Showing posts with label USS Minnesota. Show all posts
Showing posts with label USS Minnesota. Show all posts

Monday, May 10, 2021

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: April 13, 1864

A clear, but cool day. Again planted corn, the other having rotted.

There is an unofficial report that one of our torpedo boats struck the Federal war steamer Minnesota yesterday, near Newport News, and damaged her badly.

I learn (from an official source) to-day that Gen. Longstreet's corps is at Charlottesville, to co-operate with Lee's army, which will soon move, no doubt.

Gen. Bragg received a dispatch yesterday, requesting that commissary stores for Longstreet be sent to Charlottesville, and he ordered his military secretary to direct the Commissary-General accordingly. To this Col. Northrop, C. G. S., took exceptions, and returned the paper, calling the attention of Gen. B.'s secretary to the Rules and Regulations, involving a matter of red tape etiquette. The C. G. S. can only be ordered or directed by the Secretary of War. Gen. B. sent the paper to the Secretary, with the remark that if he is to be restricted, etc., his usefulness must be necessarily diminished. The Secretary sent for Col. N., and I suppose pacified him.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2p. 186

Monday, February 10, 2020

Diary of Corporal David L. Day: January 10, 1862


A thick, heavy fog envelopes the bay this morning, so thick we cannot see half the boat’s length. In a little while the fog began to settle, and it looked curious to see the topmasts of the boats and schooners above the fog as they passed us, their hulls being hidden entirely from view.

9 a. m. Weighed anchor and proceeded on our journey. Our boat being first after the flag-boat, we soon passed the boats that ran by us in the fog.

ARRIVAL AT FORTRESS MONROE

A little before noon we sighted Fortress Monroe, and as we passed the Minnesota and other men-of-war lying in the roads, the sailors sprung into the rigging and cheered lustily, to which the boys responded heartily from the boats, the bands playing as each boat passed. At 12 m., our boat dropped anchor between the rip raps and the fort. Every available place on the boat for sight seeing was quickly taken, the boys eagerly looking at things the like of which they never saw before, and many of them probably never supposed existed. Here it appears is the rendezvous of the expedition; gunboats, tugboats and supply vessels in great numbers are lying here to join us. If one-half the armada lying here accompany us, we may naturally conclude there is heavy work to be done somewhere, or else we are taking force enough to break down all opposition and make an easy job of it.

SOURCE: David L. Day, My Diary of Rambles with the 25th Mass. Volunteer Infantry, p. 18-19

Saturday, September 16, 2017

Major-General Benjamin F. Butler to Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott, May 24, 1861

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA,
Fort Monroe, May 24, 1861.
Lieutenant-General WINFIELD SCOTT:

I have the honor to report my arrival at this post Wednesday morning at 8 o'clock. I found that no troops had arrived except some recruits for the Third and Fourth Massachusetts Regiments of three-months' men and two detached companies of three-years' men which have been temporarily annexed to those regiments. This morning the Second New York Volunteers have reported themselves in good condition, numbering 782 men. These I have encamped on the farm of Mr. Segar, which is at the end of Mill Creek Bridge toward Hampton, and have also ordered into camp in connection with them the First Vermont Regiment (militia), Colonel Phelps. The force at this post may be stated thus: Colonel Dimick, commanding U.S. Regulars, 415 men; Third Regiment Massachusetts Militia and one company three-years' men, 727 men; Fourth Massachusetts Militia and one company three-years' men, 783 men; First Vermont Militia, 779 men; Second New York Volunteers, three years, 782 men. As there is very little sickness, the effective force kill be probably 3,375 men. Of these, the New York and Vermont regiments only are furnished with camp equipage.

Upon my arrival I put myself in communication with Colonel De Russy, of the Engineers, and consulted him upon two subjects:

First, as to the supply of water. I found that on that day the Minnesota was supplying herself from a well or spring on land of Mr. Clark, near the end of Mill Creek Bridge, about a mile from the fort, and that after pumping 800 gallons the well was exhausted, but refilled itself during the night, and from personal examinations of its surroundings I think it may be trusted to supply 700 to 1,000 gallons daily with a little enlargement of the reservoir. The water is of the best quality, and as it is immediately under the guns of the heaviest battery of the fort on the land side, I have thought it proper, with the advice of Colonel De Russy, of the Engineer Corps, to direct that a pipe be put in to bring it into the fort along the bridge and causeway, first having a cistern excavated at the fountain which will contain the whole supply of the spring. I have also advised with Colonel De Russy of the propriety of finishing the artesian well which had been begun here, and he is now in communication with a contractor for that purpose. There is an appropriation, as I understand, of $14,000 made by Congress for that purpose.

On Thursday I directed Colonel Phelps, of the Vermont regiment, to make a reconnaissance in force in Hampton and its neighborhood within two miles of the fort, in order to examine its capabilities for en-camping the troops about to arrive, and at the same time I made personal examination of the ground, Colonel De Russy being of opinion that the wood suggested by the Lieutenant-General might be a little unhealthy, and I was further determined upon encamping in this direction by considerations of probable advances in this direction, to which I will take leave to call your attention soon. The rebels upon our approach attempted to burn the bridge over Hampton Creek, but the fire was promptly extinguished by the Vermonters, assisted by the citizens. Colonel Phelps passed into the village of Hampton, and found only a few citizens, who professed to be watching their negroes, in which occupation I have not as yet disturbed them. I therefore encamped Colonel Phelps' Vermont regiment and Colonel Carr's New York regiment on the point of land just above the spring, about half way between Fort Monroe and Hampton.

Saturday, May 25. — I had written thus far when I was called away to meet Major Cary, of the active Virginia volunteers, upon questions which have arisen of very considerable importance both in a military and political aspect, and which I beg leave to submit herewith.

On Thursday night, three negroes, field hands, belonging to Col. Charles Mallory, now in command of the secession forces in this district, delivered themselves up to my picket guard, and, as I learned from the report of the officer of the guard in the morning, had been detained by him. I immediately gave personal attention to the matter, and found satisfactory evidence that these men were about to be taken to Carolina for the purpose of aiding the secession forces there; that two of them left wives and children (one a free woman) here; that the other had left his master from fear that he would be called upon to take part in the rebel armies. Satisfied of these facts from cautious examination of each of the negroes apart from the others, I determined for the present, and until better advised, as these men were very serviceable, and I had great need of labor in my quartermaster's department, to avail myself of their services, and that I would send a receipt to Colonel Mallory that I had so taken them, as I would for any other property of a private citizen which the exigencies of the service seemed to require to be taken by me, and especially property that was designed, adapted, and about to be used against the United States.

As this is but an individual instance in a course of policy which may be required to be pursued with regard to this species of property, I have detailed to the Lieutenant-General this case, and ask his direction. I am credibly informed that the negroes in this neighborhood are now being employed in the erection of batteries and other works by the rebels, which it would be nearly or quite impossible to construct without their labor. Shall they be allowed the use of this property against the United States, and we not be allowed its use in aid of the United States?

Major Cary, upon my interview with him, which took place between this fort and Hampton, desired information upon several questions: First: Whether I would permit the removal through the blockade of the families of all persons who desired to pass southward or northward. In reply to this, I informed him that I could not permit such removal, for the reasons, first, that presence of the families of belligerents in a country was always the best hostage for the good behavior of the citizens; and, secondly, that one object of our blockade being to prevent the passage of supplies of provisions into Virginia so long as she remained in a hostile attitude, the reduction of the number of consumers would in so far tend to neutralize that effect.

He also desired to know if the transit of persons and families northward from Virginia would be permitted. I answered him that with the exception of an interruption at Baltimore there was no interruption of the travel of peaceable persons north of the Potomac, and that all the internal lines of travel through Virginia were at present in the hands of his friends, and that it depended upon them whether that line of travel was interrupted, and that the authorities at Washington could better judge of this question than myself, as necessary travel could go by way of Washington; that the passage through our blockading squadron would require an amount of labor and surveillance to prevent abuse which I did not conceive I ought to be called upon to perform.

