Showing posts with label USRC Harriet Lane. Show all posts
Showing posts with label USRC Harriet Lane. Show all posts

Wednesday, April 5, 2023

Diary of Gideon Welles: October 1865

Some slight indisposition and pressing duties have postponed my daily remarks. The President had expressed to me his intention to go to Richmond and Raleigh on the 3d inst., and invited me to accompany him, but I doubted if he would carry the design out, and he said on the 3d he must postpone it for the present, which I think will be for the season.

A vote was taken in Connecticut on Monday, the 2d, on the proposed Constitutional Amendment to erase the word "white" and permit the colored persons to vote. I was not surprised that the proposition was defeated by a very decided majority, yet I had expected that the question might be carried on the strong appeal to party. But there is among the people a repugnance to the negro, and a positive disinclination to lower the standard of suffrage. They will not receive the negro into their parlors on terms of social intimacy, and they are unwilling to put him in the jury-box or any political position. There are probably not five hundred colored persons who could be made electors, and the grievance is therefore not very great.

The defeat of the Constitutional Amendment has caused a great howl to be set up by certain extremists, in the State and out of it. While I might have voted affirmatively had I been in the State, I have no wailing over the negative results. I regret to witness the abuse of the Press and other papers on those whom it failed to convince, and who consequently voted according to their convictions. This abuse and denunciation will tend to alienate friends, and weaken the influence of the Union leaders in future elections.

The effect of the vote elsewhere will be to impair centralization, which has been setting in strong of late, and invigorate State action, and in this respect the result will be beneficent. I apprehend our extreme negro advocates are doing serious injury to the negro in their zeal in his behalf, and they are certainly doing harm to our system by insisting on the exercise of arbitrary and unauthorized power in aid of the negro.

Some of the workmen in the Philadelphia Navy Yard complained that an assessment had been levied upon them for party purposes. I had written a pretty decisive letter correcting the evil when I went to the Cabinet-meeting on Tuesday, and had given it out to be copied. After the general business before the Cabinet had been disposed of, the President took me aside and said complaints of a similar character had been made to him. I told him my own conclusion and what I had done, which he approved. The opportunity is most favorable to correct a pernicious practice, which I last year would not sanction, and which led Raymond, Thurlow Weed, and others to try to prejudice President Lincoln against me.

On Wednesday Amos Kendall called and wished me to go with him to the President. He alluded to old friendly political associations and relations between us. I was glad of the opportunity of taking him to the President, whom I was about to call upon with my letter to the Commandant of the Philadelphia Navy Yard, respecting the improper assessment of workmen. After a brief interview Mr. Kendall left, and I read my letter concerning the assessment of workmen, which the President complimented and desired it should go to other yards and be made public. [The letter follows.]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,      

3 October, 1865.

 

SIR: The attention of the Department has been called to an attempt recently made in Philadelphia to assess or tax for party purposes the workmen in the Navy Yard. It is claimed by those who have participated in these proceedings, that the practice has prevailed in former years, at that and other Navy Yards, of levying contributions of this character on mechanics and laborers employed by the Government.

 

Such an abuse cannot be permitted; and it is the object of this communication to prohibit it, wherever it may be practiced.

 

From inquiries instituted by the Department, on the complaint of sundry workmen, who represented that a committee had undertaken, through the agency of the masters, to collect from each of the employés in their respective departments, a sum equal to one day's labor, for party purposes—it has been ascertained that there had been received from the workmen before these proceedings were arrested, the sum of $1052.

 

This and all other attempts to exact money from laborers in the public service, either by compulsion or voluntary contribution, is, in every point of view, reprehensible, and is wholly and absolutely prohibited. Whatever money may have been exacted, and is now in the hands of the Masters, will be forthwith returned to the workmen from whom it was received; and any Master or other appointee of this Department who may be guilty of a repetition of this offense, or shall hereafter participate in levying contributions in the Navy Yards, from persons in the Government service, for party purposes, will incur the displeasure of the Department, and render himself liable to removal. The organization of the Yard must not be perverted to aid any party. Persons who desire to make voluntary party contributions, can find opportunities to do so, at ward or other local political meetings, and on other occasions than during working hours. They are neither to be assisted nor opposed, in this matter, by government officials. The Navy Yards must not be prostituted to any such purpose, nor will Committee men be permitted to resort thither, to make collections for any political party whatever. Working men, and others in the service of the Government, are expected and required to devote their time and energies during working hours, and while in the Yard, to the labor which they are employed to execute.


It has been also represented that some of the Masters at some of the Navy Yards employ extra hands preceding warmly contested elections, and that much of the time of these superfluous hands is devoted to party electioneering. Such an abuse, if it exists in any department of any of the Navy Yards, must be corrected. No more persons should be retained in the Navy Yards than the public service actually requires. Party gatherings and party discussions are at all times to be avoided within the Yards. It will be the duty of the Commandants of the respective Yards, and of all officers, to see that this order is observed.

 

Very respectfully,

G. WELLES, 

Secty. of the Navy.

COMMO. CHAS. H. BELL,

Commdt. Navy Yard,

New York.

 

(Also written to all the other Commandants of Navy Yards.)

I called on Seward on Wednesday in relation to the Stonewall, the Harriet Lane, the Florida, etc., as he was about leaving to be absent for a fortnight, and we may wish to send to Havana before he returns. After disposing of business, and I had left his room, he sent his messenger to recall me. He seemed a little embarrassed and hesitating at first, but said he wished to say to me that he had had full and free and unreserved talks recently with the President; that he had found him friendly and confiding, and more communicative than Mr. Lincoln ever had been; that he knew and could say to me that the President had for me, for him (Seward), and indeed for all the Cabinet a friendly regard; that he had no intention of disturbing any member of the Cabinet; that I had reason to be specially gratified with the President's appreciation of me. Some general conversation followed on past transactions and events. Among other things we got on to Blair's letters and speeches. He says the original armistice, alluded to by Blair, was left by Buchanan with other papers on the office table at the Executive Mansion or with the Attorney-General.

Seward, McCulloch, Harlan, and Speed were absent from Washington on Friday, the 6th, the day of the last Cabinet-meeting. No very important questions were presented and discussed. The presence of the assistants instead of the principals operates, I perceive, as an obstruction to free interchange of opinion.

At the last Cabinet-meeting in September, Seward read a strange letter addressed to one of the provisional governors, informing him that the President intended to continue the provisional governments in the several insurrectionary States until Congress assembled and should take the subject in hand with the newly formed constitutions. I was amazed, and remarked that I did not understand the question or status of the States to be as stated, and was relieved when the President said he disapproved of that part of the letter. Speed asked to have the letter again read and was evidently satisfied with it. Seward made a pencil correction or alteration that was unimportant and meaningless, when the President said very emphatically he wished no reference to Congress in any such communication, or in any such way. Stanton, I observed, remained perfectly silent though very attentive. It appeared to me that the subject was not novel to him.

In an interview with the President the Monday following (the 2d inst.), I expressed my wish that no letter should be sent defining the policy of the Administration without full and careful consideration. The President said he should see to that, and that Seward's letter as modified by himself was a harmless affair.

