General Carroll's
Brigade passed on toward Carthage. Allison was instructed to remain until
further orders. We were in Smith County, eight and a half miles from Carthage.
The whole division halted.
SOURCE: Richard R.
Hancock, Hancock's Diary: Or, A History of the Second Tennessee
Confederate Cavalry, p. 131
By daylight all of
Colonel Statham's Brigade had crossed Caney Fork except a few wagons. Before
night General Carroll's Brigade, except two regiments (Stanton's1
and Murray's, that were yet behind), had crossed. Four companies of McNairy's
Battalion were still on the east side of Caney Fork waiting for those other two
regiments.
Seven regiments of
Crittenden's Division had crossed and moved out in the direction of Nashville
by the way of Lebanon. Allison's company was still boarding among the citizens
near Trousdale's Ferry.
The following
explains itself:
HEADQUARTERS Western DEPARTMENT,
Edgefield, February 17th, 1862.
Major-General
Crittenden, Commanding Chestnut Mound:
General
Johnston directs you to move your command to Murfreesboro (instead of
Nashville) without delay. Press all the wagons you need. Fort Donelson has
fallen, and General Floyd's army is captured after a gallant defense.
Respectfully,
W. W. MACKALL.2
_______________
1 Stanton belonged to Statham's Brigade.
2 Rebellion
Records, Vol. VII., p. 889.
SOURCE: Richard R.
Hancock, Hancock's Diary: Or, A History of the Second Tennessee
Confederate Cavalry, p. 132-3
When within five
miles of Gainesboro we met the advance of the First Brigade, now under the
command of Colonel Statham, going in the direction of Carthage by the way of
Chestnut Mound.
Captain Allison, I
and four others went on to Gainesboro. There we found General Carroll's
Brigade, and Colonel McNairy with a part of our battalion. Colonel McNairy said
we had better go back to Mr. Allison's, or in that neighborhood, in order to
get forage for our horses. We went back and remained in the Allison
neighborhood until [Friday, February 7.]
SOURCE: Richard R.
Hancock, Hancock's Diary: Or, A History of the Second Tennessee
Confederate Cavalry, p. 130
Some of our boys
went down the river that morning before day to assist in bringing the wounded,
on horses, back to a point out of range of the Federal guns. A few of the
severely wounded had to be left on the north side of the river.
Surgeon D. B. Cliff
was allowed by General Thomas to accompany the remains of General Zollicoffer
and Lieutenant Bailie Peyton to Louisville, Kentucky, and from there, if
General Buell would consent, to Nashville, Tennessee.1
Having been sent
with a dispatch to General Zollicoffer's headquarters, a few days previous to
his death, he invited me, though but a "high private," into his tent,
offered me a drink of wine, and treated me with as much respect and politeness
as if I had been his equal in rank.
His men did not only
have confidence in him as a commander, but he had been so good and so kind to
them that they had learned to love him almost with filial affection. Hence the
fall of our gallant leader was a desperate blow to the followers. And, unfortunately,
General Crittenden had been with the command only sixteen days and General
Carroll only four previous to this unfortunate event.
To add to the
demoralization of our little army, such rumors as the following were now afloat
in camps: "Crittenden is drunk a good portion of the time. He has a
brother in the Federal army." "He is in sympathy with the
North." "He will surrender us all to the Federals if he has a good
opportunity," etc. It was thought by some that the Fifteenth Mississippi
were so desperately mad that they would have shot him if they had had a good
opportunity. It was said that he ordered the brigades to halt and fortify at
Monticello, Kentucky, and that the colonels refused to obey orders. I give the
above as rumors, allowing each reader to have his own opinion about them. But,
whether true or untrue, they had a demoralizing effect upon the command.
On January 27th the
Hon. Landon C. Haynes wrote from Knoxville to President Davis thus:
The
Army of the Cumberland is utterly routed and demoralized. The result is
regarded with the profoundest solicitude. Confidence is gone in the ranks and
among the people. It must be restored. I am confident it cannot be done under
Generals Crittenden and Carroll. . . I do not propose to inquire whether the
loss of public confidence in Generals Crittenden and Carroll is ill or well
founded. It is sufficient that all is lost.
I
must think, as everybody else does, that there has been a great mistake made. .
Cannot you, Mr. President, right the wrong by the immediate presence of a new
and able man?2
On the same date
(27th) Governor Isham G. Harris dispatched thus to Hon. J. D. C. Atkins:
Crittenden
can never rally troops in East Tennessee. Some other general must be sent
there.3
We fell back to
Monticello, nine miles from the river, unmolested by the Federals. The infantry
and foot cavalry had quite a disagreeable march on account of so much mud. The
command halted for the night about one mile south of Monticello-that is to say,
a part of the command, for a good many besides our battalion kept moving
homeward.
There was nothing to
have hindered us from bringing off all the camp equipage belonging to our
battalion, as we were camping on the south side of the river, but in place of
doing that we lost all, leaving our tents in flames. I suppose it was thought
that the Federals would cross the river and follow us, but they did not.
Col. McNairy being
absent, the captains of our battalion held a consultation at Monticello, and
after taking all things into consideration-no rations, camp equipage, etc. they
decided to disband, allow the men to go home for a few days, get a better
supply of clothing and return to our command again.
1 Rebellion
Records, Vol. VII., p. 565.
2 Rebellion
Records, Vol. VII., p. 849.
3 Rebellion
Records, Vol. VII., p. 849.
SOURCE: Richard R.
Hancock, Hancock's Diary: Or, A History of the Second Tennessee
Confederate Cavalry, p. 125-8
SIR: The Army of the
Cumberland is utterly routed and demoralized. The result is regarded with the
profoundest solicitude. Confidence is gone in the ranks and among the people.
It must be restored. I am confident it cannot be done under Generals Crittenden
and Carroll. There is now no impediment whatever but bad roads and natural
obstacles to prevent the enemy from entering East Tennessee and destroying the
railroads and putting East Tennessee in a flame of revolution.
