SPEECH IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DECEMBER 20, 1852, ON THE
PROPOSITION TO ESTABLISH A GENERAL COMMITTEE ON CLAIMS.
MR. BROWN. I ask the unanimous consent of the House to introduce the
resolution which I proposed on Friday last.
There being no objection, the resolution was read, as follows:
"Resolved, That the following be added
to the rules of the House of Representatives:
"There shall be appointed a standing
committee of the House of Representatives, to consist of fifteen members, to be
called The General
Committee on Claims,
whose duty it shall be to report a bill at each session of Congress making
appropriations for the payment of private claimants. It shall be the duty of
the other committees of this House, when they have prepared a written report in
favor of any claim, to transmit their report, together with the evidence on
which it is based, to said General Committee on Claims; and if said committee,
after due examination, shall concur in said report, they shall insert an item
for the payment of said claim in the bill for the payment of private claimants,
and thereupon submit to the House the report and evidence aforesaid, to be
printed or otherwise disposed of, as the House may direct. And upon the demand
of a single member, a separate vote shall be had on any section of said bill
designated by him, notwithstanding the previous question may have been moved
and seconded."
Mr. BROWN said: Mr. Speaker, it is conceded that the present mode of
treating private claims amounts to a denial of justice, and ought to be
changed.
For several years a proposition was urged upon Congress to establish a
board of claims. For a time I was strongly inclined to sustain this
proposition; but reflection satisfied me that, to make it efficient, it would
be dangerous, and possibly a violation of the Constitution.
A board of claims would investigate; but it is not investigation that we
want. We want action—final action. Our present committees investigate claims
and report bills, but we do not pass those bills. Bills to which there is no
reasonable objection remain for years upon the calendar without action. The
claimant grows weary and sick with hopes deferred, but Congress will not
act. The bills are not passed, and just claims are not paid. This ought not to
be. The creditors of the government have as much right to their pay as the
creditors of private persons.
These tedious and sickening delays ought to be remedied. It cannot be
safely done, in my judgment, by the appointment of a board of claims. It is the
least objection (and yet it is an objection) to the appointment of such a board
that it will increase Executive patronage, already grown quite too large.
If such a board is created, it will, as I have said, give us
investigation; but what then? "No money shall be drawn from the treasury
but in consequence of appropriations made by law," says the Constitution.
Will you appropriate an aggregate sum, and allow the board to check it from the
treasury as they may see fit, and apply it to the payment of claims? To do
this, you must delegate to the board a power over the public funds which
belongs exclusively to Congress, and which I very much question your right to
transfer to another. The right to appropriate presupposes the existence of an
object to which the appropriation may rightfully be made. The Constitution, in
my judgment, contemplates that Congress shall decide as to the merits of the
object to which the money is to be applied before making the appropriation. To
make the appropriation first, and then leave others to decide as to the merits
of the object to which it may be applied, is to shrink from the performance of
one-half, and that to the treasury the most important half of your duty.
Could you appropriate $10,000,000 for the support of the army, and leave
to the Secretary of War, or even to the President and cabinet, the privilege of
applying it as he or they should see fit? Possibly you may have the power. But
its exercise would dissatisfy the country, and strain, if it did not break the
Constitution. It would, to say the least, be a very loose control over the
public funds. It would be a still more loose control of them to appropriate
$1,000,000 or $500,000, or a greater or less sum, and leave a board of
commissioners to parcel it out among private claimants as the board should
adjudge right. To do such an act would be to invite constant repetitions of the
disgraceful Gardiner frauds. I am very confident Congress will commit no such
folly.
What then shall we do? After the board has investigated and reported
favorably on claims, shall we pass bills to pay them? This brings us just to
the point where we now are; for I repeat, it is action, and not investigation,
that we want—action, action. The passage of bills, that is what we want. And
why is it that we do not act? why is it that we do not pass bills? It is, sir,
because we have not confidence, we have not full confidence in the
investigations of our committees. And shall we have more confidence, I pray
you, in a board of claims? Will we distrust our own committees, and rely with
confidence on the board of claims? I think not. When we are called to act, when
we are called to pass bills, to make appropriations, we shall have the same
difficulty that we now have. Some doubting Thomas will ejaculate those
cabalistic words, "I object!" and in a twinkling the bill fades from
our view, and the poor claimant is turned away in sorrow.
