Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, June 4, 1866

Bryson telegraphed yesterday that he had captured seven hundred Fenians crossing the river at Black Rock. I sent the telegram to the President and to Seward, and soon after called on the President. He seemed a little perplexed. Said we had an elephant on our hands. I asked whether they were prisoners of war and what was to be done with them. He thought we must wait and we should soon have inquiries.

Shortly after my return Seward sent his carriage for me. I went to his house. He and Speed were sitting on the back porch. Speed had a telegram from Dart, District Attorney, stating the capture and making inquiries. Seward asked about the prisoners and what accommodations the Navy had. I told him none whatever and that these men could hardly be considered prisoners of war, even if we had accommodations; that they ought, if prisoners of war, at once to be turned over to the custody of the military. He said that would not do. Stanton wanted nothing to do with them, — there was no military force there. I told him there were officers and they could call on the militia or call out volunteer companies in Buffalo. This would be necessary, for such a number could not be retained by the civil authorities without a guard. He said, "Let them run away." Speed said that would not do. There might be and probably would be extradition claims for the leaders. I asked them if they thought that these men were prisoners of war, for I did not. Nor did I know how far their capture would be justified.

Seward said the capture was all right; they should, perhaps, be considered prisoners of state; that he and Speed had talked over the matter before I came, and he had prepared a couple of telegrams. Fred Seward read one, which was signed by Speed. Seward proposed that I should telegraph Bryson that he, Seward, would take charge of them as prisoners of state. Said Dart must attend to them. I thought the marshal the proper person. He said that was the same thing. Asked how much it would cost to feed them, whether it could be done for a dollar each day. I told him it would cost more than that, for he could not confine them in Buffalo jail, or any inclosure, but must have a guard. I did not see how he could get along without military help, which would necessarily be attended with expense. He said he would send word to Meade.

I again adverted to the matter of a proclamation when such movements were being made upon the border, but Seward interrupted me, said no, that was not necessary. The thing was just right. He felt, he said, very happy over it. Wanted neither Speed nor myself should say anything about the matter until the regular Cabinet-meeting on Tuesday.

Governor Morgan at my house last evening introduced the subject of Reconstruction and the position of things in the Senate, remarking, as though casually, there really was now very little difference between the President and Congress. I promptly, and perhaps unwisely in my promptness, differed with him, and told him it was not wise to attempt to deceive ourselves in the matter, that the difference was broad, deep, and such as could not be reconciled.

He asked if I did not think the proposed amendment of the Constitution, of the Senate, an improvement on that which had passed the House; and whether that was not a step towards getting together. I told him that for myself, without speaking for others, I was opposed to the scheme for changing the Constitution now before Congress and opposed to any amendment while one third of the States were excluded from participating or giving their views, deprived, in fact, of their rightful representation; that I, therefore, did not feel as though there could be harmonious action, and it appeared to me a mistake to suppose that the President, a Constitutionalist, and the exclusionists, who were not, were likely to act together.

I have no doubt that Morgan came expressly to sound me and ascertain whether we would be united on the exclusion plan. Not unlikely Seward sent him. Morgan has evidently been trapped in the caucus into a pledge, direct or implied.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 520-2

Circular of Major-General George G. Meade, July 1, 1863

CIRCULAR.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,        

Taneytown, July 1, 1863.

From information received, the commanding general is satisfied that the object of the movement of the army in this direction has been accomplished, viz, the relief of Harrisburg, and the prevention of the enemy's intended invasion of Philadelphia, &c., beyond the Susquehanna. It is no longer his intention to assume the offensive until the enemy's movements or position should render such an operation certain of success.

If the enemy assume the offensive, and attack, it is his intention, after holding them in check sufficiently long, to withdraw the trains and other impedimenta; to Withdraw the army from its present position, and form line of battle with the left resting in the neighborhood of Middleburg, and the right at Manchester, the general direction being that of Pipe Creek. For this purpose, General Reynolds, in command of the left, will withdraw the force at present at Gettysburg, two corps by the road to Taneytown and Westminster, and, after crossing Pipe Creek, deploy toward Middleburg. The corps at Emmitsburg will be withdrawn, via Mechanicsville, to Middleburg, or, if a more direct route can be found leaving Taneytown to their left, to withdraw direct to Middleburg.

General Slocum will assume command of the two corps at Hanover and Two Taverns, and withdraw them, via Union Mills, deploying one to the right and one to the left, after crossing Pipe Creek, connecting on the left with General Reynolds, and communicating his right to General Sedgwick at Manchester, who will connect with him and form the right.

The time for falling back can only be developed by circumstances. Whenever such circumstances arise as would seem to indicate the necessity for falling back and assuming this general line indicated, notice of such movement will be at once communicated to these headquarters and to all adjoining corps commanders.

The Second Corps now at Taneytown will be held in reserve in the vicinity of Uniontown and Frizellburg, to be thrown to the point of strongest attack, should the enemy make it. In the event of these movements being necessary, the trains and impedimenta will all be sent to the rear of Westminster.

Corps commanders, with their officers commanding artillery and the divisions, should make themselves thoroughly familiar with the country indicated, all the roads and positions, so that no possible confusion can ensue, and that the movement, if made, be done with good order, precision, and care, without loss or any detriment to the morale of the troops.

The commanders of corps are requested to communicate at once the nature of their present positions, and their ability to hold them in case of any sudden attack at any point by the enemy.

This order is communicated, that a general plan, perfectly understood by all, may be had for receiving attack, if made in strong force, upon any portion of our present position.

Developments may cause the commanding general to assume the offensive from his present positions.

The Artillery Reserve will, in the event of the general movement indicated, move to the rear of Frizellburg, and be placed in position, or sent to corps, as circumstances may require, under the general supervision of the chief of artillery.

The chief quartermaster will, in case of the general movement indicated, give directions for the orderly and proper position of the trains in rear of Westminster.

All the trains will keep well to the right of the road in moving, and, in case of any accident requiring a halt, the team must be hauled out of the line, and not delay the movements.

The trains ordered to Union Bridge in these events will be sent to Westminster.

General headquarters will be, in case of this movement, at Frizellburg; General Slocum as near Union Mills as the line will render best for him; General Reynolds at or near the road from Taneytown to Frizellburg.

The chief of artillery will examine the line, and select positions for artillery.

The cavalry will be held on the right and left flanks after the movement is completed. Previous to its completion, it will, as now directed, cover the front and exterior lines, well out.

The commands must be prepared for a movement, and, in the event of the enemy attacking us on the ground indicated herein, to follow up any repulse.

