Diary of Private William S. White, April 21, 1861

“THE PAWNEE WAR.”

For a day or so since there has been a report current that the United States steamer "Pawnee" was certainly on its way to Richmond, and we were ordered to hold ourselves in readiness to leave at a moment's notice. We have not yet been "mustered into service," and of course we spend our nights and spare moments at home, consequently there must be some preconcerted signal to call us together if we should be immediately wanted. That signal was the tolling of the public bell—three strokes, silence, then three strokes again. Last night I was "on guard," and this morning 'twas nearly midday before I arose. Having dressed myself I sauntered leisurely up Main street toward the Spotswood Hotel, where our battery was stationed, thinking sombrely of the great struggle before us, when hark! a bell tolls—once, twice, three times—silence; again it tolls. "Fall in, Howitzers!" The first command of the war!

With a shout the soldiers rush to their rendezvous and soon we are on our way to Wilton—a high bluff commanding the approach to Richmond, and some eight miles below. Of all the amusing spectacles this "Pawnee War" was the most amusing I ever beheld. It was a matter of utter impossibility for such a vessel as the "Pawnee" to come up the river any where near Richmond, yet no one thought of that—young and old, rich and poor, bond and free turned out en masse to drive back or sink with double-barrel shot guns, and long-let-off-from-duty horse-pistols, this formidable Northern War steamer. ’Tis said that one of our heaviest citizens paid Walsh, the gunsmith, five dollars in good and lawful Virginia currency to show him how to load his pistol. Walsh must have taken it for granted that somebody was going to be hurt.

The Richmond Howitzers, a battery of six guns; the Fayette Artillery, six guns; the Richmond Grays; Company "F," and a host of amateur warriors took position on the Wilton Bluffs and calmly awaited the war ship's approach, but no Pawnee came, and quietly we gathered our blankets around us, and, for the first time, "slept the warrior's sleep."

The "pale moon rose up slowly”—rose on a country just commencing a fratricidal war, and the twinkling stars seemed holding a "council of grief," as from their starry home they beheld sleeping men who would awake to a soldier's life.

SOURCE: William S. White, A Diary of the War; or What I Saw of It, p. 92-3

Diary of Private William S. White, April 22, 1861

No dread "Pawnee" coming we returned to Richmond to-day, and in a few days will go into a camp of instruction. We now consider ourselves regular soldiers of the Southern Confederacy, having received our first orders yesterday, and we date our enlistment from that period.

SOURCE: William S. White, A Diary of the War; or What I Saw of It, p. 93

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, July 11, 1865

The Cabinet-meeting was full. Stanton submitted an application from Judge Campbell, asking to be released from imprisonment in Pulaski. Seward talked generalities, but on the whole would not advise Campbell's release at present. Said C. was a fool; that he lacked common sense and had behaved singularly. I remarked that he was a judge of the highest court, had failed in his duty at a critical moment, that he was the only judge on that bench that had been recreant and a traitor, and he would be one of the last I would recommend for special favor. The others coincided with me, and some were even stronger.

Stanton also stated the circumstances under which he had sent a guard to close Ford's Theatre, and prevent it from being reopened. Was opposed to its ever being again used as a place of public amusement. Ford, he said, expected to make money from the tragedy, by drawing crowds to the place where Lincoln was slain. McCulloch and Harlan said that a crowd was gathering for riotous purposes, and that commotion would have followed the opening of the theatre. Stanton assigned that as one of the principal reasons for his course. It was concluded that it would not be advisable for the present to permit any attempt to open the theatre, for, in the present state of the public mind, tumult and violence, endangering not only the theatre but other property in the vicinity and human life, would be certain to follow.

The President and Cabinet agreed to visit Rear-Admiral Dahlgren on the Pawnee. Went on the tug Geranium from the foot of 7th St. at half past-four. Had a pleasant time. A heavy shower came upon us on our return and delayed us at the wharf for nearly an hour.

Both Stanton and Seward are disposed to exercise arbitrary power, — have too little regard for personal rights. The two men, I think, act in concert and have an understanding with each other on most important questions. If neither felt quite so severe towards Campbell, the traitor judge, as the rest of us, they were harsher towards the other prisoners. On the question of Ford's Theatre there had, I thought, been preconcert between them. True some others of the Cabinet were under apprehension of a mob disturbance and concurred with them. I thought Ford's course not commendable in some respects, but, after all, who shall destroy his property or take it from him? A wrong is done him whether deprived of his own by arbitrary government acts or by mob violence. Stanton says he has been compelled to seize buildings for public use and can take this. But this is a perversion. He does not need this building; it is an excuse, a false pretext. And I doubt if he will put it to any public use, though I presume he will pay Ford for depriving him of his property.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 330-2

Diary of Gideon Welles: Wednesday, July 12, 1865

The Pawnee left to-day for Portsmouth. Edgar went in her, though with some reluctance.

