Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, August 15, 1865

Seward read a letter in relation to St. Domingo matters, to which I for some cause did not give that attention which its importance demanded. After he had read it Stanton suggested that one expression was too strong, he thought. Seward appealed to me. I asked to have the passage reread, and concurred with Stanton that more cautious language should be used.

Stanton says there is to be a large reduction of the force which is moving against the Indians; that by the 1st of October the force will be about 6000; that large supplies have gone on, but they can be diverted or deflected to New Mexico and other points, so that they will not be lost.

This whole proceeding is anything but commendable in the War Department. Stanton professes not to have been informed on the subject, and yet takes credit for doing something in the direction of reduction. When questioned, however, he gets behind Grant or Pope or some military officer. An army of twenty-two thousand and a winter campaign, which he said would cost certainly not less than fifty million and very likely eighty or one hundred million, are arranged, a great Indian war is upon us, but the Secretary of War is, or professes to be, wholly ignorant in regard to it, and of course every member of the Administration is uninformed. If Stanton is as ignorant as he professes, it is disgraceful and ominous, and it is not less so if he is not ignorant. There are some things which make me suspicious that he is not as uninformed and ignorant as he pretends. This matter of supplies, so ruinously expensive, is popular on the frontiers, with Lane and others in Kansas. I have seen enough of Stanton to know that he is reckless of the public money in fortifying himself personally. These great contracts for supplies and transportation must have been known to him. How far Grant, whom he does not like, has acted independently of him is a question.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 360-1

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, April 22, 1865

I learned that General Grant left in person to go to General Sherman instead of sending written orders. This was sensible, and will insure the work to be well and satisfactorily done. Senator Sumner called on me with inquiries which he heard in the street relative to General Sherman. As he came direct from the War Department, I was satisfied that Stanton, as usual, after enjoining strict secrecy upon others, was himself communicating the facts in confidence to certain parties. One or two others spoke to me in the course of the afternoon on the same subject.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 295

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, July 8, 1864

The War Department keeps very close as to matters at Harper’s Ferry and vicinity. There is either little knowledge of what is doing, or a very great reluctance to communicate. Mr. Felton, President of the Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore R. R. sends me a, letter by private hands, stating that while he was not alarmed, he desired a gunboat at Gunpowder Creek, etc., to protect railroad property. Sent Fox to inquire of General Halleck as to the necessity. General H. thinks it unnecessary; but will advise us in season if wanted. Beyond this nothing is communicated.

Stanton tells me that he has no idea the Rebels are in any force above, and should not give them a serious thought, but that Grant says he thinks they are in force, without, however, giving his reasons or any facts. The President has been a good deal incredulous about a very large army on the upper Potomac, yet he begins to manifest anxiety. But he is under constraint, I perceive, such as I know is sometimes imposed by the dunderheads at the War Office, when they are in a fog, or scare, and know not what to say or do. It is not natural or the way of the President to withhold information, or speculation at such times, and I can always tell how things are with Halleck and Stanton when there are important movements going on. The President is now enjoined to silence, while Halleck is in a perfect maze, bewildered, without intelligent decision or self-reliance, and Stanton is wisely ignorant. I am inclined to believe, however, that at this time profound ignorance reigns at the War Department concerning the Rebel raid in the Shenandoah Valley; that they absolutely know nothing of it, — its numbers, where it is, or its destination. It has to me appeared more mischievous than to others. I think we are in no way prepared for it, and a fierce onset could not well be resisted. It is doubtful, however, whether the onset will be made, for it is the nature of man to lose his opportunities. The true course of the Rebels is to strike at once at this point.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 69-70

Horace Greeley to Abraham Lincoln, August 9, 1864

Office of the Tribune,            

New York, Aug. 9, 1864

(Tuesday)

Dear Sir:

Your dispatch of Saturday only reached me on Sunday, when I immediately answered by letter; yesterday I was out of town; and I have just received your dispatch of that date. I do not venture to telegraph you since I learned by sad experience at Niagara that my dispatches go to the War Department before reaching you. But I will gladly come on to Washington whenever you apprise me that my doing so may perhaps be of use.

But I fear that my chance for usefulness has passed. I know that nine-tenths of the whole American People, North and South, are anxious for Peace — Peace on almost any terms — and utterly sick of human slaughter and devastation.

I know that to the general eye, it now seems that the Rebels are anxious to negotiate, and that we repulse their advances.

I know that, if this impression be not removed, we shall be beaten out of sight next November. I firmly believe that, were the election to take place to-morrow, the democratic majority in this State and Pennsylvania would amount to 100,000, and that we should lose Connecticut also.

Now if the Rebellion can be crushed before November, it will do to go on; if not, we are rushing on certain ruin.

