Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 9. — Report of Maj. Gen. U S. Stanley, U. S. Army, commanding Fourth Army Corps, of operations November 14—December 1, 1864.

No. 9.

Report of Maj. Gen. David S. Stanley, U. S. Army, commanding Fourth Army Corps, of operations November 14—December 1, 1864.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY CORPS,        

Huntsville, Ala., February 25, 1865.*

On the 14th [November] Major-General Schofield arrived and assumed command, by direction of Major-General Thomas. On the 21st it became positively known, from a dispatch intercepted by General Hatch's pickets and from other sources, that the enemy were moving north and in the direction of Columbia The roads, however, off the pikes were very bad, it having rained very heavily for some days, and then frozen, but not hard enough to bear wagons. It was believed the enemy could make but little speed, and the evacuation of Pulaski was made the afternoon of the 23d. The corps marched to Lynnville that night, to which place the Second Division (General Wagner) had moved the day before. During the night it was learned that the enemy had made good use of his time, notwithstanding the bad roads, and that Colonel Capron's brigade had been driven out of Mount Pleasant; it was believed by an infantry force. This information was received about 1 o'clock at night, and the troops were immediately waked up and put in motion for Columbia, twenty-one miles distant. General Cox's division, of the Twenty-third Corps, was ten miles nearer Columbia, and marching at the same hour as ourselves he arrived in time to save Capron's brigade of cavalry from annihilation and perhaps the town of Columbia from capture. Turning west at a point three miles south of Columbia, on the Pulaski pike, General Cox, by a cross road, reached the Mount Pleasant pike, and immediately attacking the advancing rebels, drove them back. As fast as the divisions of the Fourth Corps arrived they were placed in line of battle and immediately intrenched themselves. The First Division, Brigadier-General Whitaker, did not get into position until after night. The enemy's cavalry made some demonstrations upon our left flank during the march, but were easily driven off by a regiment of infantry commanded by Colonel Knefler. During the 24th and 25th a very strong and complete set of earth-works were constructed, but the line being very long, and leaving no disposable troops after properly occupying it, two divisions of the corps were withdrawn from it on the night of the 25th to occupy a short and interior line, leaving General Wood's division to hold the front, formerly held by the entire corps. Cox's division, of the Twenty-third Corps, at the same time crossed to the north of Duck River, and General Ruger commenced the construction of a bridge-head.

The enemy undoubtedly deployed their whole force upon our front, and they made several attacks upon our pickets; but it became evident very soon that Hood was moving to the east, and most likely with a view of crossing Duck River above us. The intentions of the enemy became so apparent that it was determined to cross the entire of our force to the north bank of Duck River. The night of the 26th orders were given accordingly, but the night was so dark and the rain poured down so that no progress could be made crossing the artillery, and at midnight the movement was given up and the artillery replaced in position. During the night of the 27th the withdrawal to the north side of Duck River was made very successfully, the pickets leaving the outside line and falling back to the first line of works at 7 o'clock and remaining one hour, when they fell back to the interior line abandoned by the troops, holding that line until near daylight. The fort and magazine were fired, but the destruction was not very complete. The morning of the 28th we occupied the high ground immediately north of Duck River, from below the railroad bridge to about a mile above Columbia. The railroad and pontoon bridges had been destroyed. The enemy could be seen in full view across the river. The troops were employed on the 28th in strengthening their position on the north bank of Duck River; one brigade, Whitaker's, was sent back to Rutherford's Creek to protect all the trains of the army parked near the crossing on the Franklin pike. About 3 p.m. it was learned that Forrest's cavalry had driven Colonel Capron's brigade of cavalry to the north bank of Duck River, eleven miles above, and that the rebel cavalry had effected a crossing to the same side. Later in the evening the pickets of Wood's division reported the enemy crossing cavalry at Huey's Mills, five miles above Columbia. A reconnaissance sent after dark failed to find the enemy, but early on the morning of the 29th General Wilson sent word that the enemy had laid a pontoon bridge at Huey's Mills.

At 8 a.m. on the 29th I started to Spring Hill with the First and Second Divisions, all the artillery that could be spared, and all trains and ambulances to follow; at the same time a reconnaissance, consisting of Colonel Post's brigade, of Wood's division, was sent up the river, and soon sent back word that the enemy was crossing infantry and wagons and moving off rapidly to the north and parallel to the turnpike. It being apprehended that the enemy might make a flank attack upon the position of our force between Duck River and Rutherford's Creek, the First Division, General Kimball commanding, was halted, and took up position to cover the crossing of the creek. At 11.30 o'clock the head of the Second Division was within two miles of Spring Hill. A cavalry soldier, who seemed badly scared, was met here, who stated that a scout had come in from the direction of Raleigh [Rally] Hill, and reported that Buford's division of rebel cavalry was all way between Raleigh [Rally] Hill and Spring Hill, and on the march to the latter place. The Second Division was pushed on, and, attracted by the firing east of the village, double-quicked into the place and deployed the leading brigade as they advanced, drove off a force of the enemy's cavalry which was driving our small force of cavalry and infantry and would very soon have occupied the town. General Wagner was ordered to deploy his division at once; Opdycke's and Lane's brigades to cover as much space about the village as would serve for room to park the trains; General Bradley's brigade was sent to occupy a wooded knoll about three-quarters of a mile east of the pike, and which commanded the approaches from that direction.

