Sunday, September 25, 2016

Reverend Samuel H. Cox to the New York Evangelist, August 8, 1846

London, August 8th, 1846

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Last night we had a grand popular meeting — where do you think? In the Theatre, Covent Garden. The stage was well prepared as a regular platform, the pit was filled to its utmost capacity, the front boxes — three tiers of them — were well occupied, and the two galleries were literally crammed.

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There were many speakers. Among the first in order, was our venerable friend, now in his seventy-first year, the Rev. Dr. Beecher. He was hailed as pater atque princeps in the army of temperance — and be well sustained his character. There he stood in green old age, fat and flourishing, bringing forth fruit as a tree of righteousness, planted by the rivers of waters; and if wine instead of water had been his beverage, he Would probably now have been in his grave. Other speakers followed from different parts of the world. They all advocated the same cause, showed a glorious unity of thought and feeling; and the effect was constantly raised — the moral scene was superb and glorious — when Frederick Douglass, the coloured abolition agitator and ultraist, came to the platform, and so spake a la mode, as to ruin the influence, almost, of all that preceded! He logged in anti-slavery, or abolition, no doubt prompted to it by some of the politic ones, who can use him to do what they would not themselves adventure to do in person. He is supposed to have been well paid for the abomination.

What a perversion, an abuse, an iniquity against the law of reciprocal righteousness, to call thousands together, and get them, some certain ones, to seem conspicuous and devoted for one sole and grand object, and then, all at once, with obliquity, open an avalanche on them for some imputed evil or monstrosity, for which, whatever he the wound or the injury inflicted, they were
both too fatigued and hurried with surprise, and too straitened for time to be properly prepared. I say it is a trick of meanness ! It is abominable!

On this occasion, Mr. Douglass allowed himself to denounce America and all its temperance societies together, as a grinding community of the enemies of his people; said evil, with no alloy of good, concerning the whole of us: was perfectly indiscriminate in his severities; talked of the American delegates, and to them, as if he had been our schoolmaster, and we his docile and devoted pupils; and launched his revengeful missiles at our country, without one palliative, and as if not a Christian or a true Anti-Slavery man lived in the whole of the United States. The fact is, the man has been petted, and flattered, and used, and paid by certain abolitionists not unknown to us, of the ne plus ultra stamp, till he forgets himself; and though he may gratify his own impulses, and those of old Adam in others, yet sure I am that all this is just the way to ruin his own influence, to defeat his own object, and to do mischief, not good, to the very cause he professes to love. With the single exception of one cold-hearted parricide, whose character I abhor, and whom I will not name, and who has, I fear, no feeling of true patriotism or piety within him, all the delegates from our country were together wounded and indignant. No wonder at it! I write freely. It was not done in a corner. It was inspired, I believe, from beneath, and not from above. It was adapted to re-kindle on both sides of the Atlantic the flames of national exasperation and war. And this is the game which Mr. Frederick Douglass and his silly patrons are playing in England, and in Scotland, and wherever they can find “some mischief still, for idle hands to do.” I came here his sympathizing friend — I am such no more, as I more know him.

My own opinion is increasingly that this abominable spirit must be exercised out of England and America, before any substantial good can be effected for the cause of the slave. It is adapted only to make bad worse, and to inflame the passions of indignant millions to an incurable resentment. None but an ignoramus or a madman could think that this way was that of the inspired apostles of the Son of God. It may gratify the feelings of a self-deceived and malignant few, but it will do no good in any direction — least of all to the, poor slave ! It is short-sighted, impulsive, partisan, reckless, and tending only to sanguinary ends. None of this, with men of sense and principle.

We all wanted to reply, but it was too late; the whole theatre seemed taken with the spirit of the Ephesian uproar; they were furious and boisterous in the extreme, and Mr. Kirk could hardly obtain a moment though many were desirous in his behalf, to say in few words, as he did, very calm and properly, that the cause of temperance was not at all responsible for slavery, and had no connection with it. There were some “sly” agencies behind the scenes — we know!

To the remnant of the meetings for business, some of us repaired this morning, and demanded an opportunity to reply, which, after great clamor, was accorded to us. The Rev. Mr. Marsh and myself, and the Rev. Dr. Schmucker, spoke in succession, and with some good effect, as was generally supposed. Many of them, and those the most intelligent, felt nobly, and spoke nobly on our side. And, apart from what these miserable malignants choose to say of us, on their own responsibility hereafter, and the witnesses are many, I am happy to say that the spirit of the whole nation is kind and benevolent in a very exemplary degree. They all rejoice in I re-established peace with us, and feel kind and pacific all. I have had much opportunity to observe and know, from Portsmouth to Edinburgh, and to do them justice they are our friends at heart.

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Yours, in hope and love,
SAMUEL H. cox.

SOURCE: American Anti-Slavery Society, Correspondence between the Rev. Samuel H. Cox, D. D., of Brooklyn, L. I. and Frederick Douglass, a Fugitive Slave, p. 5-7

William H. Seward to Benjamin H. Brewster, April 18, 1862


DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, April 18, 1862.

Hon. BENJAMIN H. BREWSTER,  Philadelphia.

SIR: I have received your letter of yesterday stating that by directions of Mr. Simon Cameron you transmit to me a summons issued out of the supreme court of the State of Pennsylvania at the suit of Pierce Butler against Mr. Cameron for trespass, vi et armis, assault and battery and false imprisonment in causing the arrest of the plaintiff without authority of law.

This communication has been submitted to the President, and I am directed by him to say in reply that he avows the proceeding of Mr. Cameron referred to as one taken by him when Secretary of War under the President's directions and deemed necessary for the prompt suppression of the existing insurrection.

The President will at once communicate this correspondence to the Attorney-General of the United States and also to Congress.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,
 WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series II, Volume 2 (Serial No. 115), p. 507-8

Edwin M. Stanton to Major-General Irvin McDowell, April 11, 1862, 9:36 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR,
Washington, D. C., April 11, 1862 — 9.36 a.m.
Major-General McDOWELL,
Comdg. Department of the Rappahannock, Hdqrs. Manassas:

SIR: For the present and until further orders from this Department, you will consider the national capital as especially under your protection, and make no movement throwing your force out of position for the discharge of this primary duty.

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 12, Part 3 (Serial No. 18), p. 66

Alexander Stephens to J. Henly Smith, July 10, 1860

Crawfordville [ga.] , July 10th, 1860.

Dear Smith, Your letter of the 6th inst. was received last night. The paper came by the same mail. The point in your historical narrative I referred to was in part corrected by yourself. The word have instead of protect covered the idea. Besides this, one other. My opposition to the Clayton Compromise was not entirely or solely because it did not protect but because it perpetuated the existing status of the country at the time of acquisition, which was antislavery. I wished that status changed either by Congress or that authority might be given to the territorial legislatures to change it. That bill tied the hands of both Congress and the territorial legislatures forever. This however does not amount to much so far as your letter is concerned. I now mention it that you may know the whole facts of the case. You would do well to read that speech, the one I made on the Clayton Compromise, if you write on that subject. What is to become of the country in case of Lincoln's election I do not know. For one I can only give you my own opinion. As at present advised I should not be for disunion on the grounds of his election. It may be that his election will be attended with events that will change my present opinion, but his bare election would not be sufficient cause in my judgment to warrant a disruption — particularly as his election will be the result if it occurs at all of the folly and madness of our own people. If they do these things in the green tree what will they not do in the dry? If without cause they destroy the present Govt., the best in the world, what hopes would I have that they would not bring untold hardships upon the people in their efforts to give us one of their modelling. All I can therefore say in response to your question is that I would not advocate disunion on that ground. Let events shape their own course. “Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof.” In point of merit as a man I have no doubt Lincoln is just as good, safe and sound a man as Mr. Buchanan, and would administer the Government so far as he is individually concerned just as safely for the South and as honestly and faithfully in every particular. I know the man well. He is not a bad man. He will make as good a President as Fillmore did and better too in my opinion. He has a great deal more practical common sense. Still his party may do mischief. If so it will be a great misfortune, but a misfortune that our own people brought upon us. This is my judgment — this is the way I look upon it at present. I have not lime now to go more into detail, but I will say this, that I consider slavery much more secure in the Union than out of it if our people were but wise. And if they are not this fact adds no additional grounds to hope for more security out of the Union under the head of those who now control our destinies, than in it. We have nothing to fear from anything so much as unnecessary changes and revolutions in government. The institution is based on conservatism. Everything that weakens this has a tendency to weaken the institution. But I will stop.

