MAJOR: In obedience
to orders from corps headquarters, I have the honor most respectfully to
forward this report of the operations of my command in the late Tennessee
campaign.*
I left Florence,
Ala., on the 21st of November with my command, moving with its corps, via
Waynesborough and Mount Pleasant, to near Columbia, Tenn., and went into
bivouac on the 26th day of November, on the Shelbyville turnpike. The
succeeding day and night was followed with slight skirmishing on the line
around Columbia.
At daylight on the
morning of the 29th I moved to Duck River, four miles above Columbia, and
crossed on the pontoon bridge at 7.30 o'clock, which was as soon as I could do
so, having to wait for General Cleburne's division, which had the advance. I
moved that day in rear of that division to the neighborhood of Spring Hill, a
distance of twelve miles. After moving rapidly for several miles and wading the
creek I deployed my division in line of battle, in obedience to orders from
General Cheatham to form and move on Cleburne's left, Jackson on the right, and
Smith in echelon on the left of front line, Col. R. Bullock, commanding the
Florida brigade, supporting the left. Not seeing General Cheatham at the moment
of forming my line of battle, General Hood, who was personally present,
directed me to move to the turnpike and sweep toward Columbia. General
Cleburne, being in advance, formed and moved forward before it was possible for
me to do so, and changed front without stopping and without my knowing the fact,
owing to intervening hills obstructing the view. As soon as ascertained I
conformed to the movement as well as I could and pushed forward in the
direction of the enemy, who held the turnpike. It was now getting dark, and I
had moved more than a mile in line of battle. Cleburne had been engaged; with
what success I did not know. Procuring a guide, learning the exact locality of
the enemy and the general direction of the turnpike, I changed direction to the
right again, and was moving so as to strike the turnpike to the right of Maj.
Nat. Cheer's residence, which I believed would bring me near Cleburne's left;
Caswell's battalion of sharpshooters, deployed as skirmishers, was within 100
yards of and commanded the turnpike, checking the enemy's movement along it in
my front, and my lines were being adjusted for a further forward movement, when
I received an order, through Lieutenant Schell, from General Cheatham to halt
and join my right to General Cleburne's left. My main line was within 200 yards
of the turnpike when Major Caswell's battalion fired into the enemy on the
pike. He (the enemy) veered to his left, as I subsequently ascertained, and
took a road leaving the pike near Doctor McKessick's. I obeyed the order of
General Cheatham, and with delay and difficulty, it being in the night and near
the enemy, I ascertained the left of Cleburne's line, which had retired some
distance to the rear of my right. I made known to General Cheatham the fact of
the enemy threatening my left, and called for force to protect it. My left
brigade was retired to confront any movement from that direction, and during
the night (perhaps 10 o'clock) General Johnson's division, of Lee's corps, was
moved to my left. My command so disposed as to be an extension of Cleburne's
line, with its left retired, I bivouacked between 9 and 10 o'clock for the
night. At daylight there was no enemy in my front.
Early on the morning
of the 30th of November I was ordered to follow Cleburne and bring up the rear
of Cheatham's corps. In pursuance thereof I moved down the Franklin turnpike to
the rear of Winstead's Hill, three miles from Franklin, where our forces were
being deployed and lines formed. About 3 o'clock in the evening I was ordered
by General Cheatham to move my command by the left flank, pass a gap in the
ridge to the left, circle around a mound which rose in the plain below, and
move toward the Carter Creek turnpike, until, in a direct advance on the town
of Franklin, my left would strike the house of Mrs. Rebecca Bostick. I lost no
time in starting and moved rapidly. This gave me the arc, while the divisions
on my right moved on the chord of the circle. I was informed that General
Chalmers' cavalry was ordered to form and advance in conjunction with me on my
left. My line was formed with Jackson's brigade and Tyler's, commanded by Brig.
