Lewis E. Harvie to Senator Robert M. T. Hunter, March 17, 1855

March 17th, 1855.

MY DEAR HUNTER: Your letter and enclosures have been received and immediately thereupon I wrote to Capt. Meigs accepting the offer, which is all that I wish, saving the fact, that I think, and so I am sure does John, that he is qualified to discharge the duties of a higher grade than the one he will hold. If this should be the case however Meigs will find it out soon enough and if not it is best as it is. I shall also write to Professor Bache to remove any feeling that he may have about his withdrawal, and to express my obligations to him. It is said that the way to make a man an enemy, is to do him a favor. If so, and sometimes, it is, I ought to become a very bitter enemy of yours. All I can say, or at least all I will say, is that I don't just now, think that the proverb will ever apply to me. What is to result from the Know Nothing nominations? And why should I have thought of Patton in connection with that ticket, just after writing the preceding paragraph? Sometimes, tho thank God not often I doubt my kind. Change of Party for good reason, is the evidence of high moral principle, but for greed or mere self it is degrading and vile, and unfortunately, when done by men high in the confidence of their community, it is demoralizing and utterly destroys confidence. This it is, and not the belief that so cold blooded an act of prostitution and treason, for a consideration either of money or place, can strengthen this Hivmaphrodite [sic] party, that makes me deplore this act. The ticket is strong and was the work of master workmen. It carries on its face tho' too plainly the object for which it was made. Flournoy, for the old Whigs, Neals for the Northwest and the old liners and Patton for the Chivalry and to give weight, for its ability. Men and not measures on their part. The Union of men of all parties. The hope of office extended to all from the Constable to the President. Let our cry be Principles not mere Trust in the People, open discussion Pledges given before trusts are confided. We will beat them I have faith, if I had not I should well nigh despair, not only now but for the future. If we can stand up and maintain this fight and beat this movement in Virginia I feel that our institutions will be sound if not may God have mercy on us, for on him alone must be our reliance. I have as yet seen no flinching here, our men are true and hopeful. The Whigs are however either of the Organization or aiding it. I still think you should throw yourself into the fight, heartily zealously and proclaim the consequences of defeat to your State, whose Representation will be listened to and whose statements must carry weight.

SOURCE: Charles Henry Ambler, Editor, Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1916, in Two Volumes, Vol. II, Correspondence of Robert M. T. Hunter (1826-1876), p. 162-3

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, December 18, 1865

Called on Secretary of the Treasury in behalf of Pease of Janesville for collector. He, McCulloch, defers too much to the dictates of Members of Congress, who have personal objects in view, and many of them unfriendly to the Administration. Told him of my interview with Sumner. McCulloch said in regard to Stanton that if he had said to Sumner he approved of the Worcester speech, he was a double-dealer, wore two faces, that if really opposed to the President's policy he ought not to remain in the Cabinet.

On my way, returning to the Navy Department, I called and had an interview with the President. Told him of my conversation with Sumner, and that I was confirmed in the conviction that a deep and extensive intrigue was going on against him. He seemed aware of it, but not yet of its extent or of all the persons engaged in it. I remarked that the patronage of the Executive had, I believed, been used to defeat the policy of the Executive, and a summary removal of one or two mischievous men at the proper time would be effective and salutary. He said he should not hesitate one moment in taking off the heads of any of that class of busybodies.

I showed him a copy of the New Orleans Tribune which Sumner had sent me, with passages underscored in a memorial for the impeachment of the President. He wished the copy and I gave it to him.

Called on Dennison this evening and had a full and free interchange with him. He inquired if I had ever heard a distinct avowal from Seward on the question of negro suffrage or the provisional governments, or from Stanton explicitly in its favor. I replied that I had not and he said he had not. He tells me that he hears from some of Stanton's intimates that he will probably soon resign. This is mere trash, unless he finds himself about being cornered; then he will make a merit of what cannot be avoided. Dennison ridicules the flagrant humbug which Seward and the papers have got up of Stanton's immense labors, which are really less than those of his own, McCulloch's, or mine. Grant, Meigs, and others discharge the labors for which S. gets credit. D. intends leaving to-morrow for Ohio, to be absent for ten days. Wants me to accompany him in the morning to the President.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 398-9

Dr. Seth Rogers to his daughter Dolly, March 27, 1863

March 27, 1863.

This afternoon our eyes were gladdened by the sight of the Boston and Convoy steaming up the river, but when, instead of a cavalry force and light artillery to weigh them down, we perceived they came empty, we were filled with forebodings, till our hearts actually sank within us at the intelligence that an order from General Hunter had come for our forces to evacuate the town, to help those further north. This may be wisdom, but I fail to see anything but that fatal vacillation which has thus far cursed us in this war. We have planted ourselves here for the definite purpose of making this state free, and have already so fortified the city that a small force can hold it, while the boats are making such raids up the river as may seem best. Colonel Montgomery and his men have been off two days up the river and tonight, a steamer is dispatched to call them back. I hope it will take the John Adams a week to find the Gen. Meigs, for we cannot think of leaving without them. Unfortunately we are constantly expecting her back, though it would not surprise me if Colonel Montgomery had marched his men twenty miles inland, and confiscated all sorts of contrabands. He carefully avoided taking anything but hard bread, for he religiously believes we ought to live on the rebels.

Judge Stickney is exceedingly anxious to take the Convoy and go back to Hilton Head to ask for a reconsideration of the order. Among the officers there is a difference of opinion as to the rightfulness of such a delay. The order was peremptory and, were I General Hunter, I would cashier the officer who disobeyed it. At the same time I believe the only reason why General Hunter calls us back is, because he fears our black troops might be overpowered in the absence of the other regiments. There would be no danger of it. If our army ever should happen to do anything at Charleston we could be reinforced after that.

SOURCE: Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Volume 43, October, 1909—June, 1910: February 1910. p. 381-2

Dr. Seth Rogers to his daughter Dolly, March 28, 1863

March 28, Evening.

Not yet off. Have worked enough for one day in getting our sick and wounded on the John Adams. Another steamer has arrived with additional instructions. It seems that each regiment is to return to its former camp. I suppose that this means that we are to protect the Islands while the advance is made on Charleston, if it means anything. The John Adams found the Gen. Meigs a long way up the river. They returned at noon with twelve rebel prisoners, who were caught while asleep at their station. The Lieutenant in command was permitted to say good-bye to his wife, and made his escape through the sobs and crinoline of his female friends. Colonel Montgomery admits a weak spot in his military nature. He could have shot the Lieut. while escaping, but would not do so in the presence of his wife.

Our men made a landing at Palatka and were fired into by the rebs. Lieut. Col. Billings received a ball through the fleshy margin of each hand while attempting to get off the steamer. Brave old John Quincy received one through the leg, a little above the ankle, fracturing the small bone and carrying away some of it. I shall not amputate. It seemed peculiarly trying for the old man. He had begged the privilege of going up for his wife and received a shot instead. I don't see quite how he will harmonize this double affliction with the theory he so often preaches to the men, that when one trusts in God and is not a coward, he will be protected against the bullets of his enemies. . . .

Tonight the Major and Capt. with twenty picked men, go up the river with muffled oars, to try to capture another lot of pickets. I fear they will not be successful. . . Thomas Long returned safely day before yesterday. He examined camp Finnegan, eight miles out, and went to the trestle four miles beyond, but finding it closely watched by pickets he did not attempt to burn it. I look at that man with a deep feeling of reverence.

My "Rebel" and I went, this afternoon, round the circuit of the pickets, forts, rifle pits and stockades for the last time. The pickets were playing euchre and fishing in the creek and enjoying themselves as only pickets can. I thought how much less the rebels troubled them than me. The truth is, the order to evacuate this town depresses me. I hate weak vacillation and this seems too much like the unsettled policy that all along has crippled the energy of our forces.