Up to this time it was thought we had only cavalry to contend with, but a general officer and his staff, at whom we sent some complimentary shells, were seen reconnoitering our position, and very soon afterward General Bradley was assailed by a force which the men said fought too well to be any dismounted cavalry. I received General Schofield's dispatch about the same time, telling me that the rebels had been crossing the river, and leaving no doubt but that we now confronted a superior force of rebel infantry. About the same time an attack was made upon a small wagon train, composed of some pressed wagons which had passed on, by rebel cavalry, at Reynolds' [Thompson's] Station, three miles toward Franklin, and simultaneously the rebel cavalry appeared west of us and threatened the railroad station of Spring Hill. Thus we were threatened and attacked from every direction, and it was impossible to send any re-enforcements to Bradley's brigade, which had become quite severely engaged, lest in so doing we should expose the train and artillery park to destruction. The enemy made two assaults on Bradley's position, and were severely handled and repulsed; but finding his flank the third time they overlapped him on his right,. and the general at the time receiving a severe wound whilst encouraging his men, his brigade was driven back to the outskirts of the village, where we rallied them and again formed them in line. The enemy attempted to follow up his advantage, but coming across the corn-field toward the village they fell under the fire of at least eight pieces of artillery, at good range for spherical case-shot, and received a fire in flank from a section of a battery which had been placed on the pike south of the village. A part of the rebel force making the charge fled to their rear, and a portion ran down into a ravine between their own and our lines and concealed themselves in the bed of the small stream, neither able to crawl forward or go back until night-fall. This was the condition of affairs when night fell. General Bradley's brigade had lost about 150 men in killed, wounded, and missing. We now know that the enemy lost, according to the statement of one of their surgeons who was on the field, 500 men. Our greatest loss was in the disabling of so intrepid an officer as General Bradley.

As night closed we could see the enemy rapidly extending his lines, and by 8 o'clock it was evident that at least a corps of Hood's army was formed in line of battle, facing the turnpike, and at a near distance of but little more than a half a mile from it. General Schofield arrived from Columbia at 7 o'clock in the evening with Ruger's division. He found the enemy on the pike, and had quite a skirmish in driving them off. My pickets had reported seeing rebel columns passing east of our position as if to get possession of the hills at Thompson's Station, and the anxious question arose whether we could force our way through to Franklin. It was determined to attempt this, and General Schofield pushed on with Ruger's division to ascertain the condition of affairs. He found that the enemy did not attempt to hold the road. It was now 11 o'clock at night, and Cox's division had just arrived from in front of Columbia; the division pushed on at once for Franklin. From a rebel officer, captain and adjutant-general of Cleburne's division, we learned that it was his division of the rebel army we had been fighting. Wood's division, of the Fourth Corps, arrived just after Cox. The enemy's skirmishers fired into the column frequently, and stampeded a new regiment which had just joined the day before; but instructions were sent to push on and not get into a fight if the enemy kept off the road, and in half an hour after General Wood's division arrived I had the satisfaction of meeting the head of General Kimball's column, which got through with some skirmishing. So close were the enemy on our flank that, when a column was not passing, it was difficult for a staff officer or an orderly to get through on the road. General Cox's division was out of the way, and the train commenced to pull out at 1 o'clock the morning of the 30th. The number of wagons, including artillery and ambulances, was about 800. At the very starting point they had to pass singly over a bridge, and it was exceedingly doubtful whether the train could be put on the road by daylight. Unless this could be done, and the corps put in motion, we were sure of being attacked at daylight and of being compelled to fight under every disadvantage. I was strongly advised to burn the train, and move on with the troops and such wagons as could be saved, but I determined to make an effort to save the train. My staff officers were busily employed hurrying up teamsters, and everything promised well, when we were again thrown into despair by the report that the train was attacked north of Thompson's Station, and that the whole train had stopped.

It was now 3 o'clock in the morning. General Kimball was directed to push on with the First Division and clear the road. General Wood's division, which had deployed in the night north of Spring Hill and, facing the east, had covered the road, was directed to move on, keeping off the road and on the right flank of the train, and General Wagner's division, although wearied by the fighting of the day before, was detailed to bring up the rear. Before Kimball's division could reach the point at which the train was attacked, Major Steele, of my staff, had gotten up a squad of our stragglers and driven off the rebels making the attack; they had succeeded in burning about ten wagons. The trains moved on again, and at about 5 o'clock I had the satisfaction of seeing the last wagon pass the small bridge. The entire corps was on the road before daylight. The rebel cavalry was in possession of all the hills to our right, and made numerous demonstrations upon our flank, but were easily driven off by General Wood's skirmishers, and when finally a section of Canby's battery unlimbered and threw a few shells into them the rebel cavalrymen disappeared and troubled us no more. Colonel Opdycke's brigade formed the rear guard, and rendered excellent service, skirmishing all the way with the rebel force following us and forcing our stragglers and lame men, of whom there were many, to make a final effort to reach Franklin. General Kimball's division reached Franklin soon after 9 o'clock and took up position on the right of the Twenty-third Corps, the right flank of the division resting on the Harpeth below Franklin. The line selected by General Schofield was about a mile and a half in length, and inclosed Franklin, resting the flanks upon the river above and below the town. The trains were all crossed over to the north side of the Harpeth; Wood's division was also crossed and posted to watch the fords below the place. Colonel Opdycke reached the heights two miles south of Franklin at 12 m. He was directed to halt on the hills to observe the enemy. Croxton's brigade of cavalry was steadily pushed back by the enemy's infantry column on the Lewisburg pike, and at 1 o'clock General Wagner reported heavy columns of infantry approaching on the Columbia and Lewisburg pikes. General Wagner was instructed to fall back before the advance of the enemy, observing them. About the same time word was received that the rebels were trying to force a crossing at Hughes' Ford, two miles above Franklin.

