Showing posts with label Philip D Roddey. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Philip D Roddey. Show all posts

Thursday, March 21, 2024

Diary of 1st Lieutenant Daniel L. Ambrose: December 13, 1864

With but short intervals, Slocum's guns have been heard all day. About three o'clock in the evening we hear to our right a sullen roar, a desperate crash, a whoop, and all is over; and soon we are told that Fort McAllister has fallen; that the immortal Hazen, Ohio's ideal son, has planted his battle-flag upon the ramparts there, making free our passage to the sea, and now we hope to receive supplies, as we have access to the fleet anchored in Ossabaw Sound. This evening Captain Ed. R. Roberts of Company C, makes his appearance in camp, after an imprisonment of seven months in the southern prison hells. The reader will remember that Captain Roberts, together with Captain McGuire, Lieutenant Fergus, and about thirty of the men, were captured on the seventh of May, 1864, in our encounter with Roddy and Johnson at Florence, Alabama. The captain has now a large crowd of the Seventh congregated around him, listening attentively to his heart-rending stories of rebel cruelty. We will now follow Captains Roberts and McGuire and Lieutenant Fergus during their wanderings in the land of their captivity. After their capture at Florence, Alabama, on the 7th of May 1864, they, in company with the men, were taken via Mobile and Montgomery, Alabama to Macon, Georgia, where they arrived May 28th. As soon as they entered the stockade Roberts washed his shirt, and after wringing it out, approached the picket fence immediately inside of the stockade to hang it thereon to dry, and just as he was about to touch the fence he was pulled back by a comrade who saved his life-saved him from being cruelly murdered; for it was the dead line he was about to touch, a line upon which many a noble patriot Union soldier poured out his life blood. At one time while here they were compelled to be two and a half days without anything to eat. After remaining in the Macon stockade for some time the officers were separated from the men, and transferred to the city work-house and jail at Charleston, South Carolina, and while here they were continually under the fire of Gilmore's guns. On the 5th of October they were all moved to Columbia, South Carolina, with the exception of those who were sick, among which number was the gallant Lieutenant Fergus, who was suffering with the yellow fever. After long weary months of suffering known only to those who were the sufferers, Captain Roberts and a number of other officers made their escape from those wicked men who sought their lives. The story of the Captain's march from bondage to liberty would alone fill a good sized volume. Guided by the trusty negroes they traveled one hundred and eighty miles in ten nights, (lying in the swamps by day) and reached Sherman's army, seventy miles above Savannah, Georgia, December 5th.

The Captain remained with Kilpatrick's cavalry until the 12th of November, when he joined his regiment and company. Brave, self-sacrificing soldier, the story of your trials, the longings that were yours, the revolting scenes that met your eyes, and the feeling of joy that came to your heart when your eyes fell upon the old flag, will never be known to any save those who experienced like trials, who witnessed like scenes and felt like joys. We now think of those of our number who are yet suffering in southern prison pens, and we are informed that some of them have been freed from their suffering, have been starved, have been murdered. It cannot be that these brave men's sufferings and sorrows which they endured in this land of cruel wrongs will not be righted in the world beyond the stars. We could not believe in a heaven if we should lose the faith that these men's wrongs will be made right above.

SOURCE: Daniel Leib Ambrose, History of the Seventh Regiment Illinois Volunteer Infantry, p. 284-6

Saturday, February 3, 2024

General Pierre G. G. Beauregard to Samuel Cooper, January 17, 1865

TUPELO, January 17, 1865.        
(Received 18th.)
General S. COOPER,
        Adjutant and Inspector General:

Roddey's brigade is useless as at present located by War Department. I desire authority to dispose of it to best advantage, according to circumstances.

G. T. BEAUREGARD,        
General.

[First indorsement.]

Respectfully submitted to honorable Secretary of War.

JOHN W. RIELY,        
Major and Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Second indorsement.]

SECRETARY OF WAR:

On each occasion when this officer has been sent with his command to distant service, serious calamity to Alabama has followed. It is desirable to know what disposition General Beauregard proposes to make of this force.

J. D.

[Third indorsement.]

JANUARY 18, 1865.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL:

Inquire of General B. the purpose for which General Roddey's brigade is wanted. Twice his removal has been followed by unfortunate results, and hence some hesitation is felt in authorizing change of locality.

J. A. S.,        
Secretary.

[Fourth Indorsement.]

File with original. See telegram to General Beauregard, January 19, 1865.

J.W.R.,        
Assistant Adjutant-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 2 (Serial No. 94), p. 789-90

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: January 19, 1865

Clear and frosty. Among the rumors, it would appear that the Senate in secret session has passed a resolution making Lee generalissimo.

It is again said Mr. Seddon will resign, and be followed by Messrs. Benjamin and Mallory, etc.

The following dispatch was received by the President yesterday:

“TUPELO, MISS., January 17th, 1865.—Roddy's brigade (cav.) is useless as at present located by the War Department. I desire authority to dispose of it to the best advantage, according to circumstances.—G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."

The President sends it to the Secretary of War with this indorsement: "On each occasion, when this officer has been sent with his command to distant service, serious calamity to Alabama has followed. It is desirable to know what disposition Gen. Beauregard proposes to make of this force.—J. D.”

We have nothing further from Wilmington. Bad enough. Sherman is said to be marching on Charleston. Bad enough, too!

Our papers have glowing accounts of the good treatment the citizens of Savannah received from the enemy.

Mr. Foote has arrived in the city—and it is said he will take his seat in Congress to-day.

Gen. Whiting and Col. Lamb were taken at Fort Fisher both wounded, it is said—and 1000 of the garrison.

Mr. Peck paid back to the clerks to-day the unexpended balance of their contributions for supplies, etc. The money is not worth half its value some months ago. But Mr. P. secured ten barrels of flour for himself and as many more for the Assistant Secretary, Mr. Kean, etc. etc.

One o'clock P.M. The day has grown dark and cold, indicating snow, and a dismal gloom rests upon the faces of the increasing party of croakers. We have famine, owing to the incapacity of the government, and the rapacity of speculators. Wood, however, is coming in, but it is only for military officers, etc. No one can live on wood. Gold is $70 for $1, and meal about $100 per bushel.

The House of Representatives (in secret session) has passed the Senate joint resolution creating the office of commander-in-chief (for Gen. Lee), and recommending that Gen. Johnston be reinstated, etc. It passed by a vote of 62 to 14.

What will result from this? Is it not a condemnation of the President and the administration that displaced Gen J., etc.? Who will resign? Nous verrons!

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2p. 391-2

Saturday, August 12, 2023

Diary of Private Daniel L. Ambrose: May 7, 1864

This morning the train proceeds on its way to Florence; gone but one hour when a courier comes dashing back to the detachment headquarters with the word “Attacked at Shoal Creek bridge! The train is in danger! Captain Ring, you are requested to send one company immediately to Captain Yeager's aid” (who was commanding the train and escort). Company F, Captain Ahern, is sent. The train is turned back towards our camp, where it soon after arrives. Company F reports back to Captain Ring with the intelligence that General Roddy and Colonel Johnson, with about fifteen hundred rebels, were now crossing the Tennessee; that their advance had crossed early in the morning and captured Sergeant Josiah Lee and squad, standing as a picket guard at Bainbridge Ferry; that they now occupied the road leading towards Florence. The situation is critical. Rowett, with a part of the regiment at Florence, Estabrook with a part camped on Sweet Water, three miles northwest from Florence, Ring with three companies one mile beyond Shoal Creek and nine miles from Florence. We attempt to communicate with Rowett and Estabrook, but the courier returns with no news from them. We only know that they have been attacked by an overwhelming force. Captain Ring, with his detachment and the regimental teams, remains on the opposite side of Shoal Creek from Florence, anxiously waiting to hear from Rowett. We are now convinced that he has been driven; we expect every moment that the rebels will be upon us. Lieutenant Fergus is now sent out with twelve men on a reconnoisance towards Shoal Creek. He soon comes up with a squad of rebels, when he boldly gives the command “forward.” Driving the rebels a short distance, a company lying in ambush spring into the road and succeed in capturing the Lieutenant and private Joseph Burkhardt of Company F, who happened to be on horses in advance of the rest who were mounted on mules, and being in consequence unable to afford any relief, are compelled to beat a retreat to Center Star. Scouts now report to Captain Ring that a part of the rebel force is advancing towards us. It is now night; we know that Rowett has been driven from Florence; that to night he is some forty miles from us; we know that if we remain here until morning we will be compelled to confront two rebel battalions and a battery of artillery. Nine o'clock.—We are still lingering around Center Star as if loath to leave. The train is now headed towards Athens, Alabama. Ten o'clock. Captain Ring concludes for the safety of the command and the train to move on and cross Elk River. We travel all night, and early on the morning of the eighth find Elk River between us and Florence. We are now fifteen miles from Athens. Soon after crossing we go into camp to await orders. We are now distinguished as the army of the Elk. We receive a dispatch this evening informing us that Colonel Rowett has made his appearance at Pulaski, Tennessee, having lost from his command Captain McGuire of Company A, and Lieutenant Roberts of Company C, and thirty men, all taken prisoner. The particulars of Rowett's engagement with Roddy we have not yet learned. We receive orders to-day to report to the commanding officer at Athens, where we arrive and go into camp late in the evening.

SOURCE: Daniel Leib Ambrose, History of the Seventh Regiment Illinois Volunteer Infantry, p. 235-7

Diary of Private Daniel L. Ambrose: Friday, May 13, 1864

This morning Captain Ring receives orders from Colonel Rowett to report with his detachment to the regiment, now at Prospect, Tennessee, where we arrive by dark and join the regiment from which we have been for the last two months. Soon after going into camp we learn that there is another expedition to be started towards Florence, Alabama, commanded by our gallant Dick Rowett, to be composed of the Ninth Ohio Cavalry and the Seventh Illinois Mounted Infantry.

We will now go back and follow Rowett from Florence to Pulaski, thence to Prospect, Tennessee. As we stated, when Roddy crossed at Bainbridge Ferry, Rowett, with a portion of the regiment was in Florence, Estabrook in camp at Sweet Water, and Ring at Center Star. Early on the morning of the seventh the rattle of musketry was borne to Rowett's ears from the direction of Bainbridge Ferry. In a moment he was on Charley and away towards Sweet Water, five miles from Florence, and two miles from the river. Arriving at Sweet Water he learns that a superior force, with two pieces of artillery, was on the north side of the Tennessee. Immediately Colonel Rowett dashes forward with Estabrook's detachment, consisting of companies E, B and C, to develop the strength of the enemy; finding it to be strong, Major Estabrook is ordered by Colonel Rowett to hasten back to Florence and bring out the remaining companies. In the meantime the companies on Sweet Water are routed, with the loss of Captain McGuire, Lieutenant Roberts and thirty men, all taken prisoner. The woods are now swarming with . rebels. Rowett's attention is now directed to the train corraled at Florence, whither a retreat is ordered. Captain Hector Perrin being left to conduct the retreat, Rowett hastens on to Florence to make preparations for the worst. Fifteen hundred rebels, led by Roddy and Johnson, are now driving Captains Perrin and Smith towards Florence, yelling like so many infuriated demons. The train is soon put on the road and started towards Lawrenceburg. Eager for Rowett's capture, the rebels press hard. East of Florence, on a slight elevation, Captain Smith, with the invincible E, takes his position and gallantly holds in check for one-half hour the entire rebel command, thereby giving Rowett time to get the wagon train well on its way. Smith then brings up the rear on the Lawrenceburg road. The rebels continue to press hard; the crash of artillery makes the earth tremble on the road leading down to Lawrenceburg. About every half mile Rowett is compelled to halt and give battle to the rebels, who seem loath to let him escape. About eleven o'clock, the rebels having given up the pursuit, Rowett goes into camp between Raw Hide and Lawrenceburg. Some considerable time after going into camp, Captain Johnson, with his company, joins the Colonel, having been cut off at Florence from the main command. Passing by the way of Lawrenceburg, Rowett arrived in Pulaski, Tennessee, on the eighth. On the ninth he gets part of his stock shod. On the tenth he leaves Pulaski, Tennessee, for Prospect via Lexington, Alabama, leaving Estabrook with the unshod mules and the teams at Pulaski. The Colonel, with his command, swims Elk River in the evening in the midst of a terrible storm; a hazardous undertaking, but information had reached the Colonel that the rebels were aiming to head him off and to burn the large railroad bridge spanning the Elk at Prospect. Early on the morning of the eleventh he reached Prospect in time to save the weakly guarded bridge from rebel wrath. Though we were not with the Colonel, we judge from the appearance of the men accompanying him, that he passed through some fierce hours. A colonel with less bravery than Colonel Rowett would have faltered had he stood like he did in that raging storm on the banks of the Elk River, and beheld its frightful current. But duty demanded it; the safety of the bridge at Prospect required it. Thus urged on, Rowett led and his men followed, and the daring deed was accomplished. It now seems that all the rebel force in North Alabama lent their aid for the sole purpose of capturing Dick Rowett and his regiment, who. have in the last twelve months been a terror to them in that region. All are in fine spirits to-night. Edwin M. Stanton's war bulletin—how cheering to the soldiers.