SOURCE: Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Volume 43, October, 1909—June, 1910: February 1910. p. 382-3

Diary of Gideon Welles: September 28, 1865

I have been absent during most of the month of September in my native State and among the scenes of my childhood and youth. Change is there. Of the companions who fifty years ago it was my pleasure to love, and who I truly believe loved me, few, only few, remain, while of those who were in middle life or more advanced age, men who encouraged and stood by me, who voluntarily elected me to the Legislature when I was but twenty-four, scarcely one remains. Their children and grandchildren to some extent occupy their places, but a different class of persons have come into the old town and much altered its character.

Little of importance has transpired during the month. The rebellious States are reorganizing their governments and institutions, — submitting to results they could not arrest or avert. In the Free States, political conventions have been held and movements made to revivify old parties, and, on the part of the extremists, or Radicals, an exhibition of intense hate towards the Rebels which bodes mischief has manifested itself.

In New York an extraordinary step, a coup d'état, was taken by the Democratic organization, which indorsed President Johnson and nominated Union men to some of the most important places on the ticket. A counter move was made by the Union party, which nominated an entire new ticket, and passed resolutions not remarkable in any respect.

The Massachusetts Republican convention did not like to take ground antagonistic to the Administration, although the leaders, particularly Sumner and his friends, cannot suppress their hostile feelings. Their resolutions, adopted at Worcester, are very labored, and abound more in words than distinct ideas, reminding one of the old woman who wished to scream but dared not.

In Connecticut the question of amending the State Constitution so as to erase the word "white" is pending. Some feeling among the old Abolitionists and leading politicians was exhibited, and they may, and probably will, work up some feeling in its favor; but generally the people are indifferent or opposed to it. But for the national questions before the country, the amendment would be defeated; the probabilities appeared to me in its favor. I avoided interfering in the question or expressing an opinion on the subject, but the partisans are determined to draw me out. It is asserted in the Times that I am opposed to negro suffrage. Two of the editors deny this and have so written me. I replied in a hasty note that no one was authorized to say I had expressed opposition to it. Since then I have had a telegram from the editor of the Press, Warner, asking if I am in favor of negro suffrage. Disliking to be catechized in this way and not disposed to give a categorical answer, I replied that I was in favor of intelligence, not of color for qualification for suffrage. The truth is I have little or no feeling on the subject, and as we require that the electors shall read, and have few negroes in Connecticut, I acquiesce in, rather than advocate, the amendment. I would not enslave the negro, but his enfranchisement is another question, and until he is better informed, it is not desirable that he should vote. The great zeal of Sumner and the Abolitionists in behalf of the negro voting has no responsive sympathy with me. It is a species of fanaticism, zeal without discretion. Whenever the time arrives that he should vote, the negro will probably be permitted. I am no advocate for social equality, nor do I labor for political or civil equality with the negro. I do not want him at my table, nor do I care to have him in the jury-box, or in the legislative hall, or on the bench. The negro does not vote in Connecticut, nor is he taxed. There are but a few hundreds of them. Of these perhaps not half can read and consequently cannot vote, while, if the restriction is removed, all will be taxed.

Judge Blair came to see me the day after I came back. He is preparing a reply to Judge Holt. During my absence the papers have published a statement made by Mr. Fox in relation to the Sumter expedition, which was sent to the Senate as an appendix to my reply to a call of the Senate, but that body declined to receive F.'s statement. It comes in now, aptly, with Blair's speech, and will doubtless be considered a part of the scheme. General Meigs hastened too fast to reply in order to assure Mr. Seward.

There are serious mistakes or blunders in Meigs's letter, which, however, will doubtless be corrected. Blair wished to get the armistice signed by Holt, Toucey, and Mallory, and asked if I remembered it. I told him I did, and that we had it on our files. But on sending for the volume I find it is only a copy. Yet my convictions were as positive as Blair's that the original was in the Navy Department. I thought I remembered the paper distinctly, its color and general appearance, but the copy does not correspond with my recollection, yet I cannot doubt it is the paper which I saw. From this difference I am admonished of the uncertainty and fallibility of human testimony.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 372-4

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, August 8, 1865

The subject of a change to relieve the President was discussed in Cabinet and Seward produced the order which he had prepared. There was no dissent as to the necessity of some action. Various matters were submitted by different members. I presented, at the request of Judge Wayne, the subject of paying debts in the Rebel States, and all thought none that were due prior to the War should, for the present at least, be considered.

Stanton submitted a number of not material questions, yet possessed of some little interest. Before the meeting closed, the subject of army movements on the Plains came up, and Stanton said there were three columns of twenty-two thousand troops moving into the Indian country, with a view to an Indian campaign. Inquiry as to the origin and authority of such a movement elicited nothing from the Secretary of War. He said he knew nothing on the subject. He had been told there was such a movement, and Meigs had informed him it was true. Grant had been written to for information, but Grant was away and he knew not when he should have a reply. The expenses of this movement could not, he said, be less than fifty millions of dollars. But he knew nothing about it.

All manifested surprise. The President, however, made, I observed, no inquiry or any comment. Whether this was intentional reticence, or the result of physical weariness or debility,—for he was far from well, I could not determine. I thought it alarming that there should be such an imposing demonstration on the part of the military, and the Administration, or executive officer of the War Department, ignorant in regard to it. If so, it is to his discredit; if not true, it is no less so. The only apology or excuse would be that the President had ordered this through General Grant, or assented to it at least. But this would be a slight upon the Secretary of War to which he would not possibly submit.

Following up this subject, Governor Dennison inquired of Stanton in relation to the recent general order dividing the country into eighteen military departments and assigning a multitude of generals to them. The question was mildly, pertinently, and appropriately put, but Stanton evinced intense feeling and acrimony. He said the Postmaster-General must address his inquiries to General Grant respecting that order, and he had no doubt General Grant would have been glad to have had Dennison's advice and direction on the subject. For his part he had not undertaken to instruct or advise General Grant.

There was a sneer and insolence in the manner, more offensive even than the words. I was on the point of inquiring if the civil administration of the government could not be informed on so important a subject, when Speed, who evidently saw there was feeling, hastened to introduce another topic. I was glad he did so, yet this state of things cannot endure.

I fell in with Dennison, or he with me, when taking my usual walk, and we at once got on to the subject of Stanton's insolent replies to-day. Dennison was, with reason, irritated. Said he had forborne to reply or pursue the subject because his temper was excited and there would have been a scene. He says he has known Stanton well for twenty-five years; that he is a charlatan and that he wanted D. to make a sharp reply on Grant in order that he might report it to that officer and thus create a difference.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 354-6

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, August 18, 1865

Senators Doolittle and Foster and Mr. Ford, who have been on a mission to the Plains, visiting New Mexico, Colorado, etc., had an interview with the President and Cabinet of an hour and a half. Their statement in relation to the Indians and Indian affairs exhibits the folly and wickedness of the expedition which has been gotten up by somebody without authority or the knowledge of the government.

Their strong protestations against an Indian war, and their statement of the means which they had taken to prevent it came in very opportunely. Stanton said General Grant had already written to restrict operations; he had also sent to General Meigs. I have no doubt a check has been put on a very extraordinary and unaccountable proceeding, but I doubt if an entire stop is yet put to war expenses.

Stanton is still full of apprehension and stories of plots and conspiracies. I am inclined to believe he has fears, and he evidently wishes the President to be alarmed. He had quite a story to-day, and read quite a long affidavit from some one whom I do not recall, stating he had been in communication with C. C. Clay and others in Canada, that they wanted him to be one of a party to assassinate President Lincoln and his whole Cabinet. Dennison and McCulloch and I thought the President seemed inclined to give this rigmarole some credence. I think the story, though plausibly got up, was chiefly humbug. Likely Stanton believes me stupid because I give so little heed to his sensational communications; but really a large portion of them seem to me ludicrous and puerile. He still keeps up a guard around his house, and never ventures out without a stout man to accompany him who is ordinarily about ten feet behind him. This body-guard is, I have no doubt, paid for by the public. He urged a similar guard for me and others.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 362-3

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, April 14, 1865

Last night there was a general illumination in Washington, fireworks, etc. To-day is the anniversary of the surrender of Sumter, and the flag is to be raised by General Anderson.