P. S. — I see some of our papers are disputing about my position. I shall vote for Douglas; but I do not intend to take any active part in the canvass. I am out of politicks and intend to stay out. This it seems hard to make the people understand.

SOURCE: Ulrich Bonnell Phillips,Editor, The Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb, p. 486-7

Saturday, September 24, 2016

General Robert E. Lee to Jefferson Davis, July 12, 1864

[Telegram]

Received at Richmond, Va. July 12 1864.
at 8.45 P.M.

Hd. Qrs. Near Petersburg 12
His Excy Jeffn. Davis
Prest. C. S.

Telegram of to-day received. I regret the fact stated. It is a bad time to release [relieve] the commander of an army situated as that of Tenne. We may lose Atlanta and the army too. Hood is a bold fighter. I am doubtful as to other qualities necessary.

R. E. Lee

[Endorsed]
Genl. R. E. Lee
Hd. Qrs. Army N. Va.
July 12 1864.
Telegram in cypher.
Reed. July 12 1864.

SOURCE: Doughlas Southall Freeman, Editor, Lee's Dispatches: Unpublished Letters of General Robert E. Lee, C.S.A., p. 282

Brigadier-General William T. Sherman to Captain John A. Rawlins, April 5, 1862

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION,
Camp Shiloh, Tenn., April 5, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that yesterday about 3 p.m. it was reported to me that the lieutenant commanding and 7 men of the advance pickets had imprudently advanced from their posts and were captured. I ordered Major Ricker, of the Fifth Ohio Cavalry, to proceed rapidly to the picket station, ascertain the truth, and act according to circumstances. He reached the station, found the pickets had been captured as reported, and that a company of infantry sent by the brigade commander had gone forward in pursuit of some cavalry. He rapidly advanced some 2 miles and found them engaged; charged the enemy, and drove them along the ridge road until he met and received three discharges of artillery, when he very properly wheeled under cover and returned till he met me. As soon as I heard artillery I advanced with two regiments of infantry and took position and remained until the scattered companies of infantry and cavalry returned. This was after night.

I infer that the enemy is in some considerable force at Pea Ridge; that yesterday morning they crossed a brigade of two regiments of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and one battery of field artillery to the ridge on which the Corinth road lays. They halted the infantry and artillery at a point about 5 miles in my front, and sent a detachment to the lane of General Meeks, on the north of Owl Creek, and the cavalry down towards our camp. This cavalry captured a part of our advance pickets and afterwards engaged the two companies of Colonel Buckland's regiment, as described by him in his report, herewith inclosed. Our cavalry drove them back upon their artillery and infantry, killing many and bringing off 10 prisoners (all of the First Alabama Cavalry), whom I send to you.

We lost of the picket: 1 first lieutenant and 7 men of the Seventieth Ohio Infantry, taken prisoners; 1 major, 1 lieutenant, and 1 private of the Seventy-second Ohio taken prisoners, and 8 privates wounded. Names of all embraced in report of Colonel Buckland, inclosed herewith. We took 10 prisoners, and left 2 wounded and many killed on the field.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
 W. T. SHERMAN,
 Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.
 Capt. JOHN A. RAWLINS,
 A. A. G., District of West Tennessee.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 10, Part 1 (Serial No. 10), p. 89-90

Major Thomas J. Jackson to Thomas Jackson Arnold, January 26, 1861

Lexington, Va., January 26, 1861.
My Dear Nephew:

Your very welcome letter reached me a few days since. I was apprehensive from not hearing from any of you for so long a time that some of you might be sick. I am glad to learn that you are progressing so well in your studies, and trust that you will be able to enter the desired class in the Institute. During the present academic year the cadets have numbered between two and three hundred. I was glad to learn your father's views respecting the state of the country; I agree very much with him. In this county there is a strong Union feeling, and the union party have unanimously nominated Samuel McDowell Moore and Jas. B. Dorman as delegates to the convention,1 and I expect that they will be elected by a large majority. I am in favor of making a thorough trial for peace, and if we fail in this, and the state is invaded, to defend it with a terrific resistance. . . . I desire to see the state use every influence she possesses in order to procure an honorable adjustment of our troubles, but if after having done so the free states, instead of permitting us to enjoy the rights guaranteed to us by the Constitution of our country, should endeavor to subjugate us, and thus excite our slaves to servile insurrection in which our families will be murdered without quarter or mercy, it becomes us to wage such a war as will bring hostilities to a speedy close. People who are anxious to bring on war don't know what they are bargaining for; they don't see all the horrors that must accompany such an event. For myself I have never as yet been induced to believe that Virginia will even have to leave the Union. I feel pretty well satisfied that the Northern people love the Union more than they do their peculiar notions of slavery, and that they will prove it to us when satisfied that we are in earnest about leaving the Confederacy unless they do us justice. Your aunt joins me in love to you all. Write often.

Your affectionate uncle,
Thomas.
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1The State Convention called to meet at the capital in Richmond.

SOURCE: Thomas Jackson Arnold, Early Life and Letters of General Thomas J. Jackson, p. 293-4

Friday, September 23, 2016

Horace Greeley to Abraham Lincoln, July 29, 1861

New York, Monday, July 29, 1861.
Midnight.
Dear Sir:

This is my seventh sleepless night – yours too, doubtless – yet I think I shall not die, because I have no right to die. I must struggle to live , however, bitterly. But to business.

You are not considered a great man, and I am a hopelessly broken one. You are now undergoing a terrible ordeal, and God has thrown the gravest responsibility upon you. Do not fear to meet them.

Can the Rebels be beaten after all that has occurred, and in view of the actual disaster state of feeling caused by our late awful disaster? If they can – and it is your business to ascertain and decide – write me that such is your judgment, so that I may know and do my duty.

And if they cannot be beaten – if our recent disaster is fatal – do not fear to sacrifice yourself to your country. If the Rebels are not to be beaten – if that is your judgment in view of all the light you can get – then every drop of blood henceforth shed in this quarrel will be wantonly, wickedly shed, and the guilt will rest heavily on the soul of every promoter of the crime. I pray you to decide quickly, and let me know my duty.

If the Union is irrevocably gone, an Armistice for thirty, sixty, ninety, 120 days – better still, for a year – ought at once to be proposed with a view to a peaceful adjustment. Then Congress should call a National convention to meet at the earliest possible day. And there should be an immediate and mutual exchange or release of prisoners and a disbandment of forces.

I do not consider myself at present a judge of any thing but the public sentiment. That seems to me every where gathering and deepening against a prosecution of the war. The gloom in this city is funereal for our dead at Bull Run were many, and they lie unburied yet. On every brow sits sullen, scowling, black despair.

It would be easy to have Mr. Crittenden move any proposition that ought to be adopted, or to have it come from any proper quarter. The first point is to ascertain what is best that can be done – which is the measure of our duty – and do that very thing at the earliest moment.

This letter is written in the strictest confidence, and is for your eye alone. But you are at liberty to say to members of your Cabinet that you know I will second any move you may see fit to make. But do nothing timidly nor by halves.

Send me word what to do. I will live till I can hear it at all events. If it is best for the country and for mankind that we make peace with the Rebels at once and on their own terms, do not shrink even from that. But bear in mind the greatest truth – “Whoso would lose his life for my sake shall save it,” do the thing that is the highest right, and tell me how I am to second you.

Yours, in the depths of bitterness,
Horace Greeley

Colonel Joseph G. Totten to Simon Cameron, April 3, 1861


WASHINGTON, April 3, 1861.
To the SECRETARY OF WAR:

Under the strongest convictions on some military questions upon which great political events seem about to turn, I feel impelled to state them, since they are of a nature to derive, possibly, a little weight from my official relation to them, and since, moreover, circumstances might cause my failing to make the statement in time to be considered as a grave delinquency. I refer particularly to the question of defending or abandoning Fort Sumter and Fort Pickens.

Fort Sumter. – In addition to what I have heretofore said as to the impracticability of efficiently re-enforcing and supplying this fort, I will now say only that if the fort was filled with men and munitions it could  hold out but a short time. It would be obliged to surrender with much loss of life, for it would be bravely and obstinately defended, and the greater the crowd within the greater the proportionate loss. This issue can be averted only by sending a large army and navy to capture all the surrounding forts and batteries, and to assemble and apply these there is now no time. If we do not evacuate Fort Sumter it will be wrested from us by force.

