No. 231.
Report of General G.
T. Beauregard, C. S. Army, commanding Military Division of the West.
HEADQUARTERS, &c.,
Greensborough, N. C., April 15, 1865.
GENERAL: I have read
in the Richmond Enquirer of the 25th ultimo the report of General J. B. Hood
touching the operations of the Army of Tennessee from July 18, 1864, to January
23, 1865. During a portion of the period embraced in that report, General Hood
having been under my command, his report should have passed through me for my
consideration and remarks before it reached the War Department. The regular
channel of communication should have been observed, as my own acts and conduct
as his commanding officer are referred to by him. I am the more surprised at
this irregularity, as I informed General Hood, at Tupelo, a few days previous
to his being relieved that I desired and expected his report to be addressed to
and pass through me to the Department. At that time he expressed his intention
of making through me a report covering the operations of the Army of Tennessee
from the date of his assumption of command, to which I objected, as I only had
a right to call for one embracing his operations from the time I took command.
There are several errors and inaccuracies in the report which I cannot leave
unnoticed, while reserving for some more suitable occasion a more extended
report of operations in the Military Division of the West while under my command.
Unexpectedly to me
His Excellency the President, on October 2, 1864, called me to the command of
the departments then under General J. B. Hood and Lieut. Gen. R. Taylor,
respectively, embracing together the States of Mississippi, Alabama, East
Louisiana, Tennessee, and Georgia, with my headquarters to be established at
the most convenient point for purposes of communication, but with the
understanding that my personal presence would be given wheresoever in my
judgment the interest of my command rendered it necessary, and that when
present with an army in the field I should exercise the immediate command.
On the 1st of
November, the President, repeating his instructions that I should exercise
immediate command when present with the troops, added: That in order to retain
freedom of motion it was expected I would not relieve the commander of the
particular army, but by retaining the existing organization be enabled to leave
it when expedient at any moment without impairing its administration and
efficiency.
In pursuance of
orders I repaired to the headquarters of General Hood, at Cave Spring, Ga., on
or about the 9th of October, and there conferred with him in regard to his
future movements. General Hood is, therefore, in error in saying that I joined
the army at Gadsden, Ala. Being at the time unprovided with my staff and
horses, and desirous also to confer with Lieutenant-General Taylor, I hastened
thence to Jacksonville, Ala., which had then become the new base of operations,
intending to return in the event a battle should become probable.
On the 19th of
October, supposing that General Hood was near Alpine or Summerville, Ga., I
proceeded to rejoin the Army of Tennessee. In the meantime, however, he had
commenced his movement toward Middle Tennessee without advising me, and had
marched as far as Gadsden—
a fact which I
ascertained at Round Mountain Iron-Works (in advance of Center)—when, retracing
my steps, I joined him on the 21st of October.
In an interview with
General Hood he informed me that he was then en route to Middle
Tennessee, via Gunter's Landing, on the Tennessee River. At Gadsden I had
conferences during two days with him in relation to the future operations of
the army, in the course of which he stated that his general plan had been
submitted to and approved by General Bragg, then commanding the Armies of the
Confederate States. In view of existing condition of affairs the movement then
in progress met my approval also, for reasons, some of which are as follows:
First. General Hood
alleged that Sherman was short of provisions and forage at Atlanta, while his
wheel transportation was in wretched condition.
Second. That the
destruction of the railroad near Marietta and Dalton by our forces had been so
thorough it would require at least five or six weeks to repair it, during which
the Army of Tennessee could be thrown into Middle Tennessee, via Gunter's
Landing, distance about forty miles from Gadsden, and destroy the railroad
bridges at Bridgeport and across the Elk and Duck Rivers before Sherman could
finish the repairs of the road below Chattanooga, thus forcing him to return to
Tennessee to protect his communications and obtain supplies.