Major Cary demanded to know with regard to the negroes what course I intended to pursue. I answered him substantially as I have written above, when he desired to know if I did not feel myself bound by my constitutional obligations to deliver up fugitives under the fugitive-slave act. To this I replied that the fugitive-slave act did not affect a foreign country, which Virginia claimed to be, and that she must reckon it one of the infelicities of her position that in so far at least she was taken at her word; that in Maryland, a loyal State, fugitives from service had been returned, and that even now, although so much pressed by my necessities for the use of these men of Colonel Mallory's, yet if their master would come to the fort and take the oath of allegiance to the Constitution of the United States I would deliver the men up to him and endeavor to hire their services of him if he desired to part with them. To this Major Cary responded that Colonel Mallory was absent.

This morning the steamer Alabama arrived, having on board Colonel Duryea's regiment of New York, 850 strong, fully equipped. I have caused them to be landed and encamped with the First Vermont. The steamer Pembroke, from Massachusetts, has arrived, having two unattached companies — one of rifles and the other of infantry, 101 men each, and without equipage — so that now the actual number of men ready for service may be set down at 4,400, but not very efficient, some being quite new recruits and others not fully equipped, two regiments being wholly without tents.

The rebels have built a very strong battery on Sewell's Point, at the entrance of Elizabeth River, about four miles from this post, and about two and one-half miles from the Ripraps, or Fort Calhoun, and supported in the rear, at the distance of about a mile across Tanner's Creek, by the rebel forces gathered about there, amounting, as nearly as I can ascertain, to some 3,000 or 4,000 men, it being understood from the attack of the Monticello on Sunday last that I intended to menace Norfolk in that direction. Of course I had not at my disposal any force sufficient to make such an attack and carry this battery with any hope of holding possession of it should it be taken. I had determined, however, upon consultation with Commodore Stringham, to engage the battery with the naval force, and to endeavor, under the cover of their fire, to land and at least destroy the guns and works, and such plan was arranged for this morning; but yesterday Commodore Stringham received orders from the Navy Department to sail at once for Charleston, so that our expedition was disorganized. As we had no sufficient force to make such an attack — in the absence of the flag-ship Minnesota and her guns at long range — as would give the movement that assurance of success which I understand you desire should seem to attend our operations, it has been abandoned. I have, however, directed Colonel De Russy to prepare to put some guns of long range upon the Ripraps, so as to prevent any further approach towards us from Sewell's Point or Willoughby's Spit.

In this connection I beg leave to suggest to the Lieutenant-General the necessity in coast operations for say fifty surf-beats, of such construction as he caused to be prepared for the landing at Vera Cruz, the adaptation and efficiency of which have passed into history. May I respectfully request and urge that such a flotilla be furnished for coast operations.

I have learned that the enemy are about to fortify a point at Newport News, about eleven miles from this place, at the mouth of the James River, and on the northerly side of it. They have already a battery at Pig Point, on the southerly and opposite side of the river, which commands the Nansemond River. I think it of the last importance that we should occupy Newport News, and I am now organizing an expedition consisting of two regiments for that purpose, unless I find unexpected obstacles. I purpose this afternoon, in the steamer Yankee, to make a personal reconnaissance of that point, and at once to occupy the same with that amount of force, intending to intrench there for the purpose of being in possession and command of the entrance to the James River myself, and from that position, by the aid of the naval force, to be in condition to threaten Craney Island and the approaches of Norfolk, and also to hold one of the approaches to Richmond. By a march of nine miles, at farthest, I can support the post at Newport News; by the sea, in two hours, I can afford it relief. There is water enough to permit the approach of the largest sized vessels--indeed the Lieutenant-General will recollect that Newport News Point was once counted upon as a naval depot instead of Norfolk.

Trusting that these dispositions and movements will meet the approval of the Lieutenant-General, and begging pardon for the detailed length of this dispatch, I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

BENJ. F. BUTLER,
Major-General, Commanding.


[Indorsements.]

MAY 29, 1861

There is much to praise in this report, and nothing to condemn. It is highly interesting in several aspects, particularly in its relation to the slave question.

Respectfully submitted to the Secretary of War.
WINFIELD SCOTT.


I agree with the Lieutenant-General in his entire approval of the within report.

SIMON CAMERON.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 2 (Serial No. 2), p. 648-52

Major-General Benjamin F. Butler to Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott, May 27, 1861

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA,
May 27, 1861.

SIR: The expedition (of which I gave you information in my former dispatch) to Newport News got off in fine style this morning about 7 o'clock. I have added to the expedition the Eighth New York Regiment, 780 strong, which came here on board the Empire City on Sunday afternoon, and they proceeded without debarking. I also added two 6-pounder and two 12-pounder guns, with a detachment of twenty-five men from Colonel Dimick's command, who are intended to act as drill-masters to the volunteers in the exercise of the guns. My purpose is to intrench and hold that point, and ultimately to mount a few heavy guns, which will command that channel of approach to James River.

Since I wrote my last dispatch the question in regard to slave property is becoming one of very serious magnitude. The inhabitants of Virginia are using their negroes in the batteries, and are preparing to send their women and children South. The escapes from them are very numerous, and a squad has come in this morning to my pickets, bringing with them their women and children. Of course these cannot be dealt with upon the theory on which I designed to treat the services of able-bodied men and women who might come within my lines, and of which I gave you a detailed account in my last dispatch. I am in the utmost doubt what to do with this species of property. Up to this time I have had come within my lines men and women with their children — entire families — each family belonging to the same owner. I have therefore determined to employ, as I can do very profitably, the able-bodied persons in the party, issuing proper food for the support of all, and charging against their services the expense of care and sustenance of the non-laborers, keeping a strict and accurate account as well of the services as of the expenditures, having the worth of the services and the cost of the expenditures determined by a board of survey, hereafter to be detailed. I know of no other manner in which to dispose of this subject and the questions connected therewith. As a matter of property to the insurgents it will be of very great moment, the number I now have amounting, as I am informed, to what in good times would be of the value of $60,000. Twelve of these negroes, I am informed, have escaped from the erection of batteries on Sewell's Point, which this morning fired upon my expedition as it passed by out of range. As a means of offense, therefore, in the enemy's hands, these negroes, when able-bodied, are of the last importance. Without them the batteries could not have been erected, at least for many weeks. As a military question, it would seem to be a measure of necessity to deprive their masters of their services. How can this be done? As a political question and a question of humanity, can I receive the services of the father and mother and not take the children? Of the humanitarian aspect I have no doubt. Of the political one I have no right to judge. I therefore submit all this to your better judgment; and as these questions have a political aspect, I have ventured — and I trust I am not wrong in so doing — to duplicate the parts of my dispatches relating to this subject, and forward them to the Secretary of War.

It was understood when I left Washington that the three Massachusetts regiments, two of which are at the Relay House, should be forwarded to me here, and also Cook's light battery, of which I have the utmost need, if I am expected even to occupy an extended camp with safety. May I ask the attention of the Commanding General to this subject, and inquire if the exigencies of the service will permit these troops to be sent to me immediately? I have to report the arrival of no more troops except the New York Eighth since my last dispatch. The steamship Wabash, which was expected here to take the place of the Minnesota, has not yet reported herself. The Harriet Lane has reported herself here from Charleston, and is employed in convoying the Newport News expedition. I find myself extremely short of ammunition, having but a total in magazine of 85,000 rounds, (if which 5,000 rounds only are for the smooth-bore musket, and the major part of my command are provided with that arm. May I desire the attention of the Lieutenant-General to this state of facts, and ask that a large amount of ammunition for that arm — I would suggest “buck and ball” — be ordered forward from the Ordnance Department? The assistant adjutant-general has made a requisition for this purpose. I will endeavor to keep the Lieutenant-General informed daily of any occurrences of interest, provided I am not interfered with by the irregularity of the mails and modes of conveyance.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJ. F. BUTLER,
Major-General, Commanding.
 Lieutenant-General SCOTT.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 2 (Serial No. 2), p. 52-4

Monday, June 15, 2015

Diary of Gideon Welles: September 16, 1862

Chase called on me this morning. Wishes a secret concerted attack on Richmond. Says Stanton will furnish 10,000 men. Told him we would do all that could be expected of the Navy in a sudden movement, but doubted if a military expedition could be improvised as speedily and decisively as he supposed. He thought it could certainly be effected in six days. I told him to try. We would have a naval force ready in that tune, though not so large and powerful as I would wish; but we would do our part.