General Grant was present at the meeting of the Cabinet to-day, and remained during the session. The subject was the relations of the Rebels, the communications, the trade, etc. Stanton proposed that intercourse should be opened by his issuing an order, that the Treasury would give permits to all who wished them to trade, excluding contraband, and he, Stanton, would order the vessels to be received into any port. I suggested that it would be better that the President should issue a proclamation stating and enjoining the course to be pursued by the several Departments.

McCulloch expressed a willingness to be relieved of the Treasury agents. General Grant expressed himself very decidedly against them; thought them demoralizing, etc. The President said we, i. e. the Secretaries of Treasury, War, and Navy, had given the subject more attention than he had and he would be satisfied with any conclusion we would unite upon. I proposed to open the whole coast to any one who wished to trade, and who had a regular clearance and manifest, and was entitled to a coast license. Stanton thought it should not extend beyond the military lines. General Grant thought they might embrace all this side of the Mississippi.

Secretary Stanton requested the Cabinet to hear some remarks which he desired to make, and to listen to a proposition or ordinance which he had prepared with much care and after a great deal of reflection, for reconstruction in the Rebel States. The plan or ordinance embraced two distinct heads, one for asserting the Federal authority in Virginia, the other for reëstablishing a State government. The first struck me favorably, with some slight emendations; the second seemed to me objectionable in several essentials, and especially as in conflict with the principles of self-government which I deem essential. There was little said on the subject, for the understanding was that we should each be furnished with a copy for criticism and suggestion, and in the mean time we were requested by the President to deliberate and carefully consider the proposition. He remarked that this was the great question now before us, and we must soon begin to act. Was glad Congress was not in session.

I objected that Virginia occupied a different position from that of any other State in rebellion; that while regular State governments were to be established in other States, whose Secession governments were nullities and would not be recognized, Virginia had a skeleton organization which she had maintained through the War, which government we had recognized and still recognized; that we to-day acknowledged Peirpoint as the legitimate Governor of Virginia. He had been elected by only a few border counties, it was true; had never been able to enforce his authority over but a small portion of the territory or population; nevertheless we had recognized and sustained him.

The President said the point was well taken. Governor Dennison said he thought we should experience little difficulty from Peirpoint. Stanton said none whatever.

I remarked the fact was not to be controverted that we had treated with the existing government and could not ignore our own acts. The President and a portion of the Cabinet had, in establishing the new State of West Virginia, recognized the validity of the government of Virginia and of Peirpoint's administration, which had given its assent to that division. Without that consent no division could legally have taken place. I had differed with others in that matter, but consistency and the validity of our own act required us to continue to acknowledge the existing government. It was proper we should enforce the Federal authority, and it was proper we should aid Governor Peirpoint, whose government was recognized and established. In North Carolina a legal government was now to be organized and the State reëstablished in her proper relations to the Union.

Inquiry had been made as to army news on the first meeting of the Cabinet, and especially if any information had been received from Sherman. None of the members had heard anything, and Stanton, who makes it a point to be late, and who has the telegraph in his Department, had not arrived. General Grant, who was present, said he was hourly expecting word. The President remarked it would, he had no doubt, come soon, and come favorable, for he had last night the usual dream which he had preceding nearly every great and important event of the War. Generally the news had been favorable which succeeded this dream, and the dream itself was always the same. I inquired what this remarkable dream could be. He said it related to your (my) element, the water; that he seemed to be in some singular, indescribable vessel, and that he was moving with great rapidity towards an indefinite shore; that he had this dream preceding Sumter, Bull Run, Antietam, Gettysburg, Stone River, Vicksburg, Wilmington, etc. General Grant said Stone River was certainly no victory, and he knew of no great results which followed from it. The President said however that might be, his dream preceded that fight.¹

“I had,” the President remarked, “this strange dream again last night, and we shall, judging from the past, have great news very soon. I think it must be from Sherman. My thoughts are in that direction, as are most of yours.

I write this conversation three days after it occurred, in consequence of what took place Friday night, and but for which the mention of this dream would probably have never been noted. Great events did, indeed, follow, for within a few hours the good and gentle, as well as truly great, man who narrated his dream closed forever his earthly career.

I had retired to bed about half past-ten on the evening of the 14th of April, and was just getting asleep when Mrs. Welles, my wife, said some one was at our door. Sitting up in bed, I heard a voice twice call to John, my son, whose sleeping-room was on the second floor directly over the front entrance. I arose at once and raised a window, when my messenger, James Smith, called to me that Mr. Lincoln, the President, had been shot, and said Secretary Seward and his son, Assistant Secretary Frederick Seward, were assassinated. James was much alarmed and excited. I told him his story was very incoherent and improbable, that he was associating men who were not together and liable to attack at the same time. “Where," I inquired, “was the President when shot?" James said he was at Ford's Theatre on 10th Street. "Well," said I, “Secretary Seward is an invalid in bed in his house yonder on 15th Street." James said he had been there, stopped in at the house to make inquiry before alarming me.

I immediately dressed myself, and, against the earnest remonstrance and appeals of my wife, went directly to Mr. Seward's, whose residence was on the east side of the square, mine being on the north. James accompanied me. As we were crossing 15th Street, I saw four or five men in earnest consultation, standing under the lamp on the corner by St. John's Church. Before I had got half across the street, the lamp was suddenly extinguished and the knot of persons rapidly dispersed. For a moment and but a moment I was disconcerted to find myself in darkness, but, recollecting that it was late and about time for the moon to rise, I proceeded on, not having lost five steps, merely making a pause without stopping. Hurrying forward into 15th Street, I found it pretty full of people, especially so near the residence of Secretary Seward, where there were many soldiers as well as citizens already gathered.

Entering the house, I found the lower hall and office full of persons, and among them most of the foreign legations, all anxiously inquiring what truth there was in the horrible rumors afloat. I replied that my object was to ascertain the facts. Proceeding through the hall to the stairs, I found one, and I think two, of the servants there holding the crowd in check. The servants were frightened and appeared relieved to see me. I hastily asked what truth there was in the story that an assassin or assassins had entered the house and assaulted the Secretary. They said it was true, and that Mr. Frederick was also badly injured. They wished me to go up, but no others. At the head of the first stairs I met the elder Mrs. Seward, who was scarcely able to speak but desired me to proceed up to Mr. Seward's room. I met Mrs. Frederick Seward on the third story, who, although in extreme distress, was, under the circumstances, exceedingly composed. I asked for the Secretary's room, which she pointed out, — the southwest room. As I entered, I met Miss Fanny Seward, with whom I exchanged a single word, and proceeded to the foot of the bed. Dr. Verdi and, I think, two others were there. The bed was saturated with blood. The Secretary was lying on his back, the upper part of his head covered by a cloth, which extended down over his eyes. His mouth was open, the lower jaw dropping down. I exchanged a few whispered words with Dr. V. Secretary Stanton, who came after but almost simultaneously with me, made inquiries in a louder tone till admonished by a word from one of the physicians. We almost immediately withdrew and went into the adjoining front room, where lay Frederick Seward. His eyes were open but he did not move them, nor a limb, nor did he speak. Doctor White, who was in attendance, told me he was unconscious and more dangerously injured than his father.

