Edward Bates to the Whig Committee of New York, February 24, 1859

St. Louis, Feb. 24, 1859.

To Messrs. J. PHILIPS PHOENIX, WILLIS BLACKSTONE, H. M. BININGER, DAVID J. LILET AND H. R. SMITH, Committee, New York.

Sirs: A short time ago I was favored with your note of the 7th inst., covering a resolution of the Committee, to the effect that it is inexpedient at this time further to discuss or agitate the Negro question, but rather to turn the attention of the people to other topics — "topics of general importance, such as our Foreign Relations, including the Extension of Territory; the building of Railroads for National purposes; the improvement of our Harbors, the navigation of our Rivers to facilitate Internal Commerce; the subject of Currency, and a Tariff of Duties, and other means of developing our own internal resources, our home wealth, and binding together by ties of national and fraternal feelings, the various parts and sections of our widely extended Republic."

Your letter, gentlemen, opens a very wide field, in asking for my "opinion upon the subject, and my views as to the signs of the times." Books have been written upon these matters, and speeches delivered by the thousand ; and yet the argument seems as far from being exhausted as it was at the beginning ; and I take it for certain that you do not expect or desire me to discuss at large, all or any of these interminable quarrels. That I have opinions upon all or most of them, is true — not the opinions of this or that party, ready to be abandoned or modified to suit this or that platform, but my own opinions — perhaps the more fixed and harder to be changed because deliberately formed in the retirement of private life, free from the exigencies of official responsibility and from the perturbations of party policy. They are my own opinions, right or wrong.

As to the Negro question — I have always thought, and often declared in speech and in print, that it is a pestilent question, the agitation of which has never done good to any party, section or class, and never can do good, unless it be accounted good to stir up the angry passions of men, and exasperate the unreasoning jealousy of sections, and by those bad means foist some unfit men into office, and keep some fit men out. It is a sensitive question into whose dangerous vortex it is quite possible for good men to be drawn unawares. But when I see a man, at the South or the North, of mature age and some experience, persist in urging the question, after the sorrowful experience of the last few years, I can attribute his conduct to no higher motive than personal ambition or sectional prejudice.

As to the power of the General Government to protect the persons and properties, and advance the interests of the people, by laying taxes, raising armies and navies, building forts and arsenals, light houses, moles, and breakwaters, surveying the coasts and adjacent seas, improving rivers, lakes, and harbors, and making roads — I should be very sorry to doubt the existence of the power, or the duty to exercise it, whenever the constituted authorities have the means in their hands, and are convinced that its exercise is necessary to protect the country and advance the prosperity of the people.

In my own opinion, a government that has no power to protect the harbors of its country against winds and waves and human enemies, nor its rivers against snags, sands and rocks, nor to build roads for the transportation of its armies and its mails and the commerce of its people, is a poor, impotent government, and not at all such a government as our fathers thought they had made when they produced the Constitution which was greeted by intelligent men everywhere with admiration and gratitude as a government free enough for all the ends of legal liberty and strong enough for all the purposes of national and individual protection. A free people, if it be wise, will make a good constitution; but a constitution, however good in itself, did never make a free people. The people do not derive their rights from the government, but the government derives its powers from the people; and those powers are granted for the main, if not the only, purpose of protecting the rights of the people. Protection, then, if not the sole, is the chief end of government.

And it is for the governing power to judge, in every instance, what kind and what degree of protection is needful — whether a Navy to guard our commerce all around the world, or an Army to defend the country against armed invasion from without, or domestic insurrection from within; or a Tariff, to protect our home industry against the dangerous obtrusion of foreign labor and capital.

Of the existence of the power and duty of the Government to protect the People in their persons, their property, their industry and their locomotion, I have no doubt; but the time, the mode and the measure of protection, being always questions of policy and prudence, must of necessity be left to the wisdom and patriotism of those whose duty it is to make laws for the good government of the country. And with them I freely leave it, as the safest, and indeed the only, constitutional depository of the power.

As to our Foreign Policy generally, I have but little to say. I am not much of a progressive, and am content to leave it where Washington [Jefferson] placed it, upon that wise, virtuous, safe maxim — "Peace [. . .] with all nations; entangling alliance[s] with none." The greedy and indiscriminate appetite for foreign acquisition, which makes us covet our neighbor's lands, and devise cunning schemes to get them, has little of my sympathy. I view it as a sort of political gluttony, as dangerous to our body politic as gluttony is to the natural man — producing disease certainly, hastening death, probably. Those of our politicians who are afflicted with this morbid appetite are wont to cite the purchase of Louisiana and Florida, as giving countenance to their inordinate desires. But the cases are wholly unlike in almost every particular. Louisiana was indispensable to our full and safe enjoyment of an immense region which was already owned, and its acquisition gave us the unquestioned control of that noble system of Mississippi waters, which nature seems to have made to be one and indivisible, and rounded off the map of the nation into one uniform and compacted whole. Nothing remained to mar and disfigure our national plat, but Florida, and that was desirable, less for its intrinsic value, than because it would form a dangerous means of annoyance, in case of war with a Maritime Power, surrounded as it is, on three sides by the ocean, and touching three of our present States, with no barrier between. The population of Louisiana and Florida, when acquired, was very small compared with the largeness of the territory; and, lying in contact with the States, was easily and quickly absorbed into and assimilated with the mass of our people. Those countries were acquired, moreover, in the most peaceful and friendly manner, and for a satisfactory consideration.

Now, without any right or any necessity, it is hard to tell what we do not claim in all the continent south of us, and the adjacent islands. Cuba is to be the first fruit of our grasping enterprise, and that is to be gotten at all hazards, by peaceful purchase if we can, by war and conquest if we must.² But Cuba is only an outpost to the Empire of Islands and continental countries that are to follow. A leading Senator³ has lately declared (in debate on the Thirty Million bill⁴) that we must not only have Cuba, but all the islands from Cape Florida to the Spanish Main, so as to surround the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea, and make them our "mare clausum" like the Mediterranean, in old times, when the Roman Emperor ruled both its shores, from the pillars of Hercules to the Hellespont.⁵ This claim of mare nostrum implies, of course, that we must own the continent that bounds our sea on the west, as well as the string of islands that inclose it on the east — that is, Mexico, Central America, and all South America, so far south at least as the Orinoco.⁶ In that wide compass of sea and land there are a good many native governments, and provinces belonging to the strongest maritime powers, and a narrow continental isthmus which we ourselves, as well as England and France, are wont to call the highway of nations. To fulfill the grand conception, and perfect our tropical empire, we must buy or conquer all these torrid countries, and their mongrel populations. As to buying them, it strikes me that we had better waite [sic] awhile, at least until the Government has ceased to borrow money to pay its current expenses. And as to conquering them, perhaps it would be prudent to pause and make some estimate of costs and contingencies, before we rush into war with all maritime Europe and half America.

I am not one of those who believe that the United States is not an independent and safe nation, because Cuba is not a part of it. On the contrary, I believe that we are quite capable of self-defense, even if the "Queen of the Antilles" were a province of England, France or Russia; and surely, while it remains an appendage of a comparatively feeble nation, Cuba has much more cause to fear us than we have to fear Cuba. In fact, gentlemen, I cannot help doubting the honesty of the cowardly argument by which we are urged to rob poor old Spain of this last remnant of her Western empire, for fear that she might use it to rob us.

But suppose we could get, honestly and peaceably, the whole of the country — continental and insular — from the Rio Grande to the Orinoco, and from Trinidad to Cuba, and thus establish our mare clausum, and shut the gate of the world across the Isthmus, can we govern them wisely and well? For the last few years, in the attempt to govern our home Territories of Kansas and Utah, we have not very well maintained the dignity and justice of the nation, nor secured the peace and prosperity of the subject people.⁷ Can we hope to do better with the various mixed races of Mexico, Central and South America, and the West India Islands? Some of those countries have been trying for fifty years to establish republican governments on our model, but in every instance have miserably failed; and yet, there was no obstacle to complete success but their own inaptitude.

For my part, I should be grieved to see my country become, like Rome, a conquering and dominant nation; for I think there are few or no examples in history, of Governments whose chief objects were glory and power, which did ever secure the happiness and prosperity of their own people. Such Governments may grow great and famous, and advance a few of their citizens to wealth and nobility; but the price of their grandeur is the personal independence and individual freedom of their people. Still less am I inclined to see absorbed into our system, "on an equal footing with the original States," the various and mixed races (amounting to I know not how many millions) which inhabit the continent and islands south of our present border. I am not willing to inoculate our body politic with the virus of their diseases, political and social — diseases which, with them, are chronic and hereditary, and with us could hardly fail to produce corruption in the head and weakness in the members.

Our own country, as it is, in position, form and size, is a wonder which proclaims a wisdom above the wit of man. Large enough for our posterity, for centuries to come: All in the temperate zone, and therefore capable of a homogeneous population, yet so diversified in climates and soils, as to produce everything that is necessary to the comfort and wealth of a great people: Bounded east and west by great oceans, and bisected in the middle by a mighty river, which drains and fructifies the continent, and binds together the most southern and northern portions of our land by a bond stronger than iron. Beside all this, it is new and growing — the strongest on the continent, with no neighbor whose power it fears, or of whose ambition it has cause to be jealous. Surely such a country is great enough and good enough for all the ends of honest ambition and virtuous power.

It seems to me that an efficient home-loving Government, moderate and economical in its administration, peaceful in its objects, and just to all nations, need have no fear of invasion at home, or serious aggression abroad. The nations of Europe have to stand continually in defense of their existence; but the conquest of our county by a foreign power is simply impossible, and no nation is so absurd as to entertain the thought. We may conquer ourselves by local strifes and sectional animosities; and when, by our folly and wickedness, we have accomplished that great calamity, there will be none to pity us for the consequences of so great a crime.

If our Government would devote all its energies to the promotion of peace and friendship with all foreign countries, the advancement of Commerce, the increase of Agriculture, the growth and stability of Manufactures, and the cheapening, quickening and securing the internal trade and travel of our country ; in short, if it would devote itself in earnest to the establishment of a wise and steady policy of internal government, I think we should witness a growth and consolidation of wealth and comfort and power for good, which cannot be reasonably hoped for from a fluctuating policy, always watching for the turns of good fortune, or from a grasping ambition to seize new territories, which are hard to get and harder to govern.

The present position of the Administration is a sorrowful commentary upon the broad democracy of its professions. In theory, the people have the right and ability to do anything; in practice, we are verging rapidly to the One-Man power.

The President, the ostensible head of the National Democrats, is eagerly striving to concentrate power in his own hands, and thus to set aside both the People and their Representatives in the actual affairs of government. Having emptied the Treasury, which he found full, and living precariously upon borrowed money, he now demands of Congress to entrust to his unchecked discretion the War power, the Purse and the Sword. First, he asks Congress to authorize him, by statute, to use the Army to take military possession of the Northern Mexico, and hold it under his protectorate, and as a security for debts due to our citizens⁸ — civil possession would not answer, for that might expose him, as in the case of Kansas, to be annoyed by a factious Congress and a rebellious Territorial Legislature.