Chase tells me that Harrington, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, was at Fortress Monroe last Thursday and heard Bankhead, who commands the Minnesota, say that the Government was a poor affair, that the Administration was inefficient, that it is time the politicians were cleared out of Washington and the army in power. Harrington called subsequently and confirmed the statement, — less strong perhaps in words but about as offensive. I requested him to reduce his statement to writing.

At the Executive Mansion, the Secretary of State informed us there was to be no Cabinet-meeting. He was authorized by the President to communicate the fact. Smith said it would be as well, perhaps, to postpone the Cabinet-meetings altogether and indefinitely, — there seemed no use latterly for our coming together. Others expressed corresponding opinions. Seward turned off, a little annoyed.

An unfavorable impression is getting abroad in regard to the President and the Administration, not without reason, perhaps, which prompted Smith and others to express their minds freely. There is really very little of a government here at this time, so far as most of the Cabinet are concerned; certainly but little consultation in this important period. Seward, when in Washington, spends more or less of each day with the President, absorbs his attention, and I fear to an extent influences his action not always wisely. The President has good sense, intelligence, and an excellent heart, but is sadly perplexed and distressed by events. He, to an extent, distrusts his own administrative ability and experience. Seward, instead of strengthening and fortifying him, encourages this self-distrust, but is not backward in giving his own judgment and experience, which are often defective expedients, to guide the Executive. A conviction of this state of things stirred up Smith to make his remarks. The President has, I believe, sincere respect and regard for each and every member of the Cabinet, but Seward seeks, and has at times, influence, which is sometimes harmful. The President would often do better without him, were he to follow his own instincts, or were he to consult all his advisers in council. He would find his own opinions confirmed and be convinced that Seward's suggestions are frequently unwise and weak and temporizing. No one attempts to obtrude himself, or warn the President, or even to suggest to him that others than S. should be consulted on some of the important measures of the Government. In fact, they are not informed of some of the measures which are of general interest until they see them in operation, or hear of them from others. Chase is much chafed by these things, and endeavors, and to some extent succeeds, in also getting beside the President, and obtaining information of what is going forward. But this only excites and stimulates Seward, who has the inside track and means to keep it. The President is unsuspicious, or apparently so; readily gives his ear to suggestions from any one. Only one of his Cabinet, however, has manifested a disposition to monopolize his attention; but the discussion of important measures is sometimes checked almost as soon as introduced, and, without any consultation, or without being again brought forward, they are disposed of, the Secretary of State alone having had sometimes certainly a view, or ear, or eye in the matter. He alone has abbreviated general consultation in many cases. With greater leisure than most of the Cabinet officers, unless it be Smith of the Interior, he runs to the President two or three times a day, gets his ear, gives him his tongue, makes himself interesting by anecdotes, and artfully contrives with Stanton's aid to dispose of measures without action or give them direction independent of his associates. Under the circumstances, I perhaps am, latterly, as little interfered with as any one, though the duties of the State and Navy Departments run together; yet I am sometimes excessively annoyed and embarrassed by meddlesome intrusions and inconsiderate and unauthorized action by the Secretary of State. The Navy Department has, necessarily, greater intimacy, or connection, with the State Department than any other, for, besides international questions growing out of the blockade, our squadrons and commanders abroad come in contact with our ministers, consuls, and commercial agents, and each has intercourse with the Governments and representatives of other nations. Mutual understanding and cooperation are therefore essential and indispensable. But while I never attempt to direct the agents of the State Department, or think of it, or to meddle with affairs in the appropriate sphere of the Secretary of State, an entirely different course is pursued by him as regards the Navy and naval operations. He is anxious to direct, to be the Premier, the real Executive, and give away national rights as a favor. Since our first conflict, however, when he secretly interfered with the Sumter expedition and got up an enterprise to Pensacola, we have had no similar encounter; yet there has been an itching propensity on his part to have a controlling voice in naval matters with which he has no business, — which he really does not understand, — and he sometimes improperly interferes as in the disposition of mails on captured vessels. The Attorney-General has experienced similar improper interference, more than any other perhaps; none are exempt. But the Secretary of State, while meddlesome with others, is not at all communicative of the affairs of his own Department. Scarcely any important measures or even appointments of that Department are brought before us, except by the President himself or by his express direction. The consequence is that there is reticence by others and the Government is administered in a great measure by Departments. Seward is inquisitive and learns early what is doing by each of his associates, frequently before we meet in council, while the other Cabinet officers limit themselves to their provided duties and are sometimes wholly unadvised of his.

I have administered the Navy Department almost entirely independent of Cabinet consultation, and I may say almost without direction of the President, who not only gives me his confidence but intrusts all naval matters to me. This has not been my wish. Though glad to have his confidence, I should prefer that every important naval movement should pass a Cabinet review. To-day, for instance, Wilkes was given the appointment of Acting Rear-Admiral, and I have sent him off with a squadron to cruise in the West Indies. All this has been done without Cabinet consultation, or advice with any one, except Seward and the President. The detail and the reserve are at the instigation of Seward, who wished Wilkes, between whom and himself, since the Trent affair, there seems to be an understanding, to have a command, without specifying where. In due time our associates in the Cabinet will learn the main facts and infer that I withheld from them my orders. My instructions to our naval officers, — commanders of squadrons or single ships, — cruising on our blockade duty, have never been submitted to the Cabinet, though I have communicated them freely to each. I have never read but one of my letters of instructions to the President, and that was to Captain Mercer of the Powhatan in command of the naval expedition to Sumter a few weeks after I entered upon my duties, and those instructions were, covertly, set aside and defeated by Seward.

So in regard to each and all the Departments; if I have known of their regulations and instructions, much of it has not been in Cabinet consultations. Seward beyond any and all others is responsible for this state of things. It has given him individual power, but often at the expense of good administration.

In everything relating to military operations by land, General Scott first, then McClellan, then Halleck, have directed and controlled. The Government was virtually in the hands of the General-in-Chief, so far as armies and military operations were concerned. The Administration had no distinct military policy, was permitted to have none. The President was generally advised and consulted, but Seward was the special confidant of General Scott, was more than any one of McClellan, and, in conjunction with Stanton, of Halleck. With wonderful kindness of heart and deference to others, the President, with little self-esteem and unaffected modesty, has permitted this and in a great measure has surrendered to military officers prerogatives intrusted to himself. The mental qualities of Seward are almost the precise opposite of the President. He is obtrusive and never reserved or diffident of his own powers, is assuming and presuming, meddlesome, and uncertain, ready to exercise authority always, never doubting his right until challenged; then he becomes timid, uncertain, distrustful, and inventive of schemes to extricate himself, or to change his position. He is not particularly scrupulous in accomplishing an end, nor so mindful of what is due to others as would be expected of one who aims to be always courteous towards equals. The President he treats with a familiarity that sometimes borders on disrespect. The President, though he observes this ostentatious presumption, never receives it otherwise than pleasantly, but treats it as a weakness in one to whom he attributes qualities essential to statesmanship, whose pliability is pleasant, and whose ready shrewdness he finds convenient and acceptable.