To add to the
chances of success I remained two days at Gadsden after the departure of the
army, to issue the necessary orders to secure railroad communications in
Mississippi and Middle Alabama for the transportation of supplies, and to
direct Major-General Forrest, who was then operating in West Tennessee, to
report to General Hood with his command.
While en route
to Gunter's Landing I learned, casually and to my surprise, that the line of
march of our forces had been changed to one in the direction of Decatur, at
which point I overtook it, and where the enemy was found strongly intrenched.
As it was impossible to effect a crossing without great and unnecessary
sacrifice of life, it was now judged proper by General Hood to attempt a
passage, first, at Lamb's Ferry, that failing, then at Bainbridge, or, finally,
at Tuscumbia, which had become our base of supplies. He determined, however,
soon after leaving Decatur, to undertake the passage of the river at the latter
point, which he reached on the 30th of October. There and at Florence, on the
opposite or north bank of the Tennessee, he remained until the 21st of
November.
The effective
strength of the force at this date was as follows: Three corps—infantry,
25,085; artillery, 2,200; total, 27,285.
No report has been
received of the strength of the cavalry. Jackson's division consisted of three
brigades, estimated at 2,000 men; General Forrest's command estimated at 3,500
men, and General Roddey's at 2,000; making an aggregate of 34,785.
General Roddey with
his command was to cover the line of communication from Tuscumbia to Corinth,
and thence toward Meridian.
When it became
apparent that Sherman (still at Atlanta) was dividing his army by assembling
two corps, the Fourth and Twenty-third, (about 20,000 infantry and artillery),
at Pulaski, Huntsville, and Decatur, it was determined by General Hood, after a
discussion between us, that our army should move promptly into Tennessee and
strike the enemy before a junction could be effected with the forces of A. J.
Smith (about 8,000 effectives), known to be moving from Missouri, and of Steele
(about the same strength), from Arkansas. To this end our forces were to be
thrown forward as speedily as possible from Florence to Lawrenceburg, and
thence either to Pulaski or Columbia, as circumstances might indicate; and I
repeated my orders to General Forrest to form a junction with the Army of
Tennessee in the direction of Lawrenceburg or Waynesborough, making first,
however, a demonstration toward Columbia to distract and harass the enemy. The
movement of the Army of Tennessee did not commence, however, on the 9th of
November, as arranged, and I addressed General Hood, on the 15th of that month,
a communication, from which the following are extracts:
My
purpose was to call again your attention, as I did yesterday, first, to the
necessity of guarding well your right flank and rear in advancing toward
Lawrenceburg and Pulaski against a sudden movement of the enemy from Huntsville
or Athens across the Elk River; second, to the necessity of securing from the
passage of the enemy's gun-boats another point above Savannah or Clifton,
besides Florence, for the army to recross the Tennessee in case of disaster;
third, to the necessity of giving still greater protection to Corinth and the
Mobile and Ohio Railroad to that point. * * *
I
was aware that those points had already been discussed between us, but my
anxiety for the safety of the troops under your command made it incumbent upon
me to call again your attention to those important matters. * * *
General
Taylor and myself will always be anxious to aid you in your present campaign
with all the means at our control; but these being limited, ample previous
notice for what may be required should be given, to enable us to make all
necessary preparations. * * *
G. T. BEAUREGARD,
General.
Lieutenant-General
Taylor was then directed to repair to Georgia to assume command of all forces
there, with instructions to call on the Governors of Georgia and South Carolina
for the militia of their respective States; and General Hood, in view of the
fact that General Sherman had divided his army, was directed to hasten his
movement and strike the enemy a vigorous blow before he could unite with his
re-enforcements. He was likewise ordered to send to Major-General Wheeler, who
was closely watching General Sherman, the cavalry division of Brigadier-General
Jackson. In consequence, however, of the urgent solicitation of General Hood,
who represented his deficiency in cavalry, the order for Jackson's division was
countermanded so far as to direct only one brigade to be detached.
