Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864 — January 23, 1865: No. 180. Report of Col. Benjamin Harrison, Seventieth Indiana Infantry, commanding First Brigade, of operations November 29, 1864—January 12, 1865.

No. 180.

Report of Col. Benjamin Harrison, Seventieth Indiana Infantry, commanding First Brigade,

of operations November 29, 1864--January 12, 1865.

HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, PROVISIONAL DIVISION,                      

ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND, 

Chattanooga, Tenn., January 12, 1865.

In obedience to your instructions, I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of this brigade from the time of its leaving Chattanooga (November 29) to the present date:

The organization of the brigade, begun about the 20th of November, had been but partially perfected when orders were received on the 29th of November to take the field. The brigade consisted of three battalions, designated, respectively, the First, Second, and Third, each composed, as far as possible, of the officers and men belonging to the corresponding divisions of the Twentieth Army Corps—the First Battalion, with an effective force of 290, was commanded by Captain Halbert, Regiment ———; the Second Battalion, with an effective force of 304, was in command of Major Hoskins, One hundred and twenty-ninth Illinois Volunteers; the Third Battalion was in command of Lieutenant-Colonel McManus, One hundred and second Illinois Volunteers, with an effective force of 406 men; making an aggregate effective force of 1,000 men in the brigade. Quite a large proportion of the men thus designated as effective were, in fact, quite unfit for duty in the field—many were still suffering from wounds received in the Georgia campaign; others were fresh from the hospitals and only partly convalescent from attacks of sickness; while a still larger number were raw recruits, utterly uninstructed and not inured to hardship. The recruits represented almost every European nationality, and very many of them were unable to speak or understand the simplest words of our language.

On the 29th of November, 1864, at 5 p.m., my brigade was placed upon the cars at Chattanooga, and shortly after started in the direction of Nashville. (Before starting, however, my First Battalion, Captain Hulbert, was detached and ordered to report to Colonel Malloy, commanding brigade, Fifteenth Army Corps.) At 10 a.m. the following day we arrived at Cowan Station, where the troops were unloaded and placed in position. At 7 p.m. of the same day orders were received from Brigadier-General Cruft, commanding Provisional Division, Army of the Cumberland, to put the troops again upon the cars, which was accomplished by 10 p.m.

At daylight the following day, December 1, the trains were again started in the direction of Nashville, at which place we arrived about dusk without incident. The troops were unloaded and put in bivouac for the night, and the following morning, December 2, were moved and put in position on a hill near the house of Mr. Rains, my brigade holding the right of the line. This position was intrenched and held until the following day, December 3, when we were ordered to retire our line, and were placed in position at right angles with the Murfreesborough turnpike, facing eastward, my brigade in two lines, still holding the right, which rested upon the premises of Judge J. Trimble. A short line of earth-works was here constructed, protected by abatis and picket work, the Third Battalion occupying the works and the Second being in reserve, except one company, which was placed in rear of J. Trimble's house, to cover our right flank. My command continued to occupy this position, without material change or any important incident, till the 9th day of December, when Captain Hulbert (First Battalion) was ordered to report to me for duty, and was placed in position, on the right of Judge Trimble's house, in a line of works, refused to cover the right flank.

On the evening of the 14th of December orders were received to have the command ready to march at 4 a.m. the following morning, with sixty rounds of ammunition to the man and three days' rations. At the hour named the brigade was in motion, and was conducted to the right and ordered to relieve Kimball's division, of the Fourth Army Corps, by placing a strong skirmish line in the works occupied by that division. This was accomplished shortly after daylight, the right of my line resting on a hill about 300 yards to the right of the Granny White pike, and the left extending well toward Fort Casino. The troops were kept in this position, under arms, during this and the following day while the battle of Nashville was progressing in their front. No demonstration was made upon the line held by us, nor were any of my troops engaged, though the artillery in my line opened somewhat effectively.

On the morning of the 19th the brigade was, in obedience to orders from General Cruft, withdrawn from this position and put in march for Murfreesborough. The weather and roads were of the very worst description, the mud being shoe-top deep, and the rain pouring in torrents upon the knapsacks and blankets gave them an additional weight, which greatly burdened the men, and not a few were left along the roadside, there not being a single ambulance for the entire command. We were encamped about dark at La Vergne, having made a distance of sixteen miles. The next day at 10 o'clock the command was comfortably encamped at Murfreesborough, on a portion of the old battle-field of Stone's River. At 8 a.m. of the following day (December 21) orders were received to put the men upon the cars, and by 10 a.m. the brigade was loaded in box-cars, about sixty men inside and twenty on top of each car. Soon after the cars were loaded the weather turned suddenly and severely cold, accompanied by a piercing wind. Those on top soon found the cold unbearable, and many became so benumbed with cold that it was with great difficulty they could be got off the cars. Added to this cause of suffering and complaint the men were without rations, and none could be procured until we could reach Stevenson. I had great difficulty in keeping the men to their duty, but most of them endured their suffering with as much fortitude as could have been expected. Rations were issued at Stevenson on the evening of the 23d, and, without unloading, the train proceeded on the road toward Huntsville.

December 25 we arrived at Limestone Creek, fifteen miles from Decatur, where the troops were unloaded, and on the morning of the 26th we took up the march for the Tennessee River at the mouth of the creek. On the march this day the troops were compelled to wade a creek three feet deep, and on the following morning were called upon to wade a bayou much deeper and forty-five yards wide. This unusual exposure was endured by the men with even greater cheerfulness than could have been expected, as it was a severe trial of the physical constitution and of the patriotism of the men to require them to wade such streams in midwinter.