The chief signal officer will examine the line thoroughly, and at once, upon the commencement of this movement, extend telegraphic communication from each of the following points to general headquarters near Frizellburg, viz, Manchester, Union Mills, Middleburg, and the Taneytown road.

All true Union people should be advised to harass and annoy the enemy in every way, to send in information, and taught how to do it; giving regiments by number of colors, number of guns, generals' names, &c. All their supplies brought to us will be paid for, and not fall into the enemy's hands.

Roads and ways to move to the right or left of the general line should be studied and thoroughly understood. All movements of troops should be concealed, and our dispositions kept from the enemy. Their knowledge of these dispositions would be fatal to our success, and the greatest care must be taken to prevent such an occurrence.

By command of Major-General Meade:

S. WILLIAMS,        

Assistant Adjutant-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 3 (Serial No. 45), p. 458-9

Major-General Henry W. Slocum to L. H. Morgan, January 2, 1864

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH CORPS,                

ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND,        

TULLAHOMA, TENN., January 2d, 1864.

MY DEAR SIR:

I presume you have read Meade's Report of the battle of Gettysburg. I can imagine the feeling that its perusal has caused you. I have not met a sensible man who has read it, either soldier or civilian, who has not felt disappointed on reading it. It purports to be the official history of the most important contest of modern times a contest in which our troops fought with a valor and determination never before exhibited and the only evidence in the entire report which tends to prove this heroism is contained in the closing sentence, "our losses were very severe, amounting to 23,186." Your disappointment must have been greater from the fact that the true history of the operations on the right had already been made known to you by me, and Meade's report is a plain contradiction of almost every statement I have ever written to you. It is in direct conflict with my official report, and the reports of all my subordinate commanders. My first impulse on reading his report was to ask for a court of inquiry. I was prompted to this course not so much from personal consideration, as from a desire to have justice done to General Williams and his division.

Although Meade professed the warmest friendship for me, and the utmost confidence in me, not only during the entire battle, but at all times subsequent to it while I remained in his army, yet in his report he utterly ignores me. That he did repose this confidence in me, and that he placed the right wing entirely under my control, I have abundant written evidence now in my possession. In proof of this I enclose a copy of an order sent me during the battle, showing that he had sent part of Sedgwick's corps to me, and that without visiting me or my portion of the line, he wished me to place it in a central position where he could use it as soon as I could I also enclose a copy it. spare of an order received at ten-twenty A. M., on July second, directing me to move from the strong position we then held, and with the Fifth and Twelfth Corps, then under my command, and the Sixth, which was hourly expected, to attack the enemy. The latter order was not obeyed because every general officer consulted on the subject deemed it unwise to leave the almost impregnable position we then held.

I send you copies of these orders to convince you that although my name is not mentioned in the report, yet I really occupied the position and had the commands mentioned in my former letters. At no time was I in command of less than two corps during the entire campaign, and during all the battle the right wing was entrusted entirely to me—a position to which my rank entitled me. Williams commanded the Twelfth Corps, and was at all times during the battle treated as a corps commander by Meade. He was invited by him to the council with other corps commanders, and yet no mention is made of this fact in the report. Nor is Williams's name or that of his division to be found in it. I finally gave up the idea of asking for a court of inquiry, knowing that the interests of the service could not be promoted by such a course. I wrote a letter to Meade, however, asking him to correct his report, a copy of which I enclose. There is much secret history connected with the Gettysburg campaign which will some day be made public. The proceedings of a secret council of the corps commanders held the night before the enemy crossed the river was at once divulged, and the remarks of Meade, Warren and Pleasanton published to the world in full. It was for the interest of Meade that this publication should be made; and there is no doubt that publicity was given to it with his consent, if not through his direct instrumentality. There were other councils, however, the proceedings of which were not made public and which never will be published with the consent of Meade.

On the evening of July second a council was called, and each corps commander was asked his opinion as to the propriety of falling back towards Washington that night. The majority opposed it, and after the vote was taken Meade declared that "Gettysburg was no place to risk a battle;" and there is no doubt but for the decision of his corps commanders, the army on the third of July would have been in full retreat. The 4th of July, 1863, instead of being a day of rejoicing throughout the North, would have been the darkest day ever known to our country. This piece of history can be verified by the records of that council kept by Butterfield, and cannot have been forgotten by any officer present.

On the fourth of July nearly every corps commander urged an immediate movement, but my corps was kept three days in idleness. In the meantime the enemy reached Hagerstown, took up his new line, and had abundant time to fortify. At the council held on the thirteenth of July, by which "Meade was overruled," the following question was proposed to each officer, viz.: "Shall we, without further knowledge of the position of the enemy, make an attack?"

Previous to putting the question, Meade answered that he could get no knowledge of the position of the enemy. This announcement, together with the peculiar phraseology of the question, indicated the decision the commanding general anticipated. He offered no remarks until a vote was taken, and the question answered in the negative. He then made some general remarks about "the necessity of doing something," which was approved by all. Having "placed himself right on record," as the politicians would say, he retired. This record he at once used to sustain himself at the expense of his brother officers, although the action of these officers was precisely what he desired and anticipated it would be when he framed the question.

You may think this a hard charge to bring against a soldier, but I believe I am fully justified in making it. There are circumstances which I will make known to you when we meet which will convince you that I have not done him injustice.

As long as this war continues I shall pursue the course I have thus far followed. I shall ask for no court, enter into no controversy, write no letters. But when the danger has passed from us many facts will come to light, giving to the public a better knowledge of the real history of this war than can be obtained through the medium of such reports as that written by General Meade. Very respectfully,

Your Obt. Servant,

H. W. SLOCUM.

Hon. L. H. MORGAN,
Syracuse, N. Y.

SOURCE: New York (State). Monuments Commission for the Battlefields of Gettysburg and Chattanooga, In Memoriam: Henry Warner Slocum, 1826-1894, p. 83-5

Major-General Henry W. Slocum to Major-General George G. Meade, December 30, 1863

HDQRS. TWELFTH CORPS, ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND,        

Tullahoma, Tenn., December 30, 1863.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE G. MEADE,
        Commanding Army of the Potomac:

GENERAL: I inclose herewith the report of General T. H. Ruger of operations of the First Division, Twelfth Corps, at the battle of Gettysburg, together with the reports of his brigade and regimental commanders. General Ruger, width a large portion of his division, was ordered to New York City soon after the battle, and immediately after his return from New York the corps was ordered to this department. The reports of General Williams and myself were delayed with the hope of receiving General Ruger's report in time to forward it with them.