On the 17th of
November the following order was given General Hood:
General
Beauregard directs me to say he desires that you will fake the offensive at the
earliest practicable moment and deal the enemy rapid and vigorous blows,
striking him while thus dispersed, and by this means distract Sherman's advance
into Georgia. To relieve you from any embarrassment while operating in North
Alabama and Middle Tennessee, he authorizes you to issue all such orders in
General Taylor's department you may deem necessary to secure the efficient and
successful administration and operations of your army, sending to
Lieutenant-General Taylor, or whosoever may be in command, copies of all such
orders. He wishes you to send forthwith to Major-General Wheeler one brigade of
cavalry of Jackson's division, and the balance of that division, as soon as it
can be spared, should Sherman advance into Georgia, and also to advise General
Wheeler that in such a case Clanton's brigade is subject to his orders. * * *
GEO. WM. BRENT,
Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General.
General Hood in his
report states:
General
Beauregard left it optional with me either to divide the army, sending a part
after Sherman and to push on with the remainder, or to move at once against
Thomas with the entire force. The army I thought too small to divide. I so
informed him, when he directed me by telegraph to push forward at once.
General Hood's
request to retain all the cavalry having then been repeated, I adhered to the
order for the one brigade and telegraphed him accordingly, leaving him with his
three corps and artillery intact, as well as a large cavalry force. He was
confronted in Middle Tennessee by General Thomas with only two corps (about
20,000 infantry and artillery) and about 6,000 cavalry, General Sherman being
in Georgia with four corps (about 40,000 infantry and artillery) and about
4,000 cavalry, at a long distance from us, with muddy roads, burned bridges,
and broad devastated districts between the two armies. It was, therefore, our
clear policy to strike Thomas with the utmost celerity before he could be
re-enforced, rather than to retrace our march and pursue Sherman. But the
offensive in Middle Tennessee could only be successful if undertaken at once
and executed with energy, without any division or material diminution of our
forces. I certainly contemplated in that event no such division, for I could not
regard it as compatible with the plan of the campaign, though under existing
circumstances a division and active employment of forces would doubtless have
been preferable to inaction.
On the 6th day of
December, in answer to a telegram from the President, I addressed him, from
Augusta, a communication, stating that all had been done practicable under
existing conditions, with the limited means at command, to oppose the advance
of Sherman toward the Atlantic coast, and that I had deemed it inexpedient to countermand
the campaign of General Hood into Tennessee to attempt the pursuit of Sherman,
for the following reasons, namely:
First. The roads and
creeks from the Tennessee to the Coosa River across Sand and Lookout Mountains
had been rendered impassable by the prevailing rains.
Second. Sherman,
with an army better appointed and of superior numbers, had the start of about
275 miles on comparatively good roads.
Third. To pursue
Sherman, the march of the Army of Tennessee would necessarily have been over
roads with all the bridges destroyed, and through a desolated country,
affording neither subsistence nor forage, while a retrograde movement of the
army must have seriously depleted its ranks by desertions.
Fourth. Moreover, to
have recalled the army to follow Sherman, would have opened to Thomas the
richest portions of Alabama. Montgomery, Mobile, and Selma would have easily
fallen, without insuring the defeat of Sherman.
Fifth. From the
assurances of Governor Brown and Major-General Cobb, it was a reasonable
supposition that about 17,000 men would be furnished in a great emergency by
the State of Georgia, which force, added to thirteen brigades of cavalry, under
Major-General Wheeler, and some 5,000 men, who, it was thought, might be drawn
from the States of North and South Carolina, would have given us about 29,000
men to throw across Sherman's path. Although the delays and changes of line of
march were not satisfactory to me, nevertheless, I had not felt it to be
necessary to assume, as authorized to do, the immediate command of the Army of
Tennessee, because I had found it in good spirits, resulting in part from its
recent successful blows at the enemy's railroad communications from Dalton to
Atlanta; all appeared confident of a successful issue to the impending
campaign, and the commanders immediately subordinate to General Hood seemed to
regard him as capable to lead them. Moreover, I knew that he possessed in a
high degree the confidence of the Government as likewise of General Bragg, at
the time commander of the Armies of the Confederate States. Nevertheless, I
thought it proper, so long as my presence elsewhere was not exigent, that I
should accompany the troops; but as soon as Sherman's purposes were fully
developed in Georgia I deemed myself called on to repair at once to that
theatre of operations, to do what I might to baffle them, assured that I left
General Hood quite strong enough for the proposed campaign. On reaching there
the forces I had been led to expect were not available. The cavalry of
Major-General Wheeler and a small force of Georgia militia, under Major-General
Smith, with the detailed men from our workshops, and State reserves, were all
that could be organized and brought into the field against the overwhelming
numbers of the thoroughly organized, disciplined, and equipped veterans of the
enemy.
