On the above day and date was fought the memorable
BATTLE OF FISHING CREEK,
On “Logan's Cross Roads,” near Mill Springs.
The following is General Crittenden's official report of the
above engagement:
DIVISION HEADQUARTERS,
CAMP FOGG (Smith County), Tenn., Feb. 13, 1862.
SIR: I have the honor to submit the
following report of the engagement of January 19, near Fishing Creek, Pulaski
County, Kentucky.
On January 17 I was occupying Mill
Springs, on the south side of the Cumberland River, with the Seventeenth,
Twenty-eighth and Thirty-seventh Tennessee Regiments, the First Battalion
Tennessee Cavalry, two companies of the Third Battalion Tennessee Cavalry and
four (six) pieces of artillery. I was also at the same time occupying Beech
Grove, on the north bank of the river and directly opposite Mill Springs, with
the Fifteenth Mississippi, Sixteenth Alabama, Nineteenth, Twentieth,
Twenty-fifth and Twenty-ninth Tennessee Regiments, two battalions of Tennessee
cavalry, two independent cavalry companies, and twelve pieces of artillery.
For some time the enemy in front of
Beech Grove had occupied Somerset, eighteen miles distant, with eight regiments
of infantry and with artillery; and Columbia, thirty-five miles distant, with
five regiments of infantry. On January 17 I was informed that the force from
Columbia,1 with a large addition,2 making a total of from
six thousand to ten thousand men, with guns of a large caliber, under General
Thomas, commanding First Division of the Federal Army in Kentucky, was moving
across my front, on the road from Columbia toward Somerset, with the intention
of forming a junction with the Somerset force and attacking Beech Grove.
On the 18th, at daylight, I moved
the Seventeenth and Twenty-eighth Tennessee Regiments across the river from
Mill Springs to Beech Grove. On the 18th I was informed that the force under
General Thomas was encamped at Webb's (Logan's) Cross-Roads, a point ten miles
from Beech Grove and eight miles from Somerset, at which the roads from
Columbia to Somerset and Beech Grove to Somerset unite, and that it would there
await both a re-inforcement (that I was advised was advancing from the rear)
and the passage of Fishing Creek by the Somerset force. It was necessary that
the Somerset force should cross Fishing Creek before it could join the force
under General Thomas or approach Beech Grove, and for this purpose it had
advanced from Somerset. I was advised that late and continuous rains would
prevent the passage of Fishing Creek on the 18th and 19th by any infantry
force.
In the then condition of my command
I could array for battle about four thousand effective men.
To defend Beech Grove required me
to draw into it the force from Mill Springs. From the course of the river and
condition of things it was easy for a detachment from the force of the enemy
occupying it below to cross over, intercept the line of land communication,
and, taking Mill Springs, entirely prevent my recrossing the Cumberland. This
river (greatly swollen), with high, muddy banks, was a troublesome barrier in
the rear of Beech Grove. Transportation over it was, at best, very difficult. A
small stern-wheel steamboat, unsuited for the transportation of horses, with
two flat-boats, were the only means of crossing.
Beech Grove was protected in front
by earthworks, but these incomplete and insufficient, and necessarily of such
extent that I had not force to defend them. The range of our artillery was bad,
and there were commanding positions for the batteries of the enemy. Every
effort had been made to provision the command, to increase the means of
crossing the river and to perfect the works for defense, under charge of a
skillful engineer officer, Captain Sheliha.
When I first heard that the enemy
was approaching in front it was my opinion that I could not retire with my
command-artillery, transportation, camp and garrison equipage, baggage and
cavalry horses-from Beech Grove to Mill Springs without information of such
movement reaching the enemy, and a consequent attack during the movement and
heavy loss. I was out of reach of support or reenforcements. Under these
circumstances I determined not to retreat without a battle. I decided that it
was best to attack the enemy, if possible, before the coming re-enforcements
from his rear should arrive and before the Somerset force could cross Fishing
Creek. I could reasonably expect much from a bold attack and from the spirit of
my command.
