Showing posts with label Walter C Whitaker. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Walter C Whitaker. Show all posts

Friday, April 10, 2026

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 13. — Reports of Brig. Gen. Nathan Kimball, U.S. Army, commanding First Division of operations November 30 and December 8 and 14-28, 1864.

No. 13.

Reports of Brig. Gen. Nathan Kimball, U.S. Army, commanding First Division of operations November 30 and December 8 and 14-28, 1864.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, FOURTH ARMY CORPS,        
Near Nashville, Tenn., December 5, 1864.

COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by my division in the battle at Franklin, Tenn., on the 30th ultimo:

On the evening of the 29th orders were received to withdraw from our position on the north side of Duck River, opposite Columbia, my division to cover the retreat of the entire army. After the Twenty-third Corps and the Third Division of the Fourth Corps had withdrawn and passed Rutherford's Creek I withdrew my division, and at 12 midnight crossed Rutherford's Creek and moved on rapidly to Spring Hill, passing within 300 yards of the rebel lines. Here I joined the Second and Third Divisions of this corps. Receiving orders from Major-General Stanley, I at once took position on the left of the road, covering the artillery and trains of the Fourth Corps, and moved forward toward Franklin. We had proceeded about three miles, when word was sent me that the enemy had attacked and were burning the train of the Twenty-third Corps, which was in our front and without guard. I at once sent Col. I. M. Kirby, commanding my First Brigade, forward to save the train if possible. Colonel Kirby was prompt in his movements and reached the point in time, driving the rebels off and saving all but ten wagons, which the rebels had burned before he came up. From this point we moved on to Franklin, at which point we arrived at 12 m. of the 30th. Receiving orders, I went into position, on the right of the Twenty-third Army Corps, in the following order: My right, composed of the Second Brigade, Brig. Gen. W. C. Whitaker commanding, resting on the Harpeth River; my left, the Third Brigade, Brigadier-General Grose commanding, resting on the Centerville pike, and connecting with the Second Division of the Twenty-third Corps; my First Brigade, Col. I. M. Kirby commanding, in the center. Captain Ziegler's battery, (B) Pennsylvania Artillery, having reported to me, was placed in position by General Grose on the left of the division, near the Centerville pike. General Cox, commanding Twenty-third Corps, calling upon me for a regiment to re-enforce the Second Division of that corps, I detached the One hundred and first Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel McDanald commanding, from my First Brigade, and ordered it to report to General Ruger. I have no report from it, but am informed by the officer in command of that line that it behaved splendidly, holding a position from which two regiments had been compelled to retire until the end of the battle.

Having established my line I gave direction that barricades should be made, and by 4 p.m. my men had thrown up excellent barricades the entire length of our line. Thus having completed our works, with skirmishers thrown forward, we awaited the approach of the enemy. At near 5 o'clock he made his appearance in my front in heavy force, moving in line of battle, advancing upon us, my skirmishers retiring gradually before them to my main line. The enemy advanced to within 250 yards of my main line, when my men opened upon them with such precision that the rebel line was literally mown down. The destruction of the enemy was terrible indeed, yet they pressed forward with still another line, seemingly determined to carry our position. Reaching within a few yards of our line, my men gave them such deadly volleys that their lines mostly fell killed or wounded; the survivors broke and fell back in great confusion. In about half an hour after this first repulse the enemy again made his appearance, more to my center and right, and again was he driven back in confusion, and with terrible slaughter. Still not satisfied, and waiting until it was dark, the enemy again advanced and attempted to carry our position, but was again repulsed; after this last repulse of the enemy my skirmishers were again thrown forward from the main line some 300 yards, and remained in their position until the army was withdrawn to the north side of the Harpeth River. It was Loring's division, of Stewart's corps, and a part of Lee's corps, of the rebel army, that engaged my division, as we ascertained from prisoners captured. Captain Ziegler's battery on this, as on former occasions, did splendidly, inflicting severe punishment upon the enemy, and, in fact, at one time prevented the enemy penetrating our line near the right of Second Division, Twenty-third Corps. Too much praise cannot be awarded this battery.

At midnight, in obedience to orders, I withdrew my division from its position, leaving my skirmishers on duty in front of the line, and moved to the bridge to effect a crossing, as I had been directed to move at once upon Brentwood to take up position until the army should arrive; but to my surprise I found the way blocked up by other troops who had left their position in advance of the time, and hence was unable to cross in advance, but was compelled to wait and take the position which others should have taken. General Grose's brigade (the Third), of my division, was the last of the army to withdraw from the line in front of Franklin. My skirmishers stood alone in front of the enemy until the army had crossed Harpeth River, and I am proud to say that every man of my division was in his place and all came off in good order. My dead were buried and all my wounded brought away. My loss is 60 in killed, wounded, and missing, as will be seen by the inclosed report.

Every officer and man of this division behaved nobly and is entitled to the highest praise. Brigadier-Generals Grose and Whitaker and Col. I. M. Kirby, my brigade commanders, are officers worthy to command such noble men as those composing their brigades. They all deserve well of their country, and I again recommend Col. I. M. Kirby, of the One hundred and first Ohio, for promotion. I am greatly indebted to every member of my staff for valuable services rendered during the engagement. One of my aides, Lieut. Joseph O. Waters, was severely wounded in the right arm while conveying orders. Every officer and man of the division and of my staff has my thanks and commendations for his services and noble bearing.

