Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 252. — Report of Maj. Gen. Nathan B. Forrest, C.S. Army, commanding cavalry, of operations November 16, 1864-January 23, 1865.

No. 252.

Report of Maj. Gen. Nathan B. Forrest, C.S. Army, commanding cavalry,

of operations November 16, 1864-January 23, 1865.

HEADQUARTERS FORREST'S CAVALRY CORPS,        

Verona, Miss., January 24, 1865.

COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the troops under my command during the recent movements in Middle Tennessee:

While in West Tennessee I received orders from General Beauregard on the 30th of October, to report without delay to General Hood at Florence, Ala. I was then actively operating against Johnsonville, and so soon as I completed the destruction of the enemy's fleet and stores at that place I commenced moving up the Tennessee River. I halted my command at Perryville with a view of crossing the river at that point, but being without facilities, and the river already high and rising rapidly, I found it impossible to cross over. I succeeded, however, in throwing across a portion of Rucker's brigade, while I moved to Corinth with the balance of my command. My men and horses were much jaded, but I moved at once to Florence and crossed the river on the 16th and 17th of November. On my arrival at Florence I was placed in command of the entire cavalry then with the Army of Tennessee, consisting of Brigadier-General Jackson's division and a portion of Dibrell's brigade, under command of Colonel Biffle, amounting to about 2,000 men, together with three brigades of my former command, making in all about 5,000 cavalry. I bivouacked my command at Shoal Creek until the morning of the 21st, when, in obedience to orders from General Hood, I commenced a forward movement. My command consisted of three divisions—Chalmers', Buford's, and Jackson's. I ordered Brigadier-General Chalmers to advance via West Point, Kelly's Forge, Henryville, and Mount Pleasant. Brigadier-Generals Buford and Jackson were ordered to move up the military road to Lawrenceburg, and thence southeastward in the direction of Pulaski. Both these divisions had several engagements with the enemy, and were almost constantly skirmishing with him, but drove him in every encounter.

At Henryville Brigadier-General Chalmers developed the enemy's cavalry and captured forty-five prisoners. At Fouche Springs the enemy made another stand. I ordered General Chalmers to throw forward Rucker's brigade and to keep up a slight skirmish with the enemy until I could gain his rear. I ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Kelley to move by the left flank and join me in rear of the enemy. Taking my escort with me I moved rapidly to the rear. Lieutenant-Colonel Kelley being prevented from joining me as I had expected, I made the charge upon the enemy with my escort alone, producing a perfect stampede, capturing about 50 prisoners, 20 horses, and 1 ambulance. It was now near night, and I placed my escort in ambush. Colonel Rucker pressed upon the enemy, and as they rushed into the ambuscade my escort fired into them, producing the wildest confusion. I ordered Colonel Rucker to rest his command until 1 a.m., when the march was renewed toward Mount Pleasant, where he captured 35,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition and the guard left in charge of it. Meantime Brigadier-Generals Buford and Jackson had proceeded from Lawrenceburg toward Pulaski and encountered Hatch's division of cavalry at Campbellsville, and routed him after a short but vigorous engagement, in which he lost about 100 prisoners and several in killed and wounded. Most of my troops having reached Columbia on the evening of the 24th I invested the town from Duck River to the extreme north, which position I held until the arrival of the infantry on the morning of the 27th, when I was relieved.

Columbia having been evacuated on the night of the 28th [27th] I was ordered to move across Duck River on the morning of the 28th. Chalmers' division was ordered to cross at Carr's Mill, seven miles above Columbia, Jackson's, at Holland's Ford, while I crossed at Owen's Ford with a portion of Colonel Biffle's regiment. Before leaving Columbia I sent my escort to Shelbyville for the purpose of ascertaining the movements of the enemy and destroying the railroad, and I regret to announce that Captain Jackson was seriously wounded on this expedition. On the night of the 28th I was joined by Chalmers' division about eight miles from Columbia on the Spring Hill and Carr's Mill road. Jackson's division was ordered to proceed to the vicinity of Hurt's Cross Roads on the Lewisburg pike. At 11 o'clock at night I received a dispatch from General Buford informing me that the enemy had made such's stubborn resistance to his crossing that he could not join the command until the morning of the 29th. I ordered General Jackson to move along the Lewisburg pike toward Franklin until he developed the enemy. Brigadier-General Armstrong notified me that he had struck the enemy, when I ordered him not to press too vigorously until I reached his flank with Chalmers' division. The enemy gradually fell back, making resistance only at favorable positions. After waiting a short time for my troops to close up, I moved rapidly toward Spring Hill with my entire command. Two miles from town the enemy's pickets were encountered and heavy skirmishing ensued. I ordered General Armstrong to form his brigade in line of battle. I also ordered a portion of the Kentucky brigade and the Fourteenth Tennessee Regiment, under Colonel White, to form, which being done I ordered a charge upon the enemy, but he was so strongly posted upon the crest of a hill that my troops were compelled to fall back. I then dismounted my entire command and moved upon the enemy. With a few men I moved to the left on a high hill, where I discovered the enemy hurriedly moving his wagon train up the Franklin pike. I ordered my command to push the enemy's right flank with all possible vigor. At the same time I ordered Brigadier-General Buford to send me a regiment mounted. He sent the Twenty-first Tennessee, Colonel Wilson commanding, which I ordered to charge upon the enemy. Colonel Wilson at the head of his splendid regiment made a gallant charge through an open field. He received three wounds, but refused to leave his command. About this time I received orders from General Hood to hold my position at all hazards, as the advance of his infantry column was only two miles distant and rapidly advancing. I ordered up my command, already dismounted. Colonel Bell's brigade was the first to reach me, when I immediately ordered it to the attack. Major-General Cleburne's division soon arrived, and, after some delay, was formed in line of battle and moved upon the enemy on my left. Colonel Bell reported that he had only four rounds of ammunition to the man when I ordered him to charge the enemy. This order was executed with a promptness and energy and gallantry which I have never seen excelled. The enemy was driven from his rifle-pits, and fled toward Spring Hill. I then ordered Brigadier-General Jackson to move with his division in the direction of Thompson's Station and there intercept the enemy. He struck the road at Fitzgerald's, four miles from Spring Hill, at 11 o'clock, just as the front of the enemy's column had passed. This attack was a complete surprise, producing much panic and confusion. Brigadier-General Jackson had possession of the pike and fought the enemy until near daylight, but receiving no support, he was compelled to retire, after killing a large number of horses and mules and burning several wagons.

Chalmers' and Buford's divisions being out of ammunition, I supplied them from the infantry (my ordnance being still at Columbia), when I ordered Brigadier-General Chalmers to move at daylight on the morning of the 30th to the Carter's Creek turnpike, between Columbia and Spring Hill, and there intercept a column of the enemy reported to be cut off. General Chalmers moved as ordered, but reported to me that the enemy had passed unmolested on the main pike during the night. Buford and Jackson were ordered to move forward with their divisions on the Franklin pike and to attack the enemy. They overtook his rear two miles from where General Jackson had cut his column the night previous and pushed him on to Winstead's Hill, where he was strongly posted. General Stewart's corps arriving upon the ground, I moved with Buford's and Jackson's divisions to the right, my right extending to Harpeth River, and ordered Brigadier-General Chalmers on the left. The enemy retired from Winstead's Hill toward their fortifications at Franklin. I ordered Brigadier-General Chalmers to advance on the left, which he did, charging and dislodging the enemy from every position he had taken. The enemy was posted on a strong hill on the opposite side of Harpeth River, from which position he was firing upon our troops on the Lewisburg pike. I ordered Brigadier-General Jackson to cross over and drive the enemy from this hill and to protect our right. I ordered Brigadier-General Buford to dismount his command and take position in line of battle on the right of Stewart's corps, covering the ground from the Lewisburg pike to Harpeth River. Skirmishing at once commenced, and Buford's division rapidly advancing drove the enemy across Harpeth River, where he joined the cavalry. Brigadier-General Jackson engaged the united forces of both infantry and cavalry, and held him in check until night, when he threw forward his pickets and retired across Harpeth for the purpose of replenishing his ammunition. The enemy held strong position commanding all the fords. I ordered Brigadier-General Buford to remount his command and hold himself in readiness for action at a moment's warning. Brigadier-General Jackson's troops being out of ammunition, and my ordnance still in the rear, Captain Vanderford furnished me with the necessary supply.

At daylight on the 1st of December I moved across Harpeth River and advanced up the Wilson pike, and struck the enemy at Owen's CrossRoads, in strong force. I ordered Captain Morton to open upon him with his battery. Soon afterward I ordered Brigadier-General Buford to charge, which order he executed by dislodging the enemy and capturing several prisoners. I then moved with Jackson's and Buford's divisions to Brentwood, where I was joined by Brigadier-General Chalmers. Ordering Chalmers to proceed with his division up the Franklin and Hillsborough pike, and to cross over and intercept, if possible, the enemy retreating toward Nashville, I moved with Buford's and Jackson's divisions toward the Nashville pike, and, learning the enemy had reached Nashville, I camped for the night.

On the following morning (the 2d) I ordered Brigadier-General Chalmers to move on the left and to guard the Hillsborough and Hardin pikes, while I proceeded to the right with Buford's and Jackson's divisions and took position in sight of the capitol at Nashville. I ordered Brigadier-General Buford to move with his division across to Mill Creek and to form line of battle near the lunatic asylum on the Murfreesborough pike. Jackson's division was ordered into position so as to cover the Nashville and Mill Creek pike. My command being relieved by the infantry I commenced operating upon the railroad, block-houses, and telegraph lines leading from Nashville to Murfreesborough. I ordered Buford's division on the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad for the purpose of destroying stockades and block-houses.

On the 3d of December stockade No. 2 surrendered, with 80 prisoners, 10 men killed, and 20 wounded in the attack by Morton's battery. On the day previous, while assaulting stockade No. 2, a train of cars came from Chattanooga loaded with negro troops. The train was captured, but most of the troops made their escape.

On the 4th I ordered Brigadier-General Buford to attack block-house No. 3, but the demand for surrender was complied with, and the garrison of thirty-two men made prisoners. An assault was also ordered on stockade No. I, on Mill Creek, but the garrison unhesitatingly surrendered. I ordered the destruction of the block-house and two stockades, in which were captured 150 prisoners.

On the morning of the 4th I received orders to move with Buford's and Jackson's divisions to Murfreesborough, and to leave 250 men on the right to picket from the Nashville and Murfreesborough pike to the Cumberland River. Colonel Nixon, of Bell's brigade, was left for this purpose.

On the morning of the 5th I moved, as ordered, toward Murfreesborough. At La Vergne I ordered Brigadier-General Jackson to move on the right of town and invest the fort on the hill, while I moved with Buford's division to block-house No. 4. The usual demand for surrender was sent under flag of truce and a surrender made. The garrison on the hill, consisting of 80 men, 2 pieces of artillery, several wagons, and a considerable supply of stores, also surrendered to Brigadier-General Jackson. A large number of houses, built and occupied by the enemy, were ordered to be burned.

Four miles from La Vergne I formed a junction with Major-General Bate, who had been ordered to report to me with his division for the purpose of operating against Murfreesborough. I ordered Brigadier-General Jackson to send a brigade across to the Wilson [Wilkinson] pike, and moving on both pikes the enemy was driven into his works at Murfreesborough. After ordering General Buford to picket from the Nashville and Murfreesborough to the Lebanon pikes on the left and Jackson to picket on the right to the Salem pike, I encamped for the night.

The infantry arrived on the morning of the 6th, when I immediately ordered it in line of battle and to move upon the enemy's works. After skirmishing for two hours the enemy ceased firing, and showed no disposition to give battle. I ordered a regiment from Brigadier-General Armstrong's brigade, with which I made a careful reconnaissance of the enemy's position and works. On the evening of the 6th I was re-enforced by Sears' and Palmer's brigades of infantry. I ordered Colonel Palmer in position on the right upon a hill, and to fortify during the night.

On the morning of the 7th I discovered from the position occupied by Colonel Palmer the enemy moving out in strong force on the Salem pike, with infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Being fully satisfied that his object was to make battle, I withdrew my forces to the Wilkinson pike, and formed a new line on a more favorable position. The enemy moved boldly forward, driving in my pickets, when the infantry, with the exception of Smith's brigade, from some cause which I cannot explain, made a shameful retreat, losing two pieces of artillery. I seized the colors of the retreating troops and endeavored to rally them but they could not be moved by any entreaty or appeal to their patriotism. Major-General Bate did the same thing, but was equally as unsuccessful as myself. I hurriedly sent Major Strange, of my staff, to Brigadier-Generals Armstrong and Ross, of Jackson's division, with orders to say to them that everything depended on their cavalry. They proved themselves equal to the emergency by charging on the enemy, thereby checking his farther advance. I ordered the infantry to retire to Stewart's Creek, while my cavalry encamped during the night at Overall's Creek. The enemy returning to Murfreesborough, I ordered my cavalry to resume its former position.