What, then, can I do in Washington? Your trusted advisers nearly all think I ought to go to Fort Lafayette for what I have done already. Seward wanted me sent there for my brief conference with Mr Mercier. The cry has steadily been — No truce! No Armistice! No negotiation! No mediation! Nothing but surrender at discretion! I never heard of such fatuity before. There is nothing like it in history. It must result in disaster, or all experience is delusion.

Now, I do not know that a tolerable Peace could be had; but I believe it might have been last month; and, at all events, I know that an honest, sincere effort for it would have done us immense good. And I think no Government fighting a Rebellion should ever close its ears to any proposition the Rebels may make.

I beg you, implore you, to inaugurate or invite proposals for Peace forthwith. And in case Peace cannot now be made, consent to an Armistice for one year — each party to retain unmolested all it now holds, but the Rebel ports to be opened. Meantime, let a National Convention be held, and there will surely be no more war at all events.

Yours,

Horace Greeley

SOURCE: Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress, Washington, D. C., Lincoln, Abraham. Abraham Lincoln papers: Series 1. General Correspondence. 1833 to 1916: Horace Greeley to Abraham Lincoln, Tuesday,Peace negotiations and publication of correspondence. August 9, 1864. Manuscript/Mixed Material. https://www.loc.gov/item/mal3517100/.

Diary of Gideon Welles: Wednesday, May 11, 1864

A craving, uneasy feeling pervaded the community through the day. No intelligence from any quarter received, yet a conviction pervades everywhere that much is being done. I was at the War Department at 9 P.M. The President and Stanton were anxiously waiting intelligence.

I met Blair as I came from the Department, who wished me to go to his house. A letter from Governor Morgan asking me to name the month to which I would postpone the Union National Convention, if I desired a postponement, was received and answered by me this evening. It was a singular document and surprised me. I spoke of it to Blair, who said he had seen the circular last week. This gave me even greater surprise, for Morgan has frequently consulted and interchanged views with me, both of us concurring against postponement. It was discussed by us at our last interview.

Blair, as well as myself, was puzzled, but we both were willing to believe that no mischief was intended. The course of Thurlow Weed and some New York politicians has been singular. Blair took from his pocket a letter from Barlow of New York, a Copperhead leader, with whom, he informs me, he has corresponded for some weeks past. Barlow is thick with General McClellan, and Blair, who has clung also to McC., not giving him up until his Woodward letter betrayed his weakness and his ambition, still thought he might have military service, provided he gave up his political aspirations. It was this feeling that had led to the correspondence.

I do not admire the idea of corresponding with such a man as Barlow, who is an intense partisan, and Blair himself would distrust almost any one who should be in political communication with him. Blair had written Barlow that he would try to get McC. an appointment to the army, giving up party politics. Barlow replied that no party can give up their principles, and quotes a letter which he says was written by a distinguished member of Mr. Lincoln’s Cabinet last September, urging the organization of a conservative party on the basis of the Crittenden compromise. This extract shocks Blair. He says it must have been written by Seward. I incline to the same opinion, though Usher crossed my mind, and I so remarked to Blair. Last September U.’s position was more equivocal than Seward’s, and he might have written such a letter without black perfidy. Seward could not.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 28-9

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, April 22, 1864

Neither Seward nor Chase nor Stanton was at the Cabinet-meeting to-day. For some time Chase has been disinclined to be present and evidently for a purpose. When sometimes with him, he takes occasion to allude to the Administration as departmental, — as not having council, not acting in concert. There is much truth in it, and his example and conduct contribute to it. Seward is more responsible than any one, however, although he is generally present. Stanton does not care usually to come, for the President is much of his time at the War Department, and what is said or done is communicated by the President, who is fond of telling as well as of hearing what is new. Three or four times daily the President goes to the War Department and into the telegraph office to look over communications.

Congress is laboring on the tax bill. The Members fear to do their duty because taxation is unpopular. An old infirmity. Chase has not pressed for it heretofore for the same reason.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 16

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, April 12, 1864

To-day have a letter from Admiral Lee respecting the exportation of French tobacco from Richmond. This is an arrangement of Mr. Seward to which I have always objected, but to which the President was persuaded to yield his assent some months ago. The subject has lingered until now. Admiral Lee says the French naval vessels and transports are at the Roads and about to proceed up the James River, and inquires if he shall keep an account of their export.

I took the dispatch to the Cabinet-meeting to ascertain from Mr. Seward what his arrangements were, but he was not present. When the little business on hand was disposed of, I introduced the subject to the President, who told me he had seen the dispatch to me and also one to Mr. Stanton from General Butler. He saw them both at the telegraph office, and after he got home he had sent for Fred Seward and Mr. Stanton. They appear neither of them to think the subject of much consequence, but after Stanton had returned to the War Department and read Butler's dispatch, he sent the President word that Mr. Seward ought to give the subject attention. The President had therefore told Fred Seward to telegraph his father, who is in New York, to return.