I deeply regret the necessity which compelled me to send my report and that of General Williams unaccompanied by any report of the operations of the First Division, for although an account of the operations of this division was given in the report of General Williams, who commanded the corps during the battle, I think the absence of Ruger's report may account for some of the errors contained in your report as to the operations of the Twelfth Corps.

I inclose a letter from General Williams, calling my attention to these errors, to which I respectfully invite your attention, and if anything can be done at this late day to correct these errors, I trust you will do it. Your report is the official history of that important battle, and to this report reference will always be made by our Government, our people, and the historian, as the most reliable and accurate account of the services performed by each corps, division, and brigade of your army. If you have inadvertently given to one division the credit of having performed some meritorious service which was in reality performed by another division, you do an injustice to brave men and defraud them of well-earned laurels. It is an injustice which even time cannot correct. That errors of this nature exist in your official report is an indisputable fact.

You give great credit to Lockwood's brigade for services on the evening of July 2, but state that this brigade was a portion of the First Corps, while it never at any time belonged to that corps, but was a portion of the Twelfth Corps, and was accompanied in its operations on the evening of July 2 by General Williams in person. A portion of this brigade (the One hundred and fiftieth New York) is still in General Williams' division.

I copy the following statement from your report:

During the heavy assault on our left, portions of the Twelfth Corps were sent as re-enforcements. During their absence, the line on the extreme right was held by a very much reduced force. This was taken advantage of by the enemy, who, during the absence of General Geary's division, of the Twelfth Corps, advanced and occupied part of the line. On the morning of the 3d, General Geary, having returned during the night, attacked at early dawn the enemy, and succeeded in driving him back and reoccupying his former position. A spirited contest was maintained all the morning along this part of the line. General Geary, re-enforced by Wheaton's brigade, of the Sixth Corps, maintained his position, and inflicted severe losses on the enemy.

From this statement it would appear that Geary's division marched to the support of your left; that Williams' division did not; that his (Williams') division, or a portion of it, was guarding the intrenchments when the enemy gained possession; that General Geary returned, and with his division drove the enemy back; that the engagement on the following morning was fought by Geary's division, assisted by Wheaton's brigade. This I know is the inference drawn from your history of those operations by every person unacquainted with the truth. Yet the facts in the case are very nearly the reverse of the above in every particular, and directly in contradiction to the facts as set forth in the report of General Geary, as well as that of General Williams. Geary's division did not march even in the direction of your left. Two of his brigades, under his immediate command, left the intrenchments under orders to move to the support of your left, but through some unfortunate mistake he took the road leading to Two Taverns. Williams' entire division did move to the support of your left, and it was one of his brigades (Lockwood's), under his immediate command, which you commend, but very singularly accredit to the First Corps.

Greene's brigade, of the Second Division, remained in the intrenchments, and the failure of the enemy to gain entire possession of our works was due entirely to the skill of General Greene and the heroic valor of his troops. His brigade suffered severely, but maintained its position, and held the enemy in check until the return of Williams' division. The “spirited contest maintained by General Geary, re-enforced by Wheaton's brigade,” was a contest for regaining the portion of our intrenchments held by the enemy, and was conducted under the immediate command of General Williams, and was participated in by the entire Twelfth Corps, re-enforced not by Wheaton's but by Shaler's brigade.

Although the command of the Twelfth Corps was given temporarily to General Williams by, your order, and although you directed him to meet at the council with other corps commanders, you fail to mention his name in your entire report, and in no place allude to his having any such command, or to the fact that more than one corps was at any time placed under my command, although at no time after you assumed command of the army until the close of this battle was I in command of less than two corps. I have now in my possession your written orders, dated July 2, directing me to assume command of the Sixth Corps, and, with that corps and the two then under my command (the Fifth and Twelfth), to move forward and at once attack the enemy.

I allude to this fact for the purpose of refreshing your memory on a subject which you had apparently entirely forgotten when you penned your report, for you have not failed to notice the fact of General Schurz and others having held, even for a few hours, commands above that previously held by them. I sincerely trust that you will endeavor to correct as far as possible the errors above mentioned, and that the correction may be recorded at the War Department.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. SLOCUM,        

Major-General of Volunteers, Commanding.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 1 (Serial No. 43), p. 763-5

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, April 17, 1866

Seward read the dispatches which he proposed to send to Mr. Motley,—the first, protesting against the sending of troops to Mexico by the Austrian Government, the second, in case they did send, after being thus notified, that he ask for his papers and withdraw from Vienna.

McCulloch favored the first paper, but objected to the last; deprecated war under any circumstances, and even at any time for so worthless a people as the Mexicans. Stanton was for both. Dennison was most emphatic for both and for maintaining the Monroe Doctrine. Was ready to fight the European Powers, if they presumed to interfere with the American states; considered the honor and welfare of the country involved in this. Speed concurred with McCulloch, Harlan with Dennison. I suggested it would have been better, and would now be better, to meet the real party if we were to do anything; that we should take the head of France rather than the tail of Austria. That I did not mean to object to the measures marked out by the Secretary of State, which I looked upon as a menace, but that to fire off an ultimatum to remote Austria, while we had done nothing of the kind as regards France, whose troops were on our Southwestern frontiers, did not strike me favorably.

Seward said he was only waiting Bigelow's dispatches to take the same course towards France, if she did not recede. Have a telegram this evening from Commander Cooper of the Winooski that the Ocean Spray had arrived at Eastport with five hundred stand of arms and asking if he should permit them to land. Within five minutes Colonel Seward came in with papers from the Secretary of State, consisting of a note from Sir Frederick Bruce, inclosing two telegrams from Eastport in regard to arms on the Spray, urging that the arms and the Fenians should not be permitted to meet. These had been sent to Stanton, who had returned them with a note [to the effect] that General Meade was on his way to Eastport, but he disliked to send an order by telegraph, for that would apprize the Fenians of his coming, and suggesting that the Navy could take some action. Seward wrote in pencil on the back of the envelope inclosing the papers, that I "could send orders to restrain action, or another to that effect."

I observe that these men are very chary about disturbing the Fenians, and I do not care to travel out of the line of duty to relieve them. I therefore sent word that I was content to leave the subject with Cooper till to-morrow, when General Meade would doubtless be at Eastport; if not, the civil authorities were there, with whom the Navy would coöperate, or whom they could assist.