I have sent out another circular in relation to the appointment of masters in the navy yards. These appointments have caused great difficulty in the Department, the Members of Congress insisting on naming them, and almost without an exception the party instead of the mechanical qualifications of the man is urged. It is best to be relieved of this evil, and I shall try to cure it.

I see that Senator Grimes by letter expresses his disapproval of the Radical movements in the Iowa State Convention. Doolittle has been still more emphatic in Wisconsin. Things are working very well. The conventions in the Rebel States are discharging their duties as satisfactorily, perhaps, as could be expected. Some of the extreme Republicans, of the Sumner school, are dissatisfied, but I think their numbers are growing less. The Democrats, on the other hand, are playing what they consider a shrewd party game, by striving to take advantage of the errors and impracticable notions of the ultras. Therefore the policy of the Administration appears to be growing in favor, though the machinery of politics is at work in an opposite direction.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 375-9

Saturday, March 18, 2023

Diary of George Mifflin Dallas, January 20, 1861

If we are in turmoil on the western side of the Atlantic, they are not much better off on this eastern side. The King of Prussia has just said to his general officers in Berlin: “The aspect of the times is very serious, and menaces great dangers. Gentlemen, there is a distinct prospect of struggles in which I shall need the entire devotion of your hearts. If I and those other sovereigns wishing for peace do not succeed in dissipating beforehand the coming thunder-storm, we shall want the whole of our strength in order to stand our ground. You will have to strain every nerve if you wish to render the army adequate to the future calls of the country. Gentlemen, do not allow yourselves to be subject to any self-delusion respecting the magnitude of coming struggles. If I do not succeed in obviating war, the war will be one in which we shall have either to conquer or be lost to our position in the world!” What convulsion is it that thus thunders in the index? We hear the cry of “Peace, peace,” in every direction, but we see specially dark clouds in various quarters. Hungary is on the eve of revolt, Denmark is arming to maintain her rights in Schleswig and Holstein, Italy, under the magical inspiration of Garibaldi, will insist upon having, as parts of the temporal sovereignty of Victor Emmanuel, both Rome and Venice. War upon Austria then would seem inevitable, and it cannot fail to draw into its vortex Russia, Prussia, Germany, and, not impossibly, Turkey. But the words of solemnity used by the monarch involve a deeper meaning. They refer to the military avalanche which a breath from Louis Napoleon may precipitate across the Rhine,—his vast force of six or eight hundred thousand, his numerous and formidable ships of war, and his actual position as the chief of the revolutionary movement. The language is portentous, infinitely more so than the address of Baron Hubner on 1st of January, 1859. Where on the face of the earth can the stranger, Peace, take up her permanent abode?

The news from home during this week has been deplorable. On the 10th inst. the President sent a message to Congress which depicts the state of things in the gloomiest colours. South Carolina, at Charleston, has fired repeated volleys at a United States transport carrying troops for Major Anderson at Fort Sumter, and has compelled her to retire. The Brooklyn, a second-class screw steamer of fourteen guns, and the revenue cutter Harriet Lane are about to convoy the troops back again to Charleston on board the Star of the West, and we may expect our next news to announce a bloody fight, possibly a bombardment of the city. Seward has made a speech in the Senate which the Times calls “grand and conciliatory,” but which obviously asserts a determination to enforce the laws. Servile insurrection, too, seems. contemplated in Virginia, some twenty-five barrels of gunpowder having been disinterred from secret hiding places.

SOURCE: George Mifflin Dallas, Diary of George Mifflin Dallas, While United States Minister to Russia 1837 to 1839, and to England 1856 to 1861, Volume 3, p. 430-2

Saturday, May 30, 2020

Major-General Benjamin F. Butler to Edwin M. Stanton, April 29, 1862

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,                  
Forts Jackson and Saint Philip, April 29, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that in obedience to my instructions I remained on the Mississippi River, with the troops named in my former dispatch, awaiting the action of the fleet engaged in the bombardment of Forts Jackson and Saint Philip. Failing to reduce them after six days of incessant fire, Flag-Officer Farragut determined to attempt their passage with his whole fleet, except that part thereof under the immediate command of Captain Porter, known as the Mortar Fleet.

On the morning of the 24th instant the fleet got under way, and twelve vessels, including the four sloops of war, ran the gauntlet of fire of the forts and were safely above. Of the gallantry, courage, and conduct of this heroic action, unprecedented in naval warfare, considering the character of the works and the river, too much cannot be said. Of its casualties and the details of its performance the flag-officer will give an account to the proper Department. I witnessed this daring exploit from a point about 800 yards from Fort Jackson and unwittingly under its fire, and the sublimity of the scene can never be exceeded. The fleet pressed on up the river to New Orleans, leaving two gunboats to protect the quarantine station, 5 miles above.

In case the forts were not reduced, and a portion of the fleet got by them, it had been arranged between the flag-officer and myself that I should make a landing from the Gulf side on the rear of the forts at the quarantine, and from thence attempt Fort Saint Philip by storm and assault, while the bombardment was continued by the fleet. I immediately went to Sable Island with my transports, 12 miles in the rear of Saint Philip, the nearest point at which a sufficient depth of water could be found for them.

Captain Porter put at my disposal the Miami, drawing 7½ feet, being the lightest-draught vessel in the fleet, to take the troops from the ship, as far as the water would allow. We were delayed twenty-four hours by her running ashore at Pass à l'Outre. The Twenty-sixth Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers, Colonel Jones, were then put on board her and carried within 6 miles of the fort, where she again grounded. Captain Everett, of the Sixth Massachusetts Battery, having very fully reconnoitered the waters and bayous in that vicinity, and foreseeing the necessity, I had collected and brought with me some 30 boats, into which the troops were again transshipped and conveyed, by a most fatiguing and laborious row, some 4½ miles farther, there being within 1 mile of the steamer only 2½ feet of water. A large portion of this passage was against a heavy current, through a bayou. At the entrance of Manuel's Canal, a mile and a half from the point of landing, rowing became impossible, as well from the narrowness of the canal as the strength of the current, which ran like a mill-race. Through this the boats could only be impelled by dragging them singly, with the men up to their waists in water. It is due to this fine regiment and to a portion of the Fourth Wisconsin Volunteers and Twenty-first Indiana, who landed under this hardship without a murmur, that their labors should be made known to the Department, as well as to account for the slowness of our operations. The enemy evidently considered this mode of attack impossible, as they had taken no measures to oppose it, which might very easily have been successfully done. We occupied at once both sides of the river, thus effectually cutting them off from all supplies, information, or succor while we made our dispositions for the assault.

Meantime Captain Porter had sent into the bayou in the rear of Fort Jackson two schooners of his mortar fleet to prevent the escape of the enemy from the fort in that direction. In the hurry and darkness of the passage of the forts the flag-officer had overlooked three of the enemy's gunboats and the iron-clad battery Louisiana, which were at anchor under the walls of the fort. Supposing that all the rebel boats had been destroyed (and a dozen or more had been) he passed on to the city, leaving these in his rear. The iron steam battery being very formidable, Captain Porter deemed it prudent to withdraw his mortar fleet some miles below, where he could have room to maneuver it if attacked by the iron monster, and the bombardment ceased.

