Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, June 2, 1866

There was no Cabinet-meeting yesterday, and labor in the Department was suspended on account of the funeral of Lieutenant-General Scott.

Seward sends me a note in pencil, signed by his initials, with a telegraph from Dart, District Attorney of Western New York, stating that Captain Bryson wanted two tugs to assist him in guarding the river. Seward says, in pencil, that the President thinks I had better charter the steamers. He sent his clerk, Mr. Chew, with this note. The whole thing was one of those low, intriguing, petty, contemptible proceedings, shunning responsibility, to which Seward sometimes resorts. I am sorry to write so of one in his position and an associate, but I expressed the matter to Chew without hard words, showing Seward's weakness, [and saying] that this is a war on the Irish in which he, Stanton, and Grant fear to do their duty, but wish me to assume it.

I called on the President and spoke of the management of this Fenian movement a little earnestly, and a little freely. Reminded him that I had some weeks ago, when the subject was brought forward in Cabinet, suggested that the Irish population was an element in our politics, and, therefore, it seemed proper that there should be unity in the Cabinet and among high officials. I consequently proposed that General Grant, who was stationing the military forces on the frontiers West and South, should make a formal communication in accord with the Secretary of War, which all could approve and with which we should all be identified. Stanton was alarmed, I saw; did not think it necessary to take such steps; and from that time the subject has been dropped. I remarked to the President that the proceedings had been singular; that this Fenian movement had appeared to me to be a great bubble, nevertheless there was no denying the fact that large numbers were engaged in it; that they had large supplies of arms; that along our frontier from Eastport to Detroit there had been gatherings of armed men threatening to cross into Canada; that we had sent a naval force by request to Eastport; that our only gunboat on the Lakes had been detained by special request at Buffalo; and now the Secretary of State was calling on me to charter steamers and arm them; chartering vessels for military purposes belonged properly to the Army or War Department. By treaty stipulation we are to have but one naval vessel on the Lakes. Where, I asked him, were the revenue cutters which performed police duty? In all this time the War Department has done nothing. No proclamation has been issued. How and by what authority are we to capture or interfere with prisoners?

The President said it would be well to communicate with Commander Bryson, of the naval steamer Michigan, and ascertain whether additional vessels were wanted. I said that we had revenue cutters on the Lakes, but none were at Buffalo, where they were most wanted; that the Michigan had been detained there now some weeks awaiting a cutter. He thought I had better see the Secretaries of Treasury and State.

McCulloch was confident there were cutters at Buffalo, but on sending for the clerk in charge he found he was mistaken. He said he had turned the whole subject of Fenianism over to Attorney-General Speed, who is devoted to Stanton and Seward.

Seward was in a fog. Did not want to issue a proclamation. I asked what the naval vessels were to do, what authority I had to charter steamers if there was not a state of war. If it was police duty, he or the Treasury should attend to it. I inquired about the military. He said Stanton wanted to keep clear of this question. I well knew this, and he wants me to do duties which belong to him and thus enlist the Irish element against the Administration.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 518-20

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, June 5, 1866

At the Cabinet-meeting an hour or more was wasted in discussing a claim of Madame Bertinatti, a piece of favoritism in which the President has been imposed upon by Seward and Stanton. It seemed to me that it was brought forward and talked over for the express purpose of excluding more important subjects. There is in the Cabinet not that candor and free interchange of opinions on the great questions before the country that there should be. Minor matters are talked over, often at great length.

As McCulloch and myself came away, we spoke of this unpleasant state of things, and we came to the conclusion that we would, as a matter of duty, communicate with the President on this subject of want of frankness and freedom in the Cabinet, also in regard to his general policy and the condition of public affairs. The great mistake, I think, is in attempting to keep up the Republican organization at the expense of the President. It is that organization which the conspirators are using to destroy the Executive.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 522

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, June 8, 1866

But little of importance at the Cabinet. I had some conversation with the President after adjournment, and in the evening McCulloch and myself called upon him by appointment. Our conversation was frank, extending more than an hour. We all concurred that it was not possible to go on much longer with a view of preserving the integrity of the Republican Party, for the Radicals are using the organization to injure the President. There is direct antagonism between the leaders who control Congress and the Administration. The Democrats in Congress are more in harmony with the Administration than are the Radicals;— then why repel the Democrats and favor the Radicals?

We McCulloch and myself spoke of the want of cordial and free intercourse among the members of the Cabinet, that important questions touching differences in the Republican Party were never discussed at our meetings, that it was obvious we did not concur in opinion, and, therefore, the really important topics were avoided. The President admitted and lamented this, as he has done to me repeatedly. He expressed his surprise that Harlan and Speed should, with these understood views, desire to remain. I asked if there were not others among us as objectionable and more harmful. McCulloch said he could not believe Seward was faithless, that he fully agreed with him whenever they had conversed. I admitted the same as regarded Seward and myself, still there were some things I could not reconcile. He is not treacherous to the President, but is under the influence of Stanton and acts with him. His intimates, as well as Stanton's, in Congress, voted steadily with the Radicals; his speech at Auburn was a whistle for the Republicans to keep united and repelled Democrats. The President was reluctant to give up Seward, whose equivocal course is characteristic, but evidently had some doubts as to his sincerity and ulterior purpose. He suggested that Seward should be called in to a conference and come to an explicit understanding. This we all concurred in, though I remarked we should have fair words and no decisive action. But it was left to the President to invite a meeting.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 524-5