It is curious, that the President who saw Adl Lee’s dispatch to me should have consulted the Secretary of War and Assistant Secretary of State without advising me, or consulting me on the subject. He was annoyed, I saw, when I introduced the topic. The reason for all this I well understood. He knew full well my opposition to this whole proceeding, which I had fought off two or three times, until he finally gave in to Seward. When, therefore, some of the difficulties which I had suggested began to arise, the President preferred not to see me. It will not surprise me if this is but the beginning of the trouble we shall experience.

At the Cabinet-meeting, Chase, after presenting his weekly exhibit, showing our national debt to be over sixteen hundred millions, said he should have to request the Navy Department and also that of the Interior to make no farther calls on the Treasury for coin. I told him he must provide for foreign bills which stood different from any others, and if he had paid the Interior or any other Department than the State and Navy, which had foreign bills, and possibly the War Department some foreign purchases, I thought it not right; that I had experienced great difficulty in making California payments, but had met them, because I supposed all domestic bills were treated alike.

Chase did not meet the point squarely, but talked on other subjects, and answered some questions of the President's about the daily custom receipts, and explained the operations of his gold dollar certificates, etc. I brought him back to the Navy matter by asking him how our paymasters and agents were to draw abroad, — by what standard of value. He said the legal-tender standard. “What is that standard,” I inquired, “in Nassau, in Rio, in China, or London?”

He made me no other answer than that he was anxious to reduce the price of gold, and that something must be done to effect it. Talked of taxing bank circulation and driving it out of existence. I told him that might be a step in the right direction, perhaps, provided he did not increase his paper issues, but that if he issued irredeemable Treasury paper instead to an unlimited amount, there would be no relief; that by reducing the amount of paper and making it payable in specie on demand he would bring his legal tenders and gold nearer to equality. The President remarked that something must be done towards taxing the bank paper; said he did not fully comprehend the financial questions in all their bearings; made some sensible inquiries of Mr. Chase concerning his issues, which were bought for custom-house purposes.

Mr. Usher made some inquiries and suggestions about bringing down the price of gold and compelling banks and others to disgorge that were worthy an old Whig of thirty years gone by. His ideas were crude, absurd, and ridiculous. He evidently has never given the subject attention.

Mr. Grimes and Mr. Hale had a round in the Senate yesterday. The former had the best of the debate, but still did not do himself, the Department, and the service full justice.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 9-11

Diary of Gideon Welles: Wednesday, April 6, 1864

Little of importance. Some movements by the army in contemplation, yet nothing has been communicated to the Navy Department, except an intimation that ironclads may be wanted on the James River. This intimation, or obscure request, comes indirectly from General Grant; nothing from the War Department proper.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 6

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, April 1, 1864

The Chronicle of this morning contains my letter with some errors, to the Senate in response to a call relating to transfers.  It makes some commotion among the members of congress, and will cause some in the War Department I presume.

There was nothing of special interest to day in the cabinet.  Stanton was not present, nor was Blair. Chase calls for largely additional taxes which I have no doubt are necessary.  There should have been heavier taxes the last two years.  At least double what have been collected.  Undoubtedly demagogues will try to prevent this necessary measure for party ends, but I believe the good sense and intelligence of the people will prevail over the debasing abuse of party.  I apprehend that Chase is not making the most of his position, and think he has committed some errors.  No one could have altogether avoided them.

Seward spoke to me concerning the case of the Sir William Peel, captured at the mouth of the Rio Grande.  Had carried contraband ostensibly to Matamoras, but portions had gone direct to Brownsville, and cotton brought direct from that place in return.  It is claimed, however that she was captured in Mexican waters though near the U. States, and therefore Seward says she must be given up.  I asked him to whom.  If captured in Mexican waters, no power but Mexico could make the claim.  This he undertook to deny, provided the government of Mexico was enfeebled by revolution and not able to sustain itself.  But, I told him, if able to assert and maintain neutrality, then she, and she alone could intervene.  If not able to maintain her claim of neutrality, no other one could make a claim of Mexican jurisdiction.

I am fearful he will make a miss-fire on this question.  He has never looked into maritime law, and will make any sacrifice of national or individual rights to keep in with England.

SOURCES: William E. Gienapp & Erica L. Gienapp, Editors, The Civil War Diary of Gideon Wells: Lincoln’s Secretary of the Navy, p. 383-4; *Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 3-4 which reprinted the entry of March 30, 1864 under the date of April 1, 1864.

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, March 8, 1864

Received a telegram from Admiral Lee this P.M., confirming a rumor that was whispered yesterday of the death of young Dahlgren. He was surrounded, it seems, by superior forces near King and Queen Court-House, and fell attempting to cut his way through. Most of his command was captured. A few escaped and got on board of the gunboat which had been sent for their relief.