SOURCE: Daniel Leib Ambrose, History of the Seventh Regiment Illinois Volunteer Infantry, p. 238-40

Diary of Private Daniel L. Ambrose: Monday, May 16, 1864

This morning Colonel Rowett moves with the command towards Florence, leaving Company H, Captain Ring, near Cedar and Cox's Islands to guard the crossings. This morning Company H buries the Ninth Ohio Cavalry's fallen soldier, who was killed yesterday evening. We lay him in a lonely place beneath the drooping branches of a large tree on the bank of the Tennessee. Though he is an Ohio soldier, we care for him with the same interest as we would were he one of our own company, and why should we not, since he has been a brave warrior, fighting in the same common cause beneath the same starry banner. A dispatch from Rowett this evening informs us that Roddy crossed the Tennessee last night at twelve o'clock; that he would not fight Rowett on an equal footing. This evening Colonel Rowett arrested Buckee and Judge Foster as hostages for the delivery of Dr. McVay, now held by the rebels because of his devotion to the old Union.

SOURCE: Daniel Leib Ambrose, History of the Seventh Regiment Illinois Volunteer Infantry, p. 241

Wednesday, May 31, 2023

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 257. — Report of Col. Alfred A. Russell, Fourth Alabama Cavalry, of operations October 26, 1864-January 17, 1865.

No. 257.

Report of Col. Alfred A. Russell, Fourth Alabama Cavalry,
of operations October 26, 1864-January 17, 1865.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ALABAMA REGIMENT CAVALRY,        
January 17, 1865

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of services rendered since the 26th day of October, 1864:

In obedience to orders from army headquarters, 1 crossed the Tennessee River with my regiment on the 29th day of October, 1864, at Sublett's Ferry, two miles south of Bellefonte, on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. During one month's service in Madison and Jackson Counties the railroad was cut at different places on an average of twice every week, destroying half a mile each time.

After the evacuation of Decatur my command pursued the retreating enemy from Huntsville to within fourteen miles of Stevenson (distance, forty-five miles), capturing about 450 negroes and 250 wagons, 1 train of cars and engine, which was taken possession of by Lieutenant-Colonel Windes, of General Roddey's command, and causing the enemy to destroy another train, the engine falling into our hands; also a large lot of iron, medical, commissary, quartermaster's, and ordnance stores were captured at Huntsville; all of which property was restored to the owners or turned over to Brigadier-General Roddey. My command, during the period, killed 48 of the enemy and captured 52 horses, in addition to the above specified.

The enemy did not occupy the Memphis and Charleston Railroad for a period of about two weeks, and that road might have been destroyed by the troops Brigadier-General Roddey had upon it to within twelve miles of Stevenson. In compliance with orders from Major-General Forrest, I would have brought to the army not less than 1,500 men, who are now within the lines and their services lost to the country, but for the contrary influence of some of the staff officers of Brigadier-General Roddey and S. D. Cabaniss, inspector of conscription. My loss, 1 man killed and 2 wounded.

Respectfully submitted.
A. A. RUSSELL,        
Colonel, Commanding Regiment.
        Major MASON,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of Tennessee.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 775-6

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 256. — Report of Brig. Gen. Philip D. Roddey, C. S. Army, commanding District of North Alabama, of operations December 1-15, 1864.

No. 256.

Report of Brig. Gen. Philip D. Roddey, C. S. Army, commanding District of North Alabama,
of operations December 1-15, 1864.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF NORTH ALABAMA,        
Tuscumbia, Ala., December 15, 1864.

COLONEL: Your communication dated Selma, October 23, was received by me on the 12th instant. In answer to inquiries which it contained, and for the information of the lieutenant-general commanding, I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt on the 1st of October ultimo, of copy of General Orders, No. 118, from department headquarters, dated September 24, 1864, defining the territorial limits of the District of North Alabama and assigning me to command of the same. Since the receipt of this order, my reports and other official communications have been forwarded to department headquarters with as much promptness and regularity as circumstances would allow. The presence of the Army of Tennessee in my district, and the necessity which has existed since its arrival for me to communicate and co-operate with General Hood, has prevented my communicating with department headquarters as frequently as I could have desired. The condition of affairs in the extreme northeastern portion of my district, and the nature of information recently received from General Hood, have rendered it necessary that the whole of my available force should be concentrated at a point somewhat remote from the present terminus of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad and other established means of communicating with department headquarters. The following statements will explain more fully the present condition of my command:

About the first of the present month I was directed by General Hood to destroy that part of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad between Decatur and Stevenson. To do this it became necessary for me to move a portion of my troops from Cherokee and vicinity. I had already received orders from General Beauregard to rebuild the railroad from Cherokee to Tuscumbia, and one regiment of my command had been employed on this work before General Hood arrived in the district.

On the 5th instant I was again directed by General Hood to destroy the Memphis and Charleston Railroad to Stevenson, and the Nashville and Chattanooga road from Stevenson to Murfreesborough, Tenn. To carry out these instructions I have been compelled to withdraw such of my troops as were stationed in the vicinity of Corinth and at Grand Junction and transfer them to the new field of operations, which is being done as rapidly as possible, in view of the great extent of territory over which they had been distributed.

I have already two regiments and a battalion beyond Decatur watching the movements of a considerable force of the enemy which appeared at Paint Rock Station, on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, about the 5th instant, my object being to hold them in check until the remainder of my troops can be brought up. As soon as this is done I shall endeavor to drive this force from the line of the railroad and complete its destruction, as directed by General Hood. From the best information I can obtain the enemy is endeavoring to hold the road from Paint Rock to Stevenson, a distance of about fifty miles, with a force made up of the troops recently employed to garrison Decatur, Huntsville, Cowan's Station, and Decherd, and a small force from Chattanooga. There are also at least five gun-boats on the river above Decatur. From these, however, I anticipate but little inconvenience I succeeded on the morning of the 12th instant, after an engagement of less than an hour, in driving back three gun-boats that appeared at Decatur. I had with me at the time only a section of smooth-bore six-pounder guns and a few sharpshooters. I shall probably be able to employ guns of heavier caliber and longer range in case another opportunity for engaging them occurs.

Two engines and twenty-eight freight-cars were captured by my troops on the 2d instant near Huntsville. These are now running between Huntsville, Athens, and Decatur. The repairs on the road between Cherokee and Decatur are being pushed forward as rapidly as possible, and by the time they are completed I hope to have succeeded in getting the captured engines across the river. Boats suitable for this purpose are now being constructed. General Hood expects to have the road from near Nashville to Pulaski in running order very soon, and every effort will be made by me to have the road from Cherokee to Decatur put in order at once. The railroad iron referred to in your communication as being needed for the repairing of one of the roads near Meridian, cannot now be procured between Tuscumbia and Decatur. It can be taken, however, from the road east of Huntsville, provided the necessity of which you speak still exists. A considerable time must elapse, though, before the iron can be sent from Decatur.

My present purpose is to move from Huntsville on the 20th instant with my whole available force (which, leaving out one regiment to be left at Decatur, is about 1,500 men) on Murfreesborough by the way of Stevenson. In the event of my penetrating as far as Murfreesborough my command will, I presume, be deemed by General Hood as under his orders and subject to his control. I shall endeavor, however, to keep the lieutenant-general commanding advised of my movements, &c.

Before concluding I desire to call the attention of the department commander to certain matters touching the condition of affairs in portions of my district. I regret to state that recent developments have established the fact of the existence of a large amount of disaffection and disloyalty in that portion of the district lying north of the Tennessee River and recently in the possession of the enemy. This feeling has manifested itself since the removal of General Hood's army in acts of violence against the persons and property of loyal citizens. Murders, robberies, and arson have been of frequent occurrence in various parts of the district, and I am convinced that the interests of our cause and the safety of the loyal people of the district demand the immediate adoption of vigorous measures toward such persons as may engage in or connive at the commission of outrages of the kind above alluded to. The removal of my troops in the direction already indicated will, it is feared, be taken advantage of by disloyal persons, and result in loss of life and property to such as have been heretofore protected by the presence of an armed force. It is my purpose before going to Huntsville to make a few examples, which, I trust, will have a salutary effect; and I would urge upon the lieutenant-general commanding the adoption of such measures as may suggest themselves to him as conducive to the end in view. The organization of the reserves in the counties north of the Tennessee River, and increased vigilance and energy on the part of conscript officers and officers in charge of “supporting force," cannot be too strongly urged. You may feel assured that I shall omit no effort to secure an efficient co-operation on the part of my command with the Army of Tennessee. I have established and will continue to keep up regular communication with General Hood's army by means of couriers, though the necessity of doing so has occasioned me serious inconvenience, in reducing the available strength of my command. I hope soon to establish telegraphic communication with the army by the way of Decatur and Athens.

In view of the imperfect condition of the mail arrangements on the lines of railroad between Cherokee and Meridian, I would suggest the propriety of sending special messengers with dispatches, &c., or the adoption of such other measures as will secure their prompt transmission.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. D. RODDEY,        
Brigadier-General.
Lieut. Col. E. SURGET,
        Assistant A djutant-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 773-5

Thursday, November 24, 2022

Diary of Private Daniel L. Ambrose: Sunday, November 22, 1863

Ere it is light the bugle is sounded, and after hastily dispatching our breakfast, we move on our way. All along the road to-day we encounter squads of rebels, scouting parties from Johnson's and Roddy's commands, all of which goes to prove that the raiders Johnson or Roddy, or both, are on the north side of the Tennessee, and in consequence we anticipate considerable opposition before we reach our destination. Sure enough, at four o'clock P. M., our advance is checked. Colonel Rowett soon dismounts the regiments and forms a battle line. Our skirmishers are advanced and firing soon commences in every direction, sounding as though we were surrounded. A scout is now seen dashing from the brush to where the Colonel stands. He informs him of our danger and the fearful odds against us; that the rebels would soon be upon us if we remained there any longer. The bugle is sounded; the men spring into their saddles. Charley is champing and neighing. The Colonel's eye seems to be everywhere. He is now dashing down the road, with the regiment closely following. On we go towards Waterloo. The rebels hover on our flanks, front and rear. There is promiscuous firing all evening. They seem loth to throw any considerable force against us; feel loth to try our steel. By nine P. M., we arrive at Waterloo, four miles from Eastport, Tennessee River. The rebels soon abandon their expected game. At Waterloo we go into camp, having traveled sixty-five miles since morning, capturing twelve rebels during the day and evening.

SOURCE: Daniel Leib Ambrose, History of the Seventh Regiment Illinois Volunteer Infantry, p. 208-9

Thursday, June 2, 2022

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 231. — Report of General G. T. Beauregard, C. S. Army, commanding Military Division of the West.

No. 231.

Report of General G. T. Beauregard, C. S. Army, commanding Military Division of the West.

HEADQUARTERS, &c.,        
Greensborough, N. C., April 15, 1865.

GENERAL: I have read in the Richmond Enquirer of the 25th ultimo the report of General J. B. Hood touching the operations of the Army of Tennessee from July 18, 1864, to January 23, 1865. During a portion of the period embraced in that report, General Hood having been under my command, his report should have passed through me for my consideration and remarks before it reached the War Department. The regular channel of communication should have been observed, as my own acts and conduct as his commanding officer are referred to by him. I am the more surprised at this irregularity, as I informed General Hood, at Tupelo, a few days previous to his being relieved that I desired and expected his report to be addressed to and pass through me to the Department. At that time he expressed his intention of making through me a report covering the operations of the Army of Tennessee from the date of his assumption of command, to which I objected, as I only had a right to call for one embracing his operations from the time I took command. There are several errors and inaccuracies in the report which I cannot leave unnoticed, while reserving for some more suitable occasion a more extended report of operations in the Military Division of the West while under my command.

Unexpectedly to me His Excellency the President, on October 2, 1864, called me to the command of the departments then under General J. B. Hood and Lieut. Gen. R. Taylor, respectively, embracing together the States of Mississippi, Alabama, East Louisiana, Tennessee, and Georgia, with my headquarters to be established at the most convenient point for purposes of communication, but with the understanding that my personal presence would be given wheresoever in my judgment the interest of my command rendered it necessary, and that when present with an army in the field I should exercise the immediate command.

On the 1st of November, the President, repeating his instructions that I should exercise immediate command when present with the troops, added: That in order to retain freedom of motion it was expected I would not relieve the commander of the particular army, but by retaining the existing organization be enabled to leave it when expedient at any moment without impairing its administration and efficiency.

In pursuance of orders I repaired to the headquarters of General Hood, at Cave Spring, Ga., on or about the 9th of October, and there conferred with him in regard to his future movements. General Hood is, therefore, in error in saying that I joined the army at Gadsden, Ala. Being at the time unprovided with my staff and horses, and desirous also to confer with Lieutenant-General Taylor, I hastened thence to Jacksonville, Ala., which had then become the new base of operations, intending to return in the event a battle should become probable.