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, June 12, 1866

Not much of importance before the Cabinet. Some little attempt to converse on general subjects. Seward, McCulloch, and myself were first there, and allusion was made to our getting together and coming to an understanding on the true condition of affairs. Seward looked a little sharp, I thought, at me, and said he had no objection, but he knew not that any good would come of it. He said he was preparing a paper which would bring all things right, but was not yet quite ready. To what he alludes I know not and cannot yet conjecture, but I have little faith in it as assuring any useful purpose for the Administration or the country.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 525

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, June 15, 1866

Nothing special at Cabinet. On Tuesday Seward submitted a correspondence between Schenck and Romero, the Mexican Minister. It was a very improper proceeding, and R. evidently thought it wrong in giving a copy to the Secretary of State. Seward mentioned it as of little moment, — a sort of irregularity. Stanton said there was nothing wrong so far as Schenck was concerned, but that it was a questionable proceeding on the part of Romero. I declared my entire disapproval of the whole transaction and that it was one of the many indications of ignoring and crowding on the Executive.

The others were silent, but, after a little earnest talk, Seward said he would give the subject further consideration. To-day he brought forward the correspondence with an indorsement disapproving it and said he should communicate it to Romero.

Senator Doolittle took breakfast with me this morning. We went over the political questions and discussed what had best be done. Both were satisfied that the time had arrived when the Administration must take a stand. The game of the Radicals and of certain conspicuously professed friends of the President, that the Republican Party must be sustained and kept united at any sacrifice, even the surrender of the Constitution in some of its important features, and to the jeopardy of the Union itself, must be checked, and the opposition to any such policy made clearly manifest. We called on the President and made known our opinions. He concurred and thought a prompt call for a national convention of friends of the Union should be issued. Doolittle agreed to undertake to draw up such a call, but desired that I would also place on paper my views. He proposed that the call should be signed by the members of the Cabinet, or such of them as approved the measure. I told them that I, personally, had no objection, but I questioned its propriety and effect.

McCulloch, with whom I had a brief interview after Cabinet-meeting, told me that the elder Blair was preparing the call. I saw Judge Blair this evening and found him much engaged, yet not altogether satisfied. He expresses apprehension that Seward has control of the President and has so interwoven himself into the mind and course of the President as not to be shaken off, and if so that the Democrats must go forward independent of both President and Congress. Says the Democratic leaders, many of whom he has seen, such as Dean Richmond, Dawson, and others, say they will go in under the President's lead provided he will rid himself of Seward, but they have no confidence in him, would rather give up Johnson than retain Seward. Governor Andrew of Massachusetts takes a similar view. B. says his father has had a talk with the President; that he himself has written him fully; that he advised the President not to dismiss Harlan unless Seward also went; that the President expressed doubts whether the Senate would confirm two Cabinet officers; that he was told there would be no difficulty; if there were, he would let the assistants carry on the Departments, and assign General Grant ad interim to the War; that Grant had been consulted and assented to the arrangement.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 527-9

Diary of Gideon Welles: Wednesday, May 23, 1866

Fox called on me last evening and unexpectedly bade me farewell. Said he would not trust himself to call at the Department to-day. He was very much affected, said words were wanting to express his high respect and admiration for me and the qualities which I possessed for the position which I filled. Spoke of over five years' intercourse, during which there had not been one unpleasant word, nor, as he was aware, an unpleasant thought between us. I have not time now to speak of F. and his qualities, but shall do so. He has been useful to the country and to me, relieving me of many labors and defending me, I believe, always. His manner and ways have sometimes given offense to others, but he is patriotic and true.

The President and his Cabinet were serenaded this evening. I am opposed to these methods of calling out public men; have respectfully suggested to both Presidents Lincoln and Johnson that it was not advisable to address gatherings at such times, and was determined not to break over the rule myself. I had, therefore, given the subject no attention and was embarrassed when a crowd of perhaps a thousand appeared before my door with a band of music. Declining to make remarks, I stated that I approved the policy of the Administration and was for the union of the States and the rights of the States.

I understand Stanton read off a long address and McCulloch and Dennison each made speeches. The latter acquitted himself with credit, and Stanton read his prepared address from his door, a man standing each side of him with a lighted candle. Dennison made a soothing speech for the party; said everything was lovely. Speed ran away, and Harlan would not show himself.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 512-3

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, May 1, 1866

We have intelligence that Valparaiso has been bombarded by the Spaniards. A brutal and semi-barbarous proceeding on the part of Spain.

In Cabinet the President brought forward the subject of Reconstruction as now before Congress in the report of the Committee of Fifteen. He said his purpose was to know the opinions of the several members of the Cabinet in regard to these propositions of the Committee and his own policy, which was different.