A more gallant and brave-hearted fellow was not to be found in the service. His death will be a terrible blow to his father, who doted upon him and not without reason. I apprehend this raid was not a wise and well-planned scheme. Tested by results, it was not. Whether the War Department advised it I do not know. I heard it spoken of indefinitely and vaguely, but with no certainty till the expedition had started.

Fox is full of zeal to get hold of the fraudulent contractors and all that belongs to them, and the whole subject is committed to him. I exceedingly dislike these irregular proceedings. There should be proper law officers to whom these matters should be committed, and not impose them upon the heads of Departments. I must try to have Congress take the matter in hand, and pass the necessary laws, or devise some proper action. I do not like matters as they now are.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 537-8

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, February 15, 1864

Mr. Sedgwick on Friday wished a pass to visit Stover, the convict in Fort Lafayette, and would get from him statements that would open frauds and misdeeds upon the government. I disliked to give him such pass, and yet was not fully prepared to deny him, because he might be useful in aiding the Department to bring offenders to light. I therefore put him off with a suggestion that he might consult the marshal, and telegraph me if necessary. I gave a permit, however, to Colonel Olcott, and Baker, the detective. To-day Colonel Olcott telegraphs me that he visited Stover at Fort Lafayette, and found Sedgwick with him by permission of General Dix.

There is evidently a desire among the officials of the War Office to make difficulty, and no disposition to aid the Navy Department in ferreting out offenders. These committees in Congress are like them in many respects.

The movements of parties and partisans are becoming distinct. I think there are indications that Chase intends to press his pretensions as a candidate, and much of the Treasury machinery and the special agencies have that end in view. This is to be regretted. The whole effort is a forced one and can result in no good to himself, but may embarrass the Administration. The extreme radicals are turning their attention to him and also to Frémont. As between the two, Chase is incomparably the most capable and best, and yet I think less of his financial ability and the soundness of his political principles than I did. The President fears Chase, and he also respects him. He places a much higher estimate on the financial talents of Chase than I do, because, perhaps, we have been educated in different schools. The President, as a follower of Clay, and as a Whig, believes in expedients. I adhere to specie as the true standard of value. With the resources of the nation at his disposal, Chase has by his mental activity and schemes contrived to draw from the people their funds and credit in the prosecution of a war to which they willingly give their blood as well as their treasure.

Some late remarks in the Senate have a mischievous tendency, and there is no mistaking the fact that they have their origin in the Treasury Department. The Administration is arraigned as a departmental one in its management of affairs, and unfortunately the fact is so, owing chiefly to the influence of Seward. But Chase himself is not free from blame in this matter. He did not maintain, as he should have done, the importance of Cabinet consultations and decisions at the beginning, but cuddled first with Cameron, then with Stanton, but gained no strength. Latterly his indifference is more manifest than that of any other one, not excepting Stanton. This being the case, it does not become his special friends to assail the President on that score. Chase himself is in fault.

The President commenced his administration by yielding apparently almost everything to Seward, and Seward was opposed to Cabinet consultations. He made it a point to have daily or more frequent interviews with the President, and to ascertain from him everything that was being done in the several Departments. A different course was suggested and pressed by others, but Chase, who should, from his position and standing, have been foremost in the matter and who was most decidedly with us then, flinched and shirked the point. He was permitted to do with his own Department pretty much as he pleased, and this reconciled him to the Seward policy in a great degree, though he was sometimes restless and desired to be better informed, particularly in regard to what was doing in the War Department. Things, however, took such a course that the Administration became departmental, and the result was the President himself was less informed than he should have been and much less than he ardently craved to be, with either the War or the Treasury. The successive Generals-in-Chief he consulted constantly, as did Seward, and, the military measures being those of most absorbing interest, the President was constantly seeking and asking for information, not only at the Executive Mansion, but at their respective offices and headquarters. Scott, and McClellan, and Halleck, each influenced him more than they should have done, often in a wrong direction, for he better appreciated the public mind and more fully sympathized with it than any of his generals. Neither of the three military men named entered into the great political questions of the period with any cordiality, or in fact with any correct knowledge or right appreciation of them. Yet they controlled and directed military movements, and in some respects the policy of the government, far more than the Cabinet.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 524-7

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, February 2, 1864

Senator Grimes made a very good speech to-day in the Senate on naval affairs, in which he introduced a letter from Donald McKay, the eminent shipbuilder of Boston, complimenting our naval vessels and doing justice to the Bureau of Construction and Engineering, which have been of late so much abused. Truth will vindicate itself, though slowly. The persistent assault on the Navy Department is not without a purpose. There is design in it. The contractors, the claim agents, the corrupt portion of newspaper correspondents, and unprincipled Members of Congress are all engaged in this business. I am not mistaken in the fact that there is villainy in the scheme, for villains are combining in it. There is a conviction in my mind, although I cannot cite a tangible or certain fact to establish it, that the War Department had secretly instigated these attacks. I am, however, impressed with an earnest belief that there is a mischievous design to divert attention from the acts and doings of the military branch of the service by starting off with a hue and cry against the Navy.