For further details you are referred to the inclosed reports of brigade and regimental commanders.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

NATHAN KIMBALL,        
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Lieut. Col. J. S. FULLERTON,
        Assistant Adjutant-General, Fourth Army Corps.

[Inclosure.]

Return of casualties of First Division, Fourth Army Corps, at the battle  of  Franklin, Tenn., November 30, 1864.

Command.

Killed.

Wounded.

Missing.

Aggregate.

Officers.

Men.

Total.

Officers.

Men.

Total.

Officers.

Men.

Total.

First Brigade

....

2

2

....

8

8

1

3

4

14

Second Brigade

....

....

....

1

4

5

....

4

4

9

Third Brigade

....

3

3

2

22

24

....

10

10

37

Total

....

5

5

3

34

37

1

17

18

60


NATHAN KIMBALL,        
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
_______________

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, FOURTH ARMY CORPS,        
Nashville, Tenn., December 8, 1864.

COLONEL: In obedience to orders I have the honor to make the following report relative to the affair on my picket-line to-day:

The enemy advanced a strong skirmish line and drove my pickets from their position, taking possession, for a short time, of my line. My pickets were reformed and advanced as skirmishers, driving the rebels back and regaining their original position, and which they now hold. The picket-line of the Twenty-third Corps immediately on my left gave way first, thereby enabling the enemy to enfilade my line. In order to regain possession of the original position, I took a section of Ziegler's battery to a position near the Franklin pike, in rear of my picket reserves, and opened fire upon the rebel lines. They gave way in confusion, and I then advanced my picket-line, and at the same time the picket-line of the Twenty-third Army Corps (Cox's division) went forward. Two prisoners were captured, belonging respectively to Stevenson's and Johnson's divisions.

I have the honor to be, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

NATHAN KIMBALL,        
Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers.
Lieutenant-Colonel FULLERTON,
        Chief of Staff, Fourth Army Corps.
_______________

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, FOURTH ARMY CORPS,        
Huntsville, Ala., January 6, 1865.

COLONEL: I have the honor to report that on the evening of the 14th of December last I received the order of the general commanding the corps to be ready to march at 6 o'clock the next morning, for the purpose of attacking the rebel army, then intrenched before Nashville. At that hour my command was under arms, and immediately after daybreak it was moved toward the right and out through our line of works on the Hillsborough pike, and put in position—the Third Brigade, Brig. Gen. William Grose commanding, on the right, his right extending to the position taken by the left of the Second Division of this corps, and the First Brigade, Col. I. M. Kirby commanding, on the left, his left resting on the Hillsborough pike; the Second Brigade, Brig. Gen. Walter C. Whitaker commanding, was placed in reserve opposite my center. All of my brigades were formed in two lines of battle. During the forenoon my line was advanced, driving the enemy's skirmishers before it to a ridge fronting and about 1,000 yards from Montgomery's Hill, where the enemy had strong works and a battery commanding the Hillsborough pike. In this advance my command had obliqued to the left, conforming its movements to adjacent commands, and nearly all of the First Brigade crossed the turnpike and took position to the left of it. Ziegler's battery (B, Second Independent Pennsylvania Artillery) had been ordered to report to the, and was placed in position on the ridge before spoken of, near the pike, and on the left of it. About midway between this position and Montgomery's Hill, in front of my left, intervened a small ridge of ground, which almost disappeared at the Hillsborough pike, in front of my left center. The country between my position and the enemy's works was open, and every movement of my troops could be plainly seen by him. At 2 p.m. I was ordered to occupy this ridge, which was promptly done by Kirby's brigade, Grose's brigade connecting with his right. The right of Grose's brigade in this movement was retired to protect my right flank, which was left exposed in consequence of the Second Division not having moved at the same time. Ziegler was sent forward with his battery, and took position on the Hillsborough pike, on the right of First Brigade, and within easy musket-range of the enemy's works. From this point he kept up a galling and continuous fire upon the enemy, sending many of his shells through the rebel embrasures into their ranks. Upon securing the ridge of ground referred to it was discovered that at the foot of the slope toward the enemy there was an old road, somewhat worn by rains and long use, and which Kirby's front line was ordered to occupy. A good protection to a part of my line was thus procured for the time being within 250 yards of the enemy's works.

At 4 p.m. I asked and received permission of the general commanding the corps to assault this hill. The command, "forward," was immediately given. Grose's brigade advanced along the turnpike, and, crossing it, passed a stone fence which had been used by the enemy, and charged up the steep hill at double-quick. The right of this brigade reached around and inclosed the southwesterly or left end of the enemy's works on Montgomery's Hill. Kirby's brigade moved directly forward, with an unbroken line, across a corn-field where the ground was very heavy, and through the brush and fallen timber on the hill-side, never halting until his front line was inside the enemy's works. Both brigades moved in the face of a murderous fire of canister and rifle-balls, and both reached the hill-top at nearly the same moment. Kirby lost heavily while crossing the corn-field, as he was necessarily much exposed to the enemy's fire. In this assault my command captured — pieces of artillery, about 300 prisoners, and great numbers of small and side arms. The prisoners were sent to the rear, and the command pushed on in pursuit of the retreating enemy, leaving the artillery, small-arms, and other trophies in the works from which the enemy had been driven. The right of my line was here thrown forward and the direction of my front changed toward the left. The enemy was closely pursued until my command reached the Granny White pike, where darkness ended the day's work, and the command bivouacked for the night.