On the 19th of October, supposing that General Hood was near Alpine or Summerville, Ga., I proceeded to rejoin the Army of Tennessee. In the meantime, however, he had commenced his movement toward Middle Tennessee without advising me, and had marched as far as Gadsden—

a fact which I ascertained at Round Mountain Iron-Works (in advance of Center)—when, retracing my steps, I joined him on the 21st of October.

In an interview with General Hood he informed me that he was then en route to Middle Tennessee, via Gunter's Landing, on the Tennessee River. At Gadsden I had conferences during two days with him in relation to the future operations of the army, in the course of which he stated that his general plan had been submitted to and approved by General Bragg, then commanding the Armies of the Confederate States. In view of existing condition of affairs the movement then in progress met my approval also, for reasons, some of which are as follows:

First. General Hood alleged that Sherman was short of provisions and forage at Atlanta, while his wheel transportation was in wretched condition.

Second. That the destruction of the railroad near Marietta and Dalton by our forces had been so thorough it would require at least five or six weeks to repair it, during which the Army of Tennessee could be thrown into Middle Tennessee, via Gunter's Landing, distance about forty miles from Gadsden, and destroy the railroad bridges at Bridgeport and across the Elk and Duck Rivers before Sherman could finish the repairs of the road below Chattanooga, thus forcing him to return to Tennessee to protect his communications and obtain supplies.

To add to the chances of success I remained two days at Gadsden after the departure of the army, to issue the necessary orders to secure railroad communications in Mississippi and Middle Alabama for the transportation of supplies, and to direct Major-General Forrest, who was then operating in West Tennessee, to report to General Hood with his command.

While en route to Gunter's Landing I learned, casually and to my surprise, that the line of march of our forces had been changed to one in the direction of Decatur, at which point I overtook it, and where the enemy was found strongly intrenched. As it was impossible to effect a crossing without great and unnecessary sacrifice of life, it was now judged proper by General Hood to attempt a passage, first, at Lamb's Ferry, that failing, then at Bainbridge, or, finally, at Tuscumbia, which had become our base of supplies. He determined, however, soon after leaving Decatur, to undertake the passage of the river at the latter point, which he reached on the 30th of October. There and at Florence, on the opposite or north bank of the Tennessee, he remained until the 21st of November.

The effective strength of the force at this date was as follows: Three corps—infantry, 25,085; artillery, 2,200; total, 27,285.

No report has been received of the strength of the cavalry. Jackson's division consisted of three brigades, estimated at 2,000 men; General Forrest's command estimated at 3,500 men, and General Roddey's at 2,000; making an aggregate of 34,785.

General Roddey with his command was to cover the line of communication from Tuscumbia to Corinth, and thence toward Meridian.

When it became apparent that Sherman (still at Atlanta) was dividing his army by assembling two corps, the Fourth and Twenty-third, (about 20,000 infantry and artillery), at Pulaski, Huntsville, and Decatur, it was determined by General Hood, after a discussion between us, that our army should move promptly into Tennessee and strike the enemy before a junction could be effected with the forces of A. J. Smith (about 8,000 effectives), known to be moving from Missouri, and of Steele (about the same strength), from Arkansas. To this end our forces were to be thrown forward as speedily as possible from Florence to Lawrenceburg, and thence either to Pulaski or Columbia, as circumstances might indicate; and I repeated my orders to General Forrest to form a junction with the Army of Tennessee in the direction of Lawrenceburg or Waynesborough, making first, however, a demonstration toward Columbia to distract and harass the enemy. The movement of the Army of Tennessee did not commence, however, on the 9th of November, as arranged, and I addressed General Hood, on the 15th of that month, a communication, from which the following are extracts:

My purpose was to call again your attention, as I did yesterday, first, to the necessity of guarding well your right flank and rear in advancing toward Lawrenceburg and Pulaski against a sudden movement of the enemy from Huntsville or Athens across the Elk River; second, to the necessity of securing from the passage of the enemy's gun-boats another point above Savannah or Clifton, besides Florence, for the army to recross the Tennessee in case of disaster; third, to the necessity of giving still greater protection to Corinth and the Mobile and Ohio Railroad to that point. * * *


I was aware that those points had already been discussed between us, but my anxiety for the safety of the troops under your command made it incumbent upon me to call again your attention to those important matters. * * *


General Taylor and myself will always be anxious to aid you in your present campaign with all the means at our control; but these being limited, ample previous notice for what may be required should be given, to enable us to make all necessary preparations. * * *


G. T. BEAUREGARD,          

General.

Lieutenant-General Taylor was then directed to repair to Georgia to assume command of all forces there, with instructions to call on the Governors of Georgia and South Carolina for the militia of their respective States; and General Hood, in view of the fact that General Sherman had divided his army, was directed to hasten his movement and strike the enemy a vigorous blow before he could unite with his re-enforcements. He was likewise ordered to send to Major-General Wheeler, who was closely watching General Sherman, the cavalry division of Brigadier-General Jackson. In consequence, however, of the urgent solicitation of General Hood, who represented his deficiency in cavalry, the order for Jackson's division was countermanded so far as to direct only one brigade to be detached.

On the 17th of November the following order was given General Hood:

General Beauregard directs me to say he desires that you will fake the offensive at the earliest practicable moment and deal the enemy rapid and vigorous blows, striking him while thus dispersed, and by this means distract Sherman's advance into Georgia. To relieve you from any embarrassment while operating in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, he authorizes you to issue all such orders in General Taylor's department you may deem necessary to secure the efficient and successful administration and operations of your army, sending to Lieutenant-General Taylor, or whosoever may be in command, copies of all such orders. He wishes you to send forthwith to Major-General Wheeler one brigade of cavalry of Jackson's division, and the balance of that division, as soon as it can be spared, should Sherman advance into Georgia, and also to advise General Wheeler that in such a case Clanton's brigade is subject to his orders. * * *


GEO. WM. BRENT,              

 Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General.

General Hood in his report states:

General Beauregard left it optional with me either to divide the army, sending a part after Sherman and to push on with the remainder, or to move at once against Thomas with the entire force. The army I thought too small to divide. I so informed him, when he directed me by telegraph to push forward at once.

General Hood's request to retain all the cavalry having then been repeated, I adhered to the order for the one brigade and telegraphed him accordingly, leaving him with his three corps and artillery intact, as well as a large cavalry force. He was confronted in Middle Tennessee by General Thomas with only two corps (about 20,000 infantry and artillery) and about 6,000 cavalry, General Sherman being in Georgia with four corps (about 40,000 infantry and artillery) and about 4,000 cavalry, at a long distance from us, with muddy roads, burned bridges, and broad devastated districts between the two armies. It was, therefore, our clear policy to strike Thomas with the utmost celerity before he could be re-enforced, rather than to retrace our march and pursue Sherman. But the offensive in Middle Tennessee could only be successful if undertaken at once and executed with energy, without any division or material diminution of our forces. I certainly contemplated in that event no such division, for I could not regard it as compatible with the plan of the campaign, though under existing circumstances a division and active employment of forces would doubtless have been preferable to inaction.

On the 6th day of December, in answer to a telegram from the President, I addressed him, from Augusta, a communication, stating that all had been done practicable under existing conditions, with the limited means at command, to oppose the advance of Sherman toward the Atlantic coast, and that I had deemed it inexpedient to countermand the campaign of General Hood into Tennessee to attempt the pursuit of Sherman, for the following reasons, namely:

First. The roads and creeks from the Tennessee to the Coosa River across Sand and Lookout Mountains had been rendered impassable by the prevailing rains.

Second. Sherman, with an army better appointed and of superior numbers, had the start of about 275 miles on comparatively good roads.

Third. To pursue Sherman, the march of the Army of Tennessee would necessarily have been over roads with all the bridges destroyed, and through a desolated country, affording neither subsistence nor forage, while a retrograde movement of the army must have seriously depleted its ranks by desertions.

Fourth. Moreover, to have recalled the army to follow Sherman, would have opened to Thomas the richest portions of Alabama. Montgomery, Mobile, and Selma would have easily fallen, without insuring the defeat of Sherman.

Fifth. From the assurances of Governor Brown and Major-General Cobb, it was a reasonable supposition that about 17,000 men would be furnished in a great emergency by the State of Georgia, which force, added to thirteen brigades of cavalry, under Major-General Wheeler, and some 5,000 men, who, it was thought, might be drawn from the States of North and South Carolina, would have given us about 29,000 men to throw across Sherman's path. Although the delays and changes of line of march were not satisfactory to me, nevertheless, I had not felt it to be necessary to assume, as authorized to do, the immediate command of the Army of Tennessee, because I had found it in good spirits, resulting in part from its recent successful blows at the enemy's railroad communications from Dalton to Atlanta; all appeared confident of a successful issue to the impending campaign, and the commanders immediately subordinate to General Hood seemed to regard him as capable to lead them. Moreover, I knew that he possessed in a high degree the confidence of the Government as likewise of General Bragg, at the time commander of the Armies of the Confederate States. Nevertheless, I thought it proper, so long as my presence elsewhere was not exigent, that I should accompany the troops; but as soon as Sherman's purposes were fully developed in Georgia I deemed myself called on to repair at once to that theatre of operations, to do what I might to baffle them, assured that I left General Hood quite strong enough for the proposed campaign. On reaching there the forces I had been led to expect were not available. The cavalry of Major-General Wheeler and a small force of Georgia militia, under Major-General Smith, with the detailed men from our workshops, and State reserves, were all that could be organized and brought into the field against the overwhelming numbers of the thoroughly organized, disciplined, and equipped veterans of the enemy.

In January, 1865, General Hood furnished me with a copy of a letter from him to the War Office giving a general summary of his campaign from the 29th of September, 1864, to the 7th of January, 1865; but although repeatedly called for, no official detailed report either from General Hood or his subordinate officers has passed through me, as required by the regulations of the service.

And now, in conclusion, I deem it in place to give expression to my conviction that the campaign, instead of the unhappy day at Franklin and the disastrous culmination at Nashville, would have led to the signal defeat of Thomas, and such troops as might have been hurriedly brought up to his assistance, had the original plan been executed without undue delay and modifications and with vigor and skill; Sherman most probably would have been compelled to return to Middle Tennessee to repair and protect his line of communications before he could have collected sufficient supplies for the march from Atlanta to the sea-coast, or, in the event that he had been able to reach the coast of Georgia, he must have been forced to abandon it and hasten to the rescue of Kentucky, or perchance, the defense of Ohio, and thus have been prevented from attempting any operations looking to a junction on his part with Grant in Virginia, or any substantial diversion in favor of that commander; meantime, too, we would have been enabled to glean and send supplies from Middle and East Tennessee to Virginia, and re-establish our railway communications between our capital and those well-stored sections of the country. But instead of crossing the Tennessee River at Gunter's Landing, as General Hood intended at Gadsden, he suddenly changed his line of march, as mentioned hereinbefore, and repaired to Tuscumbia and Florence, where the want of supplies, due to the bad condition of the Mobile and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston Railroads and prevailing rains, delayed his advance for nearly three weeks, whereby Sherman was given time to repair the damage done to the Chattanooga and Atlanta Railroad and to collect sufficient supplies for his march across Georgia. It is clear, also, to my mind that after the great loss and waste of life at Franklin, the army was in no condition to make a successful attack on Nashville—a strongly fortified city, defended by an army nearly as strong as our own, and which was being re-enforced constantly by river and railroads. From Franklin, General Hood should have marched, not on Nashville, but on Murfreesborough, which could doubtless have been captured, with its garrison of about 8,000 men; and after having destroyed the railroad bridges across Duck and Elk Rivers, which surely would have caused the evacuation of Bridgeport and Chattanooga, he might have returned, with the prestige of success, into winter quarters behind the Duck or Tennessee Rivers, as circumstances might have dictated, detaching then a force for the protection of South Carolina.

Untoward and calamitous as were the issues of this campaign, never in the course of this war have the best qualities of our soldiery been more conspicuously shown; never more enthusiasm evinced than when our troops once more crossed the Tennessee River; never greater gallantry than that which was so general at Franklin; and never higher fortitude and uncomplaining devotion to duty than were displayed on the retreat from Nashville to Tupelo.

The heroic dead of that campaign will ever be recollected with honor by their countrymen, and the survivors have the proud consolation that no share of the disaster can be laid to them, who have so worthily served their country, and have stood by their colors even to the last dark hours of the republic.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. BEAUREGARD,        
General.
General SAM. COOPER,
        Adjutant and Inspector-General, C. S. Army.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 646-51

Thursday, April 14, 2022

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 229.—Report of Col. William J. Palmer, Fifteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry, of operations December 20, 1864-January 6, 1865.

No. 229.

Report of Col. William J. Palmer, Fifteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry,
of operations December 20, 1864-January 6, 1865.

HDQRS. FIFTEENTH PENNSYLVANIA (ANDERSON) CAVALRY,        
Huntsville, January 10, 1865.