But little of importance was done at the Cabinet-meeting. Several subjects discussed. Seward was embarrassed about the Dominican question. To move either way threatened difficulty. On one side Spain, on the other side the negro. The President remarked that the dilemma reminded him of the interview between two negroes, one of whom was a preacher endeavoring to admonish and enlighten the other. “There are,” said Josh, the preacher, “two roads for you, Joe. Be careful which you take. One ob dem leads straight to hell, de odder go right to damnation.” Joe opened his eyes under the impressive eloquence and awful future and exclaimed, “Josh, take which road you please; I go troo de wood.” “I am not disposed to take any new trouble,” said the President, “just at this time, and shall neither go for Spain nor the negro in this matter, but shall take to the woods.”

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 519-20

Gideon Welles to Captain Samuel Mercer, April 5, 1861

Navy Department

April 5th, 1861.

Captain Samuel Mercer

Com'dg. U.S.S. Powhatan, New York.

The United States steamers “Powhatan,” “Pawnee,” “Pocahontas,” and "Harriet Lane" will compose a naval force under your command to be sent to the vicinity of Charleston S. C. for the purpose of aiding in carrying out the objects of an expedition of which the War Department has charge.

The primary object of the expedition is to provision Fort Sumter, for which purpose the War Department will furnish the necessary transports. Should the authorities of Charleston permit the Fort to be supplied, no further particular service will be required of the force under your command; and after being satisfied that supplies have been received at the Fort, the “Powhatan,” “Pocahontas” and “Harriet Lane” will return to New York and the “Pawnee” to Washington.

Should the authorities at Charleston, However, refuse to permit or attempt to prevent the vessel or vessels having supplies on board from entering the harbor, or from peaceably proceeding to Fort Sumter, you will protect the transports or boats of the expedition in the object of their mission, disposing of your force in such manner as to open the way for their ingress and afford, so far as practicable, security to the men and boats, and repelling by force, if necessary, all obstructions toward provisioning the Fort and reinforcing it; for in case of a resistance to the peaceable primary object of the expedition a reenforcement of the garrison will also be attempted. These purposes will be under the supervision of the War Department, which has charge of the expedition. The expedition has been intrusted to Captain G. V. Fox, with whom you will put yourself in communication and cooperate with him to accomplish and carry into effect its object.

You will leave New York with the “Powhatan” in time to be off Charleston bar, ten miles distant from and due east of the lighthouse, on the morning of the 11th inst., there to await the arrival of the transport or transports with troops and stores. The “Pawnee” and “Pocahontas” will be ordered to join you there at the time mentioned, and also the “Harriet Lane,” which latter vessel has been placed under the control of this department for this service.

On the termination of the expedition, whether it be peaceable or otherwise, the several vessels under your command will return to the respective ports as above directed, unless some unforeseen circumstances should prevent.

I am, resp'y, your ob't servt.

Gideon Welles

Secretary of the Navy.

Captain Mercer took this order with him when he turned over the command to Lieut. Porter. He sent no copy to the next senior officer of the Sumter expedition. [Note by G. V. F]

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 23-5

Colonel Lorenzo Thomas to Col. D. D. Tompkins, Wednesday, April 4, 1861

War Department,                   

Adjutant-General's Office,    

Wednesday April 4th, 1861.

Col. D. D. Tompkins,

Asst-Quartermaster

New York.

Sir:

By direction of the War Department, you will charter such vessels as Captain G. V. Fox the bearer of this, may designate, for such times and with such supplies, as he may indicate.

I am, Sir, very resp'y your ob't serv't,

L. Thomas, 

Adjutant General.

SOURCES: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 20

W. E. Doster to Captain William Thompson Lusk, January 19, 1863

Washington, Jan. 19th, 1863.

My dear Lusk:

Yours was received this morning. I spread myself on the subject of unrequited merit accordingly and went in person to the War Department. Asst. Secy. Watson promised to let me have it to-morrow, but as you are impatient I write to-night. Of course it must receive the approbation of Stanton also, but altogether you have good reason to hope.

Very truly,

Meanwhile,

Doster.

SOURCE: William Chittenden Lusk, Editor, War Letters of William Thompson Lusk, p. 273

Gustavus V. Fox to Montgomery Blair, Sunday, March 31, 1861, p.m.

Sunday, P.M.

31 Mch. '61

D^r Judge.