Gen. T. B. Smith, in the front, the former on the right, and Finley's brigade,
commanded by Col. Robert Bullock, supporting. Major Caswell had charge of the
skirmish line in front. With these dispositions I moved forward through the
open plain in good order. My skirmish line drove back that of the enemy, which
was located on a line with Mrs. Bostick's house. The center of my line swept by
this house, my left, which I had extended, reaching near the Carter Creek
turnpike. The line moved steadily on, not waiting for the cavalry, driving the
enemy from his outer works, which covered the right but not the left of my
line. The cavalry (dismounted) not touching my left, nor being on a line with
it, exposed that flank to a furious fire. I moved the Florida brigade to the
left and advanced it, two regiments extending beyond the left of the turnpike.
My line, now a single one without support, charged the works of the enemy. My
right got to the works (the second line) and remained there until morning; the
left was driven back. The enemy's [works] were strong and defiant, constructed
on a slight elevation, with few obstructions in front for several hundred
yards. The works to the left of Carter Creek turnpike were not strong, and with
a vigorous assault should have been carried; a fact, however, not known until
next day. A battery was located just to the right of this turnpike, which kept
up the fire until late at night. The left of my line was reformed on the branch
between the works of the enemy and Mrs. Bostick's house, but not in sufficient
numbers to justify another effort to carry the works, as the command on my left
had not come up. A battery, under the conduct of Colonel Presstman,
participated most gallantly in the fight, first occupying a position near the
house of Mrs. Bostick, and then was run up the turnpike close to the enemy's
works and engaged that battery of the enemy on our immediate front. Many of our
men who had gone into the interior works held their positions until morning,
when the enemy had evacuated the town. General Ed. Johnson's division came in
my rear just after dark, passing over that part of my line which had been
reformed near the branch fronting Mrs. Bostick's.
My loss in this
engagement was 47 killed, 253 wounded, and 19 missing. Among the killed was
Colonel Smith, of the First [Georgia] Confederate Regiment, Jackson's brigade,
who fell most gallantly while putting his regiment into the interior works of
the enemy. Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton was badly wounded while pressing forward
in handsome style. Lieutenant-Colonel Badger, commanding First [Florida
(dismounted) Cavalry] and Fourth Florida Regiments was wounded three times
before he left the field. Captain Carter, on staff duty with Tyler's brigade,
fell mortally wounded near the works of the enemy and almost at the door of his
father's house. His gallantry I witnessed with much pride, as I had done on
other fields, and here take pleasure in mentioning it especially.
OPERATIONS AROUND
MURFREESBOROUGH.
On the morning of the 2d of December, as my command was moving from Franklin, Tenn., in the direction of Nashville, I received the following order, made official and inclosed to me by Major-General Cheatham, commanding corps:
HEADQUARTERS,
Near Franklin, December 2, 1864—7 a.m.
General
Hood directs that you will send Bate's division, with one battery of artillery,
over to Murfreesborough, and direct them to destroy the railroad from
Murfreesborough to Nashville, burning all the bridges and taking the
block-houses and then burning them.
A.
P. MASON,
Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General.
HEADQUARTERS,
Overton's House, Six Miles from Nashville, December 2, 1864.
Major-General
BATE:
GENERAL:
General Hood directs me to say that citizens report some 5,000 Yankees at
Murfreesborough. General Forrest will send some of his cavalry to assist you.
You must act according to your judgment under the circumstances, keeping in
view the object of your expedition, viz, to destroy the railroad. This report
is sent you for what it is worth.
Yours,
respectfully,
A.
P. MASON,
Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General.
Slocomb's battery,
under command of Lieutenant Chalaron, acted with conspicuous and most effective
gallantry.
Col. Ed. Dillon
reported with the squadron of cavalry just before night---too late to take part
in the fight. I certainly did not suppose this was all the support I was to get
from General Forrest, mentioned in the before-quoted order. I ordered him to
relieve the infantry pickets at 10 o'clock, at which hour I withdrew my
infantry and artillery across Stewart's Creek, fearing the enemy might get on
my flank or rear with his superior numbers during the night, and also to begin
operations on the road early next morning.
