Showing posts with label USCT. Show all posts
Showing posts with label USCT. Show all posts

Sunday, October 27, 2019

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864 — January 23, 1865: No. 178. Report of Maj. Gen. James B. Steedman, U.S. Army, commanding Provisional Detachment (District of the Etowah), of operations November 29, 1864 - January 13, 1865.

No. 178.

Report of Maj. Gen. James B. Steedman, U.S. Army, commanding Provisional Detachment (District of the Etowah), of operations November 29, 1864 - January 13, 1865.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE ETOWAH,        
Chattanooga, January 27, 1865.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my command during the recent campaign which resulted in the defeat of the enemy before Nashville and his retreat to Alabama: In obedience to the orders of Major-General Thomas, my command—consisting of the Eighteenth Regiment Ohio Volunteers, Sixty-eighth Regiment Indiana Volunteers, Sixth Indiana (dismounted) Cavalry; Fourteenth, Sixteenth, and Forty-fourth U.S. Colored Troops; detachments of the Fourteenth, Twentieth, and Seventeenth Army Corps, organized into a provisional division and commanded by Brig. Gen. Charles Cruft; and the Eighteenth Ohio and Twentieth Indiana Batteries; amounting in the aggregate to about 5,200 men—moved from Chattanooga, by railroad, on the 29th day of November, and proceeded to Cowan, Tenn., where I took my command from the cars the next morning at 8 o'clock and placed it in position. At 6 p.m. of the same day I received an order, by telegraph, from the major-general commanding to proceed as rapidly as possible with my command and report to him at Nashville, arriving at that place at 5 p.m. on the 1st day of December. By an accident to one of the trains the command of Colonel Johnson, of the Forty-fourth U.S. Colored Troops, was detained until the morning of the 2d of December, when the train conveying his troops was attacked by the cavalry of the enemy five miles south of Nashville. I herewith submit Colonel Johnson's report of his encounter with the enemy.

On the 2d day of December I moved my command, by order of the major-general commanding, into position, and occupied and fortified the ridge between the Murfreesborough and Nolensville pikes, and crossing the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad on Rains' farm.

December 3, by order of Major-General Thomas, I withdrew my command from the position occupied the day previous and placed it on a line indicated near the city of Nashville, on the north side of Brown's Creek, extending from the Nolensville pike across the Murfreesborough pike, the left resting near the house of Major Lewis, a short distance from the Lebanon pike. This position was strongly fortified by my troops, and held until they were withdrawn to participate in the action on the 15th of December.

December 5 and 7, by order of Major-General Thomas, I directed a small brigade of colored troops, under the command of Col. T. J. Morgan, of the Fourteenth U.S. Colored Troops, and the Sixty-eighth Indiana Volunteers and Sixth Indiana (dismounted) Cavalry, under the command of Colonel Biddle, to reconnoiter the position of the enemy in my front. This force on both days drove the enemy from the left of the works constructed by my command on Rains' farm, which he had taken possession of after my troops abandoned them. These reconnaissances were conducted by the officers in Command with prudence, energy, and ability, and were successful in developing the enemy's position. A detailed account of the result will be found in the report of Colonel Morgan, herewith forwarded.

December 11, in compliance with the order of Major-General Thomas, I directed Brigadier-General Cruft to reconnoiter the enemy's position. This reconnaissance, made by a brigade under the command of Col. J. G. Mitchell, owing to the whole surface of the country being covered with ice, rendering it almost impossible for men or animals to move over uneven ground, and on account of the steep slopes to be ascended in approaching the position of the enemy, was a difficult duty, but it was accomplished and the position of the enemy developed.

December 13, in obedience to the orders of Major-General Thomas, a brigade of General Cruft's troops, under the command of Col. A. G. Malloy, reconnoitered in front of my position, and felt the enemy's right. The ground being still covered with smooth ice rendered the movement tedious and hazardous, but under all the disadvantages was skillfully executed, the enemy forced into his works, and the object of the reconnaissance accomplished. The movement was made under the immediate direction of General Cruft.