From 1 o'clock until 4 in the evening the enemy's entire force was in sight and forming for attack, yet in view of the strong position we held, and reasoning from the former course of the rebels during this campaign, nothing appeared so improbable as that they would assault. I felt so confident in this belief that I did not leave General Schofield's headquarters until the firing commenced. About 4 o'clock the enemy advanced with his whole force, at least two corps, making a bold and persistent assault, which, upon a part of the line, lasted about forty minutes. When Wagner's division fell back from the heights south of Franklin, Opdycke's brigade was placed in reserve in rear of our main line, on the Columbia pike. Lane's and Conrad's brigades were deployed--the former on the right, the other the left of the pike--about 300 yards in front of the main line. Here the men, as our men always do, threw up a barricade of rails. By whose mistake I cannot tell, it certainly was never a part of my instructions, but these brigades had orders from General Wagner not to retire to the main line until forced to do so by the fighting of the enemy. The consequence was that the brigades stood their ground until the charging rebels were almost crossing bayonets with them, but the line then broke--Conrad's brigade first, then Lane's--and men and officers made the quickest time they could to our main lines. The old soldiers all escaped, but the conscripts being afraid to run under fire, many of them were captured. Conrad's brigade entered the main line near the Columbia pike, Colonel Lane's several hundred yards to the right of the pike. A large proportion of Lane's men came back with loaded muskets, and turning at the breastworks, they fired a volley into the pressing rebels now not ten steps from them. The part of the Twenty-third Corps stationed in the works for a distance of about three [hundred] or four [hundred] yards to the right of the Columbia pike, and which space took in the First Kentucky and Sixth Ohio Batteries, broke and ran to the rear with the fugitives from Conrad's brigade. To add to the disorder the caissons of the two batteries galloped rapidly to the rear, and the enemy appeared on the breast-works and in possession of the two batteries, which they commenced to turn upon us. It was at this moment I arrived at the scene of disorder, coming from the town on the Columbia pike; the moment was critical beyond ally I have known in any battle--could the enemy hold that part of the line, he was nearer to our two bridges than the extremities of our line. Colonel Opdycke's brigade was lying down about 100 yards in rear of the works. I rode quickly to the left regiment and called to them to charge; at the same time I saw Colonel Opdycke near the center of his line urging his men forward. I gave the colonel no order, as I saw him engaged in doing the very thing to save us, viz, to get possession of our line again. The retreating men of Colonel Conrad's brigade, and, I believe, the men of the Twenty-third Corps, seeing the line of Opdycke's brigade start for the works, commenced to rally. I heard the old soldiers call out, "Come on, men, we Call go wherever the general can," and making a rush, our men immediately retook all the line, excepting a small portion just in front of the brick house on the pike. A force of the rebels held out at this point, and for fifteen or twenty minutes, supported by a rebel line fifty yards to the rear, poured in a severe fire upon our men. So deadly was this fire that it was only by the most strenuous exertions of the officers that our men could be kept to the line; our exertions, however, succeeded, and in twenty minutes our front was comparatively clear of rebels, who fell back to the position formerly held by the two brigades of the Second Division in the commencement of the fight, from whence they kept up a fire until midnight, when we withdrew. Just after the retaking of the line by our troops, as I was passing toward the left to General Cox's position, my horse was killed, and no sooner had I regained my feet than I received a musket-ball through the back of my neck. My wound, however, did not prevent my keeping the field, and General Cox kindly furnished me a remount. The rapidity of the firing made it very difficult to keep up the ammunition, the train being some two miles distant on the road to Nashville when the battle commenced, and our greatest danger at one period of the battle was that we would exhaust our ammunition. One hundred wagon-loads of ammunition, artillery and musket cartridges, were expended in this short battle, belonging to the ordnance train of the Fourth Army Corps; this train, however, supplied in great part the wants of the Twenty-third Corps.

After the first great attack and repulse the enemy made several feeble demonstrations, and until 9 o'clock in the evening formed and advanced upon the Columbia pike three or four times. I think these movements were made to keep us from moving, or to ascertain the very moment we left. At the commencement of the engagement word came that the enemy's cavalry had forced a crossing at Hughes' Ford, and calling upon me for support for our cavalry. General Wood was directed to send a brigade, and General Beatty's brigade had started, when information came that our cavalry had driven the rebels back and the re-enforcements would not be needed. General Kimball's division, holding the extreme right of the line, had comparatively an easy thing of this fight; being well posted behind breast-works, their volleys soon cleared their front of rebels. One brigade, Colonel Kirby's, only had the opportunity to fire one volley, and this was a very effective one, at a rebel brigade which endeavored to move obliquely across our front to gain the right bank of the river. It having been determined to withdraw the troops to Nashville, they were directed to leave the line at midnight, the flanks withdrawing first and simultaneously, the pickets to be withdrawn when all the troops had crossed. Some villain came very near frustrating this plan by firing a house in Franklin; the flames soon spread, and the prospect was that a large fire would occur, which, lighting up objects, would make it impossible to move the troops without being seen. My staff officers and General Wood's found an old fire engine, and getting it at work, the flames were soon subdued and the darkness was found to be increased by the smoke. At midnight the withdrawal was made successfully, although the enemy discovered it and followed our pickets up closely.