In obedience to your orders, at 7 o'clock the morning of the 16th, I formed my command in line of battle, with the Second Brigade, Brigadier-General Whitaker commanding, on the right, the Third Brigade, Brigadier-General Grose commanding, on the left, and the First Brigade, Col. I. M. Kirby commanding, in reserve, each brigade in two lines. Throwing forward a strong line of skirmishers, and supporting them with my whole command, the enemy's position in my front was soon developed, and he was found strongly posted in earth-works along the base of a high ridge, his line extending toward the east across and covering the Franklin pike. At 10 o'clock I was in position in front of the enemy, my line parallel to his, my left resting upon the Franklin pike, and my right connecting with Garrard's division, of the Sixteenth Corps. Ziegler's battery was posted upon an eminence near my center and about 1,000 yards from the enemy's works. At 1 p.m. I advanced my lines to a ridge about 400 yards from the enemy's main works, and occupied it, under a most galling fire from his artillery immediately in my front. It was in this position, while using his battery with great effect upon the enemy, that Ziegler had two of his pieces disabled by solid shot. His battery was then withdrawn, and Battery F [M], Fourth U.S. Artillery, Lieutenant Canby commanding, reporting to me, was put in the position formerly occupied by Ziegler's battery, where it did excellent service, punishing the enemy severely. At 4 o'clock my command charged the enemy's works successfully, capturing — pieces of artillery, 900 prisoners, and a great number of small-arms and intrenching tools, which were left in the works while the command pressed on after the enemy, who were fleeing down the Franklin pike. The Ninety-sixth Illinois Infantry, Maj. George Hicks commanding, was in the advance, and pressed the enemy so closely that a drove of cattle was abandoned by them. The pursuit ended soon after dark, and my command bivouacked seven miles from Nashville, on the Franklin pike, picketing the Brentwood Pass. Canby's battery pressed forward with the division during the pursuit of the enemy.

Early on the morning of the 17th the pursuit was continued, and my command bivouacked at night on the north bank of the Harpeth lover near Franklin. During this day's march great numbers of stragglers and deserters from the enemy were picked up and sent to the rear. On the 18th my command crossed the Harpeth River, and marching through Franklin, bivouacked three miles south of Spring Hill. On the 19th I moved to near Rutherford's Creek, which, although usually easily forded, was then so swollen by the heavy rains which had continued to fall without cessation since the afternoon of the 16th, as to be impassable, all the bridges having been destroyed. The Third Brigade, Brigadier-General Grose commanding, was sent soon after noon to bridge the stream, and before dark the next day my whole command had crossed the creek, bivouacking near the Franklin pike, about three-quarters of a mile from Columbia. The division remained in bivouac at that point until 9 o'clock the evening of the 22d, when it crossed Duck River by the pontoon bridge, and bivouacked about midnight south of the town of Columbia. The march was resumed at 2 o'clock the evening of the 23d. The advance guard of cavalry immediately in my front came up with the rear guard of the enemy about five miles south of Columbia, strongly posted in a pass between high hills and through which the road ran. I immediately deployed a strong line of skirmishers and sent them forward. A section of Thomasson's (First Kentucky) battery was put in position about 800 yards from their lines and opened upon them. After a sharp skirmish they were driven from the pass, leaving behind a captain mortally wounded and one man killed. My command bivouacked for the night in the pass. On the 24th I marched to a point on the Pulaski road three miles south of Lynnville and bivouacked. On the 25th I moved through Pulaski to a point on the Lamb's Ferry road six miles south of Pulaski, where my command bivouacked and remained next day awaiting the arrival of rations. On the morning of the 27th I moved at daylight, and bivouacked near Puncheon Church, on Sugar Creek. At daylight the 28th my command resumed the march, and bivouacked at sundown near Lexington, Ala, where orders were received announcing that the pursuit of the enemy for the present was ended.

I have receipts for 9 pieces of artillery and 968 prisoners of war captured by this division during the actions of the 15th and 16th. The reports of my brigade commanders make the captures of artillery amount to 17 pieces, but I have no doubt that 4 of these are claimed by two different brigades. I am, however, positive that this division captured 13 pieces of artillery and 1,200 prisoners of war, besides great numbers of small-arms, several wagon-loads of intrenching tools, and a number of beef-cattle.

In the eagerness of both officers and men to pursue the fleeing enemy prisoners were sent to the rear and the artillery and other spoils passed by, which by this means falling into the hands of commands which came after us were accredited to them, although the credit of the capture is due to this division.