Seward in a very long talk expressed himself opposed to the plan of the Committee. Stanton broke in upon the President before Seward. Was very glad the President had brought the matter before the Cabinet in this formal manner. He had, like all the members of the Cabinet, approved the policy of the President from the beginning. With one or two others he had, he said, taken at the inception a different view of negro suffrage, or, as he expressed it, of allowing all the people of the State to vote. But in all his talk, which was very loud and emphatic, he expressed no opinion on the subject before us, either of sustaining or opposing the scheme of Thad Stevens and his Committee.

Mr. McCulloch was very decided in his opposition to the plan of the Committee and equally decided in favor of the President's policy. He declared himself not so hopeful as Mr. Seward, especially since reading the scheme of the Committee.

Dennison, who interposed out of the usual order, thought it premature to express any opinion, for it was not yet certain what course Congress would take.

Stanton, who should have followed McCulloch, was silent, evidently intending to be passed as having already spoken, though really giving no opinion. I was not disposed to permit any such get-off and therefore waited.

The President, whose feelings were very intense, spoke at some length in regard to the condition of the country, the effect which these schemes must have on the efforts to reestablish the Union.

Mr. Dennison again spoke at some length, expressing himself opposed to many things in the programme of the Committee, and was not prepared to say how long representation should be denied to the Southern States. Thought four years too long.

McCulloch, who has important business at his Department almost always when we have grave and important questions, obtained permission to leave, having stated his views.

The President, holding the paper in his hand, said he had brought the subject forward that he might know how each one viewed it. I remarked that was very proper and I trusted each would state his opinion, that I thought it due to him, and I then turned towards Stanton. Thus appealed to, and the President turning towards him also, Stanton said he did not approve the propositions of the Committee in the present form; he believed they might be amended and essentially improved, and thought it worth  the attempt to reconcile action between the President and Congress.

I declared myself unequivocally opposed to the whole scheme, which I considered an outrage and a wrong. I said that I was not in favor of any Constitutional Amendment in the present condition of the country, that I knew not what right Congress had to pass amnesty laws or prescribe terms to the States.

Stanton interrupted to say that I was opposed to any terms with Congress, that I was ironclad on this subject of Reconstruction, and had not only fifteen-inch guns leveled against Congress, but was for running my prow into them.

I replied that I was not aware that I was unreasonable, but my convictions were that Congress had no authority to prescribe terms on which States should be represented; that the Constitution had done this; that each house was entitled to pass on the election and qualifications of each member of its own body.

Stanton said that the convictions of Congress were exactly opposed to mine, and, therefore, I could make no compromise with them. I told him I could compromise no principle, nor consent to any usurpation.

Dennison again said he was opposed to the plan, but repeated that he did not know how soon the people or States should be represented. I said immediately, if the Representatives were loyal, I wish they could be sworn in to-morrow.

Harlan was very reserved. He agreed, he said, with Mr. Stanton in pretty much all he had said, and had no doubt a majority of Congress wanted to be in harmony with the President.

The session was very long, extending over nearly four hours, most of the time on the subject of Reconstruction, the President speaking twice at considerable length and objecting to all conditions precedent to admitting loyal Members to the seats.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 495-7

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, May 4, 1866

The subject of Reconstruction was not discussed to-day in Cabinet. Seward, while the President was engaged with some one, remarked on the publication which had been made of our last meeting, saying that he concluded the report had been made by Stanton, for the

papers had said it was from a Cabinet Minister, and there was no interest felt as regarded any one else but Stanton. There were, he remarked, some other indications. All this was said playfully as he walked the room and took snuff. But I could see it was not play for Stanton, whose countenance betrayed his vexation. Seward saw it also, and when Stanton said that Seward was the only one who would do this,—draw up and publish proceedings in Cabinet, the subject was dropped.

As we came out at the close of the meeting, McCulloch said to me that he had hoped there would have been some call for a decided expression from Stanton, for the newspapers and many honest men were disputing in regard to the truth of the report of his views in the Cabinet exposition, and he (McC.) thought it wrong that a Cabinet Minister should occupy a false or an equivocal position on such a question, at such a time. In all of which I concurred.

There is no doubt that the Radicals are surprised and many of them incredulous at the enunciation of Stanton's remarks and position in the Cabinet. I apprehend that no one was more astounded at the publication than Stanton himself. It ended any double course, if one had been pursued. Sumner has repeatedly assured me, most emphatically, that Stanton was with him and opposed to the President's policy. Others have said the same. These men were deceived and have been until now, and they cannot believe they have been duped.

The President has not been unaware of the conflicting statements in regard to Stanton, and for this reason adopted the course of calling out the individual opinions of each member of his Cabinet and then took the opportunity of throwing them in a condensed form before the public. This gives the attitude and views of the Administration and of each member of it on the subject of the report of the Reconstruction Committee in advance of the debate in Congress, and prevents misrepresentations and false assumptions in regard to them. It has been the policy of the Radical leaders to claim that the Cabinet was divided, that Stanton and others were with them, and hence their papers and orators have eulogized and magnified Stanton into enormous proportions. All this has now terminated. I did not understand Stanton as expressing himself quite so decidedly as he is represented to have done in the report, though it appeared to me he meant to be understood as represented. No doubt he dissembles. He said he did not approve the Directory plans in many respects, and if he were compelled to act upon them as now presented he should avow himself opposed; and he thought Congress and the President not so far apart that they could not come together.