Newton Case, of Hartford, wishes me to get permission of the Secretary of War for him to visit and correspond with Alexander H. Stephens, now in Fort Warren, who is preparing a work which Case and others are to publish. Stanton declines extending any facilities. Says Stephens can write and they can publish, but he won't help them. I thought the refusal injudicious. The work will be forthcoming. Why be discourteous and harsh to the prisoner? I have not a high regard for Stephens, who has not erred in ignorance, but he has ability and I would let him tell his story.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 332

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, July 17, 1865

Last Tuesday, when on board the Pawnee with the President and Cabinet, Stanton took me aside and desired to know if the Navy could not spare a gunboat to convey some prisoners to Tortugas. I told him a vessel could be detailed for that purpose if necessary, but I inquired why he did not send them by one of his own transports. He then told me he wanted to send the persons connected with the assassination of President Lincoln to Tortugas, instead of a Northern prison, that he had mentioned the subject to the President, and it was best to get them into a part of the country where old Nelson or any other judge would not try to make difficulty by habeas corpus. Said he would make further inquiries and see me, but wished strict secrecy. On Friday he said he should want a boat and I told him we had none here, but the Florida might be sent to Hampton Roads, and he could send his men and prisoners thither on one of the army boats in the Potomac. I accordingly sent orders for the Florida. Yesterday General Townsend called on me twice on the subject, and informed me in the evening that General Hancock would leave in a boat at midnight to meet the Florida. I suggested that General H. had better wait; we had no information yet that the Florida had arrived, and she would be announced to us by telegraph as soon as she did arrive. To-day I learn the prisoners and a guard went down last night, and I accordingly sent orders by telegraph, by request of Secretary of War, to receive and convey the guard and prisoners to Tortugas.

Seward sent to see me. Had dispatches from the Spanish government that the Stonewall should be given up. Is to send me copies, but the yellow fever is prevalent in Havana and it would be well to leave the Stonewall there until fall.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 334-5

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, June 26, 1865

A very wet day. Was to have visited Admiral Dahlgren on the Pawnee with the President, but, the day being inclement and the President somewhat indisposed, the visit was deferred.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 323-4

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, June 27, 1865

The President still ill, and the visit to the Pawnee further postponed. No Cabinet-meeting. The President is feeling the effects of intense application to his duties, and over-pressure from the crowd.

A great party demonstration is being made for negro suffrage. It is claimed the negro is not liberated unless he is also a voter, and, to make him a voter, those who urge this doctrine would subvert the Constitution, and usurp or assume authority not granted to the Federal government. While I am not inclined to throw impediments in the way of the universal, intelligent enfranchisement of all men, I cannot lend myself to break down constitutional barriers, or to violate the reserved and undoubted rights of the States. In the discussion of this question, it is evident that intense partisanship instead of philanthropy is the root of the movement. When pressed by arguments which they cannot refute, they turn and say if the negro is not allowed to vote, the Democrats will get control of the government in each of the seceding or rebellious States, and in conjunction with the Democrats of the Free States they will get the ascendency in our political affairs. As there must and will be parties, they may as well form on this question, perhaps, as any other. It is centralization and State rights. It is curious to witness the bitterness and intolerance of the philanthropists in this matter. In their zeal for the negro they lose sight of the fundamental law of all constitutional rights and safeguards, and of the civil regulations and organization of the government.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 324

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, July 10, 1865

A rainy day. We were to have had an excursion to the Pawnee, the flag-ship of Admiral Dahlgren, but the weather has prevented.

I read to the President two letters from Senator Sumner of the 4th and 5th of July, on the subject of negro suffrage in the Rebel States. Sumner is for imposing this upon those States regardless of all constitutional limitations and restriction. It is evident he is organizing and drilling for that purpose, and intends to make war upon the Administration policy and the Administration itself. The President is not unaware of the scheming that is on foot, but I know not if he comprehends to its full extent this movement, which is intended to control him and his Administration.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 330

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, May 29, 1865

[W]e took a morning ride, Mrs. Welles being able to go with us, and drove about the place. Returning to the wharf, we took a tug, visited the Pawnee, and then went to Sumter, Moultrie, Fort Johnston, etc. The day was beautiful and all enjoyed it.

There was both sadness and gratification in witnessing the devastation of the city and the deplorable condition of this seat of the Rebellion. No place has suffered more or deserved to have suffered more. Here was the seat of Southern aristocracy. The better blood — the superior class, as they considered themselves — here held sway and dictated the policy, not only of Charleston but of South Carolina, and ultimately of the whole South. The power of association and of exclusiveness has here been exemplified and the consequences that follow from the beginning of evil. Not that the aristocracy had more vigorous intellects, greater ability, for they had not, yet their wealth, their ancestry, the usage of the community gave them control.

Mr. Calhoun, the leading genius and master mind of the State, was not one of the élite, the first families, but was used, nursed, and favored by them, and they by him. He acknowledged their supremacy and deferred to them; they recognized his talents and gave him position. He pandered to their pride; they fostered his ambition.

Rhett, one of the proudest of the nobility, had the ambition of Calhoun without his ability, yet he was not destitute of a certain degree of smartness, which stimulated his aspirations. More than any one else, perhaps, has he contributed to precipitating this Rebellion and brought these terrible calamities on his State and country. The gentlemanly, elegant, but brilliantly feeble intellects of his class had the vanity to believe they could rule, or establish a Southern empire. Their young men had read Scott's novels, and considered themselves to be knights and barons bold, sons of chivalry and romance, born to fight and to rule. Cotton they knew to be king, and slavery created cotton. They used these to combine other weak minds at the South, and had weak and willing tools to pander to them in certain partisans at the North.

The results of their theory and the fruits of their labors are to be seen in this ruined city and this distressed people. Luxury, refinement, happiness have fled from Charleston; poverty is enthroned there. Having sown error, she has reaped sorrow. She has been, and is, punished. I rejoice that it is so.