I am writing this at Mr. Aspinwall's house. He has just had an interview with Capt. Marshall who declines to have anything to do with the matter. This is serious as he was expected to obtain all the provisions in what is called the desiccated form. These would occupy only half the space of others, could all be carried in bags, in the boats, facilitating the landing and giving the garrison, always, fresh provisions. Ships out of N. Y. now use them. Mr. Aspinwall says we can have the Baltic but he is evidently very averse to the movement. He is now writing and will send on a special messenger who takes this. I also wrote you by mail this morning. Mr. A. and Capt. M. say the loan would not be taken if this news leaked out which it will not here. Verbal orders having been given to me, which cannot be carried out, now Marshall declines, without placing me in immediate prominence. I give you the earliest information, that the War Dept. may give the necessary orders, which they can give Tuesday noon after the loan bids are received. All the desiccated meats &c are put into a size that will allow them to be bagged in common gunny bags of 2½  bushel size. We can also put coal into bags as we go down.

The Baltic's ten boats will hold all the men and the Provisions, in this form, — but in the ordinary form, i.e. salt, not one half. No flour should be sent, only bread. So we could use tugs or boats. Perhaps both.

The arguments of opposition to this act of solemn duty are all political. Capt. Marshall has been in Washington for two weeks and wishes to know if Mr. Seward goes for it. His only fear of success is the impossibility of getting their tugs out of the way — not difficult with an efficient naval force. Then the whole thing is child's play. I feel like abandoning my country, moving off somewhere. I am sick down to my heel.

The Baltic can be got ready in three days. Be particular about the provisions — desiccated and to go in bags, which can be done in the Baltic on the way down.

Has Major A. a range for burning wood or coal at the fort. This is important. I expect to hear from you at the earliest moment. Mr. A has written to the Pres^t advising no movement until the loan is taken and sends it with this note.

Very sincerely

G. V. Fox

SOURCES: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 13-14

Edwin M. Stanton to Major-General Godfrey Weitzel, April 9, 1865 – 8 p.m.

WAR DEPARTMENT,         

Washington, D.C., April 9, 1865 — 8 p.m.

Major-General WEITZEL,

Richmond:

It has just been reported to this Department that you have, at the instance of Mr. Campbell, consented that service should be performed in the Episcopal churches of Richmond to-day without the usual prayer said in loyal churches of that denomination for the President of the United States, and that you have even agreed to waive that condition. If such has been your action it is strongly condemned by this Department. As I am unwilling to believe that a general officer of the United States, commanding in Richmond, would consent to such an omission of respect to the President of the United States, you are directed immediately to report by telegraph your action in relation to religious services in Richmond, and the prayer for the President in Episcopal churches, and also to state what took place between you and Mr. Campbell on the subject. You are, moreover, directed to hold no further conference with Mr. Campbell on any subject without specific authority, to be given by the President or this Department; but if he desires to make any communication to you it must be in writing, and transmitted by you to this Department for instructions.

EDWIN M. STANTON,       

Secretary of War.

(Copy to be given to Mr. Dana.)

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I Volume 46, Part 3 (Serial No. 97), p. 678

Edwin M. Stanton to Andrew Johnson, June 14, 1865

War Department Washington City,

June 14th 1865.

Mr. President:

I have the honor to acknowledge the reference to this Department of two complaints – one in respect to the restrictions upon the sale of spiritouous liquors in the City of Richmond; and the other in relation to the regulations governing the sale of spirituous liquors in the City of Savannah.  These restrictions are undoubtedly in conflict with the general regulations recently established by your authority.  All trade regulations are, and always have been understood to be, subject to the military necessity existing in any particular locality; and where they come in conflict with such police regulations as, in the judgment of the Commander of the post, detachment, or army, are required for the safety of his command, the public safety is itself jeoparded.  By express authority from this Department, General Halleck was authorized to restrict the traffic in spirituous liquors in the City of Richmond, or even to prohibit it altogether, should such a course be found necessary for the military safety of that place.  The same general authority belongs to any military safety of that place.  The same general authority belongs to any military commander, and is the occasion of the restriction upon the liquor trade in the City of Savannah.  In my judgment, as the Government holds the commanding officers of those two important places responsible for their security, it would not be wise to control them in the exercise of that discretion which they alone can properly exert.  The small gains that would accrue to one or more liquor dealers, on the profits they might realize from this traffic, can be no consideration for a riot, a mob, or a military tumult, endangering arsenals, depots, and millions of public property.  I would therefore advise that no action be taken in reference to these complaints, but that the matter be left, where it now is, entirely in the hands of the Military Commanders.

I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

Edwin M. Stanton

Secretary of War.

SOURCE: Paul H. Bergeron, Editor, The Papers of Andrew Johnson, Volume 8: May-August 1865, p. 243-4

John G. Nicolay to Therena Bates, January 14, 1862

[Washington, 14 January 1862]

. . . The President made an item of news yesterday for the country by appointing Edwin M. Stanton of Pa Secretary of war in place of Simon Cameron whom he sends as Minister to Russia.  Cassius M. Clay of Kentucky, now holding that place will come home and take a generalship in the army.  Quite a little shuffle all round.