Speed and Stanton expressed an opinion, in which others of the Cabinet concurred, that property once taken and used by the Rebel Government became forfeited to the original owner and was legal capture. I had so previously decided last fall on the question of twenty-two rollers and machinery captured at Charlotte and now at Norfolk.

Thad Stevens yesterday introduced a resolution directing that three copies of Forney's Chronicle should be sent to our legations and consuls abroad and be paid for out of the contingent of the House, — a monstrous proposition made in wanton recklessness and supported by sixty votes. Forney in return puffs Stevens as the "Great Commoner."

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 485-7

Diary of Corporal John Worrell Northrop, May 4, 1864

Morning at Stevensburg, Va.—Taking a southwest direction we passed northeast of Stony Mountain and came in conjunction with other marching columns and moving trains. Our ears were filled with confusion, noisy jests, rough questionings and "blowing" of different regiments. Marched fast. Inspired by excitement, our boys were not to be beaten; it was a grand show that nobody saw but the performers. Our course was principally southeast until we reached this deserted village, Stevensburgh, at daylight. Here are fields of artillery and cavalry awaiting us. We rest awhile; I lay on the mossy plank steps of what was a tavern. Grass is in the streets. Buildings old style; paint has seceded. It is a pleasant site, overlooking grand country; had been a desirable place in better days. This movement is to throw our forces together to the right of Lee's position south of the Rapidan, cutting the latters' connection with Fredericksburg and to go on to Richmond, if he does not come out to fight us. This will bring our base of supplies south to points accessible to the coast.

On Field, South of Rapidan, Noon—We took a southerly course to the river, halting but little. Beautiful morning, splendid view of the glorious landscape; rich country. Occasionally stately dwellings of the comfortable Virginia style are left on terra firma and inhabited.

Sun came out hot. Those who had scruples about throwing clothing away on the start, felt the necessity. For an hour and a half the road was strewn with coats, blouses, shirts, blankets and other things, so thickly that we could not march in files without treading upon it, which made marching tiresome. Miles of ground was literally covered.

Men were sun-struck and fell as if shot dead; one who fell as we moved along a narrow dugway, rolled down the hill and lodged against a tree. It is a frightful moan they give as they fall, slamming their guns on the ground. The aid they get from comrades in the ranks is slight; we can only cast a pitying look and pass on. I came near falling. Friends applied water from canteens to the back of my head, neck and breast, which proved a relief. Capt. Swan told me to fall out but I felt determined not to leave the ranks; threw away my woolen blanket and got better.

About 11 a. m. our (Fifth) corps reached the Rapidan River at Germania ford and crossed on pontoons. Several cannon were in position commanding the heights beyond. It was a proud sight to see the columns winding up the rocky slope on the south side, as we descended from the north. They crossed a drove of cattle by driving them through; some were drowned. There was once a bridge here; the stone abutments remain.

The Second (Hancock's) corps crossed at Ely's ford several miles east. His advance surprised and captured a Confederate force this morning that had been watching our army. The Sixth (Sedgwick's) corp crossed five miles west of Germania. The positions of these grand divisions of the Army of the Potomac, in these movements, indicate their respective positions in coming battles, namely: Hancock's corp on the left, Warren's in the center, Sedgwick's on the right. The Ninth (Burnside's) corp is a few miles behind, moving in three columns to be used in emergencies. Cavalry divisions are generally in advance and on our flanks contending with the enemy's detached forces, or harassing his rear, miles away.

Hard fighting is expected by officers and men. We feel the final movement on Richmond is on. It is the beginning of the end-a big butt-end! We are to meet the enemy in regions where fighting has been mostly favorable to the Southern army, in its chosen, often fortified positions. Officers assume that our corps will make the first attack, or will be first attacked. The enemy is familiar with the country where battles are likely to occur. During winter suspension of hostilities, he has moved forces about this country to acquaint them with it. Leading officers know points of natural strategy, hence have many advantages. Naturally he will make a desperate attempt to crush us at a time most opportune to him. His position we shall find when revealed by the attack, or by our skirmishers and scouts. Our men understand this; are nerved for the crisis. Our fate rests with officers.

They were strongly fortified here and a half mile back, but forces in charge retired after a few shots. We lay down behind these fortifications two hours, taking refreshments, rest and sleep. A heavy body of troops are assembled in this vicinity.

Near Wilderness, Sunset.—Bugles sounded again; columns of infantry and trains of artillery move out by brigades, the corps having divided into several columns for convenience in forming for battle and to make closer connections with the left and right wings. It appears, by the way we move, the enemy are not disposed to check us today; all is quiet as if there were no such thing as battle. We move cautiously, through heavy wildernesses on old roads-about 4 o'clock p. m. struck the plank road and were soon near portions of the old battle grounds about Chancellorsville.

The column soon broke off by regiments on either side. То our delight, we were told that we would probably stay the night. There is a broad field covered with troops of all arms; heavy supply trains and artillery, no doubt 40,000 armed men. Generals Grant, Meade, Warren and staffs arrived soon after we camped, also several other generals and staffs. General Wadsworth has been riding among the troops of his division and passing a word with us. The old gentleman is as good natured as ever. He wears the regulation cap, rides a light gray horse, his gray hair cut short and side whiskers closely trimmed. The boys all like the old "Abolish." A have been to a creek and bathed, feel pretty well. Headquarters bands are playing beautifully. The scene is sublime; the red sun hangs just over the woods, the trees are brilliantly green and filled with happy birds. Men by thousands are boiling coffee and frying pork and hard tack.

There is an old mill near, long silent for Secessia's sake, now receiving attention from the boys; they are not likely to slight it until they run it-into the ground. Some are running through it seeing what can be picked up; others are knocking and pulling pine boards from its sides. It is not a stranger to soldiers, they have been here before, both Union and Rebs; Stonewall himself, perhaps; like enough "Fighting Joe." It was about here the former made his last dash. Two of us lug off a wide door for a bed. Of course the boys talk about where we are going; some think they know exactly; it is to Mine Run again, or it is straight to Richmond. We have marched thirty miles. Fog appears as the sun sinks. We lie down early; had no sleep last night; pitch no tents. Probabilities are for an early stir in the morning. We have plumb six days' rations, expect to need them.

SOURCE: John Worrell Northrop, Chronicles from the Diary of a War Prisoner in Andersonville and Other Military Prisons of the South in 1864, p. 22-5

Lieutenant-General William T. Sherman to Senator John Sherman, December 20, 1868

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,        

ST. LOUIS, Mo., Dec. 20, 1868.

