At the
Cabinet-meeting word was received of the death of Lieutenant-General Scott at
West Point at the advanced age of eighty. He was great in stature, and had
great qualities with some singular weaknesses or defects. Vanity was his great
infirmity, and that was much exaggerated by political or party opponents. He
had lofty political aspirations in former years, but they had expired before
him. Courteous, deferential, and respectful to his official superiors always,
he expected and required the same from others. Though something of a
politician, I do not think his judgment and opinion in regard to public affairs
were always correct or reliable. In the early stages of the late Civil War I
thought, and still think, his counsels were not wise, and yet they received
extraordinary favor and had great weight with President Lincoln. My impressions
are that Mr. Seward persuaded the President that the opinions and advice of
General Scott were of more value than those of any others or all others, and
Seward was before Mr. Lincoln's inauguration thought to be the coming man. This
he used and contrived by flattery to infuse into General S. the advice on
public affairs which he wished to have commended to the President when he made
military inquiries.
The course of the
General at the beginning of our troubles was equivocal and unreliable. He began
right and with good advice to Mr. Buchanan to garrison the forts of the South.
A small military force in different localities would have served as
rallying-points, strengthened the union sentiment and checked disunion. But he
seemed to have doubted his own advice, halted, and after Congress convened in
1860 would fall into Mr. Seward's views and was ready to let the "wayward
sisters go in peace." He, in those days, imbibed an impression, common
among the politicians in Washington, that Mr. Lincoln, the newly elected
President, was unequal to the position, for he had not figured on the national
arena. It was supposed, therefore, that one of his Cabinet would be the
managing man of the incoming administration, and that Mr. Seward, his principal
competitor in the Republican nominating convention, who was to be the Secretary
of State, would be that manager. This was the expectation of Mr. Seward
himself, as well as of General Scott and others. He had been a conspicuous
party leader for twenty years, with a reputation much overrated for political
sagacity, and with really very little devotion to political principles, which
he always subordinated to his ambition. It was not surprising that General
Scott viewed him as the coming man, and as Mr. Seward was a man of expedients
more than principle, he soon made it obvious that he intended to have no war,
but was ready to yield anything—the Constitution itself if necessary to satisfy
the Secessionists. The General under this influence abandoned his early
recommendations and ultimately advised surrendering all the forts.
The Senate, after
many caucuses on the part of the Republican members, have an amendment of the
Constitution modified from that reported by the construction, or obstruction,
committee. This amendment may be less offensive than that which passed the
House by excluding one of the States from any voice or participation, but it
ought not to receive the sanction of the Senate. Yet I have little doubt that
it will and that the canvassing has been a process of drilling the weak and
better-minded members into its support. Disgraceful as it may seem, there is no
doubt that secret party caucus machinery has been in operation to carry through
a Constitutional Amendment. Senators have committed themselves to it without
hearing opposing arguments, or having any other discussion than that of a
strictly party character in a strictly private meeting. Of course this grave
and important matter is prejudged, predetermined. Eleven States are precluded
from all representation in either house, and, of the Senators in Washington,
all not pledged to a faction are excluded from the caucus when the decision is
made. This is the statesmanship, the legislation, the enlightened political
action of the present Congress. Such doctrines, management, and principles, or
want of principles, would sooner or later ruin any country.
I happen to know
that Fessenden had long interviews with Stanton last week, though I know not
the subject matter of their conferences. Fessenden sometimes hesitates to
support a wrong measure. Seward has a personal party in Congress,—men who
seldom act on important questions in opposition to him and his views. All of
these men vote in opposition to the President's policy. Raymond alone
vacillates and trims, but this is with an understanding, for Raymond and Seward
could, if necessary, carry others with them, provided they were earnestly
disposed.
No comments:
Post a Comment