I shall not soon forget the events of the night of this
day. Our news from Chattanooga was more
hopeful – but it was evident that Rosecrans’s army was in great peril. Meade was
in the neighborhood of [Manassas], following Lee, and it was hoped, about to win
a decisive victory over him– But he was cautious & it was uncertain if he
would strike at all. I went home from
the Department thinking over the state of things – with great anxiety. It was
about midnight, and I had just retired when the door bell rang and the message
was brought to me, “The Secretary of War desires that you will come to the
Department immediately and has sent a carriage for you.”
“What can be the matter?” I said to myself as I hastily rose
and dressed. “Has the enemy attacked Rosecrans? Has he captured him and his
army? Has he driven our men across the Tennessee?”
When I reached the War Department I found Mr. Stanton there,
silent and stern.
“Is there any bad news?” I asked
“None,” was the brief reply. General Halleck was present,
and the President either was there already or soon came in; Mr. Seward also
came.
At length when we five were assembled Mr. Stanton began:
“I have invited this meeting because I am thoroughly
convinced that something must be done, and done immediately, to insure the
safety of the army under Rosecrans, and wish to have it considered and decided
whether anything, and if anything, what shall be done?”
Then turning to Gen. Halleck he asked:
“What forces can Burnside send to Rosecrans at Chattanooga?”
Gen. Halleck replied, “20,000 men.”
Halleck — “In ten days if not interruped.”
President — “Before ten days Burnside can put in enough to
hold the place.”
Halleck — “He can bring up 12,000 perhaps in eight days.”
President — “When Burnside's men begin to arrive the place
will be safe, but the pinch is now.”
Stanton — “If the enemy presses or attacks Burnside, what
then?”
Halleck — “Burnside must take his measures accordingly —
fight or act defensively.”
Stanton — “If the enemy has enough to detach a force against
Burnside, and also attack Rosecrans?”
Halleck — “Rosecrans must be relieved otherwise.”
Stanton — “When can Sherman relieve him?”
Halleck — “In about ten days, if already marched from
Vicksburg. If not marched should come up the river and overland from Memphis.
He has 20,000 or 25,000 men. Every available man is ordered forward and boats
have gone down the river from Cairo to bring them up.”
Stanton — “Then your estimate of what can be done by Sherman
is only conjectural?”
Halleck — “Of course it is impossible to speak definitely in
such a matter.”
Stanton —“Can men be had from any other quarter?”
Halleck — “Perhaps a few from Kentucky — don't know how
many. All are already ordered to Rosecrans.”
Stanton — “Mr. President, I think it perfectly clear from
what has been said that certain or even probable relief will reach Rosecrans
from any quarter that has been named. I do not believe a man will get to him
from Burnside or Sherman in time to be of any use in the emergency which is
upon us. The army of the Potomac is doing nothing important, nor is it likely
to be more actively employed. I propose therefore, to send 20,000 men from the
army of the Potomac to Chattanooga under the command of General Hooker.”
This proposition was objected to quite strongly by General
Halleck and the President. Both expressed the belief that the troops could not
be got through to Chattanooga, or near enough to be of essential service to the
army of Rosecrans as soon as troops could be furnished from Burnside's or
Sherman's command, and both were unwilling to withdraw troops from Meade. Mr.
Stanton said that he had fully considered the question of practicability and
should not have submitted his proposition had he not fully satisfied himself on
that head by conference with the ablest railroad men of the country. General
Halleck had given no definite assurance as to the time in which relief could be
given by Sherman or Burnside. His nearest approach to definiteness was eight
days by Burnside if uninterrupted by the enemy. Was not the enemy sure to
interrupt? And was it not well known that activity by Burnside would involve
the abandonment of east Tennessee, to which Burnside was strongly opposed and
therefore extremely unwilling to move? Whereas if it should be determined to
send men from the Army of the Potomac the order for the two corps could be
given in the morning — by night the column would be entering Washington, the
troops could be put in cars at once and in five days the advance might be
entering Nashville.
“Why,” said the President, “You can't get one corps into
Washington in the time you fix for reaching Nashville”; and he illustrated his
idea of the impossibility by some story which I have forgotten.
Stanton was greatly annoyed & made some remark to the
effect that the danger was too imminent & the occasion to serious for
jokes; but added that as he saw himself overruled he would give up the point;
and invited us all into the adjoining room where he had caused a light
collation to he prepared.
I then remarked that I hoped the proposition would not be
abandoned: that it seemed to me exceedingly important; & that we could
resume its consideration with advantage after a little refreshment. I added a very brief resume of Mr. Stantons
arguments already urged – expressed my entire confidence in his ability to do
what he proposed–& declared it to be my deliberate judgment that to refuse
to adopt it was to refuse to adopt the only plan [by] which the Army of Rosecrans
[w]ould with any certainty be saved.
We, then, went to the collation. On returning to the Secretarys room Mr.
Seward took up the subject & supported Mr. Stantons proposition with
excellent arguments.
The scale was now turned. Every objection was abandoned
except that of weakening Meade & finally the President said that he wd. telegraph
Meade in the morning & if he did not propose an immediate movement, the
order for the two corps to move should be given at once by Gen Halleck. It was near morning when we went home. Two or three hours later the telegram was
sent – the answer recd – the order for the movement given.
The result is well known.
The advance of Hooker’s command reached Nashville in a week – frustrated
the attempt to break up Rosecrans’ communications; & his army was saved;
and Chattanooga was saved; & the future was saved. Neither Shermans column nor Burnsides came up
in time to be of any use in this special work.
Burnsides did not come up at all.
Sherman’s came; but came after the peril was past; though in time for
the glorious achievements which soon afterwards electrified the country. The country does not know how much it owes
Edwin M. Stanton for that nights work.
SOURCES: Ellis Paxson Oberholtzer, “A Midnight Confrence and
Other Passages from the Papers of Secretary Salmon P. Chase,” Scribner’s Magazine, Volume XLV, No. 2,
February 1900, p. 144-50; The Salmon P. Chase Papers, Volume 1:
Journals, 1829-1872, p. 450-3
