Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, May 29, 1865

[W]e took a morning ride, Mrs. Welles being able to go with us, and drove about the place. Returning to the wharf, we took a tug, visited the Pawnee, and then went to Sumter, Moultrie, Fort Johnston, etc. The day was beautiful and all enjoyed it.

There was both sadness and gratification in witnessing the devastation of the city and the deplorable condition of this seat of the Rebellion. No place has suffered more or deserved to have suffered more. Here was the seat of Southern aristocracy. The better blood — the superior class, as they considered themselves — here held sway and dictated the policy, not only of Charleston but of South Carolina, and ultimately of the whole South. The power of association and of exclusiveness has here been exemplified and the consequences that follow from the beginning of evil. Not that the aristocracy had more vigorous intellects, greater ability, for they had not, yet their wealth, their ancestry, the usage of the community gave them control.

Mr. Calhoun, the leading genius and master mind of the State, was not one of the élite, the first families, but was used, nursed, and favored by them, and they by him. He acknowledged their supremacy and deferred to them; they recognized his talents and gave him position. He pandered to their pride; they fostered his ambition.

Rhett, one of the proudest of the nobility, had the ambition of Calhoun without his ability, yet he was not destitute of a certain degree of smartness, which stimulated his aspirations. More than any one else, perhaps, has he contributed to precipitating this Rebellion and brought these terrible calamities on his State and country. The gentlemanly, elegant, but brilliantly feeble intellects of his class had the vanity to believe they could rule, or establish a Southern empire. Their young men had read Scott's novels, and considered themselves to be knights and barons bold, sons of chivalry and romance, born to fight and to rule. Cotton they knew to be king, and slavery created cotton. They used these to combine other weak minds at the South, and had weak and willing tools to pander to them in certain partisans at the North.

The results of their theory and the fruits of their labors are to be seen in this ruined city and this distressed people. Luxury, refinement, happiness have fled from Charleston; poverty is enthroned there. Having sown error, she has reaped sorrow. She has been, and is, punished. I rejoice that it is so.

On Monday evening we left for Savannah, but, a storm coming on, the Santiago put into Port Royal, having lost sight of our consort. It had been our intention to stop at this place on our return, but, being here, we concluded to finish our work, and accordingly went up to Beaufort. Returning, we visited Hilton Head and Fort Welles on invitation from General Gillmore.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 312-3

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, September 2, 1864

Admiral Farragut’s dispatch relative to the capture of Fort Morgan and the infamous conduct of General Page in spiking his guns after his surrender is received. It was most disgraceful and would justify severe treatment.

Some of the Administration presses and leaders have undertaken to censure me for slighting Du Pont. Not one of them awards me any credit for selecting Farragut. Yet it was a great responsibility, for which I was severely criticized, and until he had proved himself worthy of my choice, I felt it.

The contrast between Farragut and Du Pont is marked. No one can now hesitate to say which is the real hero; yet three years ago it would have been different. Farragut is earnest, unselfish, devoted to the country and the service. He sees to every movement, forms his line of battle with care and skill, puts himself at the head, carries out his plan, if there is difficulty leads the way, regards no danger to himself, dashes by forts and overcomes obstructions. Du Pont, as we saw at Sumter, puts himself in the most formidable vessel, has no order of battle, leads the way only until he gets within cannon-shot range, then stops, says his ship would not steer well, declines, however, to go in any other, but signals to them to go forward without order or any plan of battle, does not enjoin upon them to dash by the forts; they are stopped under the guns of Sumter and Moultrie, and are battered for an hour, a sufficient length of time to have gone to Charleston wharves, and then they are signalled to turn about and come back to the Admiral out of harm's way.

When I appointed Du Pont to command a squadron, I met the public expectation. All but a few naval officers, most of whom were under a cloud, approved and applauded so judicious a selection. But no cheering response was made to the appointment of Farragut. Some naval officers said he was a daring, dashing fellow, but they doubted his discretion and ability to command a squadron judiciously. Members of Congress inquired who he was, and some of them remonstrated, and questioned whether I was not making a mistake, for he was a Southern man and had a Southern wife. Neither the President nor any member of the Cabinet knew him, or knew of him except, perhaps, Seward, but he was not consulted and knew nothing of the selection until after it was made. When told of the appointment, he inquired if Farragut was equal to it, and asked if it would not have been better to have transferred Du Pont to that command.

Farragut became a marked man in my mind when I was informed of the circumstances under which he left Norfolk. At the time the Virginia convention voted to secede he denounced the act, and at once abandoned the State, leaving his home and property the day following, avowing openly and boldly, in the face and hearing of the Rebels by whom he was surrounded, his determination to live and die owing allegiance to no flag but that of the Union under which he had served. This firm and resolute stand caused me not only to admire the act, but led me to inquire concerning the man. I had known of him slightly during Polk's administration, when I had charge of a naval bureau, remembered his proposition to take San Juan d'Ulloa at Vera Cruz, and all I heard of him was well, but he was generally spoken of as were other good officers. Fox, Foote, and Dahlgren gave him a good name. Admiral D. D. Porter was emphatic in his favor, and his knowledge and estimate of men were generally pretty correct. Admiral Smith considered him a bold, impetuous man, of a great deal of courage, and energy, but his capabilities and power to command a squadron was a subject to be determined only by trial.

Had any other man than myself been Secretary of the Navy, it is not probable that either Farragut or Foote would have had a squadron. At the beginning of the Rebellion, neither of them stood prominent beyond others. Their qualities had not been developed; they had not possessed opportunities. Foote and myself were youthful companions at school. And I have stated the circumstances under which Farragut was brought to my notice. Neither had the showy name, the scholastic attainments, the wealth, the courtly talent, of Du Pont. But both were heroes. Du Pont is a polished naval officer, selfish, heartless, calculating, scheming, but not a hero by nature, though too proud to be a coward.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 133-5

Jonathan Worth to Joseph John Jackson, December 17, 1860

RALEigh, Dec. 17, ‘60.

I can not find time to write you as often as I ought to.

To-day the Senate voted 27 to 15 to suspend the rules in order to pass through its 2d and 3d readings a bill offered this morning by Erwin, who is a manly disunionist, not a disunionist under the disguise of secession, authorizing the Gov. to expend $300,000 in buying arms. The reason given for this remarkable precipitancy is that there are reasons to fear that a considerable insurrection is on foot, and secondly, that just now a gun factory offers him the guns at cash prices and payment to be made in State bonds at par. I need not say that such pretext is equally silly. The bill is made the order of the day for 12 to-morrow. It will probably pass its second and third readings. Its real object is to enable the Governor to arm volunteers to aid S. C. The State will soon be involved in war unless, to the great disappointment and mortification of the leaders in this General Assembly, the committee of 33 should make a pacification.

Cass has resigned because B. would not reinforce Ft. Moultrie. This is the report here, fully credited. Cass is too much of a Statesman to connive at the refusal of the President to execute the laws. Lincoln would not be permitted to execute them.

So So. Ca. will become another Paradise—By her cotton will rule the world—Get plenty of cheap negroes from Africa, and we may possibly be allowed to attach ourselves to her as an humble dependency.

Slavery, as Gen. Jackson well predicted, is only a “pretext.” Slavery is doomed if the South sets up a Southern Confederacy. With Canada in effect for her Northern border from the Atlantic to the Pacific—all hating us, it is madness to think of anything else only to cut the throats of the negroes or have our own throats cut.

I am truly sorry that I am a member of this Assembly which I think contains less of patriotism than any like number of men ever assembled in this State since the close of the Revolution.

Nearly half of the Democratic members desire to preserve the Union, but they are the rank and file and will all ultimately follow their leaders—at least, vote for the measures of Avery and Co.—all of which, openly or in disguise, look to a dissolution.

