WILL McClellan
display unity in conception, and vigor in execution? That is the question. He
seems very energetic and active in organizing the army; but he ought to take
the field very soon. He ought to leave Washington, and have his headquarters in
the camp among the soldiers. The life in the tent will inspire him. It alone
inspired Frederick II and Napoleon. Too much organization may become as
mischievous as the no organization under Scott. Time, time is everything. The
levies will fight well; may only McClellan not be carried away by the notion
and the attempt to create what is called a perfect army on European pattern.
Such an attempt would be ruinous to the cause. It is altogether impossible to
create such an army on the European model, and no necessity exists for it. The rebel
army is no European one. Civil wars have altogether different military
exigencies, and the great tactics for a civil war are wholly different from the
tactics, etc., needed in a regular war. Napoleon differently fought the
Vendeans, and differently the Austrians, and the other coalesced armies. May
only McClellan not become intoxicated before he puts the cup to his lips.
Fremont disavowed by
Lincoln and the administration. This looks bad. I have no considerable
confidence in Fremont's high capacities, and believe that his head is turned a
little; but in this question he was right in principle, and right in legality.
A commander of an army operating separately has the exercise of full powers of
war.
The Blairs are not
to be accused; I read the letter from F. Blair to his brother. It is the letter
of a patriot, but not of an intriguer. Fremont establishes an absurd rule
concerning the breach of military discipline, and shows by it his ignorance and
narrow-mindedness. So Fremont, and other bungling martinets, assert that nobody
has the right to criticise the actions of his commander.
Fremont is ignorant
of history, and those around him who put in his head such absurd notions are a
pack of mean and servile spit-lickers. An officer ought to obey orders without
hesitation, and if he does not he is to be court-martialed and shot. But it is
perfectly allowable to criticise them; it is in human nature—it was, is, and
will be done in all armies; see in Curtius and other historians of Alexander of
Macedon. It was continually done under Napoleon. In Russia, in 1812, the
criticism made by almost all the officers forced Alexander I. to leave the
army, and to put Kutousoff over Barclay. In the last Italian campaign Austrian
officers criticised loudly Giulay, their commander, etc., etc.
Conspiracy to
destroy Fremont on account of his slave proclamation. The conspirators are the
Missouri slave-holders: Senator Brodhead, old Bates, Scott, McClellan, and
their staffs. Some jealousy against him in the Cabinet, but Seward rather on
Fremont's side.
McClellan makes his
father-in-law, a man of very secondary capacity, the chief of
the staff of the army. It seems that McClellan ignores what a highly
responsible position it is, and what a special and transcendent capacity must
be that of a chief of the staff—the more so when of an army of several hundreds
of thousands. I do not look for a Berthier, a Gneisenau, a Diebitsch, or
Gortschakoff, but a Marcy will not do.
Colonel Lebedeef,
from the staff of the Emperor Alexander II., and professor in the School of the
Staff at St. Petersburg, saw here everything, spoke with our generals, and his
conclusion is that in military capacity McDowell is by far superior to
McClellan. Strange, if true, and foreboding no good.
Mr. Lincoln begins
to call a demagogue any one who does not admire all the doings of his
administration. Are we already so far?
McClellan under
fatal influences of the rampant pro-slavery men, and of partisans of the South,
as is a Barlow. All the former associations of McClellan have been of the worst
kind—Breckinridgians. But perhaps he will throw them off. He is young, and the
elevation of his position, his standing before the civilized world, will
inspire and purify him, I hope. Nay, I ardently wish he may go to the camp, to
the camp.
McClellan published
a slave-catching order. Oh that he may discard those bad men around him!
Struggles with evils, above all with domestic, internal evils, absorb a great
part of every nation's life. Such struggles constitute its development, are the
landmarks of its progress and decline.
The like struggles
deserve more the attention of the observer, the philosopher, than all kinds of
external wars. And, besides, most of such external wars result from the
internal condition of a nation. At any rate, their success or unsuccess almost
wholly depends upon its capacity to overcome internal evils. A nation even
under a despotic rule may overcome and repel an invasion, as long as the
struggle against the internal evils has not broken the harmony between the
ruler and the nation. Here the internal evil has torn a part of the
constitutional structure; may only the necessary harmony between this high-minded
people and the representative of the transient constitutional formula not be
destroyed. The people move onward, the formula vacillates, and seems to fear to
make any bold step.
If the cause of the
freemen of the North succumbs, then humanity is humiliated. This high-spirited
exclamation belongs to Tassara, the Minister from Spain. Not the diplomat, but
the nobly inspired man uttered it.