Nothing but the
appointment to the command of a brave, skillful, and able general, who has the
popular confidence, will restore tone and discipline to the army, and
confidence to the people. I do not propose to inquire whether the loss of
public confidence in Generals Crittenden and Carroll is ill or well founded. It
is sufficient that all is lost.
General Humphrey
Marshall, General Floyd, General Pillow, General Smith, or General Loring would
restore tone to the army and rein-spire the public confidence. I must think, as
everybody else does, that there has been a great mistake made. Every movement
is important. Can not you, Mr. President, right the wrong by the immediate
presence of a new and able man?
SOURCE: The
War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and
Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 7 (Serial No. 7), p. 849
SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the engagement of January 19, near, Pulaski County, Kentucky:
On January 17 I was occupying Mill Springs, on the south side of the Cumberland River, with the Seventeenth, Twenty-eighth, and Thirty-seventh Tennessee Regiments, the First Battalion Tennessee Cavalry, two companies of the Third Battalion Tennessee Cavalry, and four pieces of artillery. I was also at the same time occupying Beech Grove, on the north bank of the river, and directly opposite Mill Springs, with the Fifteenth Mississippi, Sixteenth Alabama, Nineteenth, Twentieth, Twenty-fifth, and Twenty-ninth Tennessee Regiments, two battalions of Tennessee cavalry, two independent cavalry companies, and twelve pieces of artillery.
For some time the enemy in front of Beech Grove had occupied Somerset, 18 miles distant, with eight regiments of infantry and with artillery; and Columbia, 35 miles distant, with five regiments of infantry. On January 17 I was informed that the force from Columbia, with a large addition, making a total of from 6,000 to 10,000 men, with guns of a large caliber, under General Thomas, commanding the First Division of the Federal Army in Kentucky, was moving across my front, on the road from Columbia towards Somerset, with the intention of forming a junction with the Somerset force and attacking Beech Grove.
On the 18th, at daylight, I moved the Seventeenth and Twenty-eighth Tennessee Regiments across the river from Mill Springs to Beech Grove. On the 18th I was informed that the force under General Thomas was encamped at Webb's [Logan's] Cross-Roads, a point 10 miles from Beech Grove and 8 miles from Somerset, at which the roads from Columbia to Somerset and Beech Grove to Somerset unite, and that it would there await both a re-enforcement (that I was advised was advancing from the rear) and the passage of Fishing Creek by the Somerset force. It was necessary that the Somerset force should cross Fishing Creek before it could join the force under General Thomas or approach Beech Grove, and for these purposes it had advanced from Somerset. I was advised that late and continuous rains would prevent the passage of Fishing Creek on the 18th and 19th by any infantry force.
In the then condition of my command I could array for battle about 4,000 effective men. Absolute want of the necessary provisions to feed my command was pressing. The country around was barren or exhausted. Communication with Nashville by water was cut off by a force of the enemy occupying the river below. The line of communication in the rear was too long to admit of winter transportation and extended through a barren or exhausted country.
To defend Beech Grove required me to draw into it the force from Mill Springs. From the course of the river and the condition of things it was easy for a detachment from the force of the enemy occupying it below to cross over, intercept the line of land communication, and, taking Mill Springs, entirely prevent my recrossing the Cumberland. This river (greatly swollen), with high, muddy banks, was a troublesome barrier in the rear of Beech Grove. Transportation over it was, at best, very difficult. A small stern-wheel steamboat, unsuited for the transportation of horses, with two flat-boats, were the only means of crossing.
Beech Grove was protected in front by earthworks; but these incomplete and insufficient, and necessarily of such extent that I had not force to defend them. The range of our artillery was bad, and there were commanding positions for the batteries of the enemy. Every effort had been made to provision the command, to increase the means of crossing the river, and to perfect the works for defense, under the charge of a skillful engineer officer, Captain Sheliha.
When I first heard that the enemy was approaching in front it was my opinion that I could not retire with my command—artillery, transportation, camp and garrison equipage, baggage, and cavalry horses—from Beech Grove to Mill Springs without information of such a movement reaching the enemy, and a consequent attack during the movement and heavy loss. I was out of reach of support or re-enforcement. Under these circumstances I determined not to retreat without a battle. I decided that it was best to attack the enemy, if possible before the coming re-enforcements from his rear should arrive and before the Somerset force could cross Fishing Creek. I could reasonably expect much from a bold attack and from the spirit of my command.
On the evening of the 18th I called in council Brigadier-Generals Zollicoffer and Carroll and the commanding officers of regiments and of cavalry and artillery; and there it was determined, without dissent, to march out and attack the enemy under General Thomas on the next morning. Accordingly Generals Zollicoffer and Carroll were ordered to move their brigades at midnight in the following order:
1st. The brigade of General Zollicoffer, in the following order: In front, the independent cavalry companies of Captains Saunders and Bledsoe; then the Fifteenth Mississippi Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Walthall; then the Nineteenth Tennessee, commanded by Col. D. H. Cummings; then the Twentieth Tennessee, commanded by Colonel Battle; then the Twenty-fifth Tennessee, commanded by Col. S.S. Stanton; then four guns of Rutledge's battery, commanded by Captain Rutledge.
2d. The brigade of General Carroll in this order: In front, the Seventeenth Tennessee, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Miller; then the Twenty-eighth Tennessee, commanded by Colonel Murray; then the Twenty-ninth Tennessee, commanded by Colonel Powell; then two guns of —— battery, commanded by Captain McClung.
In rear were the Sixteenth Alabama, as a reserve, commanded by Col. W. B. Wood, and the cavalry battalions of Lieutenant-Colonel Branner and Lieutenant-Colonel McClellan.
Soon after daylight on the morning of January 19 the cavalry advance came in contact with the pickets of the enemy, after a march of near 9 miles, over a deep and muddy road. With a few shots the enemy's pickets were driven in, retiring about a quarter of a mile to a house on the left of the road. From this house and woods in the rear of it quite a brisk firing was opened upon the head of the column. Skirmishers having been thrown forward, General Zollicoffer's brigade was formed in line of battle and ordered to advance upon the enemy, whom I supposed would come out from their camp, which we were now approaching, to take position. The road here extended straight in front for near a mile towards the north.