December 15, the weather having moderated, and the ground thawed sufficiently to enable men and animals to stand up, in obedience to the orders of Major-General Thomas, the Provisional Division of troops, under the command of Brigadier-General Cruft, moved at 4 a.m., and relieved the troops of the Fourth and Twenty-third Army Corps, occupying their exterior line of works and picketing the front of this line from the Acklen place to Fort Negley, and commanding the approaches to the' city by the Granny White, Franklin, and Nolensville turnpikes. Brig. Gen. J. F. Miller reported his command to me at 4 a.m., and occupied the works from Fort Negley to the Lebanon pike, commanding the approaches to the city by the Murfreesborough, Chicken, and Lebanon turnpikes. Brig. Gen. J. L. Donaldson reported his command at 6 o'clock, and occupied the works from the right of General Cruft's command to the Tennessee River, commanding the approach to the city by the Hardin and Hillsborough turnpikes. Having thus disposed the troops as directed for the protection of the city—fully commanding all its approaches—and rendering the public property and supplies secure against sudden attack from either flank I moved out at 6.30 a.m., in obedience to the orders of Major-General Thomas—with the Twelfth, Thirteenth, and One hundredth Regiments of Colored Troops, under the command of Colonel Thompson, of the Twelfth Colored; the Fourteenth, Seventeenth, Forty-fourth, and a detachment of the Eighteenth Regiment Colored Troops, under command of Col. T. J. Morgan, of the Fourteenth Colored; the Sixty-eighth Indiana Volunteers, Eighteenth Ohio Volunteers, and the Second Battalion, Fourteenth Army Corps, under command of Lieut. Col. C. H. Grosvenor; and the Twentieth Indiana and Eighteenth Ohio Batteries—to attack the enemy's right, employ his forces at that point, and as far as possible by my movements to mislead him as to the real point of attack. The fog was very dense, and delayed somewhat movements on the entire line. A few minutes before 8, when the fog had partially cleared away and all my dispositions had been made for attack, Brig. Gen. W. D. Whipple, chief of staff' of the Department of the Cumberland, instructed me, by order of Major-General Thomas, as to the time of attack. At 8 o'clock, the time designated, the attack was made by the troops of Colonel Morgan and Lieutenant-Colonel Grosvenor, Colonel Morgan commanding, advancing from the Murfreesborough turnpike toward Riddle's Hill, rapidly driving in the pickets of the enemy and assaulting his line of works between the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad and the Murfreesborough turnpike. In this assault the troops behaved well, carrying a portion of the enemy's works, but as they were exposed to a destructive fire, the enemy rapidly re-enforcing that part of his line, and as my object was to deceive the enemy as to the purposes of the major-general commanding, I withdrew this force, and immediately reformed it for an attack on a force occupying an earth-work east of and within short musket range of the Rains house. This attack was made at 11 a.m., and resulted in my troops getting possession of the Rains house, and other adjacent brick outbuildings, which were loop-holed and held until the next morning. While these attacks were being made by the troops under Colonel Morgan, Colonel Thompson's command moved across Brown's Creek, between the Nolensville and Murfreesborough turnpikes, and attacked and carried the left of the front line of works of the enemy resting on the Nolensville pike. This portion of the enemy's line was held by Colonel Thompson's command until the morn-in, of the 16th.

During the operations of my command against the enemy's right, General Cruft, holding the exterior line protecting the city, and watching vigilantly all the movements, saw an opportunity to use his artillery on a flying column of the enemy's troops, and promptly ordered the Twenty-fourth [Twenty-fifth?] Indiana Battery, Captain Sturm, to open, which he did with effect, scattering and demoralizing the force.

Darkness closed the operations of the day; all the orders I received from Major-General Thomas had been executed—his plans successful, and victory crowned our efforts. Throughout the day, and until the action closed at dark, my command behaved nobly, making the several assaults ordered with cool, steady bravery, retiring only when ordered to do so. A portion of the command suffered severely; but no troops, behaving as gallantly as they did in assaulting fortified positions, could have suffered less, or borne their losses more heroically.

December 16, at 6 a.m., in obedience to the orders of Major-General Thomas, my command moved on the enemy's works, and found that he had evacuated the right of his line in my front during the night. Rushing out my troops on the Nolensville pike, rapidly driving his cavalry, I took up a position between the Nolensville pike and the left of the Fourth Corps, commanded by Brig. Gen. T. J. Wood, my right resting on the railroad, my left refused near the Nolensville pike, and covering the entire left of our line, engaging and putting to flight a portion of the enemy's cavalry. General Cruft, as I advanced with the troops under my immediate command, uncovering the approaches to the city by way of the Murfreesborough and Nolensville turnpikes, promptly pushed forward a brigade of his troops, under the command of Col. John G. Mitchell, and occupied Riddle Hill, protecting our rear against any attempt of the enemy to use his cavalry to annoy us or interfere with our ammunition or ambulance train. At 1 p.m., in obedience to an order from Major-General Thomas, my command formed a junction with the command of General Wood, and my troops united with General Wood's in assaulting the enemy, who was strongly posted and fortified on Overton's Hill. In this assault, although unsuccessful, the troops engaged—two brigades of General Wood's, and Colonel Thompson's brigade of colored troops, and Lieutenant-Colonel Grosvenor's brigade from my command—exhibited courage and steadiness that challenged the admiration of all who witnessed the charge. The concentrated fire of musketry and canister from the enemy's works forced them back, with severe loss They were immediately reformed to renew the assault, which would have been promptly made, but a division of General Wood's troops, as I was informed, on the right of the Franklin pike, taking advantage of the withdrawal by the enemy of a portion of his troops in their front to re-enforce Overton Hill, made a charge, which caused the entire line of the enemy to give way and retreat rapidly and in disorder. My troops, in conjunction with General Wood's, immediately pursued, rapidly, taking a number of prisoners. The pursuit was continued until after dark, when our exhausted troops bivouacked for the night near Brentwood.