My losses were 9 officers killed and 4 wounded; 32 enlisted men killed, 207 wounded, and 2 missing. Reference is respectfully made to the accompanying tabular statement of the losses of each brigade. For a full and complete statement of the gallantry of officers and men I respectfully refer you to the accompanying reports of brigade and regimental commanders.

It is unnecessary for me to mention to the general commanding the corps the conduct of my division in the battles of the 15th and 16th ultimo and in the pursuit of the enemy succeeding those battles. He was an eye-witness to the noble bravery of the officers and men in their daring and successful assaults upon the enemy's works, and the patient and cheerful temper with which they endured the tedious and fatiguing pursuit, through rain and mud, while driving the rebel hordes across the Tennessee. But I cannot close this report without commending to the general commanding and to the Government Brig. Gens. Walter C. Whitaker and William Grose and Col. I. M. Kirby, of the One hundred and first Ohio Infantry, my brigade commanders, for the skillful manner in which they handled their troops and the promptness with which they obeyed and executed my orders. My thanks and gratitude are tendered them, and the Government should reward them. I also with pleasure commend the officers and men of my whole command, who deserve the highest praise and gratitude of the nation. Although in general terms I thus commend all, I would make special mention of Capt. Charles E. Rowan, of the Ninety-sixth Regiment Illinois Infantry, who, when the rebels were driven from their works on the afternoon of the 16th, pursued them with twenty of his men so closely that he was beyond hearing of the order to halt and reform, and continued pressing immediately upon their heels, taking many prisoners and stampeding their drove of cattle; and of Lieut. William Felton, Ninetieth Ohio Infantry, and acting assistant adjutant-general of the First Brigade, who, in the charge on Montgomery's Hill, seized the colors of his regiment and bore them on horseback through an embrasure into the rebel works; and of Father Cooney, chaplain of the Thirty-fifth Indiana Infantry, who remained in the front with his regiment, encouraging and cheering the men by his words and acts; and of Color-Sergt. Jesse H. Hall, of the One hundred and first Ohio Infantry, who, when attacked by a rebel officer with a drawn saber, defended himself with his flagstaff' and beat the officer into an unconditional surrender; and of Sergt. John Vincent, of the Ninety-sixth Illinois Infantry, who bore the colors of his regiment into the rebel battery ahead of his comrades and planted them there while the enemy were loading the guns. I cannot speak in too high terms of commendation of Ziegler's (Battery B, Second Pennsylvania Independent Artillery) and Canby's (Battery F [M], Fourth U.S. Artillery) batteries. To the bravery, energy, and skill of their officers and men this division is greatly indebted for its success in charging the enemy's works. Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Kentucky may well be proud of such sons, their representatives in the nation's army. The honor of those States and the welfare of the nation will ever be safe in their hands when led by such noble chiefs as Bennett, Suman, Smith, Rose, Moore, Yeoman, Evans, Morton, Wood, McDanald, Tassin, Northup, Humphrey, Hicks, Taylor, Mathey, Jamison, Pollard, Cunningham, and Lawton.

To the officers of my staff I am grateful for their valuable services in promptly delivering my orders and assisting in the execution of them upon every part of the field. I commend them to your most favorable consideration.

I have the honor to be, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

NATHAN KIMBALL,        
Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.
Lieut. Col. J. S. FULLERTON,
        Asst. Adjt. Gen. and Chief of Staff, Fourth Army Corps.
_______________

Report of casualties of the First Division, Fourth Army Corps, at the battle of Nashville,

Command.

Killed

Wounded.

Missing.

Aggregate.

Officers.

Men.

Total.

Officers.

Men.

Total.

Officers.

Men.

Total.

First Brigade

6

19

25

....

98

98

....

....

....

123

Second Brigade

1

9

10

....

38

38

....

1

1

49

Third Brigade.

2

4

6

4

71

75

....

1

1

82

Total(*)

9

32

41

4

207

211

....

2

2

254

*But see revised table, p. 97.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), pp. 177-83

Saturday, October 19, 2024

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 9. — Report of Maj. Gen. U S. Stanley, U. S. Army, commanding Fourth Army Corps, of operations November 14—December 1, 1864.

No. 9.

Report of Maj. Gen. David S. Stanley, U. S. Army, commanding Fourth Army Corps, of operations November 14—December 1, 1864.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY CORPS,        
Huntsville, Ala., February 25, 1865.*