A company of skirmishers from the Mississippi regiment, advancing on the left of the road, after sharp firing, drove a body of the enemy from the house and the woods next to it, and then, under orders, crossing the road, fell in with their regiment. Following this company of skirmishers on the left of the road to the point where it crossed to the right, the regiment of Colonel Cummings (Nineteenth Tennessee) kept straight on, and, crossing a field about 250 yards wide at a double-quick, charged into the woods where the enemy was sheltered, driving back the Tenth Indiana Regiment until it was re-enforced.
At this time General Zollicoffer rode up to the Nineteenth Tennessee and ordered Colonel Cummings to cease firing, under the impression that the fire was upon another regiment of his own brigade. Then the general advanced, as if to give an order to the lines of the enemy, within bayonet reach, and was killed just as he discovered his fatal mistake. Thereupon a conflict ensued, when the Nineteenth Tennessee broke its line and gave back. Rather in the rear and near to this regiment was the Twenty-fifth Tennessee, commanded by Colonel Stanton, which engaged the enemy, when the colonel was wounded at the head of his men; but this regiment, impressed with the same idea which had proved fatal to General Zollicoffer—that it was engaged with friends—soon broke its line and fell into some disorder.
At this time—the fall of General Zollicoffer having been announced to me—I went forward in the road to the regiments of Colonels Cummings and Stanton, and announced to Colonel Cummings the death of General Zollicoffer, and that the command of the brigade devolved upon him.
There was a cessation of firing for a few moments, and I ascertained that the regiment of Colonel Battle was on the right and the Mississippi regiment in the center, neither as yet having been actively engaged, and the enemy in front of the entire line. I had ordered General Carroll to bring up his brigade, and it was now, in supporting distance, displayed in line of battle.
I now repeated my orders for a general advance, and soon the battle raged from right to left. When I sent my aide to order the Fifteenth Mississippi to charge, I sent by him an order to General Carroll to advance a regiment to sustain it. He ordered up for that purpose Colonel Murray's (Twenty-eighth Tennessee) regiment, which engaged the enemy on the left of the Mississippi regiment and on the right of Stanton's (Tennessee) regiment. I ordered Captain Rutledge, with two of his guns, forward in the road to an advanced and hazardous position, ordering Colonel Stanton to support him, where I hoped he might bring them to play effectively upon the enemy; but the position did not permit this, and he soon retired, under my order. At this point the horse of Captain Rutledge was killed under him.
Very soon the enemy began to gain ground on our left and to use their superior force for flanking in that quarter. I was in person at the right of the line of Stanton's regiment, the battle raging, and did not observe this so soon as it was observed by General Carroll, who moved the regiment of Colonel Cummings, then commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, to the left, to meet this movement of the enemy, and formed the Seventeenth Tennessee, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Miller, to support the regiments on the left. The regiments of Murray, Stanton, and Cummings were driven back by the enemy, and, while reforming in the rear of the Seventeenth Tennessee, that well-disciplined regiment met and held in check for some time the entire right wing of the Northern army. These regiments on my left and on the left of the road retired across the field a distance of about 250 yards, and there for a time repulsed the advancing enemy. Especially the regiment of Colonel Stanton, partially rallied by its gallant field officers, formed behind a fence, and, pouring volleys into the ranks of the enemy coming across the field, repulsed and drove them back for a time with heavy loss.
For an hour now the Fifteenth Mississippi, under Lieutenant-Colonel Walthall, and the Twentieth Tennessee, under Col. Joel A. Battle, of my center and right, had been struggling with the superior force of the enemy.
I cannot omit to mention the heroic valor of these two regiments, officers and men. When the left retired they were flanked and compelled to leave their position. In their rear, on the right of the road, was the regiment of Colonel Powell (Twenty-ninth Tennessee), which had been formed in the rear and ordered forward by me some time before. General Carroll ordered this regiment to face the flanking force of the enemy, which was crossing the road from the left side, which it did, checking it with a raking fire at 30 paces. In this conflict Colonel Powell, commanding, was badly wounded.
The Sixteenth Alabama, which was the reserve corps of my division, commanded by Colonel Wood, did at this critical juncture most eminent service. Having rushed behind the right and center, it came to a close engagement with the pursuing enemy, to protect the flanks and rear of the Fifteenth Mississippi and Twentieth Tennessee, when they were the last, after long fighting, to leave the front line of the battle, and, well led by its commanding officer. In conjunction with portions of other regiments, it effectually prevented pursuit and protected my return to camp.
Owing to the formation and character of the field of battle I was unable to use my artillery and cavalry to advantage in the action. During much of the time the engagement lasted rain was falling. Many of the men were armed with flint-lock muskets and they became soon unserviceable.
On the field and during the retreat to camp some of the regiments became confused and broken and great disorder prevailed. This was owing, in some measure, to a want of proper drill and discipline, of which the army had been much deprived by reason of the nature of its constant service and of the country in which it had encamped.
During the engagement, or just prior to it, the force under General Thomas was increased by the arrival, on a forced march, of a brigade from his rear, which I had hoped would not arrive until the engagement was over. This made the three of the enemy about 12,000 men. My effective force was four thousand. The engagement lasted three hours. My loss was 125 killed, 309 wounded, and 99 missing, as follows:
|
|
Killed. |
Wounded. |
Missing. |
|
15th Mississippi Regiment |
44 |
153 |
29 |
|
20th Tennessee (Battle) |
33 |
59 |
18 |
|
19th Tennessee (Cummings). |
10 |
22 |
2 |
|
25th Tennessee (Stanton) |
10 |
28 |
17 |
|
17th Tennessee (Newman) |
11 |
25 |
2 |
|
28th Tennessee (Murray) |
3 |
4 |
5 |
|
29th Tennessee (Powell) |
5 |
12 |
10 |
|
16th Alabama |
9 |
5 |
12 |
|
Captain Saunders' cavalry. |
.... |
1 |
.... |
The loss of the enemy, from the best information I have and statements made by themselves, may be estimated at 700 killed and wounded. It was larger than mine from the fact that my regiments on the left, after first being driven back, fired from the cover of woods and fences upon the large numbers advancing upon them through the open field, inflicting heavy loss and sustaining but little.