I followed in direct antagonism and objected unequivocally to the whole programme. I had no faith in Constitutional amendments at this time, in the present existing state of affairs, with eleven States unrepresented and without any voice in the deliberations; nor could I admit that Congress could prescribe terms to the States on which they should be permitted to enjoy their Constitutional right of representation, or that Congress should usurp and take to itself the pardoning power, which is a prerogative of the Executive, nor were they to prosecute and punish the people without trial. I, therefore, antagonized Stanton purposely. He saw and felt it. Hence I think he hardly committed himself so fully as represented. But he does not deny it. Will he?

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 499-501

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, May 8, 1866

The subject of admitting Colorado was to-day before the Cabinet. The bill has passed both houses after having been once rejected. Congress in 1863 authorized the formation of a State constitution, and the people refused to take upon themselves local State government. Subsequently the people formally adopted it by a small majority in a vote of some six thousand, and elected Senators, who are here anxious to get their seats. After the proposition and Senators were rejected, it was ascertained the latter would vote with the Radicals, and that their votes would contribute to overrule and defeat the Executive. This new light led Senators to revise their votes. The Constitution restricts suffrage to the whites, but Senators and others who insist on negro suffrage where the blacks are numerous, and in States where Congress has no right to intervene, voted for Colorado.

Seward, McCulloch, and myself were against admitting the State. She had a population of less than twenty thousand, as claimed by some, and not exceeding thirty or thirty-five thousand, as insisted by the most strenuous for admission. As a principle I have uniformly opposed recognizing and admitting States with a population below the ratio for one Representative. This has always ruled. The slaveholders thrust in Florida and Arkansas as an offset to Free States; and Kansas was authorized under peculiar and extraordinary circumstances to form a constitution with, I think, less than sixty thousand. There was, perhaps, some excuse for admitting and authorizing Colorado to frame a constitution when the difficulties of the country and the attempts of the Rebels to lessen the number of States was before us. But the people then refused self-government.

I therefore had no difficulty in coming to my conclusions on general principles. Stanton thought it might in this instance be well enough to let them in and avoid further trouble. Harlan argued for admission with some ability and tact, but did not meet the great underlying principle. He thought it expedient, and with so much effect as to cause Dennison to doubt, who was at first opposed to the bill. The question was deferred.

The subject of sending naval vessels to attend the laying of the Atlantic telegraph was considered. Seward, Dennison, and Harlan in the affirmative. McCulloch and Stanton opposed. I felt very indifferent; had advised Field to go to Congress. Told him I should not act without authority from Congress or an order from the Executive. Stated to the President that we could, without any difficulty or much additional expense, detail a vessel, Mr. Seward having said we did not require all the four ordered to the fishing-ground. Although my faith in the success of the ocean telegraph is not great, yet, in view of the fact that Congress had once ordered a vessel and of our present ability to spare one, and the further fact that a vessel had been ordered to assist or be present at laying the Russian telegraph, it might be expedient to show a friendly feeling as regards this, and I would assent, though unwilling to advise it.

The President thought it would be well for Congress to take up the subject, or, at all events, that we should delay a day or two before deciding. This I approved as the better course. Stanton, who had seen my previous indifference, immediately slapped me on the shoulder and said I could decide readily with the President. I said I could, for he usually was not far wrong. Stanton was vexed.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 502-4

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, April 17, 1866

Seward read the dispatches which he proposed to send to Mr. Motley,—the first, protesting against the sending of troops to Mexico by the Austrian Government, the second, in case they did send, after being thus notified, that he ask for his papers and withdraw from Vienna.

McCulloch favored the first paper, but objected to the last; deprecated war under any circumstances, and even at any time for so worthless a people as the Mexicans. Stanton was for both. Dennison was most emphatic for both and for maintaining the Monroe Doctrine. Was ready to fight the European Powers, if they presumed to interfere with the American states; considered the honor and welfare of the country involved in this. Speed concurred with McCulloch, Harlan with Dennison. I suggested it would have been better, and would now be better, to meet the real party if we were to do anything; that we should take the head of France rather than the tail of Austria. That I did not mean to object to the measures marked out by the Secretary of State, which I looked upon as a menace, but that to fire off an ultimatum to remote Austria, while we had done nothing of the kind as regards France, whose troops were on our Southwestern frontiers, did not strike me favorably.

Seward said he was only waiting Bigelow's dispatches to take the same course towards France, if she did not recede. Have a telegram this evening from Commander Cooper of the Winooski that the Ocean Spray had arrived at Eastport with five hundred stand of arms and asking if he should permit them to land. Within five minutes Colonel Seward came in with papers from the Secretary of State, consisting of a note from Sir Frederick Bruce, inclosing two telegrams from Eastport in regard to arms on the Spray, urging that the arms and the Fenians should not be permitted to meet. These had been sent to Stanton, who had returned them with a note [to the effect] that General Meade was on his way to Eastport, but he disliked to send an order by telegraph, for that would apprize the Fenians of his coming, and suggesting that the Navy could take some action. Seward wrote in pencil on the back of the envelope inclosing the papers, that I "could send orders to restrain action, or another to that effect."