Fort Pickens.Were this fort provided with a garrison of eight hundred or one thousand good soldiers, fully supplied with everything necessary to the best defense, and ably commanded, its utmost term of resistance would be about three weeks rather less than more. Were the besieging army practiced in the war of sieges, it would hardly be maintained for a fortnight. With a garrison of three hundred to five hundred men only, and in its present destitution of essential means, its siege supplies consisting of guns and ammunition merely, and these scanty and not of the best kind, the siege must be a very short one. But even the making good the deficiencies would, as stated above, only defer the issue for a week or so. In any case a quick surrender would be inevitable.

Regarding the fort independently of co-operation on one side or the other of a naval force, or of other fortifications in the harbor, these conclusions are not to be doubted, without disregarding all military experience. The occupation by the investing forces of the shore opposite, with numerous batteries pouring their showers of shot and shell into the fort, while the regular siege operations upon Santa Rosa Island were going on, would materially abridge the term of resistance. A naval force uniting in the defense, but confined to the waters outside of the harbor, might, to a certain extent, increase the casualties of the besiegers, but would not materially retard the operations. In that case the approaches would be pushed along the inshore face of the island, leaving the breadth of the island, with its sand hills and ridges, between them and the ships; and, moreover, two or three batteries planted on the out-shore face, and sheltered from the fire of the fort by sand hills and traverses, would compel ships to keep an out-of-range offing. Could this naval force act upon the bay side of Santa Rosa Island as well as upon the sea side, the progress of a siege, if practicable at all, might be greatly retarded. Under such circumstances this kind of attack would hardly be undertaken. Were the investing forces numerous and enterprising they might, nevertheless, even then attempt a coup de main; and, provided the garrison were weak in numbers, and worn out by a protracted cannonade and bombardment from the opposite shore, the chances of success would warrant the attempt.

But I consider that the passing of vessels of war into the bay would be a very hazardous proceeding in the face of Fort McRee, Fort Barrancas, its advanced battery, and several other batteries that all accounts agree in stating have been erected and mounted along the shore, from the navy-yard inclusive to and beyond the light-house. It is possible, however, that this channel might be passed at night by swift war steamers without utter destruction, and there might be retained by one or more of them enough efficiency to prevent the hostile occupation of the lower part of Santa Rosa Island, and the prosecution there of siege operations against Fort Pickens. In such event resort would certainly be had to cannonade and bombardment from the batteries on the opposite shore, and these plied with vigor and perseverance would at last reduce the fort to a condition incapable of resisting vigorous assault, since the garrison would be exhausted, and the means of defense on the cannonaded side have little efficiency left to them. The masonry on that part of the fort is exposed to sight, and to battering from top to bottom, and is pierced besides by a gateway and numerous embrasures, greatly weakening it. Every shot fired from the other shore would strike the walls, and every shell fall within them. With a brave and well-supplied garrison there would be an obstinate holding out, no doubt, but a surrender would at last close a scene in which on our side no other military virtues had room for display but fortitude and patience. The response of the fort to shot and shell would be by shot and shell, but with little proportionate chance of injury to the enemy's impassive batteries of sand.

This last mode of attack could be prevented, even with the command of the inner waters only, by landing upon the main shore a military force sufficient to capture all these forts and batteries, including the navy-yard. Admitting the supposition (quite unreasonable as I estimate our available army force) that we can before it is too late disperse the 3,000 or 5,000 men now in hostile array there and regain these possessions, what then? The Confederate States can assemble a large additional military force at Montgomery by railroad, and throw it down also by railroad upon Pensacola. Here there would be the struggle between the two armies on land, and not between forts and batteries.

The question that next arises is not whether this great nation is able with time to supply ample means in soldiers and munitions for such conflict, but whether, having expended nearly all its ready strength in reconquering the harbor fortifications and navy-yard, it could send timely and adequate re-enforcements. With our present military establishment and existing military laws I do not see how this would be possible before all that had been gained would be lost.

The seceded States, considering themselves as in a state of quasi warfare, see that if there is to be a struggle the very utmost of their military energies and resources will be called for. They see, besides, that to contend with the greater chance of success they must profit by our present state of military weakness, and under the first glow of a great political change they rush ardently into the requisite preparations. Upon the battle-field of Pensacola or its environs they are now stronger than we can become without the help of Congress, and they can and will augment their strength there if necessary beyond anything we can hope to do for yet many months.

The above and much like reasoning convince me that we cannot retain Fort Pickens, provided the other side is really in earnest, and follows up with like promptitude and energy their early military preparations. If we do not vacate this fort the result predicted as to Fort Sumter will certainly be realized here also it will be taken from us by violence.

Should the above reasoning not meet acceptance, or for political reasons should it be decided to hold and defend this fort to the last; then I have to say that every soldier that can be spared should be sent to its relief with the utmost dispatch, accompanied by military supplies of every kind and in the greatest abundance.

To supply in some sort the want of a naval force within the bay as large a force as can be spared from the immediate protection of the fort should be encamped upon Santa Rosa Island at some distance from the fort, maintaining communication with it and detaching parties to watch the upper part of the island. These will give timely notice of the entrance thereupon of hostile troops, and will prevent the erection of batteries against our ships lying off shore, through which all supplies for the fort must be derived.

While the fort is uninjured many men need not remain within its walls to secure it from surprise or escalade. Of course the detached troops must be kept within reach of quick recall. Such measures may delay somewhat, though neither these nor any others now within our reach will, in my opinion, prevent the loss of Fort Pickens.

I present these thoughts to the consideration of the Secretary of War, and, if he thinks them of sufficient interest, to the perusal of the President, because they force themselves from me by the vehemence of the convictions.

Treating it purely as a professional question, I do not presume to advise as to the policy of the Government in this connection, merely presenting what seem to me to be incontrovertible facts and inevitable consequences of a military nature, that may, perhaps, be allowed to bear upon the political question.

Having no personal ambition or party feeling to lead or mislead me to conclusions, I have maturely studied the subject as a soldier bound to give all his faculties to his country, which may God preserve in peace!

Respectfully submitted.
 JOS. G. TOTTEN,
Chief Engineer.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 232-5

Thursday, September 22, 2016

Law Partners of Abraham Lincoln

John Todd Stuart: April 27, 1837-1841

Stephen T. Logan: 1841-1843

William H. Herndon: September 20, 1843 – April 15, 1865

SOURCE: Francis Fisher Browne, The Every-day Life of Abraham Lincoln, p. 71

Tuesday, September 20, 2016

Adjutant-General Lorenzo Thomas’ General Orders No. 71, September 5, 1861

General Orders No. 71

WAR DEPT., ADJT. GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, September 5, 1861.

I. All persons having received authority to raise volunteer regiments, batteries, or companies, in the State of New York, will immediately report to His Excellency Governor Morgan, at Albany, the present state of their respective organizations. They and their commands are placed under the orders of Governor Morgan, who will reorganize them and prepare them for service in the manner he may judge most advantageous for the interests of the General Government.

II. All commissioned officers of regiments, batteries, or companies, now in service, raised in the State of New York independent of the State authorities, can receive commissions from the Governor of that State by reporting to the adjutant general thereof and filing in his office a duplicate of the muster-in rolls of their respective organizations.

By order:
 L. THOMAS,
Adjutant-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series III, Volume 1 (Serial No. 122), p. 483-4

Governor Andrew J. Curtin to Abraham Lincoln, August 21, 1861

EXECUTIVE CHAMBER,
Harrisburg, Pa., August 21, 1861.
To the PRESIDENT:

SIR: The government of Pennsylvania is and has been earnestly desirous of doing its full duty to the Commonwealth and the country. It has done and will continue to do everything in its power to fulfill the requisitions and facilitate the operations of the Government of the United States, without presuming to criticise or find fault, even when they may appear to be irregular or indiscreet. What I am about to say will therefore not be understood as said in the way of complaint, but merely for the purpose of calling attention to some arrangements, the effect of which has probably been overlooked by the authorities at Washington.