Secondly: Not content with this, he demands the discretionary power to use the Army and Navy in the South, also in blockading the coast and marching his troops into the interior of Mexico and New Granada, to protect our citizens against all evil-doers along the transit routes of Tehuantepec and Panama.⁹ And he and his supporters in Congress claim this enormous power upon the ground that, in this particular at least, he ought to be the equal of the greatest monarch of Europe. They forget that our fathers limited the power of the President by design, and for the reason that they had found out by sad experience that the monarchs of Europe were too strong for freedom.

Third: In strict pursuance of this doctrine, first publicly announced from Ostend,¹⁰ he demands of Congress to hand over to him thirty millions of dollars to be used at his discretion, to facilitate his acquisition of Cuba.¹¹ Facilitate how ? Perhaps it might be imprudent to tell.

Add to all this, the fact (as yet unexplained) that one of the largest naval armaments which ever sailed from our coast is now operating in South America, ostensibly against a poor little republic far up the Plate River,¹² to settle some little quarrel between the two Presidents.¹³ If Congress had been polite enough to grant the President's demand of the sword and the purse against Mexico, Central America and Cuba, this navy, its duty done at the south, might be made, on its way home, to arrive in the Gulf very opportunely, to aid the " Commander-in-Chief " in the acquisition of some very valuable territory.

I allude to these facts with no malice against Mr. Buchanan, but as evidences of the dangerous change which is now obviously sought to be made in the practical working of the Government — the concentration of power in the hands of the President, and the dangerous policy, now almost established, of looking abroad for temporary glory and aggrandizement, instead of looking at home, for all the purposes of good government — peaceable, moderate, economical, protecting all interests alike, and by a fixed policy, calling into safe exercise all the talents and industry of our people, and thus steadily advancing our country in everything which can make a nation great, happy, and permanent.

The rapid increase of the Public Expenditures (and that, too, under the management of statesmen professing to be peculiarly economical) is an alarming sign of corruption and decay.

That increase bears no fair proportion to the growth and expansion of the country, but looks rather like wanton waste or criminal negligence. The ordinary objects of great expense are not materially augmented — the Army and Navy remain on a low peace establishment— the military defenses are little, if at all, enlarged — the improvement of Harbors, Lakes and Rivers is abandoned, and the Pacific Railroad is not only not begun but its very location is scrambled for by angry sections, which succeed in nothing but mutual defeat. In short, the money to an enormous amount (I am told at the rate of $80,000,000 to $100,000,000 a year) is gone, and we have little or nothing to show for it. In profound peace with foreign nations, and surrounded with the proofs of National growth and individual prosperity, the Treasury, by less than two years of mismanagement, is made bankrupt, and the Government itself is living from hand to mouth, on bills of credit and borrowed money!

This humiliating state of things could hardly happen if men in power were both honest and wise. The Democratic economists in Congress confess that they have recklessly wasted the Public Revenue; they confess it by refusing to raise the Tariff to meet the present exigency, and by insisting that they can replenish the exhausted Treasury and support the Government, in credit and efficiency, by simply striking off their former extravagances.

An illustrious predecessor of the President is reported to have declared "that those who live on borrowed money ought to break." I do not concur in that harsh saying; yet I am clearly of opinion that the Government, in common prudence (to say nothing of pride and dignity), ought to reserve its credit for great transactions and unforeseen emergencies. In common times of peace, it ought always to have an established revenue, equal, at least, to its current expenses. And that revenue ought to be so levied as to foster and protect the Industry of the country employed in our most necessary and important manufactures.

Gentlemen, I cannot touch upon all the topics alluded to in your letter and resolution. I ought rather to beg your pardon for the prolixity of this answer. I speak for no party, because the only party I ever belonged to has ceased to exist as an organized and militant body.

And I speak for no man but myself.

I am fully aware that my opinions and views of public policy are of no importance to anybody but me, and there is good reason to fear that some of them are so antiquated and out of fashion as to make it very improbable that they will ever again be put to the test of actual practice.

Most respectfully,

EDWARD BATES.

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² This was the substance of the Ostend Manifesto which Buchanan as Minister to Great Britain had joined Ministers John Y. Mason and Pierre Soulé in promulgating. As Secretary of State under President Polk, Buchanan had tried to buy Cuba. In his second, third, and fourth annual messages he urged Congress to cooperate with him in securing it by negotiation.

³ Robert Toombs of Georgia: Whig state legislator, 1837-1840, 1841-1844; states' rights Democratic congressman, 1845-1853; U. S. senator, 1853-1861. He was later a leader in the Georgia Secession Convention, and congressman, brigadier-general, and secretary of State under the Confederacy.

⁴ January, 1859, Senate Reports, 35 Cong., 2 Sess., ser. no. 994, doc. no. 351. The bill purposed to appropriate $30,000,000 "to facilitate the acquisition of Cuba by negotiation." Senator Slidell (infra, Nov. 24, 1859, note 89) introduced it on January 10. 1859 (Cong. Globe, 35 Cong., 2 Sess., 277) ; it was reported favorably by the Committee on Foreign Relations of which he was chairman, on January 24, 1859 (ibid., 35 Cong., 2 Sess., 538) ; it was debated at great length on January 24, February 9-10, February 15—17, February 21, and February 25 (ibid., 35 Cong., 2 Sess., 538-544, 904-909, 934-940, 960968, 1038, Appendix [155-169], 1058-1063, 1079-1087, 1179-1192, 1326-1363) ; but because of opposition, it was withdrawn on February 26 (ibid., 35 Cong., 2 Sess., 13S51387). At the next session, on December 8, 1859, Senator Slidell reintroduced this bill (ibid., 36 Cong., 1 Sess., 53), had it referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations on December 21 (ibid., 36 Cong., 1 Sess., 199), reported it out favorably to the Senate on May 30, 1860, but because of opposition did not push it (ibid., 36 Cong., 1 Sess., 2456). He promised to call it up again at the next session, but when that time arrived was too busy seceding to bother about Cuba.

⁵ On January 24, Toombs had said, "Cuba has fine ports, and with her acquisition, we can make first the Gulf of Mexico, and then the Caribbean Sea, a mare clausum. Probably younger men than you or I will live to see the day when no flag shall float there except by permission of the United States of America . . . that development, that progress throughout the tropics [is] the true, fixed unalterable policy of the nation." Ibid., 35 Cong., 2 Sess., 543.

⁶ I. e., as far as Venezuela.

⁷ Bitterness over the slavery question had reached the point of armed conflict, raids, and murder in Kansas in 1855-1856, and Utah was at this time subject to frequent Indian raids. It was in 1859, too, that the Republicans tried to prohibit polygamy in Utah and the Democrats succeeded, probably with slavery in other territories in mind, in preventing Congressional legislation on the subject.

⁸ Dec. 6, 1858, James D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, V, 514. See infra, Feb. 15, 1860.

⁹ J. D. Richardson, op. cit., V, 516-517.

¹⁰ Supra, April 20, 1859, note 2.

¹¹ J. D. Richardson, op. cit., V, 508-511.

¹² Rio de La Plata in South America.

¹³ An expedition of some 19 ships, 200 guns, and 2.500 men which was sent against Paraguay because a vessel of that nation had fired upon the United States steamer Water Witch. A mere show of force sufficed to secure both an apology and an indemnity on February 10, 1859. The President of Argentina was so interested and so pleased that he presented the commander with a sword.

SOURCE: Howard K. Beale, Editor, Annual Report of The American Historical Association For The Year 1930, Vol. 4, The Diary Of Edward Bates, pp. 1-9

General William T. Sherman to Senator John Sherman, February 1, 1887

[New York, New York, February 1, 1887.]

. . . . I came near closing without answering the part of your letter most important. I certainly do feel competent to advise about that contemplated trip. Go south via Richmond to Atlanta, Savannah, Jacksonville, Florida, by the St. John's to Enterprise and Sanford, visiting St. Augustine en route. At Sanford go by rail to Tampa, and if the railroad is finished, to Charlotte Harbor on the Gulf side, whence a steamer goes to Havana. Much of the interior of Cuba can be reached by rail, Santa Rosa and Matanzas. The last-named is to me the finest place in Cuba. March and April are good months there. May and June are too hot. You will meet acquaintances everywhere. There are a great many beautiful places along the St. John's River, with good boats, hotels, and accommodations of all sorts, and the same in Cuba. I am sure that the railroad is finished to Charlotte Harbor, but you can learn the best way to reach Cuba from the Post-Office Department. On the Gulf side of Florida, you have the cluster of islands, leaving only the ninety miles of open sea from Key West to Havana, made in a single daylight.

Havana is a very interesting city, though for a week's stay I would prefer Matanzas and the interior bay.

Affectionately,

W. T. SHERMAN.

SOURCE: Rachel Sherman Thorndike, Editor, The Sherman Letters: Correspondence Between General and Senator Sherman from 1837 to 1891, p. 373-4

Congressman Horace Mann to Samuel Downer, December 22, 1850

WASHINGTON, Dec. 22, 1850.

MY DEAR DOWNER, I see by the date of my letter that it is Forefathers' Day; and I cannot but ask myself what the stern old Puritans would say, were they here to witness the degeneracy of their sons. Evil days have surely come upon us. There is a very considerable number here, it is true, who are still faithful to their principles; but they are embarrassed and oppressed with the palpable fact before them that they are in the hands of the Philistines, and that nothing can be done in behalf of the measures they have so steadfastly and earnestly contended for. The Administration has placed itself on open, avowed, proslavery ground. They will be proscriptive of enemies, and bountiful to friends; and I fear that what Mr. Webster once said will prove true,—that he had never known an Administration to set its heart upon any measure which it did not accomplish. There will be a giving-way somewhere; and all effective opposition will be frightened away or bought up.

But to what a pass has Northern recreancy brought us! You see the list of conditions which the South are everywhere laying down, upon compliance with which, in every item, the Union can alone be preserved, no abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia; no imposition of a proviso on any Territory, — which looks to its future acquisition, and is meant to forestall its doom; no objection to the admission of any State, whether from Texas, New Mexico, Utah, or from any new acquisitions, on account of the proslavery constitution, &c. And now the Governor of Virginia, in a special message to the Legislature, has proposed the holding of a national convention, at which the North shall appear as suppliant, shall promise all that the South demands, and shall lie down on her belly, and eat as much dirt as she can hold. It is said there is no end to discoveries; and certainly there is no end to discoveries in humiliation. One would think that even the soulless instigators of Northern Union meetings would recoil on the brink of this abyss of degradation. But such is the progress of things; and, however low they go, a "lower deep" still opens before them. Even the "National Intelligencer," with all its proslavery instincts, shudders at this pit.

