John J. Crittenden to Count Eugène de Sartiges, October 22, 1851

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, October 22, 1851.

The undersigned, acting Secretary of State of the United States, has the honor to remind M. de Sartiges, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the French republic, that in the interview which he had with him on the 8th instant, he stated that he might have occasion to address him in writing on the subject of the information which M. de Sartiges then communicated, that the French government had issued orders to its ships of war, then in the West Indies, to give assistance to Spain, and to prevent by force any adventurers of any nation from landing with hostile intent on the island of Cuba. Having imparted that information to the President, the undersigned has now the honor, by his direction, to address M. de Sartiges in regard to it.

M. de Sartiges is apprised that a few days prior to the interview adverted to the chargé d'affaires of her Britannic Majesty had given to this department official notice that his government had issued similar orders to its naval forces. The President had regarded this as a matter of grave importance, but its gravity is greatly increased by the concurrence and co-operation of France in the same measure. It cannot be doubted that those orders have been occasioned by the recent unlawful expedition of less than five hundred men, which, having evaded the vigilance of this government, and escaped from New Orleans, were landed by the steamer Pampero upon the island of Cuba, and were soon captured, and many of them executed. That such an incident should have incited the combined action of two great European powers, for an object to which neither of them is a direct party, and in a manner that may seriously affect the people of the United States, cannot fail to awaken the earnest consideration of the President.

He cannot perceive the necessity or propriety of such orders, while he entertains the strongest apprehensions that their execution by French and British cruisers will be attended with injurious and dangerous consequences to the commerce and peace of the United States. They cannot be carried into effect  without a visitation, examination, and consequent detention of our vessels on our shores, and in the great channels of our coasting trade, and this must invest British and French cruisers with the jurisdiction of determining, in the first instance at least, what are the expeditions denounced in their orders, and who are the guilty persons engaged in them. It is plain, however different may have been the intentions of the respective governments, that the exercise of such a power and jurisdiction could hardly fail to lead to abuses and collisions perilous to the peace that now so happily prevails. By such an interference those governments seem to assume an attitude unfriendly to the United States. The President will not, however, allow himself to believe that this intervention has been intended as an admonition or reproach to his government. He has signally manifested his condemnation of all such lawless enterprises, and has adopted active measures for their prevention and suppression. It must also be known to the governments of France and England, in common with all the world, that this government, since it took its place among nations, has carefully preserved its good faith, and anxiously endeavored to fulfill all its obligations, conventional and national. And this it has done from motives far above any apprehensions of danger to itself. From its beginning, under the present Constitution, it has sedulously cultivated the policy of peace, of not intermeddling in the affairs of others, and of preventing by highly penal enactments any unlawful interference by its citizens to disturb the tranquillity of countries with which the United States were in amity. To this end many such enactments have been made, the first as early as the year 1794, and the last as late as 1838. The last having expired by its own limitation, and all the preceding legislation on the subject having been comprehended in the act of Congress of the 20th of April, 1818, it is unnecessary to do more than to refer M. de Sartiges to its provisions as marking the signal anxiety and good faith of this government to restrain persons within its jurisdiction from committing any acts inconsistent with the rights of others, or its own obligations. These laws were intended to comprehend, and to protect from violation, all our relations with and duties to countries at peace with us, and to punish any violations of them by our citizens as crimes against the United States. In this manifestation of its desire to preserve just and peaceful relations with all nations, it is believed that the United States have gone before and further than any of the older governments of Europe. Without recapitulating all the provisions of those laws by which the United States have so carefully endeavored to prohibit every act that could be justly offensive to their neighbors, it is deemed enough for this occasion to say that they denounce all such enterprises or expeditions as those against which the orders in question are directed.

The undersigned thinks it is of importance enough to call the attention of M. de Sartiges more directly to this law. A literal copy of it is accordingly herewith communicated. Besides the ordinary legal process, it authorizes the President to employ the military and naval forces of the country for the purpose of preventing such expeditions and arresting for punishment those concerned in them. In the spirit of this law, the President condemns such expeditions against the island of Cuba as are denounced by the orders in question, and has omitted nothing for their detection and prevention. To that end he has given orders to civil, naval, and military officers from New York to New Orleans, and has enjoined upon them the greatest vigilance and energy. This course on the subject has been in all things clear and direct. It has been no secret, and the undersigned must presume that it has been fully understood and known by M. de Sartiges. An appeal might confidently be made to the vigilant and enlightened minister of Spain that his suggestions for the prevention of such aggressions, or the prosecution of offenders engaged in them, have been promptly considered, and, if found reasonable, adopted by the President; his course, it is believed, has been above all question of just cause of complaint. This government is determined to execute its laws, and in the performance of this duty can neither ask nor receive foreign aid. If, notwithstanding all its efforts, expeditions of small force hostile to Cuba have, in a single vessel or steamer, excited by Cubans themselves, escaped from our extensive shores, such an accident can furnish no ground of imputation either upon the law or its administration. Every country furnishes instances enough of infractions and evasions of its laws, which no power or vigilance can effectually guard against. It need not be feared that any expeditions of a lawless and hostile character can escape from the United States of sufficient force to create any alarm for the safety of Cuba, or against which Spain might not defend it with the slightest exertion of her power. The President is persuaded that none such can escape detection and prevention, except by their insignificance. None certainly can escape which could require the combined aid of France and England to resist or suppress. Cuba will find a sure, if not its surest, protection and defense in the justice and good faith of the United States.