It appears clearly from the acts of Congress of 22d and 25th of July last that the President has power to accept volunteers otherwise than through the State authorities only in cases where those authorities refuse or omit to furnish volunteers at his call or on his proclamation. The act of Assembly of Pennsylvania of 15th of May last contains, among others, a provision, “That it shall not be lawful for any volunteer soldier to leave this Commonwealth as such unless he shall have been first accepted by the Governor of this State upon a call, under a requisition of the President of the United States, made upon the Governor direct, for troops for the service of the United States.” Thus Congress and the State Legislature appear to be agreed upon the inexpediency of attempting the formation of volunteer organizations simultaneously under the control of different heads and on the propriety of leaving such organizations to be formed under the requisitions of the President by the State authorities.

Notwithstanding this common action of Congress and the State Legislature, a course has been pursued by the Government of the United States which is not in accordance with it, and which has already produced much embarrassment and must tend to greatly retard the fulfillment of the objects of the Government. On the 26th day of July last a requisition was made on the Executive of this State for ten regiments of infantry in addition to the forty-four regiments already furnished, twenty-five of which had been called for three months’ service and had been discharged at the expiration of their time. Active measures were immediately taken to comply with the requisition, but unfortunately the Government of the United States went on to authorize individuals to raise regiments of volunteers in this State. Fifty-eight individuals received authority for this purpose in Pennsylvania. The direct authority of the Government of the United States having been thus set in competition with that of the State, acting under its requisition, the consequence has been much embarrassment, delay, and confusion. It has happened in one instance that more than twenty men in one company, brought here as volunteers under the State call for the United States, have been induced to abandon that service and join one of the regiments directly authorized by the United States. In other cases companies ready to march, and whose transportation had been provided, were successfully interfered with in like manner. The inclosed letter is but a sample of the many of like character that have been received.*

As the call of the State is for the service of the United States, no military obligation can be imposed on the men until they are mustered into the service of the United States, and there are therefore no means of preventing them from joining independent regiments or even deserting their colors entirely. The few mustering officers that can be found have refused to muster in less than a whole regiment of infantry. Part of these evils, it is understood from a telegraphic dispatch received to day, will be alleviated by a general order from the War Department, which was suggested by me yesterday. Still there remains the great evil of the unavoidable clashing of two authorities attempting at the same time to effect the same object among the same people through different and competing agencies. The result is what might have been expected – that after the lapse of twenty-six days not one entire regiment has been raised in Pennsylvania since the last requisition. There are fragments of some seventy regiments, but not one complete; yet men enough have been raised to form near thirty complete regiments, and if the State had been left to fulfill its duties in accordance with the acts of Congress and of Assembly referred to, it is confidently believed that the ten regiments called for on the 26th of July would by this time have been fully raised.

That the course thus pursued is in violation of the law, both of the United States and of Pennsylvania, is a consideration not unworthy of notice. At the same time the Executive of this State will leave the authorities of the United States to construe their own law, and so far as regards the law of Pennsylvania, will take the responsibility of disobeying it rather than fail in any effort that may be required to array her military force in the present emergency in such manner as the Government of the United States may point out; and the Executive, in so doing, will rely on the Legislature to ratify his acts, dictated as they are by an earnest desire to aid the Government of the United States promptly and efficiently, without stopping to discuss the legality of any form in which that aid may be demanded. But where the law is so clearly in accordance with true policy and expediency, it is hoped that the Government of the United States will adhere to it. At all events it is earnestly suggested that the double system which has been adopted can lead to nothing but continued embarrassment and confusion, and that it would be better to rely exclusively either on requisitions on the State government, or on the authority given to individuals. It is also suggested that it would be expedient to make requisitions on the State for companies and not for regiments. Under the act of Congress of 22d of July last the President has authority to form them into regiments, and the field officers could then be appointed by the Governor, in accordance with the same act. Some of the advantages to be derived from this course are—

First. That men enlist more readily when they know that they are to enter on active service without delay.

Second. That they would have the benefit of drill by officers of the United States and in their camps, in direct contact with troops already drilled, instead of being kept in temporary camps during the time requisite for filling a whole regiment.

Third. That company officers could be examined as they come in, and the incompetent ones replaced during the same interval, and thus time be saved and the effectiveness of the troops enhanced.

There are other reasons which will readily occur to you.

With great esteem, your obedient servant,
 A. G. CURTIN.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series III, Volume 1 (Serial No. 122), p. 439-41

Adjutant-General Lorenzo Thomas to Major-General George B. McClellan, July 22, 1861

ADJUTANT-GENERAL OFFICE,
Washington, D.C., July 22, 1861.
General GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,  Beverly, Va.:

Circumstances make your presence here necessary. Charge Rosecrans or some other general with your present department and come hither without delay.

 L. THOMAS.
Adjutant-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 2 (Serial No. 2), p. 753

Congressman Galusha A. Grow to Simon Cameron, May 5, 1861

GLENWOOD, May 5, 1861.
Hon. S. CAMERON:

MY DEAR SIR: Reached home last night by way of New York. You have no conception of the depth of feeling universal in the Northern mind for the prosecution of this war until the flag floats from every spot on which it had a right to float a year ago. If the Administration fails to prosecute the war to that end, it will sink in the popular heart below that of Buchanan. There is but one feeling with all classes, parties, and sects – that the rebels must be made to lay down their arms everywhere, the traitors hung, and the union of the States restored before this contest closes. There is great dissatisfaction in New York at the ordering of Wool back to Troy, instead of acknowledging his services at a very critical point of time when all communication with Washington was cut off. For four or five days they heard nothing from Washington, and no one received any orders. If you could devise some way to have all that offer received, to remain, however, in the States till they are called for. The men who have left their business cannot wait long without pay from some source. In my judgment the enthusiasm of the hour ought not to be repressed by flat refusals on the part of the Government, but let them be held in readiness (in some way) in the States. The people in New York and the cities are very impatient for Baltimore to be opened, and on the rumor that the Government would not invade Virginia they were perfectly indignant, and I wish to say to you that if the Government adopts that policy there will be a universal execration go up from the North, and you will be as powerless in thirty days as you are now powerful. I saw many of the solid men in New York, and they have embarked their all in this contest, provided the Administration will prosecute it to the bitter end, if need be, to quell insurrection and hang traitors, so that no madcaps will ever try the experiment again.

I beg your pardon for trespassing so long on your attention. My object was briefly to assure you that any measures the most efficient, no matter what the cost, in prosecuting this war would be most satisfactory, if it has for its object the foregoing results. I give you this state of public feeling, for I am anxious that you should meet its expectation, as I confidently believe you will.

Most truly, yours,
 GALUSHA A. GROW.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series III, Volume 1 (Serial No. 122), p. 160

Abraham Lincoln to Simon Cameron, October 28, 1861

Executive Mansion, Oct. 28, 1861.

I have not sufficient time to study and mature an opinion on this plan. If the Secretary of War has confidence in it, and is satisfied to adopt it, I have no objections.

A. LINCOLN.

SOURCE: Roy P. Basler, Editor, Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Volume 5, p. 6

Monday, September 19, 2016

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, November 1, 1862

The work on the ironclad turret steamer Passaic is nearly finished. Ericsson makes a proposition to fire the fifteen-inch gun through the orifice instead of protruding the piece. I have no faith in it. Fox was at first disposed to consider it favorably but doubtingly. Have sent Fox, Admiral Smith, and Dahlgren to New York to witness test experiment

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 179

Salmon P. Chase to Charles Sumner, December 2, 1847

Cincinnati, Dec. 2, 1847.

My Dear Sir: Several months have elapsed since I rec'd your last valued letter, and the delay of my answer has not been occasioned by an indifference to your correspondence, — far from this, — but by a consciousness that I could write nothing of particular interest to you. Within the last few months however much has occurred, of deep interest to the friends of Freedom and Progress, and it seems to be time that some beginnings should be made towards a mutual understanding in regard to the best course to be pursued during the approaching national canvass.