MAJOR: I have the honor to report, as directed by Major-General Steedman, the operations of my command since the 20th ultimo:

On the evening of December 19 I received orders to march with my regiment from Wauhatchie, near Chattanooga, where I was encamped, to Bridgeport, where transports would probably meet me to take my command to Decatur. I reached Bridgeport at 4 p.m. on the 20th, but found no transports, and after telegraphing the facts to General Steedman, at Murfreesborough, was directed by telegraph on the evening of the 22d to march immediately to Huntsville. I accordingly started at 6 p.m. the same day, but was obliged to go into camp six miles from Bridgeport, on the bank of Widow's Creek, in consequence of that stream being past fording and of the bridges having been swept away. I marched at daylight the next morning, and by taking circuitous route around the source of Widow's Creek, succeeded in reaching Stevenson with my wagons early in the afternoon. Here I met Major-General Steedman, who had just arrived by rail from Murfreesborough, and received from him verbal instructions to leave my wagons at Caperton's Ferry, to be shipped by transports to Decatur, and to march as rapidly as possible with my regiment to the same place. This march occupied four days and a half, the rise of water in Crow Creek and Paint Rock River making it necessary to go around by the head of Coon Creek and of Hurricane Fork of Paint Rock River, crossing the spur of the Cumberland Mountain which divides these streams at their source. On this route I had no difficulty in fording the water courses, and found sufficient forage for my command. I reached the north bank of the Tennessee River, opposite Decatur, at 1 p.m. of December 28, and by dark had finished crossing, the infantry and artillery of the expedition, with Lieutenant-Colonel Prosser's command of cavalry, having nearly finished crossing when I arrived at the river-bank. I at once received orders from Major-General Steedman to take command of Lieutenant-Colonel Prosser's cavalry (detachments of the Second Tennessee and Tenth, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Indiana, numbering in all about 300 effective men), in connection with my own regiment, and to advance on the Courtland road. After feeding the horses I started at 8 p.m., and on reaching a hill two miles from Decatur saw the camp fires of the enemy on an elevation about two miles beyond. Halting the command I took a battalion of 130 men of the Fifteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry and advanced to reconnoitre the enemy's strength and position. On nearing the lights their pickets fired, when I ordered my advance guard of thirty men to charge, which they did so boldly that the enemy, who proved to be Colonel Windes' regiment, of Roddey's command, had not time to form, but fled in disorder down the road, followed closely by my advance guard for one mile, when the enemy attempted to make a stand to cover his artillery. Another vigorous charge by our advance, however, drove him from his guns (two 6-pounders), which fell into our hands, with all the horses standing hitched to them in the road. We then went into camp (at 10 p.m.) to rest the men and animals for the next day's work. Thus in less than four hours after landing from the boats at Decatur we had advanced in the night six miles in a country and against an enemy of which we were almost entirely ignorant, and had taken possession of the camp and artillery of his rear guard.

Early the next morning [29th] I sent Lieutenant-Colonel Prosser with his command on the main Courtland road, while I advanced with the Fifteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry by the Brown's Ferry and Courtland road, both for the purpose of meeting the flank movement of any force that might come up from Bainbridge, where Hood's army had but just crossed the Tennessee River, and also to enable me to get in the rear of Roddey's force, if practicable, while he was being attacked by Colonel Prosser in front. Colonel Prosser first encountered the enemy at Hillsborough, five miles from our camp, and after a running skirmish of five miles more met General Roddey's main force drawn up in two lines at Pond Spring; without hesitation he charged it in the most gallant manner, broke both lines of the enemy, routing him so completely that he hardly attempted to make another stand, but fled ingloriously through Courtland and for eight miles beyond to Town Creek, on the banks of which General Roddey succeeded in reforming such portion of his command as had not taken advantage of their two successive defeats to go home and spend Christmas with their families. Colonel Prosser's attack was so vigorous that my force on the Brown's Ferry road, having several miles the longer distance to march, and in an unknown country, did not have time to reach the flank or rear of the enemy. Forty-five prisoners were captured in this affair, including 3 commissioned officers; the enemy also lost 1 man killed and 2 wounded. Colonel Prosser's loss was 1 man wounded. It appeared that Patterson's (so called) brigade, of Roddey's command, having crossed at Bainbridge, had come up the preceding evening to Pond Spring to re-enforce Roddey, and constituted, with the balance of Windes' regiment, the force in our front on this day.

Being now within half a day's march of Bainbridge, where I knew the whole of Forrest's cavalry had but just crossed the river, it was necessary to advance with more caution. We reached Leighton, however, thirteen miles west of Courtland, by 1 p.m. of the next day, Friday, December 30, having skirmished nearly all the way with flying parties of Roddey's cavalry, who attempted to delay us by burning a bridge over Town Creek, on the Bainbridge Road, and by some show of holding the ford of the same stream on the main Tuscumbia Road. Most of the latter force drifted in squads southward toward the mountains, the remainder, with General Roddey, taking the roads to Tuscumbia and Florence. Toward dark a new force appeared in our front on the Tuscumbia Road, believed to be Armstrong's brigade, which I afterward learned definitely had been sent back by Forrest from Barton Station to re-enforce Roddey and protect General Hood's trains. At Leighton I learned that Hood had commenced crossing the river at Bainbridge on Sunday morning and finished on Tuesday evening, marching at once toward Corinth; his railroad had never been in operation east of Cane Creek, three miles west of Tuscumbia. I also learned that the pontoon bridge had been taken up on Tuesday night and Wednesday morning, and that the entire pontoon train of 200 wagons had passed through Leighton on Thursday and camped at La Grange the same night, and that it was bound for Columbus, Miss., with a comparatively small guard. Roddey's so-called division of cavalry had apparently been relied upon to prevent any advance of our forces until the train could get to a safe distance, but his men had become so demoralized by their successive defeats that we could afford to disregard him.

Having communicated with Major-General Steedman, who left me free to make the expedition or not, as I might deem best, I started from Leighton before daylight on Saturday morning, December 31, taking a trail which enabled us to avoid Armstrong's force and to get in the rear of a portion of Roddey's command at La Grange, where we captured Col. Jim Warren, of Tenth [Fifth] Alabama Cavalry, and some other prisoners. About 1 p.m. we passed through Russellville, where we encountered another portion of Roddey's force, which had just arrived from Tuscumbia, and drove it out on the Tuscaloosa road, while we kept on the Cotton-Gin or Bull Mountain road, after the train. Some attempt was made to delay us by burning a bridge over Cedar Creek, but we found a ford and caught up with the rear of the pontoon train at dark, ten miles beyond Russellville. We met no resistance, and our advance guard rode through to the front of the train, which extended for five miles, and consisted of seventy-eight pontoon-boats and about 200 wagons, with all the necessary accouterments and material, engineering instruments, &c.; all the mules and oxen, except what the pontoniers and teamsters were able to cut loose and ride off, were standing hitched to the wagons. Three boats had been set fire to, but so carelessly that no damage had been done. We captured a few prisoners, and went into camp at about the center of the train, fed our horses, and I then started the entire command out in either direction to burn the train, which was done in the most thorough manner, and occupied till 3 a.m. 1 should have been glad to bring the pontoon train—which was built at Atlanta last winter, and was an exceedingly well appointed one—back to our lines, but the condition of the mules, the mountainous character of the country, and the presence in our rear of a force of the enemy's cavalry estimated at three times our own strength, prevented. I had also learned from a negro servant of Captain Cobb, of the engineers, who commanded the train, that a large supply train of General Hood, bound from Barton Station to Tuscaloosa, was ahead.

Early next morning (Sunday) I pushed on through Nauvoo, taking the Aberdeen road, which I knew would flank the train. I led a detachment from near Bexar, across by a trail to head the train on the Cotton-Gin road, and sent another, under Lieutenant-Colonel Lamborn, to follow it, and by 10 p.m. had surprised it in camp a few miles over the State line in Itawamba County, Miss. It consisted of 110 wagons and over 500 mules. We burned the wagons, shot or sabered all the mules we could not lead off or use to mount prisoners, and started back. In one of the wagons was Colonel McCrosky, of Hood's infantry, who had been badly wounded at Franklin. I left a tent with him, some stores, and one of the prisoners to take care of him. About twenty of the teamsters were colored U.S. soldiers of the garrison captured by Hood at Dalton; these came back with us. We returned via Toll-gate and the old military and Hackleburg roads, capturing an ambulance with its guard on the way, to within twenty-five miles south of Russellville, when I found that Roddey's force and the so-called brigades of Biffle and Russell were already stationed in our front at Bear Creek, and on the Biler road, toward Moulton, to retard us, while Armstrong was reported as being in pursuit. The country was very difficult and rugged, with few roads or trails and scarcely any forage, but we evaded, by a night march of twenty-three miles, all the forces of the enemy except Colonel Russell, whom we attacked unexpectedly on the Moulton and Tuscaloosa road, twelve miles east of Thorn Hill, on Wednesday noon (Lieutenant-Colonel Prosser having the advance), routing him so speedily and completely that he did not delay our march twenty minutes, and this only to pick up prisoners and burn his five wagons, including his headquarters wagons, out of which we got all the brigade and other official papers. We had but a few hours previously captured, with its guard of three men, a small mail bound for Tuscaloosa. About fifty or seventy-five conscripts from both sides of the Tennessee River, that Russell was hustling off to Tuscaloosa, were released by our attack, also eight Indiana soldiers captured by Russell near Decatur. We then continued our march unmolested by way of Mount Hope toward Leighton, but, learning when within ten miles of that place that all our troops had returned to Decatur, we came on by easy marches to the same post, reaching it on Friday evening, 6th instant.

The whole distance marched from the time of leaving Decatur, nine days previously, was 265, and about 400 miles from the time of leaving Chattanooga, two weeks and three days previous.

My entire command numbered less than 600 men, consisting of the Fifteenth Pennsylvania (Anderson) Cavalry, commanded by Lieut. Col. Charles B. Lamborn, and detachments of the Second Tennessee and Tenth, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Indiana Cavalry, commanded by Lieut. Col. William F. Prosser. To these officers and all those under them, much credit is due for their gallantry and energy, as well as to all their men, for the dash and courage with which they attacked any enemy that appeared, and for the patient manner in which they bore, on the most scanty rations, the severe fatigue of this expedition. I desire particularly to recommend for honorable mention in general orders Sergt. Arthur P. Lyon, of Company A, of the Anderson Cavalry, for repeated acts of marked bravery during this short campaign, including the capture of two pieces of artillery, which fell into his hands on the night of December 28, six miles from Decatur, on the Courtland road, by a daring charge of our advance guard of fifteen inert, which he led on this occasion.

We took about 150 prisoners after leaving Leighton, including 2 colonels (one of whom was left in consequence of his wounds), 2 captains, and 6 lieutenants, and destroyed in all between 750 and 1,000 stand of arms, and captured a considerable number of pistols.

Our entire loss, 1 man killed and 2 wounded, all of Lieutenant-Colonel Prosser's command, in the charge on Russell's force.

The whole of Forrest's cavalry, except Armstrong's brigade, was at Okolona, Miss., within one day's march of us, when the supply train was captured. He had been sent there as soon as he crossed at Bainbridge, on Tuesday evening, to repel our cavalry from Memphis, who had destroyed the railroad for twenty miles near and above Okolona. I do not think General Hood brought across the Tennessee River at Bainbridge more than 12,000 infantry and thirty-five pieces of artillery.

I am very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WM. J. PALMER,        
Colonel, Commanding.
Maj. S. B. MOE,
        Assistant Adjutant-General, Hdqrs. District of the Etowah.
_______________

ADDENDA.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY,        
Huntsville, January 10, 1865.
Captain RAMSEY,
        Ass. Adjt. Gen., Hdqrs. Dept. of the Cumberland, Nashville:

CAPTAIN: As supplementary to my report of my operations in North Alabama, directed to be sent in by the major-general commanding, I inclose a copy of a letter from Major-General Steedman, which left me free to make the expedition after the enemy's pontoon train or not, as I might deem best.

I am, captain, your obedient servant,
WM. J. PALMER,        
Colonel, Commanding.

[Inclosure.]

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE ETOWAH,        
Courtland, Ala., December 30, 1864--5.15 p.m.
Col. WILLIAM J. PALMER,
        Commanding Cavalry:

COLONEL: Your dispatch just received. The infantry, if it should move now, could not reach Leighton before 2 a.m. to-morrow. You will, therefore, have to exercise your own judgment as to whether you can safely make the expedition without support from the infantry. It is fair to suppose that the pontoon train has a guard at least equal to your own force. The service of your command will be needed to scout in the direction of the river and Tuscumbia. I do not wish you to break down your horses, but leave you free to make the expedition, if you think you can do it with perfect safety. Send me a commissioned officer with twenty-five of your men for courier duty. Please inform me whether you pursue the train or not.

By command of Major-General Steedman:
S. B. MOE,        
Assistant Adjutant-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 641-5

Wednesday, April 13, 2022

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 228.— Report of Lieut. Col. William F. Prosser, Second Tennessee Cavalry, of operations December 7-8, 1864.

No. 228.

Report of Lieut. Col. William F. Prosser, Second Tennessee Cavalry,
of operations December 7-8, 1864.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY,        
Paint Rock Bridge, December 8, 1864.