There is another point of view in which this intervention on the part of France and England cannot be viewed with indifference by the President. The geographical position of the island of Cuba in the Gulf of Mexico, lying at no great distance from the mouth of the river Mississippi and in the line of the greatest current of the commerce of the United States, would become, in the hands of any powerful European nation, an object of just jealousy and apprehension to the people of this country. A due regard to their own safety and interest must, therefore, make it a matter of importance to them who shall possess and hold dominion over that island. The government of France and those of other European nations were long since officially apprised by this government that the United States could not see, without concern, that island transferred by Spain to any other European state; President Fillmore fully concurs in that sentiment, and is apprehensive that the sort of protectorate introduced by the orders in question might, in contingencies not difficult to be imagined, lead to results equally objectionable. If it should appear to M. de Sartiges that the President is too apprehensive on this subject, this must be attributed to his great solicitude to guard friendly relations between the two countries against all contingencies and causes of disturbance. The people of the United States have long cherished towards France the most amicable sentiments, and recent events which made her a republic have opened new sources of fraternal sympathy. Harmony and confidence would seem to be the natural relations of the two great republics of the world, relations demanded no less by their permanent interests than by circumstances and combinations in continental Europe, which now seem to threaten so imminently the cause of free institutions. The United States have nothing to fear from those convulsions, nor are they propagandists, but they have at heart the cause of freedom in all countries, and believe that the example of the two great republics of France and America, with their moral and social influences, co-operating harmoniously, would go far to promote and to strengthen that cause. It is with these views that the President so much desires the cultivation of friendly feelings between the two countries, and regards with so much concern any cause that may tend to produce collision or alienation. He believes that this Cuban intervention is such a cause. The system of government which prevails most generally in Europe is adverse to the principles upon which this government is founded, and the undersigned is well aware that the difference between them is calculated to produce distrust of, if not aversion to, the government of the United States. Sensible of this, the people of this country are naturally jealous of European interference in American affairs. And although they would not impute to France, now herself a republic, any participation in this distrustful and unfriendly feeling towards their government, yet the undersigned must repeat, that her intervention in this instance, if attempted to be executed, in the only practicable mode for its effectual execution, could not fail to produce some irritation, if not worse consequences. The French cruisers sailing up and down the shores of the United States to perform their needless task of protecting Cuba, and their ungracious office of watching the people of this country as if they were fruitful of piracies, would be regarded with some feelings of resentment, and the flag they bore-a flag which should always be welcome to the sight of Americans—would be looked at as casting a shadow of unmerited and dishonoring suspicion upon them and their government. The undersigned will add that all experience seems to prove that the rights, interests, and peace of the continents of Europe and America will be best preserved by the forbearance of each to interfere in the affairs of the other. The government of the United States has constantly acted on that principle, and has never intermeddled in European questions. The President has deemed it proper to the occasion that his views should be thus fully and frankly presented for the friendly consideration of M. de Sartiges and his government, in order that all possible precautions may be used to avert any misunderstanding, and every cause or consequence that might disturb the peace or alienate, in the least, the sentiments of confidence and friendship which now bind together the republics of the United States and France. The undersigned avails himself of this occasion to offer to M. de Sartiges the assurance of his very distinguished consideration.

JOHN J. CRITTENDEN.

M. DE SARTIGES.

SOURCE: Ann Mary Butler Crittenden Coleman, Editor, The Life of John J. Crittenden: With Selections from His Correspondence and Speeches, Vol. 2, p. 13-7

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, March 5, 1866

The Reconstruction Committee have reported a resolution for admitting Tennessee Members. It is, in its phraseology and conditions, in character with the dissimulating management and narrow, unpatriotic partisanship of those who control the action of Congress. Tennessee is pronounced to be in a condition to exercise all the functions of a State, therefore she shall not send Representatives until she complies with certain conditions which Congress exacts but has no authority to impose, and which the people of that State cannot comply with and preserve their independence, self-respect, and the right guaranteed to them by the Constitution. How intelligent and sensible men, not opposed to our government and the Constitution itself can commit themselves to such stuff I am unable to comprehend, but the madness of party, the weakness of men who are under the discipline of an organization which chafes, stimulates, threatens, and coaxes, is most astonishing.

In conversation with Senator Grimes, Chairman of the Naval Committee, I regret to see he still retains his rancor towards the South, though I hope somewhat modified. He is unwilling to make needful appropriations for the navy yards at Norfolk and Pensacola because they are in the Rebel States. Yet a navy yard at Pensacola is important, it may be said necessary, to the protection of the Gulf Coast and the Mississippi in time of war. A foreign power can blockade that region, the whole valley of the Mississippi be locked up; and Western Members would permit this rather than expend a small sum for necessary purposes in a navy yard at the South. But Grimes is not so intensely wrong as others living in the Mississippi Valley. He will not, however, avail of the opportunity of procuring a magnificent site at Hampton Roads for the Naval School, because it is in Virginia.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 444-5

Charles Sumner to Richard Cobden, July 9, 1850

The slaveholders are bent on securing the new territories for slavery, and they see in prospective an immense slave nation embracing the Gulf of Mexico and all its islands, and stretching from Maryland to Panama. For this they are now struggling, determined while in the Union to govern and direct its energies; or if obliged to quit, to build up a new nation slaveholding throughout. They are fighting with desperation, and have been aided by traitors at the North. Webster's apostasy is the most barefaced. Not only the cause of true antislavery is connected with the overthrow of the slave propaganda, but also that of peace. As soon as it is distinctly established that there shall be no more slave territory, there will be little danger of war. My own earnest aim is to see slavery abolished everywhere within the sphere of the national government,—which is in the District of Columbia, on the high seas, and in the domestic slave-trade; and beyond this, to have this government for freedom, so far as it can exert an influence, and not for slavery. When this is accomplished, then slavery will be taken out of the vortex of national politics; and the influences of education and improved civilization, and of Christianity, will be left free to act against it in the States where it exists.

SOURCE: Edward L. Pierce, Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner, Vol. 3, p. 216-7

The Ostend Manifesto,* October 18, 1854

AIX-LA-CHAPELLE, October 18th, 1854.

TO THE HON. WM. L. MARCY,
        Secretary of State.

SIR: The undersigned, in compliance with the wish expressed by the President in the several confidential despatches you have addressed to us respectively to that effect, have met in conference, first at Ostend, in Belgium, on the 9th, 10th, and 11th instant, and then at Aix-la-Chapelle, in Prussia, on the days next following, up to the date hereof.

There has been a full and unreserved interchange of views and sentiments between us, which, we are most happy to inform you, has resulted in a cordial coincidence of opinion on the grave and important subjects submitted to our consideration.

We have arrived at the conclusion and are thoroughly convinced that an immediate and earnest effort ought to be made by the Government of the United States to purchase Cuba from Spain, at any price for which it can be obtained, not exceeding the sum of one hundred and twenty millions of dollars.

The proposal should, in our opinion, be made in such a manner as to be presented, through the necessary diplomatic forms, to the Supreme Constituent Cortes about to assemble. On this momentous question, in which the people both of Spain and the United States are so deeply interested, all our proceedings ought to be open, frank, and public. They should be of such a character as to challenge the approbation of the World.

We firmly believe that, in the progress of human events, the time has arrived when the vital interests of Spain are as seriously involved in the sale as those of the United States in the purchase of the Island, and that the transaction will prove equally honorable to both nations.

Under these circumstances, we cannot anticipate a failure, unless, possibly, through the malign influence of foreign Powers who possess no right whatever to interfere in the matter.

We proceed to state some of the reasons which have brought us to this conclusion; and, for the sake of clearness, we shall specify them under two distinct heads:

1. The United States ought, if practicable, to purchase Cuba with as little delay as possible.

2. The probability is great that the Government and Cortes of Spain will prove willing to sell it, because this would essentially promote the highest and best interests of the Spanish people.

