Showing posts with label James K Polk. Show all posts
Showing posts with label James K Polk. Show all posts

Monday, April 6, 2026

Speech of Congressman Albert G. Brown on the subject of the Public Printing, and Against the Action of the Joint Committee in Taking It from the Contractor and Dividing It Between the "Union" and the "Republic" Newspapers, Delivered in the United States House of Representatives, April 13 and 14, 1852

MR. BROWN said: I do not intend to detain the House by anything like an elaborate speech upon the subject of the public printing. In the few remarks which I propose to submit, I shall endeavor to confine myself as nearly as possible to the subjects directly before us; nor should I have asked the indulgence of the House to say a word but for the agency which I have taken heretofore in this matter. When I heard that the Committee on Public Printing had done more than, by the explanation of the honorable chairman, I am now induced to think they intended to do, I thought they had exceeded the authority given them by law, and that they had done that which this House ought not to sanction by its silence, much less by its express assent. With the explanation which the honorable chairman has given, I am satisfied the committee have intended to confine themselves to the letter of the law; but I am just as well satisfied that their action will lead to an abuse of the law. The Committee on Public Printing have a right, according to one construction of the statute of 1846, to take so much of the public printing from the present employee as he fails or refuses to execute. Under this authority we now learn from the chairman, that they propose to take from the public printer-what? The work which he has refused or failed to execute, and this alone? No, sir; for in the progress of his remarks the honorable chairman tells you that they have in their possession now a considerable quantity of work, which has never yet been submitted to the public printer. What brought the minds of the committee to the conclusion, that the printer would either fail or refuse to execute the work, when it had never been in his hands? Was it not straining a conclusion to determine that he had failed to execute, and would not execute, work which they had never intrusted to his care, and never asked him to execute? The honorable chairman of the committee says that the public printer has failed to execute some of the work heretofore intrusted to his care. But does the conclusion necessarily follow, that he will continue to fail; or that, having failed in one kind of printing, he would fail in all others?

Was it ever expected that the public printer could execute the printing of this House instantly upon its delivery to him? Has there been any extraordinary delay in the delivery of this work? According to my recollection, the public printing is about as forward, about as near to completion, as it usually is at this season of the year. We have the first part of the President's message, bound and laid upon our tables, one copy for each member; and what matters it whether the extra copies shall be printed this month, the next month, or three months hence? When was the last part of the President's message and accompanying documents printed during the long session of the last Congress? According to my recollection, we were getting along towards the dog-days before it was laid upon our tables. Was the then venerable and highly-respected public printer [Mr. Ritchie] hauled over the coals for a failure to perform his duty? Was Mr. Ritchie—against whom I have no word of complaint to utter here—held up to the country as a defaulter in the discharge of his duties? Ah! some gentleman answers, in a low tone, Yes. It is well the tone is low. No gentleman ought to answer yes, in a loud voice. The House knows what was the action taken upon that subject two years ago. At the close of the session of 1850, there was found to be, in one House of Congress, a large majority not only indisposed to call Mr. Ritchie to an account for any failure to comply with his contract, but actually disposed and determined to give him some sixty or seventy thousand dollars of the public money as extra compensation. Mr. Ritchie was paid every dollar that he claimed under his contract, and his friends were anxious to give him a great deal more. I never understood that he did the work any better, or any more rapidly than the contract called for; and yet there was a large party in this House ready to vote him sixty thousand dollars, or more, over and above what the contract called for; and it was only, according to my recollection, by parliamentary manÅ“uvring that the thing was prevented. You had two or three committees of conference upon the subject, and the subject was pressed upon our attention as no other subject was ever pressed upon us. And let me remind certain gentlemen, who are enforcing a very rigid observance of the law against Mr. Hamilton, that the journals show them to have been more than liberal towards Mr. Ritchie. Now, sir, I desire to know why it is, in this land of laws, in this land of equality, and before this Democratic House of Representatives, this kind of distinction is made between one employee and another? I know nothing of Mr. Boyd Hamilton; I have never seen him. If I were to meet him to-day, I should not know him from any other man in Christendom. I care not one single solitary farthing about him, but I do care for justice. I will not willingly make myself a party to a transaction so unjust as this. I will not say to one man, who wields a powerful party press, We will pay you the full amount of the bond, wink at your short-comings, and pay you sixty thousand dollars extra; and then to another, who has no press, no power, no influence, We will crush you, because you have not lived up to the very letter of the law.

Mr. GORMAN. I want the gentleman distinctly to avow whether he charges that as a motive operating upon the committee?

Mr. BROWN. Not at all.

Mr. GORMAN. Your words do.

Mr. BROWN. I disavow any personal application; but this I will say: If the House of Representatives shall perpetrate such an act of gross injustice, it will merit, and will assuredly receive, the reprobation of every just man in the nation. We hear continually that the contract system has proved a failure. I do not think so. The contract system has had no fair trial. There has been, what seemed to me, a determination from the beginning to bring this system into disrepute—never to give it fair play. Powerful parties, holding the most influential positions, have engaged in this work. The system has operated against their interest, and they have labored to break it down. Its triumph is not complete, but it has not failed. Let us see how the system has worked so far. Your first contractors were Wendell and Van Benthuysen. Did they execute their contract? I understand they did. I am forced to that conclusion because there has been no suit entered upon their bond for a failure to execute their contract. Thus far the system worked well—at least it did not fail. You received the work and paid for it; and if it was not well done, it was because you did not require it to be well done. During the last Congress, the then venerable editor of the Union (Mr. Ritchie) had the contract. Did he execute it? I understand he did. It is my understanding that he executed it to the satisfaction of the Committee on Printing, and the satisfaction of Congress. I so understand, because no suit has been instituted upon his bond for a failure to execute the contract. You again received the work and paid for it, and we shall presently see that certain gentlemen proposed to do a great deal more. Surely there could have been no failure, when you not only received the work and paid for it, but wanted to give large extra compensation. Then Mr. A. Boyd Hamilton has the contract for this session. The only specifications, according to my present recollection, which the honorable chairman makes against him is, that a portion of the paper is some twelve pounds in the ream lighter than the contract requires. This I find Mr. Hamilton accounts for in the printed paper lying upon our tables. He says, that for a brief season during the past winter, on account of the closing of navigation, he was unable to get a better article of paper. The cold weather having suspended steamboat and railroad operations, he could not procure transportation.

Mr. STANTON, of Kentucky. I wish to make a statement, and it is this: I understand from the chairman of the Senate committee, or rather the late chairman of the Senate committee, that he has rejected nearly all the work sent to the Senate by the printer, and rejected it not solely for the reason that the paper was of an inferior article, but because the whole committee concurred in the idea that a great fraud had been practised upon the government if this paper should be received as the quality of paper which he has now furnished, it being one-fifth less in value, than what he was required to furnish.

But there is another defect in the paper, to which the chairman of the House committee, and of the Senate committee, I understand, objected; and it is this: that the sheets of paper upon which the printing is done, are too small; that they have too little margin; that when the pages are folded together, and the edges clipped or cut, it leaves too little margin, and that in the books in which plates are to be placed, the plates are frequently disfigured and destroyed in consequence of the smallness of the sheets.

Nor is this all. The printing which has been sent to us, is so imperfect in consequence of defects in the manner in which the presswork is done, and defects in the quality of the ink that is used, that there are not half a dozen sheets in any one book that we have examined, that are perfect. They are full from the top line to the bottom of the page, with what printers call technically "monks" and "friars," that is, here a white place, and here a black blotch. So that the work, in every view in which it can be regarded, is inferior to what was agreed for under the contract.

Mr. FLORENCE. Did the gentleman submit any of this work to the House? I understood the chairman of the Committee on Printing [Mr. Gorman] to say that there had been no documents except the President's message and accompanying documents, given to the public printer. His complaint was, that there had been no work done; but now the gentleman from Kentucky, a member of the Committee on Printing, rises in his place, and says that these have been condemned. Where are they?

Mr. POLK. I will ask the gentleman from Pennsylvania, if there are not thirty or forty executive documents that have been furnished to the printer during the last three months, and that have not been printed yet?

Mr. FLORENCE. I do not know anything at all about that, for I am not a member of the Committee on Printing. I attend to the business of the committee to which I belong, and cannot answer the gentleman's question.

Mr. POLK. Then I say to the gentleman from Pennsylvania that he ought not to talk about things he knows nothing about.

Mr. FLORENCE. I rose for the purpose of being informed; and if the gentleman had had his ears open, he would have heard my question, and would not have made the remark he did.

Mr. POLK. I am sorry I did not hear the gentleman; but it is my misfortune, if my ears are not as long as his. [Laughter.]

Mr. GORMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania misunderstood me, if he understood me as saying that no document but the President's message had gone into the hands of the printer. A great many documents have gone into his hands, but we have never seen anything of them since; when they get there, it is the last of them. A part of the President's message has, however, come to us, and it is to that that the gentleman from Kentucky alludes. If you look over the pages, you will find the "monks" and "friars," or, as I should call them, blotches of white and then blotches of black. They are really so insufferably bad that we could not receive them. I hope the gentleman from Pennsylvania is satisfied. I will produce a copy, and hand it to him.

Mr. BROWN (resuming). I was proceeding to inquire, when I was interrupted, whether it was true that the contract system had been fairly tried, and had proved a failure? I had shown that there was no evidence of its failure up to the commencement of this session of Congress, and I had stated that I believed there had been combinations to break it down. If it has failed, or shall hereafter fail, in the hands of Mr. Hamilton, is that conclusive that the system is wrong, and ought to be abandoned? That it must fail in his hands, under the policy that the committee propose to pursue towards him, is to my mind the most evident proposition on earth. If the committee suspends a job when it is half completed, takes other jobs from him entirely, and makes large deductions from time to time on the work which he has executed, who does not see that the man's credit must be broken down? If he was worth a quarter of a million of dollars, he could not execute the contract under such a policy as this.