I had got Brigadier-General Phelps in the river below with two regiments to make demonstrations in that direction if it became possible. In the night of the 27th, learning that the fleet had got the city under its guns, I left Brigadier General Williams in charge of the landing of the troops and went up the river to the flagship to procure light-draught transportation. That night the larger portion (about 250) of the garrison of Fort Jackson mutinied, spiked the guns bearing up the river, came up and surrendered themselves to my pickets, declaring that as we had got in their rear resistance was useless, and they would not be sacrificed. No bomb had been thrown at them for three days nor had they fired a shot at us from either fort. They averred that they had been impressed and would fight no longer.*

On the 28th the officers of Forts Jackson and Saint Philip surrendered to Captain Porter, he having means of water transportation to them. While he was negotiating, however, with the officers of the forts under a white flag the rebel naval officers put all their munitions of war on the Louisiana, set her on fire and adrift upon the Harriet Lane, but when opposite Fort Saint Philip she blew up, killing one of their own men by the fragments which fell into that fort.

I have taken possession of the forts, and find them substantially as defensible as before the bombardment—Saint Philip precisely so, it being quite uninjured. They are fully provisioned, well supplied with ammunition, and the ravages of the shells have been defensibly repaired by the labors of the rebels. I will cause Lieutenant Weitzel, of the Engineers, to make a detailed report of their condition to the Department I have left the Twenty-sixth Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers in garrison, and am now going up the river to occupy the city with my troops and make further demonstrations in the rear of the enemy, now at Corinth.

The rebels have abandoned all their defensive works in and around New Orleans, including Forts Pike and Wood, on Lake Pontchartrain, and Fort Livingston from Barataria Bay. They have retired in the direction of Corinth, beyond Manchac Pass, and abandoned everything up the river as far as Donaldsonville, some 70 miles beyond New Orleans. I propose to so far depart from the letter of my instructions as to endeavor to persuade the flag-officer to pass up the river as far as the mouth of Red River, if possible, so as to cut off their supplies, and make there a landing and a demonstration in their rear as a diversion in favor of General Buell if a decisive battle is not fought before such movement is possible.

Mobile is ours whenever we choose, and we can better wait.

I find the city under the dominion of the mob. They have insulted our flag—torn it down with indignity. This outrage will be punished in such manner as in my judgment will caution both the perpetrators and abettors of the act, so that they shall fear the stripes if they do not reverence the stars of our banner.

I send a marked copy of a New Orleans paper, containing an applauding account of the outrage.

Trusting my action may meet the approbation of the Department, I am; most respectfully, your obedient servant,

BENJ. F. BUTLER,              
Major-General, Commanding.
Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
_______________

* See Butler to Stanton, June 1, 1862 in Chapter XXVII.
† Not found.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 6 (Serial No. 6), p. 503-6

Sunday, July 14, 2019

George S. Denison to Salmon P. Chase, January 29, 1863

New Orleans, January 29th, 1863.

Dear Sir: I have to-day transmitted my bond as Special Agt. and Acting Collector. The sureties are men of abundant means, and were selected as being the most respectable and worthy representatives of the Union residents of this city. For good reasons, I was careful to choose such persons, rather than any of the numerous and wealthy speculators. Judge Peabody remarked that the justification of the sureties, etc., was before the highest and best authority here at any rate.

I have reason to believe that a speedy movement on the Teche country, is in preparation and will soon be carried into effect. This is the movement of which I have so frequently spoken.

In other respects military affairs are in the same condition as at the date of my last letter.

Two vessels, as I am informed, were captured by the Rebels at Sabine Pass, Texas, in the same manner as was the "Harriet Lane." One of the vessels was destroyed. They were sailing transports, I believe, and probably of not much consequence.

Enclosed is an order just issued, of Gen. Banks, “promulgating the Emancipation proclamation.”

SOURCE: Diary and correspondence of Salmon P. ChaseAnnual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 351-52

Thursday, June 27, 2019

George S. Denison to Salmon P. Chase, January 26, 1863

(Private)
New Orleans, January 26th, 1863.

Dear Sir: The situation is the same as when I last wrote. There is no movement of troops, so far as I am informed, and there appears to be no probability of an advance in any direction.

The New York papers will state that the “Harriet Lane” has escaped from Galveston and gone to sea. This is not true. She is still in the harbor according to official advices just received here.

It is rumored here that the “Ovieto” has been captured. Admiral Farragut does not believe it. When she escaped from Mobile the “Cuyler” went in pursuit and neither vessel has yet been heard from.

Three days ago a steamer supposed to be the Alabama appeared at the mouth of the river, and then steered off in a southwest direction. The Admiral sent a vessel from here (The Mississippi) to follow her. As the “Alabama” is the faster vessel and had a start of 100 miles, and the Mississippi started from here 24 hours after the Rebel vessel was seen — it is not probable that anything will be effected.

It should not be forgotten that here is the place to make the proclamation effective. I am afraid Gen. Banks will never do it. He decides and moves too slowly and is too much afraid of responsibilities. He does not seem to regard with favor the three fine regiments already raised, and declines putting them in the field. I told you that they had sent him a petition to be put in the front rank at Port Hudson, that they might remove from their race the stigma of cowardice, etc. In all the regiments Gen. Banks brought with him, three cannot be selected so efficient as these three colored regiments, and in my opinion, they would be worth any five of the raw regiments Gen. Banks brought with him. I see Gen. Banks almost every day, but am perfectly ignorant of his plans and intentions. I do not wish to retract or qualify any statement in my late letters to you — nor in a letter to Mr. Flanders which I asked him to show you.

If my letters are uninteresting or too frequent, please inform me.

SOURCE: Diary and correspondence of Salmon P. ChaseAnnual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 350-1

Wednesday, April 3, 2019

George S. Denison to Salmon P. Chase, January 15, 1863

(Private)
New Orleans, January 15th, 1863.

Dear Sir: A fight is progressing on Bayou Teche. Gen. Weitzel commands. He crossed Berwick's Bay yesterday morning, and has advanced up the Teche as far as the enemy's fortifications. The enemy have 1,100 infantry and 1,000 cavalry. Weitzel will succeed without doubt, and advance to New Iberia, where fortifications will be erected by us. The rebel salt works near New Iberia, are yielding one million pounds per day. It is carried all over the Southern States. If this movement is successful, these works will be destroyed. The Teche country is full of sugar. This present movement is simply carrying out Gen. Butler's plan of operations. I urged it a week ago, but advised a flank movement. Gen. Banks has thought best to attack in front. I have traveled through that country several times, and know it well.

The U. S. armed Transport, “Hatteras”, was sunk by the “Alabama” on Sunday the 11th inst. The fight lasted about 45 minutes, and occurred sixteen miles from Galveston. The Flag officer there sent the “Hatteras” out to overhaul a strange sail — which proved to be the “Alabama”, and proved too powerful for her antagonist. Six men of the “Hatteras” escaped in a boat — the rest of the crew were killed or captured. The “Hatteras” carried ninety men. The “Brooklyn” and other vessels lying off Galveston, immediately started for the “Alabama”, but could find nothing of her. The rebels have not attempted to come out of Galveston Bay with the “Harriet Lane”. She is still lying in the Harbor, and I do not know why our Gunboats do not go in and destroy her.

Major Gen. Augur has at last been sent to Baton Rouge to take command, and organize the force there. There begins to be exhibited in this department some little energy and activity. All that is now done, ought to have been done four weeks ago.