What shall we do here? I declare myself ready, for one, to do, to the utmost of my ability, whatever may appear under the circumstances to be advisable. I find it to be true, as I have always said, that there is no more chance of repealing or modifying the Fugitive-slave Law than there is of making a free State out of South Carolina. Still, my own opinion is that we ought to make a demonstration upon it. My belief is that there never was so much need of contending against the slave-power as now. There is far more reason for a rally now than in 1848. Then a great prize was in imminent peril. Had Cass been made President in consequence of a diversion of Whigs into the Free-soil ranks, it is, to my mind, as certain as any unfulfilled event, that California would have been a slave State, and New Mexico and Utah would have had slavery had they desired it. This great interest was put in jeopardy by that movement; though, fortunately, God sent us a deliverance.

But now there is no such immediate and magnificent stake to be lost or won. We cannot lose any thing now, because we have lost Our dangers are prospective. Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua, are the game now afoot. We must be prepared for the time when these shall be the subject of contest. We must see that we have Congresses that will stand their ground; and therefore the antislavery principle must not be suffered to sleep. . . .

Yours as ever,

H. M.

SOURCE: Mary Tyler Peabody Mann, Life of Horace Mann, p. 341-3

Diary of Lieutenant-Colonel John Beatty: July 27, 1861

The Colonel left for Ohio to-day, to be gone two weeks.

I came from the quarters of Brigadier-General Schleich a few minutes ago. He is a three-months' brigadier, and a rampant demagogue. Schleich said that slaves who accompanied their masters to the field, when captured, should be sent to Cuba and sold to pay the expenses of the war. I suggested that it would be better to take them to Canada and liberate them, and that so soon as the Government began to sell negroes to pay the expenses of the war I would throw up my commission and go home. Schleich was a State Senator when the war began. He is what might be called a tremendous little man, swears terribly, and imagines that he thereby shows his snap. Snap, in his opinion, is indispensable to a military man. If snap is the only thing a soldier needs, and profanity is snap, Schleich is a second Napoleon. This General Snap will go home, at the expiration of his three-months' term, unregretted by officers and men. Major Hugh Ewing will return with him. Last night the Major became thoroughly elevated, and he is not quite sober yet. He thinks, when in his cups, that our generals are too careful of their men. "What are a th-thousand men," said he, "when (hic) principle is at stake? Men's lives (hic) shouldn't be thought of at such a time (hic). Amount to nothing (hic). Our generals are too d----d slow" (hic). The Major is a man of excellent natural capacity, the son of Hon. Thomas Ewing, of Lancaster, and brother-in-law of W. T. Sherman, now a colonel or brigadier-general in the army. W. T. Sherman is the brother of John Sherman.

The news from Manassas is very bad. The disgraceful flight of our troops will do us more injury, and is more to be regretted, than the loss of fifty thousand men. It will impart new life, courage, and confidence to our enemies. They will say to their troops: "You see how these scoundrels run when you stand up to them."

SOURCE: John Beatty, The Citizen-soldier: Or, Memoirs of a Volunteer, p. 35-6

Senator Charles Sumner to George Sumner, September 30, 1851

The field of our national politics is still shrouded in mist. Nobody can clearly discern the future. On the Whig side, Fillmore seems to me the most probable candidate; and on the Democratic side, Douglas. I have never thought Scott's chances good, while Webster's have always seemed insignificant. His course lately has been that of a madman. He declined to participate in any of the recent celebrations,¹ cherishing still a grudge because he was refused the use of Faneuil Hall. The mayor told me that Webster cut him dead, and also Alderman Rogers, when they met in the apartments of the President. The papers-two Hunkers — have hammered me for calling on the President.² It is shrewdly surmised that their rage came from spite at the peculiarly cordial reception which he gave me. Lord Elgin I liked much; he is a very pleasant and clever man, and everybody gave him the palm among the speakers. I was not present at the dinner, and did not hear him.

There is a lull now with regard to Cuba. The whole movement may have received an extinguisher for the present; but I think we shall hear of it when Congress meets, in a motion to purchase this possession of Spain. This question promises to enter into the next Presidential election. The outrages caused by the Fugitive Slave bill continue to harass the country. There will be no end to them until that bill becomes a dead letter. It is strange that men can be so hardened to violations of justice and humanity, as many are now, under the drill of party. Mr. Webster has done more than all others to break down the North; and yet he once said, in taunt at our tameness, “There is no North!” The mischief from his course is incalculable. His speech at the reception of the President was regarded—and I think justly—by many Englishmen as insulting.

Our State politics promise to be very exciting. There has been a prodigious pressure upon me to take the field; but thus far I have declined. Under present circumstances I do not see my way to speaking. I am unwilling to defend the coalition, as in so doing I shall seem to be defending my own election; and I do not wish to seem to pursue Winthrop. His defeat seems to me inevitable, though in a contest like the present there must be an allowance for accidents and for treachery.

_______________

¹ Railroad Jubilee, Sept. 15, 1851.

² September 17, in Boston, on the occasion of the Railroad Jubilee. Sumner, as already seen, had strongly condemned President Fillmore a year before for approving the Fugitive Slave bill.

SOURCE: Edward L. Pierce, Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner, Vol. 3, p. 254-5

Isaac Edward Holmes* to Senator Robert M. T. Hunter, June 8, 1855

CHARLESTON, [S. C.], 8th June, 1855.

MY DEAR HUNTER: Some weeks since I rec[eive]d y[ou]r letter and thank you for y[ou]r efforts in behalf of my brother. I seldom ask anything and rather opine, that my last request is made. I sincerely congratulate you on the success of the Virginia Election. I feared the result, and believe the victory truly auspicious. If the Know Nothings had succeeded, if the Frontier State of the Southern Confederacy had "given-way" our institutions would have been placed in great hazard; as it is, "They are by no means safe." Fanaticism never goes-back and for the first time in our history, abolitionism has the ascendant in Congress.

I see that Senator Wilson has declared, That henceforth no Slave owner, or pro-slavery man shall be President. As the Democratic party are a minority in the North, and as the entire South will most probably act as one man in the next Election, it is essential that we have a Southern man for our Candidate. The sooner we make up the Issue, the better. If we are to be in a hopeless minority, and the Slave States to remain "in statu quo," We must share the fate of the British West Indies. Not only will slavery be abolish[e]d in the District, but in the Territories. Not only additional Slave States be excluded, but free ones made Ad Libitum until the constitution is altered and the entire labour of the South be destroyed. This cant be termed speculation. The effect is as sure as the result of any cause can be. It is my sincere desire that the Union may be saved, but its salvation depends upon the next Presidential Canvass. Virginia must lead off. There should commence an active correspondence between the politicians of the Old Dominion and the Leaders of the Northern Democracy. Before we go into a Caucus we should have a distinct understanding upon all the leading points. Otherwise we should have only a Southern Caucus, irrespective of parties, and proceed to an ulterior organization. I hope Wise may pursue the true course, and "entrenous," I hope that his ambition may not be so stimulated by his late Triumph as to aspire to the purple. Virginia ought to give the President. Her position at this time is potential, and amongst her own people there should be entire unanimity before going into Caucus. Remember that the nominating Caucus will meet during the next Session of Congress, not a Twelve month hence. I am not a politician, but I deem the times so pregnant, that, if alive next Winter, my efforts shall be given to prepare the Southern mind for the Presidential Election. South Carolina, whilst she keeps in the rear of Virginia, must nevertheless be represented in the Caucus. She must no longer be isolated. Thank God, the Cuba question seems settled for awhile. It promised much distraction, and I employed my pen, for the first time these many years, in the endeavor to show the Southern States that the acquisition of Cuba was not to their benefit. One of my pieces or letters was transferred to the National Intelligence[r]. I am writing you from the sick Chamber of Mrs. Holmes who has for a long period been confin[e]d to her room. Alas with little prospect of a recovery. I hope that y[ou]r own family are well.

_______________

* A Representative in Congress from South Carolina, 1839-1851.

SOURCE: Charles Henry Ambler, Editor, Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1916, in Two Volumes, Vol. II, Correspondence of Robert M. T. Hunter (1826-1876), p. 164-5

John J. Crittenden to Count Eugène de Sartiges, October 22, 1851

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, October 22, 1851.

The undersigned, acting Secretary of State of the United States, has the honor to remind M. de Sartiges, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the French republic, that in the interview which he had with him on the 8th instant, he stated that he might have occasion to address him in writing on the subject of the information which M. de Sartiges then communicated, that the French government had issued orders to its ships of war, then in the West Indies, to give assistance to Spain, and to prevent by force any adventurers of any nation from landing with hostile intent on the island of Cuba. Having imparted that information to the President, the undersigned has now the honor, by his direction, to address M. de Sartiges in regard to it.

M. de Sartiges is apprised that a few days prior to the interview adverted to the chargé d'affaires of her Britannic Majesty had given to this department official notice that his government had issued similar orders to its naval forces. The President had regarded this as a matter of grave importance, but its gravity is greatly increased by the concurrence and co-operation of France in the same measure. It cannot be doubted that those orders have been occasioned by the recent unlawful expedition of less than five hundred men, which, having evaded the vigilance of this government, and escaped from New Orleans, were landed by the steamer Pampero upon the island of Cuba, and were soon captured, and many of them executed. That such an incident should have incited the combined action of two great European powers, for an object to which neither of them is a direct party, and in a manner that may seriously affect the people of the United States, cannot fail to awaken the earnest consideration of the President.

He cannot perceive the necessity or propriety of such orders, while he entertains the strongest apprehensions that their execution by French and British cruisers will be attended with injurious and dangerous consequences to the commerce and peace of the United States. They cannot be carried into effect  without a visitation, examination, and consequent detention of our vessels on our shores, and in the great channels of our coasting trade, and this must invest British and French cruisers with the jurisdiction of determining, in the first instance at least, what are the expeditions denounced in their orders, and who are the guilty persons engaged in them. It is plain, however different may have been the intentions of the respective governments, that the exercise of such a power and jurisdiction could hardly fail to lead to abuses and collisions perilous to the peace that now so happily prevails. By such an interference those governments seem to assume an attitude unfriendly to the United States. The President will not, however, allow himself to believe that this intervention has been intended as an admonition or reproach to his government. He has signally manifested his condemnation of all such lawless enterprises, and has adopted active measures for their prevention and suppression. It must also be known to the governments of France and England, in common with all the world, that this government, since it took its place among nations, has carefully preserved its good faith, and anxiously endeavored to fulfill all its obligations, conventional and national. And this it has done from motives far above any apprehensions of danger to itself. From its beginning, under the present Constitution, it has sedulously cultivated the policy of peace, of not intermeddling in the affairs of others, and of preventing by highly penal enactments any unlawful interference by its citizens to disturb the tranquillity of countries with which the United States were in amity. To this end many such enactments have been made, the first as early as the year 1794, and the last as late as 1838. The last having expired by its own limitation, and all the preceding legislation on the subject having been comprehended in the act of Congress of the 20th of April, 1818, it is unnecessary to do more than to refer M. de Sartiges to its provisions as marking the signal anxiety and good faith of this government to restrain persons within its jurisdiction from committing any acts inconsistent with the rights of others, or its own obligations. These laws were intended to comprehend, and to protect from violation, all our relations with and duties to countries at peace with us, and to punish any violations of them by our citizens as crimes against the United States. In this manifestation of its desire to preserve just and peaceful relations with all nations, it is believed that the United States have gone before and further than any of the older governments of Europe. Without recapitulating all the provisions of those laws by which the United States have so carefully endeavored to prohibit every act that could be justly offensive to their neighbors, it is deemed enough for this occasion to say that they denounce all such enterprises or expeditions as those against which the orders in question are directed.