Dear Brother:

*          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *

Grant and I at Chicago had one or two stolen interviews in which he said he would leave me, as I wished, at St. Louis till the last minute, viz., March 4, and he assured me that he would oppose, if it came to him, any change as to the law in the matter of the office of General, or the diminution of salary. The only trouble is in my successor. Halleck is out of the question. Meade comes next on the list, but is not a favorite. Sheridan comes next in order and is Grant's preference, I think. Thomas could not be passed over if by the accidents of war Sheridan had not already got over him.

Thomas is universally esteemed, but was not made a regular Major General till his battle of Nashville. Whereas Sheridan, at least 13 years younger in service, was made a Major General for his Winchester battle the summer previous. So I think Sheridan will be chosen by Grant as Lt. Genl. Say not a word of this, as Grant will not wish to act till the last minute of time.

We had the most enthusiastic meeting at Chicago possible, and on the whole it was the best meeting we ever had or ever will have again. All persons, Grant included, volunteered the most fulsome eulogies of my short address of welcome, which is badly reported in the telegraphic despatches, but it was carefully written out and will be correctly printed when the whole proceedings are booked.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN.

SOURCE: Rachel Sherman Thorndike, Editor, The Sherman Letters: Correspondence Between General and Senator Sherman from 1837 to 1891, p. 324-5

Dr. Spencer G. Welch to Cordelia Strother Welch, August 10, 1863

Camp near Orange Court House, Va.,

August 10, 1863.

All is quiet here now. When two armies have a great battle both sides are so crippled up that neither is anxious to fight soon again. The enemy must be somewhere about, or we would not be here. I do think there will not be another fight soon, for the Yankees dread us too much. It seems that Meade will not attack us, and that whenever we fight we must make the attack. I believe it will be a long time before we have another battle, if we have to wait for the enemy to advance on us.

Our long trip lately was very fatiguing, and we all became very thin and lean, although our health remained fine. Your brother tells me the Pioneer Corps had a very hard time of it on the way back from Pennsylvania. He took a more direct route to Culpeper Court House than we did, in order to assist some of Ewell's men in crossing the Shenandoah River.

Wilcox of Alabama is the major-general appointed over us, but he cannot surpass General Pender, who commanded us at Gettysburg. Pender was an officer evidently superior even to Hill. He was as brave as a lion and seemed to love danger. I observed his gallantry on the opening of the battle. He was mortally wounded on the first day as the fight was closing.

I have seen letters from some of our wounded who were left at Gettysburg. They are now in New York, and all say they are treated well. I had a chance to remain with our wounded, and, had I preferred to do so, I might have had a very interesting experience. Our chaplain, Beauschelle, was captured and is somewhere in Yankeedom, and I suppose is in prison, as chaplains are now held as prisoners, but he is apt to be released soon.

Our army is in splendid health and spirits, and is being increased rapidly every day by conscription and by men returning from the hospitals. Last year when a soldier was sent to a hospital he was expected to die, but all who come from the hospitals in Richmond now are highly pleased with the treatment they received. The hospital sections set aside for officers are admirably kept.

We get plenty to eat now and I am beginning to get as fat as ever again. Beef, bacon and flour, and sometimes sugar and potatoes, are issued to us. Dr. Tyler and I have obtained twenty pounds of sugar, a fine ham and one-half bushel of potatoes, and we hope to get some apples and make pies, as we have so much sugar. Vegetables are abundant in the country around here, and I succeeded in getting so much blackberry pie to eat recently that it made me sick.

Our regiment is on picket duty to-day. It went on last night. The weather is intensely hot, as hot as I ever experienced in South Carolina, but we are encamped in a fine grove and do not suffer from the heat as we would if marching.

The first chance I have I will send you two hundred dollars. You must buy everything you need, even if calico does cost three dollars a yard and thread one dollar a spool.

I am extremely gratified to hear that you and George are both in such excellent health, and I am glad you had him baptized.

SOURCE: Dr. Spencer G. Welch, A Confederate Surgeon's Letters to His Wife, p. 73-5

Dr. Spencer G. Welch to Cordelia Strother Welch, September 27, 1863

Camp near Orange Court House, Va.,

September 27, 1863.

We had nine more military executions in our division yesterday—one man from Thomas' Brigade, one from Scales' and seven from Lane's. Colonel Hunt was a member of the court-martial which sentenced them, and he tells me that one of the men from Lane's Brigade was a brother of your preacher, and that the two looked very much alike. He said he was a very intelligent man, and gave as his reason for deserting that the editorials in the Raleigh Standard had convinced him that Jeff Davis was a tyrant and that the Confederate cause was wrong. I am surprised that the editor of that miserable little journal is allowed to go at large. It is most unfortunate that this thing of shooting men for desertion was not begun sooner. Many lives would have been saved by it, because a great many men will now have to be shot before the trouble can be stopped.

We have been having some cavalry fighting recently. On the 23d the enemy were threatening to flank us, and our division was moved about six miles up the Rapidan River, but we soon returned to a place near our old camp. We have heard nothing of General Meade for the last few days, but we all expect soon to have a battle.

I must close, as a doctor has just come for me to go with him to assist in dissecting two of the men who were shot yesterday.

SOURCE: Dr. Spencer G. Welch, A Confederate Surgeon's Letters to His Wife, p. 79-80

Dr. Spencer G. Welch to Cordelia Strother Welch, October 20, 1863

Camp near Rappahannock River,

Culpeper County, Va.,

October 20, 1863.

This is the first chance I have had to write to you since we started on our autumn campaign. We have succeeded in maneuvering Meade entirely out of Virginia, as you must have already learned. The infantry did not have much fighting to do at any time on the entire trip, but the cavalry fought a large part of the time. Two North Carolina brigades became engaged with the enemy late one afternoon near Bristow Station, and our side got rather the worst of it. It was all due to the miserable management of General Hill or General Heth, or possibly both of them. The next morning the Yankees were gone, as they did not dare give battle to General Lee.

We have had a pretty hard time of it for the last few days on account of so much rain. It made the marching extremely disagreeable, but I stood the trip well, and enjoyed the best of health. To-day the weather has cleared and it is bright and pleasant.

We have destroyed the railroad between Manassas and this place, so the Yankees cannot advance by that route again this winter, and I am sure the Army of Virginia will do no more fighting this year. Some part of it is sure to be sent somewhere soon, and our corps might go to Tennessee after resting a few days, or it might possibly be sent to General Bragg.