It is proper to state here that I ordered Brigadier-General Buford to protect my left flank, but he was so remote the order never reached him. While the fight was going on, however, he made a demonstration on Murfreesborough, and succeeded in reaching the center of town, but was soon compelled to retire.

On the 9th General Hood sent to my support Smith's brigade, commanded by Colonel Olmstead, and ordered Bate's division to report back to his headquarters. On the 11th I ordered Brigadier-General Buford to proceed to the Hermitage, and to picket the Cumberland River, so as to prevent any flank movement in that direction. On the 12th I ordered the infantry to destroy the railroad from La Vergne to Murfreesborough, which was most effectually done. Brigadier-General Jackson, who had been previously ordered to operate south of Murfreesborough, captured, on the 13th, a train of seventeen cars and the Sixty-first Illinois Regiment of Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Grass. The train was loaded with supplies of 60,000 rations, sent from Stevenson to Murfreesborough, all of which were consumed by fire, after which the prisoners, about 200 in number, were sent to the rear.

On the 14th I moved with Colonels Olmstead's and Pahner's brigades across Stone's River and east of Murfreesborough, with a view of capturing the enemy's forage train, but on the evening of the 15th I received notice from General Hood that a general engagement was then going on at Nashville, and to hold myself in readiness to move at any moment. Accordingly, on the 16th I moved my entire command to the Wilkinson Cross-Roads, at the terminus of the Wilkinson pike, six miles from Murfreesborough. On the night of the 16th one of General Hood's staff officers arrived, informing me of the disaster at Nashville and ordering me to fall back via Shelbyville and Pulaski. I immediately dispatched orders to Brigadier-General Buford to fall back from the Cumberland River, via La Vergne, to the Nashville pike, and to protect my rear until I could move my artillery and wagon train. From this position General Buford was ordered across to the Nashville and Columbia pike, for the purpose of protecting the rear of General Hood's retreating army. My sick, wounded, and wagon train being at Triune, I did not retreat via Shelbyville, but moved in the direction of Lillard's Mills, on Duck River. I ordered Brigadier-General Armstrong to the Nashville and Columbia pike. Most of the infantry under my command were barefooted and in a disabled condition, and being encumbered with several hundred head of hogs and cattle, my march along the almost impassable roads was unavoidably slow. On reaching Duck River at Lillard's Mills I ordered everything to be hurried across, as the stream was rapidly rising. After putting over a part of my wagon train the stream became unfordable. I was therefore compelled to change my direction to Columbia, which place I reached on the evening of the 18th.

On the morning of the 19th the enemy was reported at Rutherford's Creek in strong force. I immediately commenced disposing of my troops for the purpose of preventing his crossing. Everything being across Duck River I was ordered by General Hood to withdraw my command at 3 o'clock, which I did, and went into camp at Columbia. Chalmers' division having been sent to the right, I am unable to state anything from personal knowledge as to his operations from the 3d to the 19th; but I learn from his official report that his line extended from the Hillsborough pike, on the right, across the Hardin and Charlotte pikes to the river, on the left; that he captured two transports laden with horses and mules; that the transports were recaptured, but leaving on his hands 56 prisoners and 197 horses and mules; that the enemy made several attempts with his monitors and gun-boats to silence his river batteries, all of which were unsuccessful; that he maintained a strict blockade of the river and his position until Ector's brigade of infantry fell back; that he prevented Hatch from gaining the rear of our army; and that he was constantly and severely engaged every day while protecting the rear of General Hood's army until he crossed Rutherford's Creek.

On the 20th General Hood, on leaving Columbia, gave me orders to hold the town as long as possible, and when compelled to retire to move in the direction of Florence, Ala., via Pulaski, protecting and guarding his rear. To aid me in this object he ordered Major-General Walthall to report to me with about 1,900 infantry, 400 of whom were unserviceable for want of shoes. The enemy appeared in front of Columbia on the evening of the 20th and commenced a furious shelling upon the town. Under a flag of truce I proceeded to the river and asked an interview with General Hatch, who I informed by verbal communication across the river that there were no Confederate troops in town, and that his shelling would only result in injury to the women and children and his own wounded, after which interview the shelling was discontinued.

The enemy succeeded in crossing Duck River on the morning of the 22d. I at once ordered my troops to fall back in the direction of Pulaski. Brigadier-General Chalmers was ordered on the right down the Bigbyville pike toward Bigbyville. The infantry moved down the main pike from Columbia to Pulaski, the rear protected by both Buford's and Jackson's divisions of cavalry, while a few scouts were thrown out on the left flank. The enemy made his first demonstration on my rear pickets near Warfield's, three miles south of Columbia. He opened upon us with artillery, which forced us to retire farther down the road in a gap made by two high hills on each side of the road, where he was held in check for some time. On the night of the 23d I halted my command at and near Lynnville, in order to hold the enemy in check and to prevent any pressure upon my wagon train and the stock then being driven out.

On the morning of the 24th I ordered the infantry back toward Columbia on the main pike and my cavalry on the right and left flanks. After advancing about three miles the enemy was met, where a severe engagement occurred and the enemy was held in check for two hours. I retreated two miles, where I took position at Richland Creek. Briga-dier-General Armstrong was thrown forward in front and General Ross on the right flank. Chalmers and Buford formed a junction, and were ordered on the left flank. Brigadier-General Armstrong was ordered to the support of six pieces of my artillery, which were placed in position immediately on the main pike and on a line with Buford's and Chalmer's divisions and Ross' brigade, of Jackson's division. After severe artillery firing on both sides two pieces of the enemy's artillery were dismounted. The enemy then flanked to the right and left and crossed Richland Creek on my right, with the view of gaining my rear. I immediately ordered Armstrong and Ross, of Jackson's division, to cross the bridge on the main pike and move around and engage the enemy, who were crossing the creek. Both Buford and Chalmers were heavily pressed on the left, and after an engagement of two hours I ordered them to fall back across Richland Creek. I lost 1 killed and 6 wounded in this engagement. The enemy lost heavily. Brigadier-General Buford was wounded in this engagement, and I ordered Brigadier-General Chalmers to assume command of Brigadier-General Buford's division together with his own. I reached Pulaski without further molestation.

On the morning of the 25th, after destroying all the ammunition which could not be removed from Pulaski by General Hood and two trains of cars, I ordered General Jackson to remain in town as long as possible and to destroy the bridge at Richland Creek after everything had passed over. The enemy soon pressed General Jackson, but he held him in check for some time, killing and wounding several before retiring. Seven miles from Pulaski I took position on King's Hill, and awaiting the advance of the enemy, repulsed him, with a loss of 150 killed and wounded, besides capturing many prisoners and one piece of artillery. The enemy made no further demonstrations during the day. I halted my command at Sugar Creek, where it encamped during the night.

On the morning of the 26th the enemy commenced advancing, driving back General Ross' pickets. Owing to the dense fog he could not see the temporary fortifications which the infantry had thrown up and behind which they were secreted. The enemy therefore advanced to within fifty paces of these works, when a volley was opened upon him, causing the wildest confusion. Two mounted regiments of Ross' brigade and Ector's and Granbury's brigades* of infantry were ordered to charge upon the discomfited foe, which was done, producing a complete rout. The enemy was pursued for two miles, but showing no disposition to give battle my troops were ordered back. In this engagement he sustained a loss of about 150 in killed and wounded; many prisoners and horses were captured and about 400 horses killed. I held this position for two hours, but the enemy showing no disposition to renew the attack, and fearing he might attempt a flank movement in the dense fog, I resumed the march, after leaving a picket with orders to remain until 4 o'clock. The enemy made no further attack between Sugar Creek and Tennessee River, which stream I crossed on the evening of the 27th of December. The infantry were ordered  to report back to their respective corps, and I moved with my cavalry to Corinth.

The campaign was full of trial and suffering, but the troops under my command, both cavalry and infantry, submitted to every hardship with an uncomplaining patriotism; with a single exception, they behaved with commendable gallantry.

From the day I left Florence, on the 21st of November, to the 27th of December my cavalry were engaged every day with the enemy. My loss in killed and wounded has been heavy. I brought out of the campaign three pieces of artillery more than I strutted with.

My command captured and destroyed 16 block-houses and stockades, 20 bridges, several hundred horses and mules, 20 yoke of oxen, 4 locomotives, and 100 cars and 10 miles of railroad, while I have turned over to the provost-marshal-general about 1,600 prisoners.

To my division commanders--Brigadier-Generals Chalmers, Buford, and Jackson--I take pleasure in acknowledging the promptitude with which they obeyed and executed all orders. If I have failed to do justice in this report it is because they have not furnished me with a detailed report of the operations of their respective commands.

I am also indebted to Major-General Walthall for much valuable service rendered during the retreat from Columbia. He exhibited the highest soldierly qualities. Many of his men were without shoes, but they bore their sufferings without murmur and were ever ready to meet the enemy.

I am again under obligations to my staff for their efficient aid during the campaign.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

N. B. FORREST,        

Major-General.

Lieut. Col. A. P. MASON, Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,        

Charlotte, N. C., February 25, 1865.

Respectfully forwarded to the War Department for its information. General Forrest and his command deserve well of the country for the gallantry, energy, and activity displayed during this severe campaign in Middle Tennessee.

G. T. BEAUREGARD,        

General.

ADDENDA.

Address of Maj. Gen. N. B. Forrest to his troops.

SOLDIERS: The old campaign is ended, and your commanding general deems this an appropriate occasion to speak of the steadiness, self-denial, and patriotism with which you have borne the hardships of the past year. The marches and labors you have performed during that period will find no parallel in the history of this war.

On the 24th day of December there were 3,000 of you, unorganized and undisciplined, at Jackson, Tenn., only 400 of whom were armed. You were surrounded by 15,000 of the enemy, who were congratulating themselves on your certain capture. You started out with your artillery, wagon trains, and a large number of cattle, which you succeeded in bringing through, since which time you have fought and won the following battles--battles which will enshrine your names in the hearts of your countrymen, and live in history an imperishable monument to your prowess: Jack's Creek, Estenaula, Somerville, Okolona, Union City, Paducah, Fort Pillow, Bolivar, Tishomingo Creek, Harrisburg, Hurricane Creek, Memphis, Athens, Sulphur Springs, Pulaski, Carter's Creek, Columbia, and Johnsonville are the fields upon which you have won fadeless immortality. In the recent campaign in Middle Tennessee you sustained the reputation so nobly won. For twenty-six days, from the time you left Florence, on the 21st of November to the 26th of December you were constantly engaged with the enemy, and endured the hunger, cold, and labor incident to that arduous campaign without murmur. To sum up, in brief, your triumphs during the past year, you have fought fifty battles, killed and captured 16,000 of the enemy, captured 2,000 horses and mules, 67 pieces of artillery, 4 gun-boats, 14 transports, 20 barges, 300 wagons, 50 ambulances, 10,000 stand of small-arms, 40 block-houses, destroyed 36 railroad bridges, 200 miles of railroad, 6 engines, 100 cars, and $15,000,000 worth of property.

In the accomplishment of this great work you were occasionally sustained by other troops, who joined you in the fight, but your regular number never exceeded 5,000, 2,000 of whom have been killed or wounded, while in prisoners you have lost about 200.

If your course has been marked by the graves of patriotic heroes who have fallen by your side, it has, at the same time, been more plainly marked by the blood of the invader. While you sympathize with the friends of the fallen, your sorrows should be appeased by the knowledge that they fell as brave men battling for all that makes life worth living for.

Soldiers! you now rest for a short time from your labors. During the respite prepare for future action. Your commanding general is ready to lead you again to the defense of the common cause, and he appeals to you, by a remembrance of the glories of your past career; your desolated homes; your insulted women and suffering children; and, above all, by the memory of your dead comrades, to yield a ready obedience to discipline, and to buckle on your armor anew for the fight. Bring with you the soldier's safest armor--a determination to fight while the enemy pollutes your soil; to fight as long as he denies your rights; to fight until independence shall have been achieved; to fight for home, children, liberty, and all you hold dear. Show to the world the superhuman and sublime spirit with which a people may be inspired when fighting, for the inestimable boon of liberty. He not allured by the siren song of peace, for there can be no peace save upon your separate independent nationality. You can never again unite with those who have murdered your sons, outraged your helpless families, and with demoniac malice wantonly destroyed your property, and now seek to make slaves of you. A proposition of reunion with a people who have avowed their purpose to appropriate the property and to subjugate or annihilate the freemen of the South would stamp with infamy the names of your gallant dead and the living heroes of this war. Be patient, obedient, and earnest, and the day is not far distant when you can return to your homes and live in the full fruition of free-men around the old family altar.

N. B. FORREST,        

Major-General, Comdg. District of Mississippi and East Louisiana.

_______________

*According to Walthall’s report (p. 727), it was Reynolds’ and Field’s brigade

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 751-60

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 244. — Reports of Lieut. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart, C. S. Army, commanding Army Corps, of operations November 29, 1864-January 20, 1865.