December 17, my command, in obedience to orders, continued the pursuit, covering and protecting the left of our line, moving from Brentwood, on the Wilson pike, to a point four miles south of Brentwood, and crossing from that point by a southwest road to Franklin, where it bivouacked for the night, not being able to cross the Harpeth River, which was much swollen by the heavy rain of the night and day previous, and the bridges destroyed by the enemy.

December 18, my command moved across the river and proceeded about three miles beyond Franklin, on the road to Spring Hill, when, in obedience to orders, I returned with my troops to Franklin and marched to Murfreesborough, to proceed by rail to Decatur. Moving General Cruft's troops from Nashville by the Murfreesborough pike, the whole command was concentrated at Murfreesborough on the evening of the 20th. At Murfreesborough I received dispatches from Col. A. J. Mackay, chief quartermaster of the department, informing me that the transportation necessary to move my command by rail to Decatur was on the way from Chattanooga, and transports conveying supplies would meet me at such point as I might designate. These orders and dispositions of Colonel Mackay were all perfect, but the severe cold weather, the injuries to the road, and the criminal negligence, incompetency, and indifference of a portion of the railroad employés, occasioned serious delays.

On the morning of the 22d of December my command moved from Murfreesborough, reaching the mouth of Limestone River on the evening of the 26th, where I found Brig. Gen. R. S. Granger, with his command, with four gun-boats, one armed transport (the Stone River), and five transports, with rations and forage forwarded from Chattanooga for my command.

December 27, having constructed the trestles and secured the plank necessary to bridge a lagoon, on the south side of the Tennessee River, the night previous, I moved a portion of my command, with the transports, convoyed by the gun-boats, down the river to a point three miles above Decatur, where a landing was effected, the lagoon rapidly bridged, the troops crossed, and pushed out in the direction of Decatur. The enemy attempted to check the crossing of the troops with artillery, which he posted within half a mile of where we were crossing the lagoon, but my advance having crossed before this artillery opened was rapidly pushed out and drove it off. At 3 p.m. the whole of my infantry had crossed, and at 7 p.m. was in possession of Decatur.

December 28, my artillery and cavalry was crossed; the command rationed and moved out three miles on the road to Courtland. The cavalry—the Fifteenth Pennsylvania, Colonel Palmer, and detachments of the Second Tennessee, Tenth, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Indiana, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Prosser, amounting in the aggregate to about 650 effective men, Col. William J. Palmer, of the Fifteenth Pennsylvania, commanding—moved from Decatur at 8 p.m., and pushed rapidly forward, encountering the enemy six miles from the river, on the Courtland road, and at once attacked and routed him, capturing his artillery—a section of six-pounder brass guns.

December 29, my command moved at daylight, the cavalry in advance, and went into camp at 5 o'clock within four miles of Court-land. The infantry met no opposition. The cavalry skirmished most of the day in advance of the infantry, driving the enemy rapidly toward Courtland. At Pond Spring, three miles northeast of Courtland, he made a stand, but was immediately charged and routed by my cavalry. The report of Colonel Palmer, commanding the cavalry, herewith forwarded, gives a full account of this affair.

December 30, my infantry moved to Courtland, and went into camp on the south side of the town on Big Nance Creek, the cavalry pushing on as far as Leighton, thirteen miles west of Courtland. At 5 p.m. I received a dispatch from Colonel Palmer, written at Leighton, asking my permission to pursue, capture, and destroy Hood's pontoon train. I immediately gave him permission to exercise his own judgment in the matter. He decided to pursue, and in the most splendid manner not only accomplished all he proposed—the destruction of the pontoon train—but pursued, captured, and destroyed a supply train of 110 wagons. Colonel Palmer's command, in this enterprising and daring expedition, captured and destroyed upward of 300 wagons, nearly 1,000 stand of arms, a large number of mules and oxen, and captured and turned over 2 pieces of artillery, 200 prisoners, including 13 commissioned officers, and 170 serviceable mules. To support the movement of Colonel Palmer I advanced two brigades of infantry, under command of Colonel Thompson, to Town Creek, seven miles west of Courtland, and one brigade, under command of Colonel Salm, to Leighton. General Cruft's division, with the artillery, remained at Courtland.