With temperaments so constituted and so unlike it is not surprising that the obsequious affability and ready assumption of the subordinate presumed on and to an extent influenced the really superior intellect of the principal, and made himself in a degree the centralizing personage. While the President conceded to the Secretary of State almost all that he assumed, not one of his colleagues made that concession. They treated his opinions respectfully, but as no better than the opinions of others, except as they had merit; and his errors they exposed and opposed as they deserved. One or two have always been ready to avail themselves of the opportunity. In the early days of the Administration the Cabinet officers were absorbed by labors and efforts to make themselves familiar with their duties, so as rightly to discharge them. Those duties were more onerous and trying, in consequence of the overthrow of old parties and the advent of new men and new organizations, with the great rupture that was going on in the Government, avowedly to destroy it, than had ever been experienced by any of their predecessors.

Whilst the other members of the Cabinet were absorbed in familiarizing themselves with their duties and in preparing for impending disaster, the Secretary of State, less apprehensive of disaster, spent a considerable portion of every day with the President, patronizing and instructing him, hearing and telling anecdotes, relating interesting details of occurrences in the Senate, and inculcating his political party notions. I think he has no very profound or sincere convictions. Cabinet-meetings, which should, at that exciting and interesting period, have been daily, were infrequent, irregular, and without system. The Secretary of State notified his associates when the President desired a meeting of the heads of Departments. It seemed unadvisable to the Premier — as he liked to be called and considered — that the members should meet often, and they did not. Consequently there was very little concerted action.

At the earlier meetings there was little or no formality; the Cabinet-meetings were a sort of privy council or gathering of equals, much like a Senatorial caucus, where there was no recognized leader and the Secretary of State put himself in advance of the President. No seats were assigned or regularly taken. The Secretary of State was invariably present some little time before the Cabinet assembled and from his former position as the chief executive of the largest State in the Union, as well as from his recent place as a Senator, and from his admitted experience and familiarity with affairs, assumed, and was allowed, as was proper, to take the lead in consultations and also to give tone and direction to the manner and mode of proceedings. The President, if he did not actually wish, readily acquiesced in, this. Mr. Lincoln, having never had experience in administering the Government, State or National, deferred to the suggestions and course of those who had. Mr. Seward was not slow in taking upon himself to prescribe action and doing most of the talking, without much regard to the modest chief, but often to the disgust of his associates, particularly Mr. Bates, who was himself always courteous and respectful, and to the annoyance of Mr. Chase, who had, like Mr. Seward, experience as a chief magistrate. Discussions were desultory and without order or system, but in the summing-up and conclusions the President, who was a patient listener and learner, concentrated results, and often determined questions adverse to the Secretary of State, regarding him and his opinions, as he did those of his other advisers, for what they were worth and generally no more. But the want of system and free communication among all as equals prevented that concert and comity which is really strength to an administration.

Each head of a Department took up and managed the affairs which devolved upon him as he best could, frequently without consulting his associates, and as a consequence without much knowledge of the transactions of other Departments, but as each consulted with the President, the Premier, from daily, almost hourly, intercourse with him, continued, if not present at these interviews, to ascertain the doings of each and all, though himself imparting but little of his own course to any. Great events of a general character began to impel the members to assemble daily, and sometimes General Scott was present, and occasionally Commodore Stringham; at times others were called in. The conduct of affairs during this period was awkward and embarrassing. After a few weeks the members, without preconcert, expressed a wish to be better advised on subjects for which they were all measurably responsible to the country. The Attorney-General expressed his dissatisfaction with these informal proceedings and advised meetings on stated days for general and current affairs, and hoped, when there was occasion, special calls would be made. The Secretary of State alone dissented, hesitated, doubted, objected, thought it inexpedient, said all had so much to do that we could not spare the time; but the President was pleased with the suggestion, if he did not prompt it, and concurred with the rest of the Cabinet.

The form of proceeding was discussed; Mr. Seward thought that would take care of itself. Some suggestions were made in regard to important appointments which had been made by each head of Department, the Secretary of State taking the lead in selecting high officials without general consultation. There seemed an understanding between the Secretaries of State and Treasury, who had charge of the most important appointments, of which understanding the President was perhaps cognizant. Chase had extensive patronage, Seward appointments of high character. The two arranged that each should make his own selection of subordinates. These two men had political aspirations which did not extend to their associates (with perhaps a single exception that troubled neither). Chase thought he was fortifying himself by this arrangement, but he often was overreached, and the arrangement was one of the mistakes of his life.

Without going farther into details, the effect, and probably the intention, of these proceedings in those early days was to dwarf the President and elevate the Secretary of State. The latter also circumscribed the sphere of [the former] so far as he could. Many of the important measures, particularly of his own Department, he managed to dispose of, or contrived to have determined, independent of the Cabinet.

My early collision with him in some complications connected with the Sumter and Pensacola expeditions, when he was so flagrantly wrong as to be overruled by the President, caused us to get along thenceforward without serious difficulties, though, our duties being intimate, we were often brought together and had occasional disagreements.

Between Seward and Chase there was perpetual rivalry and mutual but courtly distrust. Each was ambitious. Both had capacity. Seward was supple and dexterous; Chase was clumsy and strong. Seward made constant mistakes, but recovered with a facility that was wonderful and almost always without injury to himself; Chase committed fewer blunders, but persevered in them when made, often to his own serious detriment. In the fevered condition of public opinion, the aims and policies of the [two] were strongly developed. Seward, who had sustained McClellan and came to possess, more than any one else in the Cabinet, his confidence, finally yielded to Stanton's vehement demands and acquiesced in his sacrifice. Chase, from an original friend and self-constituted patron of McC., became disgusted, alienated, an implacable enemy, denouncing McClellan as a coward and military imbecile. In all this he was stimulated by Stanton, and the victim of Seward, who first supplanted him with McC. and then gave up McC. to appease Stanton and public opinion.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 130-9

Saturday, March 14, 2015

Diary of Mary Boykin Chesnut: March 7, 1862

Mrs. Middleton was dolorous indeed. General Lee had warned the planters about Combahee, etc., that they must take care of themselves now; he could not do it. Confederate soldiers had committed some outrages on the plantations and officers had punished them promptly. She poured contempt upon Yancey's letter to Lord Russell.1 It was the letter of a shopkeeper, not in the style of a statesman at all.

We called to see Mary McDuffie.2 She asked Mary Preston what Doctor Boykin had said of her husband as we came along in the train. She heard it was something very complimentary. Mary P. tried to remember, and to repeat it all, to the joy of the other Mary, who liked to hear nice things about her husband.

Mary was amazed to hear of the list of applicants for promotion. One delicate-minded person accompanied his demand for advancement by a request for a written description of the Manassas battle; he had heard Colonel Chesnut give such a brilliant account of it in Governor Cobb's room.
The Merrimac3 business has come like a gleam of lightning illumining a dark scene. Our sky is black and lowering.

The Judge saw his little daughter at my window and he came up. He was very smooth and kind. It was really a delightful visit; not a disagreeable word was spoken. He abused no one whatever, for he never once spoke of any one but himself, and himself he praised without stint. He did not look at me once, though he spoke very kindly to me.
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1 Lord Russell was Foreign Secretary under the Palmerston administration of 1859 to 1865.

2 Mary McDuffie was the second wife of Wade Hampton.

3 The Merrimac was formerly a 40-gun screw frigate of the United States Navy. In April, 1861, when the Norfolk Navy-yard was abandoned by the United States she was sunk. Her hull was afterward raised by the Confederates and she was reconstructed on new plans, and renamed the Virginia. On March 2, 1862, she destroyed the Congress, a sailing-ship of 50 guns, and the Cumberland, a sailing-ship of 30 guns, at Newport News. On March 7th she attacked the Minnesota, but was met by the Monitor and defeated in a memorable engagement. Many features of modern battle-ships have been derived from the Merrimac and Monitor.

SOURCE: Mary Boykin Chesnut, Edited by Isabella D. Martin and Myrta Lockett Avary, A Diary From Dixie, p. 136-7

Wednesday, March 11, 2015

Diary of Judith W. McGuire: March 11, 1862

Yesterday we heard good news from the mouth of James River. The ship "Virginia," formerly the Merrimac, having been completely incased with iron, steamed out into Hampton Roads, ran into the Federal vessel Cumberland, and then destroyed the Congress, and ran the Minnesota ashore. Others were damaged. We have heard nothing further; but this is glory enough for one day, for which we will thank God and take courage.