It was a great blow for Liberty and the Right that struck at Herkimer.1 The Conventions of both Parties in your State, — the Old Bay State to which we were wont to look for examples of devotion to Freedom,—had repudiated the only measure, which, during the last quarter of a century, has been brought forward successfully in Congress, of an anti-slavery character. The sluggish depths of Servilism — apparently without Soundings — were stirred for the first time since the triumph of Slaveholders on the Missouri Question, by a bold and decided movement for the arrest of westward progress of the Great Cause. The Wilmot Proviso, carried in the House by an overwhelming majority, failed, in the Senate, — sad to say — through the folly or worse of a Massachusetts Senator. Ten political lives of ten John Davises, spent in earnest efforts in the best direction could not compensate for this half hour's mischief.2

The Slaveholders, startled by the sudden outburst of Free Sentiment, recovered their equanimity, when Congress had adjourned without adopting the proviso. At the next session, the Sentiment in favor of the proviso had visibly lost strength. Carried in the House, it was defeated in the Senate. Returned to the House, it was lost there. Emboldened, by these events, the Senate took more decided steps. In your State Convention the Proviso was smothered. Mr. Secretary Buchanan wrote his letter. Mr. Vice President Dallas made his speech. Who will bid highest for Southern votes? was now the question. The votes of the complaisant North were thought to be safe-secured by the bonds which Party gives to despotism. The Syracuse Convention met, and the Proviso was smothered there. A ticket of Anti-Proviso men was nominated, and the faithful were called upon to stand by the Party nomination. We felt the effect of this in Ohio. The friends of the Proviso were discouraged. Few, comparatively, — except the old Soldiers in the Antislavery warfare who with Spartan valor and in Spartan numbers have carried the Liberty banners through two election conflicts, — could be found who were willing to pledge themselves, come what might, to the Cause of Freedom. In this state of things, came the clarion call for the Herkimer Convention. I thank God that that call reached the hearts of the people of the Empire State! They rallied to the Convention. They repudiated the Syracuse Servilism. They resolved that the Wilmot Proviso — the stone which the builders rejected — should be made the head of the corner. The election followed. The Serviles were overthrown, and the Country was saved. I may be greatly in error, but I know of no event in the History of Parties in this Country, at all approaching, in sublimity and moment, the Herkimer Convention, or rather the great movement of which the Convention was the most signal, visible expression. I think there can now be no doubt that the Proviso is safe in Ohio, with both parties; nor can I believe that it can be successfully opposed in Congress.

But what next? Is there not great danger that the friends of freedom may be tricked out of the fruits of their labors by dexterous management of the Presidential Canvass? Will not a great effort be made to keep both parties together upon their old platforms? Will not attempts be made to select men who will be acceptable to the Slaveholders, and in their attempts will not love of office get the ascendancy over love of country, and secure the nomination of a devotee of Slavery or at least a worse man, — a Compromiser? Great efforts are being made I am well assured to bring Mr. Clay out as the candidate of the Whigs. His friends hope to manage the Taylor movement so as to make it contribute to this result. On the other hand the Democracy seems to be looking towards Woodbury and Cass chiefly; either of whom, would, I presume, give any desired pledges to the Slaveholders. There is, indeed, a very considerable opposition to these men; but, I fancy, it is hardly powerful enough to secure for any other person the choice of the party. I have heard, of late, indeed that Woodbury's decision in the Vanzandt case has gained for him the favor of Mr. Calhoun, while General Taylor's response to the signal3 letter has shaken the confidence of the Perpetualists in him.

In this state of things what is to be done? Cannot a great Convention of all Antislavery men be held at Pittsburgh, say next May or June, and put a ticket in nomination, which will at all events receive votes enough to carry the nominees into the House, with a reasonably fair prospect that the choice may fall on them, and, at all events, with a very good prospect of their election by the people in 1852? I have a good deal of faith in a movement of this kind. In the hope of aiding it I went to the Buffalo Convention and urged a postponement of the nomination. In that I did not succeed. I feel quite confident however that the nominees of that Convention will not stand in the way of such a movement. I declined its nomination for the Vice P'y, partly that I might be at liberty, more efficiently, to promote it, though you will readily conceive other and very sufficient reasons, why I — wholly unknown, and, out of my profession, wholly inexperienced — should decline such a nomination. Such a movement shall have, of course, my best efforts. I think there are multitudes, — I may be too sanguine — yet not active who will aid it. What do you and those friends who act with you think of it?

I send you by the mail which will convey this a number of the National Press, which contains three articles which will interest you. In your last you asked as to Judge M'Lean's position. One of these articles defines it, and, I am warranted by what I have heard from the Judge, in saying it defines it correctly. Another of them is an account of a recent slave case, tried at Columbus. The report is a good one. The verdict astonished most people. The motion for new trial is continued till next term. Will you make an abstract of the case for the “Reporter”? The other article is Mr. Gary's Speech against the War. Is it not strange that a gentleman who makes this speech is a thorough Calhoun man on the Subject of Slavery?

Very truly and faithfully your friend,
[Salmon P. Chase.]

Did I ever mention my wish that some copies of the Vanzandt argument might teach some of the legal minds of England? Will you be kind enough to aid in the accomplishment of that wish?
_______________

1 The mass meeting of Anti-Slavery Democrats, October 26. See Shepard's Van Buren, 357-58.

2 Referring to the prevalent belief that Davis's speech in favor of the Proviso at the end of the session was so long that no time was left for a vote. Cf. Von Hoist, III, 287-289; Henry Wilson, Slave Power, II, 17, seriously questions whether the Proviso could in any case have passed the Senate.

3 Written from Monterey, Mexico, May 18,1847, to the editor of the Cincinnati Signal, who had urged the nomination of General Taylor, April 13,1847. Itis printed in Niles' Register, July 3,1847, p. 288.

SOURCE: Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 124-7

Horace Greeley to James S. Pike, May 2, 1850

New York, May 2, 1850.

Friend Pike: I beg you not to be diffident. I know how common the fault is among Washington writers, and how hard to be overcome, but I beseech you, as Mrs. Chick would say, “to make an effort.” You don't know what may come of it.

Mr. Snow of ours will hand you this letter. He goes on to discover, with your help, that genius of an “inventive turn of mind,” who knows just what mansion great men retire to when they don't retire at all. Good boy, that — we must hire his imagination.

I like your letters, and if you won't call Foote and Butler “Democrats” in such sense as to imply that I am something else, I don't think I shall ever take liberties with your letters, except it may be the liberty of dissenting from some of their positions.

Yours,
Horace Greeley.
J. S. Pike, Esq.

SOURCE: James Shepherd Pike, First Blows of the Civil War: The Ten Years of Preliminary Conflict in the United States from 1850 to 1860, p. 50

Salmon P. Chase to Alphonso Taft, April 28, 1861

washington, April 28, 1861.

My Dear Sir: To correct misapprehensions, except by acts, is an almost vain endeavor. You may say, however, to all whom it may concern, that there is no ground for the ascription to me by Major Brown of the sentiment to which you allude.

True it is that before the assault on Fort Sumter, in anticipation of an attempt to provision famishing soldiers of the Union, I was decidedly in favor of a positive policy and against the notion of drifting — the Micawber policy of “waiting for something to turn up.”

As a positive policy, two alternatives were plainly before us. (1) That of enforcing the laws of the Union by its whole power and through its whole extent; or (2) that of recognizing the organization of actual government by the seven seceded States as an accomplished revolution — accomplished through the complicity of the late administration and letting the Confederacy try its experiment of separation; but maintaining the authority of the Union and treating secession as treason everywhere else.

Knowing that the former of these alternatives involved destructive war, and vast expenditure, and oppressive debt, and thinking it possible that through the latter these great evils might  be avoided, the union of the other States preserved unbroken, the return even of the seceded States, after an unsatisfactory experiment of separation, secured, and the great cause of freedom and constitutional government peacefully vindicated — thinking, I say, these things possible, I preferred the latter alternative.

The attack on Fort Sumter, however, and the precipitation of Virginia into hostility to the National Government, made this latter alternative impracticable, and I had then no hesitation about recurring to the former. Of course, I insist on the most vigorous measures, not merely for the preservation of the Union and the defense of the Government, but for the constitutional re-establishment of the full authority of both throughout the land.

In laboring for these objects I know hardly the least cessation, and begin to feel the wear as well as the strain of them. When my criticizers equal me in labor and zeal, I shall most cheerfully listen to their criticisms.

All is safe here now. Baltimore is repenting, and by repentance may be saved, if she adds works meet for repentance. Soon something else will be heard of.

Yours truly,
S. P. Chase.
Hon. Alphonso Taft.

SOURCES: Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 366-7

Sunday, September 18, 2016

William H. Seward to Charles Francis Adams, April 10, 1861

Department Of State,
Washington, April 10, 1861.

