HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF
THE POTOMAC,
Theological
Seminary, Va., March 19, 1862.
SIR: I have the honor to submit the following notes on the
proposed operations of the active portion of the Army of the Potomac.
The proposed plan of campaign is to assume Fort Monroe as
the first base of operations, taking the line of Yorktown and West Point upon
Richmond as the line of operations, Richmond being the objective point. It is
assumed that the fall of Richmond involves that of Norfolk and the whole of
Virginia; also that we shall fight a decisive battle between West Point and
Richmond, to give which battle the rebels will concentrate all their available
forces, understanding, as they will, that it involves the fate of their cause.
It therefore follows –
1st. That we should collect all our available forces and
operate upon adjacent lines, maintaining perfect communication between our
columns.
2d. That no time should be lost in reaching the field of
battle.
The advantages of the Peninsula between York and James
Rivers are too obvious to need explanation. It is also clear that West Point
should as soon as possible be reached and used as our main depot, that we may
have the shortest line of land transportation for our supplies and the use of
the York River.
There are two methods of reaching this point:
1st: By moving directly from Fort Monroe as a base, and
trusting to the roads for our supplies, at the same time landing a strong corps
as near Yorktown as possible, in order to turn the rebel lines of defense south
of Yorktown; then to reduce Yorktown and Gloucester by a siege, in all
probability involving a delay of weeks, perhaps.
2d. To make a combined naval and land attack upon Yorktown
the first object of the campaign. This leads to the most rapid and decisive
results. To accomplish this, the Navy should at once concentrate upon the York
River all their available and most powerful batteries. Its reduction should not
in that case require many hours. A strong corps would be pushed up the York,
under cover of the Navy, directly upon West Point, immediately upon the fall of
Yorktown, and we could at once establish our new base of operations at a
distance of some 25 miles from Richmond, with every facility for developing and
bringing into play the whole of our available force on either or both banks of
the James.
It is impossible to urge too strongly the absolute necessity
of the full co-operation of the Navy as a part of this programme. Without it
the operations may be prolonged for many weeks, and we may be forced to carry
in front several strong positions, which by their aid could be turned without
serious loss of either time or men.
It is also of first importance to bear in mind the fact,
already alluded to, that the capture of Richmond necessarily involves the
prompt fall of Norfolk, while an operation against Norfolk, if successful, as
the beginning of the campaign, facilitates the reduction of Richmond merely by
the demoralization of the rebel troops involved, and that after the fall of
Norfolk we should be obliged to undertake the capture of Richmond by the same
means which would have accomplished it in the beginning, having meanwhile
afforded the rebels ample time to perfect their defensive arrangements; for
they would well know, from the moment the Army of the Potomac changed its base to
Fort Monroe, that Richmond must be its ultimate object.
It may be summed up in few words, that for the prompt
success of this campaign it is absolutely necessary that the Navy should at
once throw its whole available force, its most powerful vessels, against
Yorktown. There is the most important point – there the knot to be cut. An
immediate decision upon the subject-matter of this communication is highly
desirable, and seems called for by the exigencies of the occasion.
I am, sir, very
respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.
Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.
SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of
the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume
5 (Serial No. 5), p. 57-8