The business of “Special Agent” under regulations of August 28th, is not now interfered with by military authorities. In consequence of this non-interference I have organized it with great success. I am satisfied that nothing, or very little, reaches the enemy from this port—and the planters within our lines are supplying themselves rapidly with whatever they need for their own use. I supervise everything myself and have an immense amount of labor to perform. I hear that large amounts of merchandise and supplies reach the enemy from Memphis and vicinity. This can be avoided by honestly adopting the right plan. Trade must be centralized and none allowed except at one or few points. I prevent it as far as possible, outside of the city, and can therefore control it. This plan is well adapted to this country, because property real and personal, is in the hands of a few planters. It is easy (and has been customary heretofore) for each planter to come to the City — take the proper oaths and be made individually responsible for whatever he wishes to take out of the City. Every boat going up the river, carries an “Aid to the Revenue” who sees that the supplies are delivered only at the proper plantation. I have to employ many additional “aids”, but make the system pay its own expenses. My personal supervision of all the details is an immense labor, but I know it will be well done if I attend to it myself — otherwise not.

The planters within and without our lines have been afraid to bring their crops of sugar and cotton because it was seized and must pass through the hands of the military commission. Gen. Butler's military commission was a dishonest plundering concern. By the enclosed order of Gen. Banks, you will see that planters are invited to bring their crops to the City and promised protection. It will have a good and marked effect. This order will not interfere with my action as “Special Agent.”

The system of furnishing supplies to planters — adopted by me, gives satisfaction to planters — but dissatisfaction to the great number of Jews, military speculators, and men from the North, who expect to swindle planters out of fortunes.

It is known here that the President has issued his proclamation, but its terms are not fully known. Gen. Banks told me this morning he is going to raise negro troops, but I fear, not in large numbers. I have information that the number of rebel troops in Texas is about 9,000 — of whom one-third are cavalry. They are provided with good arms brought through Mexico. About one-third of them are conscripts.

The number of troops in Louisiana, west of the Mississippi, is about 4,500 — nearly all of whom are in the Teche country.

SOURCE: Diary and correspondence of Salmon P. ChaseAnnual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 348-50

Monday, March 25, 2019

George S. Denison to Salmon P. Chase, January 8, 1863

(Private)
New Orleans, January 8th, 1863.

Dear Sir: A disaster has occurred at Galveston, similar to that near Fortress Monroe when the Cumberland and Congress were destroyed.

The rebels under Magruder, came down from Houston with four boats (steam) protected by cotton bales. At the same time, a land force, estimated from 3,000 to 7,000 crossed the bridge to the Island and occupied Galveston. This occurred about one or two o'clock on the morning of Jan. 1st. About 3 o'clock an attack was made by land and water on the Gunboats —which were in the narrow channel within musket shot of the shore. The “Harriet Lane” run into a rebel boat and sunk her, but became entangled in the wreck and could not get off. She was carried by boarding and captured. Less than twenty of her men are supposed to survive (out of 130). The Westfield (Flag Ship) was aground. Commodore Renshaw sent off to the other vessels all the men and officers except eight or ten, and then blew up the vessel and himself with her. He did not intend to destroy himself, but the magazine took fire unexpectedly, just as he was escaping. Two hundred and fifty men of a Massachusetts regiment (infantry only) were posted in the town, and were all captured or killed. The Gunboats had previous notice of the attack, and there must have been negligence on the part of the officers. Our loss is — “Harriet Lane” captured, but believed to be too much injured to be fit for sea for some time. The “Westfield” blown up.

Two sailing vessels loaded with coal for the navy.

About 400 men killed or taken prisoners.

All the other vessels (two were Gunboats) escaped. The fight lasted from three o'clock until 10 A. M.

Admiral Farragut, on receipt of the news, immediately dispatched several vessels to Galveston, which will set things right again, I hope. The 1st. Texas Reg't., Col. Davis, arrived, after the capture, on the S. Ship “Cumbria,” and narrowly escaped capture. The reg't. numbers about 200 men, who have all returned here.

The condition of things here does not seem to me to be very satisfactory — but Gen. Banks has not been here long enough to determine the prospect of improvement.

I think Gen. Banks lacks decision. With one or two exceptions, his staff are not men of ability. He seems to favor the policy of conciliation — which policy is weak and will always be unsuccessful. I can hardly get him to express an opinion — or if he does, it does not seem to be an earnest conviction. Secessionists grow more defiant and Union men despondent. This, I hope, and think, will be changed. I believe he is thoroughly honest, and he already has effected much good by putting down swindlers and army speculators. Gen. Butler's military commission (Gen. Orders No. 91) did an immense amount of mischief and injustice. Gen. Butler is an extraordinary man, but did very wrong in all things connected with internal trade. I have frequently heard Union men say they wished he was President, for though he would make millions for himself during the first three months, he would finish the war in three months more.

Gen. Banks has a very difficult position, for he comes here a stranger and four weeks at least are necessary for him to become informed of the situation.

The Government can finish this war in twelve months — in one way and in only one. Arm the negroes. I am perfectly satisfied it must be done. Why delay it? It can be done here without throwing the border states into a fever. Here and in S. Carolina and not well elsewhere. I called upon Gen. Banks this morning and urged the matter on his attention, as I have often done before. He agreed with me that the war could be finished in that way, but seems afraid of taking the responsibility. I wish I could assume the responsibility for him. I would suggest that you write me a letter to be shown to Gen. Banks, giving your opinion of the expediency of raising negro troops, and stating how such a step will be regarded by the Administration. If he is assured in this manner that the Government will approve, perhaps he will enlist the negroes. There are at least 20,000 black men within our lines who will make good and willing soldiers, 50,000 more can be raised west of the Mississippi as our army advances.

The three colored regiments already organized, have petitioned Gen. Banks to be put in the front rank at Port Hudson, that they may have a chance of removing the stigma of alleged cowardice from their race, and vindicate their rights and abilities as soldiers. I urge him to grant their request, but do not know what he will do about it. The negroes all say they can finish the war if the Gov't. will give them a chance. By no other means is success certain. Why delay it?

If it had not been for speculations in the sugar crops, Gen. Butler would have raised more regiments, but the men were wanted on the plantations to take off the crops.

Our last dates from the North are of the 20th. December. It is rumored that Gen. Butler may go into the Cabinet. I almost wish he would. He is a man of wonderful energy, will, and ability, and will always be admired by the Union men of New Orleans, even though he is believed by some to have acquired great wealth here.

Military affairs remain in the same condition as when I last wrote. Port Hudson has not been attacked and I don't know when it will be. The rebels are said to be receiving re-inforcements there.

P. S. Gen. Hamilton is still here.

SOURCE: Diary and correspondence of Salmon P. ChaseAnnual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 345-7

Wednesday, October 10, 2018

Commandant Samuel F. Dupont to Gustavus V. Fox, September 29, 1861

Near Wilmington, Del.
29. Sep. 61.    
My Dear Mr. Fox,

After mature deliberation with Drayton, and for reasons public & personal to himself, he prefers a separate command to going in the Wabash — provided you can let him be in my squadron, where his specialty will still be of great service to me — for the ignorance of the new Cannon, pivot guns &c is marvellous.