But I do not mean to dwell upon this branch of the subject. I have said that, in my judgment, the system has not proved a failure. If it has failed at all at any time, or in any man's hands, it is because you have not given it a fair trial.

Mr. FREEMAN (interrupting). I did the chairman of the committee to say that the contract had been abrogated, but only that they should employ others to carry out such parts of the contract as the contractor has failed to carry out. I do not understand that this is an attack upon the contract system, but only upon the manner in which this party has acted under his contract. Is not that the fact?

Mr. GORMAN. It is.

Mr. BROWN. If the committee take the printing from this man and hand it over to others, or if they refuse to deliver it over to him, what is it but an abandonment of the contract? Is not that a breaking up of the contract? Does not every man see that the result of this action on the part of the committee must be that the whole of the House printing will go to Donelson & Armstrong, and the whole of the Senate printing to Gideon & Co.? Mr. Boyd Hamilton will be left at the end of three weeks from to-day with not a penny's worth of work on hand. It is useless to say what the committee mean to do, or what is meant by this proceeding. The question is, what does their action inevitably lead to? If the work is taken from Hamilton by the committee, and their action is sanctioned by the House, there is an end of his contract; and with it we all see that the whole contract system will end. It cannot be otherwise.

The committee has notified us that they have ceased to send the work to Hamilton, and have made arrangements with other parties to do it. Is it not ridiculous, then, to say that they have not abrogated the contract? They have, to all intents and purposes, abrogated one contract and made another. It is stultifying ourselves to pretend that it is otherwise.

My reason for introducing a resolution in reference to this subject was this and I had no other purpose to subserve—I wanted to arrest what I thought a dangerous proceeding. I knew the committee were acting without having made a report to the House. I did not pause to inquire whether they had authority to do all that they proposed. I looked only to the effect which their action was certain to produce. Mr. Hamilton says he has made an outlay of $50,000 in preparing himself to execute the printing of Congress. It is proposed summarily to take the contract from him—and by whom and in what manner, pray? Not by Congress—not by a committee of Congress, but by three members of the House and one member of the Senate; for, bear you in mind, this is not the act of a full committee. And this fragment of a committee are doing this without consulting Congress, and without reporting its proceedings. Now, let Congress sanction this act of the committee, and think you, sir, that this man will not come here at the next Congress, and ask indemnity for his losses on this outlay? No man will question that. And what do you suppose he will prove? If he is half as smart in making proof as others have been, he will prove that he was executing the work as well as it had ever been done; that he was delivering it as fast as it had ever been delivered; that his contract was rudely and summarily snatched from him, his business broken up, his credit destroyed, and himself ruined. And instead of your getting the penalty of the bonds, he will present a claim for some $100,000 or more against you. Then, if a committee is appointed, as there will be, to investigate the subject, what evidence will there be on the record to show that you were justified in this proceeding? Take the contract from Mr. Hamilton, under these circumstances, if you will; but I ask you to leave upon the record the evidence which shall justify your action to those who are to come after you, and who will be charged with an investigation of Hamilton's claims. Do not go out of this contract and leave no trace behind to mark your exit. Before you sanction the acts of this committee, demand a report, a full report, one that will justify you before another Congress in dismissing Hamilton from his contract—for rest assured he will present his claim from year to year, and send it down to his children after him, from generation to generation. It will be presented time and again, until, finally, Congress will be brought to pass it. It is this result against which I now raise my warning voice.

If there is anything to justify this step on the part of Congress, let the committee report it. Let the House take the responsibility. Let us know where we stand. Let those who are to come after us have something with which to meet Mr. Hamilton, when he comes here by himself, or through his attorney or successors, to make a demand for damages on account of the breaking up of his contract.

We are told day after day in the newspapers and elsewhere, that the contract system has failed, and that Congress ought to abandon it. I am no friend of the system. I am not its friend or its apologist. But it has not failed. Its success has been wonderful, considering the amount of opposition it has encountered. Does it not strike us all as being rather remarkable, that a member can take up one of these printed documents on his desk, direct it to some one in some remote corner of California or Oregon, put his frank upon it, call a page and send it to the post-office of the House, and that it should then be taken up and carried from one point to another, and that too by contract, until finally it reaches its far off destination, and yet that this document thus borne from one part of the continent to another by contract, cannot be printed here, under the eye of Congress, by contract? Your army and navy can be supplied by contract; your troops on the distant frontier of Texas, California, and Oregon, can be furnished with supplies by contract; and yet you cannot print a book by contract. If these manuscripts belonged to a private individual, could he not get them printed by contract? and would he not do it? Why is it, then, that we cannot do the same thing? I do not profess to know, but I will tell you what I think may be the cause. I do not say why it is we have failed, but I will tell you on what I think has interfered with our success. There are party editors in the city of Washington—Whigs as well as Democrats and there may be such a thing as this going on:

"If you'll tickle me, I'll tickle you."

If a member will vote large supplies to a party editor, and thus tickle him—and it applies not more to one party than the other—why, then, the editor speaks well of the member to his constituents, and thus tickles him in return; but before an excuse can be given for voting these supplies, the contract system must be broken up. Besides, it may be possible that party men, after all, care more for the success of party editors than for the success of a system like this. And they may strive to bring the system into discredit and to destroy it in public favor, in order that party editors may come up and be elected public printers, or have contracts given to them, out of which they may realize large sums of money. I say these things may be. I do not say they are so. But these are reflections which force themselves on my mind. And when I can find no good reason why the contract system is failing, or is likely to fail—no reason why it is cried down my mind dwells here; and I inquire of myself, whether it is not possible, that at the bottom of all the difficulty in executing this contract system, there do not lie some hidden and secret causes like these? If these be the causes of failure, let them be removed. Let us fling defiance in the teeth of those who would use the national treasury to purchase favor. Let members stand on their merits, and editors, like other men, work for what they get, and the contract system will triumph.

I do not say the contract system is the best; I only say it has not had a fair trial, and we have no reason to conclude that it has failed. If I had my own way, or if my suggestions are worth anything to the House, I would say, that above all other modes, I should prefer to have the public printer elected, and that it should be required of him, by law, that he should have no connection with any party press, Whig or Democratic, during his service; but that he should be what his vocation indicated him to be the public printer, and nothing else. If I had my own way, I should prefer to have the work executed by a public printer, who should be well paid. But of all the schemes that I have ever seen or heard of, this last one of the Committee on Printing, is to me the most objectionable—objectionable in many points of view. I do not like these combinations between Whigs and Democrats. I do not say there has been a combination or coalition for bad purposes, because I will not charge my honorable friend from Indiana [Mr. Gorman] with entering into combinations; but it will strike the mind of this country as a coalition; and, however well intended, its effects upon the Democratic party must be most disastrous. Talk about the Massachusetts coalition! Why, sir, the honorable chairman of the committee ought to have retained the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Rantoul], to defend this business. He is a capital defender of coalitions, as he has given us good reason to know. [Laughter.]

This whole thing looks to me, and I fear it will strike the country, as very much like a combination or coalition between the Whigs and Democrats, or rather between the organs of the two parties, to control the government printing, keep the game in their own hands, and pocket the profits. I do not say that it is so, but it occurs to me that it looks that way, and that the country will so regard it.

Mr. GORMAN. I want to put a friendly question to the gentleman from Mississippi. I ask that gentleman whether the present coalition suits him?

Mr. BROWN. It does not.

Mr. GORMAN. I understand it does not. Would the Southern Press suit him?

Mr. BROWN. It would not.

Mr. GORMAN. I am inclined to come to the same conclusion in relation to my friend from Mississippi that he does in relation to myself. He suspects me of forming a coalition with the organs of the Whig and Democratic parties. I suspect him of doing precisely the same thing with the Southern Press. He suspects me, therefore, of exactly what I suspect him; so, if he kills my dog, I will kill his cat in the same way. [Laughter.]

Mr. BROWN. Let me say to my friend from Indiana, that he was never more mistaken. I have at no time sought, directly nor indirectly, to give any part of the public printing to the Southern Press. And, what is more, if it were left to me to direct the whole subject, I would not give one dollar of it to any party editor.

Mr. VENABLE. Wouldn't you give it to the National Era? [Laughter.]

Mr. BROWN. About as soon as to some others.

Mr. POLK. I ask the gentleman if he would not vote to give it to the Southern Press?

Mr. BROWN. No, sir. I have already stated, and I believe it to be true, that it is wrong in principle to give the public patronage to party editors at all. It destroys that independence and boldness which should belong alike to editors and representatives; it begets a sort of paralyzing sympathy between the recipient of a favor and the giver of it, which stands palpably in the way of a fair, upright, equitable, and honest administration of political justice.

Mr. RANTOUL. The suggestion which the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Brown] has thrown out, that I might be employed to defend this coalition, places me in a rather unpleasant situation; and, therefore, I beg leave to say, in advance, that I shall decline entirely to undertake any such task upon any conditions whatever. A coalition which is founded in principle, I can defend; but one which looks entirely to the division of the spoils, seems to me to be entirely indefensible. [Renewed laughter.]

Mr. BROWN. Well, I have only said that if a coalition should be completed, better counsel could not be found to defend it.

Mr. GORMAN. I congratulate the gentleman upon his new coalition.

Mr. BROWN. If my friend, the chairman of the Committee on Printing, will look over the vote of yesterday upon this subject, he will find some reason to congratulate himself upon another coalition. My recollection is, that he was found in very strange company on that occasion. If he will but turn to his friend over the way from New York [Mr. Haven], he will find in him a coadjutor with whom he struck hands in making this bargain.