But for the
authoritative influence of General Scott, and the absence of any foresight and
energy on the part of the administration, the rebels would be almost wholly
without military leaders, without naval officers. The Johnsons, Magruders,
Tatnalls, Buchanans, ought to have been arrested for treason the moment they
announced their intention to resign.
Mr. Seward has many
excellent personal qualities, besides his unquestionable eminent capacity for
business and argument; but why is he neutralizing so much good in him by the
passion to be all in all, to meddle with everything, to play the knowing one in
military affairs, he being in all such matters as innocent as a lamb? It is not
a field on which Seward's hazarded generalizations can be of any earthly use;
but they must confuse all.
Seward is free from
that coarse, semi-barbarous know-nothingism which rules paramount, not the
genuine people, but the would-be something, the half-civilized gentlemen.
Above all, know-nothingism pervades all around Scott, who is himself its grand
master, and it nestles there par excellence in more than
one way. It is, however, to be seen how far this pure American—Scott military
wisdom is something real, transcendent. Up to this day, the pure Americanism,
West Point schoolboy's conceit, have not produced much. The defences of
Washington, so much clarioned as being the product of a high conception and of
engineering skill,—these defences are very questionable when appreciated by a
genuine military eye. A Russian officer of the military engineers, one who was
in the Crimea and at Sebastopol, after having surveyed these defences here,
told me that the Russian soldiers who defended Sebastopol, and who learned what
ought to be defences, would prefer to fight outside than inside of the
Washington forts, bastions, defences, etc., etc., etc.
Doubtless many
foreigners coming to this country are not much, but the greatest number are
soldiers who saw service and fire, and could be of some use at the side of
Scott's West Point greenness and presumption.
If we are worsted,
then the fate of the men of faith in principles will be that of Sisyphus, and
the coming generation for half a century will have uphill work.
If not McClellan
himself, some intriguers around him already dream, nay, even attempt to form a
pure military, that is, a reckless, unprincipled, unpatriotic party. These men
foment the irritation between the arrogance of the thus-called regular army,
and the pure abnegation of the volunteers. Oh, for battles! Oh, for battles!
Fremont wished at
once to attack Fort Pillow and the city of Memphis. It was a bold move, but the
concerted civil and military wisdom grouped around the President opposed
this truly great military conception.
Mr. Lincoln is pulled
in all directions. His intentions are excellent, and he would have made an
excellent President for quiet times. But this civil war imperatively demands a
man of foresight, of prompt decision, of Jacksonian will and energy. These
qualities may be latent in Lincoln, but do not yet come to daylight. Mr.
Lincoln has no experience of men and events, and no knowledge of the past.
Seward's influence over Lincoln may be explained by the fact that Lincoln
considers Seward as the alpha and omega of every kind of knowledge and
information.
I still hope,
perhaps against hope, that if Lincoln is what the masses believe him to be, a
strong mind, then all may come out well. Strong minds, lifted by events into
elevated regions, expand more and more; their "mind's eye" pierces
through clouds, and even through rocks; they become inspired, and inspiration
compensates the deficiency or want of information acquired by studies. Weak
minds, when transported into higher regions, become confused and dizzy. Which
of the two will be Mr. Lincoln's fate?
The administration
hesitates to give to the struggle a character of emancipation; but the people
hesitate not, and take Fremont to their heart.
As the concrete
humanity, so single nations have epochs of gestation, and epochs of normal
activity, of growth, of full life, of manhood. Americans are now in the
stage of manhood.
Col. Romanoff, of
the Russian military engineer corps, who was in the Crimean war, saw here the
men and the army, saw and conversed with the generals. Col. R. is of opinion
that McDowell is by far superior to McClellan, and would make a better
commander.
It is said that
McClellan refuses to move until he has an army of 300,000 men and 600 guns. Has
he not studied Napoleon's wars? Napoleon scarcely ever had half such a number
in hand; and when at Wagram, where he had about 180,000 men, himself in the
centre, Davoust and Massena on the flanks, nevertheless the handling of such a
mass was too heavy even for his, Napoleon's, genius.
The country is—to
use an Americanism—in a pretty fix, if this McClellan turns out to be a
mistake. I hope for the best. 600 guns! But 100 guns in a line cover a mile.
What will he do with 600? Lose them in forests, marshes, and bad roads; whence
it is unhappily a fact that McClellan read only a little of military history,
misunderstood what he read, and now attempts to realize hallucinations, as a
boy attempts to imitate the exploits of an Orlando. It is dreadful to think of
it. I prefer to trust his assertion that, once organized, he soon, very soon,
will deal heavy and quick blows to the rebels.