On the evening of the 18th I called
in council Brigadier-Generals Zollicoffer and Carroll and the commanding
officers of regiments and of cavalry and artillery, and there it was
determined, without dissent, to march out and attack the enemy under General
Thomas on the the next morning. Accordingly Generals Zollicoffer and Carroll
were ordered to move their brigades at midnight in the following order:
1st. The brigade of General
Zollicoffer, in the following order: In front the independent cavalry companies
of Captains Saunders and Bledsoe; then the Fifteenth Mississippi Regiment,
commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Walthall; then the Nineteenth Tennessee,
commanded by Colonel D. H. Cummings; then the Twentieth Tennessee, commanded by
Colonel Battle; then the Twenty-fifth Tennessee, commanded by Colonel S. S.
Stanton; then four guns of Rutledge's Battery, commanded by Captain Rutledge.
2d. The brigade of General Carroll
in this order: In front the Seventeenth Tennessee (Newman), commanded by
Lieutenant-Colonel
Miller; then the Twenty-eighth
Tennessee, commanded by Colonel Powell; then two guns of McClung's Battery,
commanded by Captain McClung.
In rear were the Sixteenth Alabama
as a reserve, commanded by Colonel W. B. Wood, and the cavalry battalions of
Lieutenant-Colonel Branner and Lieutenant-Colonel McClellan.
Soon after daylight on the morning
of January 19 the cavalry advance came in contact with the pickets of the
enemy, after a march of near nine miles over a deep and muddy road. With a few
shots the enemy's pickets were driven in, retiring about a quarter of a mile to
a house on the left of the road. From this house and woods in the rear of it
quite a brisk firing was opened upon the head of the column. Skirmishers having
been thrown forward, General Zollicoffer's Brigade was formed in line of battle
and ordered to advance upon the enemy, whom I supposed would come out from
their camp, which we were now approaching, to take position. The road here
extended straight in front for near a mile toward the north.
A company of skirmishers from the
Mississippi Regiment, advancing on the left of the road, after sharp firing,
drove a body of the enemy from the house and the woods next to it, and then,
under orders, crossing the road, fell in with their regiment. Following this
company of skirmishers on the left of the road to the point where it crossed to
the right, the regiment of Colonel Cummings (Nineteenth Tennessee) kept
straight on, and crossing a field about two hundred and fifty yards wide at a
double-quick, charged into the woods where the enemy was sheltered, driving
back the Tenth Indiana Regiment until it was re-enforced. At this time General
Zollicoffer rode up to the Nineteenth Tennessee and ordered Colonel Cummings to
cease firing, under the impression that the firing was upon another regiment of
his own brigade. Then the General advanced, as if to give an order to the lines
of the enemy, within bayonet reach, and was killed just as he discovered his
fatal mistake. Thereupon a conflict ensued, when the Nineteenth Tennessee broke
its line and gave back. Rather in the rear and near to this regiment was the
Twenty-fifth Tennessee, commanded by Colonel Stanton, which engaged the enemy,
when the Colonel was wounded at the head of his men; but this regiment,
impressed with the same idea which had proved fatal to General Zollicoffer that
it was engaged with friends-soon broke its line and fell into some disorder.
At this time-the fall of General
Zollicoffer having been announced to me-I went forward to the regiments of
Colonels Cummings and Stanton, and announced to Colonel Cummings the death of
General Zollicoffer, and that the command of the brigade devolved upon him.
There was a cessation of firing for
a few moments, and I ascertained that the regiment of Colonel Battle was on the
right, and the Mississippi Regiment in the center, neither as yet having been
actively engaged, and the enemy in front of the entire line. I had ordered
General Carroll to bring up his brigade, and it was now, in supporting
distance, displayed in line of battle.
I now repeated my orders for a
general advance, and soon the battle raged from right to left. When I sent my
aide to order the Fifteenth Mississippi to charge, I sent by him an order to
General Carroll to advance a regiment to sustain it. He ordered up for that
purpose Colonel Murray's Regiment, which engaged the enemy on the left of the
Mississippi Regiment and on the right of Stanton's Regiment. I ordered Captain
Rutledge, with two of his guns, forward in the road to an advanced and
hazardous position, ordering Colonel Stanton to support him, where I hoped he
might bring them to play effectively upon the enemy; but the position did not
permit this, and he soon retired, under my order. At this point the horse of
Captain Rutledge was killed under him.