On Monday evening we left for Savannah, but, a storm coming on, the Santiago put into Port Royal, having lost sight of our consort. It had been our intention to stop at this place on our return, but, being here, we concluded to finish our work, and accordingly went up to Beaufort. Returning, we visited Hilton Head and Fort Welles on invitation from General Gillmore.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 312-3

Captain Percival Drayton to Flag Officer Samuel F. Dupont, June 30, 1862

U.S.S. Pawnee        

Stono River June 30th. 1862 

Sir, 

I had written you a letter on the 28th in relation to the most unfortunate and at the same time injurious evacuation of James Island by the army, as our forces were quite securely placed in an advantageous position. I cannot comprehend it, except on the supposition of positive orders from home, or the adoption by Genl. Hunter of a policy similar to that which has so frequently induced the Southern places of strength to be vacated, but which we have never yet understood. 

In the present case, I am satisfied that what is being done, will not only greatly inspirit the enemy, but depress our own troops, who must look upon themselves as beaten off, and by a force little if at all superior to theirs. As it will not now be necessary to send the letter alluded to above, I will merely repeat in substance, what I there said, and which has been talked over since with Capt. Rodgers. I am quite convinced, that if we seriously determine on the reoccupation of their deserted batteries on this river, no number of wooden vessels could wholly prevent it, but still as I think that they would be much more likely to undertake this, were there no chance of interruption, I recommend that a sufficient force be left here, to, at least, oblige caution in their approaches, and thus at least gain time, which may enable us to perhaps retake our old positions here, should Genl. Hunter's policy not meet with approval. 

Coles Island is so difficult of access, and the anchorage so roomy, that vessels lying in it could scarcely be interfered with, at least without plenty of warning, and they would be also in easy communication with our squadron outside by signal. I would consequently recommend that after the departure of the Army, our ships remain in the river to retain as complete possession as may be practicable, at least until you are satisfied that all attempts on Charleston are to be definitely given up, when you can of course reduce the force to the mere requirements of a blockade; until the army is safely on board, no vessel should, in my opinion, leave, immediately on that being done, I will send to Port Royal the Unadilla, and to Capt. Marchand the Huron, waiting further orders from you for the disposition of the other vessels. As I have before said, I do not believe that in their present depressed state of feeling, the attempt will be made by the Confederates to reoccupy any of their deserted coast lines, should they however be inspirited, either by success at the North, or by a continuance of such acts as the one I have commented upon above, they can scarcely help becoming bold on our timidity, and will no doubt at once endeavor to prevent another approach to Charleston by James Island the only one where our army can have a firm base of operations in complete communication with its own transports, and our fleet, and when it at once fixes itself, without any risk, within sight of the steeples of Charleston. 

Very Respy Your Obdt Servt. 

P. DRAYTON Comdr     

Senior Offr 

Flag Officer S. F. DuPont 

    Comdg. S. Atl. Sqdn 

        Port Royal

P. S. The Paul Jones arrived here direct from Washington on the 25 June on the 30th with orders to report to the Senior Officer at Stono. I will keep her until I hear from you. 

Very Respy 

P. DRAYTON 

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 133-5

Captain Percival Drayton to Flag Officer Samuel F. Dupont, July 2, 1862

U.S.S. Pawnee     

Stono July 2" 1862 

My dear Commodore

Rodgers will tell you my opinions and feelings better than I can in a letter, my disgust at this wretched evacuation, is more than I like to express, although I have done so pretty freely, to think of the work, transportation, loss of life and worry of the last month, being all wasted for no earthly reason, perhaps a mere pet, or the desire for a quiet summer, on the part of the Comdg. General. 

It seems almost like a joke, but I really can see no reason why Fernandina and Pulaski should not be next, if mere convenience and concentration is to carry everything before it and blind judgment to rule, anything may be done. I for one do not believe that Charleston can be taken except through James Island, and trust that the rebellion cannot end until its cradle is in our possession. This being the case, you may suppose that I am a little disappointed, when we were on the high road to obtain this object, at our all of a sudden withdrawing without any earthly reason, that we can at least here perceive, for the position occupied by our troops might have been in a few days more almost impregnable, against any means likely to be brought against it, when we might have waited quietly until men could have been spared for an advance, at any rate it would have prevented the withdrawal of troops from Charleston to Richmond, which will now very likely take place, judging from remarks in Charleston papers. I should judge that unless continued misfortunes make cowards of them an attempt will be made to reoccupy this river, which if entered on seriously I am satisfied no naval force can long prevent. I certainly think however that it is worth keeping the door open for a return a little while, although I begin to doubt whether it will be taken advantage of. I think the war is still too much of a means in the hands of politicians and contractors, for real serious work being entered on, such as that at the South. Almost the only real earnestness yet beyond a few soldiers and sailors, seems to be with the people supposed a short time since conquered by us. 

Very truly yours 

P. DRAYTON 

Flag Officer S. F. DuPont
    Wabash
        Port Royal

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 136-7

Captain Percival Drayton to Flag Officer Samuel F. Dupont, July 4, 1862

U.S.S. Pawnee    

Stono July 4" 62 

My Dear Commodore

The troops are all safely at the lower camp, and so far the enemy have taken no notice of the intended evacuation, or offered the least hindrance. I have left two gunboats above to prevent any pushing down on our pickets, and have the other vessels arranged for the protection of the camp and Segareeville, neither of which can now well be interfered with, it will require however at least three or four days more for the removal of every one, when I will immediately send off the Unadilla and Huron and perhaps the Pembina and Norwich. 