Sir: Although Great Britain and the United States possess adjacent dominions of large extent, and although they divide, not very unequally, a considerable portion of the commerce of the world, yet there are at present only two questions in debate between them. One of these concerns the line of boundary running through Puget's Sound, and involves the title to the island of San Juan. The other relates to a proposition for extinguishing the interest of the Hudson's Bay and Puget's Sound agricultural companies in the Territory of Washington. The discussion of these questions has hitherto been carried on here, and there is no necessity for removing it to London. It is expected to proceed amicably and result in satisfactory conclusions. It would seem, therefore, on first thought, that you would find nothing more to do in England than to observe and report current events, and to cultivate friendly sentiments there towards the United States. Nevertheless, the peculiar condition of our country in the present juncture renders these duties a task of considerable delicacy.

You will readily understand me as alluding to the attempts which are being made by a misguided portion of our fellow citizens to detach some of the States and to combine them in a now organization under the name of the Confederate States of America. The agitators in this bad enterprise, justly estimating the influence of the European powers upon even American affairs, do not mistake in supposing that it would derive signal advantage from a recognition by any of those powers, and especially Great Britain. Your task, therefore, apparently so simple and easy, involves the responsibility of preventing the commission of an act by the government of that country which would be fraught with disaster, perhaps ruin, to our own.

It is by no means easy to give you instructions. They must be based on a survey of the condition of the country, and include a statement of the policy of the government. The insurrectionary movement, though rapid in its progress, is slow in revealing its permanent character. Only outlines of a policy can be drawn which must largely depend on uncertain events.

The presidential election took place on the 6th of November last. The canvass had been conducted in all the southern or slave States in such a manner as to prevent a perfectly candid hearing there of the issue involved, and so all the parties existing there were surprised and disappointed in the marked result. That disappointment was quickly seized for desperate purposes by a class of persons until that time powerless, who had long cherished a design to dismember the Union and build up a new confederacy around the Gulf of Mexico. Ambitious leaders hurried the people forward, in a factious course, observing conventional forms but violating altogether the deliberative spirit of their constitutions. When the new federal administration came in on the 4th of March last, it found itself confronted by an insurrectionary combination of seven States, practicing an insidious strategy to seduce eight other States into its councils.

One needs to be as conversant with our federative system as perhaps only American publicists can be to understand how effectually, in the first instance, such a revolutionary movement must demoralize the general government. We are not only a nation, but we are States also. All public officers, as well as all citizens, owe not only allegiance to the Union but allegiance also to the States in which they reside. In the more discontented States the local magistrates and other officers cast off at once their federal allegiance, and conventions were held which assumed to absolve their citizens from the same obligation. Even federal judges, marshals, clerks, and revenue officers resigned their trusts. Intimidation deterred loyal persons from accepting the offices thus rendered vacant. So the most important faculties of the federal government in those States abruptly ceased. The resigning federal agents, if the expression may be used, attorned to the revolutionary authorities and delivered up to them public funds and other property and possessions of large value. The federal government had, through a long series of years, been engaged in building strong fortifications, a navy yard, arsenals, mints, treasuries, and other public edifices, not in any case for use against those States, but chiefly for their protection and convenience. These had been unsuspectingly left either altogether or imperfectly garrisoned or guarded, and they fell, with little resistance, into the hands of the revolutionary party. A general officer of the army gave up to them a large quantity of military stores and other property, disbanded the troops under his command, and sent them out of the territory of the disaffected States.

It may be stated, perhaps without giving just offence, that the most, popular motive in these discontents was an apprehension of designs on the part of the incoming federal administration hostile to the institution of domestic slavery in the States where it is tolerated by the local constitutions and laws. That institution and the class which especially cherishes it are not confined to the States which have revolted, but they exist in the eight other so-called slave States; and these, for that reason, sympathize profoundly with the revolutionary movement. Sympathies and apprehensions of this kind have, for an indefinite period, entered into the bases of political parties throughout the whole country, and thus considerable masses of persons, whose ultimate loyalty could not be doubted, were found, even in the free States, either justifying, excusing, or palliating the movement towards disunion in the seceding States. The party which was dominant in the federal government during the period of the last administration embraced, practically, and held in unreserved communion, all disunionists and sympathizers. It held the executive administration. The Secretaries of the Treasury, War, and the Interior were disunionists. The same party held a large majority of the Senate, and nearly equally divided the House of Representatives. Disaffection lurked, if it did not openly avow itself, in every department and in every bureau, in every regiment and in every ship-of-war; in the post office and in the custom-house, and in every legation and consulate from London to Calcutta. Of four thousand four hundred and seventy officers in the public service, civil and military, two thousand one hundred and fifty-four were representatives of States where the revolutionary movement was openly advocated and urged, even if not actually organized. Our system being so completely federative and representative, no provision had ever been made, perhaps none ever could have been made, to anticipate this strange and unprecedented disturbance. The people were shocked by successive and astounding developments of what the statute book distinctly pronounced to be sedition and treason, but the magistracy was demoralized and the laws were powerless. By degrees, however, a better sentiment revealed itself. The executive administration hesitatingly, in part, reformed itself. The capital was garrisoned; the new President came in unresisted, and soon constituted a new and purely loyal administration. They found the disunionists perseveringly engaged in raising armies and laying sieges around national fortifications situate within the territory of the disaffected States. The federal marine seemed to have been scattered everywhere except where its presence was necessary, and such of the military forces as were not in the remote States and Territories were held back from activity by vague and mysterious armistices which bad been informally contracted by the late President, or under his authority, with a view to postpone conflict until impracticable concessions to disunion should be made by Congress, or at least until the waning term of his administration should reach its appointed end. Commissioners who had been sent by the new confederacy were already at the capital demanding recognition of its sovereignty and a partition of the national property and domain. The treasury, depleted by robbery and peculation, was exhausted, and the public credit was prostrate.

It would be very unjust to the American people to suppose that this singular and unhappy condition of things indicated any extreme favor or toleration of the purpose of a permanent dissolution of the Union. On the contrary, disunion at the very first took on a specious form, and it afterwards made its way by ingenious and seductive devices. It inculcated that the Union is a purely voluntary connexion, founded on the revocable assent of the several States; that secession, in the case of great popular discontent, would induce consultation and reconciliation, and so that revolution, instead of being war, is peace, and disunion, instead of being dissolution, is union. Though the ordinances of secession in the seceding States were carried through impetuously, without deliberation, and even by questionable majorities, yet it was plausibly urged that the citizens who had remained loyal to the Union might wisely acquiesce, so as ultimately to moderate and control the movement, and in any event that if war should ensue, it would become a war of sections, and not a social war, of all others, and especially in those States, the form of war most seriously to be deprecated. It being assumed that peaceful separation is in harmony with the Constitution, it was urged as a consequence that coercion would, therefore, be unlawful and tyrannical; and this principle was even pushed so far as to make the defensive retaining by the federal government of its position within the limits of the seceding States, or where it might seem to overawe or intimidate them, an act of such forbidden coercion. Thus it happened that for a long time, and in very extensive districts even, fidelity to the Union manifested itself by demanding a surrender of its powers and possessions, and compromises with or immunity towards those who were engaged in overthrowing it by armed force. Disunion under these circumstances rapidly matured. On the other hand, the country was bewildered. For the moment even loyal citizens fell naturally into the error of inquiring how the fearful state of things had come about, and who was responsible for it, thus inviting a continuance of the controversy out of which it had arisen, rather than rallying to the duty of arresting it. Disunion, sustained only by passion, made haste to attain its end. Union, on the contrary, required time, because it could only appeal to reason, and reason could not be heard until excitement should in some degree subside. Military spirit is an element always ready for revolution. It has a fuller development in the disaffected than in the loyal States. Thousands of men have already banded themselves as soldiers in the cause of disunion, while the defenders of the Union, before resorting to arms, everywhere wait to make sure that it cannot be otherwise preserved. Even this cautious and pacific, yet patriotic disposition has been misunderstood and perverted by faction to encourage disunion.

I believe that I have thus presented the disunion movement dispassionately and without misrepresenting its proportions or its character.

You will hardly be asked by responsible statesmen abroad why has not the new administration already suppressed the revolution. Thirty-five days are a short period in which to repress, chiefly by moral means, a movement which is so active while disclosing itself throughout an empire.

You will not be expected to promulgate this history, or to communicate it to the British government, but you are entitled to the President's views, which I have thus set forth in order to enable you to understand the policy which he proposes to pursue, and to conform your own action to it.