As we descended the stairs, I asked Stanton what he had heard in regard to the President that was reliable. He said the President was shot at Ford's Theatre, that he had seen a man who was present and witnessed the occurrence. I said I would go immediately to the White House. Stanton told me the President was not there but was at the theatre. “Then,” said I, “let us go immediately there.” He said that was his intention, and asked me, if I had not a carriage, to go with him. In the lower hall we met General Meigs,² whom he requested to take charge of the house, and to clear out all who did not belong there. General Meigs begged Stanton not to go down to 10th Street; others also remonstrated against our going. Stanton, I thought, hesitated. Hurrying forward, I remarked that I should go immediately, and I thought it his duty also. He said he should certainly go, but the remonstrants increased and gathered round him. I said we were wasting time, and, pressing through the crowd, entered the carriage and urged Stanton, who was detained by others after he had placed his foot on the step. I was impatient. Stanton, as soon as he had seated himself, turned round, rose partly, and said the carriage was not his. I said that was no objection. He invited Meigs to go with us, and Judge Cartter of the Supreme Court³ mounted with the driver. At this moment Major Eckert⁴ rode up on horseback beside the carriage and protested vehemently against Stanton's going to 10th Street; said he had just come from there, that there were thousands of people of all sorts there, and he considered it very unsafe for the Secretary of War to expose himself. I replied that I knew not where he would be more safe, and that the duty of both of us was to attend the President immediately. Stanton concurred. Meigs called to some soldiers to go with us, and there was one on each side of the carriage. The streets were full of people. Not only the sidewalk but the carriage-way was to some extent occupied, all or nearly all hurrying towards 10th Street. When we entered that street we found it pretty closely packed.

The President had been carried across the street from the theatre, to the house of a Mr. Peterson. We entered by ascending a flight of steps above the basement and passing through a long hall to the rear, where the President lay extended on a bed, breathing heavily. Several surgeons were present, at least six, I should think more. Among them I was glad to observe Dr. Hall, who, however, soon left. I inquired of Dr. H., as I entered, the true condition of the President. He replied the President was dead to all intents, although he might live three hours or perhaps longer.

The giant sufferer lay extended diagonally across the bed, which was not long enough for him. He had been stripped of his clothes. His large arms, which were occasionally exposed, were of a size which one would scarce have expected from his spare appearance. His slow, full respiration lifted the clothes with each breath that he took. His features were calm and striking. I had never seen them appear to better advantage than for the first hour, perhaps, that I was there. After that, his right eye began to swell and that part of his face became discolored.

Senator Sumner was there, I think, when I entered. If not he came in soon after, as did Speaker Colfax, Mr. Secretary McCulloch, and the other members of the Cabinet, with the exception of Mr. Seward. A double guard was stationed at the door and on the sidewalk, to repress the crowd, which was of course highly excited and anxious. The room was small and overcrowded. The surgeons and members of the Cabinet were as many as should have been in the room, but there were many more, and the hall and other rooms in the front or main house were full. One of these rooms was occupied by Mrs. Lincoln and her attendants, with Miss Harris. Mrs. Dixon and Mrs. Kinney came to her about twelve o'clock. About once an hour Mrs. Lincoln would repair to the bedside of her dying husband and with lamentation and tears remain until overcome by emotion.

_______________

¹ General Grant interrupted to say Stone River was no victory, — that a few such fights would have ruined us. The President looked at Grant curiously and inquiringly; said they might differ on that point, and at all events his dream preceded it. This was the first occasion I had to notice Grant's jealous nature. In turning it over in my mind at a later period, I remembered that Rawlins had been sent to Washington to procure action against General McClernand at Vicksburg. Later there was jealousy manifested towards General Thomas and others who were not satellites. - G. W.

² Montgomery C. Meigs, Quartermaster-General.

³ That is, of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.

⁴ Maj. T. T. Eckert, Assistant Superintendent of the Military Telegraph.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 280-7

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, July 11, 1864

The Rebels are upon us. Having visited upper Maryland, they are turning their attention hitherward. General Wallace has been defeated, and it was yesterday current that General Tyler and Colonel Seward were prisoners, the latter wounded. But it seems only the last is true of the latter.

There is now a call from the War Department for gunboats at Havre de Grace, Gunpowder and Bush Rivers. Have ordered off three, but was afraid they would not arrive in season, for the call was not made and its necessity was scouted at Headquarters until the Rebels had cut the York and Baltimore Road. We have word by telegram this P.M. that the bridge over Gunpowder has been burned but a gunboat was on hand. Have no particulars.

Tom G. Welles was this day appointed to the staff of General McCook. I regret his passion for the service and his recklessness and youth.

The Rebel pickets appear in strength in front of Forts Stevens and DeRussy on the borders and within the District lines. Went to Stanton, but got from him nothing at all. He exhibits none of the alarm and fright I have seen in him on former occasions. It is evident he considers the force not large, or such that cannot be controlled, and yet he cannot tell their number nor where they are.

I rode out this evening to Fort Stevens, latterly called Fort Massachusetts. Found General Wright and General McCook with what I am assured is an ample force for its defense. Passed and met as we returned three or four thousand, perhaps more, volunteers under General Meigs, going to the front. Could see the line of pickets of both armies in the valley, extending a mile or more. There was continual firing, without many casualties so far as I could observe, or hear. Two houses in the vicinity were in flames, set on fire by our own people, because they obstructed the range of our guns and gave shelter to Rebel sharpshooters. Other houses and buildings had also been destroyed. A pretty grove nearly opposite the fort was being cut down. War would not spare the tree, if the woodman had.

I inquired where the Rebel force was, and the officers said over the hills, pointing in the direction of Silver Spring. Are they near Gunpowder or Baltimore? Where are they? Oh! within a short distance, a mile or two only. I asked why their whereabouts was not ascertained, and their strength known. The reply was that we had no fresh cavalry.

The truth is the forts around Washington have been vacated and the troops sent to General Grant, who was promised reinforcements to take Richmond. But he has been in its vicinity more than a month, resting, apparently, after his bloody march, but has effected nothing since his arrival on the James, nor displayed any strategy, while Lee has sent a force threatening the National Capital, and we are without force for its defense. Citizens are volunteering, and the employees in the navy yard are required to man the fortifications left destitute. Stanton and Halleck, who scouted Fenton's application and bluffed my inquiries, are now the most alarmed men in Washington.

I am sorry to see so little reliable intelligence. It strikes me that the whole demonstration is weak in numbers but strong in conception that the Rebels have but a small force. I am satisfied no attack is now to be apprehended on the city; the Rebels have lost a remarkable opportunity. But on our part there is neglect, ignorance, folly, imbecility, in the last degree. The Rebels are making a show of fight while they are stealing horses, cattle, etc., through Maryland. They might easily have captured Washington. Stanton, Halleck, and Grant are asleep or dumb.

The waste of war is terrible; the waste from imbecility and mismanagement is more terrible and more trying than from the ravages of the soldiers. It is impossible for the country to bear up under these monstrous errors and wrongs.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 71-3

Lieutenant David D. Porter to Commander Andrew H. Foot, April 5, 1861

ASTOR HOUSE [NEW YORK, N. Y., April 5?,] 8 o’clock.

DEAR CAPTAIN: I am with Captain Meigs and we are telegraphing to Mr. Seward. Meigs thinks Mr. Welles's telegram* is bogus. Would he, think you, dare to countermand an order (written order) of the President? Meigs and myself (knowing all the circumstances) think it impossible. I shall stay over to-night to keep telegraphing. So much depends on having no mistakes made in this matter. If you hear anything will you send me word? I will be at the yard at

6 o'clock in the morning. Will you take care of my boy to-night? And oblige me by sending the enclosed to Mr. Heap, on board the Powhatan

Yours, very truly,

D. D. PORTER.

[Commander A. H. Foote, U. S. Navy,

Acting Commandant Navy Yard, New York.]

_______________

* See p. ___

SOURCE: Official Records of Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume 4, p. 111-2

Gustavus V. Fox to Flag Officer Samuel F. Dupont, February 28, 1862

Navy Department

March 6” 1862.