January 3, having learned that Colonel Palmer had been successful, and receiving an order from Major-general Thomas to return with my command to Chattanooga, I moved with my infantry and artillery for Decatur, reaching that place on the evening of the 5th of January.

January 4, at 1 a.m., I moved with the artillery and sick of the command on board the transports for Chattanooga, leaving Brig. Gen. Cruft to return with the infantry by rail. General Cruft was delayed several days on his return by an order from Major-General Thomas directing him to pursue the rebel General Lyon. This portion of the campaign, owing to the heavy rains swelling all the streams out of their banks and rendering the roads almost wholly impassable, was very arduous, but was skillfully and satisfactorily conducted by General Cruft, resulting in the capture of a part of Lyon's men, and driving all who escaped out of the country utterly demoralized. The report of General Cruft, herewith forwarded, gives a detailed history of his operations in pursuit of General Lyon. January 13 General Cruft returned to Chattanooga with his command.

The following table will show the casualties of my command during the entire campaign:

Command.
Killed.
Wounded.
Missing.
Total.
O
M
O
M
O
M
O
M
14th U.S. Colored Infantry.1

4

41

20

65
44th U.S. Colored Infantry.
1
2

27
2
49
3
78
16th U.S. Colored Infantry.

1

2



3
18th U.S. Colored Infantry.

1

5

3

9
17th U.S. Colored Infantry.
2
14
4
64


6
78
12th U.S. Colored Infantry.2
3
10
3
99


6
109
13th U. S. Colored Infantry.
4
51
4
161

1
8
213
100th U.S. Colored Infantry.

12
5
116


5
128
18th Ohio Infantry3
2
9
2
38

9
4
56
68th Indiana Infantry

1

7



8
Provisional Division, Army of the Cumberland
1
19
3
74

33
4
126
20th Indiana Battery4


2
6


2
6
Total
13
124
23
640
2
115
38
879

[O = Officers     M = Men]

1 Organized as the First Colored Brigade, Col. T.J. Morgan commanding.
2 Organized as the Second Colored Brigade, Col. C. R. Thompson commanding.
3 Included in the Provisional Division, Army of the Cumberland, Brigadier-General Cruft commanding.
4 Captain Osborne.

The larger portion of these losses, amounting in the aggregate to fully 25 per cent. of the men under my command who were taken into action, it will be observed fell upon the colored troops. The severe loss of this part of my troops was in their brilliant charge on the enemy's works on Overton Hill on Friday afternoon. I was unable to discover that color made any difference in the fighting of my troops. All, white and black, nobly did their duty as soldiers, and evinced cheerfulness and resolution such as I have never seen excelled in any campaign of the war in which I have borne a part.

In closing this brief report of the operations of my command during the campaign, I feel that justice compels me to mention several officers who distinguished themselves by their energy, courage, and unremitting efforts to secure success.

Brig. Gen. Charles Cruft performed herculean labor in organizing, arming, and equipping the detachments of recruits, drafted men, and furloughed soldiers of the Army of the Tennessee to the number of 14,000-10,000 of whom took part in the campaign, in the battles before Nashville and in guarding the railroad defenses south of the Tennessee River. Six thousand of these men were commanded by the general in person in the field from the commencement until the close of the campaign. The general deserves the thanks of the country for the able and efficient manner in which he has performed this duty.

Brig. Gen. John F. Miller, commanding post of Nashville, displayed energy, efficiency, and promptness in placing his troops in position to hold a portion of the exterior line protecting the city of Nashville.

I am much indebted to Brigadier-General Donaldson, chief quartermaster of the department, for his efficient and energetic efforts to fit out my command on its arrival at Nashville, and for the assistance he rendered with the armed men of his department in protecting the city of Nashville pending the engagement. My thanks are due Col. A. J. Mackay, chief quartermaster Army of the Cumberland, for his promptness in furnishing transportation to convey my command from Mur-freesborough to Decatur, and forwarding supplies for my troops, by transports, to the mouth of Limestone River.

Col. Felix Prince Salm, Sixty-eighth New York Veteran Volunteers, commanded a provisional brigade of my troops, and exhibited high qualities as a soldier. I respectfully recommend him for promotion.

Col. T. J. Morgan, Fourteenth U.S. Colored Troops, behaved gallantly. I respectfully recommend him for promotion.

Lieut. Col. C. H. Grosvenor, Eighteenth Ohio Volunteers, behaved nobly in leading a charge on the rebel works, on the Rains place.

