Received two months
pay. News arrived in the evening of the Union victory at Springfield, Kentucky,
and death of the rebel General Zollicoffer, in honor of which a national salute
of thirty-four guns was fired. Quiet in camp, the latter part of January.
SOURCE: Theodore
Reichardt, Diary of Battery A, First Regiment Rhode Island Light
Artillery, p. 31
Statham's Brigade (except McNairy's Battalion*) with their baggage left by rail for Corinth, Mississippi.
* Our battalion had been with the above named brigade about six months, but we were here separated from the true, the noble, and the BRAVE soldiers who composed that brigade to be united with them no more during the war. Perhaps there were but few, if any, better brigades in the Confederate service than Zollicoffer's, and afterward Statham's Brigade.
SOURCE: Richard R. Hancock, Hancock's Diary: Or, A History of the Second Tennessee Confederate Cavalry, p. 137
Some of our boys
went down the river that morning before day to assist in bringing the wounded,
on horses, back to a point out of range of the Federal guns. A few of the
severely wounded had to be left on the north side of the river.
Surgeon D. B. Cliff
was allowed by General Thomas to accompany the remains of General Zollicoffer
and Lieutenant Bailie Peyton to Louisville, Kentucky, and from there, if
General Buell would consent, to Nashville, Tennessee.1
Having been sent
with a dispatch to General Zollicoffer's headquarters, a few days previous to
his death, he invited me, though but a "high private," into his tent,
offered me a drink of wine, and treated me with as much respect and politeness
as if I had been his equal in rank.
His men did not only
have confidence in him as a commander, but he had been so good and so kind to
them that they had learned to love him almost with filial affection. Hence the
fall of our gallant leader was a desperate blow to the followers. And, unfortunately,
General Crittenden had been with the command only sixteen days and General
Carroll only four previous to this unfortunate event.
To add to the
demoralization of our little army, such rumors as the following were now afloat
in camps: "Crittenden is drunk a good portion of the time. He has a
brother in the Federal army." "He is in sympathy with the
North." "He will surrender us all to the Federals if he has a good
opportunity," etc. It was thought by some that the Fifteenth Mississippi
were so desperately mad that they would have shot him if they had had a good
opportunity. It was said that he ordered the brigades to halt and fortify at
Monticello, Kentucky, and that the colonels refused to obey orders. I give the
above as rumors, allowing each reader to have his own opinion about them. But,
whether true or untrue, they had a demoralizing effect upon the command.
On January 27th the
Hon. Landon C. Haynes wrote from Knoxville to President Davis thus:
The
Army of the Cumberland is utterly routed and demoralized. The result is
regarded with the profoundest solicitude. Confidence is gone in the ranks and
among the people. It must be restored. I am confident it cannot be done under
Generals Crittenden and Carroll. . . I do not propose to inquire whether the
loss of public confidence in Generals Crittenden and Carroll is ill or well
founded. It is sufficient that all is lost.
I
must think, as everybody else does, that there has been a great mistake made. .
Cannot you, Mr. President, right the wrong by the immediate presence of a new
and able man?2
On the same date
(27th) Governor Isham G. Harris dispatched thus to Hon. J. D. C. Atkins:
Crittenden
can never rally troops in East Tennessee. Some other general must be sent
there.3
We fell back to
Monticello, nine miles from the river, unmolested by the Federals. The infantry
and foot cavalry had quite a disagreeable march on account of so much mud. The
command halted for the night about one mile south of Monticello-that is to say,
a part of the command, for a good many besides our battalion kept moving
homeward.
There was nothing to
have hindered us from bringing off all the camp equipage belonging to our
battalion, as we were camping on the south side of the river, but in place of
doing that we lost all, leaving our tents in flames. I suppose it was thought
that the Federals would cross the river and follow us, but they did not.
Col. McNairy being
absent, the captains of our battalion held a consultation at Monticello, and
after taking all things into consideration-no rations, camp equipage, etc. they
decided to disband, allow the men to go home for a few days, get a better
supply of clothing and return to our command again.
1 Rebellion
Records, Vol. VII., p. 565.
2 Rebellion
Records, Vol. VII., p. 849.
3 Rebellion
Records, Vol. VII., p. 849.
SOURCE: Richard R.
Hancock, Hancock's Diary: Or, A History of the Second Tennessee
Confederate Cavalry, p. 125-8
The general
commanding the division grants you permission to accompany the remains of
General Zollicoffer and Lieut. Bailie Peyton to Louisville, Ky. Transportation
for this purpose will be furnished you from the quartermaster's department. An
escort of 1 sergeant and 6 men will be detailed to accompany you as far as
Lebanon, Ky., and a transportation pass over the railroad to Louisville.
Upon your arrival at
Louisville you will at once report in person to General D. C. Buell, commanding
the Department of the Ohio, and, with his consent, can proceed to Nashville
with the remains.
SOURCE: The
War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and
Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 7 (Serial No. 7), p. 565
On the above day and date was fought the memorable
BATTLE OF FISHING CREEK,
On “Logan's Cross Roads,” near Mill Springs.
The following is General Crittenden's official report of the above engagement:
SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the engagement of January 19, near Fishing Creek, Pulaski County, Kentucky.
On January 17 I was occupying Mill Springs, on the south side of the Cumberland River, with the Seventeenth, Twenty-eighth and Thirty-seventh Tennessee Regiments, the First Battalion Tennessee Cavalry, two companies of the Third Battalion Tennessee Cavalry and four (six) pieces of artillery. I was also at the same time occupying Beech Grove, on the north bank of the river and directly opposite Mill Springs, with the Fifteenth Mississippi, Sixteenth Alabama, Nineteenth, Twentieth, Twenty-fifth and Twenty-ninth Tennessee Regiments, two battalions of Tennessee cavalry, two independent cavalry companies, and twelve pieces of artillery.