I reached this point yesterday about 12 m. The bridge and railroad, as far as I could see, are all right. The country from Bellefonte here we found full of small parties of the enemy. I captured a few prisoners at Scottsborough, who will go to Stevenson with this dispatch. We drove a small force of rebels across the creek yesterday in our advance, and about half an hour afterward the enemy appeared with an engine and a train of cars. We drove them back some two or three miles, but shortly afterward they appeared again with the train and some cavalry, and we skirmished with them until dark, when they retired. I endeavored to capture the train, but was not successful. Roddey is reported at Huntsville. Russell has recruited his regiment considerably of late, and now has from 700 to 800 men. If the enemy moves some infantry up on us by rail we may have some trouble, but we can do something for them if they come. I have been looking for a train down from Stevenson with some infantry, but so far have heard nothing from them. I should have arrived here a day sooner, but was delayed in scouting the country between Scottsborough and this place, particularly at Larkinsville. About 100 of the enemy were on the Larkinsville Ferry road, to the left, and I sent a party toward Winchester, to the right. The prisoners I send you belong to Roddey, Russell, and Twentieth Mississippi. Doctor Irwin and some other citizens were captured at Scottsborough, and they fired on my men when they went after them. He lives near Courtland and acts as surgeon for Roddey. I inclose a note* from Russell which explains his business. I wish these messengers to return as soon as possible, with some other men of my command at Stevenson, who ought to be here. I shall look for train down here, and if there is one coming please send down with it 10,000 rounds of Burnside ammunition. Please send me some late papers or news if you have any.

With my compliments to the general, and hoping to hear from you shortly,

I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. F. PROSSER,        
Lieutenant-Colonel Second Tennessee Cavalry, Commanding.
Lieutenant KNEELAND,
        Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
_______________

* Not found.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 640

Sunday, April 3, 2022

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: August 2, 1864

Bright and hot. At 4 P.M. a cloud rising. Fear my wife, and daughter Fannie, and Custis (who has a days' furlough), who went this morning per Fredericksburg Railroad into Hanover County to gather blackberries, will be caught in a rain. Nevertheless, the rain is wanted.

Assistant Secretary Campbell is again "allowing” doubtful characters to pass out of the Confederate States to the United States; among these is Dr. McClure, “the embalmer,” who, too, carried others out for bribes.

The Signal Bureau gives information to-day of Grant's purpose to spring the mine already sprung, also of a raid, that was abandoned, north and west of Richmond. They say Grant has now but 70,000 men, there being only a few men left at Washington. Can the agents paid by the Signal Bureau be relied on?

Gen. Bragg telegraphs from Columbus, Ga., that Gen. Roddy has been ordered to reassemble his forces in North Alabama, to cut Sherman's communications.

The news from Georgia is more cheering.

The commissioners (of prices) have reduced the schedule: it was denounced universally. It is said by the Examiner that the extravagant rates, $30 per bushel for wheat, and $50 for bacon, were suggested by a farmer in office.

Gen. Lee writes that he had directed Morgan to co-operate with Early, but he was sick.

The enemy's account of our loss in the battle before Atlanta is exaggerated greatly. Sherman's army is doomed, I think.

Seven P.M. No rain here, but my family were drenched in a hard shower at Hanover Junction, and what was worse, they got no blackberries, the hot sun having dried the sap in the bushes.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2p. 259

Friday, February 25, 2022

Diary of Private Daniel L. Ambrose: July 8, 1863

Last night about four hundred of Roddy's command ventured to the government corral, two miles from Corinth, capturing a company of the Thirty-ninth Iowa, and drove off about six hundred mules. Cornyn, with his cavalry, is now in hot pursuit. In the evening the Seventh's bugle blows, and we are soon in the saddle. We travel nearly all night on the road leading towards Iuka. The boys become very sleepy, and it is with difficulty that they remain on their mules.

SOURCE: Daniel Leib Ambrose, History of the Seventh Regiment Illinois Volunteer Infantry, p. 177-8

Tuesday, November 23, 2021

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 205. — Report of Maj. Thomas G. Williamson, Tenth Indiana Cavalry, of operations December 28, 1864-January 6, 1865.

No. 205.

Report of Maj. Thomas G. Williamson, Tenth Indiana Cavalry,
of operations December 28, 1864-January 6, 1865.

HEADQUARTERS TENTH INDIANA VOLUNTEER CAVALRY,        
Near Waterloo, Ala., January 11, 1865.

LIEUTENANT: In accordance with orders received, I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by the detachment of the Tenth Indiana Volunteer Cavalry under my command in the raid south of Decatur, Ala., from December 28, 1864, to January 6, 1865, inclusive, the detachment being at this time in a brigade, composed of Tenth Indiana, Second Tennessee, and Fifteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry, under the immediate command of Lieutenant-Colonel Prosser, Second Tennessee Cavalry:

On the 28th we marched from Decatur south on the Decatur and Courtland road, going into camp eight miles south of Decatur. On the 29th we overtook the rear of General Roddey's command, charging them for about six miles, capturing 30 prisoners, killing 2 and wounding 3 of the enemy. We went into camp two miles from Courtland, Ala. On the 30th of December we marched through Courtland to Leighton, on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Here we captured 3 prisoners. We camped at Leighton that night. On December 31 we marched toward Russellville, leaving La Grange to the left. Near Russellville we killed 1 man, captured 1 lieutenant and 6 men. We then marched on through Russellville, and at 8 p.m. we attacked Hood's pontoon train, consisting of eighty pontoons, also forty-five wagons loaded with cordage, equipments, forges, &c. We burned and destroyed the entire train and teams.

On January 1, 1865, we moved at daylight and marched on a trot all day, continued the march at night, and at 2 a.m., when we overtook and charged another wagon train, capturing and destroying the wagons by fire and killing the mules, about 500 in number, dismounted men taking some of the best mules to ride. The train consisted of about 125 wagons (this was Hood's supply train). On the 2d of January we marched back toward Decatur, Ala.., meeting no enemy this day, going over the mountain roads that I do not know the names of. On the 4th of January we overtook and attacked Colonel Russell, commanding the Fifth [Fourth] Alabama Cavalry, capturing his entire train, also about 30 prisoners, killing 3 of the enemy and wounding about 20; we also captured and burned General Roddey's headquarters papers. We lost here in this charge 1 killed and 1 wounded. Traveling all night, we stopped to rest at daylight, going into camp near Leighton. On the 5th we went to within twenty miles of Decatur, and on the 6th at sundown we arrived at Decatur. Our march was from Decatur to within thirty miles of Aberdeen, Miss., about three miles from the line.

In submitting this report I will respectfully call your attention to the conduct of Capts. William Mead and George R. Mitchell and their companies, D and H. They are deserving of great praise for the manner in which they conducted themselves during the entire raid.

Respectfully submitted.
THOS. G. WILLIAMSON,        
Major, Commanding Tenth Indiana Volunteer Cavalry.
Lieut. W. H. WHITWORTH,
        Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Indorsement.]

HDQRS. FIRST BRIG., SEVENTH DIV., CAVALRY CORPS,        
Gravelly Springs, January 19, 1865.

Respectfully forwarded for the information of major-general commanding Cavalry Corps.

Major Williamson is the ranking officer present, the Lieutenant-Colonel Prosser mentioned being Major Prosser, of the Second Tennessee, now at Nashville, and Major Williamson's report is that of the expedition.

J. H. HAMMOND,        
Brevet Brigadier-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 606-8

Thursday, November 11, 2021

Diary of Private Daniel L. Ambrose: April 14, 1863

Remaining in camp at Corinth without anything of note occurring until the evening of the 14th, we receive marching orders. The guerrilla Roddy, having been hovering around Glendale and Iuka, committing unwarranted depredations for some time, the rumors this evening, confirmed by general indications are, that General Dodge is about to start on an expedition against him, and the camps seem in a bustle all around Corinth this evening.

SOURCE: Daniel Leib Ambrose, History of the Seventh Regiment Illinois Volunteer Infantry, p. 146

Wednesday, October 20, 2021

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 197. — Report of Col. Datus E. Coon, Second Iowa Cavalry, commanding Second Brigade, of operations September 30, 1864-January 15, 1865

No. 197.

Report of Col. Datus E. Coon, Second Iowa Cavalry,
commanding Second Brigade, of operations September 30, 1864-January 15, 1865.

HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., FIFTH DIV., CAVALRY CORPS,                
MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,        
Gravelly Springs, Ala., January 20, 1865.

MAJOR: In compliance with circular from division headquarters, I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my command from the 30th day of September, 1864, to the 15th day of January, 1865:

September 30, my brigade (Second Brigade, First Division, Cavalry Corps, District of West Tennessee), consisting of the Sixth Illinois Cavalry, Maj. Charles W. Whitsit, the Ninth Illinois Cavalry, Capt. William C. Blackburn, the Second Iowa Cavalry, Maj. Charles C. Horton commanding, and Company K, First Illinois Light Artillery, Capt. I. W. Curtis commanding, was engaged during the morning in making preparations for a ten days' scout. At 12 m. the column was in motion on the Germantown road. The rain fell in torrents for two hours. When within one mile of Germantown turned north and crossed the Wolf River at Patten's plantation; the crossing was upon a poorly constructed bridge, which delayed my wagons and artillery until after dark, and caused much trouble in passing through the heavily timbered bottom on the opposite side. The command was in bivouac by 11.30 p.m., seven miles north of Germantown. October 1, left camp at daylight, marching in rear of First Brigade; passed Macon at 12 m., and took Somerville road; camped three miles from the former place. October 2, moved at 4 a.m.; reached Somerville at 7 a.m., and took Bolivar road; arrived at that place at 4 p.m. I immediately made a heavy detail from Second Iowa Cavalry to finish a bridge across the Hatchie, which the Seventh Illinois Cavalry had been sent in advance to construct. At 8 p.m. the bridge was completed and the whole command over and in camp. October 3, moved out of Hatchie Bottom at daylight, taking Mount Pinson road; crossed the Forked Deer River at sunset, and camped one mile north of the river at 8 p.m. and near the above-named town; heavy rain all night. October 4, left bivouac at 3 a.m., and reached Mifflin, Henderson County, and fed horses while the men made coffee. At 10 a.m. moved on, taking the road leading down the valley of Beech River, leaving Lexington to our left and north some eight miles. Camped at Jones' plantation, three miles from Scott's hill. Rained very hard all day. October 5, moved at daylight, passing Scott's Hill and taking Decaturville road, at which place we arrived at 2 p.m.; halted an hour to feed; at sunset reached the Tennessee River, opposite Clifton, where we found the fleet, under command of Maj. Gen. C. C. Washburn. October 6, steps were taken early for crossing by means of transports. At 2 p.m. all were across; and in accordance with orders from your headquarters moved out on the Nashville pike ten miles, and camped for the night. October 7, marched all day on Nashville pike; passed Waynesborough, county seat of Wayne County, and at 10 p.m. camped for the night on the Nashville pike, within seven miles of Lawrenceburg. October 8, resumed the march at 3 a.m. and owing to the extreme darkness of the morning were misled and marched some five miles out of our way; halted at 9 a.m. for breakfast and to feed; reached Lawrenceburg, the county seat of Lawrence County, at 1.30 p.m. After a short halt moved out on military road leading to Florence, Ala.; when three miles out took the road leading down the valley of Shoal Creek and camped ten miles from Lawrenceburg. October 9, left this encampment at daylight, returning to the military road, and moved in the direction of Florence until we reached Bough's Mills, where I received orders to encamp for the night. At this point we learned that Forrest had crossed the Tennessee River and escaped unharmed. October 10, at 4 a.m., were again in motion toward Florence; on arriving at Wilson's Cross-Roads received orders to move toward Waterloo; passing to the north of Florence some six miles reached Waterloo at 4 p.m., and camped for the night. October 11, remained in bivouac until 4 o'clock, when we moved down the river some ten miles, with the hope of finding the gun-boats and fleet and of procuring rations for the men. To make this more certain Maj. C. C. Horton, Second Iowa Cavalry, had been sent in advance, with his regiment, to the fleet with dispatches; unfortunately, however, the fleet had dropped down the river a few hours previous to their arrival, opposite Eastport, Miss. October 12, reveille at 4.30 a.m. My brigade was on the road for Savannah at daylight. The brigade was snugly encamped one mile below Savannah at 2 p.m. October 13, still in bivouac. There being no visible means of procuring rations for my men, who had now been subsisting on the country at a poor rate some three days, I made application for and obtained permission to gather up corn and wheat and take it to a mill five miles distant, where I supplied my command scantily for the next four days. October 14, 15, and 16, during this time each day was industriously spent at the mill by parties grinding meal into flour, while others rode the country to procure salt, bacon, &c., to make it palatable. In great anxiety we waited for the boats till the evening of the 16th, when orders came to move in the morning. October 17, at 7 a.m. moved on the Waynesborough road a distance of some ten miles, when we turned toward Clifton, at which place we arrived at sunset, having marched some thirty miles over an extremely rough road. October 18, on arriving at Clifton found no boat, went the grand rounds on a large scale (some 150 miles), and returned to the starting point very hungry, ragged, and tired. During the afternoon, while unwelcome feelings were causing us to cast about for some means of subsistence, the steamer Duke hove in sight to the great satisfaction of the whole command. Our fine hopes were soon blasted, for we learned that it had only short rations of hard bread and meat; these were equally distributed among the different regiments, the balance to be gathered from the country during the absence of the steamer to Johnson's Landing. From the 18th to the 27th of the month the officers and men were industriously employed in shoeing horses and making necessary preparations for an active campaign. Owing to the scarcity of blacksmiths and blacksmith tools, I sent to the country and pressed sufficient to supply the deficiency in part only. Many of the horses were shod by the use of the common pocket-knife and hatchet; the horses, however, improved, as the forage obtained from the country was abundant. October 28, received orders to be ready to move to-morrow. October 29, left Clifton at 3 p.m., taking the Nashville pike, and camped three miles out. October 30, at 9 a.m. the general commanding came up with the First Brigade, which passed through my camp in the advance, when all moved along to Lincoln Creek, twenty-four miles, and camped for the night. October 31, resumed the march at 7 a.m., reached Lawrence-burg at 3.15 p.m., and camped one mile beyond.