The part of Virginia through which we have marched has been totally devastated. It is now nothing but one vast track of desolation, without a fence or a planted field of any kind. I do not understand how the people exist, yet they do actually continue to live there. They are intensely hostile to the Yankees, and there is certainly no submission in them. If the people at home, who know nothing of the war, but who are always critcising the bad management of our general, could see these lofty-minded Virginians, who have lost everything but their proud spirit, they surely would hush and try to do something for their country.

SOURCE: Dr. Spencer G. Welch, A Confederate Surgeon's Letters to His Wife, p. 80-2

Major-General Ulysses S. Grant to Major-General William T. Sherman, July 11, 1863

VICKSBURG, MISS., July 11, 1863.        

Maj. Gen. WILLIAM T. SHERMAN, Comdg. Expedition:

DEAR GENERAL: Dispatches just received from General Banks announces the good news of the surrender of Port Hudson, with 5,000 prisoners and all the armament of the place. News came from the East of the defeat of Lee and his precipitate retreat, with Meade in full pursuit. I have nothing definite from you since the morning of the 9th, but, not hearing, suppose all is right. Is there any probability that Johnston may be receiving re-enforcements and intends standing? I have just learned from Yazoo City that all the steamers from above have just come down there, and that Johnston sent orders to press all the negroes that can be got, to prosecute the work of fortifying with all vigor. More than 1,000 negroes are said to be at work now. I immediately ordered a division from here to break them up. The well prisoners have been paroled and about out of town. The number reached near 25,000. There are still those in hospital, near 6,000, yet to parole, besides many escaped without paroling.

Hoping to hear of your giving Johnston a good thrashing and driving him beyond Pearl River, with the loss of artillery, transportation, and munitions of war, I remain, yours truly,

U.S. GRANT.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 24, Part 3 (Serial No. 38), p. 501

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: March 28, 1864

April-like day, but no rain; clouds, and sunshine, and warm.

About 2 P.M. the Secretary received a dispatch stating that the enemy had appeared in force opposite Fredericksburg, and attempted, without success, to cross. A copy of this was immediately sent to Gen. Lee.

It is said that Gen. Longstreet is marching with expedition down the Valley of the Shenandoah, to flank Meade or Grant. I doubt it. But the campaign will commence as soon as the weather will permit.

A letter from G. B. Lamar, Savannah, Ga., informs the Secretary that he (L.) has command of five steamers, and that he can easily make arrangements with the (Federal) commandant of Fort Pulaski to permit them to pass and repass. His proposition to the government is to bring in munitions of war, etc., and take out cotton, charging one-half for freight. Mr. Memminger having seen this, advises the Secretary to require the delivery of a cargo before supplying any cotton. Mr. M. has a sort of jealousy of Mr. Lamar.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 178

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: March 14, 1864

Bright, pleasant day. The city is full of generals—Lee and his son (the one just returned from captivity), Longstreet, Whiting, Wise, Hoke, Morgan (he was ordered by Gen. Cooper to desist from his enterprise in the West), Evans, and many others. Some fourteen attended St. Paul's (Episcopal) Church yesterday, where the President worships. Doubtless they are in consultation on the pressing needs of the country.

About noon to-day a dispatch came from Lieut.-Col. Cole, Gen. Lee's principal commissary, at Orange Court House, dated 12th inst., saying the army was out of meat, and had but one day's rations of bread. This I placed in the hands of the Secretary myself, and he seemed roused by it. Half an hour after, I saw Col. Northrop coming out of the department with a pale face, and triumphant, compressed lips. He had indorsed on the dispatch, before it came—it was addressed to him—that the state of things had come which he had long and often predicted, and to avert which he had repeatedly suggested the remedy; but the Secretary would not!

No wonder the generals are in consultation, for all the armies are in the same lamentable predicament—to the great triumph of Col. N., whose prescience is triumphantly vindicated! But Gen. Wise, when I mentioned these things to him, said we would starve in the midst of plenty, meaning that Col. N was incompetent to hold the position of Commissary-General.

At 2 P.M. a dispatch (which I likewise placed in the hands of the Secretary) came from Gen. Pickett, with information that thirteen of the enemy's transports passed Yorktown yesterday with troops from Norfolk, the Eastern Shore of Virginia, Washington City, etc.—such was the report of the signal corps. They also reported that Gen. Meade would order a general advance, to check Gen. Lee. What all this means I know not, unless it be meant to aid Gen. Kilpatrick to get back the way he came with his raiding cavalry—or else Gen. Lee's army is in motion, even while he is here. It must do something, or starve.

L. P. Walker, the first Secretary of War, is here, applying for an appointment as judge advocate of one of the military courts.

Gen. Bragg is at work. I saw by the President's papers today, that the Secretary's recommendation to remit the sentence to drop an officer was referred to him. He indorsed on it that the sentence was just, and ought to be executed. The President then indorsed: “Drop him.—J. D.”

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 170-1

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: March 2, 1864

A slight snow on the ground this morning—but bright and cool. Last night, after I had retired to bed, we heard a brisk cannonading, and volleys of musketry, a few miles distant.

This morning an excitement, but no alarm, pervaded the city. It was certainly a formidable attempt to take the city by surprise. From the number of disgraceful failures heretofore, the last very recently, the enemy must have come to the desperate resolution to storm the city this time at all hazards. And indeed the coming upon it was sudden, and if there had been a column of 15,000 bold men in the assault, they might have penetrated it. But now, twenty-four hours subsequently, 30,000 would fail in the attempt.

The Department Clerks were in action in the evening in five minutes after they were formed in line. Capt. Ellery, Chief Clerk of 2d Auditor, was killed, and several were wounded. It rained fast all the time, and it was very dark. The enemy's cavalry charged upon them, firing as they came; they were ordered to lie flat on the ground. This they did, until the enemy came within fifteen yards of them, when they rose and fired, sending the assailants to the right and left, helter-skelter. How many fell is not yet known.

To-day Gen. Hampton sent in 77 prisoners, taken six miles above town—one lieutenant-colonel among them; and Yankee horses, etc. are coming in every hour.

Gov. Vance writes that inasmuch as Judge Pearson still grants the writ of habeas corpus, and discharges all who have put substitutes in the army, on the ground of the unconstitutionality of the act of Congress, he is bound by his oath to sustain the judge, even to the summoning the military force of the State to resist the Confederate States authorities. But to avoid such a fatal collision, he is willing to abide the decision of the Supreme Court, to assemble in June; the substitute men, meantime, to be left unmolested. We shall soon see the President's decision, which will probably be martial law.