In January, 1865,
General Hood furnished me with a copy of a letter from him to the War Office
giving a general summary of his campaign from the 29th of September, 1864, to
the 7th of January, 1865; but although repeatedly called for, no official
detailed report either from General Hood or his subordinate officers has passed
through me, as required by the regulations of the service.
And now, in
conclusion, I deem it in place to give expression to my conviction that the
campaign, instead of the unhappy day at Franklin and the disastrous culmination
at Nashville, would have led to the signal defeat of Thomas, and such troops as
might have been hurriedly brought up to his assistance, had the original plan
been executed without undue delay and modifications and with vigor and skill;
Sherman most probably would have been compelled to return to Middle Tennessee
to repair and protect his line of communications before he could have collected
sufficient supplies for the march from Atlanta to the sea-coast, or, in the
event that he had been able to reach the coast of Georgia, he must have been
forced to abandon it and hasten to the rescue of Kentucky, or perchance, the
defense of Ohio, and thus have been prevented from attempting any operations
looking to a junction on his part with Grant in Virginia, or any substantial
diversion in favor of that commander; meantime, too, we would have been enabled
to glean and send supplies from Middle and East Tennessee to Virginia, and
re-establish our railway communications between our capital and those
well-stored sections of the country. But instead of crossing the Tennessee
River at Gunter's Landing, as General Hood intended at Gadsden, he suddenly
changed his line of march, as mentioned hereinbefore, and repaired to Tuscumbia
and Florence, where the want of supplies, due to the bad condition of the
Mobile and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston Railroads and prevailing rains,
delayed his advance for nearly three weeks, whereby Sherman was given time to
repair the damage done to the Chattanooga and Atlanta Railroad and to collect
sufficient supplies for his march across Georgia. It is clear, also, to my mind
that after the great loss and waste of life at Franklin, the army was in no
condition to make a successful attack on Nashville—a strongly fortified city,
defended by an army nearly as strong as our own, and which was being
re-enforced constantly by river and railroads. From Franklin, General Hood
should have marched, not on Nashville, but on Murfreesborough, which could
doubtless have been captured, with its garrison of about 8,000 men; and after
having destroyed the railroad bridges across Duck and Elk Rivers, which surely
would have caused the evacuation of Bridgeport and Chattanooga, he might have
returned, with the prestige of success, into winter quarters behind the Duck or
Tennessee Rivers, as circumstances might have dictated, detaching then a force
for the protection of South Carolina.
Untoward and calamitous
as were the issues of this campaign, never in the course of this war have the
best qualities of our soldiery been more conspicuously shown; never more
enthusiasm evinced than when our troops once more crossed the Tennessee River;
never greater gallantry than that which was so general at Franklin; and never
higher fortitude and uncomplaining devotion to duty than were displayed on the
retreat from Nashville to Tupelo.
The heroic dead of
that campaign will ever be recollected with honor by their countrymen, and the
survivors have the proud consolation that no share of the disaster can be laid
to them, who have so worthily served their country, and have stood by their
colors even to the last dark hours of the republic.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. BEAUREGARD,
General.
General SAM. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector-General, C. S. Army.
SOURCE: The
War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and
Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 646-51