SOURCE: J. G. de Roulhac Hamilton, Editor, The Correspondence of Jonathan Worth, Volume 1, p. 126-7

Statement of Messrs. Miles And Keitt, of what Transpired Between the President and the South Carolina Delegation, between January 1 & 14, 1861

In compliance with the request of the Convention, we beg leave to make the following statement:

On Saturday, the 8th of December, several of the South Carolina delegation, including ourselves, waited upon the President. At this time, there was a growing belief that reinforcements were on the eve of being sent to the forts in Charleston harbor. It was known that the subject was frequently and earnestly discussed in the Cabinet. It was rumored that General Cass and Mr. Holt were urgent that reinforcements should be sent. Upon our being announced, the President, who was then in Cabinet Council, came out to us in the ante-room. We at once entered into a conversation upon the topic, which was so closely occupying his thoughts as well as ours. The President seemed much disturbed and moved. He told us that he had had a painful interview with the wife of Major Anderson, who had come on from New York to see him. She had manifested great anxiety and distress at the situation of her husband, whom she seemed to consider in momentary danger of an attack from an excited and lawless mob. The President professed to feel a deep responsibility resting upon him to protect the lives of Major Anderson and his command. We told him that the news that reinforcements were on their way to Charleston, would be the surest means of provoking what Mrs. Anderson apprehended, and what he so much deprecated. We said, further, that we did not believe that Major Anderson was in any danger of such an attack; that the general sentiment of the State was against any such proceeding. That, prior to the action of the State Convention, then only ten days off, we felt satisfied that there would be no attempt to molest the forts in any way. That, after the Convention met, — while we could not possibly undertake to say what that body would see fit to do, — we yet hoped and believed that nothing would be done until we had first endeavored, by duly accredited Commissioners, to negotiate for a peaceful settlement of all matters, including the delivery of the forts, between South Carolina and the Federal Government. At the same time, we again reiterated our solemn belief that any change in the then existing condition of things in Charleston harbor, would, in the excited state of feeling at home, inevitably precipitate a collision. The impression made upon us was, that the President was wavering, and had not decided what course he would pursue. He said he was glad to have had this conversation with us, but would prefer that we should give him a written memorandum of the substance of what we had said. This we did on Monday, the 10th. It was in these words:

Commissioners of the State of South Carolina to James Buchanan, December 9, 1860

The President did not like the word “provided,” because it looked as if we were binding him while avowing that we had no authority to commit the Convention. We told him that we did not so understand it. We were expressing our convictions and belief, predicated upon the maintenance of a certain condition of things, which maintenance was absolutely, and entirely in his power. If he maintained such condition, then we believed that collision would be avoided until the attempt at a peaceable negotiation had failed. If he did not, then we solemnly assured him that we believed collision must inevitably, and at once, be precipitated. He seemed satisfied, and said it was not his intention to send reinforcements, or make any change. We explained to him what we meant by the words '”relative military status,” as applied to the forts; mentioned the difference between Major Anderson's occupying his then position at Fort Moultrie, and throwing himself into Fort Sumter. We stated that the latter step would be equivalent to reinforcing the garrison, and would just as certainly as the sending of fresh troops, lead to the result which we both desired to avoid. When we rose to go, the President said in substance, “After all, this is a matter of honor among gentlemen. I do not know that any paper or writing is necessary. We understand each other.” One of the delegation, just before leaving the room, remarked, “Mr. President, you have determined to let things remain as they are, and not to send reinforcements; but, suppose that you were hereafter to change jour policy for any reason, what then? That would put us, who are willing to use our personal influence to prevent any attack upon the forts before Commissioners are sent on to Washington, in rather an embarrassing position.” “Then,” said the President, “I would first return you this paper.” We do not pretend to give the exact words on either side, but we are sure we give the sense of both.

The above is a full and exact account of what passed between the President and the delegation. The President, in his letter to our Commissioners, tries to give the impression that our “understanding” or “agreement” was not a “pledge.” We confess, we are not sufficiently versed in the wiles of diplomacy to feel the force of this “distinction without a difference.” Nor can we understand how, in “a matter of honor among gentlemen,” in which “no paper or writing is necessary,” the very party who was willing to put it on that high footing can honorably descend to mere verbal criticism, to purge himself of what all gentlemen and men of honour must consider a breach of faith. The very fact that we (the representatives from South Carolina) were not authorized to commit or “pledge” the State, were not treating with the President as accredited ministers with full powers, but as gentlemen assuming, to a certain extent, the delicate task of' undertaking to foreshadow the course and policy of the State, should have made the President the more ready to strengthen our hands to bring about and carry out that course and policy which he professed to have as much at heart as we had. While we were not authorized to say that the Convention would not order the occupation of the forts immediately after secession, and prior to the sending on of Commissioners, the President, as Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, could most positively say, that so long as South Carolina abstained from attacking and seizing the forts, he would not send reinforcements to them, or allow their relative military status to be changed. We were acting in the capacity of gentlemen holding certain prominent positions, and anxious to exert such influence as we might possess, to effect a peaceful solution of pending political difficulties, and prevent, if possible, the horrors of war. The President was acting in a double capacity; not only as a gentleman, whose influence in carrying out his share of the understanding, or agreement, was potential, but as the head of the army, and, therefore, having the absolute control of the whole matter of reinforcing or transferring the garrison at Charleston. But we have dwelt long enough upon this point. Suffice it to say, that considering the President as bound in honor, if not by treaty stipulation, not to make any change in the forts, or to send reinforcements to them, unless they were attacked, we of the delegation who were elected to the Convention, felt equally bound in honor to do everything on our part to prevent any premature collision. This Convention can bear us witness as to whether or not we endeavored honorably to carry out our share of the agreement.

The published debates at the very commencement of the session, contain the evidence of our good faith. We trusted the President. We believed his wishes concurred with his policy, and that both were directed to avoiding any inauguration of hostilities. We were confirmed in our confidence, and reassured in our belief by a significant event which took place subsequent to our interview. He allowed his premier Cabinet officer, an old and tried friend to resign, rather than yield to his solicitations for the reinforcement of the garrison at Charleston. We urged this as a convincing proof of his firmness and sincerity. But how have we been deceived! The news of Major Anderson's coup produced a sudden and unexpected change in the President's policy. While declaring that his withdrawal from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter was “without orders, and contrary to orders,” he yet refused, for twelve hours, to take any action in the matter. For twelve hours, therefore, without any excuse, he refused to redeem his plighted word. No subsequent acts on the part of our State — no after reasons — can wipe away the stain which he suffered to rest upon his “honor as a gentleman,” while those hours, big with portentous events, rolled slowly by. His Secretary of War, impatient of a delay, every moment of which he felt touched his own honor, resigned. He did so solely on the ground that the faith of the government — solemly pledged — was broken, if it failed promptly to undo what had been done contrary to its wishes — against its settled policy — and in violation of its distinct agreement. The President accepted his resignation without comment. He did not attempt to disabuse the mind of his Secretary as to what was the true position of the Government. What a spectacle does the President's vacillating and disingenuous course present! He allows one Secretary to resign rather than abandon a policy which he has agreed upon. Scarcely have a few short weeks elapsed, and he accepts the resignation of another, rather than adhere to that very policy. He makes an agreement with gentlemen which, while he admits that they have faithfully kept it on their part, he himself evades and repudiates. And this he does rather than redress a wrong — correct an error — what he himself considers an error — committed by a subordinate, without his orders, and contrary to his wishes! It was at least due to Mr. Floyd, who, as one of his Cabinet, had officially and personally stood by his administration from its very commencement — through good report, and through evil report — to have explained to him that he was, in the President's opinion, laboring under a misapprehension. At least, to have said to him, “you are mistaken about this matter — do not leave me on a false issue.” But no; he coldly, ungraciously, yet promptly, receives the resignation without a syllable of remonstrance, and thus tacitly, but unequivocally, accepts without shame the issue presented. He does not deny that the faith of his government is pledged, but he deliberately refuses to redeem it.

WM. PORCHER MILES.

LAURENCE M. KEITT.

SOURCE: The Correspondence Between the Commissioners of the State of So. Ca. to the Government at Washington and the President of the United States, p. 21-6, Published in The Richmond Daily Dispatch, Richmond, Virginia, January 14, 1861, p. 1

Commissioners of the State of South Carolina to James Buchanan, January 1, 1861

Washington, D. C,

January 1st, 1861.

Sir: We have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th December, in reply to a note addressed by us to you on the 28th of the same month, as Commissioners from South Carolina.