My dear Commodore:

I had a long talk with McClellan to-day to see if he had any objections to giving Sherman orders to go ahead with the first programme. I was rather surprised to find that he did not know why it had not been carried out, and upon comparing notes more freely, we both found that we were entirely ignorant of what was going on or intended. Meigs was with us, and he had a letter from Sherman one month old, which seemed to intimate that the other expedition was about to move. Under these circumstances, an order will be given by both Departments, suggesting that the matter go forward at once, unless incompatible with some operation now on hand. I do not think, as I have several times written you, that the Government place much importance upon the acquisition of Savannah, beyond the possession of Pulaski, but the recovery of a whole state is a moral victory that cannot be too highly estimated. The people expected Sherman to march at once upon Savannah or Charleston, which was ridiculous, and impossible, though I think he could have cut the railroad. He and his compeers, expected the gun boats to go directly into the Savannah river, and dash up to the city, which was impossible, so that a month ago he seemed to be waiting for the Navy to go South. In the meantime there is an immense force and the sickly season almost upon us. I look forward to it with dire apprehension. The Nashville has got into Wilmington, Southern accounts say by hoisting the American flag and going through our ships. A regular trade seems to be carried on from Nassau and Havana to some parts of our Southern coasts in small vessels. I suppose it cannot be entirely prevented, of course, but I do not believe they use Charleston and Fernandina as they pretend. There are eight steamers fitting out in England for the Southern coast, and the blockade would give us very serious trouble were it not for the desperate condition of the rebels, owing to their sudden reverses in the west. I think Europe will now withdraw their material aid. The Vermont, having met with serious losses, the extent of which are yet unknown, the Relief is now loading for Port Royal. I hope Lenthall and Harwood keep you well up in ammunition and coal. The resolution for you went through unanimously and I trust we shall obtain for you higher honors yet. The Maratanza “double Ender” is nearly ready at Boston and we will send her down for Rodgers. The Miami steered badly but it was the fault of the constructor at Philadelphia. The Octorara is a gem. We shall get off the Vermont again at the earliest possible moment, but she is not yet saved, and I hear has lost her masts. Any little trophies from your district would be most gratefully received by the members of Congress, and as they constantly ask me for such, I have ventured to ask you to make up a box of the most trifling things. One word more, and good night. Don't write confidential letters upon a former flag officer to your short friend.

Yours most truly,

G. V. FOX.

Flag Officer S. F. DuPont, G. V. FOX.

Comd’g So Atlantic Blockd’g Squadron

Port Royal

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 109-11

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, May 9, 1864

We had yesterday great feelings, deep interest, but little news, — little in the way of detail, though great in importance. Nothing came from General Grant, who is no braggart and does not mean to have tidings precipitated in advance. A dispatch from General Ingalls to Quartermaster-General Meigs calls for forage, which indicates an onward movement. Other incidental information is to the same effect. At least this is my inference and others’ also.

To-day’s news confirms the impression, yet we have nothing specific. All our conclusions, however, are one way, and there can be no doubt the Rebels have fallen back and our forces have advanced.

Mr. Heap, clerk to Rear-Admiral Porter, arrived yesterday from Alexandria on the Red River. He brings a deplorable account of affairs in a confidential dispatch from Admiral Porter and more fully detailed by himself. The misfortunes are attributed entirely and exclusively to the incapacity of General Banks. Neither Admiral Porter nor Mr. Heap admit any mitigating circumstances, but impute to his imbecility the loss of the expedition and the probable sacrifice of the fleet and the army. They accuse him of equivocating, of electioneering, of speculating in cotton and general malfeasance and mismanagement.

I took Heap with me to the President and had him tell his own story. It was less full and denunciatory than to me, but it seemed to convince the President, who I have thought was over-partial to Banks, and I have thought that Seward contributed to that feeling. The President, after hearing Heap, said he had rather cousined up to Banks, but for some time past had begun to think he was erring in so doing. He repeated two verses from Moore, commencing

“Oh, ever thus, from childhood’s hour,

I’ve seen my fondest hopes decay,” etc.

It would not do to retain him in military command at such obvious sacrifice of the public interest.

I am not one of the admirers of Banks. He has a certain degree of offhand smartness, very good elocution and command of language, with perfect self-possession, but is not profound. He is a pretender, not a statesman, a politician of a certain description; has great ambition but little fixed principle. It was Seward’s doings that sent him to New Orleans.

Who got up the Red River expedition I know not, otherwise than by Admiral Porter, who writes me he has seen the orders from Halleck. I know that I called on Stanton in company with Seward last summer with a view of getting up an expedition to capture Mobile; that Stanton sent for General Halleck; that the latter, when he came, was not prepared to adopt our views, wanted to hear from General Banks, was thinking of operations west of the Mississippi, etc. Seward surrendered without a word of remonstrance. Halleck was to let us know as soon as he heard from Banks, and I have never had a word from him since.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 25-7

Diary of William Howard Russell: July 18, 1861

After breakfast. Leaving head-quarters, I went across to General Mansfield's, and was going up-stairs, when the General* himself, a white-headed, gray-bearded, and rather soldierly-looking man, dashed out of his room in some excitement, and exclaimed, “Mr. Russell, I fear there is bad news from the front.” “Are they fighting, General?” “Yes, sir. That fellow Tyler has been engaged, and we are whipped.” Again I went off to the horse-dealer; but this time the price of the steed had been raised to £220; “for,” says he, “I don't want my animals to be ripped up by them cannon and them musketry, and those who wish to be guilty of such cruelty must pay for it.” At the War-Office, at the Department of State, at the Senate, and at the White House, messengers and orderlies running in and out, military aides, and civilians with anxious faces, betokened the activity and perturbation which reigned within. I met Senator Sumner radiant with joy. “We have obtained a great success; the rebels are falling back in all directions. General Scott says we ought to be in Richmond by Saturday night.” Soon afterwards a United States officer, who had visited me in company with General Meigs, riding rapidly past, called out, “You have heard we are whipped; these confounded volunteers have run away.” I drove to the Capitol, where people said one could actually see the smoke of the cannon; but, on arriving there, it was evident that the fire from some burning houses, and from wood cut down for cooking purposes, had been mistaken for tokens of the fight.

It was strange to stand outside the walls of the Senate whilst legislators were debating inside respecting the best means of punishing the rebels and traitors; and to think that, amidst the dim horizon of woods which bounded the west towards the plains of Manassas, the army of the United States was then contending, at least with doubtful fortune, against the forces of the desperate and hopeless outlaws whose fate these United States senators pretended to hold in the hollow of their hands. Nor was it unworthy of note that many of the tradespeople along Pennsylvania Avenue, and the ladies whom one saw sauntering in the streets, were exchanging significant nods and smiles, and rubbing their hands with satisfaction. I entered one shop, where the proprietor and his wife ran forward to meet me. . . “Have you heard the news? Beauregard has knocked them into a cooked hat.” “Believe me,” said the good lady, “it is the finger of the Almighty is in it. Didn't he curse the niggers, and why should he take their part now with these Yankee Abolitionists, against true white men?” “But how do you know this?” said I. “Why, it's all true enough, depend upon it, no matter how we know it. We've got our underground railway as well as the Abolitionists.”

On my way to dinner at the Legation I met the President crossing Pennsylvania Avenue, striding like a crane in a bulrush swamp among the great blocks of marble, dressed in an oddly cut suit of gray, with a felt hat on the back of his head, wiping his face with a red pocket-handkerchief. He was evidently in a hurry, on his way to the White House, where I believe a telegraph has been established in communication with McDowell's head-quarters. I may mention, by the by in illustration of the extreme ignorance and arrogance which characterize the low Yankee, that a man in the uniform of a colonel said to me to-day, as I was leaving the War Department, “They have just got a telegraph from McDowell. Would it not astonish you Britishers to hear that, as our General moves on towards the enemy, he trails a telegraph wire behind him, just to let them know in Washington which foot he is putting first?” I was imprudent enough to say, “I assure you the use of the telegraph is not such a novelty in Europe or even in India. When Lord Clyde made his campaign, the telegraph was laid in his track as fast as he advanced.” “Oh, well, come now,” quoth the Colonel, “that's pretty good, that is; I believe you'll say next, your General Clyde and our Benjamin Franklin discovered lightning simultaneously.”

