Memorandum
for a Plan of Campaign
[about October 1, 1861]
On, or about the 5th. of October, (the exact day to be
determined hereafter) I wish a movement made to seize and hold a point on the
Railroad connecting Virginia and Tennesse, near the Mountain pass called
Cumberland Gap.
That point is now guarded against us by Zolicoffer, with
6000 or 8000, rebels at Barboursville, Kentucky, say twentyfive miles from the
Gap towards Lexington.
We have a force of 5000 or 6000, under General Thomas,
at Camp Dick Robinson, about twentyfive miles from
Lexington, and seventyfive from Zollicoffer's camp on the road between the two,
which is not a Railroad, anywhere between Lexington and the point to be seized –
and along the whole length of which the Union sentiment among the people
largely predominates.
We have military possession of the Railroads from Cincinnati
to Lexington, and from Louisville to Lexington, and some Home Guards under
General Crittenden
are on the latter line.
We have possession of the Railroad from Louisville to
Nashville, Tenn, so far as Muldrough's Hill, about forty miles, and the rebels
have possession of that road all South of there. At the Hill we have a force of
8000 under Gen. Sherman;
and about an
equal force of rebels is a very short distance South, under under [
sic]
Gen. Buckner.
We have a large force at Paducah, and a smaller at
Fort-Holt, both on the Kentucky side, with some at Bird's Point, Cairo, Mound
City, Evansville, & New-Albany, all on the other side; and all which, with
the Gun-Boats on the River, are, perhaps, sufficient to guard the Ohio from
Louisville to it's mouth.
About supplies of troops, my general idea is that all from
Wisconsin, Minesota, Iowa, Illinois, Missouri, and Kansas, not now elsewhere,
be left to Fremont.
All from Indiana and Michigan, not now elsewhere, be sent to
Anderson at Louisville.
All from Ohio, needed in Western Virginia be sent there; and
any remainder, be sent to Mitchell
[5]
at Cincinnati, for Anderson.
All East of the Mountains be appropriated to McClellan, and
to the coast.
As to movements, my idea is that the one for the coast,
and that on Cumberland Gap be simultaneous; and that, in
the mean time, preparation, vigilant watching, and the defensive only be acted
upon – (this however, not to apply to Fremonts operations in Northern and
middle Missouri) – that before these movements, Thomas and Sherman shall
respectively watch, but not attack Zollicoffer, and Buckner.
That when the coast and Gap movements shall be ready,
Sherman is merely to stand fast; while all at Cincincinnati [sic], and
all at Louisville with all on the lines, concentrate rapidly at Lexington, and
thence to Thomas' camp joining him, and the whole thence upon the Gap.
It is for the Military men to decide whether they can find a
pass through the mountains at or near the Gap, which can not be defended by the
enemy, with a greatly inferior force, and what is to be done in regard to this.
The Coast and Gap movements made, Generals McClellan and
Fremont, in their respective Departments, will avail themselves of any
advantages the diversions may present.