General Wood's division remained on the north side of the Harpeth until 4 o'clock in the morning as rear guard, destroying the bridges before he left. The enemy indulged in a furious shelling as soon as they found we had left. In the fight of the day before their artillery had not come up, and but two batteries were used upon us. These two batteries threw shells into the town during the entire fight.

The march was continued to Nashville without interruption; the troops made a short halt at Brentwood to get breakfast and allow the trains to move on. Our men were more exhausted physically than I have ever seen them on any other occasion. From November the 23d, when we left Pulaski, until arriving at Nashville we had been constantly in the immediate presence of an enemy we knew to be vastly superior to us in numbers, closely watching to attack us at disadvantage. With us both mind and body were kept at full stretch, and it was only by night marching and the constant use of intrenchments that we could hope to save ourselves. Many of our men were overtaxed and broke down; unable to travel any longer, they fell into the hands of the enemy. On two occasions the enemy was very near obtaining the advantage he sought of us--the first was when Cox drove back his advance, just about entering Columbia; the second and greatest escape for us was at Spring Hill, where, with a whole corps in line of battle, the left of the line within 600 yards of the road, they allowed all our army, excepting Wagner's division, which had fought them during the day, to pass them with impunity in the night. Upon arriving at Nashville I turned the command of the Fourth Corps over to Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood, and took advantage of leave of absence on account of my wounds.

Before closing this report I must mention the distinguished and faithful service rendered by some of the officers of my command. To Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood I am under more than ordinary obligations for advice, and for his success in selecting every position we occupied from Pulaski to Franklin. To General Whitaker, who commanded the First Division up to Columbia; to General Kimball, who succeeded him, and to General Wagner, commanding the Second Division, I am under many obligations for the zeal in carrying out my plans and orders.

To the members of my staff much is due for the cheerful and thorough manner in which they discharged their constant and severe duties during the campaign. Col. J. S. Fullerton, assistant adjutant-general and chief of staff; Col. W. H. Greenwood, inspector of the corps; Maj. William H. Sinclair, assistant adjutant-general; Maj. J. W. Steele, aide-de-camp; Capt. S. J. Firestone, acting aide-de-camp, and Capt. L. L. Taylor, aide-de-camp---all were most zealous in the discharge of their duties. Colonel Greenwood's duties were particularly important and thoroughly attended to.

To Capt. Lyman Bridges, chief of artillery; to Colonel Hayes, chief quartermaster; to Surg. J. T. Heard, medical director; Captain Hodgdon, chief commissary, and to Captain Tousley, chief of ambulance corps, and Lieutenant Laubach, quartermaster at corps headquarters, I am much indebted for the efficient manner in which they discharged their respective duties.

Before closing this report I will mention the names of Colonel Opdycke, One hundred and twenty-fifth Ohio Volunteer Infantry; Colonel Conrad, Fifteenth Missouri Veteran Volunteers; Lieut. Col. Arthur MacArthur, Twenty-fourth Wisconsin Volunteers; Captain Morgan, assistant adjutant-general, and Captain Tinney, of General Wagner's staff, as some of the officers whom I knew and whom I saw behave most gallantly at the battle of Franklin. Colonel Opdycke's gallant services on that occasion I have before noticed in a communication to department headquarters.

Although Brig. Gen. J. D. Cox was not in my command, he was my close neighbor in the battle of Franklin, and I take this opportunity to express to him my thanks for his gallant help at that time.

A list of casualties has already been furnished. A recommendation for promotion will be forwarded.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. S. STANLEY,        

Major-general.

Brig. Gen. W. D. WHIPPLE,
        Chief of Staff.

_______________

Report of casualties in Fourth Army Corps, at the battle of Franklin, Tenn., November 30, 1864.

	Killed.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Men.	Total.	Officers.	Men.	Total.	Officers.	Men.	Total.	Officers.	Men.
First Division	....	5	5	3	34	37	1	17	18	4	56	60
Second Division	5	47	52	31	488	519	13	657	670	49	1,192	1,241
Third Division	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Artillery Brigade	....	10	10	3	48	51	....	6	6	3	64	67
Total	5	62	67	37	570	607	14	680	694	56	1,312	1,368

NASHVILLE, TENN., December 6, 1864.

ADDENDA.

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANS., December 17, 1866.

Bvt. Brig. Gen. W. D. WHIPPLE,
        Assistant Adjutant-General, Dept. of the Tennessee:

My report of the battle of Franklin, November 30, 1864, was, from unavoidable circumstances, not written until the 25th of February ensuing. In the notice of the services of my staff on the day of battle I omitted mentioning the name of Capt. John D. Moxley, First Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, one of my aides-de-camp. I take this opportunity, though late, to correct my report. Captain Moxley did his duty gallantly and well on that day, and was busy throughout the fight encouraging and rallying our troops.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. S. STANLEY,        

Colonel Twenty-second Infantry, Brevet Major-General.

_______________

* For portion of report here omitted, relating to operations in North Georgia and North Alabama, see Vol. XXXIX, Part I, p. 907.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 112-9

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: March 15, 1865

Warm and cloudy. My cabbages coming up in the garden.