The calm of a Legation contrasts wonderfully in troubled times with the excitement and storm of the world outside. M. Mercier perhaps is moved to a vivacious interest in events. M. Stoeckl becomes more animated as the time approaches when he sees the fulfilment of his prophecies at hand. M. Tassara cannot be indifferent to occurrences which bear so directly on the future of Spain in Western seas; but all these diplomatists can discuss the most engrossing and portentous incidents of political and military life, with a sense of calm and indifference which was felt by the gentleman who resented being called out of his sleep to get up out of a burning house because he was only a lodger.

There is no Minister of the European Powers in Washington who watches with so much interest the march of events as Lord Lyons, or who feels as much sympathy perhaps in the Federal Government as the constituted Executive of the country to which he is accredited; but in virtue of his position he knows little or nothing officially of what passes around him, and may be regarded as a medium for the communication of despatches to Mr. Seward, and for the discharge of a great deal of most causeless and unmeaning vituperation from the conductors of the New York press against England.

On my return to Captain Johnson's lodgings I received a note from the head-quarters of the Federals, stating that the serious action between the two armies would probably be postponed for some days. McDowell's original idea was to avoid forcing the enemy's position directly in front, which was defended by movable batteries commanding the fords over a stream called “Bull's Run.” He therefore proposed to make a demonstration on some point near the centre of their line, and at the same time throw the mass of his force below their extreme right, so as to turn it and get possession of the Manassas Railway in their rear; a movement which would separate him, by the by, from his own communications, and enable any General worth his salt to make a magnificent counter by marching on Washington, only 27 miles away, which he could take with the greatest ease, and leave the enemy in the rear to march 120 miles to Richmond, if they dared, or to make a hasty retreat upon the higher Potomac, and to cross into the hostile country of Maryland.

McDowell, however, has found the country on his left densely wooded and difficult. It is as new to him as it was to Braddock, when he cut his wreary way through forest and swamp in this very district to reach, hundreds of miles away, the scene of his fatal repulse at Fort Du Quesne. And so, having moved his whole army, McDowell finds himself obliged to form a new plan of attack, and, prudently fearful of pushing his underdone and over-praised levies into a river in face of an enemy, is endeavoring to ascertain with what chance of success he can attack and turn their left.

Whilst he was engaged in a reconnoissance to-day, General Tyler did one of those things which must be expected from ambitious officers, without any fear of punishment, in countries where military discipline is scarcely known. Ordered to reconnoitre the position of the enemy on the left front, when the army moved from Fairfax to Centreville this morning, General Tyler thrust forward some 3000 or 4000 men of his division down to the very banks of “Bull's Run,” which was said to be thickly wooded, and there brought up his men under a heavy fire of artillery and musketry, from which they retired in confusion.

The papers from New York to-night are more than usually impudent and amusing. The retreat of the Confederate outposts from Fairfax Court House is represented as a most extraordinary success; at best it was an affair of outposts; but one would really think that it was a victory of no small magnitude. I learn that the Federal troops behaved in a most ruffianly and lawless manner at Fairfax Court House. It is but a bad beginning of a campaign for the restoration of the Union, to rob, burn, and destroy the property and houses of the people in the State of Virginia. The enemy are described as running in all directions, but it is evident they did not intend to defend the advanced works, which were merely constructed to prevent surprise or cavalry inroads.

I went to Willard's, where the news of the battle, as it was called, was eagerly discussed. One little man in front of the cigar-stand declared it was all an affair of cavalry. “But how could that be among the piney woods and with a river in front, major?” “Our boys, sir, left their horses, crossed the water at a run, and went right away through them with their swords and six-shooters.” “I tell you what it is, Mr. Russell,” said a man who followed me out of the crowd and placed his hand on my shoulder, “they were whipped like curs, and they ran like curs, and I know it.” “How?” “Well, I’d rather be excused telling you.”

_______________

* Since killed in action.

SOURCE: William Howard Russell, My Diary North and South, Vol. 1, p. 427-31

Diary of William Howard Russell: July 7, 1861

Mr. Bigelow invited me to breakfast, to meet Mr. Senator King, Mr. Olmsted, Mr. Thurlow Weed, a Senator from Missouri, a West Point professor, and others. It was indicative of the serious difficulties which embarrass the action of the Government to hear Mr. Wilson, the Chairman of the Military Committee of the Senate, inveigh against the officers of the regular army, and attack West Point itself. Whilst the New York papers were lauding General Scott and his plans to the skies, the Washington politicians were speaking of him as obstructive, obstinate, and prejudiced — unfit for the times and the occasion.

General Scott refused to accept cavalry and artillery at the beginning of the levy, and said that they were not required; now he was calling for both arms most urgently. The officers of the regular army had followed suit. Although they were urgently pressed by the politicians to occupy Harper's Ferry and Manassas, they refused to do either, and the result is that the enemy have obtained invaluable supplies from the first place, and are now assembled in force in a most formidable position at the second. Everything as yet accomplished has been done by political generals — not by the officers of the regular army. Butler and Banks saved Baltimore in spite of General Scott. There was an attempt made to cry up Lyon in Missouri; but in fact it was Frank Blair, the brother of the Postmaster-General, who had been the soul and body of all the actions in that State. The first step taken by McClellan in Western Virginia was atrocious — he talked of slaves in a public document as property. Butler, at Monroe, had dealt with them in a very different spirit, and had used them for State purposes under the name of contraband. One man alone displayed powers of administrative ability, and that was Quartermaster Meigs; and unquestionably from all I heard, the praise was well bestowed. It is plain enough that the political leaders fear the consequences of delay, and that they are urging the military authorities to action, which the latter have too much professional knowledge to take with their present means. These Northern men know nothing of the South, and with them it is omne ignotum pro minimo. The West Point professor listened to them with a quiet smile, and exchanged glances with me now and then, as much as to say, "Did you ever hear such fools in your life?”

But the conviction of ultimate success is not less strong here than it is in the South. The difference between these gentlemen and the Southerners is, that in the South the leaders of the people, soldiers and civilians, are all actually under arms, and are ready to make good their words by exposing their bodies in battle.

I walked home with Mr. N. P. Willis, who is at Washington for the purpose of writing sketches to the little family journal of which he is editor, and giving war “anecdotes;” and with Mr. Olmsted, who is acting as a member of the New York Sanitary Commission, here authorized by the Government to take measures against the reign of dirt and disease in the Federal camp. The Republicans are very much afraid that there is, even at the present moment, a conspiracy against the Union in Washington — nay, in Congress itself; and regard Mr. Breckinridge, Mr. Bayard, Mr. Vallandigham, and others as most dangerous enemies, who should not be permitted to remain in the capital. I attended the Episcopal church and heard a very excellent discourse, free from any political allusion. The service differs little from our own, except that certain euphemisms are introduced in the Litany and elsewhere, and the prayers for Queen and Parliament are offered up nomine mutato for President and Congress.

SOURCE: William Howard Russell, My Diary North and South, Vol. 1, p. 390-2

Commander Andrew Hull Foote to Gideon Welles, April 4, 1861

[Copy]

Navy Yard                 

New York      

April 4/61

Sir:

Captain Meigs has called on me with a letter showing his authority from the government to have certain preparations made and things placed on board of vessels soon to go to sea, about which you are familiar; but as the orders do not come direct I make this report, but as no time is to be lost I am preparing what is called for and report my action.

I have the honor to be in great haste

Yr Obdt Servt,

A. H. Foote

For Comdt.

Hon: Gideon Welles

Sec'y of the Navy

Washington D. C.

SOURCES: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 19

Brevet Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott to Brevet Colonel Harvey Brown, April 1, 1861

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,         

Washington, April 1, 1861.

Bvt.. Col. HARVEY BROWN,

U. S Army, Washington, D. C.:

SIR: You have been designated to take command of an expedition to re-enforce and hold Fort Pickens, in the harbor of Pensacola. You will proceed with the least possible delay to that place, and you will assume command of all the land forces of the United States within the limits of the State of Florida. You will proceed to New York, where steam transportation for four companies will be engaged, and, putting on board such supplies as you can ship, without delay proceed at once to your destination. The engineer company of Suppers and Miners; Brevet Major Hunt's Company M, Second Artillery; Captain Johns' Company C, Third Infantry, Captain Clitz's Company E, Third Infantry, will embark with you in the first steamer. Other troops and full supplies will be sent after you as soon as possible.