SOURCE: Judith W. McGuire, Diary of a Southern Refugee, During the War, p. 100

Sunday, September 28, 2014

Speech Of James W. Grimes On The Surrender Of Slaves By The Army, April 14, 1862

April 14, 1862.

It is, of course, to be expected that there will be great differences of opinion among the friends of the Government as to the manner in which the present war should be conducted. Such differences are the natural results of our various domestic institutions, systems of education, modes of thought, degrees of civilization, and of individual opinions of the necessities of our situation. But there are certain great fundamental principles upon which, one would think, all ought to agree. We certainly ought to do nothing and suffer nothing to be done calculated in any degree to repel or paralyze the efforts of our friends at home, who are doing everything in their power to encourage and sustain the soldiers in the field. While inculcating the necessity of the strictest obedience to military duty, it should be constantly borne in mind that ours are a citizen soldiery, soon to return to the bosom of civil society, and that the performance of no unsoldierly duty should be required of them that would be calculated to impair their self-respect, diminish their regard for their officers, incite them to rebel against discipline, or taint their reputations at home. It must not be expected that the natural instincts of humanity will be stifled by military orders, and surely our soldiers should not be required to assist in the perpetration of acts against which every enlightened sentiment of their hearts revolts. One would think that all men would agree in pronouncing that a cruel and despotic order, which repeals the divine precept, “Inasmuch as ye did it not to one of the least of these ye did it not to me,” and arbitrarily forbids the soldier to bestow a crust of bread or a cup of water upon a wretched, famishing fugitive escaping from our own as well as from his enemy. Yet, I grieve to say there are those high in rank in the service of the United States who have sought to break down the spirit of manhood, which is the crowning glory of true soldiers, by requiring them to do acts outside of their profession which they abhor, and to smother all impulses to those deeds of charity which they have been taught to believe are the characteristics of Christian gentlemen.

It was known to the country at an early day after the commencement of the war, that some military commanders were abusing the great power intrusted to them, and were employing the Army to assist in the capture and rendition of fugitive slaves, not in aid of any judicial process, but in obedience to their own unbridled will. The effect of this assumption of unauthorized power was to incite the soldiery to disobedience, and to arouse the people to the necessity of proper legislative restraints. It was in compliance with the popular sentiment on this subject that Congress enacted the additional article of war, which was approved on the 13th of March last, and which declared that “all officers or persons in the military or naval service of the United States are prohibited from employing any of the forces under their respective commands for the purpose of returning fugitives from service or labor, who may have escaped from any persons to whom such service or labor is claimed to be due, and any officer who shall be found guilty by court-martial of violating this article shall be dismissed from the service.”

It was intended by this article to prevent the military service from becoming odious to the people who support the war, and degrading to those who have volunteered to fight under our banners. It simply declares that the Army of the United States shall not be perverted from the legitimate use for which it was raised, while it interferes in no degree with the claim of any man to a person alleged to be a slave; it leaves questions of that character to be settled, and rights of that description to be enforced, by other than the military authority. The intention of those who voted for this article was not to abridge any man's rights, but to leave every one to his legal remedies as though no war existed.

How is this new article of war enforced? It has been promulgated to the army it is true. It may not be openly and avowedly violated. Soldiers may not hereafter be required to actually perform the humiliating office of fastening manacles upon the limbs of persons said to be slaves, nor to escort them to the residences of their masters; but the experience of the last few days has taught us that, notwithstanding the new article of war, our military officers suffer their camps to be invaded by armed detachments of slave-hunters, without the support of any process of law, who there attempt to shoot, maim, and kill with impunity those whom they claim to be slaves, while our soldiers are required to stand indifferently by and witness the inhuman work.

How long, think you, will this method of dealing with the rebels be endured by the freemen of this country? Are our brothers and sons to be confined within the walls of the tobacco-warehouses and jails of Richmond and Charleston, obliged to perform the most menial offices, subsisted upon the most stinted diet, their lives endangered if they attempt to obtain a breath of fresh air, or a beam of God's sunlight at a window, while the rebels, captured by these very men, are permitted to go at large upon parol[e], to be pampered with luxuries, to be attended by slaves, and the slaves guarded from escape by our own soldiers?

In the month of February last, an officer of the Third Regiment of Iowa Infantry, stationed at a small town in Missouri, succeeded in capturing several rebel bridge-burners, and some recruiting officers belonging to Price's army. The information that led to their capture was furnished by two or three remarkably shrewd and intelligent slaves, claimed by a lieutenant-colonel in the rebel army. Shortly afterward the master dispatched an agent with instructions to seize the slaves and convey them within the rebel lines, whereupon the Iowa officer seized them and reported the circumstances to headquarters. The slaves soon understanding the full import of General Halleck's celebrated Order No. 3, two of them attempted an escape. This was regarded as an unpardonable sin. The Iowa officer was immediately placed under arrest, and a detachment of the Missouri State militiamen, in the pay of the Government and under the command of General Halleck, were sent in pursuit of the fugitives. The hunt was successful. The slaves were caught and returned to their traitor master, but not until one of them had been shot by order of the soldier in command of the pursuing party.

Mr. President, how long shall we permit such conduct as this to go unrebuked? Does any one suppose that the people will quietly submit to the imposition of taxes to support a State militia in the field that is to be employed in the capture of slaves for the benefit of officers in the rebel army? Is it supposed that the Senators from Iowa will silently, patiently permit the gallant officers from that State to be outraged in the manner I have described?

It is quite time that some definite policy should be established for the treatment of escaped slaves; and I am of the opinion that Congress has been grossly derelict in permitting the evil to go so long unregulated and unchecked. We have almost as many diverse systems of dealing with this class of persons as we have military departments. In one, fugitive slaves have been pursued, flogged, and returned to their masters by our army; in another, they have been simply pursued and returned without flogging; in another, they have been pursued and shot in the attempt to return them; in another, they have been termed “contraband,” and received within our lines in the mixed character of persons and property. In the absence of any authoritative declaration of Congress, none of these modes may be held to be in conflict with law, other than the law of common-sense and common decency.1

It is obvious that the article of war which I have quoted does not meet the case presented by Major-General Halleck in his Order No. 3. That celebrated manifesto declares in substance that all persons from the enemy's country shall be excluded from our lines. The plain purpose of the order is to prohibit fugitive slaves escaping from the rebellious district, and thereby securing freedom. It was doubtless competent for General Halleck to issue such an order, and it is equally competent for Congress, which has made and continues to make articles of war for the government of the army and navy, to countermand it. And it ought to be countermanded. I will not pause to discuss the humanitarian features of the question. Public policy, no less than popular feeling, demands that Order No. 3 be forever erased. There never was a war waged in the history of the world where the means of acquiring information of the enemy's position and numbers were more ample than here, and there never was one where the commanding officers have suffered more from lack of such information. Order No. 3 proposes to incorporate the fatuity and blindness which remained unwritten in other military departments into an historical record and a public advertisement. It proposes to warn all persons against bringing information of the enemy's movements to our camps, under penalty of being turned back to receive such punishment as the enemy may choose to inflict for betraying them, or for running away and betraying combined. No organization of secret service can meet all the requirements of an army operating in an enemy's country, unless aided by some portion of the inhabitants of the country. What folly, then, to wall out and repel the very inhabitants who might bring us the information we most need, and who have everywhere shown an eagerness to do so!

It is the undoubted right and the duty of every nation, when engaged in a righteous war — and no other than a righteous war is justifiable at all — to avail itself of every legitimate means known to civilized warfare to overcome its enemies. What will be thought by posterity of this nation, if, in the present emergency, we not only fail to employ the agencies which Providence seems to have placed at our disposal, but actually seek every opportunity to exasperate and drive from our support those who are anxious to serve us? Were the Russian nobles now engaged in a rebellion against their Government, would we not regard their emperor as guilty of the greatest folly, if he not only declined to enlist the serfs of his empire to aid in suppressing the insurrection, but repelled them from his service and allowed his generals to return them to his rebellious nobles, to be used by them in overthrowing his authority? And can anyone tell me the difference between the case I have put and our own?