I saw some
manœuvrings, and am astonished that no artillery is distributed among the
regiments of infantry. When the rank and file see the guns on their side, the
soldiers consider them as a part of themselves and of the regiment; they fight
better in the company of guns; they stand by them and defend them as they
defend their colors. Such a distribution of guns would strengthen the body of
the volunteers. But it seems that McClellan has no confidence in the volunteers.
Were this true, it would denote a small, very small mind. Let us hope it is not
so. One of his generals—a martinet of the first class—told me that McClellan
waits for the organization of the regulars, to have them for
the defence of the guns. If so, it is sheer nonsense. These narrow-minded West
Point martinets will become the ruin of McClellan.
McClellan could now
take the field. Oh, why has he established his headquarters in the city, among
flunkeys, wiseacres, and spit-lickers? Were he among the troops, he would be
already in Manassas. The people are uneasy and fretting about this inaction,
and the people see what is right and necessary.
Gen. Banks, a true
and devoted patriot, is sacrificed by the stupidity of what they call here the
staff of the great army, but which collectively, with its chief, is only a mass
of conceit and ignorance few, as General Williams, excepted. Banks is in the
face of the enemy, and has no cavalry and no artillery; and here are immense
reviews to amuse women and fools.
Mr. Mercier, the
French Minister, visited a considerable part of the free States, and his
opinions are now more clear and firm; above all, he is very friendly to
our side. He is sagacious and good.
Missouri is in great
confusion—three parts of it lost. Fremont is not to be accused of all the
mischief, but, from effect to cause, the accusation ascends to General Scott.
Gen. Scott insisted
to have Gen. Harney appointed to the command of Missouri, and hated Lyon. If,
even after Harney's recall, Lyon had been appointed, Lyon would be alive and
Missouri safe. But hatred, anxiety of rank, and stupidity, united their
efforts, and prevailed. Oh American people! to depend upon such inveterate
blunderers!
Were McClellan in
the camp, he would have no flatterers, no antechambers filled with flunkeys;
but the rebels would not so easily get news of his plans as they did in the
affair on Munson's Hill.
The Orleans are
here. I warned the government against admitting the Count de Paris, saying that
it would be a deliberate breach of good comity towards Louis
Napoleon, and towards the Bonapartes, who prove to be our friends; I told that
no European government would commit itself in such a manner, not even if
connected by ties of blood with the Orleans. At the start, Mr. Seward heeded a
little my advice, but finally he could not resist the vanity to display
untimely spread-eagleism, and the Orleans are in our service. Brave boys! It is
a noble, generous, high-minded, if not an altogether wise, action.
If a mind is not nobly
inspired and strong, then the exercise of power makes it crotchety and
dissimulative in contact with men.
To my disgust, I witness
this all around me.
The American people,
its institutions, the Union—all have lost their virginity, their political
innocence. A revolution in the institutions, in the mode of life, in notions
begun—it is going on, will grow and mature, either for good or evil. Civil war,
this most terrible but most maturing passion, has put an end to the boyhood and
to the youth of the American people. Whatever may be the end, one thing is sure
that the substance and the form will be modified; nay, perhaps, both wholly
changed. A new generation of citizens will grow and come out from this smoke of
the civil war.
The Potomac closed
by the rebels! Mischief and shame! Natural fruits of the dilatory war policy—Scott's
fault. Months ago the navy wished to prevent it, to shell out the rebels, to
keep our troops in the principal positions. Scott opposed; and still he has
almost paramount influence. McClellan complains against Scott, and Lincoln and
Seward flatter McClellan, but look up to Scott as to a supernatural military
wisdom. Oh, poor nation!
In Europe clouds
gather over Mexico. Whatever it eventually may come to, I suggested to Mr.
Seward to lay aside the Monroe doctrine, not to meddle for or against Mexico,
but to earnestly protest against any eventual European interference in the
internal condition of the political institutions of Mexico.
Continual secondary,
international complications, naturally growing out from the maritime question;
so with the Dutch cheesemongers, with Spain, with England - all easily to be
settled; they generate fuss and trouble, but will make no fire.
Gen. Scott's
partisans complain that McClellan is very disrespectful in his dealings with
Gen. Scott. I wonder not.. McClellan is probably hampered by the narrow routine
notions of Scott. McClellan feels that Scott prevents energetic and prompt
action; that he, McClellan, in every step is obliged to fight Gen. Scott's
inertia; and McClellan grows impatient, and shows it to Scott.
SOURCE: Adam
Gurowski, Diary from March 4, 1861, to November 12, 1862, pp. 92-103