On the morning of the 27th of December the Provisional Division had arrived at a point on the north bank of the Tennessee River about two miles above Decatur. About this time the transports bearing the colored troops and the gun-boats came down and landed in fine style on the south bank opposite. After the disembarkation of those troops my brigade was ferried over by the transports and landed on the south side. Soon after landing the enemy opened with a section of artillery and dropped some shells near us, but without damage. When the whole command had crossed we were moved over the mouth of a bayou which completely surrounded the place of landing and put in position on a ridge beyond. Very soon after and while preparing to issue rations received an order to move my brigade forward and form on the right of Colonel Salm's brigade, which was advancing toward Decatur. This order was promptly executed, and having deployed a skirmish line my command advanced in line of battle through a very dense wood and underbrush toward Decatur. While forming the enemy burst a few shells over my lines, but, as it appeared afterward, the enemy on our advance immediately withdrew the artillery and evacuated the place. We moved from Decatur on the eve of the 28th after dark and marched out two miles on the Courtland road, when we encamped. This march, though short, was very trying. The weather was severely cold, the road difficult and muddy, and at our encampment no sufficient amount of wood could be found to make the men comfortable. On the 29th the command marched twelve miles and encamped at Swope's farm.

On the 30th we moved into Courtland and went into camp, and remained there until the evening of January 4, when we took up the return march and arrived at Decatur on the morning of the 6th. Having crossed the river on the pontoon bridge we immediately embarked on the cars for Chattanooga. At midnight same day we were unloaded and put in camp about two miles out from Huntsville, and remained there until noon of the following day, when we were again placed upon the cars and ran as far as Larkinsville, when we were again unloaded, and remained until the evening of the 8th. At 4 p.m. of this day I received verbal orders from Brigadier-General Cruft to proceed with my brigade to Bellefonte Station, ten miles above Larkinsville, to intercept a force of rebel cavalry under General Lyon, reported to be moving in that direction to cross the Tennessee River. I at once put my command on the cars and proceeded toward Bellefonte. In passing I stopped the train at Scottsborough and informed the lieutenant commanding there that the enemy, 800 strong, with one piece of artillery, was moving toward the railroad, and that if he was attacked I would re-enforce him. I arrived at Bellefonte Station just at dusk. The troops were immediately unloaded, and a detachment of fifteen mounted men from the Eleventh Indiana and First Alabama Cavalry (which accompanied me) was sent north on the Winchester road (which crosses the railroad at this point), under the command of Lieut. S. G. Willets, of my staff, to ascertain the direction in which the enemy was moving. Infantry scouts were also dispatched to the town of Bellefonte, one mile and a half south of the railroad, and about one mile from the river, and a patrol started back on the railroad toward Scottsborough to gather the earliest information of the presence of the enemy. While awaiting the report of these parties the troops were put in position near the stockade, one battalion occupying the work. About 12 p.m., and before any report had been received from my scouts, some scattering musketry was heard in the direction of Scottsborough, five miles west on the railroad. The troops were kept in readiness to move whenever the locality of the enemy might be discovered. While thus waiting a train going east stopped at Bellefonte Station, and reported to the sergeant of the guard that Scottsborough had been attacked, and that the lieutenant commanding there desired a re-enforcement of fifty to seventy-five men. I at once sent an order to Captain Titus, who had already started with a patrol of fifty men in that direction, to push rapidly forward, and if possible to throw himself in to the relief of the garrison, and hold the enemy in check until I could re-enforce with the brigade. Shortly afterward another train passed up the road, and they (hailed by me) reported that there was no attack on Scottsborough, that only a few guerrillas had placed some obstructions on the track, and that most of the firing had been done by the guard on the train. This led me to believe that the movement on Scottsborough was only a feint and that the real crossing could yet be attempted at Bellefonte. In a few minutes the musketry firing was renewed at Scottsborough, and was soon followed by five discharges of artillery, after which all firing ceased. The fight certainly did not last more than half an hour. I was now satisfied that the real attack had been made at Scottsborough, and concluded that the garrison of colored troops (fifty-five in number) had been overcome. I felt satisfied that the enemy would not delay long at Scottsborough, but would probably push on at once for some of the ferries on the river. My cavalry returned about this time and brought with them two citizens residing in Maynard's Cove (and one notorious guerrilla), who had seen Lyon's command nine miles from and going toward Scottsborough one hour and a half before sunset, and who estimated his force at 800 cavalry and one light piece of artillery, and that his men said that they intended to attack Scottsborough. I at once started the cavalry through the town of Bellefonte, with directions to keep the road running from that point toward Huntsville parallel to the river, and to feel in to the river at the Bellefonte and McGinn ferries, to ascertain whether the enemy were attempting either of those crossings. At 2 a.m. [9th] I started with my entire force (leaving a garrison of fifty convalescents in the stockade) to follow the road taken by the cavalry. This part of the night was very dark and the mud and water deep, so that our progress was very slow. I halted at daylight at Snodgrass' farm, on Dry Creek, and gave the men time to breakfast while a bridge was built over the stream. Having definitely learned that the enemy had moved southwest from Scottsborough, I concluded that he would not strike the river above Larkin's Landing, but I continued my march parallel to the river toward that landing, feeling in with my cavalry frequently, so as to be certain that the enemy did not slip between me and the river.