For some time the enemy in front of Beech Grove had occupied Somerset, eighteen miles distant, with eight regiments of infantry and with artillery; and Columbia, thirty-five miles distant, with five regiments of infantry. On January 17 I was informed that the force from Columbia,1 with a large addition,2 making a total of from six thousand to ten thousand men, with guns of a large caliber, under General Thomas, commanding First Division of the Federal Army in Kentucky, was moving across my front, on the road from Columbia toward Somerset, with the intention of forming a junction with the Somerset force and attacking Beech Grove.
On the 18th, at daylight, I moved the Seventeenth and Twenty-eighth Tennessee Regiments across the river from Mill Springs to Beech Grove. On the 18th I was informed that the force under General Thomas was encamped at Webb's (Logan's) Cross-Roads, a point ten miles from Beech Grove and eight miles from Somerset, at which the roads from Columbia to Somerset and Beech Grove to Somerset unite, and that it would there await both a re-inforcement (that I was advised was advancing from the rear) and the passage of Fishing Creek by the Somerset force. It was necessary that the Somerset force should cross Fishing Creek before it could join the force under General Thomas or approach Beech Grove, and for this purpose it had advanced from Somerset. I was advised that late and continuous rains would prevent the passage of Fishing Creek on the 18th and 19th by any infantry force.
In the then condition of my command I could array for battle about four thousand effective men.
To defend Beech Grove required me to draw into it the force from Mill Springs. From the course of the river and condition of things it was easy for a detachment from the force of the enemy occupying it below to cross over, intercept the line of land communication, and, taking Mill Springs, entirely prevent my recrossing the Cumberland. This river (greatly swollen), with high, muddy banks, was a troublesome barrier in the rear of Beech Grove. Transportation over it was, at best, very difficult. A small stern-wheel steamboat, unsuited for the transportation of horses, with two flat-boats, were the only means of crossing.
Beech Grove was protected in front by earthworks, but these incomplete and insufficient, and necessarily of such extent that I had not force to defend them. The range of our artillery was bad, and there were commanding positions for the batteries of the enemy. Every effort had been made to provision the command, to increase the means of crossing the river and to perfect the works for defense, under charge of a skillful engineer officer, Captain Sheliha.
When I first heard that the enemy was approaching in front it was my opinion that I could not retire with my command-artillery, transportation, camp and garrison equipage, baggage and cavalry horses-from Beech Grove to Mill Springs without information of such movement reaching the enemy, and a consequent attack during the movement and heavy loss. I was out of reach of support or reenforcements. Under these circumstances I determined not to retreat without a battle. I decided that it was best to attack the enemy, if possible, before the coming re-enforcements from his rear should arrive and before the Somerset force could cross Fishing Creek. I could reasonably expect much from a bold attack and from the spirit of my command.
On the evening of the 18th I called in council Brigadier-Generals Zollicoffer and Carroll and the commanding officers of regiments and of cavalry and artillery, and there it was determined, without dissent, to march out and attack the enemy under General Thomas on the the next morning. Accordingly Generals Zollicoffer and Carroll were ordered to move their brigades at midnight in the following order:
1st. The brigade of General Zollicoffer, in the following order: In front the independent cavalry companies of Captains Saunders and Bledsoe; then the Fifteenth Mississippi Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Walthall; then the Nineteenth Tennessee, commanded by Colonel D. H. Cummings; then the Twentieth Tennessee, commanded by Colonel Battle; then the Twenty-fifth Tennessee, commanded by Colonel S. S. Stanton; then four guns of Rutledge's Battery, commanded by Captain Rutledge.
2d. The brigade of General Carroll in this order: In front the Seventeenth Tennessee (Newman), commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel
Miller; then the Twenty-eighth Tennessee, commanded by Colonel Powell; then two guns of McClung's Battery, commanded by Captain McClung.
In rear were the Sixteenth Alabama as a reserve, commanded by Colonel W. B. Wood, and the cavalry battalions of Lieutenant-Colonel Branner and Lieutenant-Colonel McClellan.
Soon after daylight on the morning of January 19 the cavalry advance came in contact with the pickets of the enemy, after a march of near nine miles over a deep and muddy road. With a few shots the enemy's pickets were driven in, retiring about a quarter of a mile to a house on the left of the road. From this house and woods in the rear of it quite a brisk firing was opened upon the head of the column. Skirmishers having been thrown forward, General Zollicoffer's Brigade was formed in line of battle and ordered to advance upon the enemy, whom I supposed would come out from their camp, which we were now approaching, to take position. The road here extended straight in front for near a mile toward the north.
A company of skirmishers from the Mississippi Regiment, advancing on the left of the road, after sharp firing, drove a body of the enemy from the house and the woods next to it, and then, under orders, crossing the road, fell in with their regiment. Following this company of skirmishers on the left of the road to the point where it crossed to the right, the regiment of Colonel Cummings (Nineteenth Tennessee) kept straight on, and crossing a field about two hundred and fifty yards wide at a double-quick, charged into the woods where the enemy was sheltered, driving back the Tenth Indiana Regiment until it was re-enforced. At this time General Zollicoffer rode up to the Nineteenth Tennessee and ordered Colonel Cummings to cease firing, under the impression that the firing was upon another regiment of his own brigade. Then the General advanced, as if to give an order to the lines of the enemy, within bayonet reach, and was killed just as he discovered his fatal mistake. Thereupon a conflict ensued, when the Nineteenth Tennessee broke its line and gave back. Rather in the rear and near to this regiment was the Twenty-fifth Tennessee, commanded by Colonel Stanton, which engaged the enemy, when the Colonel was wounded at the head of his men; but this regiment, impressed with the same idea which had proved fatal to General Zollicoffer that it was engaged with friends-soon broke its line and fell into some disorder.
