresh provisions. Ships out of N. Y. now use them. Mr. Aspinwall says we can have the Baltic but he is evidently very averse to the movement. He is now writing and will send on a special messenger who takes this. I also wrote you by mail this morning. Mr. A. and Capt. M. say the loan would not be taken if this news leaked out which it will not here. Verbal orders having been given to me, which cannot be carried out, now Marshall declines, without placing me in immediate prominence. I give you the earliest information, that the War Dept. may give the necessary orders, which they can give Tuesday noon after the loan bids are received. All the desiccated meats &c are put into a size that will allow them to be bagged in common gunny bags of 2½  bushel size. We can also put coal into bags as we go down.

The Baltic's ten boats will hold all the men and the Provisions, in this form, — but in the ordinary form, i.e. salt, not one half. No flour should be sent, only bread. So we could use tugs or boats. Perhaps both.

The arguments of opposition to this act of solemn duty are all political. Capt. Marshall has been in Washington for two weeks and wishes to know if Mr. Seward goes for it. His only fear of success is the impossibility of getting their tugs out of the way — not difficult with an efficient naval force. Then the whole thing is child's play. I feel like abandoning my country, moving off somewhere. I am sick down to my heel.

The Baltic can be got ready in three days. Be particular about the provisions — desiccated and to go in bags, which can be done in the Baltic on the way down.

Has Major A. a range for burning wood or coal at the fort. This is important. I expect to hear from you at the earliest moment. Mr. A has written to the Pres^t advising no movement until the loan is taken and sends it with this note.

Very sincerely

G. V. Fox

SOURCES: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 13-14

Diary of 1st Lieutenant John S. Morgan: Monday, May 8, 1865

Rained very hard during the night, hearing that during the night a boat had come in Luiet Laughridge & I go to the landing. find no boat; cross the bayou & gather a mess of blackberries, dewberries & huckleberries, was on our way back when we see coming down the river the Reb steamer “Jeff Davis” by the time we readied the landing the boat was tieing up we went on board & saw the effect of a shell which had burst in her cabin this while we were besieging Spanish fort. She is quite a nice boat. Took a ride on her from the landing up to the wood yard, & learned from a capt aboard that there were 19 transports & 3 Gunboats to come down & that they would be arriving until tomorrow evening, on my way to camp Lt. Cooper told me the Regt was detailed for fatigue, reached camp at 10 Regt detailed to wood boats. While we load the Jeff Davis these transports & the Gunboat — Ram, “Baltic” come down, the Baltic bring with her their torpedo beat, a strange looking affair small & nearly entirely under water. The Regt woods the Jeff Davis, Magnolia & another boat no name on, & are relieved for dinner, after dinner march back, the gunboats Morgan & Nashville have arrived & lie anchored in the stream the Reb flag flying on the Nashville. Every boat carried a white flag. The “Southern Republic” a double cabined concern, one of the largest class of transports lies at the wood yard. The Regt was relieved & sent to camp without working, soon after getting back rec orders to hold everything in readiness to embark at a minutes warning, waited all P. M. no further orders. after Supper Capt Rankin Luit Harter & self go to the landing see several other boats which had arrived amongst them the Reindeer, Watson, & Admiral, begin to rain hurry to camp, get a little wet but reach quarters in time to miss the hard rain which fell for about an hour, during which time a train of some 20 wagons come in loaded with resin 10 bbls to each wagon, Spend the evening writing & killing fleas.

SOURCE: “Diary of John S. Morgan, Company G, 33rd Iowa Infantry,” Annals of Iowa, 3rd Series, Vol. 13, No. 8, April 1923, p. 599

Diary of John Hay: Monday, April 23, 1861

This morning Doug. Wallack came rushing into the office, looking for Seward with what he called important news. He said that the two ships at the Navy Yard were the Pawnee and the Kingston. They brought marines and naval stores from Norfolk, which place they left after carrying what government property they could not remove. The Premier cursed quietly because the Baltic had not come; told Wallach not to contradict the report that the Baltic had come; said the treason of Hicks would not surprise him; that  the Seventh could cut their way through three thousand rioters; that Baltimore delenda est; and other things, — and strolled back into the audience chamber.