The following officers of my staff accompanied me on the campaign and discharged all the duties that devolved upon them in a most satisfactory manner: Col. C. S. Cotter, First Ohio Light Artillery, chief of artillery; Maj. S. B. Moe, assistant adjutant-general; Capt. A. Mills, Eighteenth U.S. Infantry, inspector; Capt. M. Davis, Fourteenth Ohio Volunteers, aide-de-camp; Capt. W. B. Steedman, Fourteenth Ohio Volunteers, aide-de-camp; Lieut. J. G. McAdams, Sixth Kentucky Cavalry, acting commissary of subsistence. Col. H. B. Banning, One hundred and twenty-first Ohio Volunteers, served me ably as provost-marshal; Capt. A. R. Keller, assistant quartermaster, reported to me, and rendered me efficient service as quartermaster for my command.

I am deeply indebted to Maj. S. B. Moe, my assistant adjutant-general, for his efficient and gallant services on the field, as well as for the valuable aid which his large experience as a railroad man enabled him to render me in pushing through the trains conveying my troops from Chattanooga to Nashville, and from Murfreesborough to Decatur.

Captain Osborne, Twentieth Indiana Battery, and Captain Aleshire, Eighteenth Ohio Battery, deserve praise for the effective and gallant manner in which they handled their respective batteries.

I am pleased to mention Mr. Stevens, superintendent of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, Mr. Talmadge, master of transportation at Chattanooga, and Mr. Bryant, assistant superintendent Nashville and Chattanooga road, as most honorable exceptions among the railroad men who have been censured by me for neglect of duty. These gentlemen did everything in their power to aid me in getting over the railroad with my command. I respectfully commend them for their efforts.

I respectfully recommend Col. William J. Palmer, Fifteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry, for promotion for distinguished, gallant, and successful services in pursuing, capturing, and destroying the pontoon and supply train of the enemy.

I fully concur in all that General Cruft has said in his report in commendation of the officers of his command.

Mr. James R. Hood, of Chattanooga, accompanied me throughout the campaign, and rendered me efficient and valuable services as a volunteer aide.

Respectfully submitted.
JAMES B. STEEDMAN,      
Major-General, Commanding.
 [Brig. Gen. W. D. WHIPPLE,
            Chief of Staff.]

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 502-9

Sunday, July 14, 2019

Diary of Gideon Welles: Thursday, May 5, 1864

I have written a letter to the President in relation to the Fort Pillow massacre, but it is not satisfactory to me, nor can I make it so without the evidence of what was done, nor am I certain that even then I could come to a conclusion on so grave and important a question. The idea of retaliation, — killing man for man, — which is the popular noisy demand, is barbarous, and I cannot assent to or advise it. The leading officers should be held accountable and punished, but how? The policy of killing negro soldiers after they have surrendered must not be permitted, and the Rebel leaders should be called upon to avow or disavow it. But how is this to be done? Shall we go to Jeff Davis and his government, or apply to General Lee? If they will give us no answer, or declare they will kill the negroes, or justify Forrest, shall we take innocent Rebel officers as hostages? The whole subject is beset with difficulties. I cannot yield to any inhuman scheme of retaliation. Must wait the publication of the testimony.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 24

Friday, June 28, 2019

George L. Stearns to Governor John A. Andrew, after July 18, 1863

To His Excellency John A. Andrew.

Dear Sir: — Last week a deputation from my Philadelphia committee visited Washington to confer with the Government in relation to colored troops. Most prominent in the conference was the question of “pay and bounty the same as white troops.”

To-day they send to Washington a memorial setting forth their reasons for asking that colored troops be placed in every way on the same footing as white. You will see by reference that the conscription law makes no difference in pay, and the committee think that should control the earlier legislation.

*          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *

My heart bleeds for our gallant officers and soldiers of the 54th. All did their duty nobly. I am told that three companies of the 54th saved the Maine regiment engaged in the battle.

I have the honor to be
Very respectfully,
George L. Stearns.

SOURCE: Preston Stearns, The Life and Public Services of George Luther Stearns, p. 305-6

Thursday, June 27, 2019

George S. Denison to Salmon P. Chase, January 26, 1863

(Private)
New Orleans, January 26th, 1863.

Dear Sir: The situation is the same as when I last wrote. There is no movement of troops, so far as I am informed, and there appears to be no probability of an advance in any direction.

The New York papers will state that the “Harriet Lane” has escaped from Galveston and gone to sea. This is not true. She is still in the harbor according to official advices just received here.

It is rumored here that the “Ovieto” has been captured. Admiral Farragut does not believe it. When she escaped from Mobile the “Cuyler” went in pursuit and neither vessel has yet been heard from.

Three days ago a steamer supposed to be the Alabama appeared at the mouth of the river, and then steered off in a southwest direction. The Admiral sent a vessel from here (The Mississippi) to follow her. As the “Alabama” is the faster vessel and had a start of 100 miles, and the Mississippi started from here 24 hours after the Rebel vessel was seen — it is not probable that anything will be effected.