At this time-the fall of General Zollicoffer having been announced to me-I went forward to the regiments of Colonels Cummings and Stanton, and announced to Colonel Cummings the death of General Zollicoffer, and that the command of the brigade devolved upon him.
There was a cessation of firing for a few moments, and I ascertained that the regiment of Colonel Battle was on the right, and the Mississippi Regiment in the center, neither as yet having been actively engaged, and the enemy in front of the entire line. I had ordered General Carroll to bring up his brigade, and it was now, in supporting distance, displayed in line of battle.
I now repeated my orders for a general advance, and soon the battle raged from right to left. When I sent my aide to order the Fifteenth Mississippi to charge, I sent by him an order to General Carroll to advance a regiment to sustain it. He ordered up for that purpose Colonel Murray's Regiment, which engaged the enemy on the left of the Mississippi Regiment and on the right of Stanton's Regiment. I ordered Captain Rutledge, with two of his guns, forward in the road to an advanced and hazardous position, ordering Colonel Stanton to support him, where I hoped he might bring them to play effectively upon the enemy; but the position did not permit this, and he soon retired, under my order. At this point the horse of Captain Rutledge was killed under him.
Very soon the enemy began to gain ground on our left, and to use their superior force for flanking in that quarter. I was in person at the right of the line of Stanton's Regiment, the battle raging, and did not observe this as soon as it was observed by General Carroll, who moved the regiment of Colonel Cummings, then commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, to the left, to meet this movement of the enemy, and formed the Seventeenth Tennessee, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Miller, to support the regiment. The regiments of Murray, Stanton and Cummings were driven back by the enemy, and, while re-forming in rear of the Seventeenth Tennessee, that well-disciplined regiment met and held in check for some time the entire right wing of the Northern army. These regiments on my left and on the left of the road, retired across the field, a distance of about 250 yards, and there for a time repulsed the enemy. Especially the regiment of Colonel Stanton, partially rallied by its gallant field officers, formed behind a fence, and, pouring volleys into the ranks of the enemy coming across the field, repulsed and drove them back for a time with heavy loss.
For an hour now the Fifteenth Mississippi, under Lieutenant-Colonel Walthall, and the Twentieth Tennessee, under Colonel Joel A. Battle, of my center and right, had been struggling with the superior force of the enemy.
I cannot omit to mention the heroic valor of these two regiments, officers and men. When the left retired they were flanked and compelled to leave their position. In their rear, on the right of the road, was the regiment of Colonel Powell (Twenty-ninth Tennessee), which had been formed in the rear and ordered forward by me some time before. General Carroll ordered this regiment to face the flanking force of the enemy which was crossing the road from the left side, which it did, checking it with a raking fire at thirty paces. In this conflict, Colonel Powell, commanding, was badly wounded.
The Sixteenth Alabama, which was the reserve corps of my division, commanded by Colonel Wood, did, at this critical juncture, most eminent service. Having rushed behind the right and center, it came to a close engagement with the pursuing enemy, to protect the flanks and rear of the Fifteenth Mississippi and the Twentieth Tennessee when they were the last, after long fighting, to leave the front line of the battle, and, well led by its commanding officer, in conjunction with portions of other regiments, it effectually prevented pursuit and protected my return to camp.
Owing to the formation and character of the field of battle, I was unable to use my artillery and cavalry to advantage in the action. During much of the time the engagement lasted rain was falling. Many of the men were armed with flint-lock muskets, and they became soon unserviceable.
During the engagement, or just prior to it, the force under General Thomas was increased by the arrival, on a forced march, of a brigade from his rear, which I had hoped would not arrive until the engagement was over. This made the force of the enemy about 12,000 men. My effective force was 4,000. The engagement lasted three hours.
My loss was 125 killed, 309 wounded and 99 missing, as follows:
|
Troops. |
Killed. |
Wounded. |
Missing. |
|
15th Mississippi Regiment |
44 |
153 |
29 |
|
20th Tennessee (Battle) |
33 |
59 |
18 |
|
19th Tennessee (Cummings). |
10 |
22 |
2 |
|
25th Tennessee (Stanton) |
10 |
28 |
17 |
|
17th Tennessee (Newman) |
11 |
25 |
2 |
|
28th Tennessee (Murray) |
3 |
4 |
5 |
|
29th Tennessee (Powell) |
5 |
12 |
10 |
|
16th Alabama |
9 |
5 |
12 |
|
Captain Saunders' cavalry. |
.... |
1 |
.... |
The loss of the enemy, from the best information I have and statements made by themselves, may be estimated at 700 killed and wounded. It was larger than mine from the fact that my regiments on the left, after first being driven back, fired from the cover of woods and fences upon the large numbers advancing upon them through the open field, inflicting heavy loss and sustaining but little. My command retired to Beech Grove without any annoyance in the rear by infantry or cavalry. On the return, one piece of artillery, of Captain Rutledge's Battery, mired down and was left.
To myself, to the army and to the country, the fall of General Zollicoffer was a severe loss. I found him wise in council, heroic in action. He fell in front, close to the enemy, and they bore off his body. Of his staff, Lieutenants Fogg and Shields were mortally wounded and have since died. Lieutenant Bailie Peyton, Jr., commanding Company A, of Battle's Regiment, was killed in the heat of the action. Adjutant Joel A. Battle, Jr., was badly wounded while in front with the colors of his regiment, which he seized when the bearer was shot down. Lieutenant-Colonel Carter, a distinguished officer of this same regiment, was taken prisoner. Colonel Battle commanded with marked ability and courage. Colonel Statham, of the Fifteenth Mississippi Regiment, was absent at the time of the battle on furlough. His regiment was most gallantly led by Lieutenant-Colonel Walthall. The reputation of the Mississippians for heroism was fully sustained by this regiment. Its loss in killed and wounded, which was far greater than that of any other regiment, tells sufficiently the story of discipline and courage. The already extended limits of this report will not permit me, even if I had them at hand, to enumerate the individual acts of courage with which this regiment abounded. Suffice it to say that it is entitled to all praise.