Very truly yours 

P. DRAYTON 

Flag Officer S. F. DuPont
    Wabash
        Port Royal

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 137-8

Flag Officer Samuel F. Dupont to Gustavus V. Fox, May 31, 1862

Confidential 

Wabash, 31. May. 62. 

My Dear Sir 

I found the accumulation of men from Prizes so great and the Bienville's Engines so precarious from being out of line, that I determined to send her home.

You will see that we have smashing work with the “Joint Stock company” for running the blockade and I hope we shall catch more of them, but I think you will have to look out for Wilmington, for they will go from Charleston there. Prentiss has fixed Georgetown by going inside as I wrote you. You had better write to McKean about Indian River, there is a possible tran-shipment there, for there is a road from that inlet clear up to Volusia. Except this place Indian River inlet one hd miles below Cape Carnavaral and Wilmington I think all else is as tight as it can be, though I have greatly regretted that the Stono operations have taken so many gunboats from Charleston at this momentbut they are likely to be important for I believe the rebels have discovered the egregious blunder they made in letting go the Forts on Coles island and the old Fort higher up and want to reoccupy the latter fortunately I got Drayton up in time with the Pawnee to go in there, adding Huron to his force—but I am waiting to hear the exact state of things with some earnestness.

The army people have no orders on the matter alluded to in the Confidential dispatch to me, but are studying out things and looking to occupying the Stono.

I see with regret the want of success in the James River with the iron boat, showing more invulnerability on the part of the Monitor than power of aggression.

Think coolly and dispassionately on the main object -remember there is no running the gauntlet, night or day—no bombardment of a week to fatigue and demoralize the defences of the Mississippi the merest shams in comparison—for thirteen long months it has been the remark of our blockading officers that the industry of these rebels in their harbour defences is beyond all praise, it has been ceaseless day and night Sumpter has been strengthened by a water battery attached to it—Cummings Point is covered by heavy works—the Middle ground likewise is piled and fortified-Fort Johnston that reduced Sumpter still improved. Castle Pinckney and Moultrie then come, and all this mind ye in a ‘cul de sac’ or bog. I merely allude to all this, that your own intelligent and brave mind may not be carried away by a superficial view of recent events, where the results have been thank God for his mercies, so great that the difficulties have been naturally overrated. I only have to add on this subject, that if the enemy do their duty as we expect to do ours, then it must be a 'do or die work—but this we are ready for and no mistake.

Since writing the above I have a letter from Drayton who has swept the Stono River up to the fort land. We had unpleasant reports yesterday through the Soldiers that the Gun boats had been driven back, though I told the Gen' there was not a word of truth in it.

I avail myself of Drayton Report to write a full account of our occupation there, having only been informed unofficially of the fact-it is a handsome thing and very important. They have no transportation, five transports have been taken from them lately. They have to throw themselves on me, but—they give me no notice until they are in a state of despondency or despair fortunately I have the Alabama and Bienville in, they will give them important aid; but I have to send my tugs to Beaufort 14 miles to get their troops, they have no Pilots, they have nothing. Still as I have cleared James' Island for them they are anxious to possess it.

They are credited with 18,000 men; if they land 9 thousand they will do well. Wright is in Edisto where our people, Rhind's command are doing everything for them-he is to march over to the Stono, also. They are very helpless. They sent a party to cut the R. R. from Port Royal Ferry, but it was not left to Stevens, and the party came back minus a captain and a private, having done nothing. All this only for your own ear.

I send a boy by Bienville with some arms (trophies) for you to dispose of—the sword is for yrself from Pulaski—a note inside to you explains.

Please order that the Bienville must leave in two weeks, without fail. Oh that Flag! She left the 9th of March!

Ever yrs faithfully 

S. F. DP

Old Sedgwick is good deal of an elephant with his beef, but it is a good thing and we have got along!

Don't fail to read Drayton's report.

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 121-4

Commandant Samuel F. DuPont to Gustavus V. Fox, December 16, 1861

Private

Wabash, 16 Dec

Port Royal

My Dear Sir

I have been merged in reports, surveys, sick, broken machinery &c, so this mail by Atlantic our favorite steamer only takes just such things and no general report of my proceedings which Mr. Welles and yrself would like to have. So I will jot down whatever comes up first.

1". Sherman thinks Fernandina wholly secondary now, and it must fall with Savannah. While I want to take it, more because it entered the original programme, and because it is a nice naval operation, though I am much of the same opinion. With this Harb. St. Helena, and Tybee Sound in the very centre of the stations we have as many harbours of refuge as I want — but I think it may help the Union people to hoist the flag there and so soon as Davis closes up Charleston with the Stone vessels I will take the matter up. In the meantime the Genl has unloaded the vessels — for which he was paying exorbitantly I mean those intended for F. and when I can get ready — if he gives me a Regiment with the marines, it may be quite enough to hold the place. The taking it will not be much, with my present knowledge of it.