It should not be forgotten that here is the place to make the proclamation effective. I am afraid Gen. Banks will never do it. He decides and moves too slowly and is too much afraid of responsibilities. He does not seem to regard with favor the three fine regiments already raised, and declines putting them in the field. I told you that they had sent him a petition to be put in the front rank at Port Hudson, that they might remove from their race the stigma of cowardice, etc. In all the regiments Gen. Banks brought with him, three cannot be selected so efficient as these three colored regiments, and in my opinion, they would be worth any five of the raw regiments Gen. Banks brought with him. I see Gen. Banks almost every day, but am perfectly ignorant of his plans and intentions. I do not wish to retract or qualify any statement in my late letters to you — nor in a letter to Mr. Flanders which I asked him to show you.

If my letters are uninteresting or too frequent, please inform me.

SOURCE: Diary and correspondence of Salmon P. ChaseAnnual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 350-1

Tuesday, February 13, 2018

Major-General William T. Sherman to Edwin M. Stanton, October 25, 1864

HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,           
In the Field, Gaylesville, Ala., October 25, 1864.
Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War, Washington, D.C.:

SIR: I do not wish to be considered as in any way adverse to the organization of negro regiments, further than as to its effects on the white race. I do wish the fine race of men that people our Northern States should rule and determine the future destiny of America; but if they prefer trade and gain, and leave to bought substitutes and negroes the fighting (the actual conflict), of course the question is settled, for those who hold the swords and muskets at the end of this war (which has but fairly begun) will have something to say. If negroes are to fight, they, too, will not be content with sliding back into the status of slave or free negro. I much prefer to keep negroes yet for some time to come in a subordinate state, for our prejudices, yours as well as mine, are not yet schooled for absolute equality. Jeff. Davis has succeeded perfectly in inspiring his people with the truth that liberty and government are worth fighting for, that pay and pensions are silly nothings compared to the prize fought for. Now, I would aim to inspire our people also with the same idea — that it is not right to pay $1,000 to some fellow, who will run away, to do his fighting, or to some poor negro, who is thinking of the day of jubilee, but that every young and middle-aged man should be proud of the chance to fight for the stability of his country, without profit and without price; and I would like to see all trade, commerce, and manufactures absolutely cease until this fight is over, and I have no hesitation or concealment in saying that there is not, and should not be, the remotest chance of peace again on this continent till all this is realized, save the peace which would result from the base and cowardly submittal to Jeff. Davis' terms. I would use negroes as surplus, but not spare a single white man, not one. Any white man who don't or won't fight now should be killed, banished, or denationalized, and then we would discriminate among the noisy patriots and see who really should vote. If the negroes fight and the whites don't, of course the negroes will govern. They won't ask you or me for the privilege, but will simply take it, and probably reverse the relation hitherto existing, and they would do right. If, however, the Government has determined to push the policy to the end, it is both my duty and pleasure to assist, and in that event I should like to have Colonel Bowman, now commanding the District of Wilmington, Del., to organize and equip such as may fall into the custody of the army I command.

I am, with respect, your obedient servant,
 W. T. SHERMAN,   
 Major-General, Commanding.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 39, Part 3 (Serial No. 79), p. 428-9

Tuesday, January 23, 2018

Diary of 2nd Lieutenant Luman Harris Tenney: January 24, 1864

At Nashville, 9 A. M. quartered at Seminary Barracks. H. Drake and I went to dinner at a restaurant. Saw colored troops drilled and inspected. Went about town. Some splendid residences. Randall quite sick with pleurisy.

SOURCE: Frances Andrews Tenney, War Diary Of Luman Harris Tenney, p. 106

Thursday, January 11, 2018

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: August 14, 1863

The enemy is not idle. He knows the importance of following up his recent advantages, and making the utmost use of his veteran troops now in the field, because his new levies, if indeed the draft be submitted to, will not be fit for use this year, probably, if ever, for they will consist of the riff-raff of the Northern population. On the other hand, he suspects we will soon have larger armies in the field than ever before, and our accessions will consist of our bravest men, who will make efficient soldiers in a month. If our armies be not broken before October, no doubt the tide of success will turn again fully in our favor.

Major Wm. Norris, Signal Corps, reports that many transports and troops have been going down from Washington and Annapolis to Fortress Monroe during the whole week, and that 5000 men embarked at Fortress Monroe, on Monday, for (as they said themselves) Charleston. Among these was a negro regiment of 1300.