In reference to the declaration with which your reply commences, that “your position as President of the United States was clearly defined in the Message to Congress of the 3d instant,” that you possess “no power to change the relations heretofore existing” between South Carolina and the United States, “much less to acknowledge the independence of that State;” and that, consequently, you could meet us only as private gentlemen of the highest character, with an entire willingness to communicate to Congress any proposition we might have to make, we deem it only necessary to say, that the State of South Carolina having, in the exercise of that great right of self-government which underlies all our political organizations, declared herself sovereign and independent, we, as her representatives, felt no special solicitude as to the character in which you might recognize us. Satisfied that the State had simply exercised her unquestionable right, we were prepared, in order to reach substantial good, to waive the formal considerations which your constitutional scruples might have prevented you from extending. We came here, therefore, expecting to be received as you did receive us, and perfectly content with that entire willingness of which you assured us, to submit any proposition to Congress which we might have to make upon the subject of the independence of the State. That willingness was ample recognition of the condition of public affairs which rendered our presence necessary. In this position, however, it is our duty, both to the State which we represent and to ourselves, to correct several important misconceptions of our letter into which you have fallen.

You say, “It was my earnest desire that such a disposition might be made of the whole subject by Congress, who alone possesses the power to prevent the inauguration of a civil war between the parties in regard to the possession of the federal forts in the harbor of Charleston; and I, therefore, deeply regret that, in your opinion, ‘the events of the last twenty-four hours render this impossible.’” We expressed no such opinion, and the language which you quote as ours, is altered in its sense by the omission of a most important part of the sentence. What we did say was: “But the events of the last twenty-four hours render such an assurance impossible.” Place that “assurance” as contained in our letter, in the sentence, and we are prepared to repeat it.

Again, professing to quote our language, you say:— “Thus the authorities of South Carolina, without waiting or asking for any explanation, and, doubtless, believing, as you have expressed it, that the officer had acted not only without, but against my orders,” &c. We expressed no such opinion in reference to the belief of the people of South Carolina. The language which you have quoted, was applied solely and entirely to our assurance, obtained here, and based, as you well know, upon your own declaration — a declaration which, at that time, it was impossible for the authorities of South Carolina to have known. But, without following this letter into all its details, we propose only to meet the chief points of the argument.

Some weeks ago, the State of South Carolina declared her intention, in the existing condition of public affairs, to secede from the United States. She called a Convention of her people, to put her declaration in force. The Convention met, and passed the Ordinance of Secession. All this you anticipated, and your course of action was thoroughly considered. In your annual message, you declared you had no right, and would not attempt, to coerce a seceding State, but that you were bound by your constitutional oath, and would defend the property of the United States within the borders of South Carolina, if an attempt was made to take it by force. Seeing very early that this question of property was a difficult and delicate one, you manifested a desire to settle it without collision. You did not reinforce the garrisons in the harbor of Charleston. You removed a distinguished and veteran officer from the command of Fort Moultrie, because he attempted to increase his supply of ammunition. You refused to send additional troops to the same garrison when applied for by the officer appointed to succeed him. You accepted the resignation of the oldest and most eminent member of your Cabinet, rather than allow these garrisons to be strengthened. You compelled an officer stationed at Fort Sumter, to return immediately to the Arsenal, forty muskets which he had taken to arm his men. You expressed not to one, but to many, of the most distinguished of our public characters, whoso testimony will be placed upon the record, whenever it is necessary, your anxiety for a peaceful termination of this controversy, and your willingness not to disturb the military status of the forts, if Commissioners should be sent to the Government, whose communications you promised to submit to Congress. You received and acted on assurances from the highest official authorities of South Carolina, that no attempt would be made to disturb your possession of the forts and property of the United States, if you would not disturb their existing condition until Commissioners had been sent, and the attempt to negotiate had failed. You took from the members of the House of Representatives, a written memorandum that no such attempt should be made, “provided that no reinforcements shall be sent into those forts, and their relative military status shall remain as at present.” And, although you attach no force to the acceptance of such a paper, although you “considered it as nothing more in effect than the promise of highly honorable gentlemen,” as an obligation on one side without corresponding obligation on the other, it must be remembered (if we are rightly informed) that you were pledged, if you ever did send reinforcements, to return it to those from whom you had received it before you executed your resolution. You sent orders to your officers, commanding them strictly to follow a line of conduct in conformity with such an understanding.

Beside all this, you had received formal and official notice from the Governor of South Carolina, that we had been appointed Commissioners, and were on our way to Washington. You knew the implied condition under which we came; our arrival was notified to you, and an hour appointed for an interview. We arrived in Washington on Wednesday, at three o'clock, and you appointed an interview with us at one the next day. Early on that day, Thursday, the news was received here of the movement of Major Anderson. That news was communicated to you immediately, and you postponed our meeting until half-past two o'clock, on Friday, in order that you might consult your Cabinet. On Friday we saw you, and we called upon you then to redeem your pledge. You could not deny it. With the facts we have stated, and in the face of the crowning and conclusive fact, that your Secretary of War had resigned his seat in the Cabinet, upon the publicly avowed ground that the action of Major Anderson had violated the pledged faith of the Government, and that unless the pledge was instantly redeemed, he was dishonored; denial was impossible; you did not deny it. You do not deny it now, but you seek to escape from its obligation on two grounds: 1st, That we terminated all negotiation by demanding, as a preliminary, the withdrawal of the United States troops from the harbor of Charleston; and 2d, That the authorities of South Carolina, instead of asking explanation, and giving you the opportunity to vindicate yourself, took possession of other property of the United States. We will examine both.

In the first place, we deny positively, that we have ever, in any way, made any such demand. Our letter is in your possession; it will stand by this on the record. In it, we inform you of the objects of our mission. We say that it would have been our duty to have assured you of our readiness to commence negotiations with the most earnest and anxious desire to settle all questions between us amicably, and to our mutual advantage, but that events had rendered that assurance impossible. We stated the events, and we said that, until some satisfactory explanation of these events was given us, we could not proceed, and then, having made this request for explanation, we added, “and, in conclusion, we would urge upon you the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of Charleston. Under present circumstances they are a standing menace, which renders negotiation impossible,” &c. “Under present circumstances!” What circumstances? Why, clearly, the occupation of Fort Sumter, and the dismantling of Fort Moultrie by Major Anderson, in the face of your pledges, and without explanation or practical disavowal. And there is nothing in the letter, which would or could have prevented you from declining to withdraw the troops, and offering the restoration of the status to which you were pledged, if such had been your desire. It would have been wiser and better, in our opinion, to have withdrawn the troops, and this opinion we urged upon you, but we demanded nothing but such an explanation of the events of the last twenty-four hours as would restore our confidence in the spirit with which the negotiation should be conducted. In relation to this withdrawal of the troops from the harbor, we are compelled, however, to notice one passage of your letter. Referring to it, you say: “This I cannot do. This I will not do. Such an idea was never thought of by me in any possible contingency. No allusion to it had ever been made in any communication between myself and any human being.”

In reply to this statement, we are compelled to say, that your conversation with us left upon our minds the distinct impression that you did seriously contemplate the withdrawal of the troops from Charleston harbor. And, in support of this impression, we would add that we have the positive assurance of gentlemen of the highest possible public reputation, and the most unsullied integrity — men whose name and fame, secured by long service and patriotic achievement, place their testimony beyond cavil — that such suggestions had been made to, and urged upon you by them, and had formed the subject of more than one earnest discussion with you. And it was this knowledge that induced us to urge upon you a policy which had to recommend it, its own wisdom and the weight of such authority. As to the second point, that the authorities of South Carolina, instead of asking explanations, and giving you the opportunity to vindicate yourself, took possession of other property of the United States, we would observe, 1st. That, even if this were so, it does not avail you for defence, for the opportunity for decision was afforded you before these facts occurred. We arrived in Washington on Wednesday. The news from Major Anderson reached here early on Thursday, and was immediately communicated to you. All that day, men of the highest consideration — men who had striven successfully to lift you to your great office — who had been your tried and true friends through the troubles of your administration — sought you, and entreated you to act — to act at once. They told you that every hour complicated your position. They only asked you to give the assurance that, if the facts were so — that, if the commander had acted without, and against your orders, and in violation of your pledges, that you would restore the status you had pledged your honor to maintain.