My command retired to Beech Grove without any annoyance in the rear by infantry or cavalry. On the return, one piece of artillery, of Captain Rutledge's battery, mired down and was left.
To myself, to the army, and to the country the fall of General Zollicoffer was a severe loss. I found him wise in council, heroic in action. He fell in the front, close to the enemy, and they bore off his body. Of his staff, Lieutenants Fogg and Shields were mortally wounded and have since died. They displayed conspicuous courage. Lieutenant Bailie Peyton, jr., commanding Company A (of Battle's regiment), was killed in the heat of the action. Adjt. Joel A. Battle, jr., was badly wounded while in front with the colors of his regiment, which he seized when the bearer was shot down. Lieutenant-Colonel Carter, a distinguished officer of this same regiment, was taken prisoner. Colonel Battle commanded with marked ability and courage. Colonel Statham, of the Fifteenth Mississippi Regiment, was absent at the time of the battle on furlough. His regiment was most gallantly led by Lieutenant-Colonel Walthall. The reputation of the Mississippians for heroism was fully sustained by this regiment. Its loss in killed and wounded, which was far greater than that of any other regiment, tells sufficiently the story of discipline and courage. The already extended limits of this report will not permit me, even if I had them at hand, to enumerate the individual acts of courage with which this regiment abounded. Suffice it to say that it is entitled to all praise.
General Carroll, in his dispositions and conduct during the engagement, manifested both military skill and personal valor. My assistant adjutant-general, A. S. Cunningham, and my aides, Lieuts. W. W. Porter and H. I. Thornton, displayed throughout the action intelligence, activity, and courage, and were of great service to me. Happening with me at the time, Maj. James F. Brewer volunteered as my aide and was very active and gallant during the battle. Surgeons Morton, Cliff, and Dulany, unwilling to leave the wounded, remained at the hospital and were taken prisoners by the enemy.
I resumed position at Beech Grove early in the afternoon. The enemy followed and took positions in force on my left, center, and right. On my left they proceeded to establish a battery, which was not ready before nightfall. They opened with two batteries—one in front of my center and one on my right. Captain McClung and Lieutenant Falconet, commanding a section of the battery of Captain Rutledge, replied to the battery of the enemy in front. From the right the enemy fired upon the steamboat, which, at the crossing, was commanded by their position. Their first shots fell short; afterwards, mounting a larger gun, as it grew dark, they fired a shot or two over the boat, and awaited the morning to destroy it. The steamboat destroyed, the crossing of the river would have been impossible.
I considered the determination in the council of war on the previous evening to go out and attack the enemy virtually a determination that Beech Grove was untenable against his concentrating force. That it was so untenable was my decided opinion. With the morale of the army impaired by the action of the morning and the loss of what cooked rations had been carried to the field, I deemed an immediate crossing of the Cumberland River necessary. With a view to retiring from Beech Grove, I had already some days before ordered the transfer of trains and unused horses and mules to Mill Springs.
On the evening of the 19th I called in consultation General Carroll, Colonel Cummings, engineers, artillery, and other officers, and it was considered best by all to retire from Beech Grove.
I directed at once that the crossing should be effected during the night, with every effort and artifice to insure perfect concealment from the enemy and the success of the movement. Great difficulty attended the movement from the high and muddy banks and the width and heavy current of the river, the limited means of transportation (the small steamboat and two small flats) and the immediate presence of the enemy in overwhelming force. I ordered the men to be crossed over—first, by commands, in designated order; then the artillery to be crossed over; then what could be crossed of baggage and mules, horses, wagons, &c. I directed the cavalry to swim their horses over. Time only permitted to cross the infantry under arms, the sick and wounded, one company of cavalry mounted, the rest of the cavalry dismounted, the artillery-men, and some horses. Many cavalry horses, artillery horses, mules, wagons, and eleven pieces of artillery, with baggage and camp and garrison equipage were left behind.
Much is due to the energy, skill, and courage of Captain Spiller, of the cavalry, who commanded the boat, and continued crossing over with it until fired upon by the enemy in the morning, when he burned it, by my directions.
On the morning of the 20th I had my command—nine regiments of infantry, parts of four battalions and two companies of cavalry (dismounted), my sick and wounded, parts of two artillery companies, (without guns or horses), and six pieces of artillery (manned)—on the south side of the Cumberland River, at Mill Springs. On the other side, at Beech Grove (without any means of crossing), were twenty-seven regiments of infantry, with cavalry and artillery, of the enemy.
Any further collision was now prevented, but the want of commissary stores compelled me at once to move to Gainesborough, lower down on the river, a distance of 80 miles, and the nearest point where I could have communication by water with Nashville and could obtain supplies.
My march was through a poor country, over very bad roads. It was hard to obtain the necessaries of life along the route, and from scant subsistence and difficult marching my command suffered greatly. Maj. Giles M. Hillyer, of my staff, division commissary, with untiring energy and marked ability, exhausted every effort in the management of his department, and supplied whatever could be obtained, in some instances sacrificing the forms prescribed for purchase and distribution to the exigencies of the occasion and the necessities of the command.
From the fatigues of the march and the want of proper food many were taken sick. I am much gratified to commend especially the care for the wounded and sick, under most embarrassing circumstances, on the field and on the march, under the efficient charge of the accomplished medical director of my division, Dr. F. A. Ramsey.
From Mill Springs and on the first stages of my march many officers and men, frightened by false rumor of the movements of the enemy, shamelessly deserted, and, stealing horses and mules to ride, fled to Knoxville, Nashville, and other places in Tennessee. To prevent this I used every endeavor, and was laboriously assisted by my staff and other officers of the command.
I am proud to say that the field officers of all the commands, and some commands almost entire, and the main body of each command, remained ready to do their duty in any emergency, except one battalion of cavalry—which had not been in the battle, of which the lieutenant-colonel, together with some other officers and some privates, were absent on furlough—of the body of which being present only one captain, several officers and men—in all about 25—did not run away.