The whole history of the world does not exhibit a nation guilty of such extreme fatuity as has marked the conduct of our Government in its treatment of the colored population since the present war began. It seems to be impossible to convince ourselves that war, with all of its attendant responsibilities and calamities, really exists, and that future generations will not hold those guiltless who refuse to use any of the means which God has placed in their hands to bring it to a speedy and successful termination. History will pronounce those men criminal who, in this crisis of the nation's fate, consult the prejudices of caste or color, and regard the interests of property of paramount importance to the unity of the nation.

It is useless to attempt to blink out of sight the great issues before us — issues that must be settled, and settled by us. It were wiser and more manly to meet them squarely and at once. We are in the midst of the greatest revolution that ever occurred in ancient or modern times. Such armies as are now marshaled in hostile array on this continent, in point of numbers, equipment, and expense, have been hitherto unknown in the annals of mankind. We are imposing burdens in the form of taxes that will be felt by unborn generations. We are suffering much now; we expect and are willing to suffer more. And why? Because we desire to preserve the integrity of our nation; because we believe that Heaven designed us to be one people with one destiny; the freest and happiest on earth. It was to preserve that unity of our national existence that our sons and brothers have gone forth to do battle. For this it was that the gallant men of Iowa have freely, triumphantly, laid down their lives at Wilson's Creek, Blue Mills, Belmont, Fort Donelson, Pea Ridge, and Pittsburg. And shall we, after these great sacrifices of life and treasure, hesitate about employing any of the instrumentalities in aid of the country that are known to civilized warfare? Shall we not be recreant to our high trust if we doubt or delay in this particular?

This war will go on until rebellion is subdued. Upon this point there need be no controversy. Rely upon it, the Northwestern States will submit to no temporizing or compromising policy. They are too much in earnest; they have suffered too much already; they know too well what they would be compelled to suffer in the future to allow treason to go unpunished. It is because they desire to prevent the recurrence of the rebellion that they demand that it shall now be thoroughly crushed out. Among things necessary to be done to fully accomplish this purpose, we must conquer and hold all the forts and strong positions on the South Atlantic and Gulf coasts. How shall they be garrisoned when captured? This is a question we shall soon be compelled to answer; and I am prepared for its solution. I answer it unhesitatingly that we should garrison them, in whole or in part, by soldiers of African descent; that instead of returning slaves to their rebel masters to fight against us, we should employ them in our own military service.

I know very well that this proposition encounters at once all the prejudices that have been engendered by differences of race, education, and social position; but let us look at it a moment soberly and practically. It is assumed as admitted by all that the Southern forts must be captured and strongly garrisoned for some years to come. They are situated in a warm and enervating climate, and the particular location of nearly all of them renders them more than usually unhealthy, even for that section of the country. In addition to the forts already established, we shall be compelled to build new ones. The rebels rely upon the diseases of their climate to decimate our Northern army in the summer and autumnal months; and their confidence is well placed. Our troops will wither before the fevers of the Gulf coast as vegetation does before the blast of the sirocco. Now, we have in our midst thousands of hardy, athletic colored men, fitted by nature to endure the heat and miasma of the tropics, and some of them accustomed to it, who are panting to be employed in the capacity of soldiers. Many of them having been in a state of bondage, have been abandoned by their masters, and are now thrown upon us for support. Some of them were forced by our enemies into their military service, and have deserted from it. They implore our protection, and we must give it, if we would not become a “scorn and derision” among the nations of the earth. They have shown on divers occasions, both on sea and land, that they belong to a warlike race. They are obedient and teachable. They can be subsisted much cheaper than white soldiers, can perform more labor, and are subject to fewer diseases in a warm climate.

Now, with these facts before us, shall we refuse to employ them? What substantial reason can be given for not doing so? Is it because they have not the proper capacity for command? Then give them white officers, as is done by the British Government to the same race, by the French Government to the Arabs, and by the Russian Government to the Tartars and other semi-barbarous soldiers within that empire. Is it because they do not possess the average courage of soldiers? In addition to the testimony in disproof of this, furnished a few days ago by the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Wilson), I refer you to your vessels-of-war, where you have hundreds of these men employed, and none more valiant. Is it because they are not obedient to command? The whole history of the race shows the contrary, for, if there is any one thing for which they are remarkable more than another, it is their confiding submission to the will of their superiors. Is it said that we have white soldiers enough for all of our purposes? True, we have a large army, composed of men of unsurpassed valor and patriotism, who, if we require it, will sacrifice their lives for their country, whether by the sword or by disease; but I would, if I could, recall a portion of them to their homes and to the industrial pursuits of life. Am I told that the enrollment of a few colored soldiers will be regarded by the Army as humiliating to them? Mr. President, those public men fail to comprehend the character of American soldiers who suppose that they are fighting for mere military glory, or that in this critical hour they are controlled by ignoble prejudice against color or race. They are citizens and taxpayers as well as soldiers. They want the rebellion speedily crushed and the supreme authority of the law established, leaving social and political questions to be settled afterward. They feel that the desertion of every colored soldier, artificer, or laborer, from the rebellious States, withdraws aid and support from the rebellion, and brings it so much nearer to an end. They cannot understand, nor can I, that refined casuistry that justifies us in converting the enemy's horse or ox to our use, and in turning their inanimate engines of destruction against themselves, but denies to us the right to turn their slaves, their animate hostile engines in human form, to the same purpose. They cannot imagine why it is that some gentlemen are so willing that men of the African race should labor for them, and so unwilling that they should fight for them.

What a wonderful difference of action and sentiment there is on this subject between the officers of the Army and Navy! While officers of the Army have disgraced themselves, annoyed and incensed their subordinates, dishonored the country, and injured the public service, by the promulgation of their ridiculous orders about slaves, no officer of the Navy, thank God, has ever descended to follow their example. Their noble, manly, generous hearts would revolt at the idea of having imposed upon them the humiliating duty of capturing and returning fugitive slaves. They serve their country, not rebel slave-owners. They think that duty to the country requires them to avail themselves of the services of these people, instead of driving them back to their masters, or suffering them to starve; and they act upon this conviction. At the taking of Hatteras, one of the large guns of the Minnesota was wholly manned and worked by persons called “contrabands,” and no gun on the ship was better served. These people are, it is well known, remarkable for the proficiency they soon acquire as cannoneers. On the same ship is a boat’s crew, every one of whom, including the cockswain, is a colored man, and there are none more skillful, or render more satisfactory service to the officers of the vessel. The whole country knows the services rendered by them to Commodore Du Pont and to the vessels under his command. They have acted as pilots, and in the most important positions, and I have the authority of the two superior officers of that fleet for saying that they have never been deceived or misled by any one of them. I am convinced that our expedition to the South Atlantic coast would not have been so perfect a success as it has been but for the slaves found there, and who were employed by our naval officers. There are more or less of them on all our vessels-of-war. They are efficient men, and their presence produces no discord among the crews.

Mr. President, I wish to be distinctly understood. I advocate no indiscriminate arming of the colored race, although I frankly confess that I would do so were it necessary to put down the rebellion. I do not favor this proposition merely because of its antislavery tendency. I approve it because it will result in a saving of human life, and in bringing the rebellion to a speedier termination. It is my business to aid in bringing this war to a close by conquering an unconditional peace in the least expensive and speediest manner possible. Acting upon this idea of my duty, and believing that humanity and the best interests of the country require the enrollment of a few colored regiments for garrisoning the Southern forts, I shall vote, whenever an opportunity shall be afforded me, for converting a portion of the colored refugees into soldiers, instead of forcing them back into servitude to their rebel masters and their rebel government. We may hesitate to do this. Our hesitation will cost us the valuable lives of many of our own race who are near and dear to us. Our hesitation to use the means which Providence seems to have placed in our hands for crushing the rebellion may carry desolation to many a loyal hearthstone. But we must adopt this policy sooner or later, and, in my opinion, the sooner we do it the better. The rebels have this day thousands of slaves throwing up intrenchments and redoubts at Yorktown, and thousands of them performing military duty elsewhere; and yet we hesitate and doubt the propriety of employing the same race of people to defend ourselves and our institutions against them. Mr. President, how long shall we hesitate?
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1 “Up to that date (July, 1862), neither Congress nor the President had made any clear, well-defined rules touching the negro slaves, and the different generals had issued orders according to their own political sentiments.” — Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman, written by Himself, Vol. I, p. 285.