You refused to decide. Your Secretary at War — your immediate and proper adviser in this whole matter — waited anxiously for your decision, until he felt that delay was becoming dishonor. More than twelve hours passed, and two Cabinet meetings had adjourned before you knew what the authorities of South Carolina had done, and your prompt decision at any moment of that time, would have avoided the subsequent complications. But if you had known the acts of the authorities of South Carolina, should that have prevented your keeping your faith? What was the condition of things? For the last sixty days, you have had in Charleston harbor, not force enough to hold the 2 forts against an equal enemy. Two of them were empty; one of those two, the most important in the harbor. It could have been taken at any time. You ought to know better than any man, that it would have been taken, but for the efforts of those who put their trust in your honor. Believing that they were threatened by Fort Sumter especially, the people were, with difficulty, restrained from securing, without blood, the possession of this important fortress. After many and reiterated assurances given on your behalf, which we cannot believe unauthorized, they determined to forbear, and in good faith sent on their Commissioners to negotiate with you. They meant you no harm; wished you no ill. They thought of you kindly, believed you true, and were willing, as far as was consistent with duty, to spare you unnecessary and hostile collision. Scarcely had their Commissioners left, than Major Anderson waged war. — No other words will describe his action. It was not a peaceful change from one fort to another; it was a hostile act in the highest sense — one only justified in the presence of a superior enemy, and in imminent peril. He abandoned his position, spiked his guns, burned his gun-carriages, made preparations for the destruction of his post, and withdrew under cover of the night to a safer position. This was war. No man could have believed (without your assurance) that any officer could have taken such a step, “not only without orders, but against orders.” What the State did, was in simple self-defence; for this act, with all its attending circumstances, was as much war as firing a volley; and war being thus begun, until those commencing it explained their action, and disavowed their intention, there was no room for delay; and, even at this moment, while we are writing, it is more than probable, from the tenor of your letter, that reinforcements are hurrying on to the conflict, so that when the first gun shall be fired, there will have been, on your part, one continuous consistent series of actions commencing in a demonstration essentially warlike, supported by regular reinforcement, and terminating in defeat or victory. And all this without the slightest provocation; for, among the many things which you have said, there is one thing you cannot say — you have waited anxiously for news from the seat of war, in hopes that delay would furnish some excuse for this precipitation. But this “tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act, on the part of the authorities of South Carolina,” (which is the only justification of Major Anderson,) you are forced to admit “has not yet been alleged.” But you have decided. You have resolved to hold by force what you have obtained through our misplaced confidence, and by refusing to disavow the action of Major Anderson, have converted his violation of orders into a legitimate act of your Executive authority. Be the issue what it may, of this we are assured, that, if Fort Moultrie has been recorded in history as a memorial of Carolina gallantry, Fort Sumter will live upon the succeeding page as an imperishable testimony of Carolina faith.

By your course, you have probably rendered civil war inevitable. Be it so. If you choose to force this issue upon us, the State of South Carolina will accept it, and, relying upon Him who is the God of justice as well as the God of hosts, will endeavor to perform the great duty which lies before her, hopefully, bravely and thoroughly.

Our mission being one for negotiation and peace, and your note leaving us without hope of a withdrawal of the troops from Fort Sumter, or of the restoration of the status quo existing at the time of our arrival, and intimating, as we think, your determination to reinforce the garrison in the harbor of Charleston, we respectfully inform you that we propose returning to Charleston on to-morrow afternoon.

We have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully,

Your obedient servants,

R. W. BARNWELL,

J. H. ADAMS,

JAMES L. ORR.

Commissioners.

To his Excellency, the President

of the United States.

[Endorsement.]

Executive Mansion,

3½ o'clock, Wednesday.

This paper, just presented to the President, is of such a character that he declines to receive it.

SOURCE: The Correspondence Between the Commissioners of the State of So. Ca. to the Government at Washington and the President of the United States, p. 12-20

James Buchanan to the Commissioners of the State of South Carolina, December 30, 1860

Washington City, 30th December, 1860.

Gentlemen: I have the honor to receive your communication of 28th inst., together with a copy of your “full powers from the Convention of the People of South Carolina,” authorising you to treat with the Government of the United States on various important subjects therein mentioned, and also a copy of the Ordinance bearing date on the 20th instant, declaring that “the Union now subsisting between South Carolina and other States under the name of ‘the United States of America,’ is hereby dissolved.”

In answer to this communication, I have to say, that my position as President of the United States was clearly defined in the message to Congress of the 3d instant. In that I stated that, “apart from the execution of the laws, so far as this may be practicable, the Executive has no authority to decide what shall be the relations between the Federal Government and South Carolina. He has been invested with no such discretion. He possesses no power to change the relations heretofore existing between them, much less to acknowledge the independence of that State. This would be to invest a mere executive officer with the power of recognizing the dissolution of the Confederacy among our thirty-three sovereign States. It bears no resemblance to the recognition of a foreign de facto government — involving no such responsibility. Any attempt to do this would, on his part, be a naked act of usurpation. It is, therefore, my duty to submit to Congress the whole question, in all its bearings.”

Such is my opinion still. I could, therefore, meet you only as private gentlemen of the highest character, and was entirely willing to communicate to Congress any proposition you might have to make to that body upon the subject. Of this you were well aware. It was my earnest desire, that such a disposition might he made of the whole subject by Congress, who alone possess the power, as to prevent the inauguration of a civil war between the parties in regard to the possession of the Federal Forts in the harbor of Charleston; and I therefore deeply regret, that, in your opinion, “the events of the last twenty-four hours render this impossible.” In conclusion, you urge upon me “the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of Charleston,” stating that, “under present circumstances, they are a standing menace which renders negotiation impossible, and as our recent experience shows, threatens speedily to bring to a bloody issue, questions which ought to be settled with temperance and judgment.”

The reason for this change in your position is, that since your arrival in Washington, “an officer of the United States, acting as we (you) are assured, not only without, but against your (my) orders, has dismantled one fort and occupied another, thus altering, to a most important extent, the condition of affairs under which we (you) came.” You also allege that you came here “the representatives of an authority which could, at any time, within the past sixty days have taken possession of the forts in Charleston harbor, but which, upon pledges given in a manner that we (you) cannot doubt, determined to trust to your (my) honor  rather than to its own power.”

This brings me to a consideration of the nature of those alleged pledges, and in what manner they have been observed. In my message of the third of December last, I stated, in regard to the property of the United States in South Carolina, that it “has been purchased for a fair equivalent ‘by the consent of the Legislature of the State,’ ‘for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals,’ &c, and over these the authority ‘to exercise exclusive legislation’ has been expressly granted by the Constitution to Congress. It is not believed that any attempt will be made to expel the United States from this property by force; but if in this I should prove to be mistaken, the officer in command of the forts has received orders to act strictly on the defensive. In such a contingency, the responsibility for consequences would rightfully rest upon the heads of the assailants.” This being the condition of the parties, on Saturday, 8th December, four of the representatives from South Carolina called upon me and requested an interview. We had an earnest conversation on the subject of these forts, and the best means of preventing a collision between the parties for the purpose of sparing the effusion of blood. I suggested, for prudential reasons, that it would be best to put in writing what they said to me verbally. They did so accordingly, and on Monday morning, the 10th instant, three of them presented to me a paper signed by all the representatives from South Carolina, with a single exception, of which the following is a copy:

• Commissioners of the State of South Carolina to James Buchanan, December 9, 1860

And here I must, in justice to myself, remark, that at the time the paper was presented to me, I objected to the word “provided,” as it might be construed into an agreement, on my part, which I never would make. They said that nothing was farther from their intention — they did not so understand it, and I should not so consider it. It is evident they could enter into no reciprocal agreement with me on the subject. They did not profess to have authority to do this, and were acting in their individual character. I considered it as nothing more, in effect, than the promise of highly honorable gentlemen to exert their influence for the purpose expressed. The event has proven that they have faithfully kept this promise, although I have never since received a line from any one of them, or from any member of the Convention, on the subject. It is well known that it was my determination, and this I freely expressed, not to reinforce the forts in the harbor, and thus produce a collision, until they had been actually attacked, or until I had certain evidence that they were about to be attacked. This paper I received most cordially, and considered it as a happy omen that peace might still be preserved, and that time might thus be gained for reflection. This is the whole foundation for the alleged pledge.