2. I shall have Charleston closed this week. Davis was to sail this morg — but the Easterly weather makes work impossible on these bars, particularly with the hulks drawing so much water — they have been very troublesome, but will all pay in some way or other. I gave two yesterday unfit to go to sea again to the QrMaster for wharf and breakwater. The same for sheltering a landing on Tybee very necessary. Davis thinks he will succeed in closing main entrance at Charleston and so do I. Boutelle thinks not, but we will see — if it lasts till March or April it will be worth all the trouble.

3. The Sabine came in yesterday in want of water. St. Lawrence already in for the same purpose. Susquehannah out of coal and then the lame ducks in machinery and the easterly wind keeping in Drayton who with a Division is going to North Edisto and Stono. I felt almost sick at seeing so many vessels in port—but there will be a scattering tomorrow.

I cannot water the Sabine from our resources, she wants some repairs and she may as well go North. Ringgold has shown a good spirit and wishes to be fitted up and sent immediately back, but I declare to you in confidence you can keep her if you can find any use for her but do send me a gun boat or two. The St. Lawrence ought to go home too but I may force her into Brunswick and I am going to send R. Rodgers to reconnoitre there.

The Seminole is next to nothing because she can catch nothing. The Forbes goes to-day. I recommend sending her crew to the Recg. Ship and laying her up until the repairs are completed and then recommissioning — in this way we get rid of poor Newcomb without any notification to him — he is wholly incompetent to command such a vessel and she was the most valuable steamer of her size in my squadron. I have given her rifle gun to Missroon — who is anxious in his responsible position but the very man to be there. I am hurrying Sherman to get his guns down there.

4. All well at St. Helena under Nicholson and Truxtun. The Dale is paying for herself there. Henry Andrew just back from there — made the trip over via Beaufort and Coosaw in five hours! Luce went in her — reports highly as every body does of Mather her Capt. I am going to collect the Cotton again around that Sound letting the Andrew go around. There is much to be had and Nicholson and Truxtun want employment. The Gov. here shirks this cotton question, but I do not care for that. I collect it to keep it from being burnt.

5. Many thanks for Vermont. She will be all in all. She should have a condenser and a place fitted for Machine Shop. Sailing vessels are a drug, but steamers have their weak side — the breaking downs break my heart. Unadilla, Forbes, Flag, Florida, Seminole, tinkering all the time, and the three first done — Susquehannah touch and go. If you would like me to break up the inland Rebel Steamers I must have more Gunboats. Where is the Adger — all this time at Balt^o?

The most active vessel I have after the Gunboats is the Pawnee since she is under Drayton. How came his predecessor in command again after giving up so fine a ship, every one is speaking about it here.

Sherman is preparing for his campaign. I think he knows what he is about, and seems confident of doing something. I wish I could feel any degree of confidence in his troops. Some of our officers the other night while up beyond Beaufort, went out to the outer pickets and found every mother's son asleep and that is not all, they were a long time awaking them.

I am asked every day about that detailed report — do have it published. In great haste

Yrs most truly

S. F. Dupont

A Condenser in the Vermont — see King's report.

Tell Bridge no tobacco nor soap in Relief. Much wanted.

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 78-81

Result Of Gustavus V. Fox's Plan For Reinforcing Fort Sumpter; In His Own Writing

My plan for reinforcing Fort Sumpter was this—

From the outer edge of the bar to Sumpter through the swash channel it is four miles in a straight line, with no shoal spots less than nine feet at high water. The batteries of the enemy on Morris and Sullivan Islands are one and one third of a mile distant from each other, between which the reinforcements must pass.

I proposed to anchor three small men of war at the entrance of the swash channel to afford a safe base of operations. The soldiers and provisions to be taken down in a large steamer, having on board boats for the whole, with three hundred sailors, and accompanied with three steam tugs having a draft of only six feet of water. The entrance to be effected at night with the tugs or boats as circumstances might dictate.

Rough weather would render the attempt impossible in boats but favorable for tugs. Whereas a fine clear night would be more favorable for the smaller objects — boats. This plan was brought to the Pres^ts notice early in March and its practicability assured by his own convictions and concurrent naval testimony.

The military authorities seemed to think it impossible to pass their batteries, but assured the Pres^t that if reinforcements and provisions were thrown in the fort it could not be taken.

I visited Major Anderson on the 21st of March under an open order from the War Dpt, which was shown to Govr Pickens who gave me a pass, without restriction, and I confined my conversation with Major Anderson entirely to objects embraced in that order. Notwithstanding the earnest desire of the Pres^t to reinforce and provision Fort Sumpter, Mr. Seward seems to have been under obligations to oppose the attempt, and his great influence over Genl Scott, brought the military power against the plan.

As Major Anderson's supplies would be utterly exhausted on the 15th of April every effort was made by some strong hand to delay the expedition until its supporters must give it up. The last card was to send for a Union man from the Virginia Convention and say to him that Sumpter would be evacuated at once if the Union people, who were in a majority in the Convention, would adjourn it. This Union man declined the proposition and made so many preposterous demands  that the Pres^t decided the expedition should go forward. The order was given to me late the night of April 4th. The 5th was consumed in getting to N. York, and I sailed the 8th, leaving only three days to get up and dispatch the expedition. Most of those who had favored the expedition and in whom I depended for assistance to fit it out, abandoned it at this period as too late.

Unwilling to mention to the Pres^t the misgivings of those around me I determined to go forward alone.