About 12 m. this day I received an order from General Cruft directing me to have my command at daylight of the 9th at the Bellefonte Ferry, and stating that Colonel Malloy's brigade would be at Sublett's Landing, two miles and a half below. As I had already ascertained that the enemy had moved farther down the river (a fact not known to the general when the order was written), I deemed it my duty to disregard it and push on down the river. My march was miserably slow, and at 4.30 p.m. I found myself at Squire Hodges' farm, on Rosebury Creek. As my men had been out of rations all day and very much exhausted, I halted for the night and pressed some teams to send back to Scottsborough for rations. In the morning Rosebury Creek was so swollen by rains as to render it impossible to cross with infantry, and having learned that two brigades had already reached Larkin's Landing I did not deem it best to push on by the circuitous route I would be obliged to follow, but concluded to remain where I would be in position to intercept the enemy should he attempt to push his way back into the mountains. Accordingly I lay in camp during the 10th day of January awaiting orders from General Cruft and keeping my cavalry out watching for straggling parties of the enemy. On the morning of the 11th received orders to move my command to the nearest railroad station, and if I could procure transportation to come on to Chattanooga and report to General Steedman. Having succeeded in getting a train from Mr. Bryant, military superintendent railroad, I left Scottsborough about 2 p.m. the 11th instant, and, taking up my small garrison at Bellefonte, arrived at Chattanooga at 3 a.m. the 12th instant, and reported to General Steedman, as ordered.

In concluding I must say that the campaign, though not characterized by much fighting, was one of unusual severity and hardship, and considering the character of the men composing the command, certainly much more was accomplished and endured by it than could in reason have been expected. My officers were utterly without baggage and often without blankets, and several times without rations. They discharged their duties faithfully and cheerfully. The officers of my staff, who, with me, shared all the privations spoken of above, are entitled to my thanks and this public acknowledgment for their energy and intelligence. Two battalion commanders and ten line officers and two of my staff were returned sick during the campaign, While 240 enlisted men were sent back exhausted and sick.

Respectfully submitted.

BENJ. HARRISON, 

Colonel, Commanding.

 Capt. J. A. WRIGHT,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 519-24

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864 — January 23, 1865: No. 179. Report of Brig. Gen. Charles Cruft, U. S. Army, commanding Provisional Division, of operations November 29, 1864--January 13, 1865.

No. 179.

Report of Brig. Gen. Charles Cruft, U. S. Army, commanding Provisional Division,

of operations November 29, 1864—January 13, 1865.

HEADQUARTERS PROVISIONAL DIVISION,             

ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND, 

Chattanooga, Tenn., January 20, 1865.

The following report of the recent campaign is respectfully submitted: I had been ordered by Major-General Thomas to organize the troops belonging to Major-General Sherman's field command within this department and report them to Major-General Steedman, commanding District of the Etowah. On the 29th day of November, 1864, while on the above duty at Chattanooga, Tenn., an order was received from Major-General Steedman to move that day by rail all available force. A portion of the garrison at Tunnel Hill was withdrawn, and, with the Eighteenth Ohio Volunteers from this post, was added to my command. The following statement exhibits the number of officers and men comprising the command on leaving Chattanooga, and the formation of battalions and brigades, temporarily made, to wit:

Command.	Officers	Men	Aggregate	Total
FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS. Col. J. G. MITCHELL, commanding.
First Battalion, Lieut. Col. F. W. Lister	8	526	534
Second Battalion, Lieut. Col. William O'Brien	4	256	260	794
TWENTIETH ARMY CORPS. Col. BENJAMIN HARRISON, commanding.
First Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel McManus	8	399	407
Second Battalion, Major Hoskins	6	304	310	717
TWENTIETH ARMY CORPS. Lieutenant-Colonel BANNING, commanding.
Eighteenth Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Captain Henderson.	9	316	325
Third Battalion, Fourteenth Army Corps, Major Roatch	8	311	319	644
SEVENTEENTH ARMY CORPS. Col. A. G. MALLOY, commanding.
Field and staff	3		3
Twentieth Illinois Battalion, Capt. C. C. Cox	1	126	127
Thirtieth Illinois Battalion, Capt. J. Kemnitzer	1	208	209
Thirteenth Iowa Infantry, Capt. C. H. Haskin	1	186	187
Third Battalion, Twentieth Army Corps, Captain Hulbert	6	290	296	822
Total	55	2,922	2,977

November 30, 1864, reached Cowan Station at 8 a.m., disembarked the command, and bivouacked.

December 1, shipped the command by rail during the night, and left Cowan about daylight. Reached Nashville at 5 p.m. and went into camp in the eastern suburbs of the city. December 2, moved to the hill near Rains' house and built a strong line of fortifications, and a redoubt for the Twentieth Indiana Battery (Captain Osborne commanding), which was upon service with my command this day. December 3, in compliance with orders from Major-General Steedman, abandoned the works built the day previous, and fell back to a line indicated nearer the city. In the new position the right rested at Judge Trimble's house, and the line extending northward across the Murfreesborough pike, the left rested near Major Lewis' house. A substantial line of earth-works, with a protecting line of palisades, and an abatis of brush in front, was speedily constructed. During the day the Eighteenth Ohio Battery (Captain Aleshire commanding) was assigned to me for duty. A strong redoubt was built for the artillery at a point where the line crossed the Murfreesborough turnpike. My command occupied this line until the general assault upon the enemy. The position was materially strengthened from day to day by the construction and raising of a dam across Brown's Creek, at the bridge below, on the Lebanon turnpike. The creek ran nearly parallel to the line of works and about 200 yards in front of the abatis. It became--as the depth of water increased--a material impediment in the way of an assault. My command performed about 4,500 days' work in the construction of this dam. Lieutenant-Colonel Grosvenor principally superintended its construction, in obedience to orders from district headquarters. Major Roatch, commanding battalion Fourteenth Army Corps, was seriously wounded while superintending a fatigue party at the dam, and the services of this meritorious officer were thereby lost to his command during the residue of the campaign.