The papers contain no war news whatever, yet there is great activity in the army.

Sheridan's column is said to be at Ashland, and Grant is reported to be sending swarms of troops to the north side of the river, below, "in countless thousands."

The President's message, for the completion of which Congress was desired to remain, has been sent in. I will preserve this splendidly exordiumed and most extraordinary document. It is a great legal triumph, achieved by the President over his enemies in Congress, and if we are permitted to have more elections, many obnoxious members will be defeated, for the sins of omission and commission. The President strikes them "between wind and water," at a time, too, when no defense would be listened to, for he says the capital was never in such danger before, and shows that without prodigious effort, and perfect co-operation of all branches of the government, the cause is lost, and we shall have negro garrisons to keep us in subjection, commanded by Northern officers. He will have the satisfaction, at least, of having to say a portion of the responsibility rested with his political opponents.

Mr. Benjamin, who is supposed to have written a portion of the message, was very jubilant yesterday, and it is said the President himself was almost jocund as he walked through the Capitol Square, returning home from his office.

It is now rumored that a French agent is in the city, and that the President, besides his message, sent to Congress a secret communication. I doubt—but it may be so.

Gen. Hood is here, on crutches, attracting no attention, for he was not successful.

Judge Campbell, Assistant Secretary of War, said to Mr. Wattles, a clerk, to-day, that we were now arrived at the last days of the Confederacy. Mr. Wattles told me that the judge had been convinced, as far back as 1863, that the cause was nearly hopeless.

Some 1200 of Fitz Lee's cavalry passed through the city at 2 P.M. Gen. Longstreet has been ordered by Gen. Lee to attack Sheridan. He telegraphs back from north of the city that he "cannot find them," and this body of cavalry is ordered to reconnoiter their position. I know not how many more men Fitz Lee has in his division, but fear at least half have passed.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 449-50

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 8. — Report of Surg. George E. Cooper, U. S. Army, Medical Director, Department of the Cumberland.

No. 8.

Report of Surg. George E. Cooper, U. S. Army, Medical Director, Department of the Cumberland.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,                

MEDICAL DIRECTOR'S OFFICE,        

Nashville, Tenn., April 7, 1865.

SIR: My report of the medical department of the Army of the Cumberland from the time of the invasion of Northern Alabama and Tennessee by the rebel army under General Hood till the defeat of the same by the Government forces in front of Nashville, and the pursuit thereof to beyond the Tennessee River, must be a meager and unsatisfactory one in consequence of my having been separated from the army, and not having myself been in active campaign with it until after the battle of Franklin, Tenn., when it presented itself in the defenses of Nashville. The proceedings of the medical corps are, however, exceedingly well pointed out in the accompanying report of Surg. J. Theo. Heard, medical director Fourth Army Corps, who in person accompanied that corps—all that was left as an organized force of the old Army of the Cumberland, the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps having been taken by Major-General Sherman to form a portion of the army with which he made the great raid through Georgia.

At the time of evacuating Atlanta the corps hospitals of the Army of the Cumberland were, as they had been in the summer campaign, fully organized and equipped, and were ready to move at a moment's notice. The general field hospital, under the charge of Surg. M. C. Woodworth, was in fine condition and of sufficient capacity to receive all the sick and wounded of the army, who, on the breaking up of the division hospitals, might require medical treatment. Supplies of all kinds had been called for and procured by the field medical purveyor, and the army corps were amply and liberally supplied. The ambulances, which had been greatly used during the summer campaign, were repaired and put in as serviceable condition as the time and material on hand would admit of. When the rebel army fell upon the line of railroad at our rear the inconvenience suffered therefrom was, as far as the medical department was concerned, in reality nothing. The only article which ran short was whisky, and this was procured in ample quantities from the subsistence department. The quality, though not equal to that furnished by the medical department, was good enough for all practicable purposes.

The Fourth and Fourteenth Army Corps, having been detailed to follow Hood's army to the rear, the sick from their division hospitals were transferred to the general field hospital, where they were cared for as well as could be wished for, and the troops left Atlanta entirely disencumbered with sick or wounded men. What occurred from that time till the last days of November, 1864, is known to me by hearsay only and from reading the reports furnished these headquarters. For this information I refer to the excellent report of Surgeon Heard, medical director, Fourth Army Corps, who, having been one of that little band who held the whole rebel army in check from Decatur, Ala., to Nashville, Tenn., is far more competent to make the report than I. Synchronous with my arrival at Nashville from Atlanta and Chattanooga came reports of the falling back of our army from Pulaski, Tenn., and of heavy and continuous skirmishing with Hood's advance. On the 30th of November came the news that a severe action had taken place near Franklin, Tenn., and that our losses in both killed and wounded had been heavy. The medical director of the Fourth Army Corps was immediately telegraphed to and asked if he required a hospital train, and early next morning hospital train No. 2 was sent to Brentwood, between Nashville and Franklin. On the night of November 30 two freight trains loaded with wounded from skirmishes beyond Franklin, and which had been brought to that place in ambulances, arrived here. The wounded were transferred to the general hospitals here, and were promptly and skillfully cared for by the medical officers there on duty.