In the fight my
losses were 15 killed, 59 wounded (Colonel Bullock, commanding the Florida
brigade, among the latter), and 13 missing. I have every reason to believe that
the losses of the enemy were much greater. We buried some of his dead which he
left when driven from the field.
Early on the morning
of the 5th dispositions were made to take the block-houses at Stewart's Creek,
Read's Branch, and Smyrna, which, as we moved upon them, the enemy
precipitately evacuated. Each of these were burned after removing the stores;
also the bridges they were intended to guard, and several miles of the railroad
destroyed. While these operations were going on General Forrest arrived with
two divisions of cavalry, followed by two infantry brigades (Sears', of
French's, and Palmer's, of Stevenson's division), with artillery, and, by
virtue of rank, assumed command of the forces near Murfreesborough. The order
to keep in view the object of my mission, viz, "to destroy the
railroad," seemed to be revoked, and offensive operations against
Murfreesborough assumed, which did not accord with my judgment, as I was
satisfied there were 8,000 or 10,000 Federals within, strongly fortified and
with a large amount of artillery in position. Not deeming it prudent to attack
such works manned with twice our numbers, I, however, readily gave cheerful
co-operation. By command of General Forrest I ceased operations on the railroad
and moved back toward Murfreesborough. On the 6th I closed in my lines and
pressed forward skirmishers as near to the works around Murfreesborough as
practicable, in doing which I lost sixteen men from Caswell's battalion of
sharpshooters. I dug pits for skirmishers and built defenses for my main line.
I was ordered by
General Forrest to move my entire command at daylight on the 7th to the
Wilkinson and my wagon train to the Salem turnpike, which was done. My command
was ordered to be an extension of the right of Colonel Palmer's brigade, which
occupied a hill fronting the fort and works of the enemy located on the west
bank of Stone's River. While the order was being executed the enemy was
observed to be moving a force across Stone's River above the town of
Murfreesborough and down the Salem turnpike. At this juncture I was ordered by
General Forrest to make dispositions to move, in conjunction with Colonel
Palmer, on the works of the enemy, which, however, was revoked by ordering me
to take charge of infantry and put it into position near where the Wilkinson
turnpike crosses Overall's Creek, which I proceeded to do, under the personal
direction of General Forrest. The main line was established on the southwest
side of the turnpike, diagonally to but not crossing it any point, with the
right towards the creek, in the following order by brigades, beginning on the
right: Sears', Palmer's, Finley's. Jackson's and Tyler's brigades were placed
by me in reserve across the turnpike from main line. Temporary works were
constructed of rails and logs. The artillery was placed at the most eligible
and advantageous points. While temporary works were being built of rails and
logs the enemy presented himself in our front, but was speedily driven out of
view by our artillery. I was ordered by General Forrest to put my entire
command in the main line. Jackson was then ordered to the left of Finley's
brigade, Sears brought from the right to the left in prolongation of and
retiring main line toward the turnpike. He soon presented himself again,
turning our left flank and advancing diagonally to it. General Forrest ordered
the whole line by the left flank. The extent of the enemy's line was not
visible. Sears leading and Jackson following, under my order, moved too far to
the left; the Florida and Palmer's brigades were halted in the temporary works
just vacated by these two. Smith was immediately brought in between them at
right angles with the turnpike and in full front of the enemy, who was within
200 yards, driving in our skirmishers, the cavalry on the left having fallen
back with but slight resistance. The time of the reappearance of the enemy
emerging from the woods, when he was thought to have retired to Murfreesborough
(no information being received by me from the cavalry in my front), did not
admit of sufficient time to adjust the line before he was upon us, hence there
was a space of perhaps 75 or 100 yards between Smith's right and Finley's left.