I observe that these men are very chary about disturbing the Fenians, and I do not care to travel out of the line of duty to relieve them. I therefore sent word that I was content to leave the subject with Cooper till to-morrow, when General Meade would doubtless be at Eastport; if not, the civil authorities were there, with whom the Navy would coöperate, or whom they could assist.

Speed and Stanton expressed an opinion, in which others of the Cabinet concurred, that property once taken and used by the Rebel Government became forfeited to the original owner and was legal capture. I had so previously decided last fall on the question of twenty-two rollers and machinery captured at Charlotte and now at Norfolk.

Thad Stevens yesterday introduced a resolution directing that three copies of Forney's Chronicle should be sent to our legations and consuls abroad and be paid for out of the contingent of the House, — a monstrous proposition made in wanton recklessness and supported by sixty votes. Forney in return puffs Stevens as the "Great Commoner."

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 485-7

Diary of Gideon Welles: Wednesday, April 25, 1866

Major-General Benjamin F. Butler is exercising a great and dangerous influence at the Treasury Department. He has been employed in some cases and is using his opportunities to press others where he is employed as counsel. As he has talents but no principles, is avaricious and unscrupulous, I have given our friends McCulloch and Chandler at the Treasury an occasional admonition concerning him.

In 1863 the Grey Jacket, a steamer laden with cotton, was captured by the Kennebec on the way from Mobile to Cuba. The cargo and vessel were valued at about half a million of dollars, and were condemned on the showing of the captain and owners. An appeal was taken, but the case was so flagrant that there was no avoiding condemnation. The owners had employed various counsel, — first Nott and others of New Orleans, then Seward and Blatchford of New York, but all have on hearing the facts abandoned the case. About the first of last December it was put in the hands of General Butler, who commenced a series of intrigues and manoeuvres, and from his persistency and unscrupulousness had evidently a large contingent fee. I have heard it stated at $125,000. But he found no favor at the Navy Department. His last appeal with me was a half-threat to go to Congress and make an appeal to their sympathies for a man who had lost his all by this capture and condemnation. I replied that my appeal for sympathy in behalf of the sailors who had nobly done their duty in sunshine and storm, in winter and summer, day and night, would probably be as effective as his. He then changed, proposed that the captors should take one half and the claimant the other, surrendering by this arrangement the moiety which should go to the naval pension fund. I told him that was impossible; the Secretary of the Navy should make no such arrangement; moreover he was the trustee of that fund and held it sacred.

One other futile attempt was made in company with the Attorney-General, whom he persuaded to come with him, but after a brief talk Speed appeared to think he had been imposed upon and abandoned the case.

Failing at these points, Butler commenced intriguing at the Treasury, where he was listened to by Chandler, and finally Caleb Cushing was employed at Chandler's suggestion to give a written opinion, General Butler being the prompter. Cushing was timid, hesitated to present his opinion unsustained, and General Butler drew up a preamble and resolution which he procured Thad Stevens to present and procured to be passed under the previous question, without debate, to the effect that cases of this description should be suspended until the judgment of the Supreme Court should be obtained next winter. There are one or two clauses in certain acts which Chase procured to be inserted when he was striving to absorb the whole government in the Treasury Department, having the Presidency in view. These clauses Butler and Cushing made the foundation of their proceeding. Stevens's resolution was passed on the 9th, and Cushing's opinion is dated on the 11th. The whole thing is disgraceful even to a lobby agent and discreditable to the Treasury Department, which has, so far as the Secretary is concerned, unwittingly lent itself to Butler. How far the Assistant Secretary is involved is uncertain. . . . Great derangement in order to get a great fee has been effected.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 492-3

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, March 17, 1866

This being St. Patrick's Day, considerable apprehensions were entertained by the Englishmen here that there would be more active demonstration by the Fenians. Sir Frederick Bruce did not hesitate to say to me on Thursday evening at the Marquis Montholon's party when I met him, that he had great anxiety and should feel relieved after Saturday. But the day has passed off peaceably. We have had no telegraphs of riot or disorder on the frontier or in Canada. There is less disturbance in our own country than is usual on this anniversary.

By special invitation from Secretary Seward himself, I went this evening to meet a Belgian delegation at his house. Mrs. Welles and Edgar went with me. McCulloch, Dennison, and Speed were similarly invited, as were others. I found we were after-dinner guests, appendages to the special party, called in to set off the Secretary's party. The evening was cold, fires low or out, and though the persons assembled put on the best face, it was an uncomfortable affair, and I for one in no very good humor, believing I had been uselessly put to inconvenience without cause.