Mr. GORMAN. I was congratulating the gentleman upon his coalition with the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Rantoul].

Mr. BROWN. Upon the great issues which unite us as Democrats, we work together. And on these issues, I believe there is not a more trustworthy member of the party on this floor than the honorable gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Rantoul]. Those are the issues upon which the gentleman from Massachusetts and myself unite. Upon other issues, there is no bond of sympathy between us. The bond which unites us is political only; and the points of affinity are those which unite the gentleman from Indiana and myself, and indeed all Democrats. But my friend from Indiana [Mr. Gorman], and the gentleman from New York [Mr. Haven], seem to be united, and to have formed a coalition to obtain the spoils. [Laughter.]

Mr. Speaker, although I listened with the most profound attention, as I always do, to the remarks of my friend from Indiana [Mr. Gorman], I am at a loss to know why it became necessary to employ two party organs to aid in the public printing? I cannot understand why somebody else could not have done it just as well. There were other printing establishments here. There was the Towers's establishment. There was Mr. Rives's establishment; and there were others. But I understand the committee voted down all these establishments; they even voted down Donelson & Armstrong, as my friend [Mr. Gorman] says. And in order to secure to them a part of the work the right hand of fellowship was extended by him to his Whig co-laborers, they agreeing to divide it between the two great party organs, the Union and the Republic. I ask my friend [Mr. Gorman] if he did not vote against Rives, and against Towers, and against others.

Mr. GORMAN. I did.

Mr. BROWN. Exactly; and other members of the committee voted against Donelson & Armstrong, and in this way no conclusion was arrived at, until at last the two Whigs on the committee obtained their own terms, and got half the job for the Republic. It seems to me that if my friend from Indiana [Mr. Gorman], and my friend from Kentucky [Mr. Stanton], who was a member of that committee, had gone with the other members of the committee for Mr. Rives, there would have been no difficulty.

Mr. ORR. Will my friend from Mississippi yield for a motion to adjourn?

Mr. BROWN. I will yield for that purpose.

Mr. ORR. I move, then, that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was put and agreed to; and

The House adjourned till twelve o'clock to-morrow.

WEDNESDAY, April 14th, 1852.

Mr. BROWN continued: Before I enter upon the subject which was under consideration at the time of adjournment yesterday, I desire to correct an impression which I ascertain to have made a lodgement upon the minds of some gentlemen, whose opinion I prize very highly. And that is, that I have been actuated in my course by some feeling of personal hostility to the parties engaged by the committee to execute the public printing. I desire to say, once for all, that I distinctly disavow any such feeling. My personal relations with all the gentlemen (or with all of them that I know), are of a friendly character, and I know of no reason why they should not so continue. I owe them no thanks for past favors, and no grudge for past injuries. Occupying such a position, I can deal out to each one, and to all of them, equal and exact justice.

It seems to me, that in the action of the committee upon this subject of printing, there has been no bona fide effort to employ any one to execute the work, except Donelson & Armstrong. With the majority of the committee on the part of the House of Representatives, this appears clearly to have been the case. It seems that no other establishment was thought of, in connection with this printing, or was treated as worthy to receive it, except the Union establishment. With the majority, it was Donelson & Armstrong at the beginning—it was Donelson & Armstrong through its whole progress it was Donelson & Armstrong at the conclusion.

Mr. STANTON of Kentucky (interrupting). Will the gentleman from Mississippi allow me to say a word?

Mr. BROWN. If I am at all mistaken, I want to be corrected

Mr. STANTON. The remark the gentleman has just made does not apply to me. I attempted, at an early part of this struggle, to get this work divided out to Donelson & Armstrong and John T. Towers, and offered a resolution to that effect. I did so for this reason: because there was a necessity, at the time, of doing something. I thought those gentlemen were prepared to do the work, and I proposed to the committee to give to them such work as the public printer could not, or would not, do.

Mr. BROWN. Still I find, from the explanation of my friend from Kentucky [Mr. Stanton], that he insisted upon having Donelson & Armstrong in the contract somewhere. Now, sir, while these gentlemen [Messrs. Stanton and Gorman] were indulging their predilections for their friends, it seems they never thought of indulging other gentlemen to the same extent. They, it seems, had their likes for Donelson & Armstrong, and their dislikes for other printers and editors, and it was

all right that they should indulge them. But if other people indulge their likes and dislikes, then these gentlemen think it is all wrong. They think it very odd that other gentlemen should refuse to give up their opposition to Donelson & Armstrong; but they seem at no time to have been willing to yield their position in favor of these gentlemen. These facts being true, I say there does not seem to have been a bona fide single purpose of procuring the public work to be done in the speediest manner, and by those who would do it the cheapest and best. But there seems to have been but one purpose, running throughout the whole proceedings, from the beginning to the end, and that was to favor the printing establishment of Donelson & Armstrong. That I object to. I do not object to those particular individuals. What I object to is this: that the committee did not go to work in good faith to obtain the printing upon the best terms, but that they made the public interest secondary to the private interest of the Union establishment. Their position appears to have been, that unless Donelson & Armstrong could be included in the contract, they would make no contract. This, in my judgment, was wrong. Why not contract with other parties, if they would do the work as speedily and as cheaply? Why did the committee, from the beginning to the end, insist, without special reference to the speedy completion of the work, that this particular establishment should be included in whatever contract was made? It was the duty of the committee to have given the contractor every reasonable indulgence, and if he failed or refused to do the work, to have reported that failure to Congress; and if they put the work in other hands they ought to have employed the man who would do it the quickest, cheapest, and best.

The honorable gentleman, the chairman of that committee [Mr. Gorman], in the course of a colloquy yesterday, endeavored to impress upon the minds of this House, and so far as his printed speech could do it, upon the minds of the country, that there was something like an understanding between gentlemen entertaining extreme views; or, in other words, between what is called the Southern ultras and Northern Free-Soilers. An intimation was more than once made in the progress of the debate that there was something like a coalition between these extremes, and that by agreement they were acting in concert upon this question. No such thing is true of me. I repudiate any such insinuation, come from what quarter it may. I act here solely and alone, upon my own responsibility, never thinking, never inquiring, and never caring whether any other man North or South is or is not acting with me.

The gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Gorman] intimates that he will expose these understandings. For me, he is quite at liberty to begin. But before he puts my friends or myself on trial, I would advise him to try his hand on his associate, the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. Stanton]. He is a capital subject to practise on. I shall expect to hear him say, "Richard Stanton, slaveholder and pro-slavery Democratic representative from the slaveholding state of Kentucky, stand up and answer to this House, by what warrant you were found in an unholy coalition with Truman Smith, Free-Soiler and Abolition Whig Senator from Connecticut, voting to divide the public printing between the Union and the Republic?" It would be an interesting trial, and I should watch its progress with great interest. Let the gentleman settle accounts like this between his colleagues on the committee before he charges coalition upon others. It seems there is no account taken of coalitionists like theirs. But if persons occupying such extreme positions as the gentleman from Massachusetts and myself are found opposing a bargain made by others holding quite as extreme positions as we do, we hear a great outcry about coalition! coalition!! If the bargain was made by a coalition, it may be opposed in the same way. If there was nothing wrong in the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. Stanton] and Truman Smith acting together in making the bargain, there can be nothing wrong in the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Rantoul] and myself acting together in opposing it. If I am found acting with gentlemen entertaining extreme views against the contract, it will be found that it was made by gentlemen holding opinions just as extreme.

Mr. STANTON of Kentucky (interrupting). If the gentleman from Mississippi will allow me, I will tell him the result. We succeeded in bringing over a Connecticut Whig Senator and Abolitionist to the support of a compromise press.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir; and when he came over he brought with him a Whig paper which has heaped more abuse upon the Democratic majority of this House than all the presses from Maine to Louisiana. Its columns teem from day to day with abuse of members of this House whose Democracy has never been questioned—Northern men and Southern men. When you talk about your Free-Soil ally from the North going for a compromise press, let me remind you, that he carried you over to the Whig press, and that one, the most vindictive of them all. The country will inquire how this was brought about; how, with an overwhelming Democratic majority in this House, and an equally effective Democratic majority in the Senate, you have not been able to choose a Democratic printer? Why it was that the Republic was fastened upon us? Why has this coalition been formed? These are the questions that will be asked. And the answer will be, that Donelson & Armstrong might be provided for. That is the whole secret of the matter that is the nest in which the coalition was hatched.

Mr. POLK (interrupting). Will the gentleman from Mississippi allow me to propound a question to him?

Mr. BROWN. Simply a question.

Mr. POLK. Will you vote to elect the compromise Union press to be public printer?

Mr. BROWN. I will not vote to elect any newspaper editor public printer. I said so yesterday.

Mr. KING. I rise to a question of order.

Mr. POLK. I see the coalition is now formed. The gentleman from New York [Mr. King], a Free-Soiler, says I am out of order. [Laughter.]

Mr. BROWN. I beg not to be interrupted by a side-bar colloquy.

The SPEAKER. The Chair understood the gentleman from Mississippi to yield the floor to the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. Polk].

Mr. BROWN. I did for a question, but not for a colloquy. Now, let us see, sir, to what strange reasons gentlemen of this committee are driven in justification of their course. The honorable gentleman who sits before me [Mr. Haven], says that he objected to Mr. Rives's doing this work. He already had a large and important job from the government. How many important and profitable jobs has the Republic under the government? Who does not know that the Republic newspaper is fattened and made sleek by the pap it receives from the Executive departments? All this the gentleman takes no account of. It was his sow that was drinking the swill, and he never thought it worth his while to charge it.