From Gainesborough I have moved my division to this point, where it is refurnished and drilling, and I have the honor to report that it is ready for any service to which it may be assigned.
Brigadier-General
William H. Carroll arrived at Mill Springs yesterday, but his command—Captain
G. H. Monsarrat's Battery (four guns) and the balance of Colonel White's
Regiment did not arrive until to-day. One regiment and one battery of four guns
were all the troops that General Carroll was able to bring with him from
Knoxville to add to Zollicoffer's command.
He was ordered by the Secretary of War, as early as the 3d of November, to move his brigade to Knoxville and report to General Zollicoffer. He arrived at Knoxville the 23d of November, but did not move on to join Zollicoffer from the fact that his brigade was not armed, notwithstanding he had been making every possible effort for two months previous to procure arms for his men.
On the 12th of
December Carroll received another dispatch from the Secretary ordering him to
proceed immediately, with all the armed men of his brigade, to the aid of
Zollicoffer, leaving the unarmed portion of his command at Knoxville, under the
control of a suitable officer, until arms could be provided. The next day
(13th), in a lengthy communication to the Secretary, he laid before that
officer the nature and extent of the embarrassment under which he had labored
ever since he had assumed command of his brigade, especially in reference to
his inability to procure arms for his men. “Out of my entire force,”1
continued he, “I could not muster more than three hundred men efficiently
armed.”2
On the 17th of
December the Secretary of War replied thus:
Your
troops are enlisted but for twelve months, and to such troops we never furnish
arms. . . . It is impossible for us to carry on a war at such an enormous
expenditure as is involved in receiving twelve-months’ men without arms. . . .
. . .
. . . If your men will now enlist for the war
they will be entitled to receive the bounty of fifty dollars allowed by
Congress, and I will endeavor to aid in arming them; but if not, all that are
unarmed must be disbanded on the 10th of January.3
By January 1st Carroll had procured arms for two regiments (White's and Looney's) of his brigade, and had the promise of arms for the other (Gillespie's) in thirty days.
On the eighth he was
ordered by A. S. Johnston to send forward at once to Bowling Green all the men
who were armed and ready for duty of the regiments of Colonels Looney and
Gillespie.4
I give the above to
show why Carroll was so long coming to the aid of Zollicoffer, and also to show
why he did not bring more troops with him.
Newman's, Murray's
and Powell's Regiments were detached from Zollicoffer's Brigade and attached to
Carroll's. Crittenden's Division was now composed of two brigades. Zollicoffer
commanded the First, and Carroll the Second. The former had five regiments. and
the latter four. I do not know how the eighteen pieces of artillery and the
nineteen companies of cavalry were divided between the brigade commanders.
However, I am of the opinion that McNairy's Battalion still remained attached
to Zollicoffer's Brigade.
1 4,000.
2 Rebellion
Records, Vol. VII., p. 764.
3 Rebellion
Records, Vol. VII., p. 771.
4 Rebellion
Records, Vol. VII., p. 825.
SIR: Your order to me of the 10th instant to join General Zollicoffer immediately with all my armed force reached me last night. I immediately set about making the necessary arrangements to carry the same into effect, as indeed I had been doing for some days previous, under instructions from General Zollicoffer himself. A portion if not all of my command would now have been on the march for General Zollicoffer's present position but for the unsettled condition of affairs in East Tennessee, together with other obstacles that I have been utterly unable to overcome, though I have made every possible exertion to that effect, but as yet without success.
In justice to myself I feel that I may very properly lay before you the nature and extent of the embarrassments under which I have labored ever since I assumed my present command. When the President did me the honor to appoint me a brigadier-general in the Provisional Army I confidently expected to have had my entire brigade thoroughly armed within twenty days at furthest from that time, as I have taken every precaution to secure sufficient arms for that purpose while raising and organizing the regiments which I now have the honor to command. Early in the month of September I procured about 2,000 ordinary country rifles, and placed them in the Government armories at Memphis, Nashville, and Murfreesborough. In order to have them altered—made of uniform length and caliber, and fitted with a sword-bayonet. At that time I was assured by the armory officers at those places that these guns would be repaired and ready for use by the middle of October. On the 26th of that month you telegraphed to them to lay aside all other guns and put their whole force at work upon mine. This they informed me they did; but when I received your orders of the 3d of November to advance to this place and report to General Zollicoffer not a single gun had been completed.
The indications of an extensive outbreak in East Tennessee at that time were so alarming, that I deemed it unsafe to move my command through that country wholly unarmed. I therefore made application in every direction for guns of any description, to serve me until my own should be ready for use. I finally, after much annoyance, succeeded in getting from the arsenal at Memphis about 400 flint-lock muskets, rifles, and double-barreled shot-guns. With these, imperfect and almost worthless as they were, I advanced to Chattanooga, and halted my forces for a few days, for the purpose of dispersing the different bands of traitors who were gathering in that vicinity. This object being accomplished, I moved on to this point. When I reached here I found a general feeling of alarm and uneasiness prevailing throughout the surrounding country. Information every day reached me from all points that recreant Tennesseeans, with a few miscreants from other States, were organizing themselves into predatory bands in the counties of Blount, Sevier, Cocke, Hancock, Scott, Campbell, and other counties bordering on the North Carolina and Kentucky line. I immediately sent out scouting parties of cavalry, together with such small detachments of infantry as I could arm, to protect and assist the loyal citizens of these counties in driving these base ingrates from their midst. These various parties have succeeded in arresting many of the rebellious and disaffected, and bringing them to this place for trial. Out of the number thus arrested I have sent and will send about 100, as prisoners of war, to Tuscaloosa. I have for some days past been receiving information, from sources entitled to much credit, that a considerable force of the enemy were threatening a descent from the Kentucky border upon the counties of Campbell and Scott, by way of a small pass in the mountains above Cumberland Gap.