November 1, left bivouac at 6 a.m. and reached Pulaski, eighteen miles distant, at 3 p.m., and camped for the night. November 2, 3, and 4, during these three days the time was occupied in procuring clothing and rations for the men, while shoes were being fitted on the horses, and preparations made for a heavy campaign. November 5, at 8 a.m. were again in motion on the Lamb's Ferry road, which leads to a ferry by that name on the Tennessee River. Camped for the night on Sugar Creek. Heavy cannonading was heard in the direction of the Tennessee River during the afternoon, which gave undoubted evidence of Hood's advance into Tennessee.

November 6, leaving bivouac before daylight enabled us to reach Lexington, Ala., before 11 a.m., where we halted for an hour to learn the whereabouts and movements of the enemy. Getting no satisfactory information, moved on to Bough's Ford, on Shoal Creek, the Second Iowa Cavalry in advance. On arriving within two miles of the ford the advance met the enemy's pickets, driving them across the creek rapidly, when the whole command came in full view of a heavy line extending along the bluffs on the opposite side. By direction of the general commanding I detached a portion of the Second Iowa to burn the flouring mill above the factory. Lieut. George W. Budd, commanding Company G, was sent for that purpose. After a lively skirmish of nearly an hour it was ascertained that the mill was on the opposite side of the stream, and that the water was too high to admit of crossing, mounted or dismounted, besides the enemy was some 300 strong, and a large number posted in and about the mill, rendering the position almost impregnable, to say nothing of the difficulty of crossing the stream. These facts being reported to me I conveyed the same to the general commanding, who directed that I withdraw all my brigade except the Second Iowa Cavalry, which should hold its position until further orders. At 9 p.m. all were in camp in a most unpleasant rainstorm. November 7, at daylight found ourselves with mud and water under foot and a drenching rain still falling. By direction from division headquarters, I took my command back five miles for feed. At I p.m. I made a demonstration on the enemy's pickets with my whole brigade, Ninth Illinois Cavalry, Capt. William C. Blackburn commanding, in advance. A persistent and heavy skirmish took place, when the enemy was driven from the bluff on the opposite side. The regiment reached the ford, but the stream was too much swollen to admit of crossing, the water carrying horse and rider down the stream. During an hour spent in skirmishing and an unfruitful effort to cross and destroy the mill, it was ascertained beyond doubt that the enemy had reenfored the picket heavily, and that Shoal Creek was much higher than on any day previous. I withdrew, fell back to Stutt's Cross-Roads, and camped for the night.

November 8, remained in bivouac during the forenoon, giving opportunity to the Second Iowa Cavalry to vote for Lincoln, which was done almost unanimously. At 2 p.m. moved to Bough's Ford, where I arrived at 5 p.m. in a heavy rain-storm. Detachments were immediately sent to reconnoiter the ford on the main road, also the one below, while a company was sent to the mill above. All reported, as on the three days previous, that the stream could not be forded. An effort was then made to construct a raft to cross at the mill, which failed for the want of material. During a skirmish of an hour the rain fell in torrents, and soon night came on, closing all operations for the day, when I withdrew to a point near the bivouac of the previous night. Sent Maj. C. P. Moore, Second Iowa Cavalry, with detachment of 100 men, to the rear of the enemy on the Tennessee River, with instructions to strike the river ten miles below Florence. Rained steadily all day.

November 9, during the night received orders from General Hatch to make another demonstration on the enemy at Bough's Ford. Moved out promptly at 7.30 a.m.; reached the ford at 9 a.m.; roads nearly impassable from mud and water; found, as usual, the enemy's pickets heavy and well posted on the opposite side. The stream still too high to admit of fording from either side, withdrew at 12 m., and camped at Watkins' house. Rained during the afternoon, but cleared away at sunset. Major Moore, Second Iowa, returned with his command safe, having passed around in rear of the enemy's lines, a distance of forty miles, and striking the Tennessee River ten miles distant below Florence, making a distance in going and returning of eighty miles' travel in twenty-four hours. The object of the expedition was to bring in seven men of General Croxton's command, who had been three day's previously sent down the river from Bainbridge to destroy the enemy's pontoons at Florence. If the object of the expedition had not been accomplished, they were to complete the work of destruction and meet this party below, but after diligent search and careful inquiry the major returned. November 10, remained in camp all day, the first pleasant day since leaving Pulaski. Owing to the extremely inclement weather, bad roads, &c., my command was again entirely destitute of rations. Two mills were taken possession of, and a regular system of foraging off the country was adopted, which, with the most careful management, could but poorly supply the men. Received orders during the afternoon to be ready at 9 a.m. of the 11th to make another demonstration on the enemy's picket, in conjunction with the entire command. November 11, reached the ford and opened upon the enemy's picket at the precise moment designated. The Sixth Illinois Cavalry, Maj. Charles W. Whitsit commanding, having the advance, were deployed as skirmishers, dismounted, forming a line from the main road up the stream to the mill, while a section of artillery was put in position on the military road. The skirmishers soon drove back the advance picket, while the artillery caused their reserve, at first in plain view, to scatter to their rear. A company of mounted men were in the meantime to try the ford on the main road and ascertain its condition for crossing. After a thorough trial it was found to be too deep even for mounted men. The Second Iowa Cavalry, Maj. C. C. Horton commanding, succeeded in finding a ford near a quarter of a mile below the main crossing, where I ordered him to commence crossing as rapidly as possible. This order was obeyed in a most gallant manner by Company G of that regiment, with Lieut. George W. Budd commanding the advance. The First Battalion, Maj. Gustavus Schnitzer commanding, was soon over and engaging the enemy in a lively skirmish, when Major Horton reported the ford impracticable for the passage of more troops, from the quicksand and miry soil on the opposite shore, and that it was impossible to cross the artillery in any event. I ordered him to dismount the remainder of his regiment, place them in line along the shores, and recall Major Schnitzer. While the First Battalion was crossing and recrossing the stream the enemy kept up a heavy fire from a barricade some 300 yards distant, on a high bluff. Another effort had been made in the meantime to cross at the mill, which had been unsuccessful on account of high water. The Ninth Illinois Cavalry, Captain Blackburn commanding, which had been sent, on leaving camp, to make a flank movement to the right of this position, by crossing Shoal Creek above the pond and mill and moving down on the opposite and west side of the stream, now appeared in sight, frightening the enemy's pickets to such an extent that they fell back so far as to allow this regiment to cross the stream in safety by swimming their horses, with the exception of Company A, Lieut. David Hilier commanding, who, by a misunderstanding of orders, took the back track until severely pressed by a brigade of the enemy's cavalry, when he coolly took to the timber and hills, evading their main force, and after much difficulty succeeded in recrossing Shoal Creek, reporting with all his men in camp at dark. The cool, undisturbed manner of this officer in relieving himself from the snare of the enemy is at least highly creditable. At 1 p.m. withdrew my command and went into camp again at Watkins' house.

November 12, remained in camp all day. Issued a very light ration of meal ground at the mill. November 13, remained in camp during the day; received orders during the evening to proceed immediately to blockade all roads leading into the military road. November 14, the detail to fell trees reported all roads effectually blockaded in compliance with orders. November 15, at 4 a.m., moved out on military road toward Lawrenceburg, and camped at Wilcoxson's plantation, five miles distant. November 16, left the military road at 8 a.m., passed down the valley of Wolf Creek, and crossed Shoal Creek at Wolf Ford; moved from the opposite side to Aberdeen, thence to Big Butler, and down to Little Butler, from which place moved directly south toward Wilson's Cross-Roads. After passing a mile, the advance, the Second Iowa Cavalry, found the enemy's pickets and dashed at them furiously, and ran them into their reserve pell-mell which created a stampede of the whole command, composed of General Roddey's brigade, which, in turn, ran back to their infantry camps in great confusion. Through the gallant conduct of Lieutenant Griffith, of Company D of the above-named regiment, we captured several prisoners, who informed us of many important facts touching the movements of the enemy. After having forced Roddey within the infantry lines, I became satisfied that the enemy were continually receiving re-enforcements, and that Forrest had recently joined Hood (on the 14th), and that the location about the two Butler Creeks was not the most safe for the camp of a cavalry command I therefore took the responsibility of recrossing Shoal Creek at the Savannah Ford, and went into camp at Hains' plantation, three miles from Cowpen Mills. November 17, moved camp to Cowpen Mills and sent patrols three miles across Shoal Creek. Found the enemy in force. November 18, made reconnaissance across Shoal Creek with the entire brigade three miles to Butler Creek and Florence road, and sent the Second Iowa Cavalry as patrols to the Florence and Waynesborough road four miles distant, returned to Cowpen Mills and camped.

November 19, in compliance with orders from division commander, moved my brigade across Shoal Creek at Cowpen Ford, for the purpose of camping on Butler Creek. On reaching the Butler Creek road, three miles west, drove in the enemy's picket, and sent Capt. A. E. Mock, of Ninth Illinois Cavalry, commanding battalion, to patrol the Waynesborough road. The main column turned north to Butlers Creek, while Capt. J. W. Harper, with the remainder of his regiment (the Ninth Illinois Cavalry), stood picket on the road running south toward Florence. I remained with my escort at the cross-roads to see the train safely closed up for three-quarters of an hour, when I was informed by an orderly that the Second Iowa had met the enemy in heavy force, and that Buford's division was in their front, on Big Butler Creek. At about this moment Captain Harper reported the enemy pressing his picket from the south, and that they had the appearance of being infantry. Leaving an orderly to close the column I sent another to inform Captain Harper that he must hold his position at all hazards until the pack train and artillery had passed, as it was impossible, from the bad condition of the road, to halt or return by the same route. I then rode rapidly to the Second Iowa, and found them engaged with superior force. I immediately sent the train and artillery down the valley of the Little Butler, accompanied by the Sixth Illinois as escort, Major Whitsit commanding, who was instructed to take all axes and spades and make's crossing on Shoal Creek at all hazards, as this was the only place of escape from a well devised trap of the enemy. The next thirty minutes were passed in great anxiety, as Buford, on the north, was pressing the Second Iowa hard in front and flanking on their right and left with vastly superior numbers, while the Ninth Illinois was heavily pressed in the rear by a force from the south. During this time a messenger was sent to Captain Mock, informing him of his situation, and that unless he returned soon I would be compelled to abandon the last place left for his escape. As the Ninth Illinois came up they passed to the right and rear of the Second Iowa, down the Little Butler, and forming a line dismounted at the junction of the Big and Little Butler, where the high and abrupt bluffs on either side made the valley quite narrow. This made a good support for the Second Iowa when compelled to fall back. By this time the situation of the Second Iowa became truly critical, in consequence of the rapid movements of the rebel flanking column, which reached nearly to their rear on the right and left. Seeing it was impossible to hold the gap until Captain Mock could be heard from I ordered Major Horton to fail back and form again in rear of the Ninth Illinois. Each regiment then fell back alternately and formed lines for two miles, when we reached Shoal Creek, and I found, to my great surprise, the Sixth Illinois pack train, artillery, and ambulances all safe on the opposite side, and the regiment dismounted to cover the crossing. A lively skirmish was kept up by the rear guard while the command passed down the steep miry bank by file obliquely 150 feet. The mortification and apparent chagrin of the rebels when they found their prey had unexpectedly escaped was made known by those hideous yells, such as only rebels can make. 1 carefully placed my pickets on all practicable roads and encamped at dark at the same place I had left in the morning, with the firm conclusion, as previously reported, that Butler's Creek was by no means a desirable location to encamp. The day had been one of incessant rain.