Then—1. It must be clear to every reflecting mind that, from the peculiarity of its geographical position and the considerations attendant on it, Cuba is as necessary to the North American Republic as any of its present members, and that it belongs naturally to that great family of States of which the Union is the Providential Nursery.

From its locality it commands the mouth of the Mississippi and the immense and annually increasing trade which must seek this avenue to the ocean.

On the numerous navigable streams, measuring an aggregate course of some thirty thousand miles, which disembogue themselves through this magnificent river into the Gulf of Mexico, the increase of the population, within the last ten years, amounts to more than that of the entire Union at the time Louisiana was annexed to it.

The natural and main outlet of the products of this entire population, the highway of their direct intercourse with the Atlantic and the Pacific States, can never be secure, but must ever be endangered whilst Cuba is a dependency of a distant Power, in whose possession it has proved to be a source of constant annoyance and embarrassment to their interests.

Indeed, the Union can never enjoy repose, nor possess reliable security, as long as Cuba is not embraced within its boundaries.

Its immediate acquisition by our Government is of paramount importance, and we cannot doubt but that it is a consummation devoutly wished for by its inhabitants.

The intercourse which its proximity to our coasts begets and encourages between them and the citizens of the United States has, in the progress of time, so united their interests and blended their fortunes, that they now look upon each other as if they were one people and had but one destiny.

Considerations exist which render delay in the acquisition of this Island exceedingly dangerous to the United States.

The system of emigration and labor lately organized within its limits, and the tyranny and oppression which characterize its immediate rulers, threaten an insurrection, at every moment, which may result in direful consequences to the American People.

Cuba has thus become to us an unceasing danger, and a permanent cause of anxiety and alarm.

But we need not enlarge on these topics. It can scarcely be apprehended that foreign Powers, in violation of international law, would interpose their influence with Spain to prevent our acquisition of the Island. Its inhabitants are now suffering under the worst of all possible Governments,—that of absolute despotism, delegated by a distant Power to irresponsible agents who are changed at short intervals, and who are tempted to improve the brief opportunity thus afforded to accumulate fortunes by the basest means.

As long as this system shall endure, humanity may in vain demand the suppression of the African Slave trade in the Island. This is rendered impossible whilst that infamous traffic remains an irresistible temptation and a source of immense profit to needy and avaricious officials who, to attain their end, scruple not to trample the most sacred principles under foot.

The Spanish Government at home may be well disposed, but experience has proved that it cannot control these remote depositories of its power.

Besides, the commercial nations of the world cannot fail to perceive and appreciate the great advantages which would result to their people from a dissolution of the forced and unnatural connection between Spain and Cuba, and the annexation of the latter to the United States. The trade of England and France with Cuba would, in that event, assume at once an important and profitable character, and rapidly extend with the increasing population and prosperity of the Island.

2. But if the United States and every commercial nation would be benefited by this transfer, the interests of Spain would also be greatly and essentially promoted.

She cannot but see that such a sum of money as we are willing to pay for the Island would effect in the development of her vast natural resources.

Two thirds of this sum, if employed in the construction of a system of Railroads, would ultimately prove a source of greater wealth to the Spanish people than that opened to their vision by Cortes. Their prosperity would date from the ratification of the Treaty of cession. France has already constructed continuous lines of Railways from Havre, Marseilles, Valenciennes, and Strasbourg, via Paris, to the Spanish frontier, and anxiously awaits the day when Spain shall find herself in a condition to extend these roads, through her Northern provinces, to Madrid, Seville, Cadiz, Malaga, and the frontiers of Portugal.

This object once accomplished, Spain would become a centre of attraction for the travelling world and secure a permanent and profitable market for her various productions. Her fields, under the stimulus given to industry by remunerating prices, would teem with cereal grain, and her vineyards would bring forth a vastly increased quantity of choice wines. Spain would speedily become, what a bountiful Providence intended she should be, one of the first Nations of Continental Europe, rich, powerful, and contented.

Whilst two thirds of the price of the Island would be ample for the completion of her most important public improvements, she might, with the remaining forty millions, satisfy the demands now pressing so heavily upon her credit, and create a sinking fund which would gradually relieve her from the overwhelming debt now paralysing her energies.

Such is her present wretched financial condition, that her best bonds are sold, upon her own Bourse, at about one third of their par value; whilst another class, on which she pays no interest, have but a nominal value and are quoted at about one sixth of the amount for which they were issued. Besides, these latter are held principally by British creditors, who may, from day to day, obtain the effective interposition of their own Government, for the purpose of coercing payment. Intimations to that effect have been already thrown out from high quarters, and unless some new, source of revenue shall enable Spain to provide for such exigencies, it is not improbable that they may be realized.

Should Spain reject the present golden opportunity for developing her resources and removing her present financial embarrassments, it may never again return.

Cuba, in its palmiest days, never yielded her Exchequer, after deducting the expenses of its Government, a clear annual income of more than a million and a half of dollars. These expenses have increased to such a degree as to leave a deficit chargeable on the Treasury of Spain to the amount of six hundred thousand dollars.

In a pecuniary point of view, therefore, the Island is an encumbrance instead of a source of profit to the Mother Country.

Under no probable circumstances can Cuba ever yield to Spain one per cent. on the large amount which the United States are willing to pay for its acquisition.

But Spain is in imminent danger of losing Cuba without remuneration.

Extreme oppression, it is now universally admitted, justifies any people in endeavoring to relieve themselves from the yoke of their oppressors. The sufferings which the corrupt, arbitrary, and unrelenting local administration necessarily entails upon the inhabitants of Cuba cannot fail to stimulate and keep alive that spirit of resistance and revolution against Spain which has of late years been so often manifested. In this condition of affairs, it is vain to expect that the sympathies of the people of the United States will not be warmly enlisted in favor of their oppressed neighbors.

We know that the President is justly inflexible in his determination to execute the neutrality laws, but should the Cubans themselves rise in revolt against the oppressions which they suffer, no human power could prevent citizens of the United States and liberal minded men of other countries from rushing to their assistance.

Besides, the present is an age of adventure, in which restless and daring spirits abound in every portion of the world.

It is not improbable, therefore, that Cuba may be wrested from Spain by a successful revolution; and in that event, she will lose both the Island and the price which we are now willing to pay for it—a price far beyond what was ever paid by one people to another for any province.

It may also be here remarked that the settlement of this vexed question, by the cession of Cuba to the United States, would forever prevent the dangerous complications between nations to which it may otherwise give birth.

It is certain that, should the Cubans themselves organize an insurrection against the Spanish Government, and should other independent nations come to the aid of Spain in the contest, no human power could, in our opinion, prevent the people and Government of the United States from taking part in such a civil war in support of their neighbors and friends.