No. 244.

Reports of Lieut. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart, C. S. Army,

commanding Army Corps, of operations November 29, 1864-January 20, 1865.

HDQRS. STEWART'S CORPS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE,        

Near Tupelo, Miss., January 20, 1865.

SIR: The following brief outline of the operations of this corps from September 29, 1864, to the close of the campaign is respectfully submitted. It is necessarily an imperfect report, being made at the request of the commanding general without the aid of the reports of subordinate commanders.¹

On Tuesday, November 29, following Cheatham's corps, we crossed Duck River above Columbia and arrived near sunset at Rutherford's Creek. Crossing it I moved to the right of Cheatham's corps, then in line near the pike from Columbia to Franklin, and about 11 p.m. bivouacked in rear of his right.

The next morning (30th) we moved at daylight, taking the advance, in pursuit of the retreating enemy. About midday we came in sight of his line, formed on a commanding ridge some two miles from Franklin. In compliance with the instructions of the commanding general I moved to the right toward Harpeth River, and formed to attack the enemy, who fell back to an intrenched line around the town. Loring's division was on the right, Walthall's in the center, French's on the left. Ector's brigade, of the last-named division, marched from Florence as guard to the pontoon train, and had not rejoined. Buford's division of cavalry covered the space between Loring's right and the river, while another was thrown across to the other bank. In the meantime Cheatham's corps was also formed for attack, and the two corps were to move forward simultaneously. I had one battery only, the pieces of which were distributed to the three divisions. About 4 p.m. a staff-officer from the commanding general brought me the order to advance, and the word forward was given. A body of the enemy's cavalry in front of Loring and the division on his right was soon routed, and the cavalry division (Buford's) ceased to operate with us. The line moved forward in fine order, the men in high spirits, drove the enemy from his outer line and fiercely assailed the second. The ground over which Loring's division advanced was obstructed by a deep railroad cut and an abatis and hedge of Osage orange. With these exceptions the space in front of the enemy's position on our side was perfectly open and swept by a terrible and destructive cross-fire of artillery from the works and from the opposite bank of the narrow stream—the Harpeth. The men, however, pressed forward again and again, with dauntless courage, to the ditch around the inner line of works, which they failed to carry, but where many of them remained, separated from the enemy only by the parapet, until the Federal Army withdrew.

A return of casualties has heretofore been made, the number reported amounting to something over 2,000 in killed, wounded, and missing. Among them were many of our best officers and bravest men. Brig. Gen. John Adams was killed, his horse being found lying across the inner line of the enemy's works. Brigadier-General Scott was paralyzed by the explosion near him of a shell. Brigadier-Generals Quarles and Cockrell were wounded severely, the former subsequently becoming a prisoner. Major-General Walthall had two horses killed, and was himself severely bruised. Many field and staff and company officers were either killed or severely wounded; they deserve special mention; but not having yet received reports from divisions, brigades, and regiments, it is not in my power to give all their names or to do justice to their heroic conduct.

On Friday, December 2, we moved to the vicinity of Nashville, finally taking a position on the left of the army extending across the Granny White (or middle Franklin) pike to a hill near the Hillsborough pike. This line was intrenched, was just a mile in length, and occupied by Loring's division alone. To protect our left flank works were commenced on four other hills lying along near to and on either side of the Hillsborough pike, the one farthest in rear being some mile and a half distant from the left of the front line. This latter line, to the left of the Hillsborough pike, was prolonged toward Cumberland River by the cavalry, though toward the last of our stay there Ector's brigade, under Colonel Coleman, was placed on picket on the Hardin pike, having Chalmers' cavalry on his right and left.

On the morning of December 15 information was received that the enemy were advancing west of the Hillsborough pike. General Walthall, whose troops were in bivouac, excepting the working parties engaged on the flank redoubts, was directed to place his men under arms and man the redoubts. General French having received leave of absence, his division, which was small, was attached to General Walthall's. Finding the enemy were advancing in force, and that Ector's brigade and the cavalry were forced to retire, all of Walthall's command not required for the redoubts was placed behind the stone fence along the Hillsborough pike between redoubt numbered 3 and 4 on the accompanying map.² This map exhibits the position of Loring's division in the front line of the five hills crowned with unfinished works, and of Walthall's command, including his own and French's divisions. Each redoubt contained a section or battery of artillery and from 100 to 150 infantry. The enemy appeared in force along the entire line, extending around redoubts 1, 2, and 3, and as far as or beyond 4 and 5. My own line was stretched to its utmost tension, but could not reach far enough toward 4 and 5 without leaving the way open to the enemy between Loring's left and Walthall's right. The commanding general, who was notified as soon as practicable of the approach of the enemy, sent me as re-enforcements, first, Manigault's and soon after Deas brigades, of Johnson's division, Lee's corps, and later the two remaining brigades of that division, and I was informed that one or more divisions from Cheatham's corps (the extreme right) had been ordered to the left. As the object of the enemy seemed to be to turn our left flank by carrying the redoubts 4 and 5, Manigault's brigade on coming up was moved in line about parallel to the Hillsborough pike and opposite redoubt 4. Major-General Johnson arriving soon afterward was directed to place Deas' brigade on Manigault's right, so as to connect with Walthall's line. By this time the enemy had carried redoubts 4 and 5, capturing many of the men and all the artillery in them, besides killing and wounding many, and were making for the pike. The two brigades named, making but feeble resistance, fled, and the enemy crossed the pike, passing Walthall's left. Loring's line not being yet pressed, a battery had been ordered from it, which, arriving just at this moment, was placed on a commanding hill, and these same brigades rallied to its support. They again fled, however, on the approach of the enemy, abandoning the battery, which was captured. By this time the other brigades of Johnson's division had come up, but were unable to check the progress of the enemy, who had passed the Hillsborough pike a full half mile, completely turning our flank and gaining the rear of both Walthall and Loring, whose situation was becoming perilous in the extreme. Their positions were maintained to the last possible moment, in the hope that the expected succor would arrive and restore the fight on the left. Deeming it absolutely necessary for them to fall back, orders were dispatched to that effect, when it was found that Walthall had already ordered his line to retire not a moment too soon, and this of itself made it necessary for Loring to withdraw. The latter was directed also to form along the Granny White pike (which would place him nearly at right angles to his former position) to check the anticipated rush of the enemy from his and Walthall's fronts. This was gallantly and successfully done by this fine division, the corps retiring to a position between the Granny White and Franklin pikes, when night put an end to the conflict.

Brigadier-General Sears late in the day lost a leg, and subsequently fell into the enemy's hands. All the artillery in the redoubts, the battery above mentioned, and another on Loring's line, the horses of which were killed or wounded, were captured by the enemy.

In the meantime one or two divisions from Cheatham's corps had come up on the left, where the commanding general was in person, but being separated from that part of the field I am unable to state what occurred. Also Ector's brigade, commanded by Colonel Coleman, in falling back from its position on the Hardin pike, was thrown over on the left and beyond my personal observation. The report of Colonel Coleman is, therefore, referred to for account of its operations, which I have been told were characterized by the usual intrepidity of this small but firm and reliable body of men.³

During the night of the 15th the army was placed in position to receive the attack expected at an early hour next morning. The map shows the position of this corps, it being in the center, Lee's corps on the right, Cheatham's on the left, extending from the hill occupied by Bate's division, Cheatham's corps, along the range of hills on the west side of the Granny White pike. The line of this corps extended from the side of the hill occupied by Bate across the pike, along a stone fence on east side of the pike. In rear of the line and some half mile or more distant a high ridge lies in a general east and west direction, through the gaps of which run the Franklin, Granny White, and other pikes. It was the order of the commanding general that in case of disaster Lee's corps should hold the Franklin pike, this corps retiring by that pike and taking up position at or beyond Brentwood, so as to permit Lee to withdraw, while Cheatham was to move out on the Granny White pike. Instructions accordingly were given to subordinate commanders.

At an early hour in the morning the enemy approached, placing artillery in position and opening a heavy fire, which continued almost incessantly through the day. They confronted us everywhere with a force double or treble our own. Occasional attacks were made on various parts of our lines and repulsed, though their chief efforts seemed to be directed against our flanks for the purpose of gaining the roads in our rear.. Every attack made on the lines occupied by this corps to the last was repulsed with severe loss to the enemy.

In the course of the morning, the commanding general calling on me for a brigade to go to the right flank, Ector's, being in reserve, was dispatched. It was finally sent to the hills in our rear and on the east side of the Granny White pike to drive back the enemy who had passed our left, crossed to the east side of the pike, and held this portion of the ridge. Later in the day Reynolds' (Arkansas) brigade was withdrawn from Walthall's line and sent to the assistance of Ector's. They were strong enough to check the enemy, but not sufficiently so to drive him back and regain the pass by which this pike crosses the ridge, so that retreat was cut off in that direction and greatly endangered even by the Franklin pike, the only route now left open for the whole army. At one time the enemy gained the spurs on the west side of the Granny White pike occupied by Cheatham's men, some of whom, falling back, formed parallel to Bate's line, on the south side of the hill occupied by his division, but a few hundred yards from his line and fronting in the opposite direction.

The situation then, briefly, was this: The left flank completely turned, the enemy crossing to east side of Granny White pike in our rear, and holding the ridge on that side and the pass through which this road runs. The ridge was high and steep, and extended beyond the Franklin pike to the east, and was but a short distance in rear of our line. It seemed as though in case of disaster escape was impossible. There was no reserve force that could be brought up to restore any break that might occur.

About 2 or 3 o'clock in the afternoon the commanding general sent for me, and while in conversation with him an officer of his staff announced that the line had given way. Not being present at the moment this took place, at least where I could witness it, and not yet being in possession of the official reports of subordinate commanders, I do not deem it proper to attempt to decide where the line first yielded. It would seem, however, that when once broken it very soon gave way everywhere, and the whole army made for the Franklin pike. In accordance with the orders of the commanding general, before alluded to, I had dispatched Major Foster, of the engineers, to find a suitable position beyond Brentwood for holding this road.

On reaching Brentwood, however, about dark, I received orders to move on to Franklin, and next morning to move toward Spring Hill and Columbia. Arriving at the latter place on the morning of the 18th, this corps took position on the north bank of Duck River, covering the passage of the entire army, and crossing about daylight of the 20th; so the following week at Tennessee River, Bainbridge, this corps covered the operations, and was the last to cross, which it did on the morning of December 28. At Columbia, a rear guard, composed of several brigades from this and the other corps, was organized and placed under the command of Major-General Walthall. This force, in connection with the cavalry, covered the retreat from Columbia to the Tennessee River.

It is due to the officers and men of this corps that I should bear testimony to their patient endurance of fatigue and privation, their cheerfulness and alacrity in obeying orders, and, above all, their heroic valor as displayed on many occasions since I have had the honor to command them, but pre-eminently at Franklin.

My thanks are due to Major-Generals Loring, Walthall, and French for their cordial co-operation and skillful management of their respective divisions, and to the several members of my staff, who have uniformly shown themselves competent, faithful, and zealous in the discharge of their duties.

I have omitted to state in its proper place that a short time after our advance to the vicinity of Nashville, Cockrell's brigade of Missourians, French's division, was ordered by the commanding general to the mouth of Duck River. It rejoined at Bainbridge, where we recrossed the Tennessee River.

Accompanying this report are maps⁴ of the fields at Franklin and Nashville, as accurate as it is possible to make them.

I deem it proper to say that after the fall of Atlanta the condition of the army and other considerations rendered it necessary, in my judgment, that an offensive campaign should be made in the enemy's rear and on his line of communications. It is not my purpose, nor does it pertain to me, to explain the reasons which prompted the campaign, but simply to express my concurrence in the views which determined the operations of the army.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ALEX. P. STEWART,        

Lieutenant-General.

Col. A. P. MASON,
        Assistant Adjutant-General.

_______________

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,        

Near Smithfield Depot, N. C., April 3, 1865.