T. C. Reynolds, confidential agent of the government in the trans-Mississippi States, sends copy of a circular letter from Lieut.-Gen. Kirby Smith to the “representative men” of Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas, to meet him in convention, 15th August, at Marshall, Texas. Mr Reynolds says he and others will exert themselves to prevent the meeting from taking a dangerous political direction. Gen. Smith is popular, and opposed to the States named setting up for themselves, although he plainly says in the circular that they must now adopt self sustaining measures, as they cannot look for aid from the East. Mr. Reynolds says something, not clearly understood by me, about an equipoise among the political generals. Has he been instructed on that point in reference to Gen. Price?

Letters from Mr. Crenshaw, in England, and the correspondence forwarded by him, might seem to implicate Major Caleb Huse, Col. J. Gorgas's ordnance agent, in some very ugly operations. It appears that Major H. has contracted for 50,000 muskets at $4 above the current price, leaving $200,000 commission for whom? And that he really seems to be throwing obstacles in the way of Mr. C, who is endeavoring to procure commissary stores in England. Mr. C. has purchased £40,000 worth of bacon, but Major Huse, he apprehends, is endeavoring to prevent its shipment. Can this be so?

The Charleston Mercury that came to-day contains an editorial broadside against the President, Mr. Benjamin, Mr. Mallory, and Commissary-General Northrop.

Mr. Gilmer, lawyer, remarked to me to-day that some grave men (!) really believed Davis and Lincoln had an understanding, and were playing into each other's hands to prolong the war, knowing that peace would be the destruction of both! I think there is more danger to both in war. The blood of a brave people could not be trifled with without the utmost danger. Let peace come, even if the politicians be shorn of all their power.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2p. 14-5

Monday, January 8, 2018

Captain Charles Wright Wills: July 1, 1863

Lagrange, Tenn., July 1, 1863.

Everything moves quietly here. No more alarms or anything else to "bust" the confounded monotony of garrison life. A guerrilla was brought in yesterday who has murdered at least one of our soldiers, and an unarmed one at that. He rests comfortably now with a nice lot of jewelry on his arms and legs, and a good heavy chain connecting his precious body to his bed, a not very soft plank. He is a worse fellow than we have in Illinois to my knowledge. We have two regiments of negroes here now, great big, stout, hardy fellows, and they really look right well in their uniforms. I heard from old Company "E" of the 8th this morning. They have had two men killed and five wounded before Vicksburg. There are only 15 left now. Wonder where my bones would have been if I had stayed with the boys.

A woman from Holly Springs is up to-day with the statement that Johnston is marching on Memphis, and proposes to have possession thereof within ten days. Good for Joseph! We had a confirmation of the report of the taking of Port Hudson yesterday, but nothing further to-day. It don't go down here without a good deal of forcing.

Isn't it music to hear those Pennsylvania fellers howl? I almost wish that Lee would cut the levee of Lake Ontario, and let the water over that country. Don't tell father and mother. If Lee don't wake them up to a sense of their misery, he isn't the man that Price is. If ever Price reaches Illinois, and he swears he's going to do it some day, you can reckon on seeing a smoke, sure! Don't you folks feel a little blue over Lee's move? Kind o' as though you wish you hadn't gone and done it! Never mind, you'll get used to it. The first raid isn't a sample. Wait until general Rebel somebody, establishes his headquarters in Canton, and you've all taken the oath of allegiance to the Confederacy. Imagine yourself going up to the headquarters with your oath in your hand and tears in your eyes to ask the general to please keep the soldiers from tearing the boards off your house (for bunks), or asking for something to eat out of his commissary department, and then blubber right out and tell him that the soldiers broke open your trunks and took your clothes and what little money you had, and you don't know what in the world you'll do. Many of these people are in this condition, and I hear a hundred of them tell the story every week. Every man in Illinois ought to die on the border rather than allow an invading force to march into our State.

SOURCE: Charles Wright Wills, Army Life of an Illinois Soldier, p. 184-6

Thursday, December 7, 2017

Edwin M. Stanton to Major George L. Stearns, September 18, 1863

WAR DEPARTMENT,         
Washington, D.C., September 18, 1863.
Major STEARNS,
Nashville :

If any difference of opinion exists or shall arise between Governor Johnson and yourself respecting the organization and employment of colored men in the State of Tennessee, he being the State Executive, you will conform your action to his views. All dissension is to be avoided, and if there is any want of harmony between you you had better leave Nashville and proceed to Cairo to await orders, reporting by telegraph your departure from Nashville and your arrival at Cairo.