Last night, when it was supposed probable that the prisoners of war at the Libby might attempt to break out, Gen. Winder ordered that a large amount of powder be placed under the building, with instructions to blow them up, if the attempt were made. He was persuaded, however, to consult the Secretary of War first, and get his approbation. The Secretary would give no such order, but said the prisoners must not be permitted to escape under any circumstances, which was considered sanction enough. Capt. —— obtained an order for, and procured several hundred pounds of gunpowder, which were placed in readiness. Whether the prisoners were advised of this I know not; but I told Capt —— it could not be justifiable to spring such a mine in the absence of their knowledge of the fate awaiting them, in the event of their attempt to break out, —— because such prisoners are not to be condemned for striving to regain their liberty. Indeed, it is the duty of a prisoner of war to escape if he can.

Gen. Winder addressed me in a friendly manner to-day, the first time in two years.

The President was in a bad humor yesterday, when the enemy's guns were heard even in his office.

The last dispatch from Gen. Lee informs us that Meade, who had advanced, had fallen back again. But communications are cut between us and Lee; and we have no intelligence since Monday.

Gen. Wilcox is organizing an impromptu brigade here, formed of the furloughed officers and men found everywhere in the streets and at the hotels. This looks as if the danger were not yet regarded as over.

The Secretary of War was locked up with the Quartermaster and Commissary-Generals and other bureau officers, supposed to be discussing the damage done by the enemy to the railroads, etc. etc. I hope it was not a consultation upon any presumed necessity of the abandonment of the city

We were paid to-day in $5 bills. I gave $20 for half a cord of wood, and $60 for a bushel of common white cornfield beans. Bacon is yet $8 per pound; but more is coming to the city than usual, and a decline may be looked for, I hope. The farmers above the city, who have been hoarding grain, meat, etc., will lose much by the raiders. . .

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 163-5

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: February 24, 1864

Bright and pleasant. Intelligence from the West is of an interesting character. The column of Federal cavalry from Memphis, destined to co-operate with Gen. Sherman, has been intercepted and a junction prevented. And both Sherman and the cavalry are now in full retreat—running out of the country faster than they advanced into it. The desert they made as they traversed the interior of Mississippi they have now to repass, if they can, in the weary retreat, with no supplies but those they brought with them. Many will never get back.

And a dispatch from Beauregard confirms Finnegan's victory in Florida. He captured all the enemy's artillery, stores, etc., and for three miles his dead and wounded were found strewn on the ground. Thus the military operations of 1864 are, so far, decidedly favorable. And we shall probably soon have news from Longstreet. If Meade advances, Lee will meet him—and let him beware

Gold is still mounting up—and so with everything exposed for sale. When, when will prices come down?

But we shall probably end the war this year—and independence will compensate for all. The whole male population, pretty much, will be in the field this year, and our armies will be strong. So far we have the prestige of success, and our men are resolved to keep it, if the dissensions of the leaders do not interfere with the general purpose.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 156-7

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, August 5, 1864

Only four of us with the President today. Mr. Fessenden has gone to Maine. Seward and Stanton were absent when the rest were there.

I was with the President on Wednesday when Governor Morgan was there, and the President produced the correspondence that had passed between himself and Chase at the time C. resigned. It was throughout characteristic. I do not think the event was wholly unexpected to either, and yet both were a little surprised. The President fully understands Chase and had made up his mind that he would not be again overridden in his own appointments.

Chase, a good deal ambitious and somewhat presuming, felt he must enforce his determinations, which he had always successfully carried out. In coming to the conclusion that a separation must take place, the President was prompted by some, and sustained by all, his Cabinet without an exception. Chase's retirement has offended nobody, and has gratified almost everybody.

I told Blair as we left the Executive Mansion to-day that I felt depressed in consequence of the result at Petersburg, beyond what I ought from the fight itself, in consequence of impaired confidence in Grant. He tried to encourage me and partially succeeded. I do not distrust or depreciate General G.; but, if he has ability, I think he needs a better second in command, a more competent executive officer than General Meade, and he should have known that fact earlier. The knowledge of the worth of our generals is often purchased at too great a cost of blood and treasure. It is dear tuition.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 93-4

Lieutenant-General Ulysses S. Grant to Major-General George G. Meade, April 9, 1864

CULPEPER COURT-HOUSE, VA.,                       

April 9, 1864.

Maj. Gen. G. G. MEADE,

Commanding Army of the Potomac:

For information, and as instructions to govern your preparations for the coming campaign, the following is communicated confidentially, for your own perusal alone:

So far as practicable, all the armies are to move together and toward one common center. Banks has been instructed to turn over the guarding of the Red River to General Steele and to the navy, to abandon Texas with the exception of the Rio Grande, and to concentrate all the force he can—not less than 25,000 men—to move on Mobile. This he is to do without reference to any other movements. From the scattered condition of his command, however, he cannot possibly get it together to leave New Orleans before the 1st of May, if so soon.

Sherman will move at the same time you do, or two or three days in advance, Joe Johnston's army being his objective point and the heart of Georgia his ultimate aim. If successful, he will secure the line from Chattanooga to Mobile, with the aid of Banks.

Sigel cannot spare troops from his army to re-enforce either of the great armies, but he can aid them by moving directly to his front. This he has been directed to do, and is now making preparations for it. Two columns of his command will move south at the same time with the general move, one from Beverly, from 10,000 to 12,000 strong, under Major-General Ord; the other from Charleston, W. Va., principally cavalry, under Brigadier-General Crook. The former of these will endeavor to reach the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad about south of Covington, and if found practicable will work eastward to Lynchburg and return to its base by way of the Shenandoah Valley or join you. The other will strike at Saltville, Va., and come eastward to join Ord. The cavalry from Ord's command will try to force a passage southward; if they are successful in reaching the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, to cut the main lines of the road connecting Richmond with all the South and Southwest.

Gillmore will join Butler with about 10,000 men from South Carolina. Butler can reduce his garrison so as to take 23,000 men into the field directly to his front. The force will be commanded by Maj. Gen. W. F. Smith. With Smith and Gillmore, Butler will seize City Point and operate against Richmond from the south side of the river. His movement will be simultaneous with yours.

Lee's army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also. The only point upon which I am now in doubt is whether it will be better to cross the Rapidan above or below him. Each plan presents great advantages over the other, with corresponding objections. By crossing above, Lee is cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond and going north on a raid: but if we take this route all we do must be done while the rations we start with hold out; we separate from Butler, so that he cannot be directed how to co-operate. By the other route, Brandy Station can be used as a base of supplies until another is secured on the York or James River. These advantages and objections I will talk over with you more fully than I can write them.