I want something practical; something that will give the claimants
justice; something that will protect the treasury against fraud; keep the
people's money under the control of the people's representatives, and at the
same time relieve the Speaker's table from that accumulated and accumulating
mass of private business under which it has literally groaned for
five-and-twenty years.
The rule which I propose will do this. I have reflected on it maturely,
and my confidence is entire that it will be efficient for all the purposes I
have indicated.
What does it propose? First, a committee of fifteen, to be styled the
General Committee on Claims; and why a committee of fifteen? I have, in my own
judgment, fixed a large number, because the functions of the committee will be
onerous, varied, and perplexing. No small committee could well discharge the
duties which I propose to devolve on this general committee.
What will be the duties of this committee? To exercise a supervisory
jurisdiction, in the first place, over all the reports from the other
committees touching private claims. To stand as a kind of appellate court,
having no original jurisdiction, but authorized and required to review the
reports of other committees, and only to ask the action of Congress in case
they approve such reports; and, in the second place, to report a bill for the
payment of private claimants, the items of which shall in all cases be founded
on the approved reports of other committees.
Allow me to illustrate, by supposed cases, the practical workings of this
rule, if it shall be adopted. A claim is referred to the Committee on the Post
Office and Post Roads; another to the Committee on Public Lands, and another to
the Committee on Claims. Each of these committees makes a favorable report.
These reports, and the evidence to sustain them, they send to the General
Committee on Claims. That committee, after due investigation, approve each one
of the reports, and thereupon they insert a separate item in the bill for the
payment of private claimants to cover each claim, and then lay the report and
evidence before the House to be printed, if the House shall so direct. And so
of every other claim. It will be seen that each particular item will be
sustained by a separate report, and that report will be supported by the concurrent
judgment of two separate committees. The bill thus reported must of necessity
go to the Committee of the Whole House, and being here considered, item by
item, every member of Congress will have ample opportunity for the fullest and
fairest investigation. When the bill is at last reported to the House for final
action, each particular item will have passed the ordeal of the three separate
committees: First, the present committee of nine; next, the proposed committee
of fifteen; and lastly, the Committee of the Whole House. Having thus run the
gauntlet, it seems to me no reasonable man could object to a vote by yeas and
nays, as to whether the bill should become a law. The advantages which I
anticipate are-first, thorough investigation, and therefore entire security to
the government; and secondly, certain action, and consequently a hope of
justice to claimants.
If Congress can be induced to act at all, it will generally act justly.
Congress often does not act because of the anxiety of each member to get his
own business forward. In the general scramble for precedence the avenues of
legislation are choked up, private bills are neglected, and the rights of
private parties disregarded. I desire to change this state of things; put all
on the same footing, and this scramble will cease. Under the rule which I
propose, we shall have but one bill instead of many hundred bills. The struggle
which is constantly going on here for precedence will cease, because all these
rival bills will be merged into one bill. This bill will never fail of being
considered and passed. It only remains to determine whether the checks and
guards which the rule imposes will be sufficient to protect the treasury. In
the first place, you have the examination of the committees as at present organized;
their duties, so far as investigation is concerned, remain unchanged. In the
second place, we have the proposed committee of fifteen, with no original
jurisdiction, but sitting only as a revisory court; it is their duty to weigh
the evidence and determine whether it sustains the report; and thirdly, we have
the Committee of the Whole House. All these committees must pass affirmatively
upon each section of the bill separately, before it is laid before the House,
and in the House the rule guaranties to every member the right to demand a
separate vote upon any section of the bill to which he may object. Now, it does
seem to me that if a bill has passed three committees of this House section by
section, and has then run the hazard of a separate vote by sections in the
House, no reasonable man ought to object to its becoming a law.
If the House does not choose to adopt this rule, I hope at least we shall
do something to relieve private claimants from the crushing and overpowering
influence of a single member when pronouncing those potential words, "I
object!" "I object!" How often the heedless or captious use of
these words has sent honest claimants in sadness and in sorrow from this Hall!
Let us snatch from them this unnatural power and restore them to their original
modest position in our political vocabulary, and we shall have taken one step
at least towards a salutary reform.
SOURCE: M. W. Cluskey, Editor, Speeches, Messages, and Other Writings of the Hon. Albert G. Brown, A Senator in Congress from the State of Mississippi, pp. 318-21