SOURCE: William Salter, The Life of James W. Grimes, p. 184-93

Sunday, September 8, 2013

Shelling of Sewall’s Point

BALTIMORE, May 9.

The special correspondent of the American sends the following relative to affairs in Hampton Roads and the Peninsula:


FORT MONROE, May 8.

This has been a most stirring and exciting day at Old Point, and all are anticipating the early fall of Norfolk.  At 11 o’clock the steamer Naugatuck was observed raising steam, and about 12 o’clock she moved out by the side of the Monitor, which vessel also cleared her decks for action, taking down her awning, and stood forth in full fighting trim.

11:30. – The gunboat Dacotah has just moved up on line of battle, together with the sloops of war Seminole and San Jacinto.  The flag ship Minnesota was also under steam.

12 o’clock. – The Naugatuck has moved up towards Elizabeth river, followed by the Monitor and Dacotah in line of battle.  The San Jacinto follows slowly.

Heavy firing can still be heard in the direction of James river, where, you have already been informed by telegraph, the Galena and other boats of gone.  The Susquehanna has just gone up in the meantime, the Dacotah, Monitor and Naugatuck have reached the channel and taken a position near Sewall’s Point.  The Dacotah fired a shot towards Craney Island.  A second shot from the Dacotah struck the beach at Sewall’s Point.

12:30 – The Susquehanna moves up and takes the lead of the San Jacinto and Seminole – no answer from either.  The Dacotah and Seminole are steaming up Elizabeth river.  The Naugatuck is lying off towards the mouth of the James River.

Presently, the Dacotah and Monitor approached Craney Island and Sewall’s Point.  The Dacotah fires every few minutes alternately at Sewall’s Point and Craney Island, the enemy making no reply, although the balls reached their intended destination. – The Monitor is taking the lead.  Meantime the Seminole and Susquehanna open upon Sewall’s point, and two shots are fired from the Point, the latter falling short of the Monitor, which is now a mile above the other vessels.

12:40. – The rebels are firing rapidly from Sewall’s Point, principally on the Monitor, while a succession of shells are being poured on the enemy from the Susquehanna, Dacotah, Seminole and San Jacinto, broadside after broadside.  The Rip Raps also threw occasional shells at Sewall’s Point.

12:50. – The Susquehanna, Dacotah, San Jacinto and Seminole are pouring shells and the Monitor threw her first two shells full a mile and a half from the Point.


FORT MONROE, May 8.

Shortly before noon to-day the Monitor, Naugatuck, Seminole, Susquehanna, Dacotah and San Jacinto, in the order in which they are named, steamed up toward Sewall’s Point – Capt. Lardner, of the Susquehanna, in command of the expedition.

As soon as within range, fire was opened with a shot and shell against Sewall’s Point.  Most of the shots were good ones.  It was nearly half an hour before a reply was made from the Point.

The Rip Raps next opened fire, and then the Naugatuck for the first time.  Several shots were fired from the single gun on the extremity of the Point, when one from the Monitor struck in the vicinity, doubtless disabling the gun, as it has not been fired since.  The position of the Monitor was far in advance of the rest of the fleet, and she continued in motion until within a mile or two of the Point where considerable execution must have been done by here accurate firing.

The Naugatuck kept in the back ground, the range of her Parrot gun enabling her to do so.  Sewall Point battery replied briskly.  The Rip Raps fired occasionally.  A continual fire was kept up from the gunboats.  On account of the distance, no details can be given.  Nothing occurred till two o’clock, when the firing was very feeble from the Point.  The Monitor about this time returned from her advanced position and joined the fleet.

At 2:15 a very dense smoke arose rapidly from the Point, caused probably by the burning of the rebel barracks and other buildings.  At about half past two o’clock, the Merrimac made her appearance, when the fleet returned with the exception of the Monitor.  The Merrimac is still (5 o’clock) off the Point.  The Monitor is ready to attack her.

1 P. M. – The Monitor is now within a mile of Sewall’s Point, moving slowly forward and firing.  The enemy are also firing briskly from Sewall’s Point at the Monitor and shells are falling thickly around her.  Craney Island is also joining in the fight, and has thrown shells at the Monitor, one of which exploded directly over her.  The Monitor moved steadily forward, and occasionally firing, and receiving shells and shot from the rebel battery with perfect indifference.

2 P. M. – The monitor has fallen back, and lays alongside of the Susquehanna, probably for the purpose of communicating with her.  The Naugatuck in the meantime has been throwing shells into Pig’s Point, and the fleet has also thrown a number of shells in the same direction.

2:15 P. M. – The Monitor and Dacotah are moving along again slowly up the mouth of the Elizabeth river, and dense black smoke has commenced to arise from Sewall’s Point, indicating that our incendiary shells thrown there have fired the barracks.  The Dacotah continues to throw her shells directly into the point.  The vessels by constantly changing position destroy the range of the rebel gunners, but they are, however, making quite a determined fight, their works giving us almost shell for shell, shot for shot.  The Monitor has laid out of action for nearly an hour, and is probably cooling her guns.  The Rip Raps battery has the range of Sewall’s Point perfectly.

2:45 P. M. – The Merrimac now makes her appearance on the scene.  She has just passed from behind Sewall’s Point, and is slowly running down toward the Federal fleet.  Simultaneously with the appearance of the Merrimac the Monitor started from behind the wooden vessels and moved up to meet the enemy.  The larger vessels have drawn aside and left.  The Monitor and Naugatuck are now in the approaching path of the Merrimac.  The vessels of the fleet had been lying quietly at anchor for the last half hour, when the signal from the flag ship ordered them all to return.  The Susquehanna leads the way, followed by the San Jacinto, Seminole, Dacotah and Monitor, being all apparently using the greatest speed towards the fort.  To the spectator, this seemed rather mortifying, but as they moved down in line the Monitor was seen to halt, and the San Jacinto and Dacotah also followed her example, leaving the Susquehanna and Seminole moving ahead.  The four steamers and the Monitor having taken their position the Merrimac also halted, and the vessels stood there not more than a mile and a half apart – the Merrimac apparently unwilling to come further down and the Monitor unwilling to go further up.  The Minnesota also steamed up in front of the fortress wharf, followed slowly by the Vanderbilt, when both stopped.  After laying in this position the Minnesota turned round and steamed back, and the Vanderbilt turning slowly backed water down the river.  Whilst this maneuvering was going on firing had entirely ceased from all points.

3:30. – The Merrimac now turns round and steams back toward Norfolk with her rebel flag flying.  The Dacotah again proceeds up towards the Merrimac and the Monitor starts toward the mouth of the Elizabeth river.  The Dacotah is now within easy range of Sewall’s Point, but the batteries there do not open on the shore.  The Monitor has stopped and the Merrimac is lying stationary about a mile from the Craney Island Battery.  Here commenced an important movement, which cannot be made public just yet.  The Vanderbilt and Arago have now steamed in front of the wharf.  The Merrimac has run back under the guns of Craney Island, and the Monitor is steaming off towards here at full speed.  The Minnesota is also coming up again at full speed, the effort being to draw the rebels again.  For the past two hours the fleet has been moving back and forwards, but the Merrimac still lies under the guns of Craney Island.  The Minnesota, Arago and Vanderbilt have gone back to their anchorage, and there is no prospect of a fight to-night.  The troops are going on board the transports, and the war vessels, including the Monitor, have all returned to their anchorage.