But I acted in the same manner I would have done had I entered into a positive and formal agreement with parties capable of contracting, although such an agreement would have been, on my part, from the nature of my official duties, impossible.

The world knows that I have never sent any reinforcements to the forts in Charleston harbor, and I have certainly never authorized any change to be made “in their relative military status.”

Bearing upon this subject, I refer you to an order issued by the Secretary of War, on the 11th inst., to Major Anderson, but not brought to my notice until the 21st instant.' It is as follows:

Memorandum of verbal instructions to Major Anderson,

1st Artillery, Commanding Fort Moultrie, S. C.

You are aware of the great anxiety of the Secretary of War that a collision of the troops with the people of this State shall be avoided, and of his studied determination to pursue a course with reference to the military force and forts in this harbor, which shall guard against such a collision. He has, therefore, carefully abstained from increasing the force at this point, or taking any measures which might add to the present excited state of the public mind, or which would throw any doubt on the confidence he feels that South Carolina will not attempt by violence to obtain possession of the public works, or interfere with their occupancy. But as the counsel and acts of rash and impulsive persons may possibly disappoint these expectations of the Government, he deems it proper that you should be prepared with instructions to meet so unhappy a contingency. He has, therefore, directed me, verbally, to give you such instructions.

You are carefully to avoid every act which would needlessly tend to provoke aggression; and, for that reason, you are not, without evident and imminent necessity, to take up any position which could be construed into the assumption of a hostile attitude; but you are to hold possession of the forts in this harbor, and, if attacked, you are to defend yourself to the last extremity. The smallness of your force will not permit you, perhaps, to occupy more than one of the three forts; but an attack on, or attempt to take possession of either of them, will be regarded as an act of hostility, and you may then put your command into either of them which you may deem most proper, to increase its power of resistance. You are also authorized to take similar defensive steps whenever you have tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act.

D. P. BUTLER, Assistant Adjutant General.

Fort Moultrie, S. C, Dec. 11, 1860.

This is in conformity to my instructions to Major Buell.

JOHN B. FLOYD, Secretary of War.

These were the last instructions transmitted to Major Anderson before his removal to Fort Sumter, with a single exception in regard to a particular which does not, in any degree, affect the present question. Under these circumstances, it is clear that Major Anderson acted upon his own responsibility, and without authority, unless, indeed, he had “tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act,” on the part of the authorities of South Carolina, which has not yet been alleged. Still, he is a brave and honorable officer; and justice requires that he should not be condemned without a fair hearing.

Be this as it may, when I learned that Major Anderson had left Fort Moultrie, and proceeded to Fort Sumter, my first promptings were to command him to return to his former position, and there to await the contingencies presented in his instructions. This could only have been done, with any degree of safety to the command, by the concurrence of the South Carolina authorities. But, before any steps could possibly have been taken in this direction, we received information, dated on the 28th instant, that “the Palmetto flag floated out to the breeze at Castle Pinckney, and a large military force went over last night (the 27th) to Fort Moultrie.” Thus the authorities of South Carolina, without waiting or asking for any explanation, and doubtless believing, as you have expressed it, that the officer had acted not only without, but against my orders, on the very next day after the night when the removal was made, seized, by a military force, two of the three federal forts in the harbor of Charleston, and have covered them under their own flag, instead of that of the United States. At this gloomy period of our history, startling events succeed each other rapidly. On the very day (the 27th instant) that possession of these two forts was taken, the Palmetto flag was raised over the federal Custom House and Post Office in Charleston; and, on the same day, every officer of the Customs — Collector, Naval Officers, Surveyor and Appraisers — resigned their offices. And this, although it was well known, from the language of my message, that, as an executive officer, I felt myself bound to collect the revenue at the port of Charleston under the existing laws. In the harbor of Charleston, we now find three forts confronting each other, over all of which the federal flag floated only four days ago; but now, over two of them, this flag has been supplanted, and the Palmetto flag has been substituted in its stead. It is, under all these circumstances, that I am urged immediately to withdraw the troops from the harbor of Charleston, and am informed that without this, negotiation is impossible. This I cannot do; this I will not do. Such an idea was never thought of by me in any possible contingency. No allusion to it had ever been made in any communication between myself and any human being. But the inference is, that I am bound to withdraw the troops from the only fort remaining in the possession of the United States in the harbor of Charleston, because the officer then in command of all the forts thought proper, without instructions, to change his position from one of them to another. I cannot admit the justice of any such inference.

At this point of writing, I have received information, by telegram, from Captain Humphreys, in command of the Arsenal at Charleston, “that it has to-day (Sunday, the 30th) been taken by force of arms.” It is estimated that the munitions of war belonging to the United States in this Arsenal are worth half a million of dollars.

Comment is needless. After this information, I have only to add, that, whilst it is my duty to defend Fort Sumter, as a portion of the public property of the United States against hostile attacks from whatever quarter they may come, by such means as I may possess for this purpose, I do not perceive how such a defence can be construed into a menace against the City of Charleston.

With great personal regard, I remain

Yours, very respectfully,

JAMES BUCHANAN.

To Honorable

Robert W. Barnwell,

James H. Adams,

James L. Orr.

SOURCE: The Correspondence Between the Commissioners of the State of So. Ca. to the Government at Washington and the President of the United States, p. 5-11

Memorandum of Verbal Instructions to Major Anderson, First Artillery, Commanding Fort Moultrie, South Carolina, December 11, 1860

FORT MOULTRIE, S.C., December 11, 1860.

Memorandum of verbal instructions to Major Anderson, First Artillery, commanding at Fort Moultrie, S.C.

You are aware of the great anxiety of the Secretary of War that a collision-of the troops with the people of this State shall be avoided, and of his studied determination to pursue a course with reference to the military force and forts in this harbor which shall guard against such a collision. He has therefore carefully abstained from increasing the force at this point, or taking any measures which might add to the present excited state of the public mind, or which would throw any doubt on the confidence he feels that South Carolina will not attempt, by violence, to obtain possession of the public works or interfere with their occupancy. But as the counsel and acts of rash and impulsive persons may possibly disappoint those expectations of the Government, he deems it proper that you should be prepared with instructions to meet so unhappy a contingency. He has therefore directed me verbally to give you such instructions.*

You are carefully to avoid every act which would needlessly tend to provoke aggression; and for that reason you are not, without evident and imminent necessity, to take up any position which could be construed into the assumption of a hostile attitude. But you are to hold possession of the forts in this harbor, and if attacked you are to defend yourself to the last extremity. The smallness of your force will not permit you, perhaps, to occupy more than one of the three forts, but an attack on or attempt to take possession of any one of them will be regarded as an act of hostility, and you may then put your command into either of them which you may deem most proper to increase its power of resistance. You are also authorized to take similar steps whenever you have tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act.

 D.C. BUELL,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

_______________

* See also Floyd to Anderson, December 21, 1860, and Holt to Anderson, February 23, 1860, post.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 89-90;  Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 73; The Correspondence Between the Commissioners of the State of So. Ca. to the Government at Washington and the President of the United States, p. 8-9

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: October 2, 1863

Our 5000 prisoners taken at the battle of Chickamauga have arrived in this city, and it is ascertained that more are on the way hither. Gen. Bragg said he had 5000 besides the wounded, and as none of the wounded have arrived, more must have been taken since his dispatch. Every effort is being made on our part to capture the army of Rosecrans — and everything possible is done by the enemy to extricate him, and to reinforce him to such an extent that he may resume offensive operations. Without this be done, the campaign must close disastrously in the West, and then the peace party of the North will have a new inspiration of vitality.

It is now said that Gen. Lee, despairing of being attacked in his chosen position, has resolved to attack Meade, or at least to advance somewhere. It is possible (if Meade has really sent two corps of his army to the West) that he will cross the Potomac again — at least on a foraging expedition. If he meets with only conscripts and militia he may penetrate as far as Harrisburg, and then let Europe perpend! The Union will be as difficult of reconstruction, as would have been the celebrated Campo Formio vase shivered by Napoleon. It is much easier to destroy than to construct. The emancipation and confiscation measures rendered reconstruction impracticable — unless, indeed, at a future day, the Abolitionists of the United States should be annihilated and Abolitionism abolished.