I resumed position at Beech Grove early in the afternoon. The enemy followed and took position in force on my left, center and right. They opened with two batteries-one in front of my center and one on my right. Captain McClung and Lieutenant Falconet, commanding a section of Rutledge's Battery, replied to the enemy's battery in front. From the right the enemy fired upon the steamboat, which, at the crossing, was commanded by their position. Their first shots fell short, afterwards, mounting a larger gun, as it grew dark, they fired a shot or two over the boat, and awaited the morning to destroy it. The steamboat destroyed, the crossing of the river would have been impossible.
On the evening of the 19th, I called in consultation General Carroll, Colonel Cummings, engineers, artillery and other officers, and it was considered best by all to retire from Beech Grove.
I ordered the men to be crossed over-first, by commands, in designated order, then the artillery to be crossed over, then what could be, crossed of baggage and mules, horses, wagons, etc. I directed the cavalry to swim their horses over. Time only permitted to cross the infantry under arms, the sick and wounded, one company of cavalry mounted, the rest of the cavalry dismounted, the artillerymen and some horses. Many cavalry horses, artillery horses, mules, wagons and eleven pieces of artillery, with baggage and camp and garrison equipage were left behind.
Much is due to the energy, skill and courage of Captain Spiller, of the cavalry, who commanded the boat and continued crossing over with it until fired upon by the enemy in the morning, when he burned it, by my directions.
Any further collision was now prevented, but the want of commissary stores compelled me at once to move to Gainesboro, lower down on the river, a distance of eighty miles, and the nearest point where I could have communication by water with Nashville and could obtain supplies.
From Gainesborough I have moved my division to this point (Chestnut Mound), where it is refurnished and drilling, and I have the honor to report that it is ready for any service to which it may be assigned.
I take the following extracts from General Thomas' official report of the engagement near Fishing Creek:
HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,
Somerset, Kentucky, January 31, 1862.
Captain: I reached Logan's Cross Roads, about ten miles north of the intrenched camp of the enemy on the Cumberland River, on the 17th instant, with a portion of the Second and Third Brigades, Kenny's Battery of artillery, and battalion of Wolford's Cavalry. The Fourth and Tenth Kentucky, Fourteenth Ohio, and the Eighteenth U. S. Infantry being still in rear, detained by the almost impassable condition of the roads, I determined to halt at this point to await their arrival and to communicate with General Schoepf.
General Schoepf visited me on the day of my arrival, and after consultation I directed him to send to my camp Standart's Battery, the Twelfth Kentucky, and the First and the Second Tennessee Regiments to remain until the arrival of the regiments in rear.
The Fourth Kentucky, the Battalion of Michigan Engineers, and Wetmore's Battery joined on the 18th.
About 6:30 o'clock on the morning of the 19th, the pickets from Wolford's Cavalry encountered the enemy advancing on our camp, retired slowly and reported their advance to Colonel M. D. Manson, commanding the Second Brigade. He immediately formed his regiment (the Tenth Indiana) and took a position on the road to await the attack, ordering the Fourth Kentucky (Colonel S. S. Fry) to support him, and then informed me in person that the enemy were advancing in force. I directed him to join his brigade immediately and hold the enemy in check until I could order up the other troops, which were ordered to form immediately and were marching to the field in ten minutes.
On reaching the position held by the Fourth Kentucky, Tenth Indiana, and Wolford's Cavalry, at a point where the roads fork leading to Somerset, I found the enemy advancing through a corn field and evidently endeavoring to gain the left of the Fourth Kentucky, which was maintaining its position in a most determined manner. I directed one of my aides to ride back and order up a section of artillery, and the Tennessee Brigade to advance on the enemy's right, and sent orders to Colonel McCook to advance with his two regiments (the Ninth Ohio and Second Minnesota) to the support of Fourth Kentucky and Tenth Indiana.
A section of Captain Kenny's Battery took a position on the edge of the field to the left of Fourth Kentucky and opened an efficient fire on a regiment of Alabamians, which were advancing on the Fourth Kentucky. Soon afterward the Second Minnesota arrived, the Colonel (Van Cleve) reporting to me for instructions. I directed him to take the position of the Fourth Kentucky and Tenth Indiana, which regiments were nearly out of ammunition. The Ninth Ohio came into position on the right of the road at the same time.
Immediately after these regiments had gained their positions the enemy opened a most determined and galling fire, which was returned by our troops in the same spirit, and for nearly half an hour the contest was maintained on both sides in the most obstinate manner. At this time the Twelfth Kentucky4 (Colonel Haskins) and the Tennessee Brigade reached the field to the left of the Minnesota Regiment, and opened fire on the right flank of the enemy, who then began to fall back. The Second Minnesota kept up a most galling fire in front, and the Ninth Ohio charged the enemy on the right with bayonets fixed, turned their flank and drove them from the field, the whole line giving way and retreating in the utmost disorder and confusion.
As soon as the regiments could be formed and refill their cartridge-boxes, I ordered the whole force to advance. As we approached their intrenchments the division was deployed in line of battle and steadily advanced to the summit of the hill at Moulden's. From this point I directed their intrenchments to be cannonaded, which was done until dark by Standart's and Wetmore's Batteries. Kenny's Battery was placed in position on the extreme left at Russell's house, from which point he was directed to fire on their ferry to deter them from attempting to cross. . And every preparation was made to assault their intrenchments on the following morning. The Fourteenth hio (Steedman) and the Tenth Kentucky (Harlan), having joined from detached service soon after the repulse of the enemy, were placed in front in my advance on the intrenchments the next morning and entered first. General Schoepf also joined me the evening of the 19th with the Seventeenth, Thirty-first, and Thirty-eighth Ohio. His entire brigade entered with the other troops.