December 11. My command was increased on and after the 6th instant by the assignment of recruits arriving from the rear, amounting in the aggregate to 2,327 enlisted men, who were properly armed and distributed to their respective battalions and brigades. The Sixty-eighth Indiana Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Espy commanding, was also added. These re-enforcements brought the effective strength of the division up to 5,249. This day orders were received directing a reconnaissance in force upon the enemy occupying our old line of works, near Rains' house. Col. J. G. Mitchell, commanding the brigade of detachments from Fourteenth Army Corps, was assigned to that duty. He moved his brigade on the Murfreesborough turnpike for about half a mile, then made a detour to the right, where he formed his lines behind a small ridge and sent his skirmishers to the front; drove in the skirmishers of the enemy, advanced upon his works, and thoroughly reconnoitered his position. The casualties of Colonel Mitchell's command were trifling, having none killed and but 3 or 4 slightly wounded.

December 12, the command was put in shape to move at 6 a.m. on the following morning. December 13, in obedience to orders another reconnaissance was made on the enemy's line near Rains' house. This duty was assigned to Col. A. G. Malloy, commanding brigade of detachment of Fifteenth and Seventeenth Army Corps. Colonel Malloy, with 1,200 men of his command, advanced upon the enemy's line at the point indicated. Some sharp skirmishing ensued, but the objects of the reconnaissance were attained. Colonel Malloy's casualties were as follows: Killed, 1; wounded, 6; missing, 1; making a total of 8 enlisted men.

December 14, the effective force of the division was 5,359, as shown by the following statement:

Command.	Officers.	Men.	Aggregate.
Division headquarters :	6	20	26
First Brigade, Colonel Harrison	26	1,033	1,059
Second Brigade, Colonel Mitchell	24	1,104	1,128
Third Brigade, Colonel Grosvenor	39	852	891
Second Brigade (Army of the Tennessee), Colonel Malloy	22	1,925	1,947
Miscellaneous Camp, Captain Eaton	4	304	308
Total	121	5,238	5,359

Orders were again received to be ready to march at 6 a.m. of the next day. Arms were issued to the portion of troops that were unarmed, and command was put in readiness to comply with the order. In the evening orders were received from Major-General Steedman to detail one of the brigades to report for duty to Colonel Morgan, commanding colored brigade, on my left.. Lieut. Col, C. H. Grosvenor (who had succeeded Lieutenant-Colonel Banning in command of the brigade) was ordered to report to Colonel Morgan. This order detached Colonel Grosvenor's brigade from my immediate control during the operations before Nashville, and it did not again rejoin its command until it reached Murfreesborough, marching by way of Franklin, Tenn.

December 15, according to directions from the major-general commanding, the division moved at 4 a.m., and, abandoning its line of defenses, relieved a portion of the troops of the Fourth Army Corps, Brigadier-General Wood commanding, and Twenty-third Army Corps, Major-General Schofield commanding, and held their exterior line of works, picketing also the front from the Acklen place to a point north of Fort Negley, and commanding the approaches to the city by the Granny White, Franklin, Nolensville, and Murfreesborough turnpikes. Details were furnished to support the batteries of artillery in the lines and to garrison Fort Morton, and Redoubt Casino. The brigade of Lieutenant-Colonel Grosvenor (temporarily reporting to Colonel Morgan) was engaged during the day in the assault on the enemy's works near Rains' house, and was the only portion of the division in the fight. It suffered considerably in killed and wounded, and behaved creditably. The Twenty-fourth [Twenty-fifth?] Indiana Battery (Captain Sturm), in position on the right of the line, near the Acklen place, was ordered by me, near night-fall, to fire upon a retreating line of rebels which came in sight, passing parallel to my right, from left of the Fourth Corps. The fire was opened with good effect (though at long range) and the rebel line was dispersed in great confusion. Captain Sturm and his officers and artillerists deserve great credit for the precision with which they worked their guns and the good results that followed.

December 16, the command remained in position as of yesterday. The brigade commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Grosvenor was engaged on the left during the day and contributed its share in the work achieved by Major-General Steedman in that quarter. The assault made upon the enemy's lines and works in the afternoon of this day was under the immediate sight and direction of Major-General Steedman, and the brigade will, without doubt, receive due credit from him. All accounts that reach me speak well of the conduct of the troops in this action. During the afternoon Colonel Mitchell's brigade was moved rapidly out from the works and occupied the hills beyond Rains' house, in compliance with orders, pushing a strong line of skirmishers to Riddle's Hill beyond. The brigade held this position firmly and in shape to repel any attack on the part of the enemy's cavalry to turn the left of the general line, and protected all approaches from the east during the residue of the time this command remained at Nashville.

Monday, December 19, received orders to march to Murfreesborough; moved the command at 6.30 a.m., leaving behind those sick and unable to march, in all, say, 500. Reached La Vergne, fifteen miles, and encamped at night-fall. Tuesday, December 20, marched to Murfreesborough and encamped. Wednesday, December 21, shipped the command on cars, without rations, and started on the morning of 22d for Stevenson. Remained on cars four days. Sunday, December 25, reached Limestone Creek, eight miles beyond Huntsville, and bivouacked. Monday, December 26, marched to bayou near mouth of Limestone Creek, say ten miles, and bivouacked; sent back by train those sick and unable to march, say 400 men.