Am having sharp questions and importunities in regard to the Connecticut election, and do not choose to answer them or to be mixed up in the contest, which has been badly shaped. The fault is as much here in Washington as elsewhere. Foreseeing the issues which the Radicals in Congress were forming, I suggested near the commencement of the session to the President, that unless the lines were sharply drawn, they would have him at disadvantage. We now see it in the result in New Hampshire, and similar consequences may be expected in Connecticut. General Hawley's sympathies and feelings are with the Radicals in the differences between the President and Congress, or rather with Congress than the President. English, on the other hand, is wholly with the President, and totally, earnestly opposed to the Congressional policy. The election of English would secure a friend to the President, but English and those who support him opposed his (the President's) election and most of them opposed the War. Hawley, while not in full accord with the President on present questions, and I am afraid not on the rights of the States, supported his election, and was an earnest soldier from the beginning of the War until the whole Rebel force surrendered and dispersed. While I think well of both candidates, I have a particular personal regard for Hawley now, as well as intimate party relations in the past.

The President and very many of his friends would be pleased to have English succeed. But they do not comprehend the whole circumstances, personal and political, for they cannot know them. It is not a personal question. The organization is a revival of ante-War differences. It commenced and has gone on under the old party banners. A stand for the Administration should have been made last autumn, but the nominations from Governor down have been made by parties as organized years ago. It is too late to change front, or get up a new arrangement. Such an issue should have commenced last December, and the President himself should have led in the fight by announcing the policy of his Administration and rallying his friends to its support. He would have had the State, the country, and Congress with him, but he hesitated, was reluctant to encounter those who elected him, and then postponed too long for us to begin in Connecticut, for this election takes place in three weeks.

As things are, I cannot take an active part in this contest. Were Hawley more emphatic and unequivocally with the President, I should enter earnestly, heartily, into the struggle, although I did not advise his nomination, or wish it to be made. I think, when elected, he will give the Administration fair support, but he is an ardent partisan. A doubt on the subject of his course paralyzes my zeal and efforts. I am unwilling to believe that Hawley dissembles.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 454-6

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, March 31, 1866

I had an interview with the President concerning Semmes, as understood yesterday. Showed him the papers, and, after some conversation, he proposed to see Judge-Advocate-General Bolles, Solicitor of the Navy Department; said he would on the whole prefer him to the Attorney-General in this matter, and named Monday next.

By the President's request I went into the library and was introduced to Doctor Norris, with whom the President desired me to have some conversation. Doctor N. said he believed that the President and I had had some consultation in relation to a sea voyage for Robert, the President's son. He supposed I knew the circumstances. I told him I was aware of the young man's infirmity, that he had once spoken to me himself on the subject in a manner to touch my sympathy in his behalf. That I had also conversed with his father, as he seemed to be aware, and as he (the father) had doubtless advised him. He said that was so, and proceeded to tell me that R. had been beguiled into intemperance after he became of age, through his generous qualities, goodness of heart, and friendly disposition. He, therefore, thought it possible to reclaim him.

I had very little expectation of such a result, but it is important, for his father's sake and for the country's, that the President should in these days be relieved of the care and anxiety which his excesses and passions involve. To send him abroad in a public ship is the best disposition that can be made of him, and a voyage to the East Indies would be better than any other, and such a voyage was now in preparation. Doctor Norris thought this desirable.

I subsequently saw the President and told him what had taken place and that I could make the arrangement with little trouble to him. It seemed to give him consolation.

Letters from Connecticut do not speak with confidence of the result of the election next Monday. But my impressions are that the Union Party with Hawley will be successful. The battle will not be on the strict political issues before the country. On these issues, if well defined and the candidates were squarely presented, I have no doubt that the Administration would be triumphantly sustained. It would be union against disunion, the President versus Congress under the lead of Stevens. But politics and parties have become strangely mixed. Hawley, I am apprehensive, leans to the Congressional policy at present, but I trust observation and reflection will bring him right.

The true Union men who sustain the President feel that the defeat of Hawley would be a triumph to Toucey, Seymour, Eaton, and others who opposed the Government in war and whom they, for that reason, detest, and they will band together to support Hawley from matters of the past rather than issues of the present. Moreover Hawley has popular qualities. For ten years he has fought the Union battles in our political contests and in the field, and though he may be touched with Radicalism, he has good reasoning faculties and a sense of right within him on which I rely. The people have correct instincts in these matters, and I therefore feel pretty sure he will succeed. The worst is, should that be the case, the curse of party will claim that it is a triumph over the Administration. No harm will come of it, perhaps, but it is annoying and vexatious to have results to which men have contributed turned against themselves. But it cannot be helped. The distinction cannot now be drawn. Parties are in a transition state.

Sumner tells me this P.M. that his committee will go against the use of naval vessels for the French Exhibition. This will be counter to Banks, who laid himself out largely in this matter, and Sumner will not be grieved to have Banks disappointed. There is obviously no special love between these two gentlemen. They are opposites in many respects. Banks has thought to gain popularity in this move, which was concocted by himself and Seward, to use naval vessels and naval appropriations for a purpose not naval. To make their scheme appear less expensive, I am told that General Butler has succeeded in inducing the Secretary of the Treasury to interfere in the matter of the Grey Jacket, condemned as prize. If so, I regret it. McCulloch has been imposed upon. Butler is reckless, avaricious, unscrupulous. He knows there is neither law nor justice in his course on this question, but he has the promise of large fees. For three months he has been annoying me on this subject. He then went to the Attorney General and for a time made some headway. Failing there, he has now imposed upon McCulloch, who has been deceived by Butler's cunning and browbeaten by his audacity.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 467-70 

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, March 6, 1866

The Secretary of the Treasury is embarrassed by the test oath. He finds it difficult to procure good officers for collectors and assessors in the Rebel States and still more difficult to get good subordinates. When he attempts to reason with Members of Congress, they insist that their object is to exclude the very men required and say they want Northern men sent into those States to collect taxes. As if such a proceeding would not excite enmities and the foreign tax-gatherer be slain!