On the 14th [November] Major-General Schofield arrived and assumed command, by direction of Major-General Thomas. On the 21st it became positively known, from a dispatch intercepted by General Hatch's pickets and from other sources, that the enemy were moving north and in the direction of Columbia The roads, however, off the pikes were very bad, it having rained very heavily for some days, and then frozen, but not hard enough to bear wagons. It was believed the enemy could make but little speed, and the evacuation of Pulaski was made the afternoon of the 23d. The corps marched to Lynnville that night, to which place the Second Division (General Wagner) had moved the day before. During the night it was learned that the enemy had made good use of his time, notwithstanding the bad roads, and that Colonel Capron's brigade had been driven out of Mount Pleasant; it was believed by an infantry force. This information was received about 1 o'clock at night, and the troops were immediately waked up and put in motion for Columbia, twenty-one miles distant. General Cox's division, of the Twenty-third Corps, was ten miles nearer Columbia, and marching at the same hour as ourselves he arrived in time to save Capron's brigade of cavalry from annihilation and perhaps the town of Columbia from capture. Turning west at a point three miles south of Columbia, on the Pulaski pike, General Cox, by a cross road, reached the Mount Pleasant pike, and immediately attacking the advancing rebels, drove them back. As fast as the divisions of the Fourth Corps arrived they were placed in line of battle and immediately intrenched themselves. The First Division, Brigadier-General Whitaker, did not get into position until after night. The enemy's cavalry made some demonstrations upon our left flank during the march, but were easily driven off by a regiment of infantry commanded by Colonel Knefler. During the 24th and 25th a very strong and complete set of earth-works were constructed, but the line being very long, and leaving no disposable troops after properly occupying it, two divisions of the corps were withdrawn from it on the night of the 25th to occupy a short and interior line, leaving General Wood's division to hold the front, formerly held by the entire corps. Cox's division, of the Twenty-third Corps, at the same time crossed to the north of Duck River, and General Ruger commenced the construction of a bridge-head.

The enemy undoubtedly deployed their whole force upon our front, and they made several attacks upon our pickets; but it became evident very soon that Hood was moving to the east, and most likely with a view of crossing Duck River above us. The intentions of the enemy became so apparent that it was determined to cross the entire of our force to the north bank of Duck River. The night of the 26th orders were given accordingly, but the night was so dark and the rain poured down so that no progress could be made crossing the artillery, and at midnight the movement was given up and the artillery replaced in position. During the night of the 27th the withdrawal to the north side of Duck River was made very successfully, the pickets leaving the outside line and falling back to the first line of works at 7 o'clock and remaining one hour, when they fell back to the interior line abandoned by the troops, holding that line until near daylight. The fort and magazine were fired, but the destruction was not very complete. The morning of the 28th we occupied the high ground immediately north of Duck River, from below the railroad bridge to about a mile above Columbia. The railroad and pontoon bridges had been destroyed. The enemy could be seen in full view across the river. The troops were employed on the 28th in strengthening their position on the north bank of Duck River; one brigade, Whitaker's, was sent back to Rutherford's Creek to protect all the trains of the army parked near the crossing on the Franklin pike. About 3 p.m. it was learned that Forrest's cavalry had driven Colonel Capron's brigade of cavalry to the north bank of Duck River, eleven miles above, and that the rebel cavalry had effected a crossing to the same side. Later in the evening the pickets of Wood's division reported the enemy crossing cavalry at Huey's Mills, five miles above Columbia. A reconnaissance sent after dark failed to find the enemy, but early on the morning of the 29th General Wilson sent word that the enemy had laid a pontoon bridge at Huey's Mills.

At 8 a.m. on the 29th I started to Spring Hill with the First and Second Divisions, all the artillery that could be spared, and all trains and ambulances to follow; at the same time a reconnaissance, consisting of Colonel Post's brigade, of Wood's division, was sent up the river, and soon sent back word that the enemy was crossing infantry and wagons and moving off rapidly to the north and parallel to the turnpike. It being apprehended that the enemy might make a flank attack upon the position of our force between Duck River and Rutherford's Creek, the First Division, General Kimball commanding, was halted, and took up position to cover the crossing of the creek. At 11.30 o'clock the head of the Second Division was within two miles of Spring Hill. A cavalry soldier, who seemed badly scared, was met here, who stated that a scout had come in from the direction of Raleigh [Rally] Hill, and reported that Buford's division of rebel cavalry was all way between Raleigh [Rally] Hill and Spring Hill, and on the march to the latter place. The Second Division was pushed on, and, attracted by the firing east of the village, double-quicked into the place and deployed the leading brigade as they advanced, drove off a force of the enemy's cavalry which was driving our small force of cavalry and infantry and would very soon have occupied the town. General Wagner was ordered to deploy his division at once; Opdycke's and Lane's brigades to cover as much space about the village as would serve for room to park the trains; General Bradley's brigade was sent to occupy a wooded knoll about three-quarters of a mile east of the pike, and which commanded the approaches from that direction.

Up to this time it was thought we had only cavalry to contend with, but a general officer and his staff, at whom we sent some complimentary shells, were seen reconnoitering our position, and very soon afterward General Bradley was assailed by a force which the men said fought too well to be any dismounted cavalry. I received General Schofield's dispatch about the same time, telling me that the rebels had been crossing the river, and leaving no doubt but that we now confronted a superior force of rebel infantry. About the same time an attack was made upon a small wagon train, composed of some pressed wagons which had passed on, by rebel cavalry, at Reynolds' [Thompson's] Station, three miles toward Franklin, and simultaneously the rebel cavalry appeared west of us and threatened the railroad station of Spring Hill. Thus we were threatened and attacked from every direction, and it was impossible to send any re-enforcements to Bradley's brigade, which had become quite severely engaged, lest in so doing we should expose the train and artillery park to destruction. The enemy made two assaults on Bradley's position, and were severely handled and repulsed; but finding his flank the third time they overlapped him on his right,. and the general at the time receiving a severe wound whilst encouraging his men, his brigade was driven back to the outskirts of the village, where we rallied them and again formed them in line. The enemy attempted to follow up his advantage, but coming across the corn-field toward the village they fell under the fire of at least eight pieces of artillery, at good range for spherical case-shot, and received a fire in flank from a section of a battery which had been placed on the pike south of the village. A part of the rebel force making the charge fled to their rear, and a portion ran down into a ravine between their own and our lines and concealed themselves in the bed of the small stream, neither able to crawl forward or go back until night-fall. This was the condition of affairs when night fell. General Bradley's brigade had lost about 150 men in killed, wounded, and missing. We now know that the enemy lost, according to the statement of one of their surgeons who was on the field, 500 men. Our greatest loss was in the disabling of so intrepid an officer as General Bradley.