At dinner we sat opposite old Gen. Spinner, who was fierce and jubilant. No frenzied poet ever predicted the ruin of a hostile house with more energy and fervor than he issued the rescript of destiny against Baltimore. “We've got ’em,” he said. “It is our turn now. We keep steadily one week ahead of them, as 8 says. We have burned their hospital and poor-house, Harper's Ferry and the Norfolk Navy Yard. Now let them fight or starve.” He was peculiarly disgusted with the impertinence of Delaware. “The contemptible little neighborhood without population enough for a decent country village, gets upon her hind legs and talks about armed neutrality. The only good use for traitors is to hang them. They are worth more, dead than alive.” — Thus the old liberty-loving Teuton raged.

A gaunt, tattered, uncombed and unshorn figure appeared at the door and marched solemnly up to the table. He wore a rough, rusty overcoat, a torn shirt, and suspenderless breeches. His thin hair stood fretful-porcupine-quill-wise upon his crown. He sat down and gloomily charged upon his dinner. A couple of young exquisites were eating and chatting opposite him. They were guessing when the road would be open through Baltimore. “Thursday!” growled the grim apparition; “or Baltimore will be laid in ashes.”

It was Jim Lane.

To-night there seems to be reliable news at the State Department that the Seventh Regiment and the Massachusetts troops would start from Annapolis to-night, and through the favoring moonlight march to the Junction, where the Government has possession of the Road. The hostile peasantry can harass them fearfully on the way, from fence-corners and hill-sides, if they are ready and brave. . . .

A large and disappointed throng gathered at the Depot this morning hoping to get deliverance. But the hope was futile. They seem doomed to see the rising of the curtain. . . .

SOURCES: Clara B. Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary, Volume 1, p. 21; Michael Burlingame, Inside Lincoln's White House: The Complete Civil War Diary of John Hay, p. 8-9

Captain Gustavus V. Fox to Montgomery Blair, February 23, 1861

NEW YORK, February 23, 1861.

MY DEAR BLAIR: Mr. Blunt received a telegraph from General Scott a few days since which he thought indicated an adjournment of my plan; but I put the construction upon it that another was substituted for mine, and I feel certain it must be “boats.” To corroborate this the New York Times, of February 21, says: “Government has determined to relieve Fort Sumter by boats at night.” I consider this plan possible, and the alternative of mine, but inferior at every step. The distance from Fort Sumter to outside is five miles – an hour's pull. From this point the open ocean, winter season, and at night, say two hundred men (requiring for six months five hundred and forty-six barrels of provisions) are to be put into boats, rowed over a very dangerous bar, and subjected for half an hour to a fire of grape from sixty guns. Besides, if a single tug (they have four) eludes Major Anderson's vigilance, she would run in amongst these boats with perfect impunity to herself and utter destruction to them. I have made two cruises on the coast of Africa, where the passing of bars by boats, unless very light and in broad daylight, was considered the most dangerous duty we were subjected to, fatal accidents being common in the smoothest weather. Moreover, this plan has been spoken of publicly in connection with the U. S. ship Brooklyn, and from this fact is probably made a special study by the Charlestonians.

I simply propose three tugs, convoyed by light-draught men-of-war. These tugs are sea-boats, six feet draught, speed fourteen knots. The boilers are below, with three and a half feet space on each side, to be filled with coal. The machinery comes up between the wheel-houses, with a gangway on either hand of five to six feet, enabling us to pack the machinery with two or three thicknesses of bales of cotton or hay. This renders the vulnerable parts of the steamer proof against grape and fragments of shells, but the momentum of a solid shot would probably move the whole mass and disable the engine. The men are below, entirely protected from grape – provisions on deck. The first tug to lead in empty, to open their fire. The other two to follow, with the force divided, and towing the large iron boats of the Baltic, which would hold the whole force should every tug be disabled, and empty they would not impede the tugs. When such men as George W. Blunt, Charles K. Marshall, and Russell Sturgis, all seamen, give my plan the preference, it must have merit. At Kinburn, in the Black Sea, eight gunboats passed in the night forts mounting eighty guns – only one boat hit. The next day, in broad daylight, the Cracker (English) came out under their deliberate fire – distance nine hundred yards. The Vladimar (Russian steamer at Sebastopol) was under fire at various distances during the whole war, but her motion prevented her being disabled. How few of Dahlgren's shots hit the target with all the elements of success he is capable of producing! I am sure I could convince the authorities of the preference that is due to this plan, if I could argue the plan instead of write it.

Sincerely yours,

 G. V. FOX.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 204-5