But if Spain, deaf to the voice of her own interest, and actuated by stubborn pride and a false sense of honor, should refuse to sell Cuba to the United States, then the question will arise, what ought to be the course of the American Government under such circumstances?

Self-preservation is the first law of nature, with States as well as with individuals. All nations have, at different periods, acted upon this maxim. Although it has been made the pretext for committing flagrant injustice, as in the partition of Poland and other similar cases which history records, yet the principle itself, though often abused, has always been recognized.

The United States have never acquired a foot of territory, except by fair purchase, or, as in the case of Texas, upon the free and voluntary application of the people of that independent State, who desired to blend their destinies with our own.

Even our acquisitions from Mexico are no exception to this rule, because, although we might have claimed them by the right of conquest in a just way, yet we purchased them for what was then considered by both parties a full and ample equivalent.

Our past history forbids that we should acquire the Island of Cuba without the consent of Spain, unless justified by the great law of self-preservation. We must in any event preserve our own conscious rectitude and our own self-respect.

Whilst pursuing this course, we can afford to disregard the censures of the world to which we have been so often and so unjustly exposed.

After we shall have offered Spain a price for Cuba, far beyond its present value, and this shall have been refused, it will then be time to consider the question, does Cuba in the possession of Spain seriously endanger our internal peace and the existence of our cherished Union?

Should this question be answered in the affirmative, then, by every law human and Divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain, if we possess the power; and this, upon the very same principle that would justify an individual in tearing down the burning house of his neighbor, if there were no other means of preventing the flames from destroying his own home.

Under such circumstances, we ought neither to count the cost, nor regard the odds which Spain might enlist against us. We forbear to enter into the question, whether the present condition of the Island would justify such a measure.

We should, however, be recreant to our duty, be unworthy of our gallant forefathers, and commit base treason against our posterity, should we permit Cuba to be Africanized and become a second St. Domingo, with all its attendant horrors to the white race, and suffer the flames to extend to our neighboring shores, seriously to endanger or actually to consume the fair fabric of our Union.

We fear that the course and current of events are rapidly tending towards such a catastrophe. We, however, hope for the best, though we ought certainly to be prepared for the worst.

We also forbear to investigate the present condition of the questions at issue between the United States and Spain,

A long series of injuries to our people have been committed in Cuba by Spanish officials, and are unredressed. But recently a most flagrant outrage on the rights of American citizens, and on the flag of the United States, was perpetrated in the harbor of Havana, under circumstances which without immediate redress would have justified a resort to measures of war, in vindication of national honor. That outrage is not only unatoned, but the Spanish Government has deliberately sanctioned the acts of its subordinates and assumed the responsibility attaching to them.

Nothing could more impressively teach us the danger to which those peaceful relations it has ever been the policy of the United States to cherish with foreign nations are constantly exposed than the circumstances of that case.

Situated as Spain and the United States are, the latter have forborne to resort to extreme measures. But this course cannot, with due regard to their own dignity as an independent nation, continue; and our recommendations, now submitted, are dictated by the firm belief that the cession of Cuba to the United States, with stipulations as beneficial to Spain as those suggested, is the only effective mode of settling all past differences and of securing the two countries against future collisions.

We have already witnessed the happy results for both countries which followed a similar arrangement in regard to Florida.

Yours very respectfully,

JAMES BUCHANAN.

J. Y. MASON.

PIERRE SOULÉ.

_______________

* MSS. Department of State, 66 Despatches from England. Printed in H. Ex. Doc. 93. 33 Cong. 2 Sess. 127-132; Horton's Buchanan, 392-399. An extract is given in Curtis's Buchanan, II. 139.

SOURCE: John Bassett Moore, The Works of James Buchanan: Comprising His Speeches, State Papers and Private Correspondence, Volume 9: 1853-1855, p. 260-6

Congressman Roscoe Conkling to Colonel Charles Wheelock of the 97th New York Infantry, December 25, 1861

Washington, Christmas Day, 1861.

My Dear Colonel: The regiment you command has, I am informed, done me the honor to assume my name. A compliment so unexpected, bestowed upon me in my absence, and by so large a body of my fellow-citizens from different sections of the State, awakens, I need hardly say, lively and enduring emotions.

Grateful as I am for unnumbered and undeserved marks of confidence and kindness showered upon me by the generous people of Oneida County, among them all there is scarcely one that I shall cherish longer than this token of approbation at once so spontaneous and expressive.

A thousand men, who as winter approaches leave their homes for the camp, to defend on distant battlefields the life and honor of their country, are inspired and consecrated by heroic purposes and unfaltering faith. Earnestness and sincerity abide with them, and they mean in seriousness all they say. When they inscribe a name upon their colors, they mean not a mere token of courtesy or friendship, nor simply to make the name less humble than it was before; but they adopt it because they consider it associated with some idea. In this case that idea is a vigorous and unconditional prosecution of the war till the Union is restored and the Government acknowledged on the Gulf of Mexico as much as on the river St. Lawrence. It is the idea that whoever and whatever stands in the way of national success must go down before the advancing columns of the Union.

The colors you carry will never be disgraced; they will be borne forward by men many of whom I have long known and respected as neighbors and friends, and though the regiment, however called, would have been an object of interest and pride with me, I shall now watch its career with double solicitude, its advancement with double pleasure.

Do me the favor to present my warm acknowledgments to the regiment and reserve them to yourself.

I remain your friend,

ROSCOE CONKLING.

Col. Chas. Wheelock, Boonville, N. Y.

SOURCE: Alfred Ronald Conkling, The Life and Letters of Roscoe Conkling: Orator, Statesman, Advocate, 137-8

Brevet Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott to Brevet Colonel Harvey Brown, April 1, 1861

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,         

Washington, April 1, 1861.

Bvt.. Col. HARVEY BROWN,

U. S Army, Washington, D. C.:

SIR: You have been designated to take command of an expedition to re-enforce and hold Fort Pickens, in the harbor of Pensacola. You will proceed with the least possible delay to that place, and you will assume command of all the land forces of the United States within the limits of the State of Florida. You will proceed to New York, where steam transportation for four companies will be engaged, and, putting on board such supplies as you can ship, without delay proceed at once to your destination. The engineer company of Suppers and Miners; Brevet Major Hunt's Company M, Second Artillery; Captain Johns' Company C, Third Infantry, Captain Clitz's Company E, Third Infantry, will embark with you in the first steamer. Other troops and full supplies will be sent after you as soon as possible.

Captain Meigs will accompany you as engineer, and will remain with you until you are established in Fort Pickens, when he will return to resume his duties in this city. The other members of your staff will be Asst. Surg. John Campbell, medical staff; Capt. Rufus Ingalls, assistant quartermaster; Capt. Henry F. Clarke, assistant commissary of subsistence; Bvt. Capt. George L. Hartsuff, assistant adjutant-general; and First Lieut. George T. Balch, ordnance officer.