Jackson and Sears were immediately ordered to move, under the conduct of a
staff officer, Major Shaaff, by the right flank and align on Smith's left, who
was now engaged with the main line of the enemy. The enemy's line came
diagonally from the left and struck Finley's and Palmer's brigades, crumbling
and driving them from the temporary works. Meanwhile Smith's (Tyler's) and the
right of Jackson's brigade, which was getting in position, drove back in
gallant style the right of the enemy's line which confronted them. I did not
again see the Florida and Palmer's nor Sears' brigade until night, they being
under the immediate conduct of General Forrest. I remained in person with
Smith's and Jackson's brigades. The enemy occupied the line vacated by Finley's
and Palmer's brigades on Smith's flank, but did not push up vigorously. I
changed front to rear on my left battalion and formed line in the woods
parallel to and near the turnpike, where I remained without molestation until
ordered by General Forrest to move across the creek and join him (who was then
with cavalry, artillery, and Sears', Palmer's, and Finley's brigades), which I
did leisurely, moving off the two remaining brigades by the flank. If the
cavalry on either flank was seriously engaged, I was not aware of it.
In this day's fight
there were 19 killed, 73 wounded, and 122 missing. Among the former was
Lieutenant-Colonel Billopp [Twenty-ninth] Georgia Regiment, who fell gallantly
at his post.
I have to regret the
loss of two of the guns of that gallant battery, Slocomb's, commanded by
Lieutenant Chalaron. The horses being killed, they could not be brought off.
After crossing the
creek, about sundown, Smith's brigade was placed in position to resist in case
of pursuit, and brought up the rear In good order to the bivouac on the
Nashville turnpike.
Next day we engaged
again in the destruction of the railroad; but little progress was made, in
consequence of the extreme bad weather; the snow fell rapidly and the ground
was freezing. In consequence of the recent marches many of the men were
barefooted; all were shod, however, when we left Florence. I pressed every pair
of shoes which could be found for them, and in many instances the citizens gave
them second-hand shoes, which but partially supplied the demand. The country
afforded us superabundance of rations. While in this neighborhood I put in
operation several mills for the use of the army.
Major-General Forrest
gave me an intimation of a probable attack on the main army in front of
Nashville, and directed that I be ready to move at short notice. I soon
thereafter received an order to move to the right flank of the Army of
Tennessee, held by General Cheatham, to take part in the anticipated operations
there. The sleet and severe freezes had made the surface of the earth a sheet
of ice. Nearly one-fourth of the men were still barefooted, yet plodded
"their weary way" under these adverse circumstance (many with
bleeding feet), and arrived in good time to the position assigned in Cheatham's
corps. I was contiguous to and on the left of the Nolensville turnpike, at a
point known as Rains' Hill. I remained here in the intrenched line, with the
men uncomfortable from the extreme cold and the scarcity of wood, until the
evening of the 15th, when I was ordered by General Cheatham to move to the
left, where the fighting was going on, and should he not be there to report to
General Hood. When I passed the Franklin turnpike streams of stragglers, and
artillerists, and horses, without guns or caissons, the sure indicia of defeat,
came hurriedly from the left. I formed my division for battle at once, its
right resting near the turnpike, and communicated the situation to General
Cheatham, who meantime had come up. It was nearly dark. I received an order
from General Hood to move straight forward and take a skirt of woods beyond the
field, in the rear of which I had formed my line, and near which the firing was
going on. I did so, and made known that fact to my corps commander, and awaited
orders. The firing had now slackened. About 8 o'clock Major-General Cheatham
came to me and took me with him to find the line I was to occupy. He informed
me that he was directed by the general commanding to extend a line of battle
from the apex of the hill (now known as Shy's Hill) occupied by Ector's brigade
in direction of Mrs. Bradford's house, on the Granny White turnpike, so that a
prolongation of the same would strike the line then occupied by General
Stewart. We went together and found General Sharp's brigade on left of that
corps, in the rear of Mrs. Bradford's house, somewhat parallel to the turnpike,
its right resting near the woods, in which we were informed the balance of that
corps was. A fire was kindled, by General Cheatham's order, to indicate the
direction of my line from the, given point on the left. I moved my command in
the position indicated, but with much delay, attributable to the darkness of