SIR: In my report of the operations of my corps during the campaign made by General Hood into Tennessee I omitted the details of what transpired near Spring Hill during the afternoon and night of the 29th of November, 1864. I respectfully submit the following statement, and ask that it be filed as a part of my report:

On the morning of November 29 General Hood moved with Cheatham's corps and mine and Johnson's division, of Lee's corps (the latter reporting to me), Cheatham's corps in advance. We made a forced march to get in rear of the enemy. In the course of the afternoon, about 3 or 4 o'clock, I reached Rutherford's Creek as Cheatham's rear division was crossing. I received orders to halt and form on the south side of the creek, my right to rest on or near the creek, so as to move down the creek if necessary. Subsequently I received an order to send a division across the creek, and finally, between sunset and dark, an order was received to cross the creek, leaving a division on the south side. Johnson's division, being in rear, was designated to remain. Riding in advance of the column, about dusk, I found General Hood some half mile from the creek and about as far west of the road on which we were marching and which led to Spring Hill. The commanding general gave me a young man of the neighborhood as a guide, and told me to move on and place my right across the pike beyond Spring Hill, "your left, he added, "extending down this way." This would have placed my line in rear of Cheatham's, except that my right would have extended beyond his. The guide informed me that at a certain point the road made a sudden turn to the left, going into Spring Hill; that from this bend there used to be a road leading across to the pike, meeting it at the toll-gate some mile and a half beyond Spring Hill, toward Franklin. I told him if he could find it, that was the right road. Arriving at the bend of the road we passed through a large gateway, taking what appeared in the darkness to be an indistinct path. Within a short distance I found General Forrest's headquarters and stopped to ascertain the position of his pickets covering Cheatham's right and of the enemy. He informed me that his scouts reported the enemy leaving the direct pike--leading from Spring Hill to Franklin and Nashville-and taking the one down Carter's Creek. While in conversation with him I was informed that a staff officer from General Hood had come up and halted the column. It turned out to be a staff (engineer) officer of General Cheatham's, who informed me that General Hood had sent him to place me in position. It striking me as strange the commanding general should send an officer not of his own staff on this errand, or indeed any one, as he had given directions to me in person, I inquired of the officer if he had seen General Hood since I had. He replied that he had just come from General Hood, and that the reason why he was sent was that I was to go into position on General Brown's right (the right of Cheatham's corps), and he and General Brown had been over the ground by daylight. Thinking it possible the commanding general had changed his mind as to what he wished me to do, I concluded it was proper to be governed by the directions of this staff officer, and therefore returned to the road and moved on toward Spring Hill. Arriving near the line of Brown's division, General Brown explained his position, which was oblique to the pike, his right being farther from it than his left. It was evident that if my command were marched up and formed on his right, it being now a late hour, it would require all night to accomplish it, and the line, instead of extending across the pike, would bear away from it. Feeling satisfied there was a mistake, I directed the troops to be bivouacked, while I rode back to find the commanding general to explain my situation and get further instructions. On arriving at his quarters I inquired of him if he had sent this officer of General Cheatham's staff to place me in position. He replied that he had. I next inquired if he had changed his mind as to what he wished me to do. He replied that he had not, "But," said he, "the fact is, General Cheatham has been here and represented that there ought to be somebody an Brown's right." I explained to him that in the uncertainty I was in I had directed the troops, who had been marching rapidly since daylight, and it was now 11 p.m., to be placed in bivouac, and had come to report. He remarked, in substance, that it was not material; to let the men rest; and directed me to move before daylight in the morning, taking the advance toward Franklin. Subsequently General Hood made to me the statement:

I wish you and your people to understand that I attach no blame to you for the failure at Spring Hill; on the contrary, I know if I had had you there the attack would have been made.

Very respectfully, general, your obedient servant,

ALEX. P. STEWART,        

Lieutenant-General.

General S. COOPER,
        Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va.

_______________

ADDENDA.

CHESTER, S.C., April 9, 1865.

MY DEAR GENERAL: Before leaving for Texas I desire to say that I am sorry to know that some of your friends thought that I intended some slight reflection on your conduct at Spring Hill. You did all that I could say or claim that I would have done under similar circumstances myself. The great opportunity passed with daylight. Since I have been informed that your friends felt that my report led to uncertainty as to yourself and troops, I regret that I did not make myself more clear in my report by going more into detail about the staff officer of General Cheatham. I only regret, general, that I did not have you with your corps in front on that day. I feel, and have felt, that Tennessee to-day would have been in our possession.

*          *          *          *          *          *          *

Your friend,

J. B. HOOD.

_______________

¹ For portion of report here omitted see Vol.XXXIX, Part 1, p. 812.

² Plate LXXII, Map 2 of the Atlas.

³ Coleman’s Report not found.

⁴ See Plate LXXIII, Maps three and 2 of the Atlas.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 707-13

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 243. — Report of Brig. Gen. James T. Holtzclaw, C. S. Army, commanding brigade, of operations November 20-December 27, 1864.

No. 243.

Report of Brig. Gen. James T. Holtzclaw, C. S. Army,

commanding brigade, of operations November 20-December 27, 1864.

HEADQUARTERS HOLTZCLAW'S BRIGADE,        

Near Tupelo, Miss., January 12, 1865.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my brigade north of the Tennessee River:

The brigade left Florence with the division on the 20th of November, and arrived in front of Columbia on the morning of the 27th; went into position and skirmished with the enemy late in the afternoon, but without any result. On the 29th, the enemy having withdrawn from the town, I crossed Duck River at 10 o'clock at night and formed on the brigade of General Pettus, which had effected a lodgment during the day. I had worked the remainder of the night intrenching within 100 yards of the enemy's skirmish line. At 4 a.m. the enemy withdrew, closely pursued by my skirmish line, under Major H. I. Thornton, who succeeded in capturing about forty prisoners from their rear guard. At daylight I moved forward with the division in pursuit of the enemy, believing and hoping that he would be forced to a general engagement while en route to Franklin. My command, notwithstanding it had worked all night without a moment for repose, moved forward with great alacrity and marched the twenty-four miles to Franklin by 4.30 p.m., not a straggler falling from the ranks. At sundown I moved forward with the remainder of the division to support a line of General Cheatham's corps then hotly engaged with the enemy, intrenched around the town of Franklin, halting just beyond musket range. I remained in line until 4 a.m., when I moved into the town of Franklin, where I remained till 1 p.m. guarding stores and prisoners, moving at that hour with the command en route for Nashville. I arrived in front of the enemy on the 1st of December, my brigade in advance of the army. Driving in the skirmish line of the enemy, I established myself in position, which the next day became the line for the corps. The next twelve days were spent in intrenching and strengthening the position, which was made impregnable. I organized an efficient corps of shoemakers, finding no difficulty in procuring leather in the surrounding country—would have soon been able to supply all the wants of my command in this respect.

On the 12th of December the skirmish line in my front, without difficulty, drove in the enemy's line to their main works and established our line half a mile in advance. My loss was one man in this affair.

On the morning of the 15th of December the unusual activity of the enemy had the whole command under arms, demonstrating on the extreme right. He attacked late in the day in force on the left. The line gradually contracting to repel the attack, my line became extended three-quarters of a mile. About sundown I closed my line on its extreme left to repel a threatened attack of the enemy. He, however, made no advance, contenting himself with a spirited shelling, mostly under the protection of works. My command sustained no loss. At night the army dropped back to a new line one mile. I brought up the rear and gained my new position at 2 a.m., which was right across the Franklin pike, the road being my center, my left behind a stone wall. I commenced work immediately, and continued until the opening of the enemy's batteries at 7 a.m. obliged me to desist. He soon advanced in force all along my front. At 10 o'clock [he] made a desperate charge, but was driven back, with loss. He then commenced a most furious shelling from three six-gun batteries, concentrating his fire mainly upon my right. One battery of unusually heavy guns was brought down the pike to within 600 yards of my line. The conformation of the ground prevented me sharpshooting it sufficiently to drive it away. At 12 m. the enemy made a most determined charge on my right. Placing a negro brigade in front they gallantly dashed up to the abatis, forty feet in front, and were killed by hundreds. Pressed on by their white brethren in the rear they continued to come up in masses to the abatis, but they came only to die. I have seen most of the battle-fields of the West, but never saw dead men thicker than in front of my two right regiments; the great masses and disorder of the enemy enabling the left to rake them in flank, while the right, with a coolness unexampled, scarcely threw away a shot at their front. The enemy at last broke and fled in wild disorder. With great difficulty I prevented my line from pursuing; with a supporting line I should certainly have done so; but covering the pike, which would be our only line of retreat in case of disaster, I did not feel justified in hazarding the position for what might only have been a temporary success. A color-bearer of the negro brigade brought his standard to within a few feet of my line. He was shot down, and Lieutenant Knox, of the Thirty-sixth Alabama Regiment, sprang over the shattered works and brought it in. Another flag was carried off by an officer after five different bearers had fallen in the vain effort to plant it in my works. At 2 p.m. the enemy attempted a second charge, less determined than the first. Their brave officers could neither lead nor drive their men to such certain death; I noticed as many as three mounted who fell far in advance of their commands urging them forward. The shelling of the enemy's batteries between 12 and 3 p.m. was the most furious I ever witnessed, while the range was so precise that scarce a shell failed to explode in the line. The enemy seemed now to be satisfied that he could not carry my position, and contented himself by shelling and sharpshooting everything in sight. About 4 p.m. I saw the left suddenly give way three or four brigades distant from me. Almost instantaneously the line crumbled away till it reached me. I had no time to give any order or make any disposition to check the disaster, when my command showed symptoms of taking care of themselves. I could only order them back, hoping to reform in a new position. I had to retire under a destructive fire of eighteen guns, 600 yards distant, sweeping almost an open plain. I could not maintain order. The parallel stone walls on the pike separated my command in the center. I had neither staff officer nor courier mounted with me, and used my best endeavors to get my command all on the same side of the pike. I succeeded in doing this about one mile from the field, getting the greater body of the brigade together. I was directed by the major-general commanding to take position as rear guard of the army across the pike. Shortly after dark I moved slowly back, driving up and hurrying stragglers forward. At 11 p.m. I halted four miles from Hollow Tree Gap, remaining until 3 a.m. [17th], when I moved inside of the gap and halted in rear of Pettus' brigade. At daylight our cavalry stampeded, ran through the gap, and formed a mile in the rear. I sent, by direction of the major-general, a regiment up the hollow to the left of the gap. The enemy passing to the right induced the withdrawal of the brigades from the gap. I was unable to communicate with a portion of the regiment sent out, the enemy dashing in in force between us. I moved in rear of the brigade in line of battle to within one mile of Franklin, where I passed the brigade of General Gibson, drawn up to support a section of artillery. I hurried across the river and formed on the southern bank, in Franklin. By the time I had formed, the enemy's cavalry pursued Buford's cavalry division, driving it in confusion into the river. They were repulsed by Pettus' brigade, in the works north of the river, and the section of Bledsoe's battery, in my line on the south, not getting in musket-range of my command. The portion of the regiment I had detached in the morning and could not communicate with passed around the hills to the left of the pike, running five miles to get there. They came into the pike just at the position taken by General Gibson, exhausted with running around the enemy's cavalry. Without notice to myself or authority from the major-general, Brigadier-General Gibson ordered this detachment of about seventy-five men to remain and cover the battery. Then withdrawing with the battery he withdrew his brigade, while my small detachment, in obedience to his orders, held the position, covered the retreat of himself and the section. As a matter of course they were overwhelmed by the enemy's cavalry, 2,000 or 3,000 of whom had surrounded them, three officers and five men only escaping. I went into line next just outside of the trenches of Franklin. The enemy's cavalry dashed up to within 300 yards of my line, firing carbines and pistols. Three or four volleys drove them back. I then marched back in line, halting every few hundred yards until I passed through the gap south of Franklin. Moving on with the division I was ordered into line about six miles from Franklin just before dark. Just after I had formed another of the many cavalry stampedes from Chalmers' division occurred. In trying to get them out of my line and formed on the left I received a severe contusion on the ankle, so painful as to prevent my doing anything for several hours. I retired to seek medical aid, a fight with the enemy's cavalry occurring shortly after. My brigade acted under orders of the major-general. I need not, therefore, speak of its operations in that affair.

I joined my command at Columbia the next day. The corps of General Cheatham bringing up the rear, I with it marched to the Tennessee River, which we reached on the 25th of December, and fortified and crossed on the morning of the 27th.

I will say nothing of the hardships and exposures borne by my command; they but bore their part of the general burden; yet that part they bore with cheerfulness and spirit, and repulsed the enemy, with loss, whenever they encountered him on the soil of Tennessee.

My officers and men conducted themselves to my entire satisfaction throughout all the fights and marches.

To my division and corps commanders I return my sincere thanks. In every emergency of the campaign I have found them at hand ready to advise and assist me.

I offer no excuse for not bringing off Stanford's battery on the right of my line. It was so badly crippled as to be immovable, scarce a whole wheel remaining in its carriages, sustaining, without works, a fire from eighteen of the enemy's guns for seven hours.

Many daring achievements were performed by both officers and men of my command during our stay, which I will hereafter notice in application for them to the department and to army headquarters.

To the efficient commissary of my brigade, Maj. J. W. Williams, I am indebted for the faithful and prompt discharge of his duties. My quartermaster, W. B. Hoyt, by his vigilance and activity, succeeded in bringing every mule and wagon of my command south of the Tennessee River. He also accumulated and brought out in his train a wagonload of leather and a fine supply of shoemakers' tools.

My loss while north of the Tennessee River was as follows: 1 officer and 8 men killed, 1 officer and 27 men wounded, and 13 officers and 149 men missing; total, officers, 15; men, 184; grand total, 199. A good many of the missing, I am satisfied, were killed and wounded in coming out of the trenches, while some made their way across the Tennessee River at different points and have not yet found their commands.