The object and destination of this expedition will be communicated to no one to whom it is not already known. The naval officers in the Gulf will be instructed to co-operate with you, and to afford every facility in their power for the accomplishment of the object of the expedition, which is the security of Fort Pickens against all attacks, foreign and domestic. Should a shot be fired at you, you will defend yourself and your expedition at whatever hazard, and, if needful for such defense, inflict upon the assailants all the damage in your power within the range of your guns.

Lieutenant-Colonel Keyes, military secretary, will be authorized to give all necessary orders, and to call upon the staff department for every requisite material and transportation, and other steamers will follow that on which you embark, to carry re-enforcements, supplies, and provisions for the garrison of Fort Pickens for six months. Captain Barry's battery will follow as soon as a vessel can be fitted for its transportation. Two or three foot companies will embark at the same time with the battery. All the companies will be filled up to the maximum standard, those to embark first from the recruits in the harbor of New York. The other companies will be filled, if practicable, with instructed soldiers.

You will make Fort Jefferson your main depot and base of operations. You will be careful not reduce too much the means of the fortresses in the Florida Reef, as they are deemed of greater importance than even Fort Pickens. The naval officers in the Gulf will be instructed to cooperate with you in every way, in order to insure the safety of Fort Pickens, Fort Jefferson, and Fort Taylor. You will freely communicate with them for this end, and will exhibit to them the authority of the President herewith.

The President directs that you be assigned to duty from this date according to your brevet rank in the Army.

With great confidence in your judgment, zeal, and intelligence, I remain, respectfully,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

APRIL 2, 1861.

Approved:

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

[Inclosure.]

SOURCES: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 15; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 365-6;

Diary of 1st Lieutenant John S. Morgan: Friday, June 16, 1865

Genl Slack is assigned to command our Brigade. Issues orders for drill 2 hours. Parade sundown, no enlisted men to cross the river. Gulf so high that the black troops at Brazos cannot disembark.

SOURCE: “Diary of John S. Morgan, Company G, 33rd Iowa Infantry,” Annals of Iowa, 3rd Series, Vol. 13, No. 8, April 1923, p. 605-6

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, April 17, 1863

No reports from Charleston. Am in hopes that side issues and by-play on the Mississippi are about over and that there will be some concentrated action. Porter should go below Vicksburg and not remain above, thereby detaining Farragut, who is below, from great and responsible duties at New Orleans and on the Gulf. The weak and sensitive feeling of being outranked and made subordinate in command should never influence an officer in such an emergency. Porter has great vanity and great jealousy but knows his duty, and I am surprised he does not perform it. Wrote him a fortnight since a letter which he cannot misunderstand, and which will not, I hope, wound his pride.

But little was before the Cabinet, which of late can hardly be called a council. Each Department conducts and manages its own affairs, informing the President to the extent it pleases. Seward encourages this state of things. He has less active duties than others, and watches and waits on the President daily, and gathers from him the doings of his associates and often influences indirectly and not always advantageously their measures and movements, while he communicates very little, especially of that which he does not wish them to know.

Blair walked over with me from the White House to the Navy Department, and I showed him the correspondence which had taken place respecting captured mails. Understanding Seward thoroughly, as he does, he detected the sly management by which Seward first got himself in difficulty and is now striving to get out of it. My course he pronounced correct, and he declared that the President must not be entrapped into any false step to extricate Seward, who, he says, is the least of a statesman and knows less of public law and of administrative duties than any man who ever held a seat in the Cabinet. This is a strong statement, but not so overstated as would be generally supposed. I have been surprised to find him so unpractical, so erratic, so little acquainted with the books, — he has told me more than once that he never opened them, that he was too old to study. He has, with all his bustle and activity, but little application; relies on Hunter and his clerk, Smith, perhaps Gushing also, to sustain him and hunt up his authorities; commits himself, as in the case of the mails, without knowing what he is about.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 274-5

Diary of 2nd Lieutenant George G. Smith: May 17, 1864

That General Smith was a joker was conceded by everybody, our friends, the enemy, as well as the union army. When we were in Alexandria I was on guard at the pontoon bridge. An Irishman, stood at the end of the bridge, smoking a clay pipe. Smith returning from a scouting expedition at the head of his forces, rode up to the Irishman coolly took the pipe out of his mouth and put it in his own, and rode on smoking contentedly as though nothing had happened. The Irishman laughed heartily, well pleased with the joke. Many stories were reported of his pleasantries with the enemy while covering our retreat from Alexandria. At one time coming down the plank road he left a baggage wagon on the road and placed a company in ambush within easy range. The rebel hangers on in the rear spied it and made for it on the gallop with a yell. At the proper time the ambush rose up and many saddles were emptied and riderless horses were seen cantering through the woods. The force was nearly all killed or taken prisoners. At two times cannon were left with similar results. Marched into Simsport about noon. The day was hot and the roads were dusty so that our clothes were saturated with mud as well as sweat. It was my practice, during the whole time I was in the army to bathe whenever an opportunity presented itself, and so here was a good one The water in the rivers and ponds we had been passing were generally almost milk warm and I thought this would be, so without further ado I plunged in. “O my! Holy Moses, how cold it was!” I could hardly swim to shore. But I did, and got out too but I did not go in any more that day. The reason of the water being so cold was on account of the rise in the Mississippi river at this time of the year, called the June rise. It is caused by the melting snows in the Rocky mountains, at the head waters of the Missouri and in the Northern part of Minnesota, where the Mississippi rises, and it is a little strange, that water is nearly as cold when it reaches the Gulf of Mexico as it is when it leaves the snows of the Rocky mountains. When this mighty river is high it backs up the Red river and discharges its surplus waters through the Atchaffalaya Bayou into the Gulf of Mexico, so that bayou is really one of the mouths of the Mississippi. It was my turn to go on picket guard that night, so we crossed the bayou on a steamer and went up that stream about a mile and posted the pickets in the woods across the bottom where we fought mosquitoes all night. It was a question which was the worse, the mosquitoes or the rebels. I was not feeling very well from the effects of my bath, so after the guard was posted I hunted the dryest place I could find and laid down, but the conditions were not very favorable for a good night's rest. It did not however last forever.

SOURCE: Abstracted from George G. Smith, Leaves from a Soldier's Diary, p. 117-9

Diary of 2nd Lieutenant John S. Morgan: Tuesday, March 14, 1865

Commenced raining at, 12 O.clock last night, rained all the balance of night with moon shining brightly took breakfast in our tents, rained until 2. P. M. Gulf sure high.