As night closed we could see the enemy rapidly extending his lines, and by 8 o'clock it was evident that at least a corps of Hood's army was formed in line of battle, facing the turnpike, and at a near distance of but little more than a half a mile from it. General Schofield arrived from Columbia at 7 o'clock in the evening with Ruger's division. He found the enemy on the pike, and had quite a skirmish in driving them off. My pickets had reported seeing rebel columns passing east of our position as if to get possession of the hills at Thompson's Station, and the anxious question arose whether we could force our way through to Franklin. It was determined to attempt this, and General Schofield pushed on with Ruger's division to ascertain the condition of affairs. He found that the enemy did not attempt to hold the road. It was now 11 o'clock at night, and Cox's division had just arrived from in front of Columbia; the division pushed on at once for Franklin. From a rebel officer, captain and adjutant-general of Cleburne's division, we learned that it was his division of the rebel army we had been fighting. Wood's division, of the Fourth Corps, arrived just after Cox. The enemy's skirmishers fired into the column frequently, and stampeded a new regiment which had just joined the day before; but instructions were sent to push on and not get into a fight if the enemy kept off the road, and in half an hour after General Wood's division arrived I had the satisfaction of meeting the head of General Kimball's column, which got through with some skirmishing. So close were the enemy on our flank that, when a column was not passing, it was difficult for a staff officer or an orderly to get through on the road. General Cox's division was out of the way, and the train commenced to pull out at 1 o'clock the morning of the 30th. The number of wagons, including artillery and ambulances, was about 800. At the very starting point they had to pass singly over a bridge, and it was exceedingly doubtful whether the train could be put on the road by daylight. Unless this could be done, and the corps put in motion, we were sure of being attacked at daylight and of being compelled to fight under every disadvantage. I was strongly advised to burn the train, and move on with the troops and such wagons as could be saved, but I determined to make an effort to save the train. My staff officers were busily employed hurrying up teamsters, and everything promised well, when we were again thrown into despair by the report that the train was attacked north of Thompson's Station, and that the whole train had stopped.

It was now 3 o'clock in the morning. General Kimball was directed to push on with the First Division and clear the road. General Wood's division, which had deployed in the night north of Spring Hill and, facing the east, had covered the road, was directed to move on, keeping off the road and on the right flank of the train, and General Wagner's division, although wearied by the fighting of the day before, was detailed to bring up the rear. Before Kimball's division could reach the point at which the train was attacked, Major Steele, of my staff, had gotten up a squad of our stragglers and driven off the rebels making the attack; they had succeeded in burning about ten wagons. The trains moved on again, and at about 5 o'clock I had the satisfaction of seeing the last wagon pass the small bridge. The entire corps was on the road before daylight. The rebel cavalry was in possession of all the hills to our right, and made numerous demonstrations upon our flank, but were easily driven off by General Wood's skirmishers, and when finally a section of Canby's battery unlimbered and threw a few shells into them the rebel cavalrymen disappeared and troubled us no more. Colonel Opdycke's brigade formed the rear guard, and rendered excellent service, skirmishing all the way with the rebel force following us and forcing our stragglers and lame men, of whom there were many, to make a final effort to reach Franklin. General Kimball's division reached Franklin soon after 9 o'clock and took up position on the right of the Twenty-third Corps, the right flank of the division resting on the Harpeth below Franklin. The line selected by General Schofield was about a mile and a half in length, and inclosed Franklin, resting the flanks upon the river above and below the town. The trains were all crossed over to the north side of the Harpeth; Wood's division was also crossed and posted to watch the fords below the place. Colonel Opdycke reached the heights two miles south of Franklin at 12 m. He was directed to halt on the hills to observe the enemy. Croxton's brigade of cavalry was steadily pushed back by the enemy's infantry column on the Lewisburg pike, and at 1 o'clock General Wagner reported heavy columns of infantry approaching on the Columbia and Lewisburg pikes. General Wagner was instructed to fall back before the advance of the enemy, observing them. About the same time word was received that the rebels were trying to force a crossing at Hughes' Ford, two miles above Franklin.