On the following day the troops arrived from Franklin, bringing with them quite a number of wounded, but having, unfortunately, been compelled to leave by far the greater portion in the hands of the enemy. Almost at the same time came the troops commanded by Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith. These troops were deficient in almost everything belonging to the hospital department; they had no organized ambulance corps or trains; there was no division or brigade organization of hospitals, but were as they had been from the beginning of the war, and seemed to have learned nothing from experience or the example of others, and opposed every improvement as an innovation. They had but few medical supplies, and were wanting in almost everything which would aid them in alleviating the sufferings of the sick and wounded of their commands. It became necessary to fit them out with all possible dispatch, which was done; and thanks are due to Surg. Robert Fletcher, U.S. Volunteers, medical purveyor, for his energy, efficiency, and promptness in this emergency. No one could have performed the duties of purveyor in a manner more creditable to himself or with greater benefit to the Government.

As soon as the troops arrived in front of Nashville they were placed in the lines and were compelled to throw up intrenchments. They were much prostrated by their constant harassing night and day marches from the Tennessee River to Nashville; but, notwithstanding this, in a short time, by constant and severe labor, works were thrown up which rendered Nashville impregnable. As the army was short of men, it became necessary to call to the aid of the beleaguered city all the troops within call. Consequently, the different detachments of the army which left Atlanta with General Sherman, and had remained behind, in hospitals and otherwise, were organized into a temporary corps under the command of Major-General Steedman. This extemporized corps was without any organization whatever, and to it was attached the regiments of colored troops. It is impossible for me to learn if these troops consider themselves a part and parcel of the Army of the Cumberland, or a separate command made for Colonel Mussey. I should judge them to be out of the department did I take the attention they pay to the existence of this office as a criterion. They are more irregular in forwarding their reports than any regiments in the Army of the Cumberland.

The weather, which, previous to the arrival of the troops, had been moderate, became, shortly after their arrival at Nashville, excessively cold for this latitude. The result of this was much suffering on the part of the troops and the comparative cessation of all offensive measures on the part of either army. At this time the results of the fatigue undergone by the troops in the retreat from Decatur and the subsequent labor in the trenches began to show themselves in the greatly increased number of men who presented themselves for medical treatment. Many, too, who had without detriment to their health undergone all the hardships of the summer and fall campaign, now yielded to the effects of the bitter cold, and diseases of the pulmonary viscera became numerous. Rheumatic affections, too, became quite prevalent. The advent of the rebel army in front of Nashville, and the fact of intrenching itself, rendered the necessity of a general action a moral certainty. To prepare for the sick and wounded of the Government forces demanded a much larger amount of hospital accommodation than was at that time at the disposal of the hospital department. Anticipating a large influx of wounded, the efficient superintendent and director of U.S. general hospitals at Nashville took possession of every building that could be made use of for hospital purposes and had them fitted up with all possible dispatch. Consequently, some 4,000 vacant beds were at the disposal of the medical department. The Assistant Surgeon-General, too, anticipating the necessity, ordered to Nashville a large number of medical officers, of whom many arrived prior to the actions and all in sufficient time to be of the greatest service to the wounded in the battles in front of Nashville. The medical officers of the Fourth Army Corps, being emphatically experts in the care of the wounded after battle, had everything prepared for prompt and efficient action. They had supplied themselves with all the necessaries, and, in addition, had procured all the delicacies within their reach. The result was that after the actions of 15th and 16th of December the men belonging to the Fourth Army Corps, and all who were brought to the field hospitals of that corps, were promptly and skillfully treated and most carefully provided for. Too much praise cannot be awarded to the medical staff of the Fourth Army Corps for their untiring attention and skillful manner of treating the wounded in their division hospitals. Were it not invidious to designate and particularize by name certain officers when all are worthy, I would give a list of the medical officers who so faithfully performed their duty. This I will not do, but justice to themselves demands that I should mention and particularize Surgs. M. G. Sherman, Ninth Indiana Volunteers; Stephen J. Young, Seventy-ninth Illinois Volunteers; E.B. Glick, Fortieth Indiana Volunteers, and C. N. Ellinwood, Seventy-fourth Illinois Volunteers, as men deserving of more than ordinary notice. Previous to the battles instructions had been given to the surgeons in charge to establish division field hospitals as near to the field as practicable, and strict orders were issued directing the surgeons to operate on the field upon all requiring it, previous to transferring the men to the general hospitals in the city.