SOURCE: “Diary of John S. Morgan, Company G, 33rd Iowa Infantry,” Annals of Iowa, 3rd Series, Vol. 13, No. 8, April 1923, p. 577

Diary of 2nd Lieutenant John S. Morgan: Tuesday, March 7, 1865

Day rather cool to be agreeable drilled the co. P. M. 1 hour, rained at 8 P. M. News is that a Rebel Ram French built has appeared in the Gulf, monitor moves up to Flag ship. Reb flag of truce report that news in Mobile is Beauregard has defeated Sherman, & that Lee was evacuating Richmond. The Rebel force at Mobile is augmenting. Deserters report one division of Hoods army 10000 strong to have arrived there.

SOURCE: “Diary of John S. Morgan, Company G, 33rd Iowa Infantry,” Annals of Iowa, 3rd Series, Vol. 13, No. 8, April 1923, p. 577

Diary of 2nd Lieutenant John S. Morgan: Friday, March 10, 1865

Last night quite cold, strong North wind, morning very cold & windy, no wood, water in Gulf two ft— lower on beach than any time since we have been here, bushels of shells, see a small porpoise lieing out on the beach, too rough all day for drill, P. M. after Oysters up the bay. At 8.30 P. M. notice signal lights followed by a rockit from one of the Monitors, Reported that 3 Reb Rams were seen in the Gulf. A rumor current that our Brigade will be sent to Charleston. Evening cold

SOURCE: “Diary of John S. Morgan, Company G, 33rd Iowa Infantry,” Annals of Iowa, 3rd Series, Vol. 13, No. 8, April 1923, p. 577

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: January 22, 1863

We have reliable intelligence of the sinking of the U. S. gun-boat Hatteras, in the Gulf, by the Alabama. She was iron-clad, and all the officers and crew, with the exception of five, went down.

Gen. Whiting telegraphs to-day for the use of conscripts near Wilmington, in the event of an emergency. Several ships have just come in safely from abroad, and it is said a large number are on the way.

Mr. Miles yesterday reported, from the Military Committee, a bill repealing the existing exemption law, and embracing all male residents between the ages of 18 and 45 years. The President, or Secretary of War, to have authority to grant exemptions in certain cases, if deemed expedient. This ought to give us 200,000 more men. And they will be required.

A resolution was passed demanding of the Commissary and Quartermaster-General the number of their employees capable of performing military duty. It would be well to extend the inquiry to the War Deparment itself.

A letter from Norfolk states that at a grand ball, in celebration of the emancipation of the negroes, Gen. Vieille opened the dance with a mulatto woman of bad character as his partner; and Mrs.V. had for her partner a negro barber.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 243-4

Diary of 2nd Lieutenant John S. Morgan: Saturday, February 25, 1865

Slept well, rained all night. At 10. a. m. start through pass, aground at 11. Brown with 4 co of our Regt passes us here. Men runing short of rations & begin to complain at 2 P. M. Small steamer Mustang comes to our relief, transfer men and baggage. Ship floats fast an hour again right in the pass abreast of Ft Powell, when she gets off Mustang runs alongside and transfers back. 3 reb deserters from Mobile come to us on Mustang. about 5.30 Ship touches at Ft. Gaines. thence to 4 mile above Ft. Morgan, at 7. P. M. disembark, march through sand 3/4 of mile to camp. on the beach of Gulf, sleep within 200 yds of Gulf, breakers Ligh & night clear, a Grand sight. 30 000 men here now.

SOURCE: “Diary of John S. Morgan, Company G, 33rd Iowa Infantry,” Annals of Iowa, 3rd Series, Vol. 13, No. 8, April 1923, p. 575

Diary of Sergeant George G. Smith: New Haven to Ship Island

Soon after recruiting for the 13th Connecticut Regiment Infantry Volunteers was begun, I entered the recruiting service, and during the winter of 1861—1862 labored for that regiment in that capacity until it was full. Recruiting officers were quite plenty at that time and somehow the war fever among the people had worn away considerably and consequently recruiting was what might be termed slow, and not until March 17th, 1862, was the regiment ready for the seat of war.

 

On that day at ten p. m. we left New Haven, on a steamboat, and the next morning at five o'clock found us on board a large sailing vessel in New York harbor, bound for Ship Island in the Gulf of Mexico. I enlisted as a sergeant in Company K and it so happened the first night I was detailed as sergeant of the guard. I don't think the 13th C. V. all belonged to the temperance society. If they did many of them sadly broke their pledges; but perhaps they thought the occasion justified them in doing so. The Colonel ordered one poor fellow “seized” up in the rigging for disorderly conduct. It was distasteful to me, but military orders must be obeyed. The job was new to me but I accomplished it without much trouble, otherwise the night passed off quite peacefully.

 

March 20th, the ship hoisted anchor, moved down and anchored off Sandy Hook, where she lay until the 23rd. On the way everything was new to me, Castle Garden, Governor's Island, Staten Island, etc. Besides the U. S. gunboat Roanoake lay there. During the time tugboats were busy bringing water and other supplies for the voyage.

 

On March 23d a propeller came down with two four-inch guns, put them aboard and towed us out to sea. A U. S. mail steamship outward bound passed us. It was a beautiful sight and one to make one feel proud of his country. Thirty-one vessels, great and small were in sight from the deck of our ship. At about one o'clock p. m. the tug boat left us, but the wind was calm as a summer evening, and remained so until about 3 p. m. when a stiff breeze sprang up and the good ship, City of New York, spread her white wings, and soon the Jersey Heights began to grow dim, and the shades of night coming on, they disappeared entirely from view. We never saw any more of this green earth until we reached an island on the southern coast of Florida. Next day got the guns in position, so that when Old Glory crept up to the masthead in the morning and unfolded to the breeze he was greeted with the cannon's roar, the emblem of freedom and power.

 

On the 25th we entered the Gulf Stream, water about milk warm, sea rough, about in the latitude of Charleston, S. C. In the morning, “Sail ho!” from the masthead. “Where away?” “Three points on the weather bow, sir.” “Steamship, looks like a privateer.” Captain Saulter cracks on more sail. At noon it disappeared to leeward. A gale sprang up in the afternoon and blew tremendously all night.

 

SOURCE: George G. Smith, Leaves from a Soldier's Diary, p. 1-3

Senator James W. Grimes to J. H. Gear, W. F. Coolbaugh, A. W. Carpenter, Joshua Copp, J. G. Foote, and other Citizens of Burlington, August 17, 1861

Burlington, August 17, 1861.

I have received your favor of the 15th instant, in which you congratulate me upon my return to the State, and invite me to address the people of this city, at such time and place as I may designate, on the important questions now before the country, involving the existence of the Government.