If this printing had to be divided out, why was not more justice observed in the division? Why should the committee have confined themselves exclusively to the Union and Republic? Why take two newspapers, occupying extreme positions, and turn all others out? Why not take in the "old fogies" of the Intelligencer? Why were they, like Nebuchadnezzar, turned out to grass? I do not see any reason why they should not have had a share. They are for the compromise. Was it because they had not been peculiarly abusive of the Democratic party, and of the Democratic members of this House? I must confess, sir, if I had to elect between Donelson & Armstrong and the Intelligencer, on the one hand, and Donelson & Armstrong and the Republic, on the other, I would take the Intelligencer by large odds.

I ask the attention of gentlemen to what I am about to say. What are we to understand by this procedure? My friend from Indiana [Mr. Gorman], on yesterday, when he came to allude to the Southern Press, to which he evidently thought I was much attached, and in whose service I was laboring (and in all of which he was very much mistaken), became almost frantic. His manner was excited, and he became a little denunciatory for a gentleman of his amiable temper. [Laughter.] Why was this? Why was it thought necessary thus to denounce the Southern Press. That paper, as is well known, reflects the sentiments of a large number of the Southern Democrats. Are we to understand, in its exclusion, and the bitter denunciations which follow the mention of its name, that such portion of the Democracy as sympathize in the sentiments uttered through its columns, are also to be proscribed, excluded, and denounced? Is this what we are to understand? And if we are, where is this proscription to stop? If Southern Democrats, who sympathize with the sentiments uttered through the columns of the Southern Press, are to be proscribed before the election, what is to be their position after the election? These are matters, sir, to be reflected upon.

Now, I am free to say to you, Mr. Speaker, to the House, and to the country, that my vote and my course in the presidential canvass, are not to be controlled by your action upon this subject. But I am not authorized to say that your action may not control the votes of hundreds and thousands of others in the South. If you shall indicate to them, that because certain newspapers and gentlemen have defended what they believe to be the rights of the Southern States, they are therefore to be proscribed, they will probably feel it to be due to their own dignity and self-respect to proscribe you in return. Lightly as gentlemen may think of it, this view of the subject may be found worthy of consideration. There are in the states of Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi alone, one hundred thousand State-Rights men. Proscribe them, proscribe the organ that more nearly than any other in this city reflects their views, and do it because of those views, and I tell you, I will not be accountable for the manner in which they will dispose of their votes. They may not ask favors at your hands for themselves or for any one else, but they may feel it to be due to their own self-respect to resent an insult—to resent proscription. I will not undertake to say what they will do. I am not authorized, as I have said before, to state what their future action will be; but I do feel authorized, in a friendly way, to say that you should be cautious how you act. You may endanger the success of your presidential candidate. You may endanger a matter infinitely more important to you than the public printing. You may endanger the patronage of the President, and the distribution of the $50,000,000. A little caution, and a little good temper, properly exercised, and a slight sprinkle of justice and common sense, may save a deal of trouble by and by. It is one thing to give up that which is one's due voluntarily, and it is another thing to have it snatched away, and that in so rude a manner as to give offence. I repeat again that I do not want any part of this printing for any friend of mine on earth. But I should not like to be told that certain parties could not have it because they were my friends. And I think it likely this may be the feeling of a great many southern people.

I do not care, sir, to pursue this discussion. I have said about all that I care to say, and if I go farther, I may say that which had better be left unsaid. The concluding portion of my remarks, I throw out only as a friendly warning to my political brethren here. They can receive them in a friendly spirit or not. I want it to be understood, and it is all I have to say, that when proscription commences for opinion's sake, there can be proscription upon one side as well as upon the other. I offer the following resolution. It is not my own, and does not fully meet my approbation. A friend has handed it to me, with a request that I should offer it. I do so in compliance with his request:—

"Resolved, That the report of the Committee on Printing be referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, with instructions to report upon the whole subject, and to recommend for the adoption of Congress such a system for the execution of the public printing as they may deem most expedient, and that they especially take into consideration the plan for a printing bureau, for the execution of the work under the supervision of a government officer."

Mr. BROWN. The Judiciary Committee had been selected, because in taking this contract, if it must be taken, out of the hands of Hamilton, and disposing of it otherwise, legal questions must necessarily arise, which it will be better to have passed upon by the Judiciary Committee than any other. I have done, sir.

At a later period in the debate, Mr. NABERS and Mr. POLK both made inquiries of Mr. Brown as to how far he agreed with Mr. RANTOUL, and what he meant by old issues. When Mr. B. was about to respond, he was decided to be out of order.

Mr. BROWN. It is in order to ask questions, but out of order to answer them.

[Mr. BROWN requests the reporter to say, that if he had been allowed to respond to Mr. Nabers and Mr. Polk, he would have said: The time was when the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Rantoul) was accepted as a sound Democrat. President Polk appointed him United States District Attorney for Massachusetts, and thus endorsed him to me and to the nation. He was a Democrat then on the old issues. If he has changed his opinions on these issues, I have yet to learn it; and if he has not, he is a Democrat on these issues yet. By old issues, I mean those that divided the two parties in the days of Jackson, Van Buren, and Polk. Such, for example, as the Bank, Tariff, Distribution, and the Sub-Treasury. If the bank charter, or a protective tariff, distribution, wasteful appropriations, or the repeal of the sub-treasury, any one or all of them shall be proposed, I will not reject the aid of the gentleman from Massachusetts (Free-Soiler though he be) in upholding the Democratic side of these questions. These were the issues—the old issues—when the honored brother of the gentleman from Tennessee appointed Robert Rantoul district attorney. On these he was sound at that time; we all trusted him then, and if he has not changed his opinions on these issues, I know of no reason why we should not trust him now.

On the new issues—those growing out of the slavery strife and the territorial acquisitions, the compromise, &c.—there is no bond of sympathy, no affinity between the gentleman from Massachusetts and myself. On all these issues, direct and collateral, that gentleman and myself are as wide apart as the poles. This the gentlemen from Tennessee and Mississippi know full well.

If gentlemen on both sides of the House who are the special friends of the compromise are to be trusted, the slavery agitation, and all the incidental issues growing out of it, have been settled; they were all compromised; and it was but the other day that we passed a finality resolution, which meant, as I supposed, that there was an end of the main issue and all its incidents. Now we have it dug up, resurrected, and dragged in here again, and that, too, by its own best friends. I hope we shall be done with this business.

If fidelity to the Democratic party means that I must vote large and fat jobs of printing to Donelson & Armstrong, and if I can only signalize my fidelity by voting other large and fat jobs to the Republic, I must say to the gentlemen who are croaking "Coalition!" "Coalition!" that, in this view of the subject, I am not faithful, and never mean to be.

I would as soon have the aid of the gentleman from Massachusetts in severing the unholy bonds which unite the Union and Republic newspapers, as I would in pulling down protection and upholding the independent treasury. When a good work has to be done, I will accept aid from any quarter.

It is a weak invention of the coalitionists to raise this hue and cry. And they expect thereby to divert public attention from the fact that they have fastened the Union to one teat of the National Treasury, and then, by way of quieting the Republic, given it another and a better one. Cry coalition as much as you please, the people will inquire by whom and for what reason these things were done.

SOURCE: M. W. Cluskey, Editor, Speeches, Messages, and Other Writings of the Hon. Albert G. Brown, A Senator in Congress from the State of Mississippi, pp. 289-303

Tuesday, September 30, 2025

Speech of Senator John C. Calhoun on His Resolutions in Reference on the War with Mexico Delivered in the United States Senate, January 4, 1848

RESOLUTIONS.

Resolved, That to conquer Mexico, and to hold it, either as a province or to incorporate it in the Union, would be inconsistent with the avowed object for which the war has been prosecuted; a departure from the settled policy of the Government; in conflict with its character and genius; and, in the end, subversive of our free and popular institutions.

 

Resolved, That no line of policy in the further prosecution of the war should be adopted which may lead to consequences so disastrous.

MR. CALHOUN said: In offering, Senators, these resolutions for your consideration, I am governed by the reasons which induced me to oppose the war, and by which I have been governed since it was sanctioned by Congress. In alluding to my opposition to the war, I do not intend to touch on the reasons which governed me on that occasion further than is necessary to explain my motives on the present.

I, then, opposed the war, not only because it might have been easily avoided; not only because the President had no authority to order a part of the disputed territory in possession of the Mexicans to be occupied by our troops; not only because I believed the allegations upon which Congress sanctioned the war untrue; but from high considerations of policy—because I believed it would lead to many and serious evils to the country, and greatly endanger its free institutions. But, after the war was declared, by authority of the Government, I acquiesced in what I could not prevent, and which it was impossible for me to arrest; and I then felt it to be my duty to limit my efforts to give such direction to the war as would, as far as possible, prevent the evils and danger with which it threatened the country and its institutions. For this purpose, at the last session, I suggested to the Senate the policy of adopting a defensive line; and for the same purpose I now offer these resolutions. This, and this only, is the motive which governs me on this occasion. I am moved by no personal or party considerations. My object is neither to sustain the Executive nor to strengthen the opposition;—but simply to discharge an important duty to the country. In doing so, I shall express my opinion on all points with the freedom and boldness which becomes an independent Senator, who has nothing to ask from the Government or from the People. But when I come to notice those points on which I differ from the President, I shall do it with all the decorum which is due to the Chief Magistrate of the Union.