I advised McCulloch to address a strong and emphatic letter to the President, stating the difficulties, which letter the President could communicate to Congress. A direct issue would then be made, and the country could see and appreciate the difficulties of the Administration. Dennison took the same view, and stated some of his difficulties, and I suggested that he should also present them to the President. Seward was not prepared to act. Harlan was apprehensive that a confession of the fact that it was not possible to procure men of integrity who could take the test oath, would operate injudiciously just at this time. There is, he thinks, a growing feeling for conciliation in Congress, and such a confession would check this feeling. The suggestion was adroitly if not ingenuously put. Stanton half-responded to Harlan; doubted the expediency of a letter from McCulloch; said it was unnecessary; that he paid officers who could not take the oath; thought the Secretary of the Treasury might also; but concluded by saying he had not examined the question. Finally the subject was postponed to Friday. Stanton said it had presented itself to him in a new form during the discussion, and he required a little time for examination and reflection before submitting his views.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 445

Diary of Gideon Welles: Thursday, March 8, 1866

Myers of Philadelphia had a long conversation with me in regard to the "admission" of Tennessee. I told him, as I have others, that Tennessee had been admitted more than seventy years ago. Well, he said, he did not mean admission, but to permit her to send Representatives. I told him he did mean admission and nothing else, and that permission to send Representatives was quite as offensive as his first position. The Constitution secured her that right when the State was admitted and made part of the Union, and Congress could neither deprive nor grant her the privilege of representation. Much more of like tendency passed between us—pleasantly. He expects to make a speech on the subject.

Governor Dennison called this evening to see whether he, McCulloch, and myself had not best consult with the President in regard to the welfare of the Republican Party and endeavor to bring about a reconciliation with the factious majority in Congress. I told him I could see no benefit that would result from such an effort; that the President's policy was well defined; that when Congress assembled, the Members well understood that policy, and that they, the Radicals, had promptly organized to oppose and defeat it; that this hostility or antagonism had gone forward for three months, Congress doing nothing, accomplishing nothing towards a restoration of the Union, but on the contrary had devoted its time and energies to prevent it. What, I asked him, could the President do under these circumstances? He cannot abandon his honest, rightful convictions, and to approach or attempt to approach these Radical leaders in their present state of mind would be misconstrued and retard rather than promote the work. The Republican Party had evidently about accomplished its mission. Slavery was abolished and the Rebellion suppressed. Perhaps it would result beneficially to take a new departure. He appeared to acquiesce in my suggestions.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 446-7

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, March 13, 1866

Had a call this evening from Mr. English, the Democratic candidate for Governor in Connecticut. He is very decidedly, and I think sincerely, in favor of the President's policy. With General Hawley, who is the Administration candidate, I am more intimate, and for him I personally feel special regard, yet such is the strange mixture of parties that his election would be hailed as a triumph by the opponents of the Administration. I am much embarrassed by this state of things. I believe Hawley intends to support the President, yet, tainted by party, he also aims to support Congress in its differences with the Executive. He will find it difficult to reconcile the two, and if compelled to make an election he would be more likely at the present moment to go wrong, I fear, than right.

Mr. English desired an introduction to the President, whom he wishes to see concerning some person who is imprisoned in Tennessee, and is acting in concert with a Mr. Fleming, whom, with his beautiful wife, I met this evening at the President's house.

Seward was not at the Cabinet to-day. I brought forward the subject of the test oath, and McCulloch says he has prepared a letter which he will show me. Dennison is to prepare one also.

On the subject of the Fenians there was less inclination to converse, but the subject was referred to the Attorney-General to send circulars to the District Attorneys, etc. I suggested that the Administration should show a solid front, and, therefore, General Grant should send a communication. To this Stanton demurred. It would necessarily come through his Department, and he would be openly committed.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 452-3

Diary of Gideon Welles: Wednesday, March 14, 1866

Secretary McCulloch sent me his letter this morning on the subject of the test oath, to read and criticize. It is in the main very well done. I would have proposed some alterations, but, on making one or two suggestions as feelers, I perceived he had the usual sensitiveness in regard to his own production and, therefore, desisted. My course differs from his in this respect, for in public communications I want criticism from friends until the document is signed and has gone from me.