Instead of the 300 sailors I asked for on board the steamer, the Sec'y of the Navy proposed to send down the Powhatan stm'r of war with that number of men, which was satisfactory to me. Therefore I sailed in the Baltic the 8th inst. without the sailors. The Powhatan having sailed the 6th. The revenue cutter H. Lane, the 8th, the Pawnee the 9th and the Pocahontas the 10th. The Baltic and Pawnee arrived off Charleston the 12th inst. after hostilities had commenced. The H. Lane the evening previous, and the Pocahontas the 13th at the surrender of Sumpter. The passage to Charleston and the day and night of our arrival was severe weather, preventing the tugs reaching the rendezvous. The next day, the 13th inst, seeing no part of my proposed means of effecting an entrance had arrived, a schooner loaded with ice was captured and means undertaken to effect an entrance in her the following night, but at 8 A.M. the wood work of the fort was set on fire by hot shot and by 3 P.M. the place was rendered untenable, and consequently it was surrendered.

The defects of the fort, and its injuries, such as were never anticipated by the engineers, are such, that had the place been provisioned and reinforced, the final result would have been delayed but a few days. The Powhatan, with her sailors, was the whole strength of my proposed plan because both tugs and boats were to be manned by these sailors. Yet the Powhatan sailed from N. York the 6th two days before I did, with an officer who bore an order from the Pres^t of the U. S. to carry her directly to Pensacola. Her regular Captn having the orders of the Navy Dept to cooperate with me at Charleston. This order of the Pres^t was unknown to the war or navy departments and was signed by him in ignorance that the Powhatan was one of my vessels. She was sent off on an expedition got up by the Sec'y of State who thus interfered with the other depts as the last hope of preventing the reinforcing of Sumpter. And it did prevent it, and I had the mortification of witnessing the surrender of the Fort with no part of my proposed plan arrived, in fact deprived by treachery of all power of accomplishing it, and losing reputation with the general public for the failure because I cannot state the facts at this crisis of our affairs without injury to the Govt.

The Charleston people assumed that the merchant vessels detained outside of their bar were the various expeditions which had sailed from N. York about the period of our departure and therefore they concentrated a large force on the islands and abused us for not landing and attacking the batteries. But they were vessels detained by the bombardment. Our military force consisted of 200 recruits of no earthly use to Fort Sumpter in such an emergency because they were undrilled. The S. C. authorities had 13,000. I believe every officer of the army or navy present were entirely satisfied of the feasibility of either of my plans.

In fact their fire upon Sumpter was precipitated because they intercepted my plan and were assured by their best naval authority that it was perfectly practicable.

G. V. Fox.

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 38-41

Gustavus V. Fox to Montgomery Blair, April 17, 1861

Baltic, 17th April

At Sea, 1861  

Dr Blair,

As I have no writing materials and wish to save tomorrow's mail I use a pencil.

Monday at 6 P.M. of the 8th we dropped down to Sandy Hook and anchored for the night, being too late for the tide. One of my tugs went to sea Sunday night, another one followed the Baltic, and the 3d I left in the hands of Russell Sturgis, to send on if he could charter her, the owner, like many others, being shaky at the last moment. At 8 A.M. of the 9th inst. we discharged the pilot and had constant steady bad weather and heavy sea. At 3 A.M. of the 12th reached the rendezvous 10 miles east of Charleston light — found only the H. Lane. At 6 A.M. saw the Pawnee coming in; boarded her and intimated to her Comdr that I was going in to offer to land provisions, asked him to stand in with me. He said his orders were to remain 10 miles east of the light and await the Powhatan. I took the H. Lane as an escort, and as we drew in saw that the forts had all opened fire upon Sumpter and that Major Anderson was replying gallantly. Seeing a stm'r off the bar, supposed to be the Isabel, I notified Capt. Faunce of the H. Lane and he started after her. It proved to be the Nashville from N. York.