I suggested a defensive line because, in the first place, I believed that the only certain mode of terminating the war successfully was to take indemnity into our own hands by occupying defensively, with our military force, a portion of the Mexican territory, which we might deem ample for indemnity; and, in the next, because I believed it would prevent a great sacrifice of life and property; but, above all, because I believed that it was the only way we could avoid the great danger to our institutions against which these resolutions are intended to guard. The President took a different view. He recommended a vigorous prosecution of the war—not for conquest—that was emphatically disavowed—but for the purpose of conquering peace—that is, to compel Mexico to sign a treaty ceding sufficient territory to indemnify the claims of our citizens and of the country for the expenses of the war. I could not approve of this policy. I opposed it, among other reasons, because I believed there was no certainty that the object intended to be effected would be accomplished let the war be ever so successful. Congress thought differently, and granted ample provisions, in men and money, for carrying out the policy recommended by the President. It has now been fully tested under the most favorable circumstances. It has been as successful as the most sanguine hope of the Executive could have anticipated. Victory after victory followed in rapid succession, without a single reverse. Santa Anna repelled and defeated with all his forces at Buena Vista—Vera Cruz, with its castle, captured—the heights of Cerro Gordo triumphantly carried—Jalapa, Perote, and Puebla occupied—and, after many triumphant victories under the walls of Mexico, its gates opened to us, and we put in possession of the capital. But what have all these splendid achievements accomplished? Has the avowed object of the war been attained? Have we conquered peace? Have we compelled Mexico to sign a treaty? Have we obtained indemnity? No. Not a single object contemplated by the campaign has been effected; and what is worse, our difficulties are greater now than they were at the commencement, and the objects sought more difficult to be accomplished. To what is this complete failure to be attributed? Not to our army. It has done all that skill and gallantry could accomplish. It is to be attributed to the policy pursued. The Executive aimed at indemnity in a wrong way. Instead of taking it into our own hands, when we had territory in our possession ample to cover the claims of our citizens and the expenses of the war, he sought it indirectly through a treaty with Mexico. He thus put it out of our own power, and under the control of Mexico, to say whether we should have indemnity or not, and thereby enabled her to defeat the whole object of the campaign by simply refusing to treat with us. Owing to this mistaken policy, after a most successful and brilliant campaign, involving an expenditure of not less, probably, than $40,000,000, and the sacrifice, by the sword and by disease, of many valuable lives, probably not less than six or seven thousand, nothing is left but the glory which our army has acquired.

But, as an apology for this, it is insisted that the maintenance of a defensive line would have involved as great a sacrifice as the campaign itself. The President and the Secretary of War have assigned many reasons for entertaining this opinion. I have examined them with care. This is not the proper occasion to discuss them, but I must say, with all due deference, they are, to my mind, utterly fallacious; and to satisfy your mind that such is the case, I will place the subject in a single point of view.

The line proposed by me, to which I suppose their reasons were intended to be applied, would be covered in its whole extent—from the Pacific Ocean to the Paso del Norte, on the Rio Grande—by the Gulf of California and the wilderness peopled by hostile tribes of Indians, through which no Mexican force could penetrate. For its entire occupancy and defence, nothing would be required but a few small vessels of war stationed in the gulf, and a single regiment to keep down any resistance from the few inhabitants within. From the Paso del Norte to the mouth of the river, a distance of a few hundred miles, a single fact will show what little force will be necessary to its defence. It was a frontier between Texas and Mexico, when the former had but an inconsiderable population-not more than an hundred and fifty thousand at the utmost, at any time-with no standing army, and but very few irregular troops; yet for several years she maintained this line without any, except slight occasional intrusion from Mexico, and this too when Mexico was far more consolidated in her power, and when revolutions were not so frequent, and her money resources were far greater than at present. If, then, Texas alone, under such circumstances, could defend that frontier for so long a period, can any man believe that now, when she is backed by the whole of the United States,—now that Mexico is exhausted, defeated, and prostrated—I repeat, can any man believe that it would involve as great a sacrifice to us of men and money, to defend that frontier, as did the last campaign? No. I hazard nothing in asserting, that, to defend it for an indefinite period would have required a less sum than the interest on the money spent in the campaign, and fewer men than were sacrificed in carrying it on.

So much for the past. We now come to the commencement of another campaign, and the question recurs, What shall be done? The President, in his message, recommends the same line of policy—a vigorous prosecution of the war—not for conquest, that is again emphatically disavowed ; not to blot Mexico out of the list of nations; no, he desires to see her an independent and flourishing community-and assigns strong reasons for it-but to obtain an honorable peace. We hear no more of conquering peace, but I presume that he means by an honorable peace the same thing; that is, to compel Mexico to agree to a treaty, ceding a sufficient part of her territory, as an indemnity for the expenses of the war, and for the claims of our citizens.

I have examined with care the grounds on which the President renews his recommendation, and am again compelled to dissent. There are many and powerful reasons—more so, even, than those that existed at the commencement of the last campaign—to justify my dissent. The sacrifice in money will be vastly greater. There is a bill for ten additional regiments now before the Senate, and another for twenty regiments of volunteers has been reported, authorizing, in all, the raising of an additional force of something upwards of thirty thousand. This, in addition to that already authorized by law, will be sufficient to keep an effective army in Mexico, of not much, if any, less than seventy thousand men, and will raise the expenses of the campaign to probably not less than sixty millions of dollars.

To meet so large an expenditure would involve, in the present and prospective condition of the money market, it is to be apprehended, not a little embarrassment. Last year money was abundant, and easily obtained. An unfortunate famine in Europe created a great demand for our agricultural products. This turned the balance of trade greatly in our favor, and specie poured into the country with a strong and steady current. No inconsiderable portion of it passed into the treasury, through the duties, which kept it full, in spite of the large sums remitted to meet the expenses of the war. The case is different now. Instead of having a tide flowing in, equal to the drain flowing out, the drain is now both ways. The exchanges now are against us,—instead of being in our favor, and instead of specie flowing into the country from abroad, it is flowing out. In the mean time, the price of stocks and treasury notes, instead of being at or above par, have both fallen below, to a small extent. The effects of the depreciation of treasury notes will cause them to pass into the treasury in payment of the customs and other dues to the Government, as the cheaper currency, instead of gold and silver; while the expenses of the war, whether paid for by the transmission of gold and silver direct to Mexico, or by drafts drawn in favor of British merchants or other capitalists there, will cause whatever specie may be in the vaults of the treasury to flow from it, either for remittance direct, on account of the ordinary transactions of the country, or to pay the drafts which may be drawn upon it, and which, when paid, in the present state of exchanges, will be remitted abroad. But this process of paying in treasury notes instead of gold and silver, and gold and silver flowing out in both directions, cannot continue long without exhausting its specie, and leaving nothing to meet the public expenditure, including those of the war, but treasury notes. Can they, under such circumstances, preserve even their present value? Is there not great danger that they will fall lower and lower, and finally involve the finances of the Government and the circulation of the country in the greatest embarrassment and difficulty?

Is there not great danger, with this prospect before us, and with the necessity of raising by loans near forty millions, of a commercial and financial crisis—even possibly a suspension by the banks. I wish not to create panic; but there is danger, which makes a great difference in a financial and moneyed point of view between the state of things now and at the commencement of the last session. Looking to the future, it is to be apprehended that not a little difficulty will have to be encountered in raising money to meet the expenses of the next campaign, if conducted on the large scale which is proposed. Men you may raise, but money will be found difficult to obtain. It is even to be apprehended that loans will have to be negotiated on very disadvantageous terms for the public. In the present state of things, if they grow no worse, there can be no resort to treasury notes. They cannot be materially increased, without a ruinous depreciation, and a resort must be had, exclusively, or almost entirely so, to borrowing. But at the present prices of stocks, to borrow so large a sum as will be necessary, can only be done at a greatly increased rate of interest on the nominal amount of stock. In a recent conversation with a gentleman, well informed on this subject, he said that in his opinion, if forty millions are required, a loan could not be had for more than ninety for one hundred, which would be about at the rate of seven per cent.

These are formidable objections; but they are not the only ones that are more so than they were at the commencement of the last campaign. I hold that the avowed object for the vigorous prosecution of the war is less certain of being realized now, than it was then; and if it should fail to be realized, it will leave our affairs in a far worse condition than they are at present. That object, as has been stated, is to obtain an honorable treaty; one which, to use the language of the President, will give indemnity for the past and security for the future—that is, a treaty which will give us a cession of territory, not only equal to our present demand for indemnity, but equal to the additional demand—equal to the entire expenses to be incurred in conducting the campaign; and a guaranty from the Government of Mexico for its faithful execution. Now, Senators, I hold that whether the war is successful or unsuccessful, there is not only no certainty that this object will be accomplished, but almost a certainty that it will not be. If the war be unsuccessful; if our arms should be baffled, as I trust and believe they will not be; if, from any unfortunate accident, such should be the case, it is clear that we shall not be able to negotiate a treaty that will accomplish the object intended. On the contrary, if the war should be successful, it is almost equally certain that, in such case, the avowed object for prosecuting the war vigorously, will not be accomplished. I might take higher ground, and maintain that the more successfully the war is prosecuted, the more certainly the object avowed will be defeated, while the objects disavowed would as certainly be accomplished.

What is the object of a vigorous prosecution of the war? How can it be successful? I can see but one way of making it so, and that is,—by suppressing all resistance on the part of Mexico, overpowering and dispersing her army, and utterly overthrowing her Government. But if this should be done; if a vigorous prosecution of the war should lead to this result, how are we to obtain an honorable peace? With whom shall we treat for indemnity for the past and security for the future? War may be made by one party, but it requires two to make peace. If all authority is overthrown in Mexico, where will be the power to enter into negotiation and make peace? Our very success would defeat the possibility of making peace. In that case the war would not end in peace, but in conquest; not in negotiation, but in subjugation; and defeat, I repeat, the very object you aim to accomplish, and accomplish that which you disavow to be your intention, by destroying the separate existence of Mexico,—overthrowing her nationality, and blotting out her name from the list of nations,—instead of leaving her a free Republic, which the President has so earnestly expressed his desire to do.