To-day I got an excellent pair of winter shoes from a quartermaster here for $13 — the retail price for as good an article, in the stores, is $75; fine boots have risen to $200!

The enemy's batteries on Morris Island are firing away again at Sumter's ruins, and at Moultrie — but they have not yet opened on the city.

The newspapers continue to give accounts of the Chickamauga battle.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 59-60

Commissioners of the State of South Carolina to James Buchanan, December 28, 1860

Washington, 28th December, 1860.

Sir: We have the honor to transmit to you a copy of the full powers from the Convention of the People of South Carolina, under which we are “authorized and empowered to treat with the Government of the United States for the delivery of the forts, magazines, light houses and other real estate, with their appurtenances, within the limits of South Carolina, and also for an apportionment of the public debt and for a division of all other property held by the Government of the United States as agent of the confederated States, of which South Carolina was recently a member; and generally to negotiate as to all other measures and arrangements proper to be made and adopted in the existing relation of the parties, and for the continuance of peace and amity between this commonwealth and the Government at Washington.”

In the execution of this trust, it is our duty to furnish you, as we now do, with an official copy of the Ordinance of Secession, by which the State of South Carolina has resumed the powers she delegated to the Government of the United States and has declared her perfect sovereignty and independence.

It would also have been our duty to have informed you that we were ready to negotiate with you upon all such questions as are necessarily raised by the adoption of this ordinance, and that we were prepared to enter upon this negotiation with the earnest desire to avoid all unnecessary and hostile collision, and so to inaugurate our new relations as to secure mutual respect, general advantage and a future of good will and harmony beneficial to all the parties concerned.

But the events of the last twenty-four hours render such an assurance impossible. We came here the representatives of an authority which could, at any time within the past sixty days, have taken possession of the forts in Charleston harbor, but which, upon pledges given in a manner that, we cannot doubt, determined to trust to your honor rather than to its own power. Since our arrival here an officer of the United States, acting, as we are assured, not only without but against your orders, has dismantled one fort and occupied another, thus altering, to a most important extent, the condition of affairs under which we came.

Until these circumstances are explained in a manner which relieves us of all doubt as to the spirit in which these negotiations shall be conducted, we are forced to suspend all discussion as to any arrangements by which our mutual interests might be amicably adjusted.

And, in conclusion, we would urge upon you the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of Charleston. Under present circumstances, they are a standing menace which renders negotiation impossible, and, as our recent experience shews, threatens speedily to bring to a bloody issue questions which ought to be settled with temperance and judgment.

We have the honor, Sir, to be,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servants,

R. W. BARNWELL,

J. H. ADAMS,

JAMES L. ORR,

Commissioners.

To the President

of the United States.

SOURCE: The Correspondence Between the Commissioners of the State of So. Ca. to the Government at Washington and the President of the United States, p. 3-4

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: September 10, 1863

A Mr. J. C. Jones has addressed a letter to the President asking permission to run the blockade to confer with Mr. Bates, of President Lincoln's cabinet, on terms of peace, with, I believe, authority to assure him that none of the Northwestern States, or any other free States, will be admitted into the Confederacy. Mr. J. says he has been on intimate terms with Mr. B., and has conceived the idea that the United States would cease the war, and acknowledge the independence of the South, if it were not for the apprehension of the Northwestern States seceding from the Union. If his request be not granted, he intends to enter the army immediately. He is a refugee from Missouri. He assures the President he is his friend, and that a “concentration of power” in his hands is essential, etc. The President refers this paper, with a gracious indorsement, to the Secretary of War, recommending him either to see Mr. Jones, or else to institute inquiries, etc.

S. Wyatt, Augusta, Ga., writes in favor of appeals to the patriotism of the people to counteract what Mr. Toombs has done. What has he done? But he advises the President, to whom he professes to be very friendly, to order a discontinuance of seizures, etc.

A. Cohen (Jew name), purser of the blockade-running steamer “Arabia” at Wilmington, has submitted a notable scheme to Gen. Winder, who submits it to the Secretary of War, establishing a police agency at Nassau. Gen. W. to send some of his detectives thither to examine persons coming into the Confederate States, and if found “all right,” to give them passports. It was only yesterday that a letter was received from Gen. Whiting, asking authority to send out a secret agent on the “Arabia,” to see what disposition would be made of her cargo, having strong suspicions of the loyalty of the owners and officers of that vessel.

Gov. Z. B. Vance complains indignantly of Marylanders and Virginians appointed to office in that State, to the exclusion of natives; he says they have not yet been recalled, as he had a right to expect, after his recent interview with the President. He says he is disgusted with such treatment, both of his State and of himself. Alas I what is behind?

Night before last some thirty of the enemy's barges, filled with men, attempted to take the ruins of Sumter by assault. This had been anticipated by Beauregard, and every preparation had been made accordingly. So the batteries at Forts Moultrie, Bee, etc. opened terrifically with shell and grape; the amount of execution by them is not ascertained: but a number of the barges reached the debris of Sumter, where a battalion of infantry awaited them, and where 115 of the Yankees, including more than a dozen officers, begged for quarters and were taken prisoners. No doubt the casualties on the side of the assailants must have been many, while the garrison sustained no loss. This is substantially the purport of a dispatch from Beauregard to Gen. Cooper, which, however, was published very, awkwardly — without any of the niceties of punctuation a fastidious general would have desired. Nevertheless, Beauregard's name-is on every tongue.

The clerks in the departments were startled to-day by having read to them an order from Brig.-Gen. Custis Lee (son of Gen. R. E. Lee), an order to the captains of companies to imprison or otherwise punish all who failed to be present at the drills. These young gentlemen, not being removable, according to the Constitution, and exempted from conscription by an act of Congress, volunteered some months ago for “local defense and special service,” never supposing that regular drilling would be obligatory except when called into actual service by the direction of the President, in the terms of an act of Congress, which provided that such organizations were not to receive pay for military service, unless summoned to the field by the President in an emergency. They receive no pay now—but yet the impression prevails that this order has the approbation of the President, as Gen. G. W. Custis Lee is one of his special aids, with the rank and pay of a colonel of cavalry. As an aid of the President, he signs himself colonel; as commander of the city brigade, he signs himself brigadier-general, and has been so commissioned by the President. How it can be compatible to hold both positions and commissions, I do not understand — but perhaps the President does, as he is well versed in the rules and regulations of the service. Some of the clerks, it is said, regard the threat as unauthorized by law, and will resist what they deem a usurpation, at the hazard of suffering its penalties. I know not what the result will be, but I fear “no good will come of it.” They are all willing to fight, when the enemy comes (a probable thing); but they dislike being forced out to drill, under threats of “punishment.” This measure will not add to the popularity of Col. (or Gen.) Lee.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 39-41

Captain Gustavus V. Fox: Memorandum for the Relief of Fort Sumter, February 6, 1861

ST. GERMAIN HOTEL,

New York, February 6, 1861.

Since the repulse of the steamer Star of the West at Charleston it may be assumed that all the channels over the bar are obstructed, but as the bar is more than four miles in length the spaces between these channels are too extensive to be closed. Therefore at high water and smooth sea the bar is perfectly accessible to vessels drawing say seven feet of water. The U. S. has no steamers of this draft. The skillfull officers at Charleston, aware of this fact, will conclude that relief must go in at high water in boats or light draft steamers incapable of bearing a very offensive armament. They will be perfectly prepared for such attempts by arming, and heavily manning all the steamers they possess and at the critical moment will throw themselves alongside the relief vessels and thus jeopardise the movement by the very detention of the conflict. To elude their vigilance or attempt a strategem however ingenious I consider too liable to failure.

I propose to put the troops on board of a large, comfortable sea steamer and hire two powerful light draft New York tug boats, having the necessary stores on board. These to be convoyed by the U.S.S. Pawnee, now at Philadelphia, and the revenue cutter Harriet Lane. (The Pawnee is the only available steam vessel of war north of the Gulf of Mexico; draws twelve feet of water and has seven heavy guns. As a steamer she seems to be a failure, but may be got ready for this emergency — at least she is, unfortunately, our only resource.) The Harriet Lane I understand to be an excellent and efficient vessel, but either of these steamers alone may be liable to capture, by an overwhelming force.