The weather, which had entirely stopped all offensive military operations, having moderated considerably, the army on the morning of December 15 marched out beyond the fortifications for the purpose of assaulting the enemy's lines. The medical department of the Army of the Cumberland proper were prepared to attend to any number of wounded brought in to them from the field, and established their hospitals as near the front as the safety of the wounded and the configuration of the country would admit of. Water being quite plenty, position only had to be sought for. The extemporized corps, commanded by Major-General Steedman, had no organized medical staff. This was composed of all the surgeons who could be found unattached, in consequence of being on leave of absence or having been separated from their regiments which had marched from Atlanta with Major-General Sherman. To these were added the medical officers of the U.S. Colored Troops. This portion of the medical staff was under the charge of Surg. Josiah D. Cotton, Ninety-second Ohio Volunteers, who acted as medical director. Though hastily brought together and lacking in all the appurtenances for field hospitals, the medical officers of this command did all in their power to assist and relieve the wounded under their charge. The only great drawback to prompt action in this portion of the army was the entire absence of an ambulance corps. The blockade of the Cumberland River by the rebel batteries had prevented the quartermaster's department from bringing a sufficient number to Nashville. To avoid the want of ambulances as much as possible, every one that could be found in Nashville, no matter in what capacity used, was taken possession of and sent into the field, to be used as circumstances might demand. This, in a manner, served in the place of an ambulance corps, but the want of system and organization was most apparent. The soldiery wounded in the action of the 15th of December were, on the same night, brought into the city and placed in the U.S. general hospitals, where every necessary attention was paid them. Such as had not been operated upon were then examined, and such measures were taken as their cases demanded. The wounded in the action of the 16th of December, 1864, were also brought in and placed in the general hospitals. Some were brought in by ambulances of the corps and some by vehicles, which had been impressed for that purpose. Surg. O. Q. Herrick, Thirty-fourth Illinois Volunteers, superintendent of transportation of sick and wounded, made use of all available means to remove from the field each and every wounded man found there. This was a matter of no little labor, for the scene covered several miles, and wounded men were in every portion of it, and the cavalry wounded even farther distant; yet, by midday of the 17th of December all our wounded were in comfortable hospitals, the recipients of every attention that skill and science could furnish. The pursuit of the enemy entailed, as a necessary consequence, much more labor in the care of the wounded. The railroads were destroyed, and all the wounded had to be transferred by means of ambulances to the hospitals at Franklin, Columbia, and Pulaski. This was done under the supervision of Surg. O. Q. Herrick; and too much praise cannot be given him for his untiring energy and labor in collecting and bringing in from the houses in the vicinity of the line of march the wounded of our own and the rebel army. The cavalry in advance paid but little attention to their wounded, but left them in houses by the roadside, to be cared for by the surgeons of the infantry troops who were following. The Fourth Army Corps carried with them the sick and wounded in ambulances until they arrived where proper hospital accommodations could be furnished. The Sixteenth and Twenty-third Army Corps, not being-in the advance, had no wounded to care for.

In Franklin, Columbia, and Pulaski a large number of rebel wounded were found who had been left by their army. A sufficient number of medical officers had been left with them to give them proper attention. These wounded were, as soon as practicable, transferred in hospital cars to Nashville, where they were placed in one large hospital. The medical officer in charge was directed to furnish them all necessaries and such luxuries as the condition of their wounds required. This was done until the arrival of the Commissary-General of Prisoners, who directed that the wounded rebels should be confined to prison hospital rations. I do not think that it is the intention of the Government to deprive wounded men, rebels though they be, of everything needful for their treatment. Prison hospitals being at a distance from the front, it was not expected that wounded men would be brought there till sufficiently well to travel, when diet would be but a matter of minor import. No surgeon can give good results if he be not allowed to use every article called for by sinking nature and to treat disease untrammeled by orders from non-professional men.

The wounded of our armies who were left at Franklin, Columbia, and Pulaski had medical officers detailed to remain with them until the railroad should have been repaired, when those who could bear transportation were to be removed to Nashville. The necessary supplies were left with the sick and wounded as far as was practicable, but not in such abundance as would have been furnished had the railroad been intact.

The weather during the pursuit was of the most disagreeable character. Rain fell for four successive days, and when this ceased the weather grew severely cold. This was followed by rain, rain, rain, and as a sequence mud. Probably in no part of the war have the men suffered more from inclement weather than in the month of December, 1864, when following Hood's retreating army from Nashville to the Tennessee River. The result of this weather and the hard marching was, as might have been looked for, severe affections of the pulmonary viscera, fevers, rheumatism, and diarrheas, which served to fill the hospitals in this vicinity to their utmost capacity.

The number of men wounded in the actions in front of Nashville will never be correctly furnished, in consequence of the character of some of the troops engaged and their having no organized medical department. The records of this office, as far as furnished, show for the actions from Decatur to Nashville, 402 wounded; in front of Nashville and during the pursuit of the rebels, 1,717 wounded. The wounds were caused by musketry, throwing conoidal projectiles, and by artillery of the latest and most approved character. The wounds were received at all distances, from contact with the muzzle of the piece to the extreme range of artillery and musketry. The character of many of the wounds were of the most severe kind, having been received at short range, consequent upon the peculiarity of the battle, which was a series of charges upon heavily fortified lines held by strong forces of the enemy.

The medical officers of the Army of the Cumberland did in this campaign all that men could do to alleviate the sufferings of the wounded soldiery, and have only added to the envious reputation gained by them on many a former battle-field. They are skillful, zealous, untiring, and faithful, knowing their whole duty and doing it most conscientiously. The medical officers of Sixteenth Corps did their duty well and faithfully, but want of systematic organization crippled their movements most perceptibly.

I will transmit the nominal list of wounded as soon as it can be made out; it will be defective in the Cavalry Corps and in those troops commanded by Major-General Steedman.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. E. COOPER,        

Surg., U.S. Army, Medical Director, Dept. of the Cumberland.

ASST. ADJT. GEN., DEPT. OF THE CUMBERLAND,
        Nashville, Tenn.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 107-11

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: January 21, 1865

A dark, cold, sleety day, with rain. Troopers and scouts from the army have icicles hanging from their hats and caps, and their clothes covered with frost, and dripping.

The Examiner this morning says very positively that Mr. Secretary Seddon has resigned. Not a word about Messrs. Benjamin and Mallory—yet. The recent action of Congress is certainly a vote of censure, with great unanimity.