The undersigned thinks it is of importance enough to call the attention of M. de Sartiges more directly to this law. A literal copy of it is accordingly herewith communicated. Besides the ordinary legal process, it authorizes the President to employ the military and naval forces of the country for the purpose of preventing such expeditions and arresting for punishment those concerned in them. In the spirit of this law, the President condemns such expeditions against the island of Cuba as are denounced by the orders in question, and has omitted nothing for their detection and prevention. To that end he has given orders to civil, naval, and military officers from New York to New Orleans, and has enjoined upon them the greatest vigilance and energy. This course on the subject has been in all things clear and direct. It has been no secret, and the undersigned must presume that it has been fully understood and known by M. de Sartiges. An appeal might confidently be made to the vigilant and enlightened minister of Spain that his suggestions for the prevention of such aggressions, or the prosecution of offenders engaged in them, have been promptly considered, and, if found reasonable, adopted by the President; his course, it is believed, has been above all question of just cause of complaint. This government is determined to execute its laws, and in the performance of this duty can neither ask nor receive foreign aid. If, notwithstanding all its efforts, expeditions of small force hostile to Cuba have, in a single vessel or steamer, excited by Cubans themselves, escaped from our extensive shores, such an accident can furnish no ground of imputation either upon the law or its administration. Every country furnishes instances enough of infractions and evasions of its laws, which no power or vigilance can effectually guard against. It need not be feared that any expeditions of a lawless and hostile character can escape from the United States of sufficient force to create any alarm for the safety of Cuba, or against which Spain might not defend it with the slightest exertion of her power. The President is persuaded that none such can escape detection and prevention, except by their insignificance. None certainly can escape which could require the combined aid of France and England to resist or suppress. Cuba will find a sure, if not its surest, protection and defense in the justice and good faith of the United States.

There is another point of view in which this intervention on the part of France and England cannot be viewed with indifference by the President. The geographical position of the island of Cuba in the Gulf of Mexico, lying at no great distance from the mouth of the river Mississippi and in the line of the greatest current of the commerce of the United States, would become, in the hands of any powerful European nation, an object of just jealousy and apprehension to the people of this country. A due regard to their own safety and interest must, therefore, make it a matter of importance to them who shall possess and hold dominion over that island. The government of France and those of other European nations were long since officially apprised by this government that the United States could not see, without concern, that island transferred by Spain to any other European state; President Fillmore fully concurs in that sentiment, and is apprehensive that the sort of protectorate introduced by the orders in question might, in contingencies not difficult to be imagined, lead to results equally objectionable. If it should appear to M. de Sartiges that the President is too apprehensive on this subject, this must be attributed to his great solicitude to guard friendly relations between the two countries against all contingencies and causes of disturbance. The people of the United States have long cherished towards France the most amicable sentiments, and recent events which made her a republic have opened new sources of fraternal sympathy. Harmony and confidence would seem to be the natural relations of the two great republics of the world, relations demanded no less by their permanent interests than by circumstances and combinations in continental Europe, which now seem to threaten so imminently the cause of free institutions. The United States have nothing to fear from those convulsions, nor are they propagandists, but they have at heart the cause of freedom in all countries, and believe that the example of the two great republics of France and America, with their moral and social influences, co-operating harmoniously, would go far to promote and to strengthen that cause. It is with these views that the President so much desires the cultivation of friendly feelings between the two countries, and regards with so much concern any cause that may tend to produce collision or alienation. He believes that this Cuban intervention is such a cause. The system of government which prevails most generally in Europe is adverse to the principles upon which this government is founded, and the undersigned is well aware that the difference between them is calculated to produce distrust of, if not aversion to, the government of the United States. Sensible of this, the people of this country are naturally jealous of European interference in American affairs. And although they would not impute to France, now herself a republic, any participation in this distrustful and unfriendly feeling towards their government, yet the undersigned must repeat, that her intervention in this instance, if attempted to be executed, in the only practicable mode for its effectual execution, could not fail to produce some irritation, if not worse consequences. The French cruisers sailing up and down the shores of the United States to perform their needless task of protecting Cuba, and their ungracious office of watching the people of this country as if they were fruitful of piracies, would be regarded with some feelings of resentment, and the flag they bore-a flag which should always be welcome to the sight of Americans—would be looked at as casting a shadow of unmerited and dishonoring suspicion upon them and their government. The undersigned will add that all experience seems to prove that the rights, interests, and peace of the continents of Europe and America will be best preserved by the forbearance of each to interfere in the affairs of the other. The government of the United States has constantly acted on that principle, and has never intermeddled in European questions. The President has deemed it proper to the occasion that his views should be thus fully and frankly presented for the friendly consideration of M. de Sartiges and his government, in order that all possible precautions may be used to avert any misunderstanding, and every cause or consequence that might disturb the peace or alienate, in the least, the sentiments of confidence and friendship which now bind together the republics of the United States and France. The undersigned avails himself of this occasion to offer to M. de Sartiges the assurance of his very distinguished consideration.

JOHN J. CRITTENDEN.

M. DE SARTIGES.

SOURCE: Ann Mary Butler Crittenden Coleman, Editor, The Life of John J. Crittenden: With Selections from His Correspondence and Speeches, Vol. 2, p. 13-7

Herschel V. Johnson* to Senator Robert M. T. Hunter, November 8, 1852

(Private.)

ELIZABETH CITY Co., NEAR HAMPTON, [VA.],

November 5th, 1852.

MY DEAR HUNTER: I wrote you in June a short note from Baltimore immediately after the adjournment of the Convention, to which I rec[eive]d an answer in a few days. I write now to acknowl

edge its receipt and to say that I have had several very free conversations with Wise since. He speaks of you in the kindest manner and does you ample justice, meet him with the cordiality of former days and all will be well. I know that he loves you and desires your friendship, nay thinks himself entitled to it. I pray God that nothing may ever occur to separate you.

Franklin Pierce from present indications will receive at least 270 of the electoral vote-the vote of every Southern State. We believe, an awful beating, this indeed. He is indebted to Virginia for his Crown. Well who from our State must go into the Cabinet? You say "I have nothing to ask and shall ask nothing from the incoming administration for myself." Do you intend to say that you would decline any offer? I ask the question because I frequently heard you spoken of and the wish expressed that you would accept the Treasury if offered you, indeed I have been asked if I thought you would accept. I had not thought much upon the subject, and had no wish about it. The only desire I have upon the subject is that you should exercise your own judgment and be where you can be most useful.

The Treasury will be the great leaver to work for reform 'tis very certain, and I hope to see some Southern man of the right stamp at it.. Your present position is a commanding one and one from which you can better be heard by the nation, perhaps too it is nearer to the succession. Well if you shall come next after Pierce I shall not despair of the republic.

The last time I saw Bayly he told me that you would be the next President, that he intended to make you President. "You be d-d you can't get back to Congress yourself, and you talk to me about making Hunter President." "When and how come you so fond of Hunter. You always loved Hunter better than you love me." "If it be true can't you account for it very, very easy. Hunter votes right always-You only occasionally." Booker it is impossible you can doubt my fidelity to the South you must have confidence in me. "Confidence sir is a plant of slow groth as Mr. Pitt said." I like Bayly very much. We have been friends a long time, and Ì have tried very hard to forgive him. I withheld from him my vote the last time he was a candidate. It was painful to me to be obliged to do so. He does not understand his position, does, not know how much ground he has lost. I doubt if he can ever recover. In saying this much do not understand me as doubting his fidelity to you. I do not, no, I believe him sincere. In the event of your taking a seat in the Cabinet Bayly and Wise will both struggle hard for your place in the Senate, the former I am certain cannot succeed the latter may, perhaps will. I know of no really formidable competitor in the East. I am interrupted and must conclude before I had finished all I had to say.

SOURCE: Charles Henry Ambler, Editor, Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1916, in Two Volumes, Vol. II, Correspondence of Robert M. T. Hunter (1826-1876), p. 149-50

Congressman Horace Mann to Samuel Downer, June 28, 1850

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1850.

S. DOWNER, Esq.

DEAR SIR,—The fate of the Compromise Bill is still doubtful in the Senate, though public opinion here is against its success. Nothing but the prowess of Clay could have kept the breath in it to this time.

The news from New Mexico, if confirmed, knocks the bottom all out of the compromise. If they organize a government there, choose a governor and a legislature, appoint judges, &c., it will present a very pretty anomaly for us to be sending governor, judges, &c., to them. But the great point is the presumed proviso in their constitution. With that, the longer the South keeps them out of the Union, the more antislavery they will become.

. . . Well, Downer, it is the greatest godsend in our times that Taylor was elected over Cass. It is the turning-point of the fortunes of all the new Territories. Had Cass been President, they would have all been slave, and a fair chance for Cuba into the bargain. I am not sorry because I did not vote for Taylor; but I am glad others did. I think he has designedly steered the ship so as to avoid slavery. . . .

Best regards to your wife. You know you always have them. Look out for the boy, and make a hero of him.

Ever truly yours,

H. MANN.

SOURCE: Mary Tyler Peabody Mann, Life of Horace Mann, p. 304-5

Charles Sumner to George Sumner, June 25, 1850

The recent outrageous expedition against Cuba¹ has dishonored us before the world. My own impression is that it [Clay's Compromise] will pass through the Senate; and this is founded on two things: first, Clay is earnest and determined that it shall pass; he is using all his talents as leader; and, secondly, the ultra-Southern opposition, I think, will at last give way and support it, at least enough to pass the measure. If Webster had willed it, he might have defeated it.

_______________

¹ The second attempt of Lopez.

SOURCE: Edward L. Pierce, Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner, Vol. 3, p. 216

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, December 26, 1865

Captain Walker, of the De Soto, called last evening. He has been actively engaged at Cape Haytien, and should not have left with his vessel until the arrival of another. Seward made a formal request that he should be recalled and reprimanded on the ex parte statement of the consul, who himself was in error. I declined acceding to Seward's strange request, and desired him to possess himself of all the facts. Subsequently he wrote me approving Walker's course, and told me he should require an explanation from Folsom, the consul.

I have detailed the De Soto to take Seward to Cuba, and he obscurely hints that his ultimate destination will be some point on the Mexican coast. Has mystical observations and givings-out. I give them little credit, as he seems to be aware. After some suggestions of a public nature, he subsides into matters private, intimating a wish that it should be understood he goes for his health, for a relaxation, wishes to escape the tumult and reception of New Year's Day, wants the factionists in Congress should understand he cares little for them and has gone off recreating at the only time they are leveling their guns at us.¹

No very important matters before the Cabinet. Seward had a long story about Mrs. Cazneau² and St. Domingo. I judge from his own statement or manner of stating, and from his omission to read Mrs. C.'s communication, that he has committed some mistakes which he does not wish to become public.