Will you therefore be so kind as to let him have the Harriet Lane or the Bienville from which Livingston was detached? He prefers the former being the nearest ready and of the lightest draft. She will be very useful to me.

I leave in the morg. My private affairs never having had an hour of my time since the War, it was a godsend to have these two last days. Sherman is after me so I hope he has some good news.

Faithfully Yours,
S. F. Dupont.
G. V. Fox, Esq.
Ass. Sec. Navy.

P.S.

Drayton not having seen his sea service in command, having when out before been similarly attached to a flag officer, he thought he ought to put in for a ship and I yielded — he is a very fine man and a very able officer.

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 55-6

Monday, July 23, 2018

Result Of Gustavus V. Fox's Plan For Reinforcing Fort Sumpter; In His Own Writing

My plan for reinforcing Fort Sumpter was this—

From the outer edge of the bar to Sumpter through the swash channel it is four miles in a straight line, with no shoal spots less than nine feet at high water. The batteries of the enemy on Morris and Sullivan Islands are one and one third of a mile distant from each other, between which the reinforcements must pass.

I proposed to anchor three small men of war at the entrance of the swash channel to afford a safe base of operations. The soldiers and provisions to be taken down in a large steamer, having on board boats for the whole, with three hundred sailors, and accompanied with three steam tugs having a draft of only six feet of water. The entrance to be effected at night with the tugs or boats as circumstances might dictate.

Rough weather would render the attempt impossible in boats but favorable for tugs. Whereas a fine clear night would be more favorable for the smaller objects — boats. This plan was brought to the Prests notice early in March and its practicability assured by his own convictions and concurrent naval testimony.

The military authorities seemed to think it impossible to pass their batteries, but assured the Prest that if reinforcements and provisions were thrown in the fort it could not be taken.

I visited Major Anderson on the 21st of March under an open order from the War Dpt, which was shown to Govr Pickens who gave me a pass, without restriction, and I confined my conversation with Major Anderson entirely to objects embraced in that order. Notwithstanding the earnest desire of the Prest to reinforce and provision Fort Sumpter, Mr. Seward seems to have been under obligations to oppose the attempt, and his great influence over Genl Scott, brought the military power against the plan.

As Major Anderson's supplies would be utterly exhausted on the 15th of April every effort was made by some strong hand to delay the expedition until its supporters must give it up. The last card was to send for a Union man from the Virginia Convention and say to him that Sumpter would be evacuated at once if the Union people, who were in a majority in the Convention, would adjourn it. This Union man declined the proposition and made so many preposterous demands  that the Prest decided the expedition should go forward. The order was given to me late the night of April 4th. The 5th was consumed in getting to N. York, and I sailed the 8th, leaving only three days to get up and dispatch the expedition. Most of those who had favored the expedition and in whom I depended for assistance to fit it out, abandoned it at this period as too late.

Unwilling to mention to the Prest the misgivings of those around me I determined to go forward alone.

Instead of the 300 sailors I asked for on board the steamer, the Sec'y of the Navy proposed to send down the Powhatan stm'r of war with that number of men, which was satisfactory to me. Therefore I sailed in the Baltic the 8th inst. without the sailors. The Powhatan having sailed the 6th. The revenue cutter H. Lane, the 8th, the Pawnee the 9th and the Pocahontas the 10th. The Baltic and Pawnee arrived off Charleston the 12th inst. after hostilities had commenced. The H. Lane the evening previous, and the Pocahontas the 13th at the surrender of Sumpter. The passage to Charleston and the day and night of our arrival was severe weather, preventing the tugs reaching the rendezvous. The next day, the 13th inst, seeing no part of my proposed means of effecting an entrance had arrived, a schooner loaded with ice was captured and means undertaken to effect an entrance in her the following night, but at 8 A.M. the wood work of the fort was set on fire by hot shot and by 3 P.M. the place was rendered untenable, and consequently it was surrendered.

The defects of the fort, and its injuries, such as were never anticipated by the engineers, are such, that had the place been provisioned and reinforced, the final result would have been delayed but a few days. The Powhatan, with her sailors, was the whole strength of my proposed plan because both tugs and boats were to be manned by these sailors. Yet the Powhatan sailed from N. York the 6th two days before I did, with an officer who bore an order from the Prest of the U. S. to carry her directly to Pensacola. Her regular Captn having the orders of the Navy Dept to cooperate with me at Charleston. This order of the Prest was unknown to the war or navy departments and was signed by him in ignorance that the Powhatan was one of my vessels. She was sent off on an expedition got up by the Sec'y of State who thus interfered with the other depts as the last hope of preventing the reinforcing of Sumpter. And it did prevent it, and I had the mortification of witnessing the surrender of the Fort with no part of my proposed plan arrived, in fact deprived by treachery of all power of accomplishing it, and losing reputation with the general public for the failure because I cannot state the facts at this crisis of our affairs without injury to the Govt.

The Charleston people assumed that the merchant vessels detained outside of their bar were the various expeditions which had sailed from N. York about the period of our departure and therefore they concentrated a large force on the islands and abused us for not landing and attacking the batteries. But they were vessels detained by the bombardment. Our military force consisted of 200 recruits of no earthly use to Fort Sumpter in such an emergency because they were undrilled. The S. C. authorities had 13,000. I believe every officer of the army or navy present were entirely satisfied of the feasibility of either of my plans.

In fact their fire upon Sumpter was precipitated because they intercepted my plan and were assured by their best naval authority that it was perfectly practicable.

G. V. Fox.

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 38-41

Tuesday, July 10, 2018

Gustavus V. Fox to Montgomery Blair, April 17, 1861

Baltic, 17th April
At Sea, 1861  
Dr Blair,

As I have no writing materials and wish to save tomorrow's mail I use a pencil.

Monday at 6 P.M. of the 8th we dropped down to Sandy Hook and anchored for the night, being too late for the tide. One of my tugs went to sea Sunday night, another one followed the Baltic, and the 3d I left in the hands of Russell Sturgis, to send on if he could charter her, the owner, like many others, being shaky at the last moment. At 8 A.M. of the 9th inst. we discharged the pilot and had constant steady bad weather and heavy sea. At 3 A.M. of the 12th reached the rendezvous 10 miles east of Charleston light — found only the H. Lane. At 6 A.M. saw the Pawnee coming in; boarded her and intimated to her Comdr that I was going in to offer to land provisions, asked him to stand in with me. He said his orders were to remain 10 miles east of the light and await the Powhatan. I took the H. Lane as an escort, and as we drew in saw that the forts had all opened fire upon Sumpter and that Major Anderson was replying gallantly. Seeing a stm'r off the bar, supposed to be the Isabel, I notified Capt. Faunce of the H. Lane and he started after her. It proved to be the Nashville from N. York.