Very soon the enemy began to gain
ground on our left, and to use their superior force for flanking in that
quarter. I was in person at the right of the line of Stanton's Regiment, the
battle raging, and did not observe this as soon as it was observed by General
Carroll, who moved the regiment of Colonel Cummings, then commanded by
Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, to the left, to meet this movement of the enemy, and
formed the Seventeenth Tennessee, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Miller, to
support the regiment. The regiments of Murray, Stanton and Cummings were driven
back by the enemy, and, while re-forming in rear of the Seventeenth Tennessee,
that well-disciplined regiment met and held in check for some time the entire
right wing of the Northern army. These regiments on my left and on the left of
the road, retired across the field, a distance of about 250 yards, and there
for a time repulsed the enemy. Especially the regiment of Colonel Stanton,
partially rallied by its gallant field officers, formed behind a fence, and,
pouring volleys into the ranks of the enemy coming across the field, repulsed
and drove them back for a time with heavy loss.
For an hour now the Fifteenth
Mississippi, under Lieutenant-Colonel Walthall, and the Twentieth Tennessee,
under Colonel Joel A. Battle, of my center and right, had been struggling with
the superior force of the enemy.
I cannot omit to mention the heroic
valor of these two regiments, officers and men. When the left retired they were
flanked and compelled to leave their position. In their rear, on the right of
the road, was the regiment of Colonel Powell (Twenty-ninth Tennessee), which
had been formed in the rear and ordered forward by me some time before. General
Carroll ordered this regiment to face the flanking force of the enemy which was
crossing the road from the left side, which it did, checking it with a raking
fire at thirty paces. In this conflict, Colonel Powell, commanding, was badly
wounded.
The Sixteenth Alabama, which was
the reserve corps of my division, commanded by Colonel Wood, did, at this
critical juncture, most eminent service. Having rushed behind the right and
center, it came to a close engagement with the pursuing enemy, to protect the
flanks and rear of the Fifteenth Mississippi and the Twentieth Tennessee when
they were the last, after long fighting, to leave the front line of the battle,
and, well led by its commanding officer, in conjunction with portions of other
regiments, it effectually prevented pursuit and protected my return to camp.
Owing to the formation and
character of the field of battle, I was unable to use my artillery and cavalry
to advantage in the action. During much of the time the engagement lasted rain
was falling. Many of the men were armed with flint-lock muskets, and they
became soon unserviceable.
During the engagement, or just
prior to it, the force under General Thomas was increased by the arrival, on a
forced march, of a brigade from his rear, which I had hoped would not arrive
until the engagement was over. This made the force of the enemy about 12,000
men. My effective force was 4,000. The engagement lasted three hours.
My loss was 125 killed, 309 wounded
and 99 missing, as follows:
|
Troops.
|
Killed.
|
Wounded.
|
Missing.
|
|
15th Mississippi Regiment
|
44
|
153
|
29
|
|
20th Tennessee (Battle)
|
33
|
59
|
18
|
|
19th Tennessee (Cummings).
|
10
|
22
|
2
|
|
25th Tennessee (Stanton)
|
10
|
28
|
17
|
|
17th Tennessee (Newman)
|
11
|
25
|
2
|
|
28th Tennessee (Murray)
|
3
|
4
|
5
|
|
29th Tennessee (Powell)
|
5
|
12
|
10
|
|
16th Alabama
|
9
|
5
|
12
|
|
Captain Saunders' cavalry.
|
....
|
1
|
....
|
The loss of the enemy, from the
best information I have and statements made by themselves, may be estimated at
700 killed and wounded. It was larger than mine from the fact that my regiments
on the left, after first being driven back, fired from the cover of woods and
fences upon the large numbers advancing upon them through the open field,
inflicting heavy loss and sustaining but little. My command retired to Beech
Grove without any annoyance in the rear by infantry or cavalry. On the return,
one piece of artillery, of Captain Rutledge's Battery, mired down and was left.
To myself, to the army and to the
country, the fall of General Zollicoffer was a severe loss. I found him wise in
council, heroic in action. He fell in front, close to the enemy, and they bore
off his body. Of his staff, Lieutenants Fogg and Shields were mortally wounded
and have since died. Lieutenant Bailie Peyton, Jr., commanding Company A, of
Battle's Regiment, was killed in the heat of the action. Adjutant Joel A.