Arriving off the bar, I propose to examine by day the naval preparations and obstructions. If their vessels determine to oppose our entrance, and a feint or flag of truce would ascertain this, the armed ships must approach the bar and destroy or drive them on shore. Major Anderson would do the same upon any vessels within the range of his guns and would also prevent any naval succor being sent down from the city.

Having dispersed this force, the only obstacles are the forts on Cummings point, and Fort Moultrie, and whatever adjacent batteries they may have, distant on either hand from mid channel about three-quarters of a mile. Two hours before high water, at night, with half the force on board of each tug, within relieving distance of each other, should run in to Fort Sumpter.

[Endorsement:]

Proposition of Relief of Fort Sumpter Accepted by the Govt. Mch, 1861.

SOURCES: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume 4, p. 223-4; Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 8-9

Brigadier-General Robert Anderson to Edwin M. Stanton, December 1862

New York, December, 1862.

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

Sir: Although by the strict advice of my medical advisers I am prevented from undertaking any correspondence, the subject upon which I now have the honor to address you is one involving so much that I am induced to incur a risk, in order to bring it to your notice. I have observed in published Orders No. 181 that the brevet of major for the distinguished part taken by him in the transfer of the garrison of Fort Moultrie to Sumter, South Carolina, has been conferred upon Captain John G. Foster, Engineer Corps, to date from December 26, 1860. It is proper that I should here refer to the part taken by the different officers in that move; the only part Captain Foster took in the removal was his compliance with my request in directing Lieutenants Snyder and Meade to report to me with their boats' crews to aid in the move. To Lieutenants Snyder and Meade we were greatly indebted for their active and laborious exertions in making the transfer. I regret more deeply that neither of those officers can receive the favorable notice of our Government; the former is dead, and the latter has left our service. Assistant Surgeon Crawford returned to Fort Moultrie on the 27th, and was very active in sending over some ammunition, which was of material and essential service to us during our fight; and articles which Lieutenant Hall, to whom I was greatly indebted for his activity and energy in sending off the greater part of the stores which I had been unable to take over. From this it will be seen that if the Department desires to reward any officers for this service, that Brevets should be conferred upon those just named.

In my letters to the Adjutant-General, whilst at Fort Sumter, numbered 43, 44, 45, 58, 62, 74, 54, 66, 83, 93, and 94, I make a special mention of the services of Captain Seymour, Dr. Crawford, Lieutenants Snyder and Meade; these officers, in addition to their appropriate duties, contributed in no small degree to the maintenance of our position at Fort Sumter, and whose service deserves a special mention from me. If the Government deems any brevets due, it is to these officers.

It will be seen by reference to my letters I have mentioned, I have in letter No. 83 given credit to Captain Doubleday for an important suggestion; I now take advantage of this occasion to renew the commendation thus made, and to respectfully recommend that as a measure of justice to the officers named, a brevet, to date from April 14, 1861, should be bestowed either upon those of whom a special mention is made, or, as an act of justice to all, each one of the officers under my command should alike receive a brevet; and I again implore the Department that the distinction now contemplated for one only of the officers shall not be bestowed alone, it being in my estimation neither deserved upon his part nor just to his brother officers. As this matter has become the subject of official notice, it renders it more important that I should, as soon as possible, undertake an official report of the closing scenes of the occupancy of that work, which I have been thus far prevented from complying with from the strict orders of my physician. As soon as I can write, with the assistance of my friends I will make the report.

Very respectfully,

Robert Anderson,

Brigadier-General.

Letter No. 54, thanks to Dr. Crawford, and to Lieutenant Snyder, and Lieutenant Meade.

SOURCE:  Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 471-2

Simon Cameron to Major Robert Anderson, April 20, 1861

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, April 20, 1861.

Maj. ROBERT ANDERSON,

Late Commanding at Fort Sumter.

MY DEAR SIR: I am directed by the President of the United States to communicate to you, and through you to the officers and the men under your command, at Forts Moultrie and Sumter, the approbation of the Government of your and their judicious and gallant conduct there, and to tender to you and them the thanks of the Government for the same.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

SIMON CAMERON,

Secretary of War.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 16; Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 450.

Official Reports of the Operations in Charleston Harbor, S. C., December 20, 1860 – April 14, 1861: No. 11. – Report of Lieut. Col. Roswell S. Ripley, South Carolina Army, commanding Artillery

No. 11.

Report of Lieut. Col. R. S. Ripley, South Carolina Army, commanding Artillery.

HEADQUARTERS ARTILLERY,

Sullivan's Island, Fort Moultrie, April 16, 1861.

MAJOR: I have the honor to report that on the evening of the 11th instant, at 9½ o'clock, the batteries under my command were supplied and manned, the furnace heated, and all was ready for action either against a fleet or Fort Sumter. They were the following:

The five-gun battery, east of Curlew ground, under Captain Tupper, of the Vigilant Rifles.

The Maffitt channel battery, two guns, and mortar-battery No. 2, two 10-inch mortars, under Captain Butler, of the Infantry.

Fort Moultrie, which was my headquarters, thirty guns, under Capt. W. R. Calhoun, of the Artillery assistant commandant of batteries; First Lieuts. Thomas Wagner and Alfred Rhett, Artillery, commanding Channel and Sumter batteries.

Mortar-battery No. 1, two 10-inch mortars.

The enfilade battery, four guns, under Capt. J. H. Hallonquist, Artillery, assistant commandant of batteries, and Lieutenants Flemming,  Artillery, and Valentine, Infantry.

The Point battery, one 9-inch Dahlgren gun, and the floating battery,  four guns, under Capt. J. R. Hamilton and First Lieutenant Yates, of the Artillery, and the Mount Pleasant battery, two 10-inch mortars, under Capt. Robert Martin, of the Infantry.

Of these three 8-inch columbiads, two 32-pounders, and six 24-pounders in Fort Moultrie; two 24-pounders and two 32-pounders in the enfilade battery; one 9-inch Dahlgren gun, two 32-pounders, two 42-pounders at the Point and on board the floating battery, and the six 10-inch mortars bore upon Fort Sumter.

A strict watch was kept all night, but no attempt to send re-enforcements into Fort Sumter was observed. At 4½ o'clock on the morning of the 12th a shell was seen from the batteries of Fort Johnson, and in accordance with orders the signal for general action was made at once. The commands went quickly and quietly to their posts, and very soon every battery bearing upon the fort had commenced. As it was still dark the firing was very slow, but after dawn the direct fire was quickened, until every gun which bore upon Sumter was in quick operation, and this was continued at the regular intervals presented throughout the day. The enemy at first only replied to the Cummings Point batteries, but in a short time opened a brisk fire on the Point and floating batteries of this command with great precision. Shortly afterward he commenced firing on the enfilade batteries, but did not open upon Fort Moultrie.

At about 8 o'clock I visited the batteries to the west of this fort, and noticed the admirable conduct of the officers and men. Lieutenants Blanding and Flemming, of the Artillery, at mortar battery No. 1, and Lieutenants Valentine and Burnet, of the Infantry, at the enfilade battery, were promptly and energetically performing their duties. Captain Hallonquist was directing his fire to enfilade and drive the enemy from his parapet. At the Point battery Capt. J. R. Hamilton was firing with great precision and skill, and from his battery I noticed First Lieutenants Yates and Harleston on board the floating battery working their guns with all the rapidity which the order of firing permitted. I next visited Captain Butler's mortar battery, which he was working energetically.

Fort Sumter opened upon Fort Moultrie about 8.30 o'clock in the morning, and from that time a steady and continuous fire was kept up on us from his casemate 32-pounders and 42-pounders throughout the day. This was replied to by the nine guns of the Sumter battery of this fort, under Lieutenants Rhett and Mitchell, and two guns of the oblique battery, under Lieutenant Parker, until 9 a.m., when Lieutenant Rhett's command was relieved by the detachment of Company A, under Lieutenants Wagner, Preston, and Sitgreaves.