It is said Congress, in secret session, has decreed the purchase of all the cotton and tobacco! The stable locked after the horse is gone! If it had been done in 1861—

Mr. Secretary Trenholm is making spasmodic efforts to mend the currency—selling cotton and tobacco to foreign (Yankee) agents for gold and sterling bills, and buying Treasury notes at the market depreciation. For a moment he has reduced the price of gold from $80 to $50 for $1; but the flood will soon overwhelm all opposition, sweeping every obstruction away.

The Federal papers say they got 2500 prisoners at Fort Fisher.

It is said the President refuses to accept Mr. Seddon's resignation.

A rumor has sprung up to the effect that Judge Campbell, Assistant Secretary of War, has also resigned. If this be so, it will soon produce a great commotion among detailed and exempted men all over the country. Rumors fly thick these dark days. It is a good time, however, for some to resign. The President has need even of incompetent men, and may beg them to remain, etc., and thus they are flattered. But if they really feel that the ship is sinking, they will endeavor to jump ashore, notwithstanding the efforts made to retain them. And then, if the ship should not sink, manned by different men!

I hear nothing more about Gen. Breckinridge as Mr. Seddon's successor, but he is the guest of the old lawyer, G. A. Myers; and it is not probable he is bestowing his bread and meat, in such times as these, for nothing. He has made a fortune, and knows how to increase it—and even ̧ Gen. B. would never be the wiser.

We have at last a letter from Gen. Hood, narrating the battle of Franklin, Tenn. He says he lost about 4500 men—enemy's loss not stated. Failure of Gen. Cheatham to execute an order the day before, prevented him from routing the enemy. His account of the battle of Nashville I have not yet seen—but know enough about it.

Both the Secretary and his Assistant have been pretty constantly engaged, for some time past, in granting passports beyond our lines, and generally into those of the enemy.

Congress has passed an act allowing reserve forces to be ordered anywhere. Upon the heels of this, Governor Smith notifies the Secretary of War that the two regiments of second class militia here, acting with the reserves, shall no longer be under the orders of Gen. Kemper. He means to run a tilt against the President, whereby Richmond may be lost! Now "Tray, Blanche, and Sweetheart, bark at him."

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 393-4

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: January 27, 1865

Clear, and coldest morning of the winter. None but the rich speculators and quartermaster and commissary speculators have a supply of food and fuel. Much suffering exists in the city; and prices are indeed fabulous, notwithstanding the efforts of the Secretary of the Treasury and the press to bring down the premium on gold. Many fear the high members of the government have turned brokers and speculators, and are robbing the country-making friends of the mammon of unrighteousness, against the day of wrath which they see approaching. The idea that Confederate States notes are improving in value, when every commodity, even wood and coal, daily increases in price, is very absurd!

The iron-clad fleet returned, without accomplishing anything— losing one gun-boat and having some fifteen killed and wounded. The lower house of Congress failed yesterday to pass the Midshipman bill over the President's veto—though a majority was against the President.

It is said, and published in the papers, that Mrs. Davis threw her arms around Mr. Blair and embraced him. This, too, is injurious to the President.

My wood-house was broken into last night, and two (of the nine) sticks of wood taken. Wood is selling at $5 a stick this cold morning; mercury at zero.

A broker told me that he had an order (from government) to sell gold at $35 for $1. But that is not the market price.

It is believed (by some credulous people) that Gen. J. E. Johnston will command the army in Virginia, and that Lee will reside here and be commander-in-chief. I doubt. The clamor for Gen. J. seems to be the result of a political combination.

Mr. Hunter came to the department to-day almost in a run. He is excited.

Lieut.-Gen. Hardee, of Charleston, 26th (yesterday), dispatches to the Secretary that he has received an order from Gen. Cooper (Adjutant-General) for the return of the 15th Regiment and 10th Battalion North Carolina troops to North Carolina. He says these are nearly the only regular troops he has to defend the line of the Combahee—the rest being reserves, disaffected at being

detained out of their States. The withdrawal may cause the loss of the State line, and great disaster, etc. etc.

Official statement of Gen. Hood's losses shows 66 guns, 13,000 small arms, etc. The report says the army was saved by sacrificing transportation; and but for this the losses would have been nothing.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 400-1

Diary of Sergeant Daniel L. Ambrose: October 3 – November 10, 1864

From October 3d to November 10th Sherman's army was continually marching, manoeuvering and skirmishing. The battle of Allatoona had been fought, the pass had been defended, the mad men who rushed up those rugged hills had been hurled back, the army of Georgia and Tennessee had been saved by the handful of men who stood there facing the grim monster as man never before had stood, and November 11th we find the armies commanded by General Sherman in the vicinity of Rome and Kingston. Hood was far to the northward. Sherman says: "He may push on his conquests; I will leave Thomas to confront him. I will enter the heart of the Confederacy. I will visit the South with war's stern realities."

Orderlies and aids are dashing hither and thither. The order has been given. Hark! We hear the drum and the bugle, as if to say "Up boys and be ready, for Sherman is going to make a great stride in the South-land." The Seventh is now ready, shod and equipped, and in the evening, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Hector Perrin, we move from Rome about six miles and go into camp.

Rome is now burning, and to-night innocence, beautiful innocence is crying, all because its brothers rebelled; because they leaped from liberty's lap and struck the flag and swore this Union to divide, and her name and her glories to blacken.

SOURCE: Daniel Leib Ambrose, History of the Seventh Regiment Illinois Volunteer Infantry, p. 273-4