I am, captain, your obedient servant,

J. T. HOLTZCLAW,        

Brigadier-General.

Capt. J. M. MACON,
        Assistant Adjutant-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 704-7

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 208 — Reports of Maj. Gen. Lovell H. Rousseau, U. S. Army, commanding District of Tennessee, of operations December 4-12, 1864.

No. 208

Reports of Maj. Gen. Lovell H. Rousseau, U. S. Army, commanding District of Tennessee,

of operations December 4-12, 1864.

MURFREESBOROUGH, TENN., December 8, 1864—12 m.

GENERAL: I beg leave to report that everything is in first-rate condition here. The railroad south of this is believed to be uninjured, as well as the railroad between this and Overall's Creek, five miles north. From a point half a mile beyond that creek the railroad is believed to be destroyed north beyond La Vergne. The block-houses Nos. 5 and 6 were abandoned, and the garrisons arrived safely here. These garrisons received orders from Captain Hake, at La Vergne (who said he acted under the orders of General Thomas),to abandon the block-houses. They did so, with the enemy all around them, and, much to my surprise and their own, reached here without loss, coming though the country. On Sunday [4th] last the block-house at Overall's Creek was attacked by General Bate's division with a battery of artillery, and seventy-four shots fired at it, doing it no damage. In the afternoon a force of three regiments of infantry, four companies of the Thirteenth Indiana Cavalry, Colonel Johnson, with a section of artillery, went out from here, under General Milroy. The force of the enemy was unknown to me. This force attacked and routed the enemy, showing great spirit and courage. Our loss in the affair was 4 killed and 49 wounded. The loss of the enemy was unknown, for although we took possession of the field night closed in at the end of the fight, and I ordered our forces to return at once to the fortress, which they did. Colonel Johnson, Thirteenth Indiana Cavalry, with four companies of his regiment, being cut off from Nashville by the enemy, joined me here and has rendered very efficient service. On Monday [5th] the enemy were re-enforced by two brigades of infantry and 2,500 of Forrest's cavalry, under Forrest in person. On Monday evening and during Tuesday and Wednesday [7th] the enemy demonstrated against the fortress at all points as well as against the town. They were very impudent and skirmished heavily with us, especially on the Nashville pike, coming up to within a mile of the fortress. On Wednesday the enemy's infantry had moved around on the Wilkinson pike, about one mile and a quarter northwest of the fortress. The major-general commanding will not have forgotten the very spot, being near where Negley's command was formed at the battle of Stone's River, a little farther south. Not knowing where the main body of the enemy was, I sent General Milroy, with seven regiments and a battery, on the Salem pike, with directions to swing around to right, returning parallel to the works along the line of the woods west and northwest of the fortifications. The enemy was encountered on the Wilkinson pike behind breast-works made of logs and rails, and infantry and cavalry utterly routed and driven off in great confusion, Forrest's cavalry making the finest time, to the right, across and down the Nashville road, I have seen in many a day.

Our loss was about 30 killed and 175 wounded. The loss of the enemy unknown, though it largely exceeded ours. Immediately after the fight I ordered our forces to return to the fortress. In this fight we captured 207 prisoners, including 18 commissioned officers. We captured also 2 guns of the enemy (12-pounder Napoleons), and have them now in position on the fortress.

Just before General Milroy fell upon the enemy Buford's division of cavalry attacked Murfreesborough and entered the town, shelling it fiercely, knocking the houses to pieces. With a regiment of infantry and a section of artillery I drove the enemy out of the town, and I have not heard any more of them in any direction since. All is perfectly quiet here to-day, which doubtless results from the fact that the enemy was badly whipped. In these fights the troops have behaved with exceeding courage and I am glad to say that the new troops have not been at all behind the old in the exhibition of steadiness and courage.

I heard from General Granger on Monday last by telegram and he was all right at Stevenson, having had great difficulty from high water in reaching there, going but eight miles a day for three days. The wires in that direction were cut at 4 p.m. on that day, and I have not heard from him since.

Perhaps you have not heard of the enemy's loss of generals at the battle of Franklin; I have it definitely from prisoners; it is this: Killed, Major-General Cleburne, Brigadier-General Gist, Brigadier-General Strahl, Brigadier-General Adams, Brigadier-General Carter, Brigadier-General Granbury, and three others wounded. It is reported by citizens here that Bate was killed on yesterday, and I think the report very probably true.

I shall ask leave to make a more detailed report, calling attention, amongst other matters, to the deportment of individual officers and men.

I am, general, very respectfully, &c.,

LOVELL H. ROUSSEAU,        

Major-General.

Brig. Gen. W. D. WHIPPLE,
        Chief of Staff.

_______________

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE,        

Murfreesborough, December 12, 1864.

Dispatches from General Thomas of the 5th and 8th instant received last night. Railroad train to Stevenson for supplies will take this dispatch to be forwarded. Wires down between this and Stevenson. On the 8th instant I dispatched by courier by way of Gallatin reporting operations here on the 4th instant. The enemy attacked the block-house at Overall's Creek, fired seventy-four shots, doing no damage. I sent three regiments, under General Milroy, to its relief. The enemy (Bate's division) were routed and driven off. We took some prisoners, near thirty, but no guns. Loss of the enemy unknown, as night closed in before the fight was over. Our troops, new and old, behaved admirably. We withdrew at night. The next evening Bate returned, skirmished with amid drove in our pickets, and threatened the fortress; pretty heavy skirmishing till the 7th, when the enemy moved around on the Wilkinson pike, northwest of the fortress. He was re-enforced by Forrest with 2,500 cavalry and two divisions of infantry. On the evening of the 6th he made a breast-work of logs and rails on Wilkinson's pike, from which he was driven on the 7th by General Milroy with seven regiments of the garrison here; a pretty severe engagement, lasting perhaps three-quarters of an hour. The rout was complete, infantry and cavalry running in every direction. The fight was well conducted by Major-General Milroy, and the troops behaved most gallantly. We took 207 prisoners, including 18 commissioned officers, 2 pieces (12-pounder Napoleons) of artillery, which were at once placed in position in the fortifications, and 1 stand of colors belonging to the First and Third Florida. Our loss in the fight at Overall's Creek was 5 killed and 49 wounded, and on Wilkinson's pike about 175 killed and wounded, 1 missing. I reported these facts a little more fully in my dispatch of the 8th, which may not have reached you. I am subsisting off the country, which I think I can do. Before the fight on the Wilkinson pike, Buford's division of cavalry took possession of about one-half of the town of Murfreesborough, shelling it vigorously and destroying many of the houses. With a section of artillery and a small force of infantry, I drove them, wounding and killing 30 and taking 25 prisoners. A captain of artillery left his boots, letters, sponges, staff buckets, on the ground. We lost one man wounded. The enemy's cavalry all around, but I think in small bodies. We forage without molestation. No enemy near here that! know of. Cheatham reported coming this way through Triune. All right here, and will endeavor to keep it so.

LOVELL H. ROUSSEAU,        

Major-General.

Brig. Gen. W. D. WHIPPLE,
        Chief of Staff.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 612-5

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 197. — Report of Col. Datus E. Coon, Second Iowa Cavalry, commanding Second Brigade, of operations September 30, 1864-January 15, 1865

No. 197.

Report of Col. Datus E. Coon, Second Iowa Cavalry,

commanding Second Brigade, of operations September 30, 1864-January 15, 1865.

HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., FIFTH DIV., CAVALRY CORPS,                

MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,        

Gravelly Springs, Ala., January 20, 1865.

MAJOR: In compliance with circular from division headquarters, I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my command from the 30th day of September, 1864, to the 15th day of January, 1865:

September 30, my brigade (Second Brigade, First Division, Cavalry Corps, District of West Tennessee), consisting of the Sixth Illinois Cavalry, Maj. Charles W. Whitsit, the Ninth Illinois Cavalry, Capt. William C. Blackburn, the Second Iowa Cavalry, Maj. Charles C. Horton commanding, and Company K, First Illinois Light Artillery, Capt. I. W. Curtis commanding, was engaged during the morning in making preparations for a ten days' scout. At 12 m. the column was in motion on the Germantown road. The rain fell in torrents for two hours. When within one mile of Germantown turned north and crossed the Wolf River at Patten's plantation; the crossing was upon a poorly constructed bridge, which delayed my wagons and artillery until after dark, and caused much trouble in passing through the heavily timbered bottom on the opposite side. The command was in bivouac by 11.30 p.m., seven miles north of Germantown. October 1, left camp at daylight, marching in rear of First Brigade; passed Macon at 12 m., and took Somerville road; camped three miles from the former place. October 2, moved at 4 a.m.; reached Somerville at 7 a.m., and took Bolivar road; arrived at that place at 4 p.m. I immediately made a heavy detail from Second Iowa Cavalry to finish a bridge across the Hatchie, which the Seventh Illinois Cavalry had been sent in advance to construct. At 8 p.m. the bridge was completed and the whole command over and in camp. October 3, moved out of Hatchie Bottom at daylight, taking Mount Pinson road; crossed the Forked Deer River at sunset, and camped one mile north of the river at 8 p.m. and near the above-named town; heavy rain all night. October 4, left bivouac at 3 a.m., and reached Mifflin, Henderson County, and fed horses while the men made coffee. At 10 a.m. moved on, taking the road leading down the valley of Beech River, leaving Lexington to our left and north some eight miles. Camped at Jones' plantation, three miles from Scott's hill. Rained very hard all day. October 5, moved at daylight, passing Scott's Hill and taking Decaturville road, at which place we arrived at 2 p.m.; halted an hour to feed; at sunset reached the Tennessee River, opposite Clifton, where we found the fleet, under command of Maj. Gen. C. C. Washburn. October 6, steps were taken early for crossing by means of transports. At 2 p.m. all were across; and in accordance with orders from your headquarters moved out on the Nashville pike ten miles, and camped for the night. October 7, marched all day on Nashville pike; passed Waynesborough, county seat of Wayne County, and at 10 p.m. camped for the night on the Nashville pike, within seven miles of Lawrenceburg. October 8, resumed the march at 3 a.m. and owing to the extreme darkness of the morning were misled and marched some five miles out of our way; halted at 9 a.m. for breakfast and to feed; reached Lawrenceburg, the county seat of Lawrence County, at 1.30 p.m. After a short halt moved out on military road leading to Florence, Ala.; when three miles out took the road leading down the valley of Shoal Creek and camped ten miles from Lawrenceburg. October 9, left this encampment at daylight, returning to the military road, and moved in the direction of Florence until we reached Bough's Mills, where I received orders to encamp for the night. At this point we learned that Forrest had crossed the Tennessee River and escaped unharmed. October 10, at 4 a.m., were again in motion toward Florence; on arriving at Wilson's Cross-Roads received orders to move toward Waterloo; passing to the north of Florence some six miles reached Waterloo at 4 p.m., and camped for the night. October 11, remained in bivouac until 4 o'clock, when we moved down the river some ten miles, with the hope of finding the gun-boats and fleet and of procuring rations for the men. To make this more certain Maj. C. C. Horton, Second Iowa Cavalry, had been sent in advance, with his regiment, to the fleet with dispatches; unfortunately, however, the fleet had dropped down the river a few hours previous to their arrival, opposite Eastport, Miss. October 12, reveille at 4.30 a.m. My brigade was on the road for Savannah at daylight. The brigade was snugly encamped one mile below Savannah at 2 p.m. October 13, still in bivouac. There being no visible means of procuring rations for my men, who had now been subsisting on the country at a poor rate some three days, I made application for and obtained permission to gather up corn and wheat and take it to a mill five miles distant, where I supplied my command scantily for the next four days. October 14, 15, and 16, during this time each day was industriously spent at the mill by parties grinding meal into flour, while others rode the country to procure salt, bacon, &c., to make it palatable. In great anxiety we waited for the boats till the evening of the 16th, when orders came to move in the morning. October 17, at 7 a.m. moved on the Waynesborough road a distance of some ten miles, when we turned toward Clifton, at which place we arrived at sunset, having marched some thirty miles over an extremely rough road. October 18, on arriving at Clifton found no boat, went the grand rounds on a large scale (some 150 miles), and returned to the starting point very hungry, ragged, and tired. During the afternoon, while unwelcome feelings were causing us to cast about for some means of subsistence, the steamer Duke hove in sight to the great satisfaction of the whole command. Our fine hopes were soon blasted, for we learned that it had only short rations of hard bread and meat; these were equally distributed among the different regiments, the balance to be gathered from the country during the absence of the steamer to Johnson's Landing. From the 18th to the 27th of the month the officers and men were industriously employed in shoeing horses and making necessary preparations for an active campaign. Owing to the scarcity of blacksmiths and blacksmith tools, I sent to the country and pressed sufficient to supply the deficiency in part only. Many of the horses were shod by the use of the common pocket-knife and hatchet; the horses, however, improved, as the forage obtained from the country was abundant. October 28, received orders to be ready to move to-morrow. October 29, left Clifton at 3 p.m., taking the Nashville pike, and camped three miles out. October 30, at 9 a.m. the general commanding came up with the First Brigade, which passed through my camp in the advance, when all moved along to Lincoln Creek, twenty-four miles, and camped for the night. October 31, resumed the march at 7 a.m., reached Lawrence-burg at 3.15 p.m., and camped one mile beyond.