On reaching the intrenchments we found the enemy had abandoned every thing and retired during the night. Twelve pieces of artillery, with their caissons packed with ammunition, one battery wagon and two forges, a large amount of ammunition, a large number of small arms, mostly the old flint-lock muskets, one hundred and fifty or one hundred and sixty wagons, and upwards of one thousand horses and mules, a large amount of commissary stores, intrenching tools, and camp and garrison equipage fell into our hands.
The steam and ferry boats having been burned by the enemy in their retreat, it was found impossible to cross the river and pursue them.
Colonel S. S. Fry, Fourth Kentucky, was slightly wounded whilst his regiment was gallantly resisting the advance of the enemy, during whch time General Zollicoffer fell from a shot from his (Colonel Fry's) pistol, which no doubt contributed materially to the discomfiture of the enemy.
The enemy's loss, as far as known, is as follows: 192 killed; 89 prisoners not wounded and 68 wounded; a total of killed, wounded and prisoners, 349.
Our loss was as follows:
39 killed and 207 wounded. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.
CAPTAIN J. B. FRY.
A. A. G., Chief of Staff, Headquarters Department Ohio, Louisville, Ky.5
According to the preceding reports, the Fifteenth Mississippi lost more men killed (five more) than General Thomas' entire division, or our entire loss in killed was nearly five times greater than that of the enemy. Surely the superiority of the enemy in arms did not make the difference so great. According to Crittenden's report, the loss of the enemy in killed and wounded was greater than ours.
In July, 1880, ex-President Davis wrote to General G. B. Crittenden "requesting a statement of the affairs at Fishing Creek." The following is an extract from Crittenden's reply:
While I was detained in Knoxville on business connected with my command, I received an official communication from General Zollicoffer, informing me that he had crossed the Cumberland by fording, and was fortifying a camp on the right bank, etc. By the messenger who bore me this communication I ordered him to recross the river and resume his original position on the left bank. Early in January I reached Mill Springs and found, to my surprise, General Zollicoffer still on the right bank. He called on me immediately and informed me that his messenger who bore back my order had lost several days in returning, and that when it was received he supposed that I would arrive almost immediately, and, hoping to be able to convince me that it would be better to remain on the right bank, he had postponed crossing, until, by a rise in the river, it had become impossible to do so. . . . I was dissatisfied, but as I knew that the General had been actuated by pure motives, I accepted his excuse. Details were promptly placed in the woods to prepare timber for flat-boats to transport the artillery and wagons to the left bank of the river. The weather was execrable and the men unskilled, so that the work progressed slowly.
Such was the posture of affairs when, on the 18th of January, I was informed that General Thomas was approaching with a large force of all arms. . . . Here was thrust upon me the very contingency which my order to General Zollicoffer was intended to obviate.
We had scarcely taken up the line of march when the rain began to fall, the darkness became intense, and the consequent confusion great, so that day dawned before we reached his position. The attack as a surprise, failed; nevertheless, it was promptly made. It rained violently throughout the action, rendering all the flint-lock guns useless. The men bearing them were allowed to fall back on the reserve. . . . . . . . . . . .
I attributed the loss of the battle, in a great degree, to the inferiority of our arms and the untimely fall of General Zollicoffer, who was known and highly esteemed by the men, who were almost all Tennesseeans.
I think I have shown that the battle of Fishing Creek was a necessity, and that I ought not to be held responsible for that necessity.6
Ex-President Davis concludes his criticism upon this affair thus:
By General Crittenden . . . it is assumed that General Zollicoffer made a mistake in crossing to the right bank of the Cumberland, and that thence it resulted as a consequence that General Johnston's right flank of his line through Bowling Green was uncovered. I do not perceive the correctness of the conclusion, for it must be admitted that General Zollicoffer's command was not adequate to resist the combined forces of Thomas and Schöpf (Schoepf), or that the Cumberland River was a sufficient obstacle to prevent them from crossing either above or below the position at Mill Springs.
General Zollicoffer may well have believed that he could better resist the crossing of the Cumberland by removing to the right bank rather than by remaining on the left. The only difference, it seems to me, would have been that he could have retreated without the discomfiture of his force or the loss of his artillery and equipments, but in either case Johnston's right flank would have been alike uncovered.
To Zollicoffer and the brave patriots who fell with him, let praise, not censure, be given; and to Crittenden, let tardy justice render the meed due to a gallant soldier of the highest professional attainments, and whose fault, if fault it be, was a willingness to dare much in his country's service.7
Captain Allison, who was in command of our battalion,
ordered us to saddle our horses and be ready to move at a moment's warning; but
he did not receive a single order during the day.
1 Thomas moved from Lebanon via Columbia with two brigades, Manson's and McCook's. Boyle's Brigade had moved to the river near Burkesville. On the 19th Buell dispatched to Thomas thus:
2 "The reinforcements ordered to you were ten pieces of artillery and DeCourcy's and Ray's regiments." Rebellion Records, Vol. VII., p. 560.
3 Rebellion Records, Vol. VII., pp. 105-110.
4 Both from Somerset. So you see that Crittenden did not attack Thomas before the arrival of the Somerset force, as he had hoped to do.
5 Rebellion Records, Vol. VII., pp. 79 to 82.
6 The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, by Jefferson Davis, Vol. II., pp. 19 to 21.
7 The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, by Jefferson Davis, Vol. II., p. 23.
SOURCE: Richard R. Hancock, Hancock's Diary: Or, A History of the Second Tennessee Confederate Cavalry, p. 113-25
SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the engagement of January 19, near, Pulaski County, Kentucky:
On January 17 I was occupying Mill Springs, on the south side of the Cumberland River, with the Seventeenth, Twenty-eighth, and Thirty-seventh Tennessee Regiments, the First Battalion Tennessee Cavalry, two companies of the Third Battalion Tennessee Cavalry, and four pieces of artillery. I was also at the same time occupying Beech Grove, on the north bank of the river, and directly opposite Mill Springs, with the Fifteenth Mississippi, Sixteenth Alabama, Nineteenth, Twentieth, Twenty-fifth, and Twenty-ninth Tennessee Regiments, two battalions of Tennessee cavalry, two independent cavalry companies, and twelve pieces of artillery.