So far as the Secretaryship of War is concerned I think the change a very important and much needed one.  I don’t know Mr. Stanton personally but he is represented as being an able and efficient man, and I shall certainly look for very great reforms in the war department.  So far the Department has substantially taken care of itself. . . .

SOURCE: Michael Burlingame, Editor, With Lincoln in the White House: Letters, Memoranda, and Other Writings of John G. Nicolay, 1860-1865, p. 66

Major-General Benjamin F. Butler to Edwin M. Stanton, May 25, 1862

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,

New Orleans, May 25, 1862.

Hon. E. M. STANTON,

Secretary of War:

SIR: In matters pertaining to the conduct of affairs in my own department which affect that alone I will trouble you for instructions as little as possible, but in those which affect the administrative policy of the country I beg leave to refer to the help of the War Department for advice and direction. The question now pressing me is the state of negro property here and the condition of the negroes as men. It has a gravity as regards both white and black appalling as the mind follows out the logical necessities of different lines of action. Ethnological in its proportions and demands for investigation, it requires active administrative operations immediately upon the individual in his daily life, his social, political, and religious status as a human being, while some of the larger deductions of political economy are to be at once worked out by any given course of conduct. It cannot be solved therefore without thought or discussion by a phrase or a paragraph. The question now comes to me in a different form from that in which it has presented itself to any other military commander.

At Fortress Monroe during the last summer I found the negro deserted by his master or having been forced by him into the fortification as the builder and thus made to aid in the rebellion. The rights of property under that condition of things could be easily settled. The man was to be treated as a human being wrecked upon a civilized coast, all his social ties and means of living gone, to be cared for because he was a man. My action thereupon is well known and was approved by the Government.

At Port Royal the same condition of things substantially obtained and I suppose will be dealt with in like manner. Here, however, an entirely different state of the question is disclosed.

The general commanding finds himself in possession of a tract of country larger than some States of the Union. This has submitted to the Government of the United States; a community with whom by proclamation the President is about opening commercial relations with all the world except for that which is contraband of war; rich in fertile lands; in it a city of the first class, wherein its inhabitants by a large majority are attending to their usual avocations and endeavoring in good faith to live quietly under the laws of the Union, and whoever does not do so is speedily punished and his compeers thereby admonished.

To this city and vicinage has been pledged the governmental protection and inviolability of the rights of property under the laws of the United States so long as these conditions of peace and quiet shall be preserved, and that pledge has been accepted by the good, loyal, and peaceful, and the power of the Union is respected by the wicked, so that they have become peaceful, if not loyal. It is found that a large portion of property held here is in slaves. They till the soil, raise the sugar, corn, and cotton, lead and unload the ships; they perform every domestic office, and are permeated through every branch of industry and peaceful calling.

In a large degree the owners of the soil, planters, farmers, mechanics, and small traders have been passive rather than active in the rebellion. All that had real property at stake have been the led rather than the leaders in this outbreak against law and order. In the destruction of cotton and sugar even, which has been so largely effected, the owners and producers have not been the destroyers, but in many cases the resistants of destruction.

There is still another class. Those actively in arms and those who for motives of gain or worse have aided the rebellion in their several spheres.

The property of these I am hunting out and holding for confiscation under the laws. There is in most cases no military necessity for its immediate confiscation. Such act, if done, would in many instances work injustice to the bona fide loyal creditor, whose interest the Government will doubtless consider. I am only confiscating in fact in cases where there is a breach of a positive order, for the purpose of punishment and example. In all these cases I have no hesitation as to the kinds of property or rights of property which shall be confiscated, and make no distinctions, save that where that property consists in the services of slaves I shall not sell it until so ordered.

Now, many negroes (slaves) have come within my lines. Many have sought to be kept, fed, and to live in the quarters with my troops. Loyal and disloyal masters have lost them alike. I have caused as many to be employed as I have use for. I have directed all not employed to be sent out of my lines, leaving them subject to the ordinary laws of the community in that behalf.

I annex all orders and communications to my officers upon this matter up to the date of the transmission of this dispatch.

Now, what am I to do? Unless all personal property of all rebels is to be confiscated (of the policy of which a military commander has no right to an opinion) it is manifestly unjust to make a virtual confiscation of this particular species of property. Indeed it makes an actual confiscation of all property, both real and personal, of the planter if we take away or allow to run away his negroes as his crop is just growing, it being impossible to supply the labor necessary to preserve it. Again, if a portion of these slaves only are to be taken within my lines, and if to be so taken is a benefit to them, it is unjust to those that are not taken. Those that come early to us are by no means the best men and women. With them, as with the whites, it is the worse class that rebel against and evade the laws that govern them. The vicious and unthrifty have felt punishment of their masters as a rule, the exception being where the cruel master abuses the industrious and well-behaved slave, and the first to come are those that feel particular grievances.