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series III, Volume 3 (Serial No. 124), p. 823

Wednesday, December 6, 2017

Frederick Douglass to Major George L. Stearns, August 1, 1863

RochESTER, August 1st, 1863.
MAJOR GEORGE L. STEARNS:

My Dear Sir, Having declined to attend the meeting to promote enlistments, appointed for me at Pittsburgh, in present circumstances, I owe you a word of explanation. I have hitherto deemed it a duty, as it certainly has been a pleasure, to coöperate with you in the work of raising colored troops in the free States to fight the battles of the Republic against slaveholding rebels and traitors. Upon the first call you gave me to this work I responded with alacrity. I saw, or thought I saw, a ray of light, brightening the future of my whole race, as well as that of our war-troubled country, in arousing colored men to fight for the nation's life. I continue to believe in the black man's arm, and still have some hope in the integrity of our rulers. Nevertheless, I must for the present leave to others the work of persuading colored men to join the Union army. I owe it to my long abused people, and especially to those already in the army, to expose their wrongs and plead their cause. I cannot do that in connection with recruiting. When I plead for recruits I want to do it with all my heart, without qualification. I cannot do that now. The impression settles upon me that colored men have much over-rated the enlightenment, justice, and generosity of our rulers at Washington. In my humble way I have contributed somewhat to that false estimate. You know that when the idea of raising colored troops was first suggested, the special duty to be assigned them was the garrisoning of forts and arsenals in certain warm, unhealthy, and miasmatic localities in the South. They were thought to be better adapted to that service than white troops. White troops trained to war, brave and daring, were to take fortifications, and the blacks were to hold them from falling again into the hands of the rebels. Three advantages were to arise out of this wise division of labor: 1st, The spirit and pride of white troops was not to waste itself in dull, monotonous inactivity in fort life; their arms were to be kept bright by constant use. 2d, The health of white troops was to be preserved. 3d, Black troops were to have the advantage of sound military training and to be otherwise useful, at the same time that they should be tolerably secure from capture by the rebels, who early avowed their determination to enslave and slaughter them in defiance of the laws of war. Two out of the three advantages were to accrue to the white troops. Thus far, however, I believe that no such duty as holding fortifications has been committed to colored troops. They have done far other and more important work than holding fortifications. I have no special complaint to make at this point, and I simply mention it to strengthen the statement that, from the beginning of this business, it was the confident belief among both the colored and white friends of colored enlistments that President Lincoln, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, would certainly see to it that his colored troops should be so handled and disposed of as to be but little exposed to capture by the rebels, and that, if so exposed, as they have repeatedly been from the first, the President possessed both the disposition and the means for compelling the rebels to respect the rights of such as might fall into their hands. The piratical proclamation of Jefferson Davis, announcing slavery and assassination to colored prisoners, was before the country and the world. But men had faith in Mr. Lincoln and his advisers. He was silent, to be sure, but charity suggested that being a man of action rather than words he only waited for a case in which he should be required to act. This faith in the man enabled us to speak with warmth and effect in urging enlistments among colored men. That faith, my dear sir, is now nearly gone. Various occasions have arisen during the last six months for the exercise of his power in behalf of the colored men in his service. But no word comes to us from the war department, sternly assuring the rebel chief that inquisition shall yet be made for innocent blood. No word of retaliation when a black man is slain by a rebel in cold blood. No word was said when free men from Massachusetts were caught and sold into slavery in Texas. No word is said when brave black men, according to the testimony of both friend and foe, fought like heroes to plant the star-spangled banner on the blazing parapets of Fort Wagner and in so doing were captured, mutilated, killed, and sold into slavery. The same crushing silence reigns over this scandalous outrage as over that of the slaughtered teamsters at Murfreesboro; the same as over that at Milliken's Bend and Vicksburg. I am free to say, my dear sir, that the case looks as if the confiding colored soldiers had been betrayed into bloody hands by the very government in whose defense they were heroically fighting. I know what you will say to this; you will say “Wait a little longer, and, after all, the best way to have justice done to your people is to get them into the army as fast as you can.” You may be right in this; my argument has been the same; but have we not already waited, and have we not already shown the highest qualities of soldiers, and on this account deserve the protection of the government for which we are fighting? Can any case stronger than that before Charleston ever arise? If the President is ever to demand justice and humanity for black soldiers, is not this the time for him to do it? How many 54ths must be cut to pieces, its mutilated prisoners killed, and its living sold into slavery, to be tortured to death by inches, before Mr. Lincoln shall say, “Hold, enough!”

You know the 54th. To you, more than to any one man, belongs the credit of raising that regiment. Think of its noble and brave officers literally hacked to pieces, while many of its rank and file have been sold into slavery worse than death; and pardon me if I hesitate about assisting in raising a fourth regiment until the President shall give the same protection to them as to white soldiers.

With warm and sincere regards,
FREDERICK DOUGLASS.

SOURCE: Frederick Douglass, Life and Times of Frederick Douglass, 418-20