Battle, Jr., was badly wounded while in front with the colors of his regiment,
which he seized when the bearer was shot down. Lieutenant-Colonel Carter, a
distinguished officer of this same regiment, was taken prisoner. Colonel Battle
commanded with marked ability and courage. Colonel Statham, of the Fifteenth
Mississippi Regiment, was absent at the time of the battle on furlough. His
regiment was most gallantly led by Lieutenant-Colonel Walthall. The reputation
of the Mississippians for heroism was fully sustained by this regiment. Its
loss in killed and wounded, which was far greater than that of any other
regiment, tells sufficiently the story of discipline and courage. The already
extended limits of this report will not permit me, even if I had them at hand,
to enumerate the individual acts of courage with which this regiment abounded.
Suffice it to say that it is entitled to all praise.
I resumed position at Beech Grove
early in the afternoon. The enemy followed and took position in force on my
left, center and right. They opened with two batteries-one in front of my
center and one on my right. Captain McClung and Lieutenant Falconet, commanding
a section of Rutledge's Battery, replied to the enemy's battery in front. From
the right the enemy fired upon the steamboat, which, at the crossing, was
commanded by their position. Their first shots fell short, afterwards, mounting
a larger gun, as it grew dark, they fired a shot or two over the boat, and
awaited the morning to destroy it. The steamboat destroyed, the crossing of the
river would have been impossible.
On the evening of the 19th, I
called in consultation General Carroll, Colonel Cummings, engineers, artillery
and other officers, and it was considered best by all to retire from Beech Grove.
I ordered the men to be crossed
over-first, by commands, in designated order, then the artillery to be crossed
over, then what could be, crossed of baggage and mules, horses, wagons, etc. I
directed the cavalry to swim their horses over. Time only permitted to cross
the infantry under arms, the sick and wounded, one company of cavalry mounted,
the rest of the cavalry dismounted, the artillerymen and some horses. Many
cavalry horses, artillery horses, mules, wagons and eleven pieces of artillery,
with baggage and camp and garrison equipage were left behind.
Much is due to the energy, skill
and courage of Captain Spiller, of the cavalry, who commanded the boat and
continued crossing over with it until fired upon by the enemy in the morning,
when he burned it, by my directions.
Any further collision was now
prevented, but the want of commissary stores compelled me at once to move to
Gainesboro, lower down on the river, a distance of eighty miles, and the
nearest point where I could have communication by water with Nashville and
could obtain supplies.
From Gainesborough I have moved my
division to this point (Chestnut Mound), where it is refurnished and drilling,
and I have the honor to report that it is ready for any service to which it may
be assigned.
G. B. CRITTENDEN,
Major-General Provisional Army Confederate States.
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W. W. MACKALL,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
3
I take the following extracts from General Thomas' official
report of the engagement near Fishing Creek:
HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, DEPARTMENT
OF THE OHIO,
Somerset, Kentucky, January 31, 1862.
Captain: I reached Logan's Cross Roads,
about ten miles north of the intrenched camp of the enemy on the Cumberland
River, on the 17th instant, with a portion of the Second and Third Brigades,
Kenny's Battery of artillery, and battalion of Wolford's Cavalry. The Fourth
and Tenth Kentucky, Fourteenth Ohio, and the Eighteenth U. S. Infantry being
still in rear, detained by the almost impassable condition of the roads, I
determined to halt at this point to await their arrival and to communicate with
General Schoepf.
General Schoepf visited me on the day
of my arrival, and after consultation I directed him to send to my camp
Standart's Battery, the Twelfth Kentucky, and the First and the Second
Tennessee Regiments to remain until the arrival of the regiments in rear.
The Fourth Kentucky, the Battalion of
Michigan Engineers, and Wetmore's Battery joined on the 18th.
About 6:30 o'clock on the morning of
the 19th, the pickets from Wolford's Cavalry encountered the enemy advancing on
our camp, retired slowly and reported their advance to Colonel M. D. Manson,
commanding the Second Brigade. He immediately formed his regiment (the Tenth
Indiana) and took a position on the road to await the attack, ordering the
Fourth Kentucky (Colonel S. S. Fry) to support him, and then informed me in
person that the enemy were advancing in force. I directed him to join his
brigade immediately and hold the enemy in check until I could order up the
other troops, which were ordered to form immediately and were marching to the
field in ten minutes.