November 1, left bivouac at 6 a.m. and reached Pulaski, eighteen miles distant, at 3 p.m., and camped for the night. November 2, 3, and 4, during these three days the time was occupied in procuring clothing and rations for the men, while shoes were being fitted on the horses, and preparations made for a heavy campaign. November 5, at 8 a.m. were again in motion on the Lamb's Ferry road, which leads to a ferry by that name on the Tennessee River. Camped for the night on Sugar Creek. Heavy cannonading was heard in the direction of the Tennessee River during the afternoon, which gave undoubted evidence of Hood's advance into Tennessee.

November 6, leaving bivouac before daylight enabled us to reach Lexington, Ala., before 11 a.m., where we halted for an hour to learn the whereabouts and movements of the enemy. Getting no satisfactory information, moved on to Bough's Ford, on Shoal Creek, the Second Iowa Cavalry in advance. On arriving within two miles of the ford the advance met the enemy's pickets, driving them across the creek rapidly, when the whole command came in full view of a heavy line extending along the bluffs on the opposite side. By direction of the general commanding I detached a portion of the Second Iowa to burn the flouring mill above the factory. Lieut. George W. Budd, commanding Company G, was sent for that purpose. After a lively skirmish of nearly an hour it was ascertained that the mill was on the opposite side of the stream, and that the water was too high to admit of crossing, mounted or dismounted, besides the enemy was some 300 strong, and a large number posted in and about the mill, rendering the position almost impregnable, to say nothing of the difficulty of crossing the stream. These facts being reported to me I conveyed the same to the general commanding, who directed that I withdraw all my brigade except the Second Iowa Cavalry, which should hold its position until further orders. At 9 p.m. all were in camp in a most unpleasant rainstorm. November 7, at daylight found ourselves with mud and water under foot and a drenching rain still falling. By direction from division headquarters, I took my command back five miles for feed. At I p.m. I made a demonstration on the enemy's pickets with my whole brigade, Ninth Illinois Cavalry, Capt. William C. Blackburn commanding, in advance. A persistent and heavy skirmish took place, when the enemy was driven from the bluff on the opposite side. The regiment reached the ford, but the stream was too much swollen to admit of crossing, the water carrying horse and rider down the stream. During an hour spent in skirmishing and an unfruitful effort to cross and destroy the mill, it was ascertained beyond doubt that the enemy had reenfored the picket heavily, and that Shoal Creek was much higher than on any day previous. I withdrew, fell back to Stutt's Cross-Roads, and camped for the night.

November 8, remained in bivouac during the forenoon, giving opportunity to the Second Iowa Cavalry to vote for Lincoln, which was done almost unanimously. At 2 p.m. moved to Bough's Ford, where I arrived at 5 p.m. in a heavy rain-storm. Detachments were immediately sent to reconnoiter the ford on the main road, also the one below, while a company was sent to the mill above. All reported, as on the three days previous, that the stream could not be forded. An effort was then made to construct a raft to cross at the mill, which failed for the want of material. During a skirmish of an hour the rain fell in torrents, and soon night came on, closing all operations for the day, when I withdrew to a point near the bivouac of the previous night. Sent Maj. C. P. Moore, Second Iowa Cavalry, with detachment of 100 men, to the rear of the enemy on the Tennessee River, with instructions to strike the river ten miles below Florence. Rained steadily all day.

November 9, during the night received orders from General Hatch to make another demonstration on the enemy at Bough's Ford. Moved out promptly at 7.30 a.m.; reached the ford at 9 a.m.; roads nearly impassable from mud and water; found, as usual, the enemy's pickets heavy and well posted on the opposite side. The stream still too high to admit of fording from either side, withdrew at 12 m., and camped at Watkins' house. Rained during the afternoon, but cleared away at sunset. Major Moore, Second Iowa, returned with his command safe, having passed around in rear of the enemy's lines, a distance of forty miles, and striking the Tennessee River ten miles distant below Florence, making a distance in going and returning of eighty miles' travel in twenty-four hours. The object of the expedition was to bring in seven men of General Croxton's command, who had been three day's previously sent down the river from Bainbridge to destroy the enemy's pontoons at Florence. If the object of the expedition had not been accomplished, they were to complete the work of destruction and meet this party below, but after diligent search and careful inquiry the major returned. November 10, remained in camp all day, the first pleasant day since leaving Pulaski. Owing to the extremely inclement weather, bad roads, &c., my command was again entirely destitute of rations. Two mills were taken possession of, and a regular system of foraging off the country was adopted, which, with the most careful management, could but poorly supply the men. Received orders during the afternoon to be ready at 9 a.m. of the 11th to make another demonstration on the enemy's picket, in conjunction with the entire command. November 11, reached the ford and opened upon the enemy's picket at the precise moment designated. The Sixth Illinois Cavalry, Maj. Charles W. Whitsit commanding, having the advance, were deployed as skirmishers, dismounted, forming a line from the main road up the stream to the mill, while a section of artillery was put in position on the military road. The skirmishers soon drove back the advance picket, while the artillery caused their reserve, at first in plain view, to scatter to their rear. A company of mounted men were in the meantime to try the ford on the main road and ascertain its condition for crossing. After a thorough trial it was found to be too deep even for mounted men. The Second Iowa Cavalry, Maj. C. C. Horton commanding, succeeded in finding a ford near a quarter of a mile below the main crossing, where I ordered him to commence crossing as rapidly as possible. This order was obeyed in a most gallant manner by Company G of that regiment, with Lieut. George W. Budd commanding the advance. The First Battalion, Maj. Gustavus Schnitzer commanding, was soon over and engaging the enemy in a lively skirmish, when Major Horton reported the ford impracticable for the passage of more troops, from the quicksand and miry soil on the opposite shore, and that it was impossible to cross the artillery in any event. I ordered him to dismount the remainder of his regiment, place them in line along the shores, and recall Major Schnitzer. While the First Battalion was crossing and recrossing the stream the enemy kept up a heavy fire from a barricade some 300 yards distant, on a high bluff. Another effort had been made in the meantime to cross at the mill, which had been unsuccessful on account of high water. The Ninth Illinois Cavalry, Captain Blackburn commanding, which had been sent, on leaving camp, to make a flank movement to the right of this position, by crossing Shoal Creek above the pond and mill and moving down on the opposite and west side of the stream, now appeared in sight, frightening the enemy's pickets to such an extent that they fell back so far as to allow this regiment to cross the stream in safety by swimming their horses, with the exception of Company A, Lieut. David Hilier commanding, who, by a misunderstanding of orders, took the back track until severely pressed by a brigade of the enemy's cavalry, when he coolly took to the timber and hills, evading their main force, and after much difficulty succeeded in recrossing Shoal Creek, reporting with all his men in camp at dark. The cool, undisturbed manner of this officer in relieving himself from the snare of the enemy is at least highly creditable. At 1 p.m. withdrew my command and went into camp again at Watkins' house.

November 12, remained in camp all day. Issued a very light ration of meal ground at the mill. November 13, remained in camp during the day; received orders during the evening to proceed immediately to blockade all roads leading into the military road. November 14, the detail to fell trees reported all roads effectually blockaded in compliance with orders. November 15, at 4 a.m., moved out on military road toward Lawrenceburg, and camped at Wilcoxson's plantation, five miles distant. November 16, left the military road at 8 a.m., passed down the valley of Wolf Creek, and crossed Shoal Creek at Wolf Ford; moved from the opposite side to Aberdeen, thence to Big Butler, and down to Little Butler, from which place moved directly south toward Wilson's Cross-Roads. After passing a mile, the advance, the Second Iowa Cavalry, found the enemy's pickets and dashed at them furiously, and ran them into their reserve pell-mell which created a stampede of the whole command, composed of General Roddey's brigade, which, in turn, ran back to their infantry camps in great confusion. Through the gallant conduct of Lieutenant Griffith, of Company D of the above-named regiment, we captured several prisoners, who informed us of many important facts touching the movements of the enemy. After having forced Roddey within the infantry lines, I became satisfied that the enemy were continually receiving re-enforcements, and that Forrest had recently joined Hood (on the 14th), and that the location about the two Butler Creeks was not the most safe for the camp of a cavalry command I therefore took the responsibility of recrossing Shoal Creek at the Savannah Ford, and went into camp at Hains' plantation, three miles from Cowpen Mills. November 17, moved camp to Cowpen Mills and sent patrols three miles across Shoal Creek. Found the enemy in force. November 18, made reconnaissance across Shoal Creek with the entire brigade three miles to Butler Creek and Florence road, and sent the Second Iowa Cavalry as patrols to the Florence and Waynesborough road four miles distant, returned to Cowpen Mills and camped.

November 19, in compliance with orders from division commander, moved my brigade across Shoal Creek at Cowpen Ford, for the purpose of camping on Butler Creek. On reaching the Butler Creek road, three miles west, drove in the enemy's picket, and sent Capt. A. E. Mock, of Ninth Illinois Cavalry, commanding battalion, to patrol the Waynesborough road. The main column turned north to Butlers Creek, while Capt. J. W. Harper, with the remainder of his regiment (the Ninth Illinois Cavalry), stood picket on the road running south toward Florence. I remained with my escort at the cross-roads to see the train safely closed up for three-quarters of an hour, when I was informed by an orderly that the Second Iowa had met the enemy in heavy force, and that Buford's division was in their front, on Big Butler Creek. At about this moment Captain Harper reported the enemy pressing his picket from the south, and that they had the appearance of being infantry. Leaving an orderly to close the column I sent another to inform Captain Harper that he must hold his position at all hazards until the pack train and artillery had passed, as it was impossible, from the bad condition of the road, to halt or return by the same route. I then rode rapidly to the Second Iowa, and found them engaged with superior force. I immediately sent the train and artillery down the valley of the Little Butler, accompanied by the Sixth Illinois as escort, Major Whitsit commanding, who was instructed to take all axes and spades and make's crossing on Shoal Creek at all hazards, as this was the only place of escape from a well devised trap of the enemy. The next thirty minutes were passed in great anxiety, as Buford, on the north, was pressing the Second Iowa hard in front and flanking on their right and left with vastly superior numbers, while the Ninth Illinois was heavily pressed in the rear by a force from the south. During this time a messenger was sent to Captain Mock, informing him of his situation, and that unless he returned soon I would be compelled to abandon the last place left for his escape. As the Ninth Illinois came up they passed to the right and rear of the Second Iowa, down the Little Butler, and forming a line dismounted at the junction of the Big and Little Butler, where the high and abrupt bluffs on either side made the valley quite narrow. This made a good support for the Second Iowa when compelled to fall back. By this time the situation of the Second Iowa became truly critical, in consequence of the rapid movements of the rebel flanking column, which reached nearly to their rear on the right and left. Seeing it was impossible to hold the gap until Captain Mock could be heard from I ordered Major Horton to fail back and form again in rear of the Ninth Illinois. Each regiment then fell back alternately and formed lines for two miles, when we reached Shoal Creek, and I found, to my great surprise, the Sixth Illinois pack train, artillery, and ambulances all safe on the opposite side, and the regiment dismounted to cover the crossing. A lively skirmish was kept up by the rear guard while the command passed down the steep miry bank by file obliquely 150 feet. The mortification and apparent chagrin of the rebels when they found their prey had unexpectedly escaped was made known by those hideous yells, such as only rebels can make. 1 carefully placed my pickets on all practicable roads and encamped at dark at the same place I had left in the morning, with the firm conclusion, as previously reported, that Butler's Creek was by no means a desirable location to encamp. The day had been one of incessant rain.

November 20, moved from Cowpen Mills at 3 a m., going toward the military road. On arriving at that place halted for an hour, when I received orders to move to Bluewater Creek and camp, leaving pickets on military road. Captain Mock, of Ninth Illinois Cavalry, reported on military road, having traveled all night to reach the command. He succeeded in reaching the Waynesborough road, but in returning found himself and command completely surrounded by the enemy, and took to the hills by meandering neighborhood roads. By accident he came upon General Chalmers' division wagon train and made a charge on the guard, capturing several wagons and prisoners and fifty mules, besides much plunder which he could not bring away. While in the act of destroying the train he was attacked by a superior force and compelled to leave all and take to the woods again. By the assistance of Union men and negroes he was guided by circuitous routes until he reached the column. His loss was thirty men, most of whom were taken prisoners. Papers conveying important information were captured with the train, information which must have been of infinite importance to General Thomas, as they detailed the movements about to be made, giving timely notice to all of what was to take place. Captain Mock is entitled to much credit for the skill displayed in bringing out his command with so little loss. At sunset the pickets on the military road were attacked and compelled to fall back. Patrols sent to the military road and the front on all roads during the fore part of the night found the enemy advancing in force November 21, ordered to take the rear on the Lexington road at daylight. Reached Lexington at 10.15 a.m., when the division joined Croxton's brigade and was ordered to take the Lawrenceburg road in rear of command and train. Reached Lawrenceburg at 5 p.m. and camped for the night. The day was cold and much snow fell during the afternoon and night following.