From 1 o'clock until 4 in the evening the enemy's entire force was in sight and forming for attack, yet in view of the strong position we held, and reasoning from the former course of the rebels during this campaign, nothing appeared so improbable as that they would assault. I felt so confident in this belief that I did not leave General Schofield's headquarters until the firing commenced. About 4 o'clock the enemy advanced with his whole force, at least two corps, making a bold and persistent assault, which, upon a part of the line, lasted about forty minutes. When Wagner's division fell back from the heights south of Franklin, Opdycke's brigade was placed in reserve in rear of our main line, on the Columbia pike. Lane's and Conrad's brigades were deployed--the former on the right, the other the left of the pike--about 300 yards in front of the main line. Here the men, as our men always do, threw up a barricade of rails. By whose mistake I cannot tell, it certainly was never a part of my instructions, but these brigades had orders from General Wagner not to retire to the main line until forced to do so by the fighting of the enemy. The consequence was that the brigades stood their ground until the charging rebels were almost crossing bayonets with them, but the line then broke--Conrad's brigade first, then Lane's--and men and officers made the quickest time they could to our main lines. The old soldiers all escaped, but the conscripts being afraid to run under fire, many of them were captured. Conrad's brigade entered the main line near the Columbia pike, Colonel Lane's several hundred yards to the right of the pike. A large proportion of Lane's men came back with loaded muskets, and turning at the breastworks, they fired a volley into the pressing rebels now not ten steps from them. The part of the Twenty-third Corps stationed in the works for a distance of about three [hundred] or four [hundred] yards to the right of the Columbia pike, and which space took in the First Kentucky and Sixth Ohio Batteries, broke and ran to the rear with the fugitives from Conrad's brigade. To add to the disorder the caissons of the two batteries galloped rapidly to the rear, and the enemy appeared on the breast-works and in possession of the two batteries, which they commenced to turn upon us. It was at this moment I arrived at the scene of disorder, coming from the town on the Columbia pike; the moment was critical beyond ally I have known in any battle--could the enemy hold that part of the line, he was nearer to our two bridges than the extremities of our line. Colonel Opdycke's brigade was lying down about 100 yards in rear of the works. I rode quickly to the left regiment and called to them to charge; at the same time I saw Colonel Opdycke near the center of his line urging his men forward. I gave the colonel no order, as I saw him engaged in doing the very thing to save us, viz, to get possession of our line again. The retreating men of Colonel Conrad's brigade, and, I believe, the men of the Twenty-third Corps, seeing the line of Opdycke's brigade start for the works, commenced to rally. I heard the old soldiers call out, "Come on, men, we Call go wherever the general can," and making a rush, our men immediately retook all the line, excepting a small portion just in front of the brick house on the pike. A force of the rebels held out at this point, and for fifteen or twenty minutes, supported by a rebel line fifty yards to the rear, poured in a severe fire upon our men. So deadly was this fire that it was only by the most strenuous exertions of the officers that our men could be kept to the line; our exertions, however, succeeded, and in twenty minutes our front was comparatively clear of rebels, who fell back to the position formerly held by the two brigades of the Second Division in the commencement of the fight, from whence they kept up a fire until midnight, when we withdrew. Just after the retaking of the line by our troops, as I was passing toward the left to General Cox's position, my horse was killed, and no sooner had I regained my feet than I received a musket-ball through the back of my neck. My wound, however, did not prevent my keeping the field, and General Cox kindly furnished me a remount. The rapidity of the firing made it very difficult to keep up the ammunition, the train being some two miles distant on the road to Nashville when the battle commenced, and our greatest danger at one period of the battle was that we would exhaust our ammunition. One hundred wagon-loads of ammunition, artillery and musket cartridges, were expended in this short battle, belonging to the ordnance train of the Fourth Army Corps; this train, however, supplied in great part the wants of the Twenty-third Corps.

After the first great attack and repulse the enemy made several feeble demonstrations, and until 9 o'clock in the evening formed and advanced upon the Columbia pike three or four times. I think these movements were made to keep us from moving, or to ascertain the very moment we left. At the commencement of the engagement word came that the enemy's cavalry had forced a crossing at Hughes' Ford, and calling upon me for support for our cavalry. General Wood was directed to send a brigade, and General Beatty's brigade had started, when information came that our cavalry had driven the rebels back and the re-enforcements would not be needed. General Kimball's division, holding the extreme right of the line, had comparatively an easy thing of this fight; being well posted behind breast-works, their volleys soon cleared their front of rebels. One brigade, Colonel Kirby's, only had the opportunity to fire one volley, and this was a very effective one, at a rebel brigade which endeavored to move obliquely across our front to gain the right bank of the river. It having been determined to withdraw the troops to Nashville, they were directed to leave the line at midnight, the flanks withdrawing first and simultaneously, the pickets to be withdrawn when all the troops had crossed. Some villain came very near frustrating this plan by firing a house in Franklin; the flames soon spread, and the prospect was that a large fire would occur, which, lighting up objects, would make it impossible to move the troops without being seen. My staff officers and General Wood's found an old fire engine, and getting it at work, the flames were soon subdued and the darkness was found to be increased by the smoke. At midnight the withdrawal was made successfully, although the enemy discovered it and followed our pickets up closely.