The President neither looks for nor apprehends any actual and permanent dismemberment of the American Union, especially by a line of latitude. The improvement of our many channels of intercourse, and the perfection of our scheme of internal exchanges, and the incorporation of both of them into a great system of foreign commerce, concurring with the gradual abatement of the force of the only existing cause of alienation, have carried us already beyond the danger of disunion in that form. The so-called Confederate States, therefore, in the opinion of the President, are attempting what will prove a physical impossibility. Necessarily they build the structure of their new government upon the same principle by which they seek to destroy the Union, namely, the right of each individual member of the confederacy to withdraw from it at pleasure and in peace. A government thus constituted could neither attain the consolidation necessary for stability, nor guaranty any engagements it might make with creditors or other nations. The movement, therefore, in the opinion of the President, tends directly to anarchy in the seceding States, as similar movements in similar circumstances have already resulted in Spanish America, and especially in Mexico. He believes, nevertheless, that the citizens of those States, as well as the citizens of the other States, are too intelligent, considerate, and wise to follow the leaders to that disastrous end. For these reasons he would not be disposed to reject a cardinal dogma of theirs, namely, that the federal government could not reduce the seceding States to obedience by conquest, even although he were disposed to question that proposition. But, in fact, the President willingly accepts it as true. Only an imperial or despotic government could subjugate thoroughly disaffected and insurrectionary members of the State. This federal republican system of ours is of all forms of government the very one which is most unfitted for such a labor. Happily, however, this is only an imaginary defect. The system has within itself adequate, peaceful, conservative, and recuperative forces. Firmness on the part of the government in maintaining and preserving the public institutions and property, and in executing the laws where authority can be exercised without waging war, combined with such measures of justice, moderation, and forbearance as will disarm reasoning opposition, will be sufficient to secure the public safety until returning reflection, concurring with the fearful experience of social evils, the inevitable fruits of faction, shall bring the recusant members cheerfully back into the family, which, after all, must prove their best and happiest, as it undeniably is their most natural home. The Constitution of the United States provides for that return by authorizing Congress, on application to be made by a certain majority of the States, to assemble a national convention, in which the organic law can, if it be needful, be revised so as to remove all real obstacles to a reunion, so suitable to the habits of the people, and so eminently conducive to the common safety and welfare.

Keeping that remedy steadily in view, the President, on the one hand, will not suffer the federal authority to fall into abeyance, nor will he, on the other, aggravate existing evils by attempts at coercion which must assume the form of direct war against any of the revolutionary States. If, while he is pursuing this course, commended as it is by prudence as well as patriotism, the scourge of civil war for the first time in our history must fall upon our country during the term of his administration, that calamity will then have come through the agency, not of the government, but of those who shall have chosen to be its armed, open, and irreconcilable enemies; and he will not suffer himself to doubt that when the value of the imperilled Union shall be brought in that fearful manner home to the business and the bosoms of the American people, they will, with an unanimity that shall vindicate their wisdom and their virtue, rise up and save it.

It does not, however, at all surprise the President that the confidence in the stability of the Union, which has been heretofore so universally entertained, has been violently shocked both at home and abroad. Surprise and fear invariably go together. The period of four months which intervened between the election which designated the head of the new administration and its advent, as has already been shown, assumed the character of an interregnum, in which not only were the powers of the government paralyzed, but even its resources seemed to disappear and be forgotten.

Nevertheless, all the world know what are the resources of the United States, and that they are practically unencumbered as well as inexhaustible. It would be easy, if it would not seem invidious, to show that whatever may be the full development of the disunion movement, those resources will not be seriously diminished, and that the revenues and credit of the Union, unsurpassed in any other country, are adequate to every emergency that can occur in our own. Nor will the political commotions which await us sensibly disturb the confidence of the people in the stability of the government. It has been necessary for us to learn, perhaps the instruction has not come too soon, that vicissitudes are incident to our system and our country, as they are to all others. The panic which that instruction naturally produced is nearly past. What has hitherto been most needful for the reinvigoration of authority is already occurring. The aiders, abettors, and sympathizers with disunion, partly by their own choice and partly through the exercise of the public will, are falling out from the civil departments of the government as well as from the army and the navy. The national legislature will no longer be a distracted council. Our representatives in foreign courts and ports will henceforth speak only the language of loyalty to their country, and of confidence in its institutions and its destiny.

It is much to be deplored that our representatives are to meet abroad agents of disunion, seeking foreign aid to effect what, unaided, is already seen to be desperate. You need not be informed that their success in Great Britain would probably render their success easy elsewhere. The President does not doubt that you fully appreciate the responsibility of your mission. An honored ancestor of yours was the first to represent your whole country, after its independence was established, at the same court to which you now are accredited. The President feels assured that it will happen through no want of loyalty or of diligence on your part if you are to be the last to discharge that trust. You will have this great advantage, that from the hour when that country, so dear to us all, first challenged the notice of nations, until now, it has continually grown in their sympathy and reverence.

Before considering the arguments you are to use, it is important to [indicate] those which you are not to employ in executing that mission:

First. The President has noticed, as the whole American people have, with much emotion, the expressions of good will and friendship toward the United States, and of concern for their present embarrassments, which have been made on apt occasions by her Majesty and her ministers. You will make due acknowledgment for these manifestations, but at the same time you will not rely on any mere sympathies or national kindness. You will make no admissions of weakness in our Constitution, or of apprehension on the part of the government. You will rather prove, as you easily can, by comparing the history of our country with that of other states, that its Constitution and government are really the strongest and surest which have ever been erected for the safety of any people. You will in no case listen to any suggestions of compromise by this government, under foreign auspices, with its discontented citizens. If, as the President does not at all apprehend, you shall unhappily find her Majesty's government tolerating the application of the so-called seceding States, or wavering about it, you will not leave them to suppose for a moment that they can grant that application and remain the friends of the United States. You may even assure them promptly in that case that if they determine to recognize, they may at the same time prepare to enter into alliance with the enemies of this republic. You alone will represent your country at London, and you will represent the whole of it there. When you are asked to divide that duty with others, diplomatic relations between the government of Great Britain and this government will be suspended, and will remain so until it shall be seen which of the two is most strongly entrenched in the confidence of their respective nations and of mankind.

You will not be allowed, however, even if you were disposed, as the President is sure you will not be, to rest your opposition to the application of the Confederate States on the ground of any favor this administration, or the party which chiefly called it into existence, proposes to show to Great Britain, or claims that Great Britain ought to show to them. You will not consent to draw into debate before the British government any opposing moral principles which may be supposed to lie at the foundation of the controversy between those States and the federal Union

You will indulge in no expressions of harshness or disrespect, or even impatience, concerning the seceding States, their agents, or their people. But you will, on the contrary, all the while remember that those States are now, as they always heretofore have been, and, notwithstanding their temporary self-delusion, they must always continue to be, equal and honored members of this federal Union, and that their citizens throughout all political misunderstandings and alienations still are and always must be our kindred and countrymen. In short, all your arguments must belong to one of three classes, namely: First. Arguments drawn from the principles of public law and natural justice, which regulate the intercourse of equal States. Secondly. Arguments which concern equally the honor, welfare, and happiness of the discontented States, and the honor, welfare, and happiness of the whole Union. Thirdly. Arguments which are equally conservative of the rights and interests, and even sentiments of the United States, and just in their bearing upon the rights, interests, and sentiments of Great Britain and all other nations.

We freely admit that a nation may, and even ought, to recognize a new State which has absolutely and beyond question effected its independence, and permanently established its sovereignty; and that a recognition in such a case affords no just cause of offence to the government of the country from which the new State has so detached itself. On the other hand, we insist that a nation that recognizes a revolutionary State, with a view to aid its effecting its sovereignty and independence, commits a great wrong against the nation whose integrity is thus invaded, and makes itself responsible for a just and ample redress.

I will not stop to inquire whether it may not sometimes happen that an imperial government or even a federative one may not so oppress or aggrieve its subjects in a province or in a State as to justify intervention on the plea of humanity. Her Majesty's government, however, will not make a pretence that the present is such a case. The United States have existed under their present form of government seventy and more years, and during all that time not one human life has been taken in forfeiture for resistance to their authority. It must be the verdict of history that no government so just, so equal, and so humane, has ever elsewhere existed. Even the present disunion movement is confessedly without any better cause than an apprehension of dangers which, from the very nature of the government, are impossible; and speculations of aggressions, which those who know the physical and social arrangements of this continent must see at once are fallacious and chimerical.

