Some of our boys
went down the river that morning before day to assist in bringing the wounded,
on horses, back to a point out of range of the Federal guns. A few of the
severely wounded had to be left on the north side of the river.
Surgeon D. B. Cliff
was allowed by General Thomas to accompany the remains of General Zollicoffer
and Lieutenant Bailie Peyton to Louisville, Kentucky, and from there, if
General Buell would consent, to Nashville, Tennessee.1
Having been sent
with a dispatch to General Zollicoffer's headquarters, a few days previous to
his death, he invited me, though but a "high private," into his tent,
offered me a drink of wine, and treated me with as much respect and politeness
as if I had been his equal in rank.
His men did not only
have confidence in him as a commander, but he had been so good and so kind to
them that they had learned to love him almost with filial affection. Hence the
fall of our gallant leader was a desperate blow to the followers. And, unfortunately,
General Crittenden had been with the command only sixteen days and General
Carroll only four previous to this unfortunate event.
To add to the
demoralization of our little army, such rumors as the following were now afloat
in camps: "Crittenden is drunk a good portion of the time. He has a
brother in the Federal army." "He is in sympathy with the
North." "He will surrender us all to the Federals if he has a good
opportunity," etc. It was thought by some that the Fifteenth Mississippi
were so desperately mad that they would have shot him if they had had a good
opportunity. It was said that he ordered the brigades to halt and fortify at
Monticello, Kentucky, and that the colonels refused to obey orders. I give the
above as rumors, allowing each reader to have his own opinion about them. But,
whether true or untrue, they had a demoralizing effect upon the command.
On January 27th the
Hon. Landon C. Haynes wrote from Knoxville to President Davis thus:
The
Army of the Cumberland is utterly routed and demoralized. The result is
regarded with the profoundest solicitude. Confidence is gone in the ranks and
among the people. It must be restored. I am confident it cannot be done under
Generals Crittenden and Carroll. . . I do not propose to inquire whether the
loss of public confidence in Generals Crittenden and Carroll is ill or well
founded. It is sufficient that all is lost.
I
must think, as everybody else does, that there has been a great mistake made. .
Cannot you, Mr. President, right the wrong by the immediate presence of a new
and able man?2
On the same date
(27th) Governor Isham G. Harris dispatched thus to Hon. J. D. C. Atkins:
Crittenden
can never rally troops in East Tennessee. Some other general must be sent
there.3
We fell back to
Monticello, nine miles from the river, unmolested by the Federals. The infantry
and foot cavalry had quite a disagreeable march on account of so much mud. The
command halted for the night about one mile south of Monticello-that is to say,
a part of the command, for a good many besides our battalion kept moving
homeward.
There was nothing to
have hindered us from bringing off all the camp equipage belonging to our
battalion, as we were camping on the south side of the river, but in place of
doing that we lost all, leaving our tents in flames. I suppose it was thought
that the Federals would cross the river and follow us, but they did not.
Col. McNairy being
absent, the captains of our battalion held a consultation at Monticello, and
after taking all things into consideration-no rations, camp equipage, etc. they
decided to disband, allow the men to go home for a few days, get a better
supply of clothing and return to our command again.
1 Rebellion
Records, Vol. VII., p. 565.
2 Rebellion
Records, Vol. VII., p. 849.
3 Rebellion
Records, Vol. VII., p. 849.
SOURCE: Richard R.
Hancock, Hancock's Diary: Or, A History of the Second Tennessee
Confederate Cavalry, p. 125-8