To-day I am in receipt of information, which apparently admits of no doubt, that a body of the enemy, some 500 strong, had attacked the town of Huntsville, and captured a company of cavalry stationed at that place. Other less reliable reports place the number of the enemy at 2,000. I have therefore made arrangements to dispatch Colonel White there with all the armed force I can command, with orders to attack them if not too strong, and if the numbers are too great to fall back until I can re-enforce him. The country abounds in mountain passes and ravines, and a position well selected can be easily held against largely superior numbers. This movement will not delay the prompt execution of your order, as the place mentioned is near my line of march to join General Zollicoffer. During the time I have been here I have continued my exertions to procure arms from every source where they were likely to be obtained, though almost entirely without success. A few days ago I dispatched one of my officers to General Johnston, at Bowling Green, with a statement of my condition, and an urgent appeal for arms of some description, if he should have any at his disposal; but he dispatches me that none are to be had. I have also sent a competent armory officer to Memphis upon a similar mission. From him I learn that 500 of my rifles will be ready by Monday next. These will be forwarded immediately. He further informs me that the remainder will soon be repaired and sent on, as they are being pushed forward as rapidly as possible. Two hundred of those left at Nashville were sent me some days ago, but so imperfectly repaired as to be wholly unfit for use, as you will see from the inclosed report from the ordnance officer at this place. The repairs on these I am having completed here, and will have them finished as soon as possible.
I have here now three regiments fully organized and another in process of formation, besides seven companies of cavalry, amounting in all to about 4,000 men, who could be brought immediately into the field if I could only supply them with arms. Out of my entire force I could not muster more than 300 men efficiently armed. A few hundred more have old hunting guns, but they are of little or no service in their present condition. I still hope that all my guns will be ready in a very short time. I send to Richmond Lieut. Col. E. J. Golladay, one of my best-informed and most discreet officers, to represent to you more fully the true condition of my command. His suggestions may perhaps be of service in shaping the policy proper to pursue in the region of country of which I have spoken.
For a detailed statement of the operations of my command since taking the field, together with an account of all the other forces now in East Tennessee, I beg to call your attention to my report made to Maj. Gen. G. B. Crittenden on the 9th instant, and by him forwarded to the office of the Adjutant and Inspector General. Colonel Golladay can also give you much valuable information of the strength, condition, &c., of the different commands in this portion of the State, together with the state of public feeling and real condition of the country here.
SIR: Your letter of the 13th instant, containing an account of the difficulties which have hitherto prevented the movement of your brigade, has been handed to me by Lieutenant-Colonel Golladay. The principal difficulty seems to be that your regiments are unarmed, and I am unable to discover from your statements that you are much nearer a capacity for movement now than you were two months ago. Your troops are enlisted but for twelve months, and to such troops we never furnish arms. At least one-fourth of the term of your men has passed away, and nearly the entire expenditure of the Government is a dead loss up to the present time. It is impossible for us to carry on a war at such an enormous expenditure as is involved in receiving twelvemonths' men without arms. I will allow you till the 10th of January to complete the armament of your regiments, and at that date I shall order all unarmed companies and regiments to be disbanded. Lieutenant-Colonel Golladay has inquired of me in relation to obtaining arms from this Government, but we give none Whatever to any but troops enlisted for the war. If your men will now enlist for the war they will be entitled to receive the bounty of $50 allowed by Congress, and I will endeavor to aid in arming them; but, if not, all that are unarmed must be disbanded on the 10th of January.
Send forward at once to this place all the men who [are] armed and ready for duty of the regiments of Colonels Looney and Gillespie. If they are part of your brigade, and it is not inconsistent with orders in East Tennessee, you will accompany the regiments here.
The First Battalion
had the honor of going on dress parade in the presence of Major-General George
B. Crittenden, who had arrived at Mill Springs and assumed command on the 3d
instant.
Colonel S. Powell's
Regiment (Twenty-ninth Tennessee) came with General Crittenden, and I think a
part of Colonel M. White's Regiment (Thirty-seventh Tennessee), of Carroll's
Brigade, arrived at the same time.
Good news! good
news! A small steamboat, the “Noble Ellis,” has arrived at Mill Springs loaded
with army stores, coffee, sugar, molasses, etc.
General Boyle, who
had returned to Columbia and was now in command of Eleventh Brigade, wrote as
follows to General Thomas, Lebanon, Kentucky:
A
rebel steamboat passed Burkesville yesterday (6th) at twelve o'clock, loaded
with men and cannon and other arms, clothing, etc.
I
send three hundred cavalry to heights on this side to intercept it, if
possible. I will move with three hundred of Third Kentucky and Nineteenth Ohio
to an advantageous position at the mouth of Renick's Creek, two and a half
miles above Burkesville, on the Cumberland. I shall move the whole force here
to Burkesville. It is only four miles further from Glasgow than Columbia.
I
am not willing to see the Cumberland surrendered without a struggle to
Zollicoffer and the rebel invaders.
We
have no cannon, and must rely on our rifles to take off the men from the boats.
With one piece of artillery the boats could be torn to atoms or sunk.
Can
you not send me a section of a battery?*
Fortunately for us,
Boyle did not stop our boat.
* Rebellion Records,
Vol. VII. p. 535.
I went back to camp,
fifteen miles from Mr. West's.
Zollicoffer wrote to
A. S. Johnston, Bowling Green, Kentucky, as follows:
SIR—I
feel it my duty frankly to say that the failure to receive the reserves and
supplies I ordered up a month ago, and upon which in part the plan of campaign
was predicated, has given and is likely to give serious embarrassment.
I
now receive no responses to communications addressed to Knoxville connected
with the most important details.
I
have five (four and a half) regiments north of the river and two south. The
strength of the enemy is unknown, but it is reported by the country people to
be very large.
There
are now, I learn, in East Tennessee,1 besides the force at
Cumberland Gap, eight full regiments and a Georgia Battalion, a battery of
artillery and eight cavalry companies. I beg respectfully to say that it cannot
be that half this force is required there.