I stood out in the Baltic to let Capt. Rowan of the Pawnee know that firing had commenced. I met him, however, coming in. Though he had expressed himself very averse to doing anything to commence the war, he now seemed willing to go in with his vessel if we had a pilot. I advised both vessels to go close in to the swash channel and anchor, which was done, and as the heavy sea and wind had moderated a little, I thought we had better attempt a couple of boats of provisions this night, the 12th, but as the Powhatan and Pocahontas had not arrived and the Pawnee and Lane were both short of hands and we had but one gun launch, the Pawnee's, I was overruled and consented upon the gallant promise of the officers that they would escort me in after daylight in the morning, defying their batteries. This was their proposition. The vessels of war remained at anchor at the Swash whilst I stood out to the rendezvous for the night in hopes of meeting the Powhatan and Pocahontas. It blew very heavy all night with a great swell and towards morning a thick fog. As Capt. Fletcher of the Baltic returned towards the anchorage, near daylight, he ran onto the Rattlesnake Shoal, but soon got off. The waves run so high that we were obliged to anchor some four miles outside of the war vessels, and having this sea it was impossible to load the boats. I took a boat at 8 A.M. 13th inst., and with the senior army officer Lt. Hudson, we pulled in to the Pawnee. As we drew near I saw, with horror, black volumes of smoke issuing from Sumpter. The barbarians, to their everlasting disgrace be it said, redoubled their fire, and through the flames and smoke the noble band of true men continued their response. The severe weather during the forenoon having prevented us using boats, Capt. Rowan captured an ice schooner and offered it to me to carry in the provisions and men. I accepted it and the night of the 13th I should certainly have gone in, and as certainly been knocked to pcs. My tug boats I knew could not have reached Charleston in the weather we had experienced since leaving N. York, and the Powhatan, I now learned, by a note from Capt. Mercer to Capt. Rowan, dated the 7th (I left the 8th, Rowan left the 9th, Gillis the 10th) that the Powhatan was “detached from duty off Charleston.” As she had the 300 sailors I asked for, and the howitzers and fighting launches, and the other ships of war were simply ordered to await her arrival 10 miles off, you will see that some one determined to utterly extinguish the expedition. I do not think I have deserved this treatment, and at present will not speak as I have felt, and now feel. At about 2 P.M. the Pocahontas arrived, just in time to witness the surrender of Fort Sumpter. I immediately suggested a flag of truce to be sent to offer a passage to Major A. and his command, which was done. Had the Powhatan arrived the 12th we should have had the men and provisions into Fort Sumpter, as I had everything ready, boats, muffled oars, small packages of provisions, in fact everything but the 300 sailors promised to me by the dept. A tug would have accomplished it, but with more risk alongside of the Fort. Capt. Foster the Eng. of Fort Sumpter says we would have got in and so does Hartstein of their navy. You know military people all told the Prest we could not get in, but if we did, the Fort was impregnable. In both instances were they wrong. Sumpter's fire had dispersed their naval preparations and they trusted entirely to their batteries and those light boats to illuminate the channel. What can be said of the builders of the fort? The burning of the officers' quarters has almost ruined the gorge wall, so that a few days more fire would have tumbled it all to pcs. One shot from Cummings point (where Cullum said it never could be breached) went entirely through the wall of the gorge. Another shot passed through an inside wall and struck below the door of the magazine, shattering the wall, so as to prevent the opening of the door, at the same time the flames nearly reached this door. In fact they all expected to be blown up. The coupe next to Cummings point is very severely handled and would soon have been a breach. So that this impregnable fort, with 33 guns and 17 mortars, playing upon it for only 34 hours, is injured $400,000 worth and actually burned as much as battered. I think these facts will make a stir, for not one was ever presented in all the discussion we had. The officers and men from the Major down have covered themselves with glory. A fort of 60 fighting men, surrounded by 9000 men, and a circle of fortifications kept up the first day gun for gun with them and on the 2 replied, though from 8 A.M. until 2 P.M. the fort was a mass of smoke through which, and in which, they fought.

I told the Major how anxious the Prest was that they (S.C.) should stand before the civilized world as having fired upon bread, yet they had made the case much worse for themselves as they knew the Major would leave the 15th at noon for want of provisions (see his correspondence), yet they opened upon 60 men and continued it whilst the fort was burning. The "World" (N. Y.) correspondent came down in the H. Lane and is now with us, and as he is the only reporter on board and is continually with the officers I imagine he will have a faithful account. As several ships brigs and schooners and one N. Y. stmr were detained at the bar by the conflict, it was believed to be a whole fleet for the relief of Sumpter with 9000 men on board. Whereas there was the Pawnee and H. Lane with one 12 lb. launch gun and on board the Baltic 200 RECRUITS only two or three of whom ever saw a gun, sent by the Gen1 in Chief, and the flag ship with her power and efficiency sent away without any intimation conveyed to the other vessels, all of which sailed subsequently to this change. Sunday the Major delivered up the fort after saluting his flag with 50 guns, which he intended to be 100, but a premature explosion killed two men and wounded three others, the only casualties of the whole battle. Monday, at noon, he and his command, and the flag (I enclose a pce) came off in the Isabel stmr and were transferred to this vessel when we sailed, all the vessels saluting. Excepting from the time of the surrender to the transfer, we have had a gale of wind just now abating (midnight).

The men in the fort, though on Pork and Rice, never flinched or grumbled, even when fire was added. I think the Prest will keenly approve the Major's course. As for our expedition, somebody's influence has made it ridiculous.

Very truly

G. V. FOX.

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 31-5

• See post script, April 18, 1861

Gideon Welles to Commander Stephen Clegg Rowan, April 5, 1861

Navy Department

April 5th. l861

Commander S. C. Rowan,

Com'dg U.S.S. “Pawnee”

Norfolk, Va.

Sir:

After the “Pawnee” shall have been provisioned at Norfolk, you will proceed with her to sea, and on the morning of the 11th instant, appear off Charleston bar, ten miles distant from and due east of the lighthouse where you will report to Captain Samuel Mercer, of the "Powhatan," for special service. Should he not be there, you will await his arrival.

I am, resp'y, your obt. servt.

Gideon Welles,

Secretary of the Navy.

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 26

Gideon Welles to Captain Samuel Mercer, April 5, 1861

Navy Department

April 5th, 1861.

Captain Samuel Mercer

Com'dg. U.S.S. Powhatan, New York.

The United States steamers “Powhatan,” “Pawnee,” “Pocahontas,” and "Harriet Lane" will compose a naval force under your command to be sent to the vicinity of Charleston S. C. for the purpose of aiding in carrying out the objects of an expedition of which the War Department has charge.

The primary object of the expedition is to provision Fort Sumter, for which purpose the War Department will furnish the necessary transports. Should the authorities of Charleston permit the Fort to be supplied, no further particular service will be required of the force under your command; and after being satisfied that supplies have been received at the Fort, the “Powhatan,” “Pocahontas” and “Harriet Lane” will return to New York and the “Pawnee” to Washington.