_______________

¹ Stanton contrived to have the President surrounded most of the time by his detectives, or men connected with the military service who are creatures of the War Department. Of course, much that was said to the President in friendly confidence went directly to Stanton. In this way a constant espionage was maintained on all that transpired at the White House. Stanton, in all this time had his confidants among the Radicals — opponents of the President in Congress, a circle to whom he betrayed the measures and purposes of the President and with whom he concocted schemes to defeat the measures and policy of the Administration. The President knew my opinion and convictions of Stanton's operations and of Stanton himself. — G. W.

² General William L. Cazneau was the special agent of the United States in the Dominican Republic, and the negotiations for the purchase of the Bay of Samaná were conducted through him.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 403-4

Diary of Gideon Welles: December 6, 1865

Seward, apprehending a storm, wants a steamer to take him to Cuba. Wishes to be absent a fortnight or three weeks. Thinks he had better be away; that the war will be pretty strong upon us for the first few weeks of the session and he had better show the Members that we care nothing about them by clearing out.

A court martial of high officers in the case of Craven, who declined to encounter the Stonewall, has made itself ridiculous by an incongruous finding and award which I cannot approve. It is not pleasant to encounter so large a number of officers of high standing, but I must do my duty if they do not.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 392-3

Diary of Gideon Welles: June 14 & 15, 1865

Not well, but pressed in disposing of current business. Acting Rear-Admiral Godon reported in person. Had returned with Susquehanna to Hampton Roads from Havana. The authorities of Cuba, he says, very courteous, and the people entirely American.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 317

The Ostend Manifesto,* October 18, 1854

AIX-LA-CHAPELLE, October 18th, 1854.

TO THE HON. WM. L. MARCY,
        Secretary of State.

SIR: The undersigned, in compliance with the wish expressed by the President in the several confidential despatches you have addressed to us respectively to that effect, have met in conference, first at Ostend, in Belgium, on the 9th, 10th, and 11th instant, and then at Aix-la-Chapelle, in Prussia, on the days next following, up to the date hereof.

There has been a full and unreserved interchange of views and sentiments between us, which, we are most happy to inform you, has resulted in a cordial coincidence of opinion on the grave and important subjects submitted to our consideration.

We have arrived at the conclusion and are thoroughly convinced that an immediate and earnest effort ought to be made by the Government of the United States to purchase Cuba from Spain, at any price for which it can be obtained, not exceeding the sum of one hundred and twenty millions of dollars.

The proposal should, in our opinion, be made in such a manner as to be presented, through the necessary diplomatic forms, to the Supreme Constituent Cortes about to assemble. On this momentous question, in which the people both of Spain and the United States are so deeply interested, all our proceedings ought to be open, frank, and public. They should be of such a character as to challenge the approbation of the World.

We firmly believe that, in the progress of human events, the time has arrived when the vital interests of Spain are as seriously involved in the sale as those of the United States in the purchase of the Island, and that the transaction will prove equally honorable to both nations.

Under these circumstances, we cannot anticipate a failure, unless, possibly, through the malign influence of foreign Powers who possess no right whatever to interfere in the matter.

We proceed to state some of the reasons which have brought us to this conclusion; and, for the sake of clearness, we shall specify them under two distinct heads:

1. The United States ought, if practicable, to purchase Cuba with as little delay as possible.

2. The probability is great that the Government and Cortes of Spain will prove willing to sell it, because this would essentially promote the highest and best interests of the Spanish people.

Then—1. It must be clear to every reflecting mind that, from the peculiarity of its geographical position and the considerations attendant on it, Cuba is as necessary to the North American Republic as any of its present members, and that it belongs naturally to that great family of States of which the Union is the Providential Nursery.

From its locality it commands the mouth of the Mississippi and the immense and annually increasing trade which must seek this avenue to the ocean.

On the numerous navigable streams, measuring an aggregate course of some thirty thousand miles, which disembogue themselves through this magnificent river into the Gulf of Mexico, the increase of the population, within the last ten years, amounts to more than that of the entire Union at the time Louisiana was annexed to it.

The natural and main outlet of the products of this entire population, the highway of their direct intercourse with the Atlantic and the Pacific States, can never be secure, but must ever be endangered whilst Cuba is a dependency of a distant Power, in whose possession it has proved to be a source of constant annoyance and embarrassment to their interests.

Indeed, the Union can never enjoy repose, nor possess reliable security, as long as Cuba is not embraced within its boundaries.

Its immediate acquisition by our Government is of paramount importance, and we cannot doubt but that it is a consummation devoutly wished for by its inhabitants.

The intercourse which its proximity to our coasts begets and encourages between them and the citizens of the United States has, in the progress of time, so united their interests and blended their fortunes, that they now look upon each other as if they were one people and had but one destiny.

Considerations exist which render delay in the acquisition of this Island exceedingly dangerous to the United States.

The system of emigration and labor lately organized within its limits, and the tyranny and oppression which characterize its immediate rulers, threaten an insurrection, at every moment, which may result in direful consequences to the American People.

Cuba has thus become to us an unceasing danger, and a permanent cause of anxiety and alarm.

But we need not enlarge on these topics. It can scarcely be apprehended that foreign Powers, in violation of international law, would interpose their influence with Spain to prevent our acquisition of the Island. Its inhabitants are now suffering under the worst of all possible Governments,—that of absolute despotism, delegated by a distant Power to irresponsible agents who are changed at short intervals, and who are tempted to improve the brief opportunity thus afforded to accumulate fortunes by the basest means.

As long as this system shall endure, humanity may in vain demand the suppression of the African Slave trade in the Island. This is rendered impossible whilst that infamous traffic remains an irresistible temptation and a source of immense profit to needy and avaricious officials who, to attain their end, scruple not to trample the most sacred principles under foot.

The Spanish Government at home may be well disposed, but experience has proved that it cannot control these remote depositories of its power.

Besides, the commercial nations of the world cannot fail to perceive and appreciate the great advantages which would result to their people from a dissolution of the forced and unnatural connection between Spain and Cuba, and the annexation of the latter to the United States. The trade of England and France with Cuba would, in that event, assume at once an important and profitable character, and rapidly extend with the increasing population and prosperity of the Island.

2. But if the United States and every commercial nation would be benefited by this transfer, the interests of Spain would also be greatly and essentially promoted.

She cannot but see that such a sum of money as we are willing to pay for the Island would effect in the development of her vast natural resources.

Two thirds of this sum, if employed in the construction of a system of Railroads, would ultimately prove a source of greater wealth to the Spanish people than that opened to their vision by Cortes. Their prosperity would date from the ratification of the Treaty of cession. France has already constructed continuous lines of Railways from Havre, Marseilles, Valenciennes, and Strasbourg, via Paris, to the Spanish frontier, and anxiously awaits the day when Spain shall find herself in a condition to extend these roads, through her Northern provinces, to Madrid, Seville, Cadiz, Malaga, and the frontiers of Portugal.

This object once accomplished, Spain would become a centre of attraction for the travelling world and secure a permanent and profitable market for her various productions. Her fields, under the stimulus given to industry by remunerating prices, would teem with cereal grain, and her vineyards would bring forth a vastly increased quantity of choice wines. Spain would speedily become, what a bountiful Providence intended she should be, one of the first Nations of Continental Europe, rich, powerful, and contented.

Whilst two thirds of the price of the Island would be ample for the completion of her most important public improvements, she might, with the remaining forty millions, satisfy the demands now pressing so heavily upon her credit, and create a sinking fund which would gradually relieve her from the overwhelming debt now paralysing her energies.

Such is her present wretched financial condition, that her best bonds are sold, upon her own Bourse, at about one third of their par value; whilst another class, on which she pays no interest, have but a nominal value and are quoted at about one sixth of the amount for which they were issued. Besides, these latter are held principally by British creditors, who may, from day to day, obtain the effective interposition of their own Government, for the purpose of coercing payment. Intimations to that effect have been already thrown out from high quarters, and unless some new, source of revenue shall enable Spain to provide for such exigencies, it is not improbable that they may be realized.

Should Spain reject the present golden opportunity for developing her resources and removing her present financial embarrassments, it may never again return.

Cuba, in its palmiest days, never yielded her Exchequer, after deducting the expenses of its Government, a clear annual income of more than a million and a half of dollars. These expenses have increased to such a degree as to leave a deficit chargeable on the Treasury of Spain to the amount of six hundred thousand dollars.

In a pecuniary point of view, therefore, the Island is an encumbrance instead of a source of profit to the Mother Country.

Under no probable circumstances can Cuba ever yield to Spain one per cent. on the large amount which the United States are willing to pay for its acquisition.

But Spain is in imminent danger of losing Cuba without remuneration.

Extreme oppression, it is now universally admitted, justifies any people in endeavoring to relieve themselves from the yoke of their oppressors. The sufferings which the corrupt, arbitrary, and unrelenting local administration necessarily entails upon the inhabitants of Cuba cannot fail to stimulate and keep alive that spirit of resistance and revolution against Spain which has of late years been so often manifested. In this condition of affairs, it is vain to expect that the sympathies of the people of the United States will not be warmly enlisted in favor of their oppressed neighbors.

We know that the President is justly inflexible in his determination to execute the neutrality laws, but should the Cubans themselves rise in revolt against the oppressions which they suffer, no human power could prevent citizens of the United States and liberal minded men of other countries from rushing to their assistance.

Besides, the present is an age of adventure, in which restless and daring spirits abound in every portion of the world.

It is not improbable, therefore, that Cuba may be wrested from Spain by a successful revolution; and in that event, she will lose both the Island and the price which we are now willing to pay for it—a price far beyond what was ever paid by one people to another for any province.

It may also be here remarked that the settlement of this vexed question, by the cession of Cuba to the United States, would forever prevent the dangerous complications between nations to which it may otherwise give birth.

It is certain that, should the Cubans themselves organize an insurrection against the Spanish Government, and should other independent nations come to the aid of Spain in the contest, no human power could, in our opinion, prevent the people and Government of the United States from taking part in such a civil war in support of their neighbors and friends.

But if Spain, deaf to the voice of her own interest, and actuated by stubborn pride and a false sense of honor, should refuse to sell Cuba to the United States, then the question will arise, what ought to be the course of the American Government under such circumstances?

Self-preservation is the first law of nature, with States as well as with individuals. All nations have, at different periods, acted upon this maxim. Although it has been made the pretext for committing flagrant injustice, as in the partition of Poland and other similar cases which history records, yet the principle itself, though often abused, has always been recognized.

The United States have never acquired a foot of territory, except by fair purchase, or, as in the case of Texas, upon the free and voluntary application of the people of that independent State, who desired to blend their destinies with our own.