I appreciate, as I ought, the kind feeling that prompted this invitation, and return you my sincere thanks for it. I would address you at any time and at any place, if I supposed I could communicate a particle of information not already in the possession or within the reach of every citizen of the State. I could only say in many words, what I now say in a few, that it seems to me that there is no safe alternative before us, but to give a firm and ardent support to the Government in its attempt to put down insurrection and rebellion. More than any State in this Confederacy, Iowa should resist the pretended right of a State to secede from it. Our position in the centre of the continent, without foreign commerce, dependent upon other States for our markets and for our means for transportation to reach them, would soon, if the right to destroy the Union by the secession of the States be conceded, place us in the character of a dependent and conquered province. We need, and must have, at whatever cost, a permanent government and unrestricted access to the Atlantic Ocean and to the Gulf of Mexico. There must be no foreign soil between us and our markets.

As one of the Representatives of Iowa in the Federal Congress, I have sought to give expression by my votes to what I believe to be the opinions of the people of the State, and have uniformly voted all the men, money, ships, and supplies, that were asked for. In doing so, I have not only expressed what I believed to be their wishes, but I have acted upon my own convictions of duty. I shall continue to do so until this unholy war shall be brought to a successful conclusion.

The public debt that this war will impose upon us will appall some and perhaps dampen the patriotism of some. Most erroneous impressions, however, seem to prevail as to the magnitude of our present indebtedness, and that which we are likely to create. The entire public indebtedness of this country on the 6th instant, the day Congress adjourned, was a hundred and eleven million dollars, most of which was inherited from the preceding Administration, and the estimated expenses of the next year, for military, naval, and civil purposes, were less than three hundred million dollars, less than the annual expenses of Great Britain in a time of profound peace. In connection with the aggregate of these two sums let us remember that England paid eight thousand five hundred million dollars to carry on her wars with the first Napoleon. She was contending for her commercial rights, and the result showed that her money was well expended: we are not only contending for our commercial rights, but we seek to uphold and perpetuate the best Government ever known among men.

Foreigners call us, with great truth, the most impatient people on the earth. This natural impatience is greatly increased by our present troubles. We all want peace restored and business revived, and most of us believe that a permanent peace can only be established by the victorious arms of our soldiers. Our anxieties in this regard are very liable to cause us to do great injustice to the Government and to ourselves also. We clamor for victories, forgetting that the most thorough preparation is necessary to achieve them. We forget the condition of the country four months ago, and ask that that shall be done in a week which requires months of arduous labor to perform. Very few fully appreciate the difficulties by which the President of the United States found himself surrounded, when he assumed power on the 4th of March last. Many of the Executive Departments had recently been under the control of traitors. The army had been dispersed and demoralized, and many of the most trusted and prominent officers were disloyal. Our vessels-of-war were scattered upon foreign and remote stations. The Departments were full of spies and traitors. The public armories had been plundered and their contents delivered to the rebels. The President was without an army, without a navy, without arms or munitions of war, and with enemies within and without. In this condition of things, and after an almost uninterrupted peace of fifty years, he was called upon to organize in a few weeks five armies, each of them larger than any that had ever been marshaled on this continent, and to improvise a navy with which to blockade a coast greater in extent than that which England was unable to blockade with more than four hundred vessels-of-war in 1812-’14. That there have been mistakes committed in the selection of agents and officers cannot be denied, but, that there has been any lack of energy or of devotion to the cause of the country, it seems to me that no fail man who examines the subject will assert. Few persons comprehend all the labor, the time, and the perplexities involved in furnishing clothing, arms, transportation, stores and pay for four hundred and fifty thousand men, and in purchasing or building, manning, arming, and equipping two hundred vessels-of-war by a Government whose credit was impaired, whose armories had been destroyed, and whose munitions of war had been stolen, and to do all this in the space of three months.

It becomes us to be hopeful and patient, bearing in mind that the authorities in Washington are resolved that their preparation for the conflict shall correspond with the magnitude of the conspiracy they are compelled to encounter.

You say, gentlemen, that you address me without distinction of party, and I find among the signatures appended to your letter the names of many to whom I have always been politically opposed. Permit me to say that the time has arrived when I am anxious to forget all party names, and party platforms, and party organizations, and to unite with anybody and everybody in an honest, ardent, and patriotic support of the Government — not as a party Government with a Republican at its head, but as the national Government, ordained by and for the benefit of the whole people of the country.

SOURCE: William Salter, The Life of James W. Grimes, p. 147-50

Colonel Thomas Kilby Smith to Elizabeth Budd Smith, August 16, 1863

Headquarters Department Op The Gulp,

Nineteenth Army Corps,

New Orleans, Aug. 16, 1863.

I believe I may be said literally to have fought my way to the Gulf. At all events, I find myself at New Orleans after many trials. The lower Mississippi is to me very beautiful scenery. You can have no conception of the nature of the grounds, the houses, improvements, general appearances of the country from anything you read. I was certainly interested and charmed. The city of New Orleans is familiar from description. I feel almost as if I had been here before. General Banks occupies one of the most beautiful residences in the most beautiful locality. I am sojourning with him. I left my horses and servants at Vicksburg, but the General has placed a carriage at my command. His establishment is elegant and thoroughly appointed. The St. Charles Hotel, the shell road to the lake, the levee, and the French portion are the most noticeable features. All these I have pretty thoroughly investigated. The streets are perfectly clean, the police system above compare, everybody here is on their best behavior. Two years in the woods among the toads and snakes has made me unfamiliar with city life and all sights and sounds are strange to me. Memphis is a mere village as compared to New Orleans, and Vicksburg and Natchez mere suburban towns. But I only weary you with vague recital of my own impressions. As new and strange scenes greet my eye, I long for the power to communicate with those I love and make them in some degree sharers in my own emotions. Upon the steamer's deck, in the whirl of life, the rapid transition from the camp to what in democratic America may be called the court, in all the varied scenes of my stirring life, kaleidoscopic in its changes, I think of home, or the dear group that makes my home. Shall I ever see any of you again? I seem impelled by some strange destiny forward, always a little in advance of the army. There are important movements in contemplation. Soon you will hear of them.

Everybody here, out of the army, is “Secesh.” This of course. We must conquer this people, wrest the power of the government from their grasp, prevent their ever regaining power, and meanwhile treat them kindly. Extermination, annihilation is out of the question. Oppression will react.

The women are strangely hostile. There is no difference among them. From the borders of Tennessee to the Gulf they are all alike — in country, town, or city, but one feeling, rebellious, coupled with an antipathy to Northern men inconceivable, indescribable. They are herded now within a narrow compass, driven, hedged in, almost girdled by a circle of fire. Georgia and Alabama are full of them. When Charleston and Mobile fall, I do not know where they will find refuge. As their men disappear, however, there will be a commingling of races and perhaps the nation regenerated. A long and bloody war is still before us. A united North would finish it in a month. Their strange, perverse insanity, their want of unity, prolongs the struggle. But God in his own good time. The nation is being bathed in fire and blood. Five years more of war will purge, the viler material will have passed away, then twenty-five years more and the people may again hope.