On reaching the position held by the
Fourth Kentucky, Tenth Indiana, and Wolford's Cavalry, at a point where the
roads fork leading to Somerset, I found the enemy advancing through a corn
field and evidently endeavoring to gain the left of the Fourth Kentucky, which
was maintaining its position in a most determined manner. I directed one of my
aides to ride back and order up a section of artillery, and the Tennessee
Brigade to advance on the enemy's right, and sent orders to Colonel McCook to
advance with his two regiments (the Ninth Ohio and Second Minnesota) to the
support of Fourth Kentucky and Tenth Indiana.
A section of Captain Kenny's Battery
took a position on the edge of the field to the left of Fourth Kentucky and
opened an efficient fire on a regiment of Alabamians, which were advancing on
the Fourth Kentucky. Soon afterward the Second Minnesota arrived, the Colonel
(Van Cleve) reporting to me for instructions. I directed him to take the
position of the Fourth Kentucky and Tenth Indiana, which regiments were nearly
out of ammunition. The Ninth Ohio came into position on the right of the road
at the same time.
Immediately after these regiments had
gained their positions the enemy opened a most determined and galling fire,
which was returned by our troops in the same spirit, and for nearly half an
hour the contest was maintained on both sides in the most obstinate manner. At
this time the Twelfth Kentucky4 (Colonel Haskins) and the Tennessee
Brigade reached the field to the left of the Minnesota Regiment, and opened
fire on the right flank of the enemy, who then began to fall back. The Second
Minnesota kept up a most galling fire in front, and the Ninth Ohio charged the enemy
on the right with bayonets fixed, turned their flank and drove them from the
field, the whole line giving way and retreating in the utmost disorder and
confusion.
As soon as the regiments could be
formed and refill their cartridge-boxes, I ordered the whole force to advance.
As we approached their intrenchments the division was deployed in line of
battle and steadily advanced to the summit of the hill at Moulden's. From this
point I directed their intrenchments to be cannonaded, which was done until dark
by Standart's and Wetmore's Batteries. Kenny's Battery was placed in position
on the extreme left at Russell's house, from which point he was directed to
fire on their ferry to deter them from attempting to cross. . And every
preparation was made to assault their intrenchments on the following morning.
The Fourteenth hio (Steedman) and the Tenth Kentucky (Harlan), having joined
from detached service soon after the repulse of the enemy, were placed in front
in my advance on the intrenchments the next morning and entered first. General
Schoepf also joined me the evening of the 19th with the Seventeenth,
Thirty-first, and Thirty-eighth Ohio. His entire brigade entered with the other
troops.
On reaching the intrenchments we found
the enemy had abandoned every thing and retired during the night. Twelve pieces
of artillery, with their caissons packed with ammunition, one battery wagon and
two forges, a large amount of ammunition, a large number of small arms, mostly
the old flint-lock muskets, one hundred and fifty or one hundred and sixty
wagons, and upwards of one thousand horses and mules, a large amount of
commissary stores, intrenching tools, and camp and garrison equipage fell into
our hands.
The steam and ferry boats having been
burned by the enemy in their retreat, it was found impossible to cross the
river and pursue them.
Colonel S. S. Fry, Fourth Kentucky, was
slightly wounded whilst his regiment was gallantly resisting the advance of the
enemy, during whch time General Zollicoffer fell from a shot from his (Colonel
Fry's) pistol, which no doubt contributed materially to the discomfiture of the
enemy.
The enemy's loss, as far as known, is
as follows: 192 killed; 89 prisoners not wounded and 68 wounded; a total of
killed, wounded and prisoners, 349.
Our loss was as follows:
39 killed and 207 wounded. I am, sir,
very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers,
Commanding.
CAPTAIN
J. B. FRY.
A. A. G., Chief of Staff, Headquarters
Department Ohio, Louisville, Ky.5
According to the preceding reports, the Fifteenth
Mississippi lost more men killed (five more) than General Thomas' entire
division, or our entire loss in killed was nearly five times greater than that
of the enemy. Surely the superiority of the enemy in arms did not make the
difference so great. According to Crittenden's report, the loss of the enemy in
killed and wounded was greater than ours.
In July, 1880, ex-President Davis wrote to General G. B.