Even our acquisitions from Mexico are no exception to this rule, because, although we might have claimed them by the right of conquest in a just way, yet we purchased them for what was then considered by both parties a full and ample equivalent.

Our past history forbids that we should acquire the Island of Cuba without the consent of Spain, unless justified by the great law of self-preservation. We must in any event preserve our own conscious rectitude and our own self-respect.

Whilst pursuing this course, we can afford to disregard the censures of the world to which we have been so often and so unjustly exposed.

After we shall have offered Spain a price for Cuba, far beyond its present value, and this shall have been refused, it will then be time to consider the question, does Cuba in the possession of Spain seriously endanger our internal peace and the existence of our cherished Union?

Should this question be answered in the affirmative, then, by every law human and Divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain, if we possess the power; and this, upon the very same principle that would justify an individual in tearing down the burning house of his neighbor, if there were no other means of preventing the flames from destroying his own home.

Under such circumstances, we ought neither to count the cost, nor regard the odds which Spain might enlist against us. We forbear to enter into the question, whether the present condition of the Island would justify such a measure.

We should, however, be recreant to our duty, be unworthy of our gallant forefathers, and commit base treason against our posterity, should we permit Cuba to be Africanized and become a second St. Domingo, with all its attendant horrors to the white race, and suffer the flames to extend to our neighboring shores, seriously to endanger or actually to consume the fair fabric of our Union.

We fear that the course and current of events are rapidly tending towards such a catastrophe. We, however, hope for the best, though we ought certainly to be prepared for the worst.

We also forbear to investigate the present condition of the questions at issue between the United States and Spain,

A long series of injuries to our people have been committed in Cuba by Spanish officials, and are unredressed. But recently a most flagrant outrage on the rights of American citizens, and on the flag of the United States, was perpetrated in the harbor of Havana, under circumstances which without immediate redress would have justified a resort to measures of war, in vindication of national honor. That outrage is not only unatoned, but the Spanish Government has deliberately sanctioned the acts of its subordinates and assumed the responsibility attaching to them.

Nothing could more impressively teach us the danger to which those peaceful relations it has ever been the policy of the United States to cherish with foreign nations are constantly exposed than the circumstances of that case.

Situated as Spain and the United States are, the latter have forborne to resort to extreme measures. But this course cannot, with due regard to their own dignity as an independent nation, continue; and our recommendations, now submitted, are dictated by the firm belief that the cession of Cuba to the United States, with stipulations as beneficial to Spain as those suggested, is the only effective mode of settling all past differences and of securing the two countries against future collisions.

We have already witnessed the happy results for both countries which followed a similar arrangement in regard to Florida.

Yours very respectfully,

JAMES BUCHANAN.

J. Y. MASON.

PIERRE SOULÉ.

_______________

* MSS. Department of State, 66 Despatches from England. Printed in H. Ex. Doc. 93. 33 Cong. 2 Sess. 127-132; Horton's Buchanan, 392-399. An extract is given in Curtis's Buchanan, II. 139.

SOURCE: John Bassett Moore, The Works of James Buchanan: Comprising His Speeches, State Papers and Private Correspondence, Volume 9: 1853-1855, p. 260-6

Speech of Senator John Bell of Tennessee, May 24 & 25, 1854

Mr. President, I did not expect to provoke a personal assault on my course in relation to the measure before the Senate by anything which I said this morning. I trust that I did not touch the honorable gentleman’s [Mr. Toombs] sensibilities when I stated that I supposed his only object was to remove what he considered a violation of the Constitution of the United states from the Statute-book; and that that seemed to be the great to be the great principle which he had in view in giving his support to this bill. I leave it to the Senate to say whether I did not state with sufficient distinctness that I wanted to know from those gentlemen who had expressed themselves so vehemently, so loudly, and so eloquently, if you please, in favor of some great fundamental principle which they wished to establish by this bill, what that great principle really was? Each one said that there was a great principle in it, which they did not risk even by voting for a proposition which their judgments approved. I turned to the honorable Senator from Georgia, I trust in no offensive manner, and asked what principle he wanted to establish by the bill. He said he wished to repeal that odious or infamous restriction called the Missouri compromise.

Mr. Toombs—I did not use the term. I said unconstitutional.

Mr. Atchison—I said infamous.

Mr. Bell.—I know some Senators spoke of it is infamous; but it does not matter in what terms that compromise is denounced. My object was to know what was the great principle to be established by this bill, which was so important that honorable Senators would sacrifice their own opinions and principles upon other questions, in order to effect that object. My honorable friend from Missouri [Mr. Atchison] said that if the bill contained a thousand objectionable features, they would not prevent him from voting to get rid of that infamous Missouri compromise. If such views—if that was the only object—had been avowed at the outset of this proceeding, how many supporters do you think the bill would have had even from the South? I believe, though I am not certain, that the honorable Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Butler] expressed the same sentiments in his remarks upon the Nebraska bill, before it passed the Senate. That honorable Senator, said that to repeal the Missouri compromise would be plucking a thorn from his side which had been a long time rankling there, and that consideration recommended the bill to his favor.

I had no idea of provoking the honorable Senator from Georgia, with whom I have been on relations of friendship, to attack upon me when I called upon him to know what was the great principle which he saw in the bill. I believe he is the only Senator from the South with whom I ever conversed, who thought that this was a good thing in itself. Of all other southern Senators with whom I have ever conversed on the subject, I do not remember a single one besides who did not deprecate the introduction of this measure of repeal. But they thought that they could not go against it, presented, as it seemed to be, from the North; though they believed no practical good would come to the South from it.

Now, it seems that the great subject of the honorable Senator from Georgia in supporting the bill as sent from the House of Representatives, is to get clear of the restriction of 1820—which, by-the-by, I will say, gave the highest renown to the authors of it which a public man in this country can attain—which gave repose to the country and preserved the harmony of the sections for a period of thirty years; and which has been acquiesced in by both sections of the Union from 1820 up to a very recent period. Now it is said to be infamous, and gentlemen say they are quite willing to risk the boiling cauldron at the North alluded to by the Senator from Indiana [Mr. Pettit,] in order to get released from that odious restriction. Sir, did the honorable Senator, when he first gave his adhesion to the repeal of the Missouri compromise, anticipate such a state of things as now exists at the North? I did not believe myself, during the period of the initiation of this measure, that the excitement would be so great at the North. I spoke with northern gentlemen about it. They thought there would be a deep feeling implanted at the North against the measure, but no great excitement would be created, except, perhaps, at the meetings which might be got up in the populous cities. Did any gentleman of the South, however, believe that such a state of things as now appears to exist at the North would arise? It may be that excitement and agitation at the North may subside. The present bubbling of the cauldron may soon evaporate after the passage of the bill; but the cauldron certainly exhibits a very high degree of fermentation and excitement just now.

Now, does the Senator mean to say that, merely to get rid of that statute—the restriction of 1820—as a lover of the Union, he would risk all the mischievious consequences which the honorable Senator from Indiana has held up to our view as likely to arise in the North? Is there no locus poenitentia.¹

Mr. Toombs—You have a right to change.

Mr. Bell—But the honorable Senator will not. I suppose that the honorable Senator from Indiana [Mr. Pettit] would be prepared to change his opinion in regard to the importance of establishing what he regards as a great principle of this bill, if he were to find the consequences, which he described to-day as likely to arise before another session of Congress, would follow the repeal of the Missouri compromise. I do not think he would be so stubborn and obstinate as to insist, at all hazards upon getting his great principle established—upon furnishing that white sheet of paper, the tabula rasa,² upon which the people of the Territory might write what they pleased and thus inaugurate the doctrine of squatter sovereignty, as promulgated by the Senator from Michigan, amended and improved by the admission to the right of suffrage foreigners not Naturalized as well as natives. Would he convulse the country for the sake of establishing such a principle, in violation all our territorial legislation for sixty years? I think he would not be so obstinate as the honorable Senator from Georgia; nor do I think he would have the same vindictive feeling against others for any change of their views on this subject. However I might have thought at first that I should be forced under the circumstances, to support this measure, however much I disapproved it, yet I tho’t better afterwards, and when I became satisfied that the mischiefs were likely to be far greater that I at first supposed they would be.

Now, sir, with regard to the constitution or anything else, which is to be vindicated or established by this bill as it now stands, what is the great principle involved in it? Why, sir, if you should acquire Cuba, what is the first thing you have to do [to] conform to the doctrine proclaimed in this bill? The first step to be taken will be to abolish slavery as a legally established institution. How else can the great principle contended for by the Senator from Indiana be inaugurated or established? [Freedom] in the operation of squatter sovereignty would require that Cuba should first be made a free territory, as you have provided in this bill that Nebraska shall be. I voted for the amendment to which the Senator has referred. I had no idea that such a principle was intended to be established, but still I do not say that that consideration regulated my vote. The principle contended for, when carried out, requires that you shall take the stylus and rub out or eradicate everything that is written on the tablet, and leave the inhabitants free to prescribe what shall be written upon it, untrammeled by any existing institution. That is the great principle, in addition to the repeal of the Missouri compromise, which the South are now so much determined upon; so zealous and united in supporting, that they will sacrifice any other principle, however substantial and important to the grand object. The squatter sovereignty clause is the grand feature in the bill. What has the South to gain by all this? But the honorable Senator from Georgia says he is not merely legislating for the South in the advocacy of this bill.  I know he is not. But this broad principle of squatter sovereignty was not the idea on which the repeal clause of this bill was inserted. I was assured then that the South had some interest in it; that it would secure, practically, a slave territory west of Missouri; that slavery would go into Kansas when the restriction of 1820 was removed. It was not dwelt on in argument; but my honorable friend from Missouri [Mr. Atchison] knows that that view was taken by him, and I differed from him in regard to it. I thought slavery could not go there; the honorable Senator though it could.

Mr. Atchison—And I still think so.

Mr. Bell.—Ay, more; the idea was diffused gradually throughout the south that another slave state might be secured west of Missouri. I said in my speech there would scarcely be a chance for it, as the bill then stood, or in any shape.