It is a physical impossibility to take all. I cannot feed the white men within my lines. Women and children are actually starving in spite of all that I can do. Ay, and they too without fault on their part. What would be the state of things if I allowed all the slaves from the plantations to quit their employment and come within the lines is not to be conceived by the imagination.

Am I then to take of these blacks only the adventurers, the shiftless, and wicked, to the exclusion of the good and quiet? If coming within our lines is equivalent to freedom, and liberty is a boon, is it to be obtained only by the first that apply?

I had written thus far when by the Ocean Queen I received a copy of an order of Major-General Hunter upon this subject in the Department of the South. Whether I assent or dissent from the course of action therein taken it is not my province to criticise it.

I desire, however, to call attention to the grounds upon which it seems to be based and to examine how far they may be applicable here.

The military necessity does not exist here for the employment of negroes in arms, in order that we may have an acclimated force. If the War Department desires, and will permit, I can have 5,000 able bodied white citizens enlisted within 60 days, all of whom have lived here many years, and many of them drilled soldiers, to be commanded by intelligent loyal officers. Besides, I hope and believe that this war will be ended before any body of negroes could be organized, armed, and drilled so as to be efficient.

The negro here, by long habit and training, has acquired a great horror of fire-arms, sometimes ludicrous in the extreme when the weapon is in his own hand. I am inclined to the opinion that John Brown was right in his idea of arming the negro with a pike or spear instead of a musket, if they are to be armed at all. Of this I say nothing, because a measure of governmental policy is not to be discussed in the dispatch of a subordinate military officer.

In this connection it might not be inopportune to call to mind the fact that a main cause of the failure of the British in their attack on New Orleans was the employment of a regiment of blacks brought with them from the West Indies. This regiment was charged with the duty of carrying the facines with which the ditch in front of Jackson's line was to be filled up and the ladders for scaling the embankment. When the attacking column reached the point of assault the facines and ladders were not there. Upon looking around for them it was found that their black guardians had very prudently laid themselves down upon the plain in the rear and protected their heads from the whistling shot with the facines which should have been to the front in a different sense.

I am further inclined to believe that the idea that our men here cannot stand the climate, and therefore the negroes must be freed and armed as an acclimated force, admits of serious debate.

My command has been either here or on the way here from Ship Island since the 1st of May, some of them on shipboard in the river since the 17th of April. All the deaths in the general hospital in this city since we have been here are only 13 from all causes, 2 of these being accidental, as will appear from Surgeon Smith's report, herewith submitted. From diseases at all peculiar to the climate I do not believe we have lost in the last thirty days one-fifth of one per cent. in the whole command; taking into the account also the infirm and debilitated, who ought never to have passed the surgeon's examination and come here.

Certain it is, if we admit the proposition that white men cannot be soldiers in this climate, we go very far toward asserting the dogma that white men cannot labor here, and therefore establish the necessity for exclusively black labor, which has ever been the corner-stone of African slavery.

We have heard much in the newspapers of the free-negro corps of this city organized for the defense of the South. From this a very erroneous idea may have been derived. The officers of that company called upon me the other day upon the question of the continuance of their organization and to learn what disposition they would be required to make of their arms; and in color, nay, also in conduct, they had much more the appearance of white gentlemen than some of those who have favored me with their presence claiming to be the “chivalry of the South.”

I have satisfied myself, if I have failed to satisfy the Department, that no military necessity exists to change the policy of the Government in this respect within my command.

I have given hurriedly amidst the press of other cares some of the considerations that seem to me to bear upon the question. I only add as a fact that those well-disposed to the Union here represent that the supposed policy of the Government, as indicated by General Hunter's order, is used by our enemies to paralyze all the efforts to co-operate with us.

Reared in the full belief that slavery is a curse to a nation, which my further acquaintance with it only deepens and widens, from its baleful effects upon the master, because as under it he cannot lift the negro up in the scale of humanity therefore the negro drags him down, I have no fear that my views will be anywhere misunderstood. I only accept the fact of its present existence, the “tares among the wheat,” and have asked the direction of the Department, “lest while I gather up the tares I root up also the wheat with them,” or shall I “let both grow together till the harvest?”

Respectfully, &c.,

 BENJ. F. BUTLER,

 Major-General, Commanding.

[lnclossures.]

• Major-General Benjamin F. Butler to Brigadier General John W. Phelps, May 9, 1862
• Major-General Benjamin F. Butler to Brigadier General John W. Phelps, May 10, 1862
• Major-General Benjamin F. Butler to Brigadier General John W. Phelps, May 21, 1862
• Major-General Benjamin F. Butler to Brigadier General John W. Phelps, May 23, 1862

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 15 (Serial No. 21), p. 439-42