Tuesday, December 27, waded bayou at 4 a.m., and marched down on north side of Tennessee, nearly opposite mouth of Flint River, and awaited orders. The enemy shelled the transports sent to convey my command over, but no casualties resulted therefrom. Signaled General Steedman information of the enemy's strength, &c., at Decatur, obtained from Colonel Prosser and one of my staff officers. Crossed the river and lagoon beyond, and halted to receive rations from the transports at 4 p.m., as directed by Major-General Steedman. Soon received orders from him to move up to support Colonel Thompson's division, which had been advanced toward Decatur and had been engaged during the afternoon in skirmishing with the enemy. The command was brought up as rapidly as possible and formed in line on Colonel Thompson's right. The enemy opened fire with two pieces of artillery. Some of the shots fell near my line, but without damage. An advance was ordered, and both divisions moved rapidly on the town. The enemy ran away before we reached it, taking his two pieces of artillery, and our troops occupied the place. Marched back to the woodland near Decatur, and encamped for the night.

Wednesday, December 28, marched at 5 p.m., on Courtland road, to Moseley's farm, say three miles west of Decatur, and bivouacked, Thursday, December 29, marched thirteen miles and a half, to Swope's place, and bivouacked. Friday, December 30, marched at 7 a.m. to Courtland, four miles, and encamped. Remained at Courtland five days.

Wednesday, January 4, 1865, left Courtland at 2 p.m.; marched back to Swope's, and bivouacked. Thursday, January 5, marched at dawn of day; made thirteen miles and a half, and encamped at Moseley's. Here orders were received from Major-General Steedman, advising of his departure, by transports, with the artillery, and turning over the entire infantry command to me. Friday, January 6, crossed the Tennessee at the Decatur pontoon, and sent forward one division to Huntsville, which arrived about dark, the transportation doubling back for the other. It was designed to remain at Huntsville until 1 p.m. of the next day to bring up the residue of the command and to await transportation and the completion of the Paint Rock bridge, which had been destroyed by the enemy. At an interview with Brigadier-General Wood, commanding Fourth Corps, then at Huntsville, he requested me strongly to press forward a brigade to Larkinsville, apprehending that the rebel General Lyon might be in the vicinity. Colonel Mitchell's brigade was sent forthwith (at 11.30 p.m.), with instructions to get over Paint Rock Creek in some manner, and reach Larkinsville by march, patrol the country thoroughly, and engage Lyon, if he could be found. Colonel Mitchell used every possible effort to carry out his instructions. He reached Larkinsville on the morning of the 7th, and made an extensive patrol of the surrounding country, and reported that he could hear nothing of Lyon. Saturday, January 7, General Wood advised, at an interview during the morning, that I should personally go to Larkinsville, with all the troops for which transportation could be had. The condition of the troops and the orders of General Steedman, &c., were explained to General Wood. In the emergency, however, I followed his advice. There could be but one train made up at Huntsville; on this Colonel Harrison's brigade was loaded at 12 m. and the train run to Paint Rock Station. Here the railway managers kept the troops until, say, 2 a.m., waiting on westward bound trains, and for repairs of the bridge. A telegraphic instrument was put in operation and communication had with Brigadier-General Wood and Major-General Steedman. Here an order from General Wood reached me by telegraph, based upon instructions from the department commander “to stop the return of Major-General Steedman's troops.” The telegraphic message directed me to “disembark the forces that are on the cars immediately, scour the country thoroughly, and find out, if possible, where Lyon is, and get in pursuit of him; he must be found, and either captured or driven across the Tennessee River. General Thomas' orders on this subject are emphatic, and he says you must not go on your way until this work is finished.” Here intelligence was received that all the troops on trains following me—Colonels Thompson's, Morgan's, and Salm's brigades—had been stopped and unloaded at Brownsborough, by orders from Brigadier-General Wood; that a portion of these were ordered to New Market by his direction; and that the arrangements for shipping Colonel Malloy's troops had not been carried out. The men were out of rations, the weather now cold, rainy, and disagreeable, and the roads well-nigh impassable for infantry. On reaching Larkinsville a telegraphic message was sent to Colonel Krzyzanowski, commanding at Stevenson, asking a supply of rations; he promptly promised them. Owing to delays on the railways, however, they did not reach the troops in time. The garrison at Larkinsville consisted of Company M, Eleventh Indiana Cavalry, Captain Givens commanding, numbering probably sixty men, and a sort of amateur gathering of mounted men, who styled themselves “Alabama Scouts,” under Captain Sparks, say thirty or forty in number. At 7 a.m. all the cavalry and the anomalous scouts were sent to patrol the roads in the direction of Winchester, New Nashville, Robinson's farm, &c., with instructions to keep a strong vedette post at Colonel Province's. Infantry patrols were sent out to watch the approaches leading through the coves, in the direction of Bellefonte, Scottsborough, and Larkinsville. The intelligence which reached my headquarters from all these parties, and from citizens during the day, showed that no enemy was in the vicinity, except the “bushwhacking gangs of Russell, Hayes, Mead, and Wilson, which constantly infest the mountains in the vicinity. Lyon could not be heard of. At 2.55 p.m. a dispatch was received from Colonel Krzyzanowski reciting a dispatch from Major-General Milroy, as follows:

General Lyon crossed the mountain last night, going toward Bellefonte. Has 500 men; many of them dressed in Federal overcoats. He has one howitzer.