It is very well for the honorable Senator from Georgia to proclaim now that he is not legislating for any section; he certainly is not going for the South! I think that no southern man can show that the South has any particular interest in this bill, because it is not like the compromise of 1850; for in New Mexico and Utah you let the territory stand legally restricted or barred against slavery, as it was by public law. When that Territory was brought into the Union, Mr. Calhoun and some other honorable Senators contended that the Constitution would operate as a repeal of the Mexican law, abolishing slavery, and give protection to the slaveholder. Some other Senators doubted on that point.  The honorable Senator from Mississippi [Mr. Brown] can, perhaps, explain the different doctrines which then were held in the South on this subject.  At all events, the compromise acts of 1850 left the Territory as it was when annexed and allowed the people to interdict or establish slavery, as they please, when they should form their state constitution. That was the doctrine of the non-intervention then. What is it in this bill? I am in favor of the principle of non-intervention. Such non-intervention as would have given to the South Cuba as a slave state, should it ever be annexed to the United States; such non-intervention as that, if there had been no compact with regard to the admission of slave States to be carved out of Texas, would have secured to us those slave States, independent of the compact by which the United states are bound to admit them[.] But now, under the state of things now produced—under the feeling of distrust and resentment getting up at the North against the South—I predict—no, I will not predict, because it is too serious a subject—I will state that, if this state of thing shall not change essentially, the time will never come when a slave State can be admitted out of Texas. The non-intervention of 1850, was to let the Territories which come into the Union as slave territory be considered slave territory until the inhabitants determine, when they form a State constitution, that slavery should be abolished; and if it came in as a free territory, then the inhabitants to restrict or adopt slavery, at their discretion, when they form a State constitution. But by this bill you interpose to repeal the Missouri compromise, which would restore the territory to the condition of slave territory, as it was when annexed; but not content with that, you further interfere to make it a free territory. You then provide, without limitation of time or numbers, that the inhabitants shall decide in their Territorial Legislature to establish or prohibit slavery. Well, suppose the first Legislature shall admit slavery may not in the next abolish it, and thus keep up a perpetual struggle; while Congress, at the same time, may be agitated again by questions of further investigation? Yet this is a measure of peace to the country! It is to give quiet; all agitation is to cease under it!

I have further answer to make the honorable Senator from Georgia, though I find myself much exhausted. It was not my intention, when I rose to-day to explain the vote I should give on the amendment of the Senator from Maryland, [Mr. Pearce,] to provoke a debate upon the general merits or demerits of the bill, and still less had I any design to say anything offensive to any Senator; but the Senator from Georgia has thought proper to avail himself of the occasion to review my course in relation to this measure in a manner which calls for more special notice.

Several Senators.  Let us adjourn.

Mr. Bell.  I will not give way for an adjournment.

Mr. Clayton. I hope the Senator will give way.

Mr. Bell.  I cannot give way for an adjournment now. I must answer the honorable Senator. I was inquiring of honorable Senators what the great principle of the bill really was, which they had stated to be of so much importance to the country, but which none of them stated distinctly. I wished to see how far they agreed, or whether they could be reconciled, one with the other. The honorable Senator from Georgia said I ought to know what the principles of the bill were; that I had consultations with the friend of the measure at divers[e] times; that I met with them, heard everything discussed, and concurred with them. I do not know what meeting it was to which the Senator referred, and at which he supposes that I concurred in, authorizing the Senator from North Carolina to make his Statement.

Mr. Toombs.  I said that the southern Senators who were present authorized the Senator from North Carolina to make the statement which he did. I did not say that the Senator from Tennessee expressed any opinion; but he was present at the meeting.

Mr. Bell.  I was invited to attend meetings of the friends of the Nebraska bill. I went with pleasure to hear their discussions, because I had not made up my mind as to what course I could take upon the subject; but all the discussion which I heard at the two meetings which I attended was to the phraseology or form in which the Missouri compromise should be repealed or made inoperative, and the principle of popular sovereignty recognized, or how far it should be recognized or whether it should be recognized at all. The distinguished Senator from Michigan [Mr. Cass,] the Senator from Mississippi, [Mr. Brown,] and the Senator from Indiana, [Mr. Pettit,] were the principal speakers, and spoke of what they would or would not accept. I do not like to tell tales out of school; but as I have been arraigned, I think I may speak of such facts as may be pertinent to my case. Those points, as I remember, were not settled at the first meeting. I attended a second meeting, at which the differences appeared to be settled. The discussion at the two meetings when I attend did not enlighten me in the least. My mind was on the question whether there was anything in those featured of the bill which I ought to support, or which ought to be supported. I took no part in the discussion. It is true that at the same time I thought I might be forced to go for the measure; but the mere phraseology of the bill was then indifferent to me. Those meetings were held, if I am not mistaken, within a few days after the discussion opened in the Senate, and when the debate between the Senator from Illinois [Mr. Douglas] and the Senator from Ohio [Mr. Chase] were having their full effect. In commencing the discussion, the Senator from Illinois displayed admirable tact in pouring such a fire as he did upon the Senators from Ohio, [Mr. Chase] and Massachusetts, [Mr. Sumner] and, as a consequence, exerting from them a response in sentiment so repugnant and offensive to southern Senators as was well calculated to stir the blood of every southern man, and to [diffuse] the impression through the country that the issue presented by the bill was between the advocates of southern rights and the ultra Free Soilers and Abolitionists of the North. I repeat, that I never saw a higher degree of parliamentary tact displayed than by the Senator from Illinois upon that occasion. The honorable Senator knows that I happened to see the inflammatory publication, on which he commented with such severity in his opening speech, before he did, and called his attention to it. It was of such a nature as to strongly incline the feelings and sympathies of southern Senators to the support of the bill, whatever they might think of its wisdom.

Mr. President, honorable Senators will perceive that this obtrusion of any matter personal to myself is not volunteered by me on this occasion. I have generally, heretofore, rested on my character, humble as it may be, to shield me from all imputations of gross impropriety or inconsistency, without troubling myself with attacks aliunde, or not arising directly out of the proceedings in the body to which I belong. The honorable Senator from Georgia has done me the honor, however, to notice me personally on this floor, and to arraign my conduct, as did a colleague of mine, [Mr. Churchwell,] in the other house, a few days ago. I have not the printed speech of that member. I do not know that it has been printed. I do not know whether his attack was so forcible, or eloquent, or so much to the satisfaction of gentlemen who would like to see me writhing under such personal charges, as the attack of the honorable Senator from Georgia; but I understood he was, in his manner, quite as offensive as in the matter of his attack. He produced and read from a paper, as I learn, which purported to be a copy of the proceedings of a meeting of southern Whig Senators, by which it appeared that a resolution was adopted declaring that the course of the National Intelligencer on the Nebraska bill was in opposition to the sentiment and interest of the South, and in opposition to the views of Southern Whig Senators; and that a committee was appointed to remonstrate or confer with the editors upon the subject. The paper also contained a statement of the southern Senators present, and that I was appointed chairman of a committee of three—all certified by the secretary of this meeting. When he was called upon for the name of the person who certified it, he said it would appear in print.

I will state the circumstances of the meeting, so far as I was connected to it. On the adjournment of the Senate, on the day of the meeting, a Senator took me by the arm, and asked me to walk into the ante-room. I asked him the object. He replied that there was to be a meeting of southern Whig Senators, upon some motion of a Senator, (naming him.) I went into the room with the gentlemen, and while standing with my hat in my hand, was surprised at hearing a Senator state that he thought some step should be taken in relation to the course of the Intelligencer, on the Nebraska bill, stating his reasons briefly. Another Senator made a few remarks, and on the suggestion of some one present, a resolution was drawn up, read and adopted. The voices of two or three, perhaps, were heard in assenting to it, but no one openly objected. Two Senators were named to be of the committee, one of whom objected, and named me in his place. On the question put by a senator, “Should the gentlemen named be the committee?” the proposition was acquiesced in. When the question was put on the committee, several Senators were on their feet, and I supposing that the meeting was over left the room. I had not taken my seat during the meeting.

My colleague [Mr. Churchwell] paraded, as I understand, a certified transcript of the resolution adopted at the meeting, and of the order appointing the committee, from which it would seem that all the proceedings were in regular form. I was made prominent on the committee as its chairman. A committee of three was certified. I know that was not true. Whoever gave the certificate of the proceedings, or drew it up, but have been mistaken—I will use no harsher term. I was not present at the meeting more than 10 minutes, or fifteen at the farthest. I regarded the whole proceeding, at the time, as I have treated it since, without feeling, and without and resentment against honorable Senators, as having been gotten up or suggested for some other object than the one I heard avowed. I believed that there were some present who thought they would be doing a very great service if they could get me committed on the Nebraska bill in such a way as to make it impossible for me to retrace my steps; and some of those present knew that I did not consider myself committed to the support of the bill. I suppose there were not more than seven or eight Senators present when I went into the room. I heard no roll called; I heard of the appointment of no secretary, no chairman. I was the last nominated on the committee; but before that, I had made up my mind as to the probable object of the meeting, or, at least of whoever prompted it. I know I should soon ascertain whether I was right or wrong in my conjecture as to the object of that meeting; but the only revenge I meditated was that no one should be the wiser from what they might hear from me in relation to it.

I have to sate further on this point, that although I have been almost daily associating on friendly terms with the gentlemen who attended the meeting in question, yet not one of the number has mentioned to me anything about the meeting since the day it took place. Not even after my colleague in the House arraigned me on the subject, has any honorable Senator, who was present at the meeting referred to, lisped to me anything about it. Nor was any resolution ever put into my hand as one of the committee by a secretary or any one else. No Senator ever inquired of me if I had executed the commission to which I was appointed at the meeting. No one ever asked me whether there was any change to be expected in the course of the National Intelligencer upon the subject.

But, sir, I had sufficient confirmation, a short time after the meeting, of the correctness of my conclusion as to the object of it. I allude to the speech of the honorable Senator from North Carolina, [Mr. Badger.] I am sorry that he is not now in his seat; but I will proceed, for I will not say anything personally offensive to him in his absence. The honorable Senator from North Carolina, who had been in that meeting of southern Whigs, when he came to make his speech, announced, at the close of it, that however southern Whig Senators might differ as to the reasoning on the doctrines which were involved in the discussion, he was authorized to say they were a unit on the main feature of the bill. Now, sir, that Senator could, by asking me, at any stage of the discussion, have ascertained my position. Soon after the commencement of the discussion, I was under the impression that I should be forced to go for the measure, whether I approved it or not, because I did not see how I could separate from my southern Whig friends and the southern delegation in Congress. If the Senator had asked me then what my course would be on the bill, I would have said to him frankly what I said to others, when they made the inquiry, that though I disapproved the measure, yet I did not see how I could separate from the southern delegation. At a later stage of the discussion I would have replied, that I was strongly disposed to oppose the measure; but, that still I would not commit myself to that course. The violation of Indian treaties proposed by the provisions of the bill would, at any time, have made it impossible that I could vote for it. The honorable Senator from Missouri [Mr. Atchison] knows better than any other Senator, that I could not vote for the bill with its present provisions, with any consistency of character or principle, but at the commencement of the discussion, I supposed that that difficulty would be removed by postponing the operation of the bill until the President could have time to make new treaties with the Indian tribes and, at least, qualify the wrong which was proposed to be done to them.

Mr. Atchison.  I will state now, that I understood from the honorable Senator from Tennessee, at the last session, when this question was pending before the Senate, as well as at the present session, that his great objections to the organization of territorial governments in Kansas and Nebraska, were, first, that there was no necessity, there being no white population there; and secondly, that it could not be without greatly disturbing our Indian relations.

Mr. Bell. And then will not the honorable Senator say that I thought the territory of west of Missouri was obliged to become a free state?

Mr. Atchison.  Most assuredly; but I told the honorable Senator that my opinion as to Kansas was different.