If I understand his message correctly, I have his own authority for the conclusion to which I come. He takes very much the same view that I do, as to how a war ought to be prosecuted vigorously, and what would be its results,—with the difference as to the latter resting on a single contingency, and that a remote one. He says that the great difficulty of obtaining peace results from this, that the people of Mexico are divided under factious chieftains, and that the chief in power dare not make peace, because for doing so he would be displaced by a rival. He also says, that the only way to remedy this evil and to obtain a treaty, is to put down the whole of them, including the one in power, as well as the others. Well, what then? Are we to stop there? No. Our generals are, it seems, authorized to encouraged and to protect the well disposed inhabitants in establishing a republican government. He says they are numerous, and are prevented from expressing their opinions and making an attempt to form such a government, only by fear of those military chieftains. He proposes, when they have thus formed a government, under the encouragement and, protection of our army, to obtain peace by a treaty with the government thus formed, which shall give us ample indemnity for the past and security for the future. I must say I am at a loss to see how a free and independent republic can be established in Mexico under the protection and authority of its conquerors. I can readily understand how an aristocracy or a despotic government might be, but how a free republican government can be so established, under such circumstances, is to me incomprehensible. I had always supposed that such a government must be the spontaneous wish of the people; that it must emanate from the hearts of the people, and be supported by their devotion to it, without support from abroad. But it seems that these are antiquated notions—obsolete ideas—and that free popular governments may be made under the authority and protection of a conqueror.

But suppose the difficulties surmounted, how can we make a free government in Mexico? Where are the materials? It is to be, I presume, a confederated government like their former. Where is the intelligence in Mexico for the construction and preservation of such a government? It is what she has been aiming at for more than twenty years, but so utterly incompetent are her people for the task, that it has been a complete failure from first to last. The great body of the intelligence and wealth of Mexico is concentrated in the priesthood, who are naturally disinclined to that form of government; the residue, for the most part, are the owners of the haciendas, the larger planters of the country, but they are without concert and destitute of the means of forming such a government. But if it were possible to establish such a government, it could not stand without the protection of our army. It would fall as soon as it is withdrawn.

If it be determined to have a treaty, it would be a far preferable course, it appears to me, to abstain from attacking or destroying the government now existing in Mexico, and to treat with it, if indeed it be capable of forming a treaty which it could maintain and execute. Upon this point I do not profess to have any information beyond that derived from conversations with those who have been in Mexico; but from all that I can hear, it may be doubted, whether we have not already pushed what is called a vigorous prosecution of the war so far, as not to leave sufficient power and influence in the Government to enter into a treaty which would be respected, when our forces are withdrawn. Such I know to be the opinion of intelligent officers. They concur in thinking that the existing Government at Queretaro, if it should enter into a treaty in conformity with the views expressed by the Executive, would be overthrown, and that we should be compelled to defend that portion of Mexico which we require for indemnity defensively, or be compelled to return and renew the prosecution of the war. If such is its weakness, it may be apprehended that even now, without pushing the vigorous prosecution of the war further, we are greatly exposed to the danger which these resolutions are intended to guard against, and that it requires great discretion and prompt action on our part to avoid it.

But before leaving this part of the subject, I must enter my solemn protest, as one of the Representatives of a State of this Union, against pledging protection to any government established in Mexico under our countenance or encouragement. It would inevitably be overthrown as soon as our forces are withdrawn; and we would be compelled, in fulfilment of plighted faith, implied or expressed, to return and reinstate such Government in power, to be again overturned and again reinstated, until we should be compelled to take the government into our own hands, just as the English have been compelled again and again to do in Hindostan, under similar circumstances, until it has led to its entire conquest. Let us avoid following the example which we have been condemning, as far back as my recollection extends.

The President himself entertains doubt, whether the plan of forming a government in the manner which I have been considering, and treating with it for indemnity, may not fail. In that case, he agrees that the very course to which I have said the vigorous prosecution of the war will inevitably lead, must be taken. He says, after having attempted to establish such a government—after having employed the best efforts to secure peace—if all fail, "we must hold on to the occupation of the country. We must take the full measure of indemnity into our own hands, and enforce such terms as the honor of the country demands." These are his words. Now, what is this? Is it not an acknowledgment, that if he fail in establishing a government with which he can treat, in Mexico-after putting down all resistance under the existing Government, we must make a conquest of the whole country, and hold it subject to our control? Can words be stronger? "Occupy the whole country"—" take the full measure of indemnity"—no defensive line—no treaty, and, "enforce terms." Terms on whom? On the Government? No, no, no. To enforce terms on the people individually. That is to say, to establish a government over them in the form of a province.

The President is right. If the vigorous prosecution of the war should be successful, and the contingency on which he expects to make a treaty fail, there will be no retreat. Every argument against calling back the army and taking a defensive line will have double force, after having spent $60,000,000, and acquired the possession of the whole of Mexico; and the interests in favor of keeping possession would be much more powerful then than now. The army itself will be larger—those who live by the war, the numerous contractors, the merchants, the sutlers, the speculators in land and mines, and all who are profiting directly or indirectly by its prosecution, will be adverse to retiring, and will swell the cry of holding on to our conquests. They constitute an immense body of vast influence, who are growing rich by what is impoverishing the rest of the country.

It is at this stage that the President speaks of taking the indemnity into our own hands. But why delay it until the whole country is subdued? Why not take it now? A part of Mexico would be a better indemnity now, than the whole of Mexico would be at the end of the next campaign, when $60,000,000 will be added to the present expenditures. We would indeed acquire a control over a much larger portion of her population, but we would never be able to extort from them, by all the forms of taxation to which you can resort, a sum sufficient to pay the force necessary to hold them in subjection. That force must be a large one, not less, certainly, than 40,000 men, according to the opinion of the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. Davis), who must be regarded as a competent judge upon this point. He stated in debate the other day, that the army now there, exceeding that number, are in danger; and urged, on that account, the immediate passage of the bill to raise ten regiments. On this subject, it is as well to speak out plainly at once. We shall never obtain indemnity for the expenditures of the war. They must come out of the pockets of the people of the United States; and the longer the war is continued, and the more numerous our army, the greater will be the debt, and the heavier the burden imposed upon the country.

If these views be correct, the end of the policy recommended by the President-whether contemplated or notwill be, to force the Government to adopt one or the other alternative alluded to in these resolutions. With this impression, I cannot support the policy he recommends, for the reasons assigned in the first resolution. The first of these is, that it would be inconsistent with the avowed object for which the war has been prosecuted. That it would be so, is apparent from what has already been said. Since the commencement of the war until this time, the President has continually disavowed the intention of conquering Mexico, and subjecting her to our control. He has constantly proclaimed that the only object was indemnity, and that the war is prosecuted to obtain it by treaty. And yet, if the results should be as I have stated, the end will be, that what was disavowed will be accomplished, and what has been avowed to be its object, will be defeated. Such a result would be a deep and lasting impeachment of the sincerity or the intelligence of the Government of its sincerity, because directly opposed to what it has continually and emphatically disavowed; of its intelligence, for not perceiving what ought to have been so readily anticipated.

We have heard much of the reputation which our country has acquired by this war. I acknowledge it to the full amount, as far as the military is concerned. The army has done its duty nobly, and conferred high honors on the country, for which I sincerely thank them; but I apprehend that the reputation acquired does not go beyond this, and that, in other respects, we have lost instead of acquiring reputation by the war. It would seem certain, from all publications from abroad, that the Government itself has not gained reputation in the eyes of the world for justice, moderation, or wisdom.

Whether this be deserved or not, it is not for me to inquire at present. I am now speaking merely of reputation; and in this view it appears that we have lost abroad, as much in civil and political reputation as we have acquired for our skill and valor in arms. But much as I regard military glory—much as I rejoice to witness the display of that indomitable energy and courage which surmounts all difficulties—I would be sorry indeed that our Government should lose any portion of that high character for justice, moderation, and discretion, which distinguished it in the early stages of our history.

The next reason assigned is, that either holding Mexico as a province, or incorporating her into the Union, would be unprecedented by any example in our history. We have conquered many of the neighboring tribes of Indians, but we have never thought of holding them in subjection, or of incorporating them into our Union. They have been left as an independent people in the midst of us, or been driven back into the forests. Nor have we ever incorporated into the Union any but the Caucasian race. To incorporate Mexico would be the first departure of the kind; for more than half of its population are pure Indians, and by far the larger portion of the residue mixed blood. I protest against the incorporation of such a people. Ours is the government of the white man. The great misfortune of what was formerly Spanish America, is to be traced to the fatal error of placing the colored race on an equality with the white. This error destroyed the social arrangement which formed the basis of their society. This error we have wholly escaped; the Brazilians, formerly a province of Portugal, have escaped also to a considerable extent, and they and we are the only people of this continent who made revolutions without anarchy. And yet, with this example before them, and our uniform practice, there are those among us who talk about erecting these Mexicans into territorial governments, and placing them on an equality with the people of these States. I utterly protest against the project.

It is a remarkable fact in this connection, that in the whole history of man, as far as my information extends, there is no instance whatever of any civilized colored race, of any shade, being found equal to the establishment and maintenance of free government, although by far the largest proportion of the human family is composed of them; and even in the savage state, we rarely find them any where with such governments, except it be our noble savages; for noble I will call them for their many high qualities. They, for the most part, had free institutions, but such institutions are much more easily sustained among a savage than a civilized people. Are we to overlook this great fact? Are we to associate with ourselves, as equals, companions, and fellow-citizens, the Indians and mixed races of Mexico? I would consider such association as degrading to ourselves, and fatal to our institutions.