Colonel Harrison's brigade was immediately loaded on the only train at Larkinsville and started before 4 p.m. to Bellefonte, with instructions to patrol the road from there west to Scottsborough and place a battalion at Bellefonte landing; engage Lyon, if possible, and pursue him at all hazards. He was directed to inform the officer commanding at Scottsborough of the intelligence received; to direct him to make stalwart resistance, and to re-enforce him if he heard firing at Scottsborough. The garrison at Scottsborough consisted of two lieutenants (whose names have been mislaid), and, say, fifty-four colored soldiers of the One hundred and tenth (unorganized) U.S. Colored Volunteers, supposed to be in a substantial earth-work at the place. At about 5.30 p.m. train arrived from the west, the last one bringing Colonel Halley's brigade. This was immediately sent forward to Scottsborough by rail, at, say, 8 p.m., as soon as the road was clear, with proper instructions. Shortly after Colonel Malloy left, a few single discharges of artillery were heard at long intervals in what citizens said was the direction of Bellefonte. It seemed possible that Harrison had fallen in with Lyon, or that the gun-boats were shelling his river detachment; however, as Colonel Malloy was rapidly nearing Scottsborough and the firing soon ceased, it seemed to demand no special attention. The commanding officer at Scottsborough erred in leaving the earth-works and betaking himself and command to the brick depot building; he made, however, from the latter place a sturdy resistance to the attack of the skirmishers and held out well (as the enemy's prisoners admit), and forced Lyon to dismount and form line of battle, bring up his artillery and use it, thus consuming considerable time. In the meanwhile the two sections preceding Colonel Malloy dashed past the troops on the trains, firing on the enemy, confusing him, and stopping his attack on the garrison. In this confusion and cessation of fire the garrison escaped and came to Colonel Malloy, who was unloading and forming his lines at the water-tank in the edge of the town. A re-enforcement from Colonel Harrison, at Bellefonte, arrived at this time on the east of the place, and the enemy ran away rapidly. Colonel Malloy sent back one of his sections, with one of the lieutenants of the colored troops, to report, reaching headquarters about midnight. This lieutenant was badly stampeded; his statements were miserably incongruous, childish, and improbable; a complete physical terror seemed to possess him, and nothing he stated could be relied on. Colonel Mitchell's brigade was immediately ordered from Larkinsville, in the direction of the river, to try and intercept Lyon at Perry's house, the junction of the Larkin's Ferry and Gunter's Landing roads. Colonel Mitchell moved at about 2 a.m. Colonel Thompson, arriving from west with his brigade, was sent forward to join Colonel Malloy and press on in pursuit. Colonel Salm's brigade, arriving in the night, was rationed, and soon after day left to follow up Colonel Mitchell by a line more to the right. At daylight the troops were disposed as follows: Colonel Malloy and Colonel Thompson in direct pursuit of Lyon and close on him; Colonel Harrison to his left, pressing down the river and feeling into Bellefonte, Sublett's, McGinn's, and Larkin's Landings, and preventing retreat up the river; Colonels Mitchell and Salm trying to cut him off, by shorter lines to the river, at Roman's and Law's Landings, and to strike the Gunter's Landing road below him. Colonel Mitchell pushed his column rapidly forward. Soon after dawn of day he came upon a detachment of the enemy attempting to burn the bridge across Santa Creek, while the main portion of his forces had swum the creek some three miles below and were passing the junction of the roads at Perry's, say four miles down the Gunter's Landing road. Colonel Mitchell drove off the enemy, extinguished the fire on the bridge, and pushed on after him. He was only about an hour behind him at Perry's Cross-Roads. Colonel Malloy was compelled to delay his pursuit at the creek below for some three hours to construct a crossing for his men. The streams were all flooded, the mud deep, the rain pouring down, and the men (except Colonels Mitchell's and Salm's commands) without rations. I accompanied Colonel Mitchell's column; Colonel Malloy joined this during the afternoon. Pursuit was made vigorously till near night-fall, when the troops were so exhausted that they were bivouacked as an act of humanity. I rode back to Larkinsville, and during [the] evening informed Brigadier-General Wood and Major-General Steedman by telegraph of the condition of affairs, and tried to get at Colonel Morgan's command, to send it from Woodville to strike the Tennessee at mouth of Paint Rock. It was impossible to reach Colonel Morgan, the telegraphic station having been removed from Brownsborough. He came up during the night with his own regiment and Colonel Shafter's. Colonel Morgan was unloaded at Larkinsville to get rations and rest, and Colonel Shafter sent on to Scottsborough to protect that place from guerrillas, who were reported to have been firing at the small guard there during the afternoon. Efforts were again made to have rations at Gunter's Landing by transport, and a message was received from Major-General Steedman announcing their shipment.