November 20, moved from Cowpen Mills at 3 a m., going toward the military road. On arriving at that place halted for an hour, when I received orders to move to Bluewater Creek and camp, leaving pickets on military road. Captain Mock, of Ninth Illinois Cavalry, reported on military road, having traveled all night to reach the command. He succeeded in reaching the Waynesborough road, but in returning found himself and command completely surrounded by the enemy, and took to the hills by meandering neighborhood roads. By accident he came upon General Chalmers' division wagon train and made a charge on the guard, capturing several wagons and prisoners and fifty mules, besides much plunder which he could not bring away. While in the act of destroying the train he was attacked by a superior force and compelled to leave all and take to the woods again. By the assistance of Union men and negroes he was guided by circuitous routes until he reached the column. His loss was thirty men, most of whom were taken prisoners. Papers conveying important information were captured with the train, information which must have been of infinite importance to General Thomas, as they detailed the movements about to be made, giving timely notice to all of what was to take place. Captain Mock is entitled to much credit for the skill displayed in bringing out his command with so little loss. At sunset the pickets on the military road were attacked and compelled to fall back. Patrols sent to the military road and the front on all roads during the fore part of the night found the enemy advancing in force November 21, ordered to take the rear on the Lexington road at daylight. Reached Lexington at 10.15 a.m., when the division joined Croxton's brigade and was ordered to take the Lawrenceburg road in rear of command and train. Reached Lawrenceburg at 5 p.m. and camped for the night. The day was cold and much snow fell during the afternoon and night following.

November 22, morning cold and the ground frozen hard. About 12 m. the enemy commenced skirmishing with our pickets, when Capt. Jacob F. Bandy, Second Iowa Cavalry, with one battalion was sent to ascertain their force. At three miles distant from town the enemy was found in force and strongly posted on bluffs and behind well-arranged rail barricades. After an hour's skirmish he fell back to the picket. At 2 p.m. the enemy moved up in heavy force, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and encamped in line in plain view of town and of our bivouac. In compliance with orders I immediately put my command in line of battle on north side of town. The enemy soon opened with one section of artillery when my battery replied. An hour was spent in firing by the artillery on both sides with no result, when we were ordered to fall back on Pulaski road, Second Brigade to take the rear. My pickets and command withdrew in good order, though heavily pressed by superior force. Halted and camped seven miles east of Lawrenceburg, leaving General Croxton's command in our front.

November 23, left camp at 4 a.m.; halted at Richland Mills to feed and issue rations to the men. General Croxton's command, in the rear, was heard skirmishing heavily. At 3 p.m. moved three miles toward Pulaski and took to the left up the valley of Dry Creek, camping five miles south of Campbellsville.

November 24, moved at 6 a.m., taking the rear. Arrived at Campbellsville at 9 a.m. Received orders to follow the First Brigade and camp one mile above and north of the town on the creek. Sent patrols west one mile, who soon returned, reporting the enemy moving on our left, with vedettes standing on every high bluff in sight. This information was promptly conveyed to General Hatch, who ordered patrols strengthened and sent back to watch the enemy. Had not proceeded half a mile when I was informed that the First Brigade, a short distance ahead, had met a heavy column, supposed to be Buford's division. I immediately ordered the regiments along the column to throw down the fences, and two regiments, the Sixth and Ninth Illinois, to form a line dismounted. This was not, fully accomplished, however, when I was ordered to fall back to the east side of town, and hold the Lynnville road until the First Brigade, reported in a critical situation, could be recalled. My line of battle was soon formed, the left, the Ninth Illinois, resting near the church, the Second Iowa in the center, and the Sixth Illinois on the right, extending north, the entire line facing to the west. The regiments had barely time to dismount. The battery was soon put in position near the center of the line, when the enemy's infantry made its appearance in heavy force on the south and west side of the town. By direction of General Hatch the battery commenced firing at a range of one mile and a half. The effect of the cannonading was excellent, causing the whole rebel column to halt for at least one hour and deploy in heavy force. During this time a flanking column of the enemy was discovered moving to our left, threatening the Lynnville road, when I ordered the Second Iowa, Maj. C. C. Horton commanding, to guard and check that movement, who soon reported the force engaging him vastly superior to his. I immediately sent the Ninth Illinois as support. These regiments were both immediately in a heavy skirmish, their position soon became intolerable, as the enemy was undoubtedly moving their main column by the right flank, to get possession of the road in their rear. These facts I communicated to the general commanding, who ordered me to fall back and hold the road regardless of the First Brigade. When three-fourths of a mile from town I found the enemy in strong force on the left, with a battery playing at 1,000 yards distance upon my column. The men were deployed on foot on the left while the led horses and artillery passed by the road. The fire from the flank of musketry or artillery was quite lively, but no casualties occurred, save the killing of two horses. Two miles from Campbellsville my flanking column and patrols from the left were suddenly driven in as the road turned to the left through a narrow gorge, and just at the time General Hatch was passing. Capt. E. T. Phillips, Company M, Sixth Illinois Cavalry, commanding his escort, discovering the rebels, charged in an instant with his company and saved the gallant commander from capture. This gallant act of Captain Phillips is worthy of special compliment here, as well for his daring as for the good result. Unfortunately, the captain, received a wound in the left hand, which disabled him for the campaign. The Ninth Illinois Cavalry, Capt. J. W. Harper commanding, following immediately in rear of the general's escort, was ordered by him to dismount and hold the gap at all hazards. Captain Harper had scarcely dismounted his men, when they received a heavy fire from a brigade of the enemy. Not a particle daunted the captain ordered his men forward until it became a hand to hand fight. In the meantime I was notified of the perilous condition of the regiments, being then one-fourth of a mile in advance. Not knowing the nature of their orders I directed Captain Harper to fall back slowly, but was soon informed that their ammunition (sixty rounds) was nearly exhausted. I then formed the Second Iowa across the gorge to protect them while they withdrew. The loss of this regiment was thirty killed and wounded in less than that number of minutes; among the number were four orderly sergeants killed. It is with pride that I mention the fact that Captain Harper brought his men back in good order, although the loss was heavy. No sooner had the Ninth Illinois passed through the line of the Second Iowa than the rebel brigade came at double-quick up the hollow, colors in front, and in another instant was in line of battle. Three hundred Spencers from the Second Iowa drove them back in confusion; but a moment, however, intervened when the rebels rallied. Major Horton in the meantime retired and mounted by battalions, under fire, leaving one officer and five men wounded on the field. I then sent Captain Bandy, Second Iowa, with two companies as rear guard, to Lynnville, three miles distant. The whole brigade was here thrown out in line of battle, and held the enemy in check until after dark, when I was ordered to withdraw and march in rear to Columbia. Put my command in bivouac within the infantry pickets at 11.30 p.m.

November 25, crossed Duck River, and encamped three miles above the city. November 26, at 10 a.m. moved out on the Murfreesborough road, and encamped eight miles east of Columbia. Rained continually during the day and that night. November 27, remained in bivouac all day; still raining very hard. The Seventh Illinois Cavalry having been assigned to this brigade, Maj. John M. Graham, commanding regiment, reported for duty. I sent Captain Glass, of Sixth Illinois Cavalry, and 400 men, to Shelbyville, to ascertain the enemy's movements in that direction.

November 28, rained until 12 m. At 2 p.m. received orders to move immediately. While "boot and saddle" was being sounded the enemy opened with a volley upon the picket on the Shelbyville road. By aid of a glass the enemy could be seen in heavy force through the thin fog, about two miles distant. I ordered a battalion of the Second Iowa, Captain Foster commanding, to support the pickets, while the command made preparations to move. By direction of the general commanding I sent the artillery and train on the Spring Hill road. This order, however, was soon countermanded, and the train sent to Huey's Cross-Roads, on the Lewisburg pike, where the brigade erected a slight barricade of rails, and slept on their arms during the night.

November 29, took up line of march at 4 a.m., passing Croxton's and Harrison's commands and moving toward Franklin, my brigade marching in rear of division to Mount Carmel, where it halted and fed in line of battle to the left of the pike. At 9 a.m. General Croxton's command passed my brigade, heavily pressed by the enemy. The light rail barricades previously prepared served as temporary breastworks and enabled my brigade, then dismounted, to check the enemy's movements. But a few moments passed until the whole line was engaged in a heavy skirmish, which continued for an hour, when I received orders to withdraw slowly, which was done by alternate numbers in line, dismounted, for two miles, when I ordered the brigade mounted. I then withdrew by brigade in line of regiments, each regiment in line of squadrons in column of fours. The enemy, discovering this formation, charged down the pike, in column of fours, on a small company of the Ninth Illinois Cavalry, which was acting as rear guard. In accordance with previous instructions from me the company did not halt, but continued to fall back, leading the enemy between the flanking columns right and left, who opened upon them a raking fire, throwing them into confusion, and ending the pursuit for the day. The command arrived at Nolen's plantation at 12 m., and halted in line of battle until 4 p.m., when it moved toward Franklin two miles, and, turning to the right, crossed Little Harpeth River and moved north to the Nolensville and Franklin road, where the brigade was encamped for the night.

November 30, the Twelfth Tennessee Cavalry, Col. George Spalding commanding, having been assigned to this brigade, reported for duty. Remained in bivouac till 12 m., when the enemy were reported to have driven our pickets in at the ford on the Little Harpeth. I received orders to put my brigade in  line of battle dismounted, and I sent the Sixth Illinois to support the pickets in front, and the Second Iowa to guard the left on the Nolensville road. After some thirty minutes I received orders to move my line forward, which was done promptly. At the distance of half a mile the enemy made his appearance in force on a high bluff in front, when, by order of the general commanding, I ordered the brigade to charge the hill and drive the enemy back, which was performed in a most gallant style, until he was driven back across the Little Harpeth River. The enemy's force making the attack was supposed to be Buford's division of cavalry and mounted infantry, estimated to be from 5,000 to 6,000 strong. My entire command acquitted itself in a most creditable manner, and camped for the night on the ground occupied the night previous.

December 1, at 5.30 a.m. marched with the division to Brentwood Station, where I was ordered to form in line of battle on the Franklin pike. I remained here until 2 p.m., when I moved on the Nashville pike in rear of the command, crossed over to Murfreesborough pike, and camped for the night. December 2, marched with the division at 5 a.m., on the right flank, to Nashville, and crossed the Cumberland River during the afternoon, and encamped at Edgefield. During the time from December 3 to December 11 the brigade was encamped at Edge-field, making preparations for active duty again. December 12, moved camp across the river, and camped two miles south of the river between the Hardin and Charlotte pikes. December 13 and 14, in camp.

December 15, by the direction of the general commanding the division the brigade moved out at daylight from camp across the field, on the right of the Hardin pike, two miles, forming dismounted on the right of the infantry under Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith. The led horses were placed in the rear of their respective regiments, with the exception of the Twelfth Tennessee Cavalry, Col. George Spalding commanding, which regiment I kept mounted for a charge, should an opportunity present. An hour was spent in regulating the line of infantry and cavalry, when the advance was ordered, and all moved forward, presenting a most magnificent spectacle. We had not proceeded far when we crossed the Hardin pike, where a wagon train was discovered still in sight moving south, and Col. George Spalding was sent in pursuit. After traveling eight miles he came upon the rear guard and charged on it, capturing some twenty wagons, with teams, &c., complete, some forty prisoners, and a large amount of plunder, belonging to the rebel General Chalmers' headquarters. My brigade formed on the extreme right of the infantry, with directions to conform to their movements, which were in a large circle and caused lively marching for the men, as the distance traveled by them was much farther than that of the infantry. After marching for three miles, much of the time at a double-quick, I formed my brigade on the left flank of the enemy, one mile and a quarter to the left of the Hardin pike. Passing my battery to my right flank, where a favorable opportunity offered to enfilade the enemy's lines, the Seventh Illinois and Second Iowa were directed to support the battery. My artillery had discharged but a few shots at the redoubt when it was rapidly replied to. A lively fire was kept up on both sides for an hour with but few casualties. The command moved forward until within 500 yards of the enemy's works, when General Hatch directed me to charge and take the nearest redoubt. The regiments engaged in this charge were as follows: Seventh Illinois Cavalry, Maj. John M. Graham commanding, on the right; the Second Iowa Cavalry, Maj. C. C. Horton, and Ninth Illinois Cavalry, Capt. Joseph W. Harper commanding, in order, on the left of the Seventh Illinois; and the Sixth Illinois Cavalry, Lieut. Col. John Lynch commanding, on the left of the brigade and closed up to the right of the infantry. In making the charge the right wing of the brigade had an open field, with nothing to impede their progress save two stone fences, while the left wing had a heavy thicket to pass through. At the word "Forward!" stone [fences and] thickets were very slight impediments in the way of this veteran brigade. The enemy, discovering the movement, changed their little messengers of shell to grape and canister, accompanied by heavy musketry from the infantry support behind their works. As I rode along the line I found each regiment competing with the others to reach the redoubt. So near the same time did each regiment reach the redoubt that it was difficult for some time to ascertain who was the first to reach the prize. All acted nobly, and are entitled to the highest praise, under the circumstances, for their efforts to be the first. The evidence, carefully examined, awards to Second Lieut. George W. Budd, of Company G, Second Iowa Cavalry, and his company, the honor of being the first to scale the rebel works and take possession of the rebel cannon, which were four in number—Napoleons. On reaching the inside of the works he drew his saber upon the cannoneers and forced them to discharge the last load intended for the Federals on their own friends, then in plain view on the east side of the fort, not 500 yards distant. As the command took possession of this point a rebel battery opened from another redoubt, 600 yards distant, situated upon the top of a bluff some 200 feet high and protected by strong earth-works. General Hatch ordered me to charge the hill without delay. This order was promptly obeyed by all my command, officers and men. The "charge" was sounded, and in twenty minutes the colors of the Second Iowa Cavalry were planted on the works by the color-bearer, Sergt. John F. Hartman, of Company F, who was mortally wounded by a musket-ball passing through the abdomen. During the charge the enemy kept up a brisk cannonading, accompanied by heavy musketry firing from the infantry within the redoubt. The long march previous, the charge in taking the first redoubt, and the short time given until the charge of the second, rendered it almost impossible for a cavalryman to move faster than a walk. So eager were the officers and men to reach the second redoubt that many fell to the ground exhausted. Lieut. Col. John Lynch, Sixth Illinois Cavalry, while at the head of his regiment gallantly leading his men, fell exhausted and was carried from the field. Many soldiers, when too tired to walk, crawled upon their hands and knees up the steep bluff to the foot of the redoubt. While my men were in the act of charging this last fort the infantry had reached within supporting distance, when I ordered my officers to pass the words, "Second Brigade, take those guns before the infantry get up!" and in less than ten minutes the work was done. Lieut. John H. Carpenter, Company L, Ninth Illinois Cavalry, was the first man who entered the redoubt, killing the officer in command of the fort, while at the same moment Sergeant Hartman planted the colors of his regiment inside the works. In honor to the brave who have fallen I should say that on arriving within some twenty yards of the redoubt I found this brave color-bearer completely exhausted and halted in advance of the line. I asked him, "Sergeant, can you put those colors upon the works?" He replied, "I can, if supported." When I called for the Second Iowa to support their colors it was done with an iron will, but the sergeant fell and was soon borne from the field. In this fort were two pieces of artillery (12-pounders), a large quantity of ammunition, and 150 prisoners. In ten minutes these guns were turned upon the enemy with such effect as to cause great confusion in their retreating columns. The prisoners and plunder had not been collected when I was ordered to continue the pursuit, leaving them in charge of the infantry. On quitting the fort, having previously instructed my regimental commanders where to form and collect their men, I mistook two regiments of the First Brigade for those of my own, and had the distinguished honor of leading them to the summit of a third hill, and shall ever remember with pleasure the gallant conduct of these men in holding that place, under a most galling fire from the enemy in front and on both right and left flanks, until the infantry came up, when they moved forward and took three pieces of artillery, from which they had driven the enemy a few moments before. These regiments, I am informed, were the Twelfth Missouri and Eleventh Indiana Cavalry. At dark I bivouacked my command near the redoubts on the Lewisburg pike.