Mr. Bell.  I repeat, that I supposed, at one time, that the difficulty on the score of Indian compacts cold be obviated by an amendment postponing the operation of the bill till new treaties could be formed. I consulted the Senator from Missouri on the subject; but he said that no such amendment could be carried; that the people could not be restrained from entering the Indian country. That was when I supposed I should have to yield to the pressure of the storm of feeling which was excited on the question in the Senate; and it required all the nerve I had afterwards to resist its force.

But, sir, I was going on to say that the honorable Senator from North Carolina, standing in the relation of a personal friend to me should have ascertained from my own lips what course I proposed to adopt in relation to the bill, before he made the declaration he did at the close of his speech. He could scarcely have supposed that I was so dull and stupid as not to comprehend the true purpose of the meeting out southern Whigs which I attended, or a test of the bill by anything which took place there. I have said before, that I had no unkind feelings againse the members of that meeting, for some of them told me over and over again, that I would be dead politically, that my standing as a public man would be utterly destroyed, if  I should vote against the bill. I was told again and again, that no southern men could vote with the northern Abolitionists upon this bill without losing the confidence of the South, as it was all-important that the South should present an unbroken front on such a question. That was one reason why I pressed so strongly to-day to know what was the great fundamental principle in the bill so much affecting the southern interests; what was the greater and larger principle which had loomed up to imposingly before the visions of southern gentlemen, that every other principle or consideration of policy should yield to it.

The honorable Senator from North Carolina is now present, and I will repeat what I have said in relation to his statement, at the close of his speech. I thought I had a right to complain of him, as a friend, that he did not inquire of me what course I had determined to pursue, when I could have done it so conveniently, before making the announcement that the southern Whigs were a unit on the Nebraska bill. That senator and myself had occupied seats very near each other during the whole discussion. Our relations, personally and socially, were kind and friendly; notwithstanding, he did not think proper to ask my opinion, but, at the close of his speech, said he was authorized to say every Whig Senator from the south concurred in the conclusion to support the bill.

Mr. Badger.  Will the Senator allow me to explain?

Mr. Bell.  I am willing that the Senator shall explain, but I do not wish any material interruption for I have a great deal more to say.

Mr. Badger.  My dear sir, I do not want a statement of that kind, as to a matter of fact, to go out without having an opportunity of stating what the fact is, as I understand it.

The Presiding Officer. (Mr. Weller is in the chair.)  Unless the honorable Senator from Tennessee yields the floor, the Senator from North Carolina is not entitled to proceed.

Mr. Bell.  I yield the floor.

Mr. Badger.  The statement which I made at the close of the remarks which I submitted to the Senate, on the Nebraska bill, I believe was to this effect that, although I did not hold my southern Whig friends responsible for the course of argument which I had adopted, yet, I thought I was authorized to say, that as to the conclusion at which I had arrived, we all stood as one man; and that I thought I had their authority for saying so. That was the statement which I made. I must say, sir, without going into particulars, that I thought, at that time, I had just the same reason to suppose that my fried from Tennessee was going for the bill, as I had to suppose that I was. In the meeting which has been alluded to by my friend from Georgia, it was suggested that the southern Whig members of this body were liable to this difficulty; that no vote was being taken, it was a matter of doubt in the country, what course they would pursue in regard to this subject, and that inconvenient consequences were resulting from that position. It was understood that I had the floor, to speak either on that day, or the next. I forget which, and I said: “Well, then, gentlemen, I had better take the occasion to say, in the course of my remarks that we are all agreed in the support of this bill.” I heard a general response: “Yes, do so by all means.” Whether my friend from Tennessee joined in this response or not, I do not know; because as witnesses very frequently say, when they are called upon to state particulars, in courts of justice, as all of us know, “I cannot answer that precisely, as I did not expect to be called upon.” [Laughter.] I certainly thought I was requested by the meeting of Whig Senators, then and there present, of whom my friend from Tennessee was one—not only authorized, but requested—in order to anticipate the delay which must take place before they could either vote or speak on the subject, that whatever course of reasoning we might adopt in bringing us to the conclusion, in support of the bill, we were all united.

Mr. Bell.  In consequence of that meeting?

Mr. Badger.  I made that remark in the conclusion of my speech. My honorable fried from Tennessee sat immediately before me. He said nothing by way of dissent, after I had concluded my speech, and passed out—

Mr. Bell.  Passed out where?

Mr. Badger.  Right there, just out of my seat. The Senator came to me and said: “why have you committed me to support this bill.”

Mr. Bell.  I said no such thing.

Mr. Badger.  Something of that sort.

Mr. Bell.  What I said was: “Mr. Badger, you had no right to commit me to support of the bill.”

Mr. Badger.  Probably that was it.

Mr. Clayton.  Let me interfere between my friends?

Mr. Badger.  Not yet.  I am willing to make any statement about the language, because, as I said, I did not expect to be called upon; but only say, a remark of that kind was made by my friend, which attracted my attention, because I had supposed I was speaking, not only by his authority, but at his instance, in making that remark.

Mr. Bell.  On what occasion?

Mr. Badger.  This very occasion now referred to.

Mr. Bell.  That is what I suppose, and I consider it full confirmation of my conjectures in regard to that transaction.

Mr. Clayton.  Will my friend now give me the floor for a moment?

Mr. Bell.  Certainly.

Mr. Clayton.  These are my friends, and I think I understand exactly the state of the case. There is a misapprehension between them, that I am anxious to correct it. There is no reason whatever for any feeling between them, and whom I have made the explanation which I am about to make, I think they will both agree that neither of them has any occasion whatever to complain of the other.

Mr. Badger.  I have no feeling whatever about it.

Mr. Clayton.  The facts were these.  The southern Whigs in this body were unanimous in favor of the repeal of the Missouri compromise. They had consulted with each other, not in a caucus, but we understood from private conversations with each other, that we all thought that the Missouri compromise line ought to be repealed.

Mr. Badger.  That we were all in favor of the provision as it stood in the bill. That is what I understood.

Mr. Clayton.  Then the Intelligencer paper took ground hostile to the position—

Mr. Bell.  I must stop the Senator from Delaware. I cannot admit his statement. We should soon get into a quarrel.

Mr. Clayton.  If that is the case I will give up. I do not wish to get into a quarrel with my friend from Tennessee.

Mr. Bell.  The Senator says we were all agreed that the Missouri compromise shold be repealed. That is the statement of the honorable Senator from Delaware.

Mr. Clayton.  Did not the honorable Senator himself take that ground in his speech?

Mr. Bell.  I never did.

Mr. Clayton.  Then I entirely misunderstood the honorable Senator, and beg his pardon.

Mr. Bell.  I know that the honorable Senator from Delaware did not intend to misrepresent me.

Mr. Clayton.  Not at all.

Mr. Bell.  But the honorable Senator from North Carolina, though it was so easy for him to have ascertained my opinion, spoke of the opinion of all the Southern Whigs. He did not ask me about it.

Mr. Badger.  I thought I had the Senator’s authority already.

Mr. Bell.  From anything I ever said?

Mr. Badger.  I have already said that we had a meeting, at which the Senator from Tennessee was present; and, when I suggested this, there was a general expression of approbation that I should—

Mr. Bell.  Do what?

Mr. Badger.  That I should state we were all agreed in support of the bill.

Mr. Bell.  That all the southern Whigs were agreed upon it?

Mr. Badger.  Yes. That is what I understood. It was a meeting of the southern Whigs.

Mr. Bell.  I could not make such a declaration. Did the honorable Senator from Delaware hear such a proposition?

Mr. Clayton.  I was proceeding to explain, but the Senator would not permit me.

Mr. Bell.  I pronounce that there was no such question put. The honorable Senator from North Carolina is mistaken.

Mr. Badger.  I do not say there was any question put.

Mr. Bell.  Nor was it asked in my hearing.

Mr. Badger.  As we were breaking up, the suggestion was thrown out that it was uncertain in the country, how southern Whig Senators stood on this bill; and I then suggested that, as I was to make a speech, it would perhaps be well for me to take the occasion of saying we were all agreed. I think my friend from Louisiana [Mr. Benjamin,] was at that meeting, and he can say whether I am right or not. There was a general declaration, “By all means do it!”

Mr. Bell.  Then I was not at that meeting.

Mr. Badger.  I will not say the Senator from Tennessee was there but I thought he was.

Mr. Bell. Now, sir, the honorable Senator from North Carolina could easily have ascertained my sentiments at any moment.

Mr. Badger.  I thought I knew these already.

Mr. Bell.  I say that no such question as that stated by the honorable Senator was asked at that meeting when I was present. If it were, it was out of my hearing.  I have before referred to the course of one of my colleagues in the House [Mr. Churchwell] on this subject. My colleagues stated that I was the chairman of the committee appointed at the meeting of the southern Whig Senators, and, as I was present and did not object, he very naturally and rationally inferred that I was in favor of the repeal of the Missouri compromise at that time, so upon no other supposition would I have undertaken such a commission to remonstrate with the editors of an independent journal against their course on the Nebraska bill. I therefore have no feeling against him on that ground; but I have some faults to find with him on the same ground that I found with the honorable Senator from North Carolina.

The honorable gentleman to whom I allude had my confidence, and was well informed as to my views and opinions on the subject of the Nebraska bill from the time of its introduction in the Senate. He professed to be my personal friend during the whole period of the pendency of the bill in the Senate; and conferred with me frequently on the subject before the meeting of the southern Whig Senators, and afterwards. In one of those conferences he was pleased to say that he had more confidence in my judgment, on questions of this description than in that of any other public man he knew; and that he should defer very much to my views, though he did not say he would be guided by them.

Some few days, or a week, after the discussion on the bill commenced, he came to my seat in the Senate, while the debate was going on, and asked me if I had made up my mind on the question. I replied that I had not. He then said that he was going home for his family, and, as the people would be making inquiries of him as to my course on the subject, he wished to know what to say to them and he wished to know on his own account. I then told him that I would not decide on my course until he returned, unless the bill should be brought to a vote before he got back. During his absence, in my conversations with other colleagues of mine in the House, I told them repeatedly that if I took ground in opposition to the measure, I thought I might rely on having our colleague [Mr. Churchwell] with me; and I told them, confidentially, the grounds upon which my confidence was based. After he returned I met him, and told him that I had determined to oppose the bill, and I then asked him what he thought he should do. He said he would reserve his decision as long as he could; perhaps until the close of the debate in the House.

I do not think that I would be mistaken in stating that not more than three or four days or a week elapsed, from that time until he made his speech in the House, without my having some conversation with him, as to the course he proposed to take on the Nebraska bill, and I was left in doubt as to what it would be until the evening before he made his speech when he informed me that he would vote for the bill. I said to him: “You are surely not sincere?” He replied that he was.”

At this point the honorable Senator yielded, at the solicitation of several Senators, and the Senate adjourned.

_______________

¹ Place of repentance.

² Clean slate.

SOURCE:  “Speech of Hon. John Bell of Tennessee,” The Tennessean, Nashville, Tennessee, Tuesday, June 13, 1854, p. 2