November 22, morning cold and the ground frozen hard. About 12 m. the enemy commenced skirmishing with our pickets, when Capt. Jacob F. Bandy, Second Iowa Cavalry, with one battalion was sent to ascertain their force. At three miles distant from town the enemy was found in force and strongly posted on bluffs and behind well-arranged rail barricades. After an hour's skirmish he fell back to the picket. At 2 p.m. the enemy moved up in heavy force, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and encamped in line in plain view of town and of our bivouac. In compliance with orders I immediately put my command in line of battle on north side of town. The enemy soon opened with one section of artillery when my battery replied. An hour was spent in firing by the artillery on both sides with no result, when we were ordered to fall back on Pulaski road, Second Brigade to take the rear. My pickets and command withdrew in good order, though heavily pressed by superior force. Halted and camped seven miles east of Lawrenceburg, leaving General Croxton's command in our front.

November 23, left camp at 4 a.m.; halted at Richland Mills to feed and issue rations to the men. General Croxton's command, in the rear, was heard skirmishing heavily. At 3 p.m. moved three miles toward Pulaski and took to the left up the valley of Dry Creek, camping five miles south of Campbellsville.

November 24, moved at 6 a.m., taking the rear. Arrived at Campbellsville at 9 a.m. Received orders to follow the First Brigade and camp one mile above and north of the town on the creek. Sent patrols west one mile, who soon returned, reporting the enemy moving on our left, with vedettes standing on every high bluff in sight. This information was promptly conveyed to General Hatch, who ordered patrols strengthened and sent back to watch the enemy. Had not proceeded half a mile when I was informed that the First Brigade, a short distance ahead, had met a heavy column, supposed to be Buford's division. I immediately ordered the regiments along the column to throw down the fences, and two regiments, the Sixth and Ninth Illinois, to form a line dismounted. This was not, fully accomplished, however, when I was ordered to fall back to the east side of town, and hold the Lynnville road until the First Brigade, reported in a critical situation, could be recalled. My line of battle was soon formed, the left, the Ninth Illinois, resting near the church, the Second Iowa in the center, and the Sixth Illinois on the right, extending north, the entire line facing to the west. The regiments had barely time to dismount. The battery was soon put in position near the center of the line, when the enemy's infantry made its appearance in heavy force on the south and west side of the town. By direction of General Hatch the battery commenced firing at a range of one mile and a half. The effect of the cannonading was excellent, causing the whole rebel column to halt for at least one hour and deploy in heavy force. During this time a flanking column of the enemy was discovered moving to our left, threatening the Lynnville road, when I ordered the Second Iowa, Maj. C. C. Horton commanding, to guard and check that movement, who soon reported the force engaging him vastly superior to his. I immediately sent the Ninth Illinois as support. These regiments were both immediately in a heavy skirmish, their position soon became intolerable, as the enemy was undoubtedly moving their main column by the right flank, to get possession of the road in their rear. These facts I communicated to the general commanding, who ordered me to fall back and hold the road regardless of the First Brigade. When three-fourths of a mile from town I found the enemy in strong force on the left, with a battery playing at 1,000 yards distance upon my column. The men were deployed on foot on the left while the led horses and artillery passed by the road. The fire from the flank of musketry or artillery was quite lively, but no casualties occurred, save the killing of two horses. Two miles from Campbellsville my flanking column and patrols from the left were suddenly driven in as the road turned to the left through a narrow gorge, and just at the time General Hatch was passing. Capt. E. T. Phillips, Company M, Sixth Illinois Cavalry, commanding his escort, discovering the rebels, charged in an instant with his company and saved the gallant commander from capture. This gallant act of Captain Phillips is worthy of special compliment here, as well for his daring as for the good result. Unfortunately, the captain, received a wound in the left hand, which disabled him for the campaign. The Ninth Illinois Cavalry, Capt. J. W. Harper commanding, following immediately in rear of the general's escort, was ordered by him to dismount and hold the gap at all hazards. Captain Harper had scarcely dismounted his men, when they received a heavy fire from a brigade of the enemy. Not a particle daunted the captain ordered his men forward until it became a hand to hand fight. In the meantime I was notified of the perilous condition of the regiments, being then one-fourth of a mile in advance. Not knowing the nature of their orders I directed Captain Harper to fall back slowly, but was soon informed that their ammunition (sixty rounds) was nearly exhausted. I then formed the Second Iowa across the gorge to protect them while they withdrew. The loss of this regiment was thirty killed and wounded in less than that number of minutes; among the number were four orderly sergeants killed. It is with pride that I mention the fact that Captain Harper brought his men back in good order, although the loss was heavy. No sooner had the Ninth Illinois passed through the line of the Second Iowa than the rebel brigade came at double-quick up the hollow, colors in front, and in another instant was in line of battle. Three hundred Spencers from the Second Iowa drove them back in confusion; but a moment, however, intervened when the rebels rallied. Major Horton in the meantime retired and mounted by battalions, under fire, leaving one officer and five men wounded on the field. I then sent Captain Bandy, Second Iowa, with two companies as rear guard, to Lynnville, three miles distant. The whole brigade was here thrown out in line of battle, and held the enemy in check until after dark, when I was ordered to withdraw and march in rear to Columbia. Put my command in bivouac within the infantry pickets at 11.30 p.m.

November 25, crossed Duck River, and encamped three miles above the city. November 26, at 10 a.m. moved out on the Murfreesborough road, and encamped eight miles east of Columbia. Rained continually during the day and that night. November 27, remained in bivouac all day; still raining very hard. The Seventh Illinois Cavalry having been assigned to this brigade, Maj. John M. Graham, commanding regiment, reported for duty. I sent Captain Glass, of Sixth Illinois Cavalry, and 400 men, to Shelbyville, to ascertain the enemy's movements in that direction.

November 28, rained until 12 m. At 2 p.m. received orders to move immediately. While "boot and saddle" was being sounded the enemy opened with a volley upon the picket on the Shelbyville road. By aid of a glass the enemy could be seen in heavy force through the thin fog, about two miles distant. I ordered a battalion of the Second Iowa, Captain Foster commanding, to support the pickets, while the command made preparations to move. By direction of the general commanding I sent the artillery and train on the Spring Hill road. This order, however, was soon countermanded, and the train sent to Huey's Cross-Roads, on the Lewisburg pike, where the brigade erected a slight barricade of rails, and slept on their arms during the night.

November 29, took up line of march at 4 a.m., passing Croxton's and Harrison's commands and moving toward Franklin, my brigade marching in rear of division to Mount Carmel, where it halted and fed in line of battle to the left of the pike. At 9 a.m. General Croxton's command passed my brigade, heavily pressed by the enemy. The light rail barricades previously prepared served as temporary breastworks and enabled my brigade, then dismounted, to check the enemy's movements. But a few moments passed until the whole line was engaged in a heavy skirmish, which continued for an hour, when I received orders to withdraw slowly, which was done by alternate numbers in line, dismounted, for two miles, when I ordered the brigade mounted. I then withdrew by brigade in line of regiments, each regiment in line of squadrons in column of fours. The enemy, discovering this formation, charged down the pike, in column of fours, on a small company of the Ninth Illinois Cavalry, which was acting as rear guard. In accordance with previous instructions from me the company did not halt, but continued to fall back, leading the enemy between the flanking columns right and left, who opened upon them a raking fire, throwing them into confusion, and ending the pursuit for the day. The command arrived at Nolen's plantation at 12 m., and halted in line of battle until 4 p.m., when it moved toward Franklin two miles, and, turning to the right, crossed Little Harpeth River and moved north to the Nolensville and Franklin road, where the brigade was encamped for the night.

November 30, the Twelfth Tennessee Cavalry, Col. George Spalding commanding, having been assigned to this brigade, reported for duty. Remained in bivouac till 12 m., when the enemy were reported to have driven our pickets in at the ford on the Little Harpeth. I received orders to put my brigade in  line of battle dismounted, and I sent the Sixth Illinois to support the pickets in front, and the Second Iowa to guard the left on the Nolensville road. After some thirty minutes I received orders to move my line forward, which was done promptly. At the distance of half a mile the enemy made his appearance in force on a high bluff in front, when, by order of the general commanding, I ordered the brigade to charge the hill and drive the enemy back, which was performed in a most gallant style, until he was driven back across the Little Harpeth River. The enemy's force making the attack was supposed to be Buford's division of cavalry and mounted infantry, estimated to be from 5,000 to 6,000 strong. My entire command acquitted itself in a most creditable manner, and camped for the night on the ground occupied the night previous.

December 1, at 5.30 a.m. marched with the division to Brentwood Station, where I was ordered to form in line of battle on the Franklin pike. I remained here until 2 p.m., when I moved on the Nashville pike in rear of the command, crossed over to Murfreesborough pike, and camped for the night. December 2, marched with the division at 5 a.m., on the right flank, to Nashville, and crossed the Cumberland River during the afternoon, and encamped at Edgefield. During the time from December 3 to December 11 the brigade was encamped at Edge-field, making preparations for active duty again. December 12, moved camp across the river, and camped two miles south of the river between the Hardin and Charlotte pikes. December 13 and 14, in camp.

December 15, by the direction of the general commanding the division the brigade moved out at daylight from camp across the field, on the right of the Hardin pike, two miles, forming dismounted on the right of the infantry under Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith. The led horses were placed in the rear of their respective regiments, with the exception of the Twelfth Tennessee Cavalry, Col. George Spalding commanding, which regiment I kept mounted for a charge, should an opportunity present. An hour was spent in regulating the line of infantry and cavalry, when the advance was ordered, and all moved forward, presenting a most magnificent spectacle. We had not proceeded far when we crossed the Hardin pike, where a wagon train was discovered still in sight moving south, and Col. George Spalding was sent in pursuit. After traveling eight miles he came upon the rear guard and charged on it, capturing some twenty wagons, with teams, &c., complete, some forty prisoners, and a large amount of plunder, belonging to the rebel General Chalmers' headquarters. My brigade formed on the extreme right of the infantry, with directions to conform to their movements, which were in a large circle and caused lively marching for the men, as the distance traveled by them was much farther than that of the infantry. After marching for three miles, much of the time at a double-quick, I formed my brigade on the left flank of the enemy, one mile and a quarter to the left of the Hardin pike. Passing my battery to my right flank, where a favorable opportunity offered to enfilade the enemy's lines, the Seventh Illinois and Second Iowa were directed to support the battery. My artillery had discharged but a few shots at the redoubt when it was rapidly replied to. A lively fire was kept up on both sides for an hour with but few casualties. The command moved forward until within 500 yards of the enemy's works, when General Hatch directed me to charge and take the nearest redoubt. The regiments engaged in this charge were as follows: Seventh Illinois Cavalry, Maj. John M. Graham commanding, on the right; the Second Iowa Cavalry, Maj. C. C. Horton, and Ninth Illinois Cavalry, Capt. Joseph W. Harper commanding, in order, on the left of the Seventh Illinois; and the Sixth Illinois Cavalry, Lieut. Col. John Lynch commanding, on the left of the brigade and closed up to the right of the infantry. In making the charge the right wing of the brigade had an open field, with nothing to impede their progress save two stone fences, while the left wing had a heavy thicket to pass through. At the word "Forward!" stone [fences and] thickets were very slight impediments in the way of this veteran brigade. The enemy, discovering the movement, changed their little messengers of shell to grape and canister, accompanied by heavy musketry from the infantry support behind their works. As I rode along the line I found each regiment competing with the others to reach the redoubt. So near the same time did each regiment reach the redoubt that it was difficult for some time to ascertain who was the first to reach the prize. All acted nobly, and are entitled to the highest praise, under the circumstances, for their efforts to be the first. The evidence, carefully examined, awards to Second Lieut. George W. Budd, of Company G, Second Iowa Cavalry, and his company, the honor of being the first to scale the rebel works and take possession of the rebel cannon, which were four in number—Napoleons. On reaching the inside of the works he drew his saber upon the cannoneers and forced them to discharge the last load intended for the Federals on their own friends, then in plain view on the east side of the fort, not 500 yards distant. As the command took possession of this point a rebel battery opened from another redoubt, 600 yards distant, situated upon the top of a bluff some 200 feet high and protected by strong earth-works. General Hatch ordered me to charge the hill without delay. This order was promptly obeyed by all my command, officers and men. The "charge" was sounded, and in twenty minutes the colors of the Second Iowa Cavalry were planted on the works by the color-bearer, Sergt. John F. Hartman, of Company F, who was mortally wounded by a musket-ball passing through the abdomen. During the charge the enemy kept up a brisk cannonading, accompanied by heavy musketry firing from the infantry within the redoubt. The long march previous, the charge in taking the first redoubt, and the short time given until the charge of the second, rendered it almost impossible for a cavalryman to move faster than a walk. So eager were the officers and men to reach the second redoubt that many fell to the ground exhausted. Lieut. Col. John Lynch, Sixth Illinois Cavalry, while at the head of his regiment gallantly leading his men, fell exhausted and was carried from the field. Many soldiers, when too tired to walk, crawled upon their hands and knees up the steep bluff to the foot of the redoubt. While my men were in the act of charging this last fort the infantry had reached within supporting distance, when I ordered my officers to pass the words, "Second Brigade, take those guns before the infantry get up!" and in less than ten minutes the work was done. Lieut. John H. Carpenter, Company L, Ninth Illinois Cavalry, was the first man who entered the redoubt, killing the officer in command of the fort, while at the same moment Sergeant Hartman planted the colors of his regiment inside the works. In honor to the brave who have fallen I should say that on arriving within some twenty yards of the redoubt I found this brave color-bearer completely exhausted and halted in advance of the line. I asked him, "Sergeant, can you put those colors upon the works?" He replied, "I can, if supported." When I called for the Second Iowa to support their colors it was done with an iron will, but the sergeant fell and was soon borne from the field. In this fort were two pieces of artillery (12-pounders), a large quantity of ammunition, and 150 prisoners. In ten minutes these guns were turned upon the enemy with such effect as to cause great confusion in their retreating columns. The prisoners and plunder had not been collected when I was ordered to continue the pursuit, leaving them in charge of the infantry. On quitting the fort, having previously instructed my regimental commanders where to form and collect their men, I mistook two regiments of the First Brigade for those of my own, and had the distinguished honor of leading them to the summit of a third hill, and shall ever remember with pleasure the gallant conduct of these men in holding that place, under a most galling fire from the enemy in front and on both right and left flanks, until the infantry came up, when they moved forward and took three pieces of artillery, from which they had driven the enemy a few moments before. These regiments, I am informed, were the Twelfth Missouri and Eleventh Indiana Cavalry. At dark I bivouacked my command near the redoubts on the Lewisburg pike.