Captain Meigs will accompany you as engineer, and will remain with you until you are established in Fort Pickens, when he will return to resume his duties in this city. The other members of your staff will be Asst. Surg. John Campbell, medical staff; Capt. Rufus Ingalls, assistant quartermaster; Capt. Henry F. Clarke, assistant commissary of subsistence; Bvt. Capt. George L. Hartsuff, assistant adjutant-general; and First Lieut. George T. Balch, ordnance officer.

The object and destination of this expedition will be communicated to no one to whom it is not already known. The naval officers in the Gulf will be instructed to co-operate with you, and to afford every facility in their power for the accomplishment of the object of the expedition, which is the security of Fort Pickens against all attacks, foreign and domestic. Should a shot be fired at you, you will defend yourself and your expedition at whatever hazard, and, if needful for such defense, inflict upon the assailants all the damage in your power within the range of your guns.

Lieutenant-Colonel Keyes, military secretary, will be authorized to give all necessary orders, and to call upon the staff department for every requisite material and transportation, and other steamers will follow that on which you embark, to carry re-enforcements, supplies, and provisions for the garrison of Fort Pickens for six months. Captain Barry's battery will follow as soon as a vessel can be fitted for its transportation. Two or three foot companies will embark at the same time with the battery. All the companies will be filled up to the maximum standard, those to embark first from the recruits in the harbor of New York. The other companies will be filled, if practicable, with instructed soldiers.

You will make Fort Jefferson your main depot and base of operations. You will be careful not reduce too much the means of the fortresses in the Florida Reef, as they are deemed of greater importance than even Fort Pickens. The naval officers in the Gulf will be instructed to cooperate with you in every way, in order to insure the safety of Fort Pickens, Fort Jefferson, and Fort Taylor. You will freely communicate with them for this end, and will exhibit to them the authority of the President herewith.

The President directs that you be assigned to duty from this date according to your brevet rank in the Army.

With great confidence in your judgment, zeal, and intelligence, I remain, respectfully,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

APRIL 2, 1861.

Approved:

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

[Inclosure.]

SOURCES: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 15; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 365-6;

Edwin M. Stanton to Major-General Henry W. Halleck, October 19, 1863

October 19 General Grant accepted the command at once, and has already issued his orders to Thomas. He considers it indispensable that Rosecrans should be relieved because he would not obey orders. His health and spirits are very good, but he is still quite lame, and moves with difficulty on a crutch. Meigs is here.

SOURCE: George Congdon Gorham, Life and Public Services of Edwin M. Stanton, Volume 2, p. 134

Edwin M. Stanton to Major-General Henry W. Halleck, October 20, 1863 - 3 p.m.

LOUISVILLE, KY., October 20, 1863 — 3 p.m.    

(Received 6.10 p.m.)

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,

General-in-Chief:

Sunday night General Grant issued his orders taking command. Generals Burnside, Rosecrans, and Thomas reported last night. General Grant has gone forward with General Meigs, and will reach Chattanooga to-night or to-morrow. Thomas says if the supply wagons now on the road arrive safely they will be all right till November 1, at least. General Grant ordered him to hold Chattanooga at all hazards. He replied: “I will hold the town till we starve.” General Meigs has taken with him a large supply of tools, for blasting and opening the road across the mountains, and everything possible has been done for railroad transportation.

EDWIN M. STANTON,

Secretary of War.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 31, Part 1 (Serial No. 54), p. 666; George Congdon Gorham, Life and Public Services of Edwin M. Stanton, Volume 2, p. 134-5

Diary of Salmon P. Chase: January 12, 1862

At church in the morning.  Good, plain sermon. Wished much to join in communion, but felt myself to subject to temptation to sin. After church went to see Cameron by appointment, but being obliged to meet the President, etc., at one, could only excuse myself. At President's, found Generals McDowell, Franklin, and Meigs, and Seward and Blair. Meigs decided against dividing forces; in favor of battles in front. President said McClellan's health was much improved; and thought it best to adjourn until to-morrow; and have all then present, attend, with McC. at three. Home, and talk, and reading. Dinner. Cameron came in. Advised loan in Holland, and recommended Brooks, Lewis, and another whom I have forgotten. Then turned to department matters; and we talked of his going to Russia, and Stanton as successor; and he proposed I should again see the President. I first proposed seeing Seward, to which he assented. He declared himself determined to maintain himself at the head of his department, if he remained; and to resist, hereafter, all interferences. I told him I would, in that event, stand by him faithfully. He and I drove to Willard's, where I left him, and went myself to Seward's. I told him, at once, what was in my mind — that I thought the President and Cameron were both willing that C. should go to Russia. He seemed to receive the matter as new; except so far as suggested by me last night. Wanted to know who would succeed Cameron. I said Holt and Stanton had been named; that I feared Holt might embarrass us, on the slavery question, and might not prove quite equal to the emergency; that Stanton was a good lawyer and full of energy; but I could not, of course, judge him as an executive officer as well as he (S.) could, for he knew him when he was in Buchanan's Cabinet. Seward replied that he saw much of him then; that he was of great force; full of expedients, and thoroughly loyal. Finally, he agreed to the whole thing; and promised to go with me, to talk with the President about it, to-morrow. Just at this point, Cameron came in, with a letter from the President, proposing his nomination to Russia, in the morning. He was quite offended; supposing the letter intended as a dismissal; and, therefore, discourteous. We both assured him it could not be so. Finally, he concluded to retain the letter till morning; and then go and see the President. Seward was expecting General Butler; and Cameron said he ought to be sent off immediately. I said, “Well, let's leave Seward to order him off at once.” C. laughed; and we went off together, I taking him to his house. Before parting, I told him what had passed between me and Seward concerning Stanton, with which he was gratified. I advised him to go to the President in the morning, express his thanks for the consideration with which his wishes, made known through me, as well as by himself orally, had been treated, and tell him frankly, how desirable it was to him that his successor should be a Pennsylvanian, and should be Stanton. I said I thought that his wish, supported as it would be by Seward and myself, would certainly be gratified, and told him that the President had already mentioned Stanton, in a way which indicated that no objection on his part would be made. I said, also, that, if he wished, I would see Seward, and would go to the President, after he had left him, and urge the point. He asked, why not come in when we should be there; and I assented to this. We parted, and I came home. A day which may have — and, seemingly, must have — great bearing on affairs. I fear Mr. Seward may think Cameron's coming into his house pre-arranged, and that I was not dealing frankly. I feel satisfied, however, that I have acted right, and with just deference to all concerned, and have in no respect deviated from the truth.*

_______________

* Warden’s “Private Life and Public Services of Salmon P. Chase.”

SOURCES: Frederick W. Seward, Seward at Washington as Senator and Secretary of State, p. 44-5; John Niven, Editor, The Salmon P. Chase Papers, Volume 1: Journals, 1828-1872, p. 324-6

Edwin M. Stanton to Reverend Heman Dyer, May 18, 1862

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.]

WASHINGTON, May 18, 1862.

Rev. HEMAN DYER:

MY DEAR FRIEND: Yours of the 16th is welcomed as an evidence of the continued regard of one whose esteem I have always been anxious to possess. I have been very well aware of the calumnies busily circulated against me in New York and elsewhere respecting my relations to General McClellan, but am compelled, from public considerations, to withhold the proofs that would stamp the falsehood of the accusations and the base motives of the accusers, who belong to two classes:

1st. Plunderers, who have been driven from the Department, where they were gorging millions.

2d. Scheming politicians, whose designs are endangered by an earnest, resolute, uncompromising prosecution of this war, as a war against rebels and traitors.