I stood out in the Baltic to let Capt. Rowan of the Pawnee know that firing had commenced. I met him, however, coming in. Though he had expressed himself very averse to doing anything to commence the war, he now seemed willing to go in with his vessel if we had a pilot. I advised both vessels to go close in to the swash channel and anchor, which was done, and as the heavy sea and wind had moderated a little, I thought we had better attempt a couple of boats of provisions this night, the 12th, but as the Powhatan and Pocahontas had not arrived and the Pawnee and Lane were both short of hands and we had but one gun launch, the Pawnee's, I was overruled and consented upon the gallant promise of the officers that they would escort me in after daylight in the morning, defying their batteries. This was their proposition. The vessels of war remained at anchor at the Swash whilst I stood out to the rendezvous for the night in hopes of meeting the Powhatan and Pocahontas. It blew very heavy all night with a great swell and towards morning a thick fog. As Capt. Fletcher of the Baltic returned towards the anchorage, near daylight, he ran onto the Rattlesnake Shoal, but soon got off. The waves run so high that we were obliged to anchor some four miles outside of the war vessels, and having this sea it was impossible to load the boats. I took a boat at 8 A.M. 13th inst., and with the senior army officer Lt. Hudson, we pulled in to the Pawnee. As we drew near I saw, with horror, black volumes of smoke issuing from Sumpter. The barbarians, to their everlasting disgrace be it said, redoubled their fire, and through the flames and smoke the noble band of true men continued their response. The severe weather during the forenoon having prevented us using boats, Capt. Rowan captured an ice schooner and offered it to me to carry in the provisions and men. I accepted it and the night of the 13th I should certainly have gone in, and as certainly been knocked to pcs. My tug boats I knew could not have reached Charleston in the weather we had experienced since leaving N. York, and the Powhatan, I now learned, by a note from Capt. Mercer to Capt. Rowan, dated the 7th (I left the 8th, Rowan left the 9th, Gillis the 10th) that the Powhatan was “detached from duty off Charleston.” As she had the 300 sailors I asked for, and the howitzers and fighting launches, and the other ships of war were simply ordered to await her arrival 10 miles off, you will see that some one determined to utterly extinguish the expedition. I do not think I have deserved this treatment, and at present will not speak as I have felt, and now feel. At about 2 P.M. the Pocahontas arrived, just in time to witness the surrender of Fort Sumpter. I immediately suggested a flag of truce to be sent to offer a passage to Major A. and his command, which was done. Had the Powhatan arrived the 12th we should have had the men and provisions into Fort Sumpter, as I had everything ready, boats, muffled oars, small packages of provisions, in fact everything but the 300 sailors promised to me by the dept. A tug would have accomplished it, but with more risk alongside of the Fort. Capt. Foster the Eng. of Fort Sumpter says we would have got in and so does Hartstein of their navy. You know military people all told the Prest we could not get in, but if we did, the Fort was impregnable. In both instances were they wrong. Sumpter's fire had dispersed their naval preparations and they trusted entirely to their batteries and those light boats to illuminate the channel. What can be said of the builders of the fort? The burning of the officers' quarters has almost ruined the gorge wall, so that a few days more fire would have tumbled it all to pcs. One shot from Cummings point (where Cullum said it never could be breached) went entirely through the wall of the gorge. Another shot passed through an inside wall and struck below the door of the magazine, shattering the wall, so as to prevent the opening of the door, at the same time the flames nearly reached this door. In fact they all expected to be blown up. The coupe next to Cummings point is very severely handled and would soon have been a breach. So that this impregnable fort, with 33 guns and 17 mortars, playing upon it for only 34 hours, is injured $400,000 worth and actually burned as much as battered. I think these facts will make a stir, for not one was ever presented in all the discussion we had. The officers and men from the Major down have covered themselves with glory. A fort of 60 fighting men, surrounded by 9000 men, and a circle of fortifications kept up the first day gun for gun with them and on the 2 replied, though from 8 A.M. until 2 P.M. the fort was a mass of smoke through which, and in which, they fought.

I told the Major how anxious the Prest was that they (S.C.) should stand before the civilized world as having fired upon bread, yet they had made the case much worse for themselves as they knew the Major would leave the 15th at noon for want of provisions (see his correspondence), yet they opened upon 60 men and continued it whilst the fort was burning. The "World" (N. Y.) correspondent came down in the H. Lane and is now with us, and as he is the only reporter on board and is continually with the officers I imagine he will have a faithful account. As several ships brigs and schooners and one N. Y. stmr were detained at the bar by the conflict, it was believed to be a whole fleet for the relief of Sumpter with 9000 men on board. Whereas there was the Pawnee and H. Lane with one 12 lb. launch gun and on board the Baltic 200 RECRUITS only two or three of whom ever saw a gun, sent by the Gen1 in Chief, and the flag ship with her power and efficiency sent away without any intimation conveyed to the other vessels, all of which sailed subsequently to this change. Sunday the Major delivered up the fort after saluting his flag with 50 guns, which he intended to be 100, but a premature explosion killed two men and wounded three others, the only casualties of the whole battle. Monday, at noon, he and his command, and the flag (I enclose a pce) came off in the Isabel stmr and were transferred to this vessel when we sailed, all the vessels saluting. Excepting from the time of the surrender to the transfer, we have had a gale of wind just now abating (midnight).

The men in the fort, though on Pork and Rice, never flinched or grumbled, even when fire was added. I think the Prest will keenly approve the Major's course. As for our expedition, somebody's influence has made it ridiculous.

Very truly
G. V. FOX.

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 31-5

Friday, June 8, 2018

Commander Andrew H. Foote to Gideon Welles, April 6, 1861

Navy Yard,    
New York, April 6/61.
Sir:

I hastily informed the Department by mail to-day of the circumstances under which the “Powhatan” sailed, with Lieut. Porter on board — Capt. Mercer taking the ship down as far as Staten Island, with the view of there handing her over to Lt. Porter; also that I had given Capt. Mercer the telegram received from the Department informing us that Purser Gulick would arrive this evening with a dispatch. I had previously handed Capt. Mercer a sealed letter from the Department, addressed to him, which was this morning received. I further stated that Capt. Meigs, Porter and Mercer had held a consultation in reference to the orders, and the service in question. Before the Powhatan sailed, Cpt. Mercer handed me a paper stating the following: —
“Capt. Mercer has turned the command of the Powhatan over to Lieut. D. D. Porter, by order of the President, and she has gone to sea.”

Capt. Mercer intends to give Capt. Faunce (of the Harriet Lane) a copy of his instructions from the Navy Department, and direct him to report to the senior naval officer he may meet with off Charleston, giving him the copy of instructions, which Capt. Mercer will certify as a correct copy. Capt. Faunce will be directed to proceed under his order, from the Department, dated April 5th, off Charleston bar, unless Capt. Faunce receives counter orders from the Department. Captains Meigs, Porter and Mercer, after consultation, determined upon this course. Captain Mercer will probably be in New York this evening, and explain himself more fully to the Department.

I also referred to having sent Lieut. Roe of the Ordnance Department to procure a steamer and if possible overhaul the Powhatan, and give Capt. Porter the dispatch sent him by Hon. Mr. Seward, but I fear that the Powhatan had then proceeded too far to be overhauled. Lt. Roe has not yet returned.