The President viewed the action from a tug-boat lying about a mile in rear of the fleet.  He has just returned, and as he passed up the wharf was vociferously cheered by the troops.

Our fleet have retired.  The Merrimac is again steaming up.  An officer of the Seminole states that the rebel staff on the Point was twice shot away during the bombardment.  The first time it fell, it was picked up and a rebel in a red shirt jumped on the ramparts with a stump of the staff and flag, and waved it, when a shell struck him killing him and it is supposed others near him.

Of the many shots fired at the fleet by the rebels, not one struck our vessels. – Some went over their masts, but most fell short.  The rebels could be distinctly seen from the vessels carrying all of their wounded and dead.

– Published in The Davenport Daily Gazette, Davenport, Iowa, Saturday Morning, May 10, 1862, p. 1

Tuesday, February 19, 2013

How the Virginia is to be Used Up

In the debate in the Senate, on the Stevens’ floating battery, Senator Pomeroy of Kansas expressed his opinion that it will soon be demonstrated that any wooden vessel, and large ocean steamer, for instance, can run down such a battery as the Virginia and sink her.  He said if he was captain of the Minnesota he would lighten her, except for the stem and put her at her highest speed, and run her upon the Virginia and sink her.  The Boston Commercial Bulletin says on the same subject:

“If the Minnesota, or any other vessel of the same size, should run bows on with a speed of twelve knots an hour, striking the Merrimac on her broadside, she would sink her.  As for instance, in 1839 the ship Columbian, 500 tons, lying a Damon’s wharf, Charlestown, parted her bow hawser, and swinging with the tide run bows on against Charlestown bridge and cut it through.  In 1841, the ship Eli Whitney, of 400 tons, coming up the harbor with her three topsails set, run three quarters of her length into the end of Long wharf.  In 1850, a ship going up to the Docks in Liverpool became unmanageable and ran into the stone pier head, moving the stones some twelve or thirteen feet, and doing but comparatively little damage to the ship.  We believe there is tact and skill enough in our navy to dispose of the Merrimac if she ventures out of Norfolk.”

These sagacious and prophetic hints are getting common, and since half the people hereabouts already know what the project to be tried in Hampton Roads is, and the rebels are unquestionably well informed on the subject, there can be no harm in printing the fact that the ocean steamers Vanderbilt and Arago have been armed with strong iron prows, and are now awaiting the appearance of the Virginia, to try upon her the experiment suggested.  It is also stated that their upper works are protected by a covering of cotton bales, which are more impervious to cannon balls than iron.  The experiment will be a novel and exciting one, and if it shall turn out that iron-clad vessels can thus be destroyed by vessels of superior speed and momentum, new and important elements will be introduced into the calculation of the value of mailed ships of war.  The Virginia is undoubtedly ready to come out, and if she does not soon appear it will indicate that the rebels have lost confidence in her impregnability.

– Published in the Burlington Weekly Hawk-Eye, Burlington, Iowa, Saturday, April 12, 1862, p. 4

Wednesday, September 12, 2012

Specials to the New York Papers


(Tribune’s Dispatch.)

NEW YORK, March 15. – The President nominated yesterday for Brigadier General, John Craig, also Robert C. Buchanan to be Inspector General.

The War Department has authorized Gen. Halleck to [supersede] Major General Grant unless he should ask to be relieved, on account of bad conduct at Fort Donelson and elsewhere.

Secretary Fox, who is in Washington, reports the Merrimac badly injured in the two days fight.  She had a hole bored in her hull by the Monitor.  She was leaking very badly when she put back.  The Cumberland’s broadside in the first fight injured her so badly that she could not attack the Monitor or Roanoke, all though they were both aground.  He thinks that the Monitor, now that she is afloat, can handle the Merrimac.  She is slow and unwieldy.  He considers it utterly impossible for the Merrimac to go to sea, as she would immediately founder in an ordinary gale.

The Merrimac’s shot was bunked away by a ball from an 11-inch on the Minnesota.

Capt. [Buchanan] was wounded by a shot from a rifle-man on board the Cumberland, the ball going through his thigh.

Mr. Fox says the crew of the Minnesota as well as that of the Monitor, which to see the Merrimac come out again, but it is not likely that they will be gratified.

Commodore Stevens of the steam battery has obtained permission from the Secretary of War to make use of the 15 inch gun at Fortress Monroe, to be placed upon his steam propeller Nangantuck, to be used in the defence of New York harbor, and to attack the Merrimac, in the event of her appearance.

The Herald’s Washington dispatch says Gen. McClellan reviewed a division of the army in the vicinity of Manassas this p. m., and as he reviewed the lines he was greeted by the most vociferous cheers and enthusiasm.

A man this evening from a village on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, 37 miles from Goodysville came into the camp of the Ira Harris cavalry. – He states that there were forty thousand rebels troops in town when he left and that they continued to come in and hurried on under in impression that the Union army was in pursuit of them.  Gen. Johnson and other rebel officers were dining when he left.

He states that the road from Rappahannock to Manassas is strewed with muskets, knapsacks, haversacks, blankets, and provisions flung away in the retreat and that numbers of soldiers lay fainting and exhausted by the roadside.

The Times’ Washington dispatch says the steamer Achilles, while passing the rebel batteries at Acquia Creek last night, was fired at six times, indicating that there are some rebels yet lounging on the Potomac.  None of the shots took effect.

Gen. Hooker was of opinion at nine o’clock, to-day, that the rebels had not abandoned Fredericksburgh.


(Herald’s Special.)

WASHINGTON, March 17. – The relatives of Capt. Franklin Buchanan, who commanded the rebel iron clad steamer Merrimac at the late fight, have written to his relatives in this city from Baltimore, that he is dead, and his body is to be brought to the old homestead on the Eastern shore of Maryland for interment.

A movement is on foot relative to the impeachment of all those judges who have in any form, shape, or manner aided in the interests of secession.  A member of Congress has now in his desk a resolution, which he will offer at the first opportune moment to instruct the Committee on the Judiciary to inquire into this matter of general impeachment, and report at an early date by bill or otherwise.


(Tribune correspondence.)

Delegates from a great number of business interests are here, suggesting a modification of the tax bill in [its favor].  Changes have already been made in committee in making the tax specific instead of ad valorem.  To newspapers,  making the advertisement tax three instead of five per cent, and on net receipts instead of gross.  Tobacconists, reducing it on leaf and stem, and raising it on the manufactured.  The tax proposed on umbrellas and parasols a change from specific to five per cent. ad valorem.  Omnibuses, entire freedom from the tax on passengers.  It was shown that it would be fatal to them in competition with the horse railroads.  The tax has also been stricken off from the manufactures of flour.  This was done by a delegation of the Rochester millers, who showed that it would be fatal to their business.  All along the line afflicted by the reciprocity treaty, the tax would enable the Canadian millers to undersell us in our own markets.

Nomination of Daniel E. Sickles and Haller Gunn of New Hampshire were made.

Gen. Lockwood’s nomination is suspended.

The limits of the Department to which Gen. Hunter has been appointed, has again been incorrectly stated.  It [may] not be improper to say that it comprises the States of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida.  Gen. Sherman will be retained in the Department under Gen. Hunter.  Also. Capt. W. [H. Peck] of the 11th Infantry, formerly of Chicago, Illinois.

To-day Senator Sumner will introduce a bill repealing an act originally passed in 1812, providing that [henceforth] no person by reason of color shall be disqualified from employment in carrying the mails.

Hon. Richard Fanchette, of the 18th N. Y. district, has obtained the signatures of about 150 Senators and Representatives to a memorial to Congress, asking that better rations be served out to the army.


(Special to Post.)

WASHINGTON, March 28 – the Naval committee formally voted in favor of the appropriation sufficient to complete the Stevens’ battery and fifteen million dollars for the construction of iron clad steamers.

– Published in The Burlington Weekly Hawk-Eye, Burlington, Iowa, Saturday, March 22, 1862, p. 4