On
the other hand, were this column strengthened properly, the enemy could not
venture to pass London to attack Cumberland Gap. We could open the Cumberland
and drive the enemy from Somerset and Columbia.2
1 On the 10th of December General Carroll
reported his brigade five thousand strong, and all other troops in East
Tennessee at six thousand-total, eleven thousand.—Rebellion Records, Vol. V11., p. 751.
2 Rebellion
Records, Vol. VII., p. 786.
McClellan's and
Branner's Battalions returned to their camps at Beech Grove. Our battalion
recrossed the river and went into camps near Mr. West's, where we left our
wagon train the 25th.
At nine P. M.,
Colonel T. E. Bramlette (First Kentucky Infantry), who was at that time in
command of General Boyle's Brigade at Columbia, wrote as follows to General
Thomas:
The
enemy is at Jamestown, eighteen miles from here, some three thousand strong.
He
has ascertained the strength and position of Colonel Wolford's camp, and
threatens to destroy that before moving further. He has one thousand seven
hundred mounted men, armed mostly as infantry.
I
would not be surprised if the whole of Zollicoffer's forces were to be on us in
two or three days.
We
will, however, strike a blow, even if left to ourselves, that shall terrify the
rebel hell-hounds wherever they hear of us. Retreat we will not, and if they
come upon us we will fight the fight of desperation to win.1
Notwithstanding
McNairy did not go so far down the river as Zollicoffer had instructed him to
go, yet it would seem from the above communication that the object of the
expedition, at least to some extent, had been accomplished. That is to say, the
attention of the Federals had been attracted from the river, and Colonel
Bramlette was now holding his brigade in readiness at Columbia, awaiting
an attack from Zollicoffer.
The long looked for
“reserves” are coming in at last. Colonel William B. Wood, with a battalion of
his regiment (Sixteenth Alabama), and Captain H. L. W. McClung, with his
battery of artillery (six guns), have arrived. Colonel Samuel Powell's Regiment
will be here soon, having started from Knoxville the 24th instant, Colonel
Moses White's Regiment, of General Carroll's Brigade, is also on the way from
Knoxville.
1 Rebellion
Records, Vol. VII., P: 517.
SIR: I have the
honor herewith to submit a report of the strength and condition of all the
forces now in East Tennessee for the past few weeks acting under my command,
together with their location, field of duty, &c. My immediate command,
assigned by the Secretary of War, is as follows:
Senior (Thirty-eighth) Regiment: Colonel,
Robert F. Looney; lieutenant-colonel, E. J. Golladay; major, D. H. Thrasher.
Organized September 23, for twelve months. Stationed at Knoxville. This
regiment is but imperfectly armed, having but 250 guns, consisting of rifles,
double-barreled shot-guns, and muskets. Of these not more than 50 are perfect.
This regiment is now stationed at this place, except one company, which is on
detached service at Morristown. Strength of regiment, 988.
Second(Thirty-ninth)
Regiment:1 Colonel, Moses White; lieutenant-colonel,
Hunter P. Moffit; major, W. M. Hunt (acting). Organized October 11, 1861, for
twelve months. This regiment is also stationed at Knoxville, except one
company, which is on detached service at Morristown. The arms of this regiment
consist of about 200 rifles, shot-guns, and muskets, mostly unfit for use
except in an emergency. Strength of regiment, 771.
In addition to the
two regiments above mentioned there are seven companies that have been mustered
into service that have heretofore been nominally under the command of Col. W.
T. Avery, which were also assigned me by the Secretary of War. These have not
yet been organized into a regiment, for the reason that three of them which I
left at a camp of instruction at Germantown were ordered to Fort Pillow by
General Pillow, commanding at Columbus. The other four companies are in the
neighborhood of Knoxville.
I have written to
General Pillow, protesting against this interference with my command, and requested him to order
the three companies now at Fort Pillow to move immediately to this place.
Should he do so, the regiment will be organized at once. Should he not do so, I
shall appeal to the Secretary of War.
When I reached
Chattanooga with my command, on the march to this point, I was joined by the
following regiment:
[Thirty-second
Regiment]: Colonel, E. C.
Cook; lieutenant-colonel, W. P. Moore; major, ——— Brownlow. Organized ———, for
twelve months. This regiment is still at Chattanooga, awaiting further orders.
It is armed with 500 flint-lock muskets, in good order. Strength of regiment,
850.
When Colonel Cook
reported to me he informed me that he was assigned to no command and requested
me to attach him to my brigade, which I did until such time as I should receive
orders from you. Should it meet your approval, I should be glad to have him
continued under my command. I would also suggest that he be ordered to this
place, as there is no further necessity for the services of his regiment at the
place where it now is, as every indication of a rebellion in that section of
country has entirely disappeared.
Col. J. W.
Gillespie, of this city, has reported to me the following companies, with the
request that they should be organized into a regiment and attached to my
brigade, viz:
Capt. A. J. Cawood,
stationed at Loudon, partially armed; Capt. S. T. Turner, stationed at Loudon;
Capt. L. Guthrie, stationed at Knoxville; Capt. John Goodman, stationed at
Knoxville; Capt. D. Neff, stationed at Knoxville; Capt. W. J. Hill, stationed
at Knoxville; Capt. A.W. Hodge, stationed at Knoxville; Capt. W. L. Lafferty,
stationed at Calhoun; Capt. W. H. McKamy, stationed at Charleston; Capt. J. W.
Phillips, stationed at Rogersville.
The strength of this
regiment will reach about 850 men. Some of these companies are partially armed
with old country rifles and shotguns. I have ordered all of them to rendezvous
at Camp Key, in the vicinity of this city, and will organize them into a
regiment early next week.
The following
detached companies have also reported to me, viz: Capt. W. D. Smith, stationed
at Charleston; Capt. J.P. Brown, stationed at Madisonville; Capt. J. B. Cook,
stationed at Athens; Capt. W. C. Nelson, stationed at Philadelphia; Capt. H.
Harris, stationed at Sevierville; Capt. W. G. McCain, stationed at Knoxville.
These companies are
also partially armed with such guns as could be secured in the surrounding
country. So soon as these companies can be relieved from duty at the places
where they are now stationed I will concentrate them at this or some other
convenient point and organize them into a regiment.