I will on Monday send a correct list of officers of the Powhatan. By the urgent request and assurance of authority on the part of Lt. Porter, as the four Master's Mates could not be shipped in time, I permitted him to take some Lts. — an extra one. The two Lieuts. ordered without express authority of the Department were Lieut. Perry and Lieut. Smith of Philadelphia. I had heard that the first had been ordered by the Department, and as he wished to go, as well as from the entreaties of Mrs. Corinna Perry, and especially as Lieut. Porter wanted the number, I ordered him; while Lieut. Smith had before been ordered to fill up the complement and was named in a list presented to me by Lieut.. Porter. The Maine officer, Lt. Browne went out in the ship, and Mr. Heap from Washington as Acting Paymaster—as Lt. Porter informed Capt. Mercer and myself on or by authority of the government.

I have the honor to be,
Very respectfully,
Your obd't serv't,
A. H. Foote.                       
for Com'd't.
Hon. Gideon Welles,
Secretary of the Navy,
Washington.

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 28-30

Saturday, May 19, 2018

Gideon Welles to Captain Samuel Mercer, April 5, 1861

Navy Department
April 5th, 1861.
Captain Samuel Mercer
Com'dg. U.S.S. Powhatan, New York.

The United States steamers “Powhatan,” “Pawnee,” “Pocahontas,” and "Harriet Lane" will compose a naval force under your command to be sent to the vicinity of Charleston S. C. for the purpose of aiding in carrying out the objects of an expedition of which the War Department has charge.

The primary object of the expedition is to provision Fort Sumter, for which purpose the War Department will furnish the necessary transports. Should the authorities of Charleston permit the Fort to be supplied, no further particular service will be required of the force under your command; and after being satisfied that supplies have been received at the Fort, the “Powhatan,” “Pocahontas” and “Harriet Lane” will return to New York and the “Pawnee” to Washington.

Should the authorities at Charleston, However, refuse to permit or attempt to prevent the vessel or vessels having supplies on board from entering the harbor, or from peaceably proceeding to Fort Sumter, you will protect the transports or boats of the expedition in the object of their mission, disposing of your force in such manner as to open the way for their ingress and afford, so far as practicable, security to the men and boats, and repelling by force, if necessary, all obstructions toward provisioning the Fort and reinforcing it; for in case of a resistance to the peaceable primary object of the expedition a reenforcement of the garrison will also be attempted. These purposes will be under the supervision of the War Department, which has charge of the expedition. The expedition has been intrusted to Captain G. V. Fox, with whom you will put yourself in communication and cooperate with him to accomplish and carry into effect its object.

You will leave New York with the “Powhatan” in time to be off Charleston bar, ten miles distant from and due east of the lighthouse, on the morning of the 11th inst., there to await the arrival of the transport or transports with troops and stores. The “Pawnee” and “Pocahontas” will be ordered to join you there at the time mentioned, and also the “Harriet Lane,” which latter vessel has been placed under the control of this department for this service.

On the termination of the expedition, whether it be peaceable or otherwise, the several vessels under your command will return to the respective ports as above directed, unless some unforeseen circumstances should prevent.

I am, resp'y, your ob't servt.
Gideon Welles
Secretary of the Navy.

Captain Mercer took this order with him when he turned over the command to Lieut. Porter. He sent no copy to the next senior officer of the Sumter expedition. [Note by G. V. F]

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 23-5

Tuesday, May 15, 2018

Gideon Welles to Captain John A. Faunce, April 5, 1861

Navy Department, April 5th, 1861.
Capt. Faunce, Commander of
U.S. Revenue Steamer "Harriet Lane"
New York.
Sir:

The revenue steamer "Harriet Lane," having been temporarily placed under the orders of this department, you will proceed with her from New York in time to appear off Charleston bar, ten miles distant from, and due east of, the lighthouse, on the morning of the nth instant, where you will report to Captain Samuel Mercer of the "Powhatan," for special service. Should he not be there, you will await his arrival.

Very resp'y, your obt. servt.

Gideon Welles  
Secy of the Navy.

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 23

Monday, April 2, 2018

Commander Andrew Hull Foote to Gideon Welles, April 1, 1861


[Telegram—Copy]
Brooklyn, April 1st, 1861.
Secretary of the Navy,

The “Powhatan” after landing her stores went out of commission at two o'clock. Crew on board the “North Carolina,” officers mostly left with their leaves of absence. I shall agreeably to the last orders refit the “Powhatan” for sea, with quickest dispatch. As there will be but few men left not wanted for the “Powhatan,” I shall not send the men to Norfolk in the chartered steamer, but remain ready to send them in the “Harriet Lane,” if so ordered.

A H foote,
For Commandant.

SOURCES: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 17

Saturday, March 17, 2018

Captain Gustavus V. Fox: Memorandum for the Relief of Fort Sumter, February 6, 1861

ST. GERMAIN HOTEL,
New York, February 6, 1861.

Since the repulse of the steamer Star of the West at Charleston it may be assumed that all the channels over the bar are obstructed, but as the bar is more than four miles in length the spaces between these channels are too extensive to be closed. Therefore at high water and smooth sea the bar is perfectly accessible to vessels drawing say seven feet of water. The U. S. has no steamers of this draft. The skillfull officers at Charleston, aware of this fact, will conclude that relief must go in at high water in boats or light draft steamers incapable of bearing a very offensive armament. They will be perfectly prepared for such attempts by arming, and heavily manning all the steamers they possess and at the critical moment will throw themselves alongside the relief vessels and thus jeopardise the movement by the very detention of the conflict. To elude their vigilance or attempt a strategem however ingenious I consider too liable to failure.

I propose to put the troops on board of a large, comfortable sea steamer and hire two powerful light draft New York tug boats, having the necessary stores on board. These to be convoyed by the U.S.S. Pawnee, now at Philadelphia, and the revenue cutter Harriet Lane. (The Pawnee is the only available steam vessel of war north of the Gulf of Mexico; draws twelve feet of water and has seven heavy guns. As a steamer she seems to be a failure, but may be got ready for this emergency — at least she is, unfortunately, our only resource.) The Harriet Lane I understand to be an excellent and efficient vessel, but either of these steamers alone may be liable to capture, by an overwhelming force.

Arriving off the bar, I propose to examine by day the naval preparations and obstructions. If their vessels determine to oppose our entrance, and a feint or flag of truce would ascertain this, the armed ships must approach the bar and destroy or drive them on shore. Major Anderson would do the same upon any vessels within the range of his guns and would also prevent any naval succor being sent down from the city.

Having dispersed this force, the only obstacles are the forts on Cummings point, and Fort Moultrie, and whatever adjacent batteries they may have, distant on either hand from mid channel about three-quarters of a mile. Two hours before high water, at night, with half the force on board of each tug, within relieving distance of each other, should run in to Fort Sumpter.


[Endorsement:]

Proposition of Relief of Fort Sumpter Accepted by the Govt. Mch, 1861.

SOURCES: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume 4, p. 223-4; Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 8-9

Friday, March 16, 2018

Memorandum of Capt. Gustavus V. Fox to Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott, February 8, 1861

Feb. 8, 1861

The proposition which I had the honor to submit to you fully in person is herewith presented in writing.

Lt. Hall and myself have had several free conferences and if he is permitted by the South C. authorities to reenter Fort Sumpter, Major Anderson will comprehend the plan for his relief.

I consider myself very fortunate in having proposed a project which meets the approval of the Genl in Chief and I ask no reward but the entire conduct of the part exclusive of the armed vessels. The Commander of these should be ordered to cooperate with me by affording protection and destroying their naval preparations near the bar, leaving to me as the author of the plan the actual operations of relief.