SOURCE: Walter George Smith, Life and letters of Thomas Kilby Smith, p. 328-9

The Rebels taking a gloomy View of their Situation

The following significant article from the Richmond Examiner of the 16th inst., shows that the rebels are uncomfortably oppressed by the view of their present situation:

* * * “While the political leaders of the South have been reposing in dreams of approaching peace and while our accomplished captains of engineers have been expending their remarkable scientific ingenuity in the erection of works as wonderful, and almost as extensive and quite as valuable as the Chinese wall to resist invading forces from a given direction, the enemy have gradually and at leisure gathered up their immense resources and concentrated their tremendous energies to envelope the Confederacy with their armies and fleets and to penetrate the interior from some one of many alternate points.  Although they can now do nothing, they have their general programme in perfect order for execution when the weather changes in the ordinary course of the earth around the sun and it this moment we find ourselves in the face of superior forces wherever we look whether to the North, the East, or the West, or the South itself.  General Sydney [sic] Johnston has to strain every nerve to prevent the military as well as the geographical heart of the country from slipping out of his grasp.  Generals Joseph Johnson [sic] and Beauregard are held by McClellan on the Potomac as in a vice.  A gigantic armament is ready to attempt the descent of the Mississippi, and their fleet on the Atlantic seacoast and the Gulf are too freshly before the attention to require remembrance.  Such are the fruits of a policy purely defensive.  Without even the hesitancy which would come of a possible interruption, the enemy have thus surrounded the Southern Confederacy, and if permitted to repeat as often as may be desired their efforts to penetrate its heart, they will necessarily attain the place and the time where success awaits them.

“There is now but one chance of success from the net that has been coolly drawn around us. – it is to concentrate our energy on one point, and cut it through, to convert our defensive into an offensive war, and transfer the scene of at least part of these hostilities to the enemy’s own country.  Situated as we are it is only possible at one point – and that is Kentucky.  If the forces that we are dispersing to the four corners of the continent every day to meet the new menaces were collected under the hand of General Sydney Johnson [sic] till a column was formed sufficient to enable him to manoeuvre with some possibility of success over the plains of that region he might hurl back the army in front of him, at present, and penetrate the State of Ohio.  The attainment of the object would render worthless all the plans of the enemy.  The circle of armies would be in the condition of the constrictor whose back has been broken, the scene of war would be transferred to his own territory, and everyone who has witnessed the ravages of armies in any of the invaded districts of Virginia knows what a precious blessing is designated in that brief phrase.  He would be attacked beyond his defences.  The alarm and confusion of the United States would paralyze its Government and its Generals, and the entire arrangement by which we suffer now and dread great disasters in future would be immediately reversed.

“At present Gen. Johnson confronts superior forces of the enemy under Buell, one of the most cautious painstaking and able Generals on the other side.  General Buell has now; immediately in front of Johnson, an army of seventy six thousand men (Yes, 110, men – Eps) and can bring to bear on us, and other given points, thirty thousand more.  What the Confederate commander has may not be stated, but it is probably enough to hold his present strong position against any numbers that might attack him there or pass him on either side, get to his rear and cut off his supplies.  This he can do by leaving a sufficient army in front of Gen. Johnson while he can still send upon the right or left flank a force as large as he leaves behind.  That this is the plan of Buell is now no longer doubtful.  He has placed a force of 8,000 men at Glasgow, thirty miles to the eastward of Bowling Green threatening the rear of Gen. Johnson while it is within easy supporting distance of two other posts held in strong force by the enemy.  If the plan of Buell is successful it may result in a great disaster.  To defeat him it is absolutely necessary that more men should at once be sent to Bowling Green.  Gen. Johnson must have a force sufficient to attack Buell in front with a good chance of success and by so doing will not only defeat his scheme on the centre of the Confederacy, but immediately transfer the war to the State of Ohio, and thus save the whole South from the great danger of being overrun in the first fine weather of the coming spring.

“We are satisfied that, beyond the flattering possibilities of a foreign intervention, the only rational hope we can entertain of a speedy termination of this war, is to be found in an offensive campaign across the Ohio, from the point that Gen. Johnson now defends.  The best line of advance imaginable to strike at the vitals of the North which are the Lake States, is that through Kentucky.  The country is a plain, the people are not actively hostile, supplies without stint and the great resources of the North are beyond.  The enemy understand this and are making tremendous efforts to secure Kentucky to them without the possibility of escape.  This season of inaction, from the inclemency of the skies, is a precious boon of Providence to us, we can now determine on a plan, and prepare for its execution in a short time, that will render naught and abortive all the costly and complicated devices of the adversary.”

– Published in The Burlington Weekly Hawk-Eye, Burlington, Iowa, Saturday, February 1, 1862, p. 4

The Next Naval Expedition

The next naval expedition, which is now preparing at New York and other points, is to be commanded by Com. Farragut, and reports are abroad, some stating that it is destined for Savannah and others assigning it to the western part of the Gulf.  It will be by far the most powerful naval force yet fitted out, and will consist of the Hartford, Richmond, Pensacola and other large steam frigates, a great number of gunboats, and twenty or thirty vessels carrying mortars and thirty-two pounders.

The mortar flotilla connected with this expedition is under the command of Capt. D. D. Porter and is being hurried towards completion with all possible haste, but from its extent some weeks may elapse before all the vessels are ready to proceed to sea.  The armament being of a kind rather novel to our navy, has caused some delay in fitting out the first vessels of the flotilla, but those obstacles are now overcome, and the vessels are nearly all ready for their guns. – The mortar, which is placed amidships of each craft, weighs about 17,000 pounds, and is bored for 13-inch projectiles, the most formidable known to modern warfare.

– Published in The Burlington Weekly Hawk-Eye, Burlington, Iowa, Saturday, February 1, 1862, p. 2

From the Gulf

NEW YORK, April 8. – A ship Island letter of the 24th ult., reports the arrival of Gen. Butler on the 20th.

A rebel fleet of seven gunboats made their appearance in Mobile Bay.

The U. S. gunboat, Santiago de Cuba chased a steamer laden with cotton, ashore on the coast of Louisiana, and there a shell into her, burning her to the water’s edge.

The schooner Grace E. Baker, with 130 bales of cotton, &c., from New Orleans for Havana, was captured by the gunboat R. R. Cuyler.

– Published in the Burlington Weekly Hawk-Eye, Burlington, Iowa, Saturday, April 12, 1862, p. 3