I called upon him with the paper, and we had a talk on subjects generally. The communication of Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency, was printed this A.M. in the Intelligencer. It is a piece of impertinence and insubordination which deserves rebuke, prompt and summary. I advised McCulloch to have his scalp off before sundown. He is more forbearing; says that is what Clarke wishes.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 453

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, March 16, 1866

A quiet Cabinet-meeting with nothing of interest discussed. Dennison read his communication on the test oath. It is less vigorous and pertinent than McCulloch's, but will do as a backer. McCulloch showed me a letter from Henry Ward Beecher to Defrees in which it is said that the postmaster at Brooklyn (Lincoln) informed him (Beecher) that Senator Pomeroy had authorized and requested him (L.) to inform B. that he (P.) called at the White House a week since, and found the President, his son, and son-in-law all drunk and unfit for business, that the President kept a mistress at the White House, etc. I advised that these slanders should be told the President in order that he might be aware of the character of the scandals circulated.

By appointment McCulloch, Dennison, and myself agreed to meet the President this evening at seven. At that hour McCulloch and I came together near Dennison's door and went in. Soon after Speed and his wife were announced. D. went in to them with an understanding that he would join us at the White House. But he failed to do so.

Mr. English of Connecticut was with the President when we went in, but left almost immediately. The President expressed himself pleased with English, and dissatisfied with something which Hawley had said, some answers to inquiries, as I understood. McCulloch remarked that it would not do for us to disconnect ourselves from the War Party, even if some had got astray, for every loyal household had its representative in the army, and the feeling was strong in their favor.

The letter on the test oath McC. read to us. I suggested a single alteration which I mentioned before, calling the Southerners "our rebellious countrymen" instead of a "hostile people." The President approved the suggestion, and McCulloch came into it. Some other alterations, chiefly verbal, suggested themselves, but, witnessing the sensitiveness of McC., I did not mention them.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 453-4  

Diary of Gideon Welles: February 1, 1866

Colonel Bolles and Eames have prepared an order for the President to sign for a mixed commission to try Semmes. I took it to the President this P.M. He expressed himself strongly against a military trial or military control. Wished the Navy to keep the case in its own hands. Said he wished to put no more in Holt's control than was absolutely necessary; that Holt was cruel and remorseless, made so perhaps by his employment and investigations; that his tendencies and conclusions were very bloody. The President said he had a large number of Holt's decisions now—pointing to the desk—which he disliked to take up; that all which came from that quarter partook of the traits of Nero and Draco. I have never heard him express himself so decidedly in regard to Holt, but have on one or two previous occasions perceived that his confidence in the Judge Advocate-General was shaken.

I long since was aware that Holt was severe and unrelenting, and am further compelled to think that, with a good deal of mental vigor and strength as a writer, he has strange weaknesses. He is credulous and often the dupe of his own imaginings. Believes men guilty on shadowy suspicions, and is ready to condemn them without trial.

Stanton has sometimes brought forward singular papers relating to conspiracies, and dark and murderous designs in which he had evident faith, and Holt has assured him in his suspicions.

I am glad that the President does not consider him infallible, and that he is guarded against the worst traits; the others will develop themselves, if they have not already.

I stated to the President that I would not advise a military, naval, or mixed commission to try Semmes for treason or piracy, for the civil tribunals had cognizance of those offenses. But if he had violated the laws of war for which he could not be arraigned in court, there was perhaps a necessity that we should act through a commission. He realized the distinction and the propriety of acting and wished me to bring the subject before the full Cabinet.

One of my troubles in the matter of the charges and specifications has been to limit our action to violations of the law of war. The lawyers who have it in charge, especially Colonel Bolles, are for embracing a wider range. He wishes to figure in the case.

Senator Dixon gave me to-day a slip from the New Haven Courier, written by Babcock, the Collector, taking issue with Deming in his late speech. Babcock sustains the policy of the President, and his article is very creditable. Dixon wished me to write him and says McCulloch will do so. I wish some of our more reliable friends would have the sagacity and determination to do this subject justice.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 423-4

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, February 13, 1866

McCulloch asked me yesterday, in the President's room in the Capitol, if I had examined the Freedmen's Bureau Bill, and when I told him I had not, that I had never been partial to the measure, had doubted its expediency, even during the War, but as Congress, the Administration, and the country had adopted it, and as I had no connection with it, I had little inclination to interest myself in the matter, he said he wished I would examine the bill, and I told him I would, though opposed to that system of legislation, and to Government's taking upon itself the care and support of communities. To-day the President inquired of me my opinions, or rather said he thought there were some extraordinary features in the bill, and asked what I thought of them, or of the bill. My reply was similar to that I gave McCulloch yesterday. He expressed a wish that I would give the bill consideration, for he apprehended he should experience difficulty in signing it. The bill has not yet reached him.

Showed the President the finding of the court in the case of Meade, who had obtained a new trial and had a little severer punishment than in the former case. The President thought it would be well not to hurry Semmes's case. Told him there were reasons why delay would be acceptable and I should prefer it, only I wished it off my hands. But as he desired delay we would not hurry the matter. He alluded with some feeling to the extraordinary intrigue which he understood was going on in Congress, having nothing short of a subversion or change in the structure of the government in view. The unmistakable design of Thad Stevens and his associates was to take the government into their own hands, the President said, and to get rid of him by declaring Tennessee out of the Union. A sort of French Directory was to be established by these spirits in Congress, the Constitution was to be remodeled by them, etc.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 431-2