For some time the enemy in front of Beech Grove had occupied Somerset, 18 miles distant, with eight regiments of infantry and with artillery; and Columbia, 35 miles distant, with five regiments of infantry. On January 17 I was informed that the force from Columbia, with a large addition, making a total of from 6,000 to 10,000 men, with guns of a large caliber, under General Thomas, commanding the First Division of the Federal Army in Kentucky, was moving across my front, on the road from Columbia towards Somerset, with the intention of forming a junction with the Somerset force and attacking Beech Grove.
On the 18th, at daylight, I moved the Seventeenth and Twenty-eighth Tennessee Regiments across the river from Mill Springs to Beech Grove. On the 18th I was informed that the force under General Thomas was encamped at Webb's [Logan's] Cross-Roads, a point 10 miles from Beech Grove and 8 miles from Somerset, at which the roads from Columbia to Somerset and Beech Grove to Somerset unite, and that it would there await both a re-enforcement (that I was advised was advancing from the rear) and the passage of Fishing Creek by the Somerset force. It was necessary that the Somerset force should cross Fishing Creek before it could join the force under General Thomas or approach Beech Grove, and for these purposes it had advanced from Somerset. I was advised that late and continuous rains would prevent the passage of Fishing Creek on the 18th and 19th by any infantry force.
In the then condition of my command I could array for battle about 4,000 effective men. Absolute want of the necessary provisions to feed my command was pressing. The country around was barren or exhausted. Communication with Nashville by water was cut off by a force of the enemy occupying the river below. The line of communication in the rear was too long to admit of winter transportation and extended through a barren or exhausted country.
To defend Beech Grove required me to draw into it the force from Mill Springs. From the course of the river and the condition of things it was easy for a detachment from the force of the enemy occupying it below to cross over, intercept the line of land communication, and, taking Mill Springs, entirely prevent my recrossing the Cumberland. This river (greatly swollen), with high, muddy banks, was a troublesome barrier in the rear of Beech Grove. Transportation over it was, at best, very difficult. A small stern-wheel steamboat, unsuited for the transportation of horses, with two flat-boats, were the only means of crossing.
Beech Grove was protected in front by earthworks; but these incomplete and insufficient, and necessarily of such extent that I had not force to defend them. The range of our artillery was bad, and there were commanding positions for the batteries of the enemy. Every effort had been made to provision the command, to increase the means of crossing the river, and to perfect the works for defense, under the charge of a skillful engineer officer, Captain Sheliha.
When I first heard that the enemy was approaching in front it was my opinion that I could not retire with my command—artillery, transportation, camp and garrison equipage, baggage, and cavalry horses—from Beech Grove to Mill Springs without information of such a movement reaching the enemy, and a consequent attack during the movement and heavy loss. I was out of reach of support or re-enforcement. Under these circumstances I determined not to retreat without a battle. I decided that it was best to attack the enemy, if possible before the coming re-enforcements from his rear should arrive and before the Somerset force could cross Fishing Creek. I could reasonably expect much from a bold attack and from the spirit of my command.
On the evening of the 18th I called in council Brigadier-Generals Zollicoffer and Carroll and the commanding officers of regiments and of cavalry and artillery; and there it was determined, without dissent, to march out and attack the enemy under General Thomas on the next morning. Accordingly Generals Zollicoffer and Carroll were ordered to move their brigades at midnight in the following order:
1st. The brigade of General Zollicoffer, in the following order: In front, the independent cavalry companies of Captains Saunders and Bledsoe; then the Fifteenth Mississippi Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Walthall; then the Nineteenth Tennessee, commanded by Col. D. H. Cummings; then the Twentieth Tennessee, commanded by Colonel Battle; then the Twenty-fifth Tennessee, commanded by Col. S.S. Stanton; then four guns of Rutledge's battery, commanded by Captain Rutledge.
2d. The brigade of General Carroll in this order: In front, the Seventeenth Tennessee, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Miller; then the Twenty-eighth Tennessee, commanded by Colonel Murray; then the Twenty-ninth Tennessee, commanded by Colonel Powell; then two guns of —— battery, commanded by Captain McClung.
In rear were the Sixteenth Alabama, as a reserve, commanded by Col. W. B. Wood, and the cavalry battalions of Lieutenant-Colonel Branner and Lieutenant-Colonel McClellan.
Soon after daylight on the morning of January 19 the cavalry advance came in contact with the pickets of the enemy, after a march of near 9 miles, over a deep and muddy road. With a few shots the enemy's pickets were driven in, retiring about a quarter of a mile to a house on the left of the road. From this house and woods in the rear of it quite a brisk firing was opened upon the head of the column. Skirmishers having been thrown forward, General Zollicoffer's brigade was formed in line of battle and ordered to advance upon the enemy, whom I supposed would come out from their camp, which we were now approaching, to take position. The road here extended straight in front for near a mile towards the north.
A company of skirmishers from the Mississippi regiment, advancing on the left of the road, after sharp firing, drove a body of the enemy from the house and the woods next to it, and then, under orders, crossing the road, fell in with their regiment. Following this company of skirmishers on the left of the road to the point where it crossed to the right, the regiment of Colonel Cummings (Nineteenth Tennessee) kept straight on, and, crossing a field about 250 yards wide at a double-quick, charged into the woods where the enemy was sheltered, driving back the Tenth Indiana Regiment until it was re-enforced.