General Wood's division remained on the north side of the Harpeth until 4 o'clock in the morning as rear guard, destroying the bridges before he left. The enemy indulged in a furious shelling as soon as they found we had left. In the fight of the day before their artillery had not come up, and but two batteries were used upon us. These two batteries threw shells into the town during the entire fight.

The march was continued to Nashville without interruption; the troops made a short halt at Brentwood to get breakfast and allow the trains to move on. Our men were more exhausted physically than I have ever seen them on any other occasion. From November the 23d, when we left Pulaski, until arriving at Nashville we had been constantly in the immediate presence of an enemy we knew to be vastly superior to us in numbers, closely watching to attack us at disadvantage. With us both mind and body were kept at full stretch, and it was only by night marching and the constant use of intrenchments that we could hope to save ourselves. Many of our men were overtaxed and broke down; unable to travel any longer, they fell into the hands of the enemy. On two occasions the enemy was very near obtaining the advantage he sought of us--the first was when Cox drove back his advance, just about entering Columbia; the second and greatest escape for us was at Spring Hill, where, with a whole corps in line of battle, the left of the line within 600 yards of the road, they allowed all our army, excepting Wagner's division, which had fought them during the day, to pass them with impunity in the night. Upon arriving at Nashville I turned the command of the Fourth Corps over to Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood, and took advantage of leave of absence on account of my wounds.

Before closing this report I must mention the distinguished and faithful service rendered by some of the officers of my command. To Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood I am under more than ordinary obligations for advice, and for his success in selecting every position we occupied from Pulaski to Franklin. To General Whitaker, who commanded the First Division up to Columbia; to General Kimball, who succeeded him, and to General Wagner, commanding the Second Division, I am under many obligations for the zeal in carrying out my plans and orders.

To the members of my staff much is due for the cheerful and thorough manner in which they discharged their constant and severe duties during the campaign. Col. J. S. Fullerton, assistant adjutant-general and chief of staff; Col. W. H. Greenwood, inspector of the corps; Maj. William H. Sinclair, assistant adjutant-general; Maj. J. W. Steele, aide-de-camp; Capt. S. J. Firestone, acting aide-de-camp, and Capt. L. L. Taylor, aide-de-camp---all were most zealous in the discharge of their duties. Colonel Greenwood's duties were particularly important and thoroughly attended to.

To Capt. Lyman Bridges, chief of artillery; to Colonel Hayes, chief quartermaster; to Surg. J. T. Heard, medical director; Captain Hodgdon, chief commissary, and to Captain Tousley, chief of ambulance corps, and Lieutenant Laubach, quartermaster at corps headquarters, I am much indebted for the efficient manner in which they discharged their respective duties.

Before closing this report I will mention the names of Colonel Opdycke, One hundred and twenty-fifth Ohio Volunteer Infantry; Colonel Conrad, Fifteenth Missouri Veteran Volunteers; Lieut. Col. Arthur MacArthur, Twenty-fourth Wisconsin Volunteers; Captain Morgan, assistant adjutant-general, and Captain Tinney, of General Wagner's staff, as some of the officers whom I knew and whom I saw behave most gallantly at the battle of Franklin. Colonel Opdycke's gallant services on that occasion I have before noticed in a communication to department headquarters.

Although Brig. Gen. J. D. Cox was not in my command, he was my close neighbor in the battle of Franklin, and I take this opportunity to express to him my thanks for his gallant help at that time.

A list of casualties has already been furnished. A recommendation for promotion will be forwarded.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
D. S. STANLEY,        
Major-general.
Brig. Gen. W. D. WHIPPLE,
        Chief of Staff.
_______________

Report of casualties in Fourth Army Corps, at the battle of Franklin, Tenn., November 30, 1864.

 

Killed.

Wounded.

Missing.

Total.

Aggregate.

Officers.

Men.

Total.

Officers.

Men.

Total.

Officers.

Men.

Total.

Officers.

Men.

First Division

....

5

5

3

34

37

1

17

18

4

56

60

Second Division

5

47

52

31

488

519

13

657

670

49

1,192

1,241

Third Division

....

....

....

....

....

....

....

....

....

....

....

....

Artillery Brigade

....

10

10

3

48

51

....

6

6

3

64

67

Total

5

62

67

37

570

607

14

680

694

56

1,312

1,368

NASHVILLE, TENN., December 6, 1864.

ADDENDA.

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANS., December 17, 1866.
Bvt. Brig. Gen. W. D. WHIPPLE,
        Assistant Adjutant-General, Dept. of the Tennessee:

My report of the battle of Franklin, November 30, 1864, was, from unavoidable circumstances, not written until the 25th of February ensuing. In the notice of the services of my staff on the day of battle I omitted mentioning the name of Capt. John D. Moxley, First Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, one of my aides-de-camp. I take this opportunity, though late, to correct my report. Captain Moxley did his duty gallantly and well on that day, and was busy throughout the fight encouraging and rallying our troops.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
D. S. STANLEY,        
Colonel Twenty-second Infantry, Brevet Major-General.

_______________

* For portion of report here omitted, relating to operations in North Georgia and North Alabama, see Vol. XXXIX, Part I, p. 907.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 112-9