The disunionists will, I am sure, take no such ground. They will appeal, not to the justice, or to the magnanimity, but to the cupidity and caprice of Great Britain.

It cannot need many words to show that even in that form their appeal ought to be promptly dismissed. I am aware that the revenue law lately passed by Congress is vehemently denounced in Great Britain. It might be enough to say on that subject that as the United States and Great Britain are equals in dignity, and not unequal in astuteness in the science and practice of political economy, the former have good right to regard only their own convenience, and consult their own judgment in framing their revenue laws. But there are some points in this connexion which you may make without compromising the self-respect of this government.

In the circumstances of the present case, it is clear that a recognition of the so-called Confederate nations must be deemed equivalent to a deliberate resolution by her Majesty's government that this American Union, which has so long constituted a sovereign nation, shall be now permanently dissolved, and cease to exist forever. The excuse for this resolution, fraught, if effectual, with fearful and enduring consequences, is a change in its revenue laws — a change which, because of its very nature, as well as by reason of the ever-changing course of public sentiment, must necessarily be temporary and ephemeral. British censors tell us that the new tariff is unwise for ourselves. If so, it will speedily be repealed. They say it is illiberal and injurious to Great Britain. It cannot be so upon her principles without being also injurious to ourselves, and in that case it will be promptly repealed. Besides, there certainly are other and more friendly remedies for foreign legislation that is injurious without premeditated purpose of injury, which a magnanimous government will try before it deliberately seeks the destruction of the offended nation.

The application of the so-called Confederate States, in the aspect now under consideration, assumes that they are offering, or will offer, more liberal commercial facilities than the United States can or will be disposed to concede. Would it not be wise for Great Britain to wait until those liberal facilities shall be definitely fixed and offered by the Confederate States, and then to wait further and see whether the United States may not accord facilities not less desirable?

The union of these States seventy years ago established perfectly free trade between the several States, and this, in effect, is free trade throughout the largest inhabitable part of North America. During all, that time, with occasional and very brief intervals, not affecting the result, we have been constantly increasing in commercial liberality towards foreign nations. We have made that advance necessarily, because, with increasing liberality, we have at the same time, owing to controlling causes, continually augmented our revenues and increased our own productions. The sagacity of the British government cannot allow it to doubt that our natural course hereafter in this respect must continue to be the same as heretofore.

The same sagacity may be trusted to decide, first, whether the so-called Confederate States, on the emergency of a military revolution, and having no other sources of revenue than duties on imports and exports levied within the few ports they can command without a naval force, are likely to be able to persevere in practicing the commercial liberality they proffer as an equivalent for recognition. Manifestly, moreover, the negotiation which they propose to open with Great Britain implies that peace is to be preserved while the new commerce goes on. The sagacity of her Majesty's government may be trusted to consider whether that new government is likely to be inaugurated without war, and whether the commerce of Great Britain with this country would be likely to be improved by flagrant war between the southern and northern States.

Again, even a very limited examination of commercial statistics will be sufficient to show that while the staples of the disaffected States do, indeed, as they claim, constitute a very important portion of the exports of the United States to European countries, a very large portion of the products and fabrics of other regions consumed in those States are derived, and must continue to be derived, not from Europe, but from the northern States, while the chief consumption of European productions and fabrics imported into the United States takes place in these same States. Great Britain may, if her government think best, by modifying her navigation laws, try to change these great features of American commerce; but it will require something more than acts of the British Parliament and of the proposed revolutionary Congress to modify a commerce that takes its composite character from all the various soils and climates of a continent, as well as from the diversified institutions, customs and dispositions of the many communities which inhabit it.

Once more: All the speculations which assume that the revenue law recently passed by Congress will diminish the consumption of foreign fabrics and productions in the United States are entirely erroneous. The American people are active, industrious, inventive, and energetic, but they are not penurious or sordid. They are engaged with wonderful effect in developing the mineral, forest, agricultural and pastoral resources of a vast and, practically, new continent. Their wealth, individual as well as public, increases every day in a general sense, irrespective of the revenue laws of the United States, and every day also the habit of liberal — not to say profuse — expenditure grows upon them. There are changes in the nature and character of imported productions which they consume, but practically no decline in the quantity and value of imports.

It remains to bring out distinctly a consideration to which I have already adverted. Great Britain has within the last forty-five years changed character and purpose. She has become a power for production, rather than a power for destruction. She is committed, as it seems to us, to a policy of industry, not of ambition; a policy of peace, not of war. One has only to compare her present domestic condition with that of any former period to see that this new career on which she has entered is as wise as it is humane and beneficent. Her success in this career requires peace throughout the civilized world, and nowhere so much as on this continent. Recognition by her of the so-called Confederate States would be intervention and war in this country. Permanent dismemberment of the American Union in consequence of that intervention would be perpetual war — civil war. The new confederacy which in that case Great Britain would have aided into existence must, like any other new state, seek to expand itself northward, westward, and southward. What part of this continent or of the adjacent islands would be expected to remain in peace?

The President would regard it as inconsistent with his habitually high consideration for the government and people of Great Britain to allow me to dwell longer on the merely commercial aspects of the question under discussion. Indeed he will not for a moment believe that, upon consideration of merely financial gain, that government could be induced to lend its aid to a revolution designed to overthrow the institutions of this country, and involving ultimately the destruction of the liberties of the American people.

To recognize the independence of a new state, and so favor, possibly determine, its admission into the family of nations, is the highest possible exercise of sovereign power, because it affects in any case the welfare of two nations, and often the peace of the world. In the European system this power is now seldom attempted to be exercised without invoking a consultation or congress of nations. That system has not been extended to this continent. But there is even a greater necessity for prudence in such cases in regard to American States than in regard to the nations of Europe. A revolutionary change of dynasty or even a disorganization and recombination of one or many States, therefore, do not long or deeply affect the general interests of society, because the ways of trade and habits of society remain the same. But a radical change effected in the political combinations existing on the continent, followed, as it probably would be, by moral convulsions of incalculable magnitude, would threaten the stability of society throughout the world.

Humanity has indeed little to hope for if it shall, in this age of high improvement, be decided without a trial that the principle of international law which regards nations as moral persons, bound so to act as to do to each other the least injury and the most good, is merely an abstraction too refined to be reduced into practice by the enlightened nations of Western Europe. Seen in the light of this principle, the several nations of the earth constitute one great federal republic. When one of them casts its suffrages for the admission of a new member into that republic, it ought to act under a profound sense of moral obligation, and be governed by considerations as pure, disinterested, and elevated as the general interest of society and the advancement of human nature.

The British empire itself is an aggregation of divers communities which cover a large portion of the earth and embrace one-fifth of its entire population. Some, at least, of these communities are held to their places in that system by bonds as fragile as the obligations of our own federal Union. The strain will some time come which is to try the strength of these bonds, though it will be of a different kind from that which is trying the cords of our confederation. Would it be wise for her Majesty's government, on this occasion, to set a dangerous precedent, or provoke retaliation? If Scotland and Ireland are at last reduced to quiet contentment, has Great Britain no dependency, island, or province left exposed along the whole circle of her empire, from Gibraltar through the West Indies and Canada till it begins again on the southern extremity of Africa?

The President will not dwell on the pleasing recollection that Great Britain, not yet a year ago, manifested by marked attention to the United States her desire for a cordial reunion which, all ancient prejudices and passions being buried, should be a pledge of mutual interest and sympathy forever thereafter. The United States are not indifferent to the circumstances of common descent, language, customs, sentiments, and religion, which recommend a closer sympathy between themselves and Great Britain than either might expect in its intercourse with any other nation. The United States are one of many nations which have sprung from Great Britain herself. Other such nations are rising up in various parts of the globe. It has been thought by many who have studied the philosophy of modern history profoundly, that the success of the nations thus deriving their descent from Great Britain might, through many ages, reflect back upon that kingdom the proper glories of its own great career. The government and people of Great Britain may mistake their commercial interests, but they cannot become either unnatural or indifferent to the impulses of an undying ambition to be distinguished as the leaders of the nations in the ways of civilization and humanity.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

SOURCE: Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1861, Message of the President of the United States and Accompanying Documents, from the Department of State, p. 71-80