Should the authorities at Charleston, However, refuse to permit or attempt to prevent the vessel or vessels having supplies on board from entering the harbor, or from peaceably proceeding to Fort Sumter, you will protect the transports or boats of the expedition in the object of their mission, disposing of your force in such manner as to open the way for their ingress and afford, so far as practicable, security to the men and boats, and repelling by force, if necessary, all obstructions toward provisioning the Fort and reinforcing it; for in case of a resistance to the peaceable primary object of the expedition a reenforcement of the garrison will also be attempted. These purposes will be under the supervision of the War Department, which has charge of the expedition. The expedition has been intrusted to Captain G. V. Fox, with whom you will put yourself in communication and cooperate with him to accomplish and carry into effect its object.

You will leave New York with the “Powhatan” in time to be off Charleston bar, ten miles distant from and due east of the lighthouse, on the morning of the 11th inst., there to await the arrival of the transport or transports with troops and stores. The “Pawnee” and “Pocahontas” will be ordered to join you there at the time mentioned, and also the “Harriet Lane,” which latter vessel has been placed under the control of this department for this service.

On the termination of the expedition, whether it be peaceable or otherwise, the several vessels under your command will return to the respective ports as above directed, unless some unforeseen circumstances should prevent.

I am, resp'y, your ob't servt.

Gideon Welles

Secretary of the Navy.

Captain Mercer took this order with him when he turned over the command to Lieut. Porter. He sent no copy to the next senior officer of the Sumter expedition. [Note by G. V. F]

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 23-5

Captain Gustavus V. Fox: Memorandum for the Relief of Fort Sumter, February 6, 1861

ST. GERMAIN HOTEL,

New York, February 6, 1861.

Since the repulse of the steamer Star of the West at Charleston it may be assumed that all the channels over the bar are obstructed, but as the bar is more than four miles in length the spaces between these channels are too extensive to be closed. Therefore at high water and smooth sea the bar is perfectly accessible to vessels drawing say seven feet of water. The U. S. has no steamers of this draft. The skillfull officers at Charleston, aware of this fact, will conclude that relief must go in at high water in boats or light draft steamers incapable of bearing a very offensive armament. They will be perfectly prepared for such attempts by arming, and heavily manning all the steamers they possess and at the critical moment will throw themselves alongside the relief vessels and thus jeopardise the movement by the very detention of the conflict. To elude their vigilance or attempt a strategem however ingenious I consider too liable to failure.

I propose to put the troops on board of a large, comfortable sea steamer and hire two powerful light draft New York tug boats, having the necessary stores on board. These to be convoyed by the U.S.S. Pawnee, now at Philadelphia, and the revenue cutter Harriet Lane. (The Pawnee is the only available steam vessel of war north of the Gulf of Mexico; draws twelve feet of water and has seven heavy guns. As a steamer she seems to be a failure, but may be got ready for this emergency — at least she is, unfortunately, our only resource.) The Harriet Lane I understand to be an excellent and efficient vessel, but either of these steamers alone may be liable to capture, by an overwhelming force.

Arriving off the bar, I propose to examine by day the naval preparations and obstructions. If their vessels determine to oppose our entrance, and a feint or flag of truce would ascertain this, the armed ships must approach the bar and destroy or drive them on shore. Major Anderson would do the same upon any vessels within the range of his guns and would also prevent any naval succor being sent down from the city.

Having dispersed this force, the only obstacles are the forts on Cummings point, and Fort Moultrie, and whatever adjacent batteries they may have, distant on either hand from mid channel about three-quarters of a mile. Two hours before high water, at night, with half the force on board of each tug, within relieving distance of each other, should run in to Fort Sumpter.

[Endorsement:]

Proposition of Relief of Fort Sumpter Accepted by the Govt. Mch, 1861.

SOURCES: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume 4, p. 223-4; Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 8-9

Memorandum of Capt. Gustavus V. Fox to Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott, February 8, 1861

Feb. 8, 1861

The proposition which I had the honor to submit to you fully in person is herewith presented in writing.

Lt. Hall and myself have had several free conferences and if he is permitted by the South C. authorities to reenter Fort Sumpter, Major Anderson will comprehend the plan for his relief.

I consider myself very fortunate in having proposed a project which meets the approval of the Genl in Chief and I ask no reward but the entire conduct of the part exclusive of the armed vessels. The Commander of these should be ordered to cooperate with me by affording protection and destroying their naval preparations near the bar, leaving to me as the author of the plan the actual operations of relief.

I suggest that the Pawnee be immediately sent to the Delaware breakwater to await orders. The H. Lane to be ready for sea, and some arrangement entered into by which the requisite stmr and tugs should be engaged, at least so far as not to excite suspicion.

I should prefer one of the Collins stmrs. They are now being prepared for sea and one of such a size and power as to be able fearlessly to run down any vessels which might attempt to capture us outside by coup de main. I could quickly engage one & have her ready to start on 24 hours notice without exciting suspicion.

I shall leave for N. York at 3 P.M. to-day and any communication previous will find me at Judge Blairs.

G. V. F.

P.S. If the Pawnee Pivot gun is landed it should certainly be remounted.

Address Lowe & Blunt

F

SOURCES: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 7-8; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 203