The next remaining reasons assigned, that it would be in conflict with the genius and character of our Government, and, in the end, subversive of our free institutions, are intimately connected, and I shall consider them together.

That it would be contrary to the genius and character of our Government, and subversive of our free popular institutions, to hold Mexico as a subject province, is a proposition too clear for argument before a body so enlightened as the Senate. You know the American constitution too well,—you have looked into history, and are too well acquainted with the fatal effects which large provincial possessions have ever had on the institutions of free states,—to need any proof to satisfy you how hostile it would be to the institutions of this country, to hold Mexico as a subject province. There is not an example on record of any free state holding a province of the same extent and population, without disastrous consequences. The nations conquered and held as a province, have, in time, retaliated by destroying the liberty of their conquerors, through the corrupting effect of extended patronage and irresponsible power. Such, certainly, would be our case. The conquest of Mexico would add so vastly to the patronage of this Government, that it would absorb the whole powers of the States; the Union would become an imperial power, and the States reduced to mere subordinate corporations. But the evil would not end there; the process would go on, and the power transferred from the States to the Union, would be transferred from the Legislative Department to the Executive. All the immense patronage which holding it as a province would create,—the maintenance of a large army, to hold it in subjection, and the appointment of a multitude of civil officers necessary to govern it, would be vested in him. The great influence which it would give the President, would be the means of controlling the Legislative Department, and subjecting it to his dictation, especially when combined with the principle of proscription which has now become the established practice of the Government. The struggle to obtain the Presidential chair would become proportionably great—so great as to destroy the freedom of elections. The end would be anarchy or despotism, as certain as I am now addressing the Senate.

Let it not be said that Great Britain is an example to the contrary; that she holds provinces of vast extent and population, without materially impairing the liberty of the subject, or exposing the Government to violence, anarchy, confusion, or corruption. It is so. But it must be attributed to the peculiar character of her government. Of all governments that ever existed, of a free character, the British far transcends all in one particular, and that is, its capacity to bear patronage without the evils usually incident to it. She can bear more, in proportion to population and wealth, than any government of that character that ever existed:—I might even go further, and assert than despotism itself in its most absolute form. I will not undertake to explain why it is so. It will take me further from the course which I have prescribed for myself, than I desire; but I will say, in a few words, that it results from the fact that her Executive and the House of Lords (the conservative branches of her Government) are both hereditary, while the other House of Parliament has a popular character. The Roman Government exceeded the British in its capacity for conquest. No government ever did exist, and none probably ever will, which, in that particular, equalled it; but its capacity to hold conquered provinces in subjection, was as nothing compared to that of Great Britain; and hence, when the Roman power passed beyond the limits of Italy, crossed the Adriatic, the Mediterranean, and the Alps, liberty fell prostrate; the Roman people became a rabble; corruption penetrated every department of the Government; violence and anarchy ruled the day, and military despotism closed the scene. Now, on the contrary, we see England, with subject-provinces of vastly greater territorial extent, and probably of not inferior population (I have not compared them); we see her, I repeat, going on without the personal liberty of the subject being materially impaired, or the Government subject to violence or anarchy! Yet England has not wholly escaped the curse which must ever befall a free government which holds extensive provinces in subjection; for, although she has not lost her liberty, or fallen into anarchy, yet we behold the population of England crushed to the earth by the superincumbent weight of debt and taxation, which may one day terminate in revolution. The wealth derived from her conquests and provincial possessions may have contributed to swell the overgrown fortunes of the upper classes, but has done nothing to alleviate the pressure on the laboring masses below. On the contrary, the expenses incident to their conquest, and of governing and holding them in subjection, have been drawn mainly from their labor, and have increased instead of decreasing the weight of the pressure. It has placed a burden upon them which, with all their skill and industry, with all the vast accumulation of capital and power of machinery with which they are aided,—they are scarce capable of bearing, without being reduced to the lowest depths of poverty. Take, for example, Ireland, her earliest and nearest conquest, and is it not to this day a cause of heavy expense, and a burden, instead of a source of revenue ?

On the contrary, our Government, in this particular, is the very reverse of the British. Of all free governments, it has the least capacity, in proportion to the wealth and population of the country, to bear patronage. The genius of the two, in this particular, is precisely opposite, however much alike in exterior forms and other particulars. The cause of this difference, I will not undertake to explain on the present occasion. It results from its federal character and elective chief magistrate; and so far from the example of Great Britain constituting a safe precedent for us to follow, the little she has gained from her numerous conquests and vast provincial possessions, and the heavy burdens which it has imposed upon her people to meet the consequent expenses, ought to be to us a warning never to be forgotten; especially when we reflect that, from the nature of our Government, we would be so liable to the other and greater evils from which she, from the nature of her Government, is, in a great measure, exempted. Such and so weighty are the objections to conquering Mexico, and holding it as a subject province.

Nor are the reasons less weighty against incorporating her into the Union. As far as law is concerned, this is easily done. All that is necessary is to establish a territorial government for the several States in Mexico, of which there are upwards of twenty,—to appoint governors, judges, and magistrates, and to give to the population a subordinate right of making laws—we defraying the cost of the government. So far as legislation goes, the work will be done; but there would be a great difference between these territorial governments, and those which we have heretofore established within our own limits. These are only the offsets of our own people, or foreigners from the same countries from which our ancestors came. The first settlers in the territories are too few in number to form and support a government of their own, and are under obligation to the Government of the United States for forming one for them, and defraying the expense of maintaining it; knowing, as they do, that when they have sufficient population, they will be permitted to form a constitution for themselves, and be admitted as members of the Union.—During the period of their territorial government, no force is necessary to keep them in a state of subjection. The case will be entirely different with these Mexican territories; when you form them, you must have powerful armies to hold them in subjection, with all the expenses incident to supporting them. You may call them territories, but they would, in reality, be but provinces under another name, and would involve the country in all the difficulties and dangers which I have already shown would result from holding the country in that condition. How long this state of things would last, before they would be fitted to be incorporated into the Union as States, we may form some idea, from similar instances with which we are familiar. Ireland has been held in subjection by England for many centuries; and yet remains hostile, although her people are of a kindred race with the conquerors. The French colony in Canada still entertain hostile feelings towards their conquerors, although living in the midst of them for nearly one hundred years. If we may judge from these examples, it would not be unsafe to conclude that the Mexicans never will be heartily reconciled to our authority. The better class have Castilian blood in their veins, and are of the old Gothic stock—quite equal to the Anglo-Saxons in many respects, and in some superior. Of all the people upon earth, they are the most pertinacious; they hold out longer, and often when there would seem to be no prospect of ever making effectual resistance. It is admitted, I believe, on all hands, that they are now universally hostile to us, and the probability is, will continue so.

But suppose this difficulty removed. Suppose their hostility should cease, and they should become desirous of being incorporated into our Union. Ought we to admit them? Are the Mexicans fit to be politically associated with us? Are they fit not only to govern themselves, but for governing us also? Are any of you, Senators, willing that your State should constitute a member of a Union, of which twenty odd Mexican States, more than one-third of the whole, would be a part, the far greater part of the inhabitants of which are pure Indians, not equal in intelligence and elevation of character to the Cherokees, Choctaws, or any of our Southern Indian tribes?

We make a great mistake in supposing all people are capable of self-government. Acting under that impression, many are anxious to force free governments on all the people of this continent, and over the world, if they had the power. It has been lately urged in a very respectable quarter, that it is the mission of this country to spread civil and religious liberty over all the globe, and especially over this continent—even by force, if necessary. It is a sad delusion. None but a people advanced to a high state of moral and intellectual excellence are capable in a civilized condition, of forming and maintaining free governments; and among those who are so far advanced, very few indeed have had the good fortune to form constitutions capable of endurance. It is a remarkable fact in the political history of man, that there is scarcely an instance of a free constitutional government, which has been the work exclusively of foresight and wisdom. They have all been the result of a fortunate combination of circumstances. It is a very difficult task to make a constitution worthy of being called so. This admirable federal constitution of ours, is the result of such a combination. It is superior to the wisdom of any or all of the men by whose agency it was made. The force of circumstances, and not foresight or wisdom, induced them to adopt many of its wisest provisions.

But of the few nations who have been so fortunate as to adopt a wise constitution, still fewer have had the wisdom long to preserve one. It is harder to preserve than to obtain liberty. After years of prosperity, the tenure by which it is held is but too often forgotten; and I fear, Senators, that such is the case with us. There is no solicitude now about liberty. It was not so in the early days of the republic. Then it was the first object of our solicitude. The maxim then was, that "Power is always stealing from the many to the few;" "The price of liberty is perpetual vigilance." Then no question of any magnitude came up, in which the first inquiry was not, "Is it constitutional?"—"Is it consistent with our free, popular institutions?"—"How is it to affect our liberty?" It is not so now. Questions of the greatest magnitude are now discussed without reference or allusion to these vital considerations. I have been often struck with the fact, that in the discussions of the great questions in which we are now engaged, relating to the origin and the conduct of this war, their effect on the free institutions and the liberty of the people have scarcely been alluded to, although their bearing in that respect is so direct and disastrous. They would, in former days, have been the great and leading topics of discussion; and would, above all others, have had the most powerful effect in arousing the attention of the country. But now, other topics occupy the attention of Congress and of the country-military glory, extension of the empire, and the aggrandizement of the country. To what is this great change to be attributed ? Is it because there has been a decay of the spirit of liberty among the people? I think not. I believe that it was never more ardent. The true cause is, that we have ceased to remember the tenure by which liberty alone can be preserved. We have had so many years of prosperity—passed through so many difficulties and dangers without the loss of liberty—that we begin to think that we hold it by right divine from heaven itself. Under this impression, without thinking or reflecting, we plunge into war, contract heavy debts, increase vastly the patronage of the Executive, and indulge in every species of extravagance, without thinking that we expose our liberty to hazard. It is a great and fatal mistake. The day of retribution will come; and when it does, awful will be the reckoning, and heavy the responsibility somewhere.