Tuesday, January 10, Colonels Mitchell, Malloy, Salm, and Thompson were in motion at 4.30 a.m., continuing the pursuit. I reached the column of Colonel Mitchell soon after dawn of day. Colonel Thompson's command was thrown off to the left to Law's Landing. About eight miles from Guntersville the head of Colonel Mitchell's column struck quite a force of the enemy; probably 100 were in sight. Two battalions were thrown into line, and with the small cavalry force (which was taken from Larkinsville) was pushed for them. They broke to small squads and ran away to the hills and woods on each side and down the road in great confusion; but few shots were fired. The gunboats on the river were at this time shelling the woods on the north side, near Gunter's Landing, and below. The enemy could be seen running about in small detachments in almost every direction and without any order, but, being well mounted, kept beyond musket-range. The column was pressed steadily toward Gunter's Landing, with patrol parties in every direction on the flanks, and the enemy chased in toward the river. They all, however, that were on the left of the road crossed it in advance of the column, and with those on the right, left rapidly by the roads running down the river. Some were driven into the riverbank, but being mounted could swim the lagoons in the bottom that could not be waded by infantry; here they encountered the gun-boats; a few abandoned their horses, and they were captured by the boats. General Lyon had reached Claysville, opposite Gunter's Landing, the evening before, with the greater portion of his command and the piece of artillery. Citizens reported that he had abandoned his command during the night, and had crossed the river by a scow with the piece of artillery and a portion of his staff. It is probable that about 200 of his command crossed during the night at Law's Landing, and at a point about one mile and a half above Claysville, in canoes and by swimming their horses. The rest of his command at Claysville was collected at the head of the island above on the 11th, attempting to cross, and was alarmed by the coming down of a gun-boat and dispersed; a portion of the command, under Colonel Chenoweth, left Claysville about 12 m. in direction of Deposit. My advance reached Claysville at 2 p.m. Colonel Salm, leaving his men who were barefooted, was sent on immediately toward Deposit, with instructions to make that point or the creek and beyond, if possible, by daylight. He marched his Command vigorously, pursuing the enemy retreating as squads, and making the points ordered. The ambulance wagon and artillery harness which General Lyon had with him were captured, as well as those wounded at Scottsborough, viz, 1 captain and 3 soldiers. Patrol parties were sent from Colonels Mitchell's, Malloy's, and Thompson's commands to scour the woods along the river and to watch the various ferrying places in the vicinity. Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien's battalion of the Fourteenth Corps detachment was placed opposite Gunter's Landing. The few cattle and sheep the country afforded were collected by the commissary and distributed to the command. The gun-boats on the river had no co-operation with me. I was able to get on board but one of them, the U.S. Grant, I think. The commanding officer was informed of the nature of my dispositions and all the intelligence that had been obtained. By some mistake one of the gun-boats (as Colonel Thompson reported) threw some shells into his camp at Law's Landing, fortunately without hurting anybody. The rebels were much alarmed by the shells of the gun-boats, but there were no casualties from them that could be heard of. Being satisfied that none of the rebel squads had gone up the river Colonel Harrison was ordered to march to the railway, at the nearest point, and load his command for Chattanooga.

Wednesday, January 11, no rations arriving by river, Colonel Malloy's and Colonel Thompson's commands were ordered back to the railway at Larkinsville, by different routes, with instructions to subsist on the country. Colonel Mitchell remained at Claysville, patrolling the country in the vicinity. Colonel Salm pushed his march toward mouth of Paint Rock Creek. On arriving at Honey Comb Creek it was found to be impassable. The few mounted men of the Eleventh Indiana with the command swam the creek and patrolled the country to Paint Rock during the day. It was impossible, however, to catch the small parties of rebels to be seen without a cavalry force. The high waters and impossibility of procuring rations rendered it out of the question to push forward infantry farther. The pursuit was abandoned, therefore, toward night-fall, confirming the experience of all time that troops of the line cannot run down cavalry.

Thursday, January 12, orders were issued to Colonel Salm to march to the railway at Woodville by Honey Comb Valley, and to Colonel Mitchell to make the same point by the mountain road from Claysville. They reached Woodville at dark, obtained rations sent there for them, and were shipped in the night to their former camps at Bridgeport and Chattanooga. One captain (Murray) and 2 soldiers were captured, in addition to those mentioned heretofore, making a total of 2 captains and 5 soldiers. Friday, January 14, the residue of the troops along the railway were rationed, provided with transportation, and returned to the places indicated in Major-General Steedman's orders.

The total casualties of the division in battle on the entire campaign cannot be given with exact accuracy as to names and regiments at this time. It was impossible to prepare correct lists of the recruits received during the last few days at Nashville before starting upon the march, and in some instances, in the haste of arming and equipping the men, this important matter was improperly neglected. It is probable that a number of worthy men have fallen in battle and by disease of whom there is no record. The following statement is made up from the reports of commanding officers, to wit:

Command	Killed.			Wounded.			Missing.			Aggregate.
	O	M	T	O	M	T	O	M	T
Colonel Malloy's brigade		4	4		7	7		6	6	17
Colonel Grosvenor's brigade.	3	25	28	5	108	113		33	33	174
Colonel Mitchell's brigade					4	4		3	3	7
Total	3	29	32	5	119	124		42	42	198

[O = Officers     M = Men]

Among the officers killed was Capt. E. Grosvenor and First Lieut. Samuel W. Thomas, Eighteenth Ohio Volunteers. They fell gallantly leading their commands on the 15th of December, in the assault upon the enemy's works; they held high characters in the service for manly and soldierly qualities. A lieutenant of Second Battalion, Fourteenth Corps, was also killed, whose name and regiment have not yet been obtained. Among the officers wounded were Captains Benedict, Eighteenth Ohio Volunteers, Henderson, One hundred and twenty-first Ohio Volunteers, Brown, Twenty-seventh Ohio Volunteers, and J. B. Emery, Eighteenth Ohio Volunteers.