Captain Calhoun arranged the reliefs, and the officers and men of Companies A, B, and D worked the Sumter battery of this fort alternately until evening. During this time Captain Calhoun kept his channel guns manned and ready for action against the fleet, which was confidently expected to attempt an entrance. At different times during the afternoon five hot shot were fired upon the quarters at Fort Sumter. I have learned that they were thrice set on fire. Meantime the enemy's shot had told with great effect upon the quarters of Fort Moultrie, continually perforating and breaking them up; but our defenses were strong, the merlons and traverses heavy and well secured, and no material damage was done to our defenses, although the principal fire of the enemy was directed on this fort during the whole of the afternoon. The direct fire ceased with the light, but the mortars kept up the bombardment at the prescribed intervals.

The night set in dark and rainy, and it was feared that the enemy would certainly attempt to re-enforce. All the batteries on the island were visited, and especial vigilance enjoined. The channel batteries were kept manned, the various enfilading guns were all in readiness to sweep the faces and landings at Fort Sumter, and the mortar batteries to redouble their fire upon an alarm. The night passed away with one alerte, during which the mortar practice was increased in rapidity for a short time, and a few shots were fired from the different batteries; but it becoming apparent that the alarm was groundless the vertical fire was resumed, according to orders, and kept up until the day dawned.

Believing that it was impossible that the fleet outside would permit the cannonade to proceed without an attempt to re-enforce during the day and the men of my command having been exposed to a pelting rain during the night, and feeling confident that we had perfect command of the enemy's parapet, it had been determined to fire but two or three guns from the Sumter battery of Fort Moultrie, and, while keeping up a brisk mortar practice and fire from the enfilade battery, to save the ammunition of the Point and floating batteries to repel an attempt to re-enforce. Orders were given to such effect, and the two guns were opened from the Sumter battery of this fort, the other batteries firing in order. Fort Sumter opened early and spitefully, and paid especial attention to Fort Moultrie – almost every shot grazing the crest of the parapet, and crashing through the quarters. Our defenses were still uninjured and our losses trifling.

Finding that I could spare men and still keep the channel battery manned, the fire was somewhat increased, until about 9 o'clock on the morning of the 13th smoke was seen to issue from the roof of the quarters of Fort Sumter, and it was evident that a conflagration had commenced. The entire Sumter battery of Fort Moultrie was manned at once, and worked with the utmost rapidity, officers and men vieing in their energy. Captain Calhoun, First Lieutenants Wagner, Rhett, and Preston, Second Lieutenants Sitgreaves, Mitchell, and Parker, of the Artillery, and Mr. F. D. Blake, acting engineer, all superintended the working of the guns, which were manned by detachments from Company B, relieved at times by detachments from Company A, with a skill, and precision rarely excelled. Indeed, I doubt whether an artillery fire at such a distance with ordinary guns has ever equaled it in precision. The shot, both hot and cold, crashed into the quarters of Fort Sumter and along the parapet rendering the extinction of the flames difficult, and lighting up new places to windward. It became evident soon that the enemy was worsted, but to insure the result orders were passed to each of the batteries to redouble their fire.

Captain Hamilton, Captain Hallonquist and Lieutenants Yates and Valentine had anticipated the order, and Captain Butler soon increased the rapidity of his mortar practice; nevertheless from his casemates the enemy still poured shot thick and fast upon Fort Moultrie until about 12.45 p.m., when his flagstaff was cut away, and it slackened. The thick and stifling smoke arising from the ruins of his buildings told plainly that the time for surrender had nearly come. Nevertheless he hoisted a new flag over the crest of his parapet, and our fire, which had been ordered to cease when his flagstaff fell, was reopened with all the vigor we could command. The smoke still poured out of the ruins, and the fire from Fort Sumter having slackened again the order was again given to cease, but upon his recommencing we reopened.

While the enemy's flag was still flying and he was still firing upon us, a boat was observed to leave Cummings Point and pull towards Fort Sumter. By my order a shot was sent ahead of it, but it continued on and landed.

At 1.15 p.m., a white flag having been hoisted alongside the United States ensign, the firing ceased. Brigadier-General Dunovant, who was present in Fort Moultrie, immediately sent Captain Hartstene, C. S. N., Captain Calhoun, and Surgeon Lynch, C. S. N., to ascertain whether the surrender was made, and to tender assistance. Upon their arrival they found that the staff of the commanding general had just preceded them.

It is hard to say whether any distinction can be made in the conduct of the officers and men under my command. From the senior captain to the prisoner turned out of the guard-house just before the action all did their duty. The conduct of several came under my special notice, and I mention them accordingly. Captains Calhoun and Hallonquist, assistants to commandant of batteries; Capt. J. R. Hamilton, First Lieutenants Wagner, Rhett, and Yates, and Second Lieutenant Flemming, of the Artillery, and Captain Butler and Lieutenant Valentine, of the Infantry, were all in command of batteries, and deserve especial mention. In addition to the officers whose names appear in the report above I take pleasure in mentioning the conduct of the engineer and assistants, First Lieutenant Earle, and Messrs. F. D. Blake and J. E. Nash, volunteers, acting.

No repairs being needed for the defenses, these gentlemen acted as staff and lookout officers, and were very efficient. Lieut. T. S. Fayssoux, of the Cavalry, assistant commissary of subsistence, acted well in the same capacity. Capt. C. F. Middleton, an old resident of Sullivan's Island, remained with his family during the cannonade, and was especially useful. All of these gentlemen were active and prompt in communicating orders and doing whatever duty devolved upon them.

Surg. Arthur Lynch, C. S. N., and Assist. Surg. Walter Taylor, South Carolina Volunteers, the permanent surgeons of the post, had made every preparation for the discharge of their duties, and would have been assisted by Drs. Raoul, Barnwell, and Porcher, who volunteered, but fortunately our casualties were so few that their services as surgeons were needless. They acted as staff officers. The Rev. Mr. Aldrich was present during the cannonade. Dr. Maddox acted as surgeon at mortar battery No. 1, and Drs. Daviga and Logan at the Point and on board the floating battery. Mr. John Wells, of South Carolina, acted as an ordnance officer at the Point battery under Captain Hamilton.

Our escape with only four slight casualties I conceive to be in a great measure due to the strength of our defenses, the material of which had been furnished under the direction of Maj. Walter Gwynn, chief engineer, in large quantities since the 1st of January last. Major Gwynn had also given his personal supervision to the construction of several of the works. The batteries exterior to the fort and many of the works adjacent were built under the superintendence of Captain Trapier, whose accomplishments as an engineer are well known, and certainly are appreciated by those who garrison works constructed by him.

Several times during the action I had the pleasure of meeting the brigadier-general commanding, and of receiving valuable assistance from Captain Bruns and other officers of the staff. I wish to draw particular and special attention to the valuable services of Messrs. John Henery and Charles Scanlan, acting military storekeepers, who have been on duty with my command since January last. These gentlemen have given every attention to their duty, and to them is due, in a great measure, the high state of efficiency of our guns and ordnance. They were indispensable during the action.

The Ordnance Department deserves and has my thanks for the material furnished under so many adverse circumstances since the 1st of January last.

Among other volunteers, Maj. John Dunovant, of the Infantry, came to Fort Moultrie early on the morning of the 13th, and was present during the action, doing all that lay in his power.

I was deprived of the services of the commissioned battalion staff during the cannonade. First Lieut. James Hamilton, adjutant, was absent sick on the 11th instant, but hearing of the probability of an engagement, left his bed and came to report for duty. He remained until some time after the action, when it was evident that his strength was gone. Lieutenant Yates, battalion quartermaster, preferred the command of the floating battery, and I excused him from staff duty.

Lieut. Col. Hatch, quartermaster-general, had made preparations for the extinguishment of fires. Mr. Prioleau Ravenel was present with the engines and a body of men to put them out should they occur. We were fortunate, and he did what duty he was called on to perform.

I have the honor to inclose a return of the few wounded, a statement of shot fired, and such reports from commanding officers as I have received. To them I beg to refer for the names of meritorious individuals not mentioned above.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. S. RIPLEY,

Lieutenant-Colonel of Artillery, Commanding.

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Return of shot and shell fired from the batteries of Fort Moultrie Sullivan's Island, and Mount Pleasant, commanded by Lieut. Col. R. S. Ripley, Artillery, South Carolina Army, during the cannonade and bombardment of Fort Sumter, April 12 and 13, 1861.

 

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SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 39-43; This report is quoted in Samuel Wylie Crawford’s The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 435.