the night and marshy fields through which I had to pass. The artillery I was
unable to get up. The field intervening the turnpike and my position was
impassable to artillery; the earth had thawed, and the cultivated low ground
was an obstruction through which even the ambulances could not pass with
success; hence the artillery was left in the rear for the night. Having a
personal interview with Colonel Coleman, commanding Ector's brigade, and
agreeing upon the point where the right of his line rested, I adjusted mine, as
ordered, between that and the point designated on General Sharp's line, taking
such advantage of the ground in its exact locality as I could in the night. My
left then rested near the crown on that slope of the hill, facing the turnpike,
and my right in the corn-field, advanced toward Nashville, hence not quite at
right angles with the turnpike. Seeing that my line at its junction with
Coleman's made a right angle, and the enemy already immediately under the brow
of the hill annoying me with sharpshooters, within 100 yards, and my right
unconnected with any one, I went in person to my corps commander and
remonstrated as to the position of my line. He informed me he was not
authorized to change it, and that General Stewart was to connect with my right.
I at once put the men to making defenses with such tools as I had. They worked
with alacrity the balance of the night (nearly all the while under my immediate
supervision), and constructed works along my entire front impervious to
ordinary shots.
Daylight [16th]
revealed the fact that Stewart's corps had been moved back several hundred
yards from the point toward which I was directed to extend my right. His two
left divisions were retired in echelon from my right, Walthall's on the same
side of the turnpike with me, and Loring's behind the rock wall on the opposite
side of the turnpike, in echelon to him. Ector's brigade was on my left,
occupying that side of the angle. It was prolonged in same direction by
Lowrey's (Cheatham's) division. My line was formed with Jackson's brigade on
the right, then Finley's and Tyler's in succession, with no support. The hill
on which my left rested was confronted by a similar one within 400 yards and an
open field in the intervening valley. On this hill the enemy had planted
several rifle pieces during the night. There was a deflection on the left of
this, and then a series of hills occupied by the enemy extending to its left
and culminating opposite Lowrey's left in an irregular range and greater
altitude than those held by us, surmounted here and there by a commanding peak.
This range of hills, from the point where Lowrey's left rested, extended at
right angles across the Granny White turnpike, almost parallel to and in rear
of my line of battle, a distance of not more than 600 yards, with open fields
between. At daylight I found a road skirting the inner border of the hills on
my left over which artillery could pass, but not without difficulty. I ordered
Captain Beauregard to send a section of howitzers and place them upon a small
plateau making out from the declivity of the hill just in rear of Finley's
brigade, from which they could sweep the front of my right and the entire line
of General Walthall. A desultory fire by sharpshooters was kept up during the
night and morning until about 8 o'clock, when the enemy began to deploy
additional masses, advanced his lines into the woods held by Stewart's corps
the night previous, where he soon planted batteries. He made a feeble charge
along my front and was quickly repulsed. About this time Ector's brigade was
taken out of the line and put in reserve, and I was ordered to extend to the
left. This not only gave me an additional ground to occupy, but necessarily
thinned my lines, as I had no reserves. The line established by Ector's brigade
had been located in the darkness of the night, and was, unfortunately, placed
back from the brow of the hill, not giving a view and range on the front of
more than from five to twenty yards, and the curvature of the hill, as well as
the gradual recession of the lines from the angle, forbid any flank fire giving
protection to the front of the angle. The works were flimsy, only intended to
protect against small-arms, and had no abatis or other obstruction to impede
the movements of an assaulting party. From the hour this became a part of my
line it was impossible to remedy it. The constant fire of sharpshooters from
the neighboring hills made it fatal to attempt a work in front. To advance my
line and attack the enemy was the only way to relieve the situation, and to do
that was to attack a re-entering angle of breastworks, which, of course, could
not be done unless the whole line moved. The enemy opened a most terrific fire
of artillery, and kept it up during the day. In the afternoon he planted a
battery in the woods in the rear of Mrs. Bradford's house and fired directly
across both lines composing the angle; threw shells directly in the back of my