At this time General Zollicoffer rode up to the Nineteenth Tennessee and ordered Colonel Cummings to cease firing, under the impression that the fire was upon another regiment of his own brigade. Then the general advanced, as if to give an order to the lines of the enemy, within bayonet reach, and was killed just as he discovered his fatal mistake. Thereupon a conflict ensued, when the Nineteenth Tennessee broke its line and gave back. Rather in the rear and near to this regiment was the Twenty-fifth Tennessee, commanded by Colonel Stanton, which engaged the enemy, when the colonel was wounded at the head of his men; but this regiment, impressed with the same idea which had proved fatal to General Zollicoffer—that it was engaged with friends—soon broke its line and fell into some disorder.
At this time—the fall of General Zollicoffer having been announced to me—I went forward in the road to the regiments of Colonels Cummings and Stanton, and announced to Colonel Cummings the death of General Zollicoffer, and that the command of the brigade devolved upon him.
There was a cessation of firing for a few moments, and I ascertained that the regiment of Colonel Battle was on the right and the Mississippi regiment in the center, neither as yet having been actively engaged, and the enemy in front of the entire line. I had ordered General Carroll to bring up his brigade, and it was now, in supporting distance, displayed in line of battle.
I now repeated my orders for a general advance, and soon the battle raged from right to left. When I sent my aide to order the Fifteenth Mississippi to charge, I sent by him an order to General Carroll to advance a regiment to sustain it. He ordered up for that purpose Colonel Murray's (Twenty-eighth Tennessee) regiment, which engaged the enemy on the left of the Mississippi regiment and on the right of Stanton's (Tennessee) regiment. I ordered Captain Rutledge, with two of his guns, forward in the road to an advanced and hazardous position, ordering Colonel Stanton to support him, where I hoped he might bring them to play effectively upon the enemy; but the position did not permit this, and he soon retired, under my order. At this point the horse of Captain Rutledge was killed under him.
Very soon the enemy began to gain ground on our left and to use their superior force for flanking in that quarter. I was in person at the right of the line of Stanton's regiment, the battle raging, and did not observe this so soon as it was observed by General Carroll, who moved the regiment of Colonel Cummings, then commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, to the left, to meet this movement of the enemy, and formed the Seventeenth Tennessee, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Miller, to support the regiments on the left. The regiments of Murray, Stanton, and Cummings were driven back by the enemy, and, while reforming in the rear of the Seventeenth Tennessee, that well-disciplined regiment met and held in check for some time the entire right wing of the Northern army. These regiments on my left and on the left of the road retired across the field a distance of about 250 yards, and there for a time repulsed the advancing enemy. Especially the regiment of Colonel Stanton, partially rallied by its gallant field officers, formed behind a fence, and, pouring volleys into the ranks of the enemy coming across the field, repulsed and drove them back for a time with heavy loss.
For an hour now the Fifteenth Mississippi, under Lieutenant-Colonel Walthall, and the Twentieth Tennessee, under Col. Joel A. Battle, of my center and right, had been struggling with the superior force of the enemy.
I cannot omit to mention the heroic valor of these two regiments, officers and men. When the left retired they were flanked and compelled to leave their position. In their rear, on the right of the road, was the regiment of Colonel Powell (Twenty-ninth Tennessee), which had been formed in the rear and ordered forward by me some time before. General Carroll ordered this regiment to face the flanking force of the enemy, which was crossing the road from the left side, which it did, checking it with a raking fire at 30 paces. In this conflict Colonel Powell, commanding, was badly wounded.
The Sixteenth Alabama, which was the reserve corps of my division, commanded by Colonel Wood, did at this critical juncture most eminent service. Having rushed behind the right and center, it came to a close engagement with the pursuing enemy, to protect the flanks and rear of the Fifteenth Mississippi and Twentieth Tennessee, when they were the last, after long fighting, to leave the front line of the battle, and, well led by its commanding officer. In conjunction with portions of other regiments, it effectually prevented pursuit and protected my return to camp.
Owing to the formation and character of the field of battle I was unable to use my artillery and cavalry to advantage in the action. During much of the time the engagement lasted rain was falling. Many of the men were armed with flint-lock muskets and they became soon unserviceable.
On the field and during the retreat to camp some of the regiments became confused and broken and great disorder prevailed. This was owing, in some measure, to a want of proper drill and discipline, of which the army had been much deprived by reason of the nature of its constant service and of the country in which it had encamped.
During the engagement, or just prior to it, the force under General Thomas was increased by the arrival, on a forced march, of a brigade from his rear, which I had hoped would not arrive until the engagement was over. This made the three of the enemy about 12,000 men. My effective force was four thousand. The engagement lasted three hours. My loss was 125 killed, 309 wounded, and 99 missing, as follows:
|
|
Killed. |
Wounded. |
Missing. |
|
15th Mississippi Regiment |
44 |
153 |
29 |
|
20th Tennessee (Battle) |
33 |
59 |
18 |
|
19th Tennessee (Cummings). |
10 |
22 |
2 |
|
25th Tennessee (Stanton) |
10 |
28 |
17 |
|
17th Tennessee (Newman) |
11 |
25 |
2 |
|
28th Tennessee (Murray) |
3 |
4 |
5 |
|
29th Tennessee (Powell) |
5 |
12 |
10 |
|
16th Alabama |
9 |
5 |
12 |
|
Captain Saunders' cavalry. |
.... |
1 |
.... |
The loss of the enemy, from the best information I have and statements made by themselves, may be estimated at 700 killed and wounded. It was larger than mine from the fact that my regiments on the left, after first being driven back, fired from the cover of woods and fences upon the large numbers advancing upon them through the open field, inflicting heavy loss and sustaining but little.
My command retired to Beech Grove without any annoyance in the rear by infantry or cavalry. On the return, one piece of artillery, of Captain Rutledge's battery, mired down and was left.