Artillery.—Captain George H. Monsarrat; first senior
lieutenant, E. Baxter; first junior lieutenant, Brian; second senior
lieutenant, Freeman; second junior lieutenant, [C.] Freeman; 140 men, 4 guns, 3
caissons, 103 horses.
This company is now
stationed near this city; is under the command of one of the most active and
efficient officers in the service. It is thoroughly drilled and disciplined.
Six more guns will be obtained in a few days and the command increased to 250
men.
Cavalry.—The following cavalry companies have
reported to me and have been acting under my orders, viz:
Captain McLin,
stationed at Lick Creek; Captain Brock, stationed at Knoxville; Capt. J. F.
White, stationed at Maryville; Capt. W. L. Brown, stationed at Cleveland; Capt.
D. C. Ghormley, stationed in Cocke County; Capt. R. W. McClary, stationed at
Cleveland; Capt. S. W. Eldredge, stationed at Loudon.
The foregoing
comprised all the force attached to my immediate command. Other forces,
however, have reported to me and acted under my command, consisting of the
following:
Col. W. B. Wood's
regiment, at present stationed new this place, numbering about 800 men, armed
with flint-lock muskets. This regiment is attached to the brigade of
Brigadier-General Zollicoffer.
Capt. H. L. W.
McClung's battery, consisting of two 6-pounder and two 12-pounder guns, with
caissons, horses, &c., numbering about 100 men; Captain Gillespie's
cavalry, numbering about 100 men, armed with double-barreled shot-guns. Both
these companies belong to the command of General Zollicoffer.
There are other
forces stationed at various points in East Tennessee from the commanders of
which I have received no official report and have no certain information
concerning them. The following is the most reliable I have been able to obtain:
Col. Samuel Powell's
regiment, stationed at Greeneville. Of its strength, arms, &c., I have no
knowledge, nor do I know to what command it is attached.
Col. S. A.M. Wood's
regiment is stationed 10 miles east of Chattanooga; is thoroughly equipped, and
with Springfield muskets. This regiment belongs, I understand, to the command
of Brigadier-General Bragg, and was sent by him from Pensacola to Chattanooga
for temporary service until such time as I could reach there with my command.
Col. R. B. Vance's
regiment is stationed at Greeneville; numbers about 800 men, and is efficiently
armed. I do not know to what command it is attached.
Col. D. Leadbetter
is stationed, with his regiment, somewhere in the neighborhood of Morristown,
on the line of the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad. I have no other
information concerning his command.
Lieutenant-Colonel
Stovall's battalion is stationed at Greeneville, numbering 500 men, and is
efficiently armed.
The foregoing is all
the organized force of which I have any knowledge in East Tennessee, except
Colonel Churchwell's regiment, which I understand is a portion of General
Zollicoffer's command. I do not know its present location.
Another of General
Zollicoffer's regiments, commanded by Colonel Statham, is, I learn, stationed
at Cumberland Gap.
There are various
companies, I am informed, being organized in the surrounding counties, and
should the necessity arise and arms could be procured I have no doubt but an
additional force of 4,000 or 5,000 men could easily be brought into the field
from East Tennessee.
|
Infantry. |
4,400 |
|
Cavalry. |
450 |
|
Artillery. |
150 |
|
Total |
5,000 |
|
Other forces in
East Tennessee |
6,000 |
|
Whole amount of
force in East Tennessee. |
11,000 |
The foregoing report is as perfect a one as I am able to make with the meager information at present before me. My own command being as yet to a great extent unorganized and stationed in small detachments at so many different points, I have not been able to obtain regular and official reports. But in the main the above statement of its strength, condition, &c., is very nearly accurate in point of numbers, as well as in other particulars.
The other forces to
which I have alluded were not under my command, and therefore I had no right to
require the official information from them, but have had to rely upon such
statements as were reported to me by others.
1 Appears on Register as Thirty-seventh Regiment.
It was now very
cold, and the ground was frozen hard all day, in consequence of which our wagon
train did not get as far as Jamestown. In place of moving with his train, or at
least going no further than it could go over the frozen roads, McNairy pressed
on through Jamestown, down Cumberland Mountain to Camp McGinnison Wolf River—a
march of about a thirty-one miles. The result was his men were without tents
and rations one very cold night, and until late in the afternoon the next day.*
The following explains itself:
HEADQUARTERS,
KNOXVILLE, November 26, 1861.
Hon. J. P. Benjamin, Secretary of Ilar:
Sir-I
have the honor to report that I arrived here on Saturday last, by order of
General Zollicoffer, and assumed command of this post on Sunday. I found
stationed here Colonel Wood's Battalion and several companies of infantry and
cavalry.
.
. . There are now in custody here about seventy persons, many of whom, it is
believed, were either directly or indirectly connected with the burning of the
railroad bridges. Colonel Wood (Sixteenth Alabama), who was in command here
before my arrival, had in contemplation a court-martial for the trial of those
upon whom proof of guilt seemed to be strong. I concurred with him, and ordered
the meeting on the 28th. . . .
It
is important that steam power should be secured for the purpose of driving the
machinery necessary in the alterations of arms. I therefore took possession of
the printing establishment of Brownlow. The steam engine and building are
suitable for our purposes, and it was the only one that could be procured here.
Brownlow
has left, and no certain information of his whereabouts can be obtained. It is,
however, certain that he is aiding and abetting our enemies. . . .
With
high respect, your obedient servant,
WM.
H. CARROLL,
Brigadier-General Commanding.
_______________
* As I was just out
of a spell of fever, I did not wish to take the frozen ground that night
without even a tent for shelter, so I rode over to my friend Lathan's, with
whom I staid while sick of the measles in September (about one mile from Camp
McGinnis), to see if I could get to lodge with him another night. As I neared
his house, and before I saw him, he called out, “Yes, you may get down.” I yet
feel grateful to Mr. Lathan for the comforts of that night.
1 Rebellion
Records, Vol. VII., pp. 704 and 705.