A brief statement of facts — an official record — which I can make to you confidentially, will be sufficient to satisfy yourself that your confidence in me has not been misplaced.

1. When I entered the Cabinet I was, and for months had been, the sincere and devoted friend of General McClellan, and to support him, and, so far as I might, aid and assist him in bringing the war to a close, was a chief inducement for me to sacrifice my personal happiness to a sense of public duty. I had studied him earnestly, with an anxious desire to discover the military and patriotic virtue that might save the country; and if in any degree disappointed, I hoped on, and waited for time to develop. I went into the Cabinet about the 20th of January. On the 27th, the President made his War Order, No. 1, requiring the Army of the Potomac to move. It is not necessary, or perhaps proper, to state all the causes that led to that order, but it is enough to know that the Government was on the verge of bankruptcy, and, at the rate of expenditure, the armies must move or the Government perish. The 22d of February was the day fixed for movement, and when it arrived there was no more sign of movement on the Potomac than there had been for three months before. Many, very many, earnest conversations I had held with General McClellan, to impress him with the absolute necessity of active operations, or that the Government would fail because of foreign intervention and enormous debt.

Between the 22d of February and the 8th of March, the President had again interfered, and a movement on Winchester and to clear the blockade of the Potomac was promised, commenced, and abandoned. The circumstances cannot at present be revealed.

On the 6th of March, the President again interfered, ordered the Army of the Potomac to be organized into army corps, and that operations should commence immediately.

Two lines of operations were open. First. One moving directly on the enemy by Manassas, and forcing him back on Richmond, beating and destroying him by superior force, and all the time keeping the capital secure by being between it and the enemy. This was the plan favored by the President. Second. The other plan was to transfer the troops by water to some point on the Lower Chesapeake, and thence advance on Richmond. This was General McClellan's plan. The President reluctantly yielded his own views, although they were supported by some of the best military men in the country, and consented that the general should pursue his own plan. But, by a written order, he imposed the special condition that the army should not be moved without leaving a sufficient force in and around Washington to make the capital perfectly secure against all danger, and that the force required should be determined by the judgment of all the commanders of army corps.

In order to enable General McClellan to devote his whole energy to the movement of his own army (which was quite enough to tax the ability of the ablest commander in the world), he was relieved from the charge of the other military departments, it being supposed that their respective commanders were competent to direct the operations in their own departments. To enable General McClellan to transport his force, every means and power of the Government was placed at his disposal and unsparingly used.

When a large part of his force had been transferred to Fortress Monroe, and the whole of it about to go in a few days, information was given to me by various persons that there was great reason to fear that no adequate force had been left to defend the capital in case of a sudden attack; that the enemy might detach a large force, and seize it at a time when it would be impossible for General McClellan to render any assistance. Serious alarm was expressed by many persons, and many warnings given me, which I could not neglect. I ordered a report of the force left to defend Washington. It was reported by the commander to be less than 20,000 raw recruits, with not a single organized brigade! A dash, like that made a short time before at Winchester, would at any time take the capital of the nation. The report of the force left to defend Washington, and the order of the President, were referred to Major-General Hitchcock and Adjutant-General Thomas to report—

1st. Whether the President's orders had been complied with.

2d. Whether the force left to defend this city was sufficient.

They reported in the negative on both points. These reports were submitted to the President, who also consulted General Totten, General Taylor, General Meigs, and General Ripley. They agreed in opinion that the capital was not safe.

The President then, by written order, directed me to retain one of the army corps for the defense of Washington, either Sumner's or McDowell's. As part of Sumner's corps had already embarked, I directed McDowell to remain with his command, and the reasons were approved by the President.

Down to this period there had never been a shadow of difference between General McClellan and myself. It is true that I thought his plan of operations objectionable, as the most expensive, the most hazardous, and most protracted that could have been chosen, but I was not a military man, and, while he was in command, I would not interfere with his plan, and gave him every aid to execute it. But when the case assumed the form it had done by his disregard of the President's order, and by leaving the capital exposed to seizure by the enemy, I was bound to act, even if I had not been required by the specific written order of the President. Will any man question that such was my duty?

When this order was communicated to General McClellan, it of course provoked his wrath, and the wrath of his friends was directed upon me because I was the agent of its execution. If the force had gone forward, as he had designed, I believe that Washington would this day be in the hands of the rebels. Down to this point, moreover, there was never the slightest difference between the President and myself. But the entreaties of General McClellan induced the President to modify his order to the extent that Franklin's division (being part of McDowell's corps that had been retained) was detached and sent forward by boat to McClellan. This was against my judgment, because I thought the whole force of McDowell should be kept together and sent forward by land on the shortest route to Richmond, thus aiding McClellan, but at the same time covering and protecting Washington by keeping between it and the enemy. In this opinion Major-General Hitchcock, General Meigs, and Adjutant-General Thomas agreed. But the President was so anxious that General McClellan should have no cause of complaint, that he ordered the force to be sent by water, although that route was then threatened by the Merrimac. I yielded my opinion to the President's order; but between him and me there has never been the slightest shadow since I entered the Cabinet. And excepting the retention of the force under McDowell by the President's order, for the reasons mentioned, General McClellan had never made a request or expressed a wish that had not been promptly complied with, if in the power of the Government. To me personally he has repeatedly expressed his confidence and his thanks in the dispatches sent me.

Now, one word as to political motives. What motive can I have to thwart General McClellan? I am not now, never have been, and never will be a candidate for any office. I hold my present post at the request of a President who knew me personally, but to whom I had not spoken from the 4th of March, 1861, until the day he handed me my commission. I knew that everything I cherished and held dear would be sacrificed by accepting office. But I thought I might help to save the country, and for that I was willing to perish. If I wanted to be a politician or a candidate for any office, would I stand between the Treasury and the robbers that are howling around me? Would I provoke and stand against the whole newspaper gang in this country, of every party, who, to sell news, would imperil a battle? I was never taken for a fool, but there could be no greater madness than for a man to encounter what I do for anything else than motives that overleap time and look forward to eternity. I believe that God Almighty founded this Government, and for my acts in the effort to maintain it I expect to stand before Him in judgment.

You will pardon this long explanation, which has been made to no one else. It is due to you, who was my friend when I was a poor boy at school, and had no claim upon your confidence or kindness. It cannot be made public for obvious reasons. General McClellan is at the head of our chief army; he must have every confidence and support; and I am willing that the whole world should revile me rather than diminish one grain of the strength needed to conquer the rebels. In a struggle like this, justice or credit to individuals is but dust in the balance. Desiring no office nor honor, and anxious only for the peace and quiet of my home, I suffer no inconvenience beyond that which arises from the trouble and anxiety suffered by worthy friends like yourself, who are naturally disturbed by the clamors and calumny of those whose interest or feeling is hostile to me.

The official records will, at the proper time, fully prove—

1st. That I have employed the whole power of the Government un-sparingly to support General McClellan's operations in preference to every other general.

2d. That I have not interfered with or thwarted them in any particular.

3d. That the force retained from his expedition was not needed, and could not have been employed by him; that it was retained by express orders of the President, upon military investigation, and upon the best military advice in the country; that its retention was required to save the capital from the danger to which it was exposed by a disregard of the President's positive order of the 6th of March.

4th. That between the President and myself there has never been any, the slightest, shadow of difference upon any point, save the detachment of Franklin's force, and that was a point of no significance, but in which I was sustained by Generals Hitchcock, Meigs, Thomas, and Ripley, while the President yielded only to an anxious desire to avoid complaint, declaring at the same time his belief that the force was not needed by General McClellan.

You will, of course, regard this explanation as being in the strictest confidence, designed only for your information upon matters wherein you express concern for me. The confidence of yourself, and men like you, is more than a full equivalent for all the railing that has been or can be expressed against me, and in the magnitude of the cause all merely individual questions are swallowed up.

I shall always rejoice to hear from you, and am, as ever, truly yours,

EDWIN M. STANTON.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 19, Part 2 (Serial No. 28), p. 725-8