To myself, to the army, and to the country the fall of General Zollicoffer was a severe loss. I found him wise in council, heroic in action. He fell in the front, close to the enemy, and they bore off his body. Of his staff, Lieutenants Fogg and Shields were mortally wounded and have since died. They displayed conspicuous courage. Lieutenant Bailie Peyton, jr., commanding Company A (of Battle's regiment), was killed in the heat of the action. Adjt. Joel A. Battle, jr., was badly wounded while in front with the colors of his regiment, which he seized when the bearer was shot down. Lieutenant-Colonel Carter, a distinguished officer of this same regiment, was taken prisoner. Colonel Battle commanded with marked ability and courage. Colonel Statham, of the Fifteenth Mississippi Regiment, was absent at the time of the battle on furlough. His regiment was most gallantly led by Lieutenant-Colonel Walthall. The reputation of the Mississippians for heroism was fully sustained by this regiment. Its loss in killed and wounded, which was far greater than that of any other regiment, tells sufficiently the story of discipline and courage. The already extended limits of this report will not permit me, even if I had them at hand, to enumerate the individual acts of courage with which this regiment abounded. Suffice it to say that it is entitled to all praise.
General Carroll, in his dispositions and conduct during the engagement, manifested both military skill and personal valor. My assistant adjutant-general, A. S. Cunningham, and my aides, Lieuts. W. W. Porter and H. I. Thornton, displayed throughout the action intelligence, activity, and courage, and were of great service to me. Happening with me at the time, Maj. James F. Brewer volunteered as my aide and was very active and gallant during the battle. Surgeons Morton, Cliff, and Dulany, unwilling to leave the wounded, remained at the hospital and were taken prisoners by the enemy.
I resumed position at Beech Grove early in the afternoon. The enemy followed and took positions in force on my left, center, and right. On my left they proceeded to establish a battery, which was not ready before nightfall. They opened with two batteries—one in front of my center and one on my right. Captain McClung and Lieutenant Falconet, commanding a section of the battery of Captain Rutledge, replied to the battery of the enemy in front. From the right the enemy fired upon the steamboat, which, at the crossing, was commanded by their position. Their first shots fell short; afterwards, mounting a larger gun, as it grew dark, they fired a shot or two over the boat, and awaited the morning to destroy it. The steamboat destroyed, the crossing of the river would have been impossible.
I considered the determination in the council of war on the previous evening to go out and attack the enemy virtually a determination that Beech Grove was untenable against his concentrating force. That it was so untenable was my decided opinion. With the morale of the army impaired by the action of the morning and the loss of what cooked rations had been carried to the field, I deemed an immediate crossing of the Cumberland River necessary. With a view to retiring from Beech Grove, I had already some days before ordered the transfer of trains and unused horses and mules to Mill Springs.
On the evening of the 19th I called in consultation General Carroll, Colonel Cummings, engineers, artillery, and other officers, and it was considered best by all to retire from Beech Grove.
I directed at once that the crossing should be effected during the night, with every effort and artifice to insure perfect concealment from the enemy and the success of the movement. Great difficulty attended the movement from the high and muddy banks and the width and heavy current of the river, the limited means of transportation (the small steamboat and two small flats) and the immediate presence of the enemy in overwhelming force. I ordered the men to be crossed over—first, by commands, in designated order; then the artillery to be crossed over; then what could be crossed of baggage and mules, horses, wagons, &c. I directed the cavalry to swim their horses over. Time only permitted to cross the infantry under arms, the sick and wounded, one company of cavalry mounted, the rest of the cavalry dismounted, the artillery-men, and some horses. Many cavalry horses, artillery horses, mules, wagons, and eleven pieces of artillery, with baggage and camp and garrison equipage were left behind.
Much is due to the energy, skill, and courage of Captain Spiller, of the cavalry, who commanded the boat, and continued crossing over with it until fired upon by the enemy in the morning, when he burned it, by my directions.
On the morning of the 20th I had my command—nine regiments of infantry, parts of four battalions and two companies of cavalry (dismounted), my sick and wounded, parts of two artillery companies, (without guns or horses), and six pieces of artillery (manned)—on the south side of the Cumberland River, at Mill Springs. On the other side, at Beech Grove (without any means of crossing), were twenty-seven regiments of infantry, with cavalry and artillery, of the enemy.
Any further collision was now prevented, but the want of commissary stores compelled me at once to move to Gainesborough, lower down on the river, a distance of 80 miles, and the nearest point where I could have communication by water with Nashville and could obtain supplies.
My march was through a poor country, over very bad roads. It was hard to obtain the necessaries of life along the route, and from scant subsistence and difficult marching my command suffered greatly. Maj. Giles M. Hillyer, of my staff, division commissary, with untiring energy and marked ability, exhausted every effort in the management of his department, and supplied whatever could be obtained, in some instances sacrificing the forms prescribed for purchase and distribution to the exigencies of the occasion and the necessities of the command.
From the fatigues of the march and the want of proper food many were taken sick. I am much gratified to commend especially the care for the wounded and sick, under most embarrassing circumstances, on the field and on the march, under the efficient charge of the accomplished medical director of my division, Dr. F. A. Ramsey.
From Mill Springs and on the first stages of my march many officers and men, frightened by false rumor of the movements of the enemy, shamelessly deserted, and, stealing horses and mules to ride, fled to Knoxville, Nashville, and other places in Tennessee. To prevent this I used every endeavor, and was laboriously assisted by my staff and other officers of the command.
I am proud to say that the field officers of all the commands, and some commands almost entire, and the main body of each command, remained ready to do their duty in any emergency, except one battalion of cavalry—which had not been in the battle, of which the lieutenant-colonel, together with some other officers and some privates, were absent on furlough—of the body of which being present only one captain, several officers and men—in all about 25—did not run away.
From Gainesborough I have moved my division to this point, where it is refurnished and drilling, and I have the honor to report that it is ready for any service to which it may be assigned.