left brigade; also placed a battery on a hill diagonally to my left, which took
my first brigade in reverse. The batteries on the hill in its front, not more
than 300 yards distant, that had borne the concentrated fire of my Whitworth
rifles all day, must have suffered heavily, but were not silenced. These rifled
guns of the enemy being so close razeed the works on the left of the angle for
fifty or sixty yards. Ector's brigade was withdrawn from its supporting
position in rear of the angle, and left me without any support whatever, at
which transfer I remonstrated. The enemy was in two lines in my front, and in
the afternoon moved by his right flank from direction of the Granny White
turnpike, and massed by advancing a skirmish line at a time under the brow of
the hill near the angle. I made this known to General Cheatham by a staff
officer (Lieutenant Rogan), and asked for re-enforcement. The general informed
me that he had nothing that could possibly be spared, and desired me to extend
still farther to the left, as he had to withdraw strength from his front to
protect his left, which had been turned. About this time the brigade on the
extreme left of our infantry line of battle was driven back, down the hill into
the field in my rear, and the balls of the enemy were fired into the backs of
(killing and wounding) my men. The lines on the left (as you go into Nashville)
of the Granny White pike at this juncture were the three sides of a square, the
enemy shooting across the two parallel lines. My men were falling fast. I saw
and fully appreciated the emergency, and passed in person along the trenches in
the angle built by Ector's brigade, where I had placed troops who I knew to be
unsurpassed for gallantry and endurance, and encouraged them to maintain their
places. The men saw the brigade on the left of our line of battle give way and
the enemy take its place on the hills in my rear, yet they stood firm and
received the fire from three directions with coolness and courage. Anticipating
a disaster I ordered Captain Beauregard, who commanded my artillery, to move
his battalion back to the Franklin turnpike, as the enemy already had the
Granny White pike in our rear, which was my channel for escape, as per order in
the forenoon. About 4 p.m. the enemy with heavy force assaulted the line near
the angle, and carried it at that point where Ector's brigade had built the
light works, which were back from the brow of the hill and without
obstructions; not, however, until the gallant and obstinate Colonel Shy and
nearly half of his brave men had fallen, together with the largest part of the
three right companies of the Thirty-seventh Georgia, which regiment constituted
my extreme left. When the breach was made, this command--the consolidated
fragments of the Second, Tenth, Fifteenth, Twentieth, Thirtieth, and
Thirty-seventh Tennessee Regiments--still contested the ground, under Major
Lucas, and, finally, when overwhelming numbers pressed them back, only
sixty-five of the command escaped, and they not as a command, but individuals.
The command was nearly annihilated, as the official reports of casualties show.
Whether the yielding of gallant and well-tried troops to such pressure is
reprehensible or not, is for a brave and generous country to decide. The breach
once made, the lines lifted from either side as far as I could see almost
instantly and fled in confusion. Two regiments, the Twenty-ninth and Thirtieth
Georgia, then my extreme right, commanded by Colonel Mitchell (Jackson's
brigade), and adjoining Walthall’s division, did not break, but remained
fighting until surrounded. The section of artillery under Lieutenant Alston was
turned on the enemy and fired after being completely flanked and our lines
vanishing. I mention it in compliment to this gallant lieutenant. I first
sought to rally the men and form line in the wooded bottom in rear of Strahl's
brigade, Lowrey's right, but found it yielding to the example on its right
(there being no pressure of consequence either on its front or that of my
extreme left), and hence it was impossible to do so. I was then directed by
General Cheatham to form a line at Lea's house, on opposite side of Granny
White turnpike, but found on getting there that our lines on that flank had
also given way, and the enemy already commanding it with his small-arms. The
men then, one by one, climbed over the rugged hills in our rear and passed down
a short valley which debouched into the Franklin turnpike. The whole army on
this thoroughfare seemed to be one heterogeneous mass, and moving back without
organization or government. Strenuous efforts were made by officers of all grades
to rally and form line of battle, but in vain. The disorganized masses swept in
confusion down the Franklin turnpike, amid the approaching darkness and
drenching rain, until beyond Brentwood, when the fragments of commands were, in
some measure, united, and bivouacked in groups for the night.