I suggest that the Pawnee be immediately sent to the Delaware breakwater to await orders. The H. Lane to be ready for sea, and some arrangement entered into by which the requisite stmr and tugs should be engaged, at least so far as not to excite suspicion.

I should prefer one of the Collins stmrs. They are now being prepared for sea and one of such a size and power as to be able fearlessly to run down any vessels which might attempt to capture us outside by coup de main. I could quickly engage one & have her ready to start on 24 hours notice without exciting suspicion.

I shall leave for N. York at 3 P.M. to-day and any communication previous will find me at Judge Blairs.

G. V. F.

P.S. If the Pawnee Pivot gun is landed it should certainly be remounted.

Address Lowe & Blunt
F

SOURCES: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 7-8; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 203

Saturday, September 16, 2017

Major-General Benjamin F. Butler to Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott, May 27, 1861

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA,
May 27, 1861.

SIR: The expedition (of which I gave you information in my former dispatch) to Newport News got off in fine style this morning about 7 o'clock. I have added to the expedition the Eighth New York Regiment, 780 strong, which came here on board the Empire City on Sunday afternoon, and they proceeded without debarking. I also added two 6-pounder and two 12-pounder guns, with a detachment of twenty-five men from Colonel Dimick's command, who are intended to act as drill-masters to the volunteers in the exercise of the guns. My purpose is to intrench and hold that point, and ultimately to mount a few heavy guns, which will command that channel of approach to James River.

Since I wrote my last dispatch the question in regard to slave property is becoming one of very serious magnitude. The inhabitants of Virginia are using their negroes in the batteries, and are preparing to send their women and children South. The escapes from them are very numerous, and a squad has come in this morning to my pickets, bringing with them their women and children. Of course these cannot be dealt with upon the theory on which I designed to treat the services of able-bodied men and women who might come within my lines, and of which I gave you a detailed account in my last dispatch. I am in the utmost doubt what to do with this species of property. Up to this time I have had come within my lines men and women with their children — entire families — each family belonging to the same owner. I have therefore determined to employ, as I can do very profitably, the able-bodied persons in the party, issuing proper food for the support of all, and charging against their services the expense of care and sustenance of the non-laborers, keeping a strict and accurate account as well of the services as of the expenditures, having the worth of the services and the cost of the expenditures determined by a board of survey, hereafter to be detailed. I know of no other manner in which to dispose of this subject and the questions connected therewith. As a matter of property to the insurgents it will be of very great moment, the number I now have amounting, as I am informed, to what in good times would be of the value of $60,000. Twelve of these negroes, I am informed, have escaped from the erection of batteries on Sewell's Point, which this morning fired upon my expedition as it passed by out of range. As a means of offense, therefore, in the enemy's hands, these negroes, when able-bodied, are of the last importance. Without them the batteries could not have been erected, at least for many weeks. As a military question, it would seem to be a measure of necessity to deprive their masters of their services. How can this be done? As a political question and a question of humanity, can I receive the services of the father and mother and not take the children? Of the humanitarian aspect I have no doubt. Of the political one I have no right to judge. I therefore submit all this to your better judgment; and as these questions have a political aspect, I have ventured — and I trust I am not wrong in so doing — to duplicate the parts of my dispatches relating to this subject, and forward them to the Secretary of War.

It was understood when I left Washington that the three Massachusetts regiments, two of which are at the Relay House, should be forwarded to me here, and also Cook's light battery, of which I have the utmost need, if I am expected even to occupy an extended camp with safety. May I ask the attention of the Commanding General to this subject, and inquire if the exigencies of the service will permit these troops to be sent to me immediately? I have to report the arrival of no more troops except the New York Eighth since my last dispatch. The steamship Wabash, which was expected here to take the place of the Minnesota, has not yet reported herself. The Harriet Lane has reported herself here from Charleston, and is employed in convoying the Newport News expedition. I find myself extremely short of ammunition, having but a total in magazine of 85,000 rounds, (if which 5,000 rounds only are for the smooth-bore musket, and the major part of my command are provided with that arm. May I desire the attention of the Lieutenant-General to this state of facts, and ask that a large amount of ammunition for that arm — I would suggest “buck and ball” — be ordered forward from the Ordnance Department? The assistant adjutant-general has made a requisition for this purpose. I will endeavor to keep the Lieutenant-General informed daily of any occurrences of interest, provided I am not interfered with by the irregularity of the mails and modes of conveyance.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJ. F. BUTLER,
Major-General, Commanding.
 Lieutenant-General SCOTT.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 2 (Serial No. 2), p. 52-4

Tuesday, February 7, 2017

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: February 8, 1863

From intelligence received yesterday evening, it is probable the Alabama, Harriet Lane, and Florida have met off the West Indies, and turned upon the U. S. steamer Brooklyn. The account says a large steamer was seen on fire, and three others were delivering broadsides into her. The United States press thought the burning steamer was the Florida.

From Charleston or Savannah we shall soon have stirring news. They may overpower our forces, but our power there will be completely exhausted before resistance ceases. There will be no more “giving up,” as with New Orleans, Norfolk, etc. Yet there is a feverish anxiety regarding Vicksburg. Pemberton permitted one iron-clad gun-boat to pass, and all our boats below are now at its mercy.

The House of Representatives, at Washington, has passed the “negro soldier bill.” This will prove a “Pandora's Box,” and the Federals may rue the day that such a measure was adopted.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 256

Sunday, January 22, 2017

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: January 31, 1863

We have dispatches from Charleston, to-day, which reconcile us to the loss of the cargo captured by the blockading squadron early in the week. An artillery company captured a fine gun-boat in Stone River (near Charleston) yesterday evening. She had eleven guns and 200 men.

But this morning we did better still. Our little fleet of two iron-clads steamed out of Charleston harbor, and boldly attacked the blockading fleet. We crippled two of their ships, and sunk one, completely raising the blockade, for the time being. This will frustrate some of their plans, and may relieve Wilmington.

The attack on Fort McAlister was a failure. The monitor which assaulted the fort sustained so much injury, that it had to retire for repairs.

Several blockade-runners between this and Williamsburg were arrested and sent to Gen. Winder to-day by Lieut. G. D. Wise. Gen. W. sent them to Gen. Rains. Mr. Petit and Mr. James Custis (from Williamsburg) came with them to endeavor to procure their liberation. Gen. Rains sent them back to Gen. W., with a note that he had no time to attend to such matters. Such business does not pertain to his bureau. I suppose they will be released.

Major Lear, of Texas, who was at the capture of the Harriet Lane, met on the captured steamer his mortally-wounded son, the lieutenant.

A few days ago, Lieut. Buchanan was killed on a United States gun-boat by our sharpshooters. He was the son of Admiral Buchanan, in the Confederate service, now at Mobile. Thus we are reminded of the wars of the roses — father against son, and brother against brother. God speed the growth of the Peace Party, North and South; but we must have independence.

Mr. Hunter was in our office to-day, getting the release of a son of the Hon. Jackson Morton, who escaped from Washington, where he had resided, and was arrested here as a conscript. The Assistant Secretary of War ruled him entitled to exemption, although yesterday others, in the same predicament, were ruled into the service.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 250-1