The number of men who were left at Nashville by direction of the surgeon and from various points sent to hospitals in rear was large, owing to the material of the command reached 1,100 during the campaign. Those left at Nashville were reported at 500; the number sent back by trains from Limestone Creek reached 400, and those from Decatur, by transports, say 200. Several officers were sent back also from these points (and among them some of the best officers in the command), suffering from disease and former wounds. In addition to these a few men were left upon the march at houses, sick and unable to be moved. These were as well cared for as possible, and measures have since been taken to bring them up. The number of deaths from disease among the men since leaving Chattanooga is reported at eleven.

In closing this sketch of the late campaign it is due to the officers and troops of my command to bear unequivocal testimony to the patience, cheerfulness, and pluck with which they endured the fatigue of forty-six days continued field service in midwinter. The command was hastily thrown together; it consisted of detachments from more than 200 regiments; it was rapidly armed, and from its very composition could be but illy provided with the ordinary appliances which render field service endurable. About one-fourth of the command consisted of soldiers recently from hospital, scarcely convalescent, another fourth of soldiers returned from furlough, and the remaining half of raw recruits of every nationality, without drill or experience of any kind, but earnest and worthy men. The officers as a class were good, and perhaps superior to the average of the army, but they were separated from their regular commands, without their personal baggage, camp furniture, servants, change of clothing, stationery, &c., and many of them without money or time to procure any supply of these necessities. The command left without ambulances or wagons. The medical department had not adequate supplies. Measles, small-pox, and camp disorders were constantly appearing among the new men, and often at points beyond the reach of hospitals. The weather was bitter cold at times, and during the coldest days there was much suffering by transportation on the railway. In spite of all such difficulties, however, the division performed its share of military and fatigue duty during the campaign; it built its share of defenses at Nashville, and not only held them but participated to some extent in the general assault; it moved by rail 451 miles and marched 155 miles, wading streams and laboring through mud and rain; it was from necessity out of rations sometimes for days. These sufferings are incident to a soldier's life, but they are much lessened by experience and thorough organization, neither of which this division had. It is simple justice to both the soldiers and officers of this provisional division that the services they have rendered should be thoroughly understood, and that their individual reputations shall not suffer in their commands with charges of idleness or shirking during their absence.

The officers necessarily were compelled to become responsible for arms, equipments, ordnance stores, clothing, &c., and to issue them irregularly in the exigency to men of all regiments, and many who did not know their assignments. A liberal course of settlement should be adopted by the supervising authorities of the various departments with regard to these officers.

Hereto are appended the reports of Colonels Harrison, Mitchell, Malloy, and Grosvenor, commanding brigades of this division, also that of Colonel Salm (covering his services in pursuit of Lyon), marked, respectively, A, B, C, D, and E.* Reports from the other brigade commanders of the part taken by their brigades in the “tramp” after Lyon have not been as yet received.

It affords me pleasure to say of Colonels Harrison, Seventieth Indiana Volunteers, Mitchell, One hundred and thirteenth Ohio Volunteer Infantry, and Malloy, Seventeenth Wisconsin Volunteers, who commanded, each, one of the brigades of the division, that throughout the campaign they performed their duties and handled their commands in a creditable and soldierly manner. They are brigade commanders of much experience and reputation in the army, and deserve well for long and faithful services and for their management of their respective commands on the recent campaign. Col. Felix Prince Salm, commanding Sixty-eighth New York, who served with me in command of a temporary brigade (after leaving Decatur), is an officer of experience in European armies, and is commended for the zeal, energy, and good sense which he brings to the service of the Government. Lieutenant-Colonels Banning, One hundred and twenty-first Ohio, and Grosvenor, of Eighteenth Ohio, each commanded for a short while a brigade of the division; they are good officers, and rendered the country service which should be remembered. Colonels Thompson, Twelfth U.S. Colored Infantry, and Morgan, Fourteenth U.S. Colored Infantry, commanded brigades' of colored soldiers for a short while with me. Their troops were disciplined and behaved uniformly well. These officers are entitled to the consideration of the Government for their personal efforts on the late campaign, and for the good results flowing from their labors in demonstration of the problem that colored men can be made soldiers. It is impossible to note all the deserving officers in command of battalions or companies of the division. The reports of the brigade commanders contain general and special notices of these officers, and the attention of the major-general commanding is directed particularly to them. The cheerful manner in which Captain Givens (Company M, Eleventh Indiana Cavalry)? commanding garrison at Larkinsville, responded to all orders from my headquarters, and the valuable service which his command rendered from thorough knowledge of the surrounding country, is entitled to creditable mention.

My staff consisted of the following officers, viz: Capt. John A. Wright, assistant adjutant-general; Capt. G. W. Marshall, assistant quartermaster; Capt. A. C. Ford (Thirty-first Indiana), acting commissary of subsistence; Capt. A. Vallendar (One hundred and twenty-fifth Ohio Volunteer Infantry), acting assistant inspector-general; Capt. L. S. Windle (One hundred and thirteenth Ohio Volunteer Infantry), ordnance officer; Surg. J. D. Cotton (Ninety-second Ohio Volunteer Infantry), medical director; First Lieut. I. N. Leonard (Ninth Indiana Volunteers), acting aide-de-camp. Each of these officers merits my thanks for the satisfactory manner in which he discharged his duties, and they are all worthy of higher positions than they hold.

With my regards to the major-general commanding district, I am, very respectfully, yours, &c.,

CHARLES CRUFT, 

Brigadier-General, U.S. Volunteers.

Maj. S. B. MOE,

Assistant Adjutant-General, District of the Etowah.

______________

* See pp. 519, 524, 532, 532, 526, 801.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 509-19