At daylight [17th] I
moved my command across Harpeth River, through Franklin, to Spring Hill, and
next day crossed Rutherford's Creek, formed line of battle, and bivouacked for
the night.
The enemy's advance
appearing on the morning of the 19th slight skirmishing ensued. I retired with
my command, in conjunction with Cheatham's corps, across Duck River, at
Columbia, that evening. My division moved without separation from its corps and
crossed the Tennessee River, at Bainbridge, on the evening of the 25th of
December.
To my senior brigade
commander, General H. R. Jackson, I am especially indebted, not only for the
prompt and willing execution of orders, but for many practical suggestions
based upon his large experience, for his conspicuous gallantry and resistless
energy. General T. B. Smith, commanding Tyler's brigade, and Col. Robert
Bullock (Finley's), bore themselves with heroic courage both through good and
evil fortune, always executing orders with zeal and alacrity, and bearing
themselves in the face of the enemy as became reputations which each had
heretofore bravely won. The latter was severely wounded on the 4th of December,
near Murfreesborough, and was succeeded by Major Lash, whose coolness and
gallantry was marked. He, together with Brigadier-Generals Jackson and Smith,
was captured at Nashville, and are yet in prison. Major Ball having arrived,
and being ranking officer present in Finley's brigade, assumed command and
conducted it at Nashville.
Captain Beauregard,
commanding my artillery, showed merit beyond his years, [and] managed the
battalion not only to my satisfaction, but to the good of the service and to
his own credit.
I take pleasure in
making my acknowledgments for their promptness and gallantry to Maj. Arthur
Shaaff, my inspector; Capt. H. J. Cheney, my assistant adjutant-general;
Lieuts. R. B. McClure, John B. Pirtle, and Charles B. Regan, of my personal
staff; and Capt. W. H. Rhea, paymaster of my division, who participated with us
in the fight without obligation to do so; also to Lieutenant Magruder, my
ordnance officer. I am also much indebted to my chief surgeon, Doctor McDowell,
for his skill and unwearying application to his delicate trust; to Maj. John L.
Brown, commissary, for his success in getting up and distributing supplies
under most embarrassing circumstances; and Maj. E. P. Tyree, quartermaster, for
his promptness, vigilance, and success in managing his department without loss
during the long march and hazardous retreat of either wagons or supplies.
My escort company,
under Capt. J. H. Buck and Lieut. J. W. Henderson, merits my special
commendation for gallantry upon the field and the faithful and cheerful
performance of all duty devolving upon them. My excellent pioneer company,
under Lieut. H. W. Reddick, labored day and night without murmur, for which
they will receive my thanks. My provost-guard was most efficiently managed by
Capt. Matthew Dwyer, for which I am under obligations. My squad of
sharpshooters (with Whitworth rifles), under Lieut. A. B. Schell, behaved with
marked gallantry on every occasion when brought into requisition.
In this report I
have dealt more in particulars for the reason there are no reports from brigade
commanders, all three of whom having been captured, I reserve to myself the
privilege of making such corrections as would appear right and proper when I
subsequently have the opportunity to examine their reports.
Assistant Adjutant-General.
_______________
* For portion of
report here omitted, see Vol. XXXIX, Part I, p. 826.