I have now shown, Senators, that the conquest of Mexico, and holding it as a subject province, or incorporating it into our Union, is liable to the many and irresistible objections assigned in the first resolution. I have also shown that the policy recommended by the President, if carried out, would terminate, in all probability, in its conquest, and holding it either in one or the other mode stated; and that such is the opinion of the President himself, unless, in the mean time, peace can be obtained. Believing, then, that this line of policy might lead to consequences so disastrous, it ought not, in my opinion, in the language of the second resolution, to be adopted. Thus thinking, I cannot give it my support. The question is then presented—What should be done? It is a great and difficult question, and daily becoming more so. I, who have used every effort in my power to prevent this war, might excuse myself from answering it, and leave it to those who have incurred greater responsibility in relation to it. But I will not shrink from any responsibility where the safety of the country or its institutions are at stake.

The first consideration in determining what line of policy, in the present state of things, ought to be adopted, is to decide what line will most effectually guard against the dangers which I have shown would result from the conquest of Mexico, and the disastrous consequences which would follow it.

After the most mature reflection which I have been able to give to the subject, I am of opinion now, and have been from the first, that the only one by which it can be certainly guarded against, is to take the question of indemnity into our own hands—to occupy defensively, and hold subject to negotiation, a portion of the territory of Mexico, which we may deem ample to cover all proper claims upon her, and which will be best suited to us to acquire, and least disadvantageous to her to lose. Such was my impression when the message of the President of the United States recommended to Congress the recognition of the existence of a war with Mexico. My view, at that time, as to the proper course to be pursued, was to vote the supplies, to rescue General Taylor and his army from the dangers which surrounded them, and take time to determine whether we should recognize the war or not. Had it been adopted, I would have insisted on raising a provisional army, to be collected at some proper point, and to be trained and disciplined: but to postpone the declaration of war until the Congress of Mexico, in which, according to her Constitution, the war-making power resided, should be allowed time to disavow the intention of making war on us, and to adjust all differences between the two countries. But if she refused, even then I would have advised to seize, by way of reprisal, the portion of her territory which we might select, and hold it defensively, as I have just stated, instead of declaring war formally against her; and that mainly for the purpose of avoiding the very dangers against which these resolutions are intended to guard. But such was the urgency which was supposed then to exist, that no time was allowed to present or press these views upon the Senate. Such a course, besides the saving of an immense sacrifice of men and money, and avoiding the many other evils to which the course adopted has already subjected the country, would have effectually prevented our being entangled in the affairs of Mexico, from which we find it now so difficult to extricate ourselves. This consideration alone gives it decisive advantages over the course adopted, and makes it vastly superior, even if it should involve the same sacrifice of men and money to maintain a defensive line, as would, to use the usual phrase, the vigorous prosecution of the war. Mexico is to us as a dead body, and this is the only way that we can cut the cord which binds us to the corpse.

In recommending this line of policy, I look not to the interests of Mexico, but to those of our own country, and to the preservation of its free popular institutions. With me, the liberty of the country is all in all. If this be preserved, every thing will be preserved, but if lost, all will be lost. To preserve it, it is indispensable to adopt a course of moderation and justice towards all other countries; to avoid war whenever it can be avoided; to let those great causes which are now at work, and which, by the mere operation of time, will raise our country to an elevation and influence which no country has ever heretofore attained, continue to work. By pursuing such a course, we may succeed in combining greatness and liberty—the highest possible greatness with the largest measure of liberty and do more to extend liberty by our example over this continent and the world generally, than would be done by a thousand victories. It may be, in expressing these sentiments, that I find no response in the breasts of those around me. If so, it must be attributed to the fact that I am growing old, and that my principles and feelings belong to a period of thirty or thirty-five years anterior to the present date. It is not, however, the first time I have ventured in their maintenance to stand alone on this floor. When General Jackson, some years since, during the latter part of his administration, recommended to Congress to issue letters of marque and reprisal against France, I stood alone in my place here, and raised my voice against it, on the ground that there was no just cause of war with her; that, in entering into the treaty to indemnify our citizens for old claims against her, the King of France and his Ministers declared to our Minister, that it required a vote of the Chambers to make the appropriation to carry it into effect; and that they were no further responsible than to use their best efforts to induce them to do so. This was all communicated to our Executive, and the treaty accepted and ratified, with this condition attached. And yet the President, although he admitted that the King and his Ministers had fully redeemed their pledge to use their best efforts to obtain the necessary appropriation, recommended the adoption of the measure to which I have alluded, and which would have been tantamount to war. Fortunately the Government of Great Britain, by her interposition, prevented it. This example, I fear, has contributed much to give the strong tendency, which we have since witnessed, to resort to menace and force in the settlement of our differences with other powers.

According to my opinion, all parties are interested in adopting a line of policy which will with certainty disentangle us from the affairs of Mexico, and avoid the great sacrifices of men and money, and the many other evils to which the war exposes us. Let me say to my friends, who support the administration in their policy, that if you persist, and if peace by some good fortune should not be obtained, the war will go on from year to year, and you will be utterly overthrown as a party. Do you not see that its effect, in reference to our internal affairs, is to drive you into a course of policy directly contrary to that which you have professed to support, and in favor of that which you have charged your opponents with supporting. You have ever professed to oppose, as a party, a national debt, and charged your opponents with being its advocates. But what, I ask, is the effect of the war in this respect? Is it not to create an immense national debt, greater than that which the party to which you are opposed could possibly have created by any other policy, had they been in power? This campaign, on which you look so lightly, will add to it a sum more than half as great as the entire debt of the Revolution. You have been opposed to the extension of the patronage of the Executive, at least in profession. But this war is doing more to enlarge his patronage than any other policy which your opponents could have adopted. You profess to be in favor of a metallic currency. Do you not see that with the increase of stocks and treasury notes, you are in danger of being plunged again into the lowest depths of the paper system? You, as a party, have advocated the doctrine of free trade. Do you not see that, by the vast increase of the expenditures of the country, and the heavy interest which you will have to pay on the public debt, you are creating a necessity for increasing the duties on imports to the highest point that revenue will admit, and thus depriving the country of all the practical benefits of free trade, and preventing the Government from making any material reduction, until the whole debt is paid, which cannot be expected during this generation? What could your opponents have done more, or even as much, to destroy a system of policy which you claim to distinguish you from them, and to establish that which you allege to be the reason why they should be excluded from power? Has not, and will not, this war policy, if persisted in, effectually and finally obliterate the line of policy which you have insisted on as distinguishing you from them? Why, then, to save yourselves from such a result, do you hesitate to adopt the course of policy I have suggested, as the only certain means of preventing these and other evils, and the danger to which our institutions are exposed? The pride of opinion may resist. I know the difficulty, and respect it, with which we yield measures that we have advocated, even when time has shown them to be wrong. But, true magnanimity and the highest honor command that we should abandon them, when they threaten to be injurious instead of beneficial to the country. It would do great credit to the party in power to adopt the policy now, in reference to the war, of taking indemnity into our own hands, by assuming a defensive position, which, it can hardly be doubted they would have done when the war was recognized, if they had foreseen the difficulties and dangers to which it has led. It would be a noble sacrifice of individual pride to patriotism.

In asserting that the only alternative is between the policy recommended by the President and the adoption of a defensive position, I have put out of the question the policy of taking no territory. I have done so, because I believe the voice of the country has decided irrevocably against it, and that to press it as the alternative, would render almost certain the final adoption of the policy recommended by the President, notwithstanding the disasters which it threatens. Let me say to my friends on the other side of the Chamber (for as such I regard them, for political differences here do not affect our personal relations), that they have contributed by their course to fix the determination not to terminate the war without some suitable indemnity in territory. I do not refer to your vote recognizing the existence of war between the Republic of Mexico and the United States. I well know that you voted with a view to furnish immediate support to General Taylor and his army, then surrounded by imminent danger, and not with the intention of recognizing the war; and that you remonstrated and protested against that interpretation being put upon your votes. But since it passed, and the war was recognized, most of you have continued to vote for appropriations to prosecute the war, when the object of prosecuting it was avowed to be to acquire territory as an indemnity. Now, I cannot see how the two can be reconciled—how you can refuse to take indemnity in territory, when you have voted means for the express purpose of obtaining such indemnity. The people are not able to understand why you should vote money so profusely to get indemnity, and refuse to take it, when obtained; and hence public opinion has been brought so decidedly to the conclusion not to terminate the war without territorial indemnity. But if such indemnity is to be had without involving the hazard of conquering the country, with all the dangers to which it would expose us, we must decide whether we shall adopt a defensive position or not, now-this very session. It will, in all possibility, be too late at the next.

I have now, Senators, delivered my sentiments with freedom and candor, upon all the questions connected with these resolutions. I propose nothing now. But if I find that I will be supported, I will move to raise a Committee to deliberate upon the subject of the defensive line.

The opportunity is favorable, while there are so many officers from Mexico now in the city, whose opinion would be of great value in determining on the one to be adopted. If the course of policy which I have suggested should be adopted, we may not get peace immediately. The war may still continue for some time; but be that as it may, it will accomplish the all-important object-will extricate the country from its entanglement with Mexico.

SOURCE: Richard C. Crallé, Editorn, The Works of John C. Calhoun: Speeches of John C. Calhoun Delivered in the House of Representatives, and in the Senate of the United States, Vol. 4, pp. 396-424