Burnside, with a force of probably 25,000 men, will re-enforce you. Immediately upon his arrival, which will be shortly after the 20th instant, I will give him the defense of the road from Bull Run as far south as we wish to hold it. This will enable you to collect all your strength about Brandy Station and to the front.

There will be naval co-operations on the James River, and transports and ferries will be provided, so that should Lee fall back into his intrenchments at Richmond Butler's force and yours will be a unit, or at least can be made to act as such.

What I would direct, then, is that you commence at once reducing baggage to the very lowest possible standard. Two wagons to a regiment of 500 men is the greatest number that should be allowed for all baggage, exclusive of subsistence stores and ordnance stores. One wagon to brigade and one to division headquarters is sufficient, and about two to corps headquarters.

Should by Lee's right flank be our route, you will want to make arrangements for having supplies of all sorts promptly forwarded to White House, on the Pamunkey. Your estimates for this contingency should be made at once. If not wanted there, there is every probability they will be wanted on the James River or elsewhere.

If Lee's left is turned, large provision will have to be made for ordnance stores. I would say not much short of 500 rounds of infantry ammunition would do. By the other, half the amount would be sufficient.

U. S. GRANT,                       

Lieutenant-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 33 (Serial No. 60), p. 827-9

Edwin M. Stanton to Major-General Benjamin F. Butler, May 9, 1864 — 3:20 p.m.

WAR DEPARTMENT,                     

May 9, 1864—3.20 p.m.

Major-General BUTLER:

A bearer of dispatches from General Meade has just reached here by way of Fredericksburg; states that on Friday night Lee's army fell back, and yesterday were in full retreat for Richmond, Grant pursuing with his army. Hancock passed Spotsylvania Court-House before daylight yesterday morning. Meade's headquarters were yesterday at Todd's Tavern. We occupy Fredericksburg. The Twenty-second New York [Cavalry] occupied it about 8 o'clock last night.

EDWIN M. STANTON,                   

Secretary of War.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 36, Part 2 (Serial No. 68), p. 587

Charles A. Dana to Edwin M. Stanton, July 7, 1864—8 a.m.

CITY POINT, VA., July 7, 1864—8 a.m.          

(Received 6 p.m.)

A change in the commander of the Army of the Potomac now seems probable. Grant has great confidence in Meade, and is much attached to him personally, but the almost universal dislike of Meade which prevails among officers of every rank who come in contact with him, and the difficulty of doing business with him felt by every one except Grant himself, so greatly impair his capacities for usefulness and render success under his command so doubtful that Grant seems to be coming to the conviction that he must be relieved. The facts in the matter have come very slowly to my knowledge, and it was not until yesterday that I became certain of some of the most important. I have long known Meade to be a man of the worst possible temper, especially toward his subordinates. I do not think he has a friend in the whole army. No man, no matter what his business or his service, approaches him without being insulted in one way or another, and his own staff officers do not dare to speak to him, unless first spoken to, for fear of either sneers or curses. The latter, however, I have never heard him indulge in very violently, but he is said to apply them often without occasion and without reason. At the same time—as far as I am able to ascertain—his generals have lost their confidence in him as a commander. His order for the last series of assaults upon Petersburg, in which he lost 10,000 men without gaining any decisive advantage, was to the effect that he had found it impracticable to secure the co-operation of corps commanders, and therefore each one was to attack on his own account and do the best he could by himself. Consequently each gained some advantage of position, but each exhausted his own strength in so doing, while for the want of a general purpose and a general commander to direct and concentrate the whole, it all amounted to nothing but heavy loss to ourselves. Of course there are matters about which I cannot make inquiries, but what I have above reported is the general sense of what seems to be the opinion of fair-minded and zealous officers. For instance, I know that General Wright has said to a confidential friend that all of Meade's attacks have been made without brains and without generalship. The subject came to pretty full discussion at Grant's headquarters last night on occasion of a correspondence between Meade and Wilson. The Richmond Examiner charges Wilson with stealing not only negroes and horses, but silver plate and clothing on his raid, and Meade, taking the statement of the Examiner for truth, reads Wilson a lecture and calls on him for explanations. Wilson deities the charges of robbing women and churches, and hopes Meade will not be ready to condemn his command because its operations have excited the ire of the public enemy. This started the conversation in which Grant expressed himself quite frankly as to the general trouble with Meade and his fear that it would become necessary to relieve him. In such event he said it would be necessary to put Hancock in command.

C. A. DANA.

Hon. E. M. STANTON.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 40, Part 1 (Serial No. 80), p. 35-6

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: January 18, 1864

A flag of truce boat came up, but no one on board was authorized to negotiate for an exchange of prisoners but Gen. Butler, outlawed. It returns without anything being effected. Congress has passed a bill for the reduction of the currency, in secret session. We know not yet what are its main features. The Senate bill increasing the compensation of civil officers has not yet been acted on in the House, and many families are suffering for food.

Anne writes us that Lieut. Minor has returned from his Canada expedition, which failed, in consequence of the gratuitous action of Lord Lyons, the British Minister at Washington, who has been secured in the interest of the Federal Government, it is said, by bribes. Lieut. M. brought his family a dozen cups and saucers, dresses, shoes, etc., almost unattainable here.

The President receives company every Tuesday evening.

Among the letters referred by the Commissary-General to the Secretary of War to-day for instructions, was one from our honest commissary in North Carolina, stating that there were several million pounds of bacon and pork in Chowan and one or two other counties, liable to the incursions of the enemy, which the people were anxious to sell the government, but were afraid to bring out themselves, lest the enemy should ravage their farms, etc., and suggesting that a military force be sent thither with wagons. The Commissary-General stated none of these facts in his indorsement; but I did, so that the Secretary must be cognizant of the nature of the paper.

The enemy made a brief raid in Westmoreland and Richmond counties a few days ago, and destroyed 60,000 pounds of meat in one of the Commissary-General's depots! A gentleman writing from that section, says it is a pity the President's heart is not in his head; for then he would not ruin the country by retaining his friend, Col. Northrop, the Commissary-General, in office.

It appears that Gen. Meade has changed the Federal policy in the Northern Neck, by securing our people within his lines from molestation; and even by allowing them to buy food, clothing, etc. from Northern traders, on a pledge of strict neutrality. The object is to prevent the people from conveying intelligence to Moseby, who has harassed his flanks and exposed detachments very much. It is a more dangerous policy for us than the old habit of scourging the non-combatants that fall in their power.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 130-1