December 16, at 10 a.m. was ordered to move my brigade out on the Lewisburg pike and support General Knipe. After advancing a mile I halted one hour, when I was ordered to move my command to the east of the pike, form in line dismounted, and move forward, in conformity with the infantry, toward the Granny White pike. The steep hills, rising abruptly from 100 to 200 feet high, and covered with thick undergrowth, rendered it almost impossible for the movement of troops even dismounted. By putting the brigade by regiments  (Sixth and Ninth Illinois, Second Iowa, Seventh Illinois, and Twelfth Tennessee) in line, successively, in order from left to right, and each upon a hill, I was at last able to move forward nearly one mile, when the whole line became engaged. The brigade was skirmishing heavily when I received orders to halt and hold my position. The line was upon a high, narrow ridge, thinly wooded, but affording an excellent point to defend. During the first hour here the Seventh Illinois charged a rebel work, driving the enemy away, capturing seventy-five prisoners and a large number of small-arms, bringing the prisoners safely sway and destroying the arms. About 3 p.m. I ordered the Sixth and Ninth Illinois and Second Iowa, on my left, to commence firing at will on a fort some 500 yards distant, while two pieces of my artillery played upon it from the valley below. This, I am satisfied, had the desired effect, for the enemy commenced evacuating in a very few minutes. The whole line was then moved forward, and the Twelfth Tennessee captured some 150 prisoners. Three stand of colors were left in the hands of the infantry. On reaching the Granny White pike I was ordered to follow the enemy south, and, if possible, charge them before dark, as they were retreating in great haste. Colonel Spalding, of the Twelfth Tennessee, took the advance, and had not proceeded more than one mile when he made a charge, which threw them into confusion, and, by the assistance of the Ninth Illinois, who were brought up dismounted, I soon drove them from a strong position protected by a barricade of rails. The Twelfth Tennessee and Sixth and Ninth Illinois followed them to another strong position, half a mile distant, when a hand-to-hand fight took place, and lasted an hour after dark. At this place Brigadier-General Rucker was captured by Capt. Joseph C. Boyer, Twelfth Tennessee Cavalry, who received a severe blow on the forehead from the hand of the rebel general. In this personal contest Captain Boyer wrenched the rebel general's saber from his hand, who in turn seized and took his, when a Federal soldier, name unknown, shot the general in the arm, causing him to surrender. It was in this melee, amidst intense darkness, that the two regiments of Twelfth Tennessee Cavalry, Federal and Confederate, met and mixed in mad confusion, neither knowing the other save by the usual challenge, "Halt, who comes there?" Colonel Spalding, who was foremost in the charge, was halted by two Confederate soldiers, who, on hearing his answer to the challenge, grasped his horse by the reins on either side and demanded his surrender, when the colonel put spurs to his horse, and with one bound the noble animal took himself and rider beyond danger. Private Berry Watson, Company G, Twelfth Tennessee, captured and brought away General Rucker's division flag, and was promoted to sergeant by Colonel Spalding, the same night, for gallant conduct. Majors Kirwan and Bradshaw, of the Twelfth Tennessee, charged entirely through the rebel lines with their battalions, and afterward returned by passing themselves as belonging to the Twelfth Tennessee Confederate Cavalry, and in great anxiety to meet the Yankees. Camped for the night on Granny White pike, eight miles south of Nashville.

December 17, moved at daylight and continued the pursuit, following in rear of the cavalry command to Franklin, where I was ordered to move to the left on the Lewisburg pike three miles and cross over to the Columbia pike. When three miles south of Franklin we met the enemy, and I immediately formed the whole brigade and charged mounted. On reaching and driving in the rebels  left the Second Iowa pressed its way around to their rear, when a hand-to-hand fight ensued, resulting in the capture of one stand of colors and several prisoners. In this engagement Sergt. John Coulter, Corpl. A. R. Heck, and Private Black, of Company K, captured and brought off a stand of division colors, after which Private Black and Corpl. A. R. Heck were killed and Sergt. John Coulter was severely wounded. The sergeant, however, succeeded in bringing away the rebel standard. Sergeant Margaretz, of Company F, same regiment, the second color-sergeant, was killed at the same place, but not until he had killed the rebel who demanded his colors. On burying the dead three Federal and five Confederate soldiers were found dead within three paces of each other. The firing in the rear, in conjunction with the brisk engagement in front, caused the enemy to fall back, and with detached portions of the brigade I continued to press his flank until dark, when I dismounted the Ninth Illinois, formed in range, and fired upon him by volleys, driving him from another position, and, in co-operation with other troops, capturing three more pieces of artillery. One of these pieces was brought off the field by the Ninth Illinois. The darkness prevented further movements, and we camped for the night seven miles below Franklin.

December 18, moved at daylight, continuing the pursuit to Spring Hill, where we found a considerable force of the enemy, and fired but a few shots, when they fell back in confusion. Camped for the night three miles south of Spring Hill. December 19, resumed the march at 7 a.m., and continued to Rutherford's Creek, where we dismounted, marched by the right flank one mile, and succeeded in crossing the Sixth Illinois on the wreck of the burnt railroad bridge, when the fragments floated away and the balance of my command were compelled to ford the stream some distance above. Moved two miles below on the enemy's flank, the Sixth Illinois skirmishing until dark; then the command encamped for the night. December 20, at daylight were again in motion down Rutherford's Creek. Marched nearly two miles, when I was ordered to dismount my command and construct a crossing from the fragment of a railroad bridge which the rebels had destroyed the day previous. This work was completed, and my command across at 12 m., and the pursuit again resumed. The Seventh and Ninth Illinois were dismounted and deployed on foot, while the remainder of the brigade followed mounted to Duck River, opposite Columbia. On arriving here found the enemy had crossed his rear guard in comparative safety at 4 a.m., leaving a small party, with a piece of artillery, as rear guard in the town upon the opposite side. A light skirmish between the above-named regiments and the enemy, accompanied by light cannonading from both sides, closed the operations of the day, when the command encamped to await the arrival of the pontoons. During the skirmish the Seventh Illinois discovered where the enemy had abandoned four pieces of artillery by tumbling it into Duck River over the abutment of the old bridge. It was afterward taken out by the infantry.

December 21 and 22, the main part of my command remained in camp two miles northeast of Columbia. One battalion of the Second Iowa, Capt. Samuel Foster, Company M, commanding, was sent on the Shelbyville pike in pursuit of a party of rebels, who were reported escaping with two pieces of artillery. The captain succeeded in capturing them without resistance, after a day's march, and also found six ambulances and three wagons in poor condition. December 23, crossed the Duck River, and encamped five miles south of Columbia on the Pulaski pike. December 24, marched with the division, in rear of General Croxton's command, as far as Lynnville, when my brigade was ordered to march by the left flank, to gain the rear of the enemy's lines, and drive him from a strong position on Richland Creek, but was prevented by the unfordable condition of Richland Creek, when I dismounted my command and engaged the enemy at long range for half an hour. During this skirmish the rebel General Buford was wounded by the Seventh Illinois. Camped for the night. December 25, marched with the division, in rear of Colonel Harrison's and General Hammond's commands, reaching Pulaski at 11 a.m., and passing beyond some six miles, when the enemy was found in force. A light skirmish ensued when the advance was repulsed. My brigade was immediately dismounted, and after a heavy skirmish of an hour drove the enemy from a strong position protected by a barricade of rails, and encamped for the night. December 26, marched in rear of General Hammond's command to Sugar Creek, and encamped for the night. December 27, sent Colonel Spalding, of the Twelfth Tennessee Cavalry; with a detachment of the best mounted men of each regiment (500 men in all), in the direction of Bainbridge, to ascertain the movements of the enemy. December 28, moved with the command to Blue Water, via Livingston, where we encamped for the night. Remained in camp during the 29th and 30th, having learned that the enemy had effected a crossing of the Tennessee River at Bainbridge. December 31, marched to Elk River on the Huntsville road; camped on opposite and east side, after much difficulty in crossing. The stream high for fording.

January 1, reached Athens, Ala., at 2 p.m., and camped five miles beyond. January 2, left bivouac at 4 a.m. for Huntsville, but were halted by a staff officer five miles on the road, who informed me that our destination had been changed from Huntsville, Ala., to Waterloo, opposite Eastport, Miss. I countermarched my command and camped at Perran's plantation, five miles southeast of Athens. January 3, moved camp from Perran's plantation to Widow West's, where I was ordered to rest my horses and shoe as many as possible. January 4, 5, and 6 were spent in shoeing horses and resting them from the fatigues of the last campaign. January 7, marched for Waterloo, where we arrived on Wednesday, the 11th, at sunset, having traveled a distance of some eighty-five miles, in a most disagreeable state of weather as well as of roads; the weather cold and the mud frozen and in places very deep. After remaining in bivouac opposite Eastport some three days, by order of the brevet major-general commanding the corps I moved to this camp on the 14th day of the month.

In conclusion I must say that the campaign and labors of the brigade have been endured by the officers and soldiers with unparalleled fortitude. They have been subject to all the privations that soldiers are heir to, and without eliciting the least complaint. An army made of such material, veterans of nearly three years' standing, can accomplish what the world never before witnessed.

I am happy to mention the names of my staff—First Lieut. John H. Avery, Ninth Illinois Cavalry, acting assistant adjutant-general; First Lieut. Sidney O. Roberts, Ninth Illinois Cavalry, provost-marshal; First Lieut. Thomas J. Cox, Tenth Tennessee Cavalry, acting assistant inspector-general; First Lieut. Samuel J. Dangler, Second Iowa Cavalry, ambulance officer; First Lieut. Henry B. Ludlow, Second Iowa Cavalry, acting assistant quartermaster First Lieut. E. A. Davenport, Ninth Illinois Cavalry, acting commissary of subsistence—for the worthy and efficient manner in which they discharged their duties.

The conduct of the officers and men hi every regiment and company was of the most soldierly character, and were I allowed the space I would gladly mention many officers and hundreds of soldiers whose bravery is worthy of personal compliment in this respect.

I should do injustice were I to omit to mention the important service rendered my brigade by Company I, First Illinois Light Artillery, from the time it reported to me at Nashville up to the present, and especially in the battle of Nashville, on the 15th and 16th of December, and at Franklin, on the 17th, in shelling the enemy from the fort on the north side of town, and also at the fight that night at the Little Harpeth, also at Spring Hill, Rutherford's Creek, and Columbia. The officers and men conducted themselves in the most gallant style, always delivering their messages to the enemy with astonishing accuracy.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DATUS E. COON,        

Colonel Second Iowa Cav., Comdg. 2d Brig., 5th Div., Cav. Corps.

        Maj. HENRY C. FORBES,
Chief of Staff to Brig. Gen. Edward Hatch, Comdg. 5th Div.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 580-94