December 16, at 10 a.m. was ordered to move my brigade out on the Lewisburg pike and support General Knipe. After advancing a mile I halted one hour, when I was ordered to move my command to the east of the pike, form in line dismounted, and move forward, in conformity with the infantry, toward the Granny White pike. The steep hills, rising abruptly from 100 to 200 feet high, and covered with thick undergrowth, rendered it almost impossible for the movement of troops even dismounted. By putting the brigade by regiments  (Sixth and Ninth Illinois, Second Iowa, Seventh Illinois, and Twelfth Tennessee) in line, successively, in order from left to right, and each upon a hill, I was at last able to move forward nearly one mile, when the whole line became engaged. The brigade was skirmishing heavily when I received orders to halt and hold my position. The line was upon a high, narrow ridge, thinly wooded, but affording an excellent point to defend. During the first hour here the Seventh Illinois charged a rebel work, driving the enemy away, capturing seventy-five prisoners and a large number of small-arms, bringing the prisoners safely sway and destroying the arms. About 3 p.m. I ordered the Sixth and Ninth Illinois and Second Iowa, on my left, to commence firing at will on a fort some 500 yards distant, while two pieces of my artillery played upon it from the valley below. This, I am satisfied, had the desired effect, for the enemy commenced evacuating in a very few minutes. The whole line was then moved forward, and the Twelfth Tennessee captured some 150 prisoners. Three stand of colors were left in the hands of the infantry. On reaching the Granny White pike I was ordered to follow the enemy south, and, if possible, charge them before dark, as they were retreating in great haste. Colonel Spalding, of the Twelfth Tennessee, took the advance, and had not proceeded more than one mile when he made a charge, which threw them into confusion, and, by the assistance of the Ninth Illinois, who were brought up dismounted, I soon drove them from a strong position protected by a barricade of rails. The Twelfth Tennessee and Sixth and Ninth Illinois followed them to another strong position, half a mile distant, when a hand-to-hand fight took place, and lasted an hour after dark. At this place Brigadier-General Rucker was captured by Capt. Joseph C. Boyer, Twelfth Tennessee Cavalry, who received a severe blow on the forehead from the hand of the rebel general. In this personal contest Captain Boyer wrenched the rebel general's saber from his hand, who in turn seized and took his, when a Federal soldier, name unknown, shot the general in the arm, causing him to surrender. It was in this melee, amidst intense darkness, that the two regiments of Twelfth Tennessee Cavalry, Federal and Confederate, met and mixed in mad confusion, neither knowing the other save by the usual challenge, "Halt, who comes there?" Colonel Spalding, who was foremost in the charge, was halted by two Confederate soldiers, who, on hearing his answer to the challenge, grasped his horse by the reins on either side and demanded his surrender, when the colonel put spurs to his horse, and with one bound the noble animal took himself and rider beyond danger. Private Berry Watson, Company G, Twelfth Tennessee, captured and brought away General Rucker's division flag, and was promoted to sergeant by Colonel Spalding, the same night, for gallant conduct. Majors Kirwan and Bradshaw, of the Twelfth Tennessee, charged entirely through the rebel lines with their battalions, and afterward returned by passing themselves as belonging to the Twelfth Tennessee Confederate Cavalry, and in great anxiety to meet the Yankees. Camped for the night on Granny White pike, eight miles south of Nashville.

December 17, moved at daylight and continued the pursuit, following in rear of the cavalry command to Franklin, where I was ordered to move to the left on the Lewisburg pike three miles and cross over to the Columbia pike. When three miles south of Franklin we met the enemy, and I immediately formed the whole brigade and charged mounted. On reaching and driving in the rebels  left the Second Iowa pressed its way around to their rear, when a hand-to-hand fight ensued, resulting in the capture of one stand of colors and several prisoners. In this engagement Sergt. John Coulter, Corpl. A. R. Heck, and Private Black, of Company K, captured and brought off a stand of division colors, after which Private Black and Corpl. A. R. Heck were killed and Sergt. John Coulter was severely wounded. The sergeant, however, succeeded in bringing away the rebel standard. Sergeant Margaretz, of Company F, same regiment, the second color-sergeant, was killed at the same place, but not until he had killed the rebel who demanded his colors. On burying the dead three Federal and five Confederate soldiers were found dead within three paces of each other. The firing in the rear, in conjunction with the brisk engagement in front, caused the enemy to fall back, and with detached portions of the brigade I continued to press his flank until dark, when I dismounted the Ninth Illinois, formed in range, and fired upon him by volleys, driving him from another position, and, in co-operation with other troops, capturing three more pieces of artillery. One of these pieces was brought off the field by the Ninth Illinois. The darkness prevented further movements, and we camped for the night seven miles below Franklin.

December 18, moved at daylight, continuing the pursuit to Spring Hill, where we found a considerable force of the enemy, and fired but a few shots, when they fell back in confusion. Camped for the night three miles south of Spring Hill. December 19, resumed the march at 7 a.m., and continued to Rutherford's Creek, where we dismounted, marched by the right flank one mile, and succeeded in crossing the Sixth Illinois on the wreck of the burnt railroad bridge, when the fragments floated away and the balance of my command were compelled to ford the stream some distance above. Moved two miles below on the enemy's flank, the Sixth Illinois skirmishing until dark; then the command encamped for the night. December 20, at daylight were again in motion down Rutherford's Creek. Marched nearly two miles, when I was ordered to dismount my command and construct a crossing from the fragment of a railroad bridge which the rebels had destroyed the day previous. This work was completed, and my command across at 12 m., and the pursuit again resumed. The Seventh and Ninth Illinois were dismounted and deployed on foot, while the remainder of the brigade followed mounted to Duck River, opposite Columbia. On arriving here found the enemy had crossed his rear guard in comparative safety at 4 a.m., leaving a small party, with a piece of artillery, as rear guard in the town upon the opposite side. A light skirmish between the above-named regiments and the enemy, accompanied by light cannonading from both sides, closed the operations of the day, when the command encamped to await the arrival of the pontoons. During the skirmish the Seventh Illinois discovered where the enemy had abandoned four pieces of artillery by tumbling it into Duck River over the abutment of the old bridge. It was afterward taken out by the infantry.

December 21 and 22, the main part of my command remained in camp two miles northeast of Columbia. One battalion of the Second Iowa, Capt. Samuel Foster, Company M, commanding, was sent on the Shelbyville pike in pursuit of a party of rebels, who were reported escaping with two pieces of artillery. The captain succeeded in capturing them without resistance, after a day's march, and also found six ambulances and three wagons in poor condition. December 23, crossed the Duck River, and encamped five miles south of Columbia on the Pulaski pike. December 24, marched with the division, in rear of General Croxton's command, as far as Lynnville, when my brigade was ordered to march by the left flank, to gain the rear of the enemy's lines, and drive him from a strong position on Richland Creek, but was prevented by the unfordable condition of Richland Creek, when I dismounted my command and engaged the enemy at long range for half an hour. During this skirmish the rebel General Buford was wounded by the Seventh Illinois. Camped for the night. December 25, marched with the division, in rear of Colonel Harrison's and General Hammond's commands, reaching Pulaski at 11 a.m., and passing beyond some six miles, when the enemy was found in force. A light skirmish ensued when the advance was repulsed. My brigade was immediately dismounted, and after a heavy skirmish of an hour drove the enemy from a strong position protected by a barricade of rails, and encamped for the night. December 26, marched in rear of General Hammond's command to Sugar Creek, and encamped for the night. December 27, sent Colonel Spalding, of the Twelfth Tennessee Cavalry; with a detachment of the best mounted men of each regiment (500 men in all), in the direction of Bainbridge, to ascertain the movements of the enemy. December 28, moved with the command to Blue Water, via Livingston, where we encamped for the night. Remained in camp during the 29th and 30th, having learned that the enemy had effected a crossing of the Tennessee River at Bainbridge. December 31, marched to Elk River on the Huntsville road; camped on opposite and east side, after much difficulty in crossing. The stream high for fording.

January 1, reached Athens, Ala., at 2 p.m., and camped five miles beyond. January 2, left bivouac at 4 a.m. for Huntsville, but were halted by a staff officer five miles on the road, who informed me that our destination had been changed from Huntsville, Ala., to Waterloo, opposite Eastport, Miss. I countermarched my command and camped at Perran's plantation, five miles southeast of Athens. January 3, moved camp from Perran's plantation to Widow West's, where I was ordered to rest my horses and shoe as many as possible. January 4, 5, and 6 were spent in shoeing horses and resting them from the fatigues of the last campaign. January 7, marched for Waterloo, where we arrived on Wednesday, the 11th, at sunset, having traveled a distance of some eighty-five miles, in a most disagreeable state of weather as well as of roads; the weather cold and the mud frozen and in places very deep. After remaining in bivouac opposite Eastport some three days, by order of the brevet major-general commanding the corps I moved to this camp on the 14th day of the month.

In conclusion I must say that the campaign and labors of the brigade have been endured by the officers and soldiers with unparalleled fortitude. They have been subject to all the privations that soldiers are heir to, and without eliciting the least complaint. An army made of such material, veterans of nearly three years' standing, can accomplish what the world never before witnessed.

I am happy to mention the names of my staff—First Lieut. John H. Avery, Ninth Illinois Cavalry, acting assistant adjutant-general; First Lieut. Sidney O. Roberts, Ninth Illinois Cavalry, provost-marshal; First Lieut. Thomas J. Cox, Tenth Tennessee Cavalry, acting assistant inspector-general; First Lieut. Samuel J. Dangler, Second Iowa Cavalry, ambulance officer; First Lieut. Henry B. Ludlow, Second Iowa Cavalry, acting assistant quartermaster First Lieut. E. A. Davenport, Ninth Illinois Cavalry, acting commissary of subsistence—for the worthy and efficient manner in which they discharged their duties.

The conduct of the officers and men hi every regiment and company was of the most soldierly character, and were I allowed the space I would gladly mention many officers and hundreds of soldiers whose bravery is worthy of personal compliment in this respect.

I should do injustice were I to omit to mention the important service rendered my brigade by Company I, First Illinois Light Artillery, from the time it reported to me at Nashville up to the present, and especially in the battle of Nashville, on the 15th and 16th of December, and at Franklin, on the 17th, in shelling the enemy from the fort on the north side of town, and also at the fight that night at the Little Harpeth, also at Spring Hill, Rutherford's Creek, and Columbia. The officers and men conducted themselves in the most gallant style, always delivering their messages to the enemy with astonishing accuracy.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
DATUS E. COON,        
Colonel Second Iowa Cav., Comdg. 2d Brig., 5th Div., Cav. Corps.

        Maj. HENRY C. FORBES,
Chief of Staff to Brig. Gen. Edward Hatch, Comdg. 5th Div.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 580-94