Crittenden "requesting a statement of the affairs at Fishing Creek."
The following is an extract from Crittenden's reply:
While I was detained in Knoxville on
business connected with my command, I received an official communication from
General Zollicoffer, informing me that he had crossed the Cumberland by
fording, and was fortifying a camp on the right bank, etc. By the messenger who
bore me this communication I ordered him to recross the river and resume his
original position on the left bank. Early in January I reached Mill Springs and
found, to my surprise, General Zollicoffer still on the right bank. He called
on me immediately and informed me that his messenger who bore back my order had
lost several days in returning, and that when it was received he supposed that
I would arrive almost immediately, and, hoping to be able to convince me that
it would be better to remain on the right bank, he had postponed crossing,
until, by a rise in the river, it had become impossible to do so. . . . I was
dissatisfied, but as I knew that the General had been actuated by pure motives,
I accepted his excuse. Details were promptly placed in the woods to prepare
timber for flat-boats to transport the artillery and wagons to the left bank of
the river. The weather was execrable and the men unskilled, so that the work
progressed slowly.
Such was the posture of affairs when,
on the 18th of January, I was informed that General Thomas was approaching with
a large force of all arms. . . . Here was thrust upon me the very contingency
which my order to General Zollicoffer was intended to obviate.
We had scarcely taken up the line of
march when the rain began to fall, the darkness became intense, and the
consequent confusion great, so that day dawned before we reached his position.
The attack as a surprise, failed; nevertheless, it was promptly made. It rained
violently throughout the action, rendering all the flint-lock guns useless. The
men bearing them were allowed to fall back on the reserve. . . . . . . . . . .
.
I attributed the loss of the battle, in
a great degree, to the inferiority of our arms and the untimely fall of General
Zollicoffer, who was known and highly esteemed by the men, who were almost all
Tennesseeans.
I think I have shown that the battle of
Fishing Creek was a necessity, and that I ought not to be held responsible for
that necessity.6
Ex-President Davis concludes his criticism upon this affair
thus:
By General Crittenden . . . it is
assumed that General Zollicoffer made a mistake in crossing to the right bank
of the Cumberland, and that thence it resulted as a consequence that General
Johnston's right flank of his line through Bowling Green was uncovered. I do
not perceive the correctness of the conclusion, for it must be admitted that
General Zollicoffer's command was not adequate to resist the combined forces of
Thomas and Schöpf (Schoepf), or that the Cumberland River was a sufficient
obstacle to prevent them from crossing either above or below the position at
Mill Springs.
General Zollicoffer may well have
believed that he could better resist the crossing of the Cumberland by removing
to the right bank rather than by remaining on the left. The only difference, it
seems to me, would have been that he could have retreated without the
discomfiture of his force or the loss of his artillery and equipments, but in
either case Johnston's right flank would have been alike uncovered.
To Zollicoffer and the brave patriots
who fell with him, let praise, not censure, be given; and to Crittenden, let
tardy justice render the meed due to a gallant soldier of the highest
professional attainments, and whose fault, if fault it be, was a willingness to
dare much in his country's service.7
Captain Allison, who was in command of our battalion,
ordered us to saddle our horses and be ready to move at a moment's warning; but
he did not receive a single order during the day.
_______________
1 Thomas moved from Lebanon via Columbia with two
brigades, Manson's and McCook's. Boyle's Brigade had moved to the river near
Burkesville. On the 19th Buell dispatched to Thomas thus:
2 "The reinforcements ordered to you were
ten pieces of artillery and DeCourcy's and Ray's regiments." Rebellion
Records, Vol. VII., p. 560.
3 Rebellion
Records, Vol. VII., pp. 105-110.
4 Both from Somerset. So you see that Crittenden
did not attack Thomas before the arrival of the Somerset force, as he had hoped
to do.
5 Rebellion
Records, Vol. VII., pp. 79 to 82.
6 The Rise and Fall of the Confederate
Government, by Jefferson Davis, Vol. II., pp. 19 to 21.
7 The Rise and Fall of the Confederate
Government, by Jefferson Davis, Vol. II., p. 23.
SOURCE: Richard R. Hancock, Hancock's Diary: Or, A
History of the Second Tennessee Confederate Cavalry, p. 113-25
