St. Louis, Feb. 24,
1859.
To Messrs. J. PHILIPS
PHOENIX, WILLIS BLACKSTONE, H. M. BININGER, DAVID J. LILET AND H. R. SMITH,
Committee, New York.
Sirs: A short time ago I was favored with your note of the
7th inst., covering a resolution of the Committee, to the effect that it is
inexpedient at this time further to discuss or agitate the Negro question, but
rather to turn the attention of the people to other topics — "topics of
general importance, such as our Foreign Relations, including the Extension of
Territory; the building of Railroads for National purposes; the improvement of
our Harbors, the navigation of our Rivers to facilitate Internal Commerce; the
subject of Currency, and a Tariff of Duties, and other means of developing our
own internal resources, our home wealth, and binding together by ties of
national and fraternal feelings, the various parts and sections of our widely
extended Republic."
Your letter, gentlemen, opens a very wide field, in asking
for my "opinion upon the subject, and my views as to the signs of the
times." Books have been written upon these matters, and speeches delivered
by the thousand ; and yet the argument seems as far from being exhausted as it
was at the beginning ; and I take it for certain that you do not expect or
desire me to discuss at large, all or any of these interminable quarrels. That
I have opinions upon all or most of them, is true — not the opinions of this or
that party, ready to be abandoned or modified to suit this or that platform,
but my own opinions — perhaps the more fixed and harder to be changed because
deliberately formed in the retirement of private life, free from the exigencies
of official responsibility and from the perturbations of party policy. They are
my own opinions, right or wrong.
As to the Negro question — I have always thought, and often
declared in speech and in print, that it is a pestilent question, the agitation
of which has never done good to any party, section or class, and never can do
good, unless it be accounted good to stir up the angry passions of men, and
exasperate the unreasoning jealousy of sections, and by those bad means foist
some unfit men into office, and keep some fit men out. It is a sensitive question
into whose dangerous vortex it is quite possible for good men to be drawn
unawares. But when I see a man, at the South or the North, of mature age and
some experience, persist in urging the question, after the sorrowful experience
of the last few years, I can attribute his conduct to no higher motive than
personal ambition or sectional prejudice.
As to the power of the General Government to protect the
persons and properties, and advance the interests of the people, by laying
taxes, raising armies and navies, building forts and arsenals, light houses,
moles, and breakwaters, surveying the coasts and adjacent seas, improving
rivers, lakes, and harbors, and making roads — I should be very sorry to doubt
the existence of the power, or the duty to exercise it, whenever the
constituted authorities have the means in their hands, and are convinced that
its exercise is necessary to protect the country and advance the prosperity of
the people.
In my own opinion, a government that has no power to protect
the harbors of its country against winds and waves and human enemies, nor its
rivers against snags, sands and rocks, nor to build roads for the
transportation of its armies and its mails and the commerce of its people, is a
poor, impotent government, and not at all such a government as our fathers
thought they had made when they produced the Constitution which was greeted by
intelligent men everywhere with admiration and gratitude as a government free
enough for all the ends of legal liberty and strong enough for all the purposes
of national and individual protection. A free people, if it be wise, will make
a good constitution; but a constitution, however good in itself, did never make
a free people. The people do not derive their rights from the government, but
the government derives its powers from the people; and those powers are granted
for the main, if not the only, purpose of protecting the rights of the people.
Protection, then, if not the sole, is the chief end of government.
And it is for the governing power to judge, in every
instance, what kind and what degree of protection is needful — whether a Navy
to guard our commerce all around the world, or an Army to defend the country
against armed invasion from without, or domestic insurrection from within; or a
Tariff, to protect our home industry against the dangerous obtrusion of foreign
labor and capital.
Of the existence of the power and duty of the Government to
protect the People in their persons, their property, their industry and their
locomotion, I have no doubt; but the time, the mode and the measure of
protection, being always questions of policy and prudence, must of necessity be
left to the wisdom and patriotism of those whose duty it is to make laws for
the good government of the country. And with them I freely leave it, as the
safest, and indeed the only, constitutional depository of the power.
As to our Foreign Policy generally, I have but little to
say. I am not much of a progressive, and am content to leave it where
Washington [Jefferson] placed it, upon that wise, virtuous, safe maxim —
"Peace [. . .] with all nations; entangling alliance[s] with none."
The greedy and indiscriminate appetite for foreign acquisition, which makes us
covet our neighbor's lands, and devise cunning schemes to get them, has little
of my sympathy. I view it as a sort of political gluttony, as dangerous to our
body politic as gluttony is to the natural man — producing disease certainly,
hastening death, probably. Those of our politicians who are afflicted with this
morbid appetite are wont to cite the purchase of Louisiana and Florida, as
giving countenance to their inordinate desires. But the cases are wholly unlike
in almost every particular. Louisiana was indispensable to our full and safe
enjoyment of an immense region which was already owned, and its acquisition
gave us the unquestioned control of that noble system of Mississippi waters,
which nature seems to have made to be one and indivisible, and rounded off the
map of the nation into one uniform and compacted whole. Nothing remained to mar
and disfigure our national plat, but Florida, and that was desirable, less for
its intrinsic value, than because it would form a dangerous means of annoyance,
in case of war with a Maritime Power, surrounded as it is, on three sides by the
ocean, and touching three of our present States, with no barrier between. The
population of Louisiana and Florida, when acquired, was very small compared
with the largeness of the territory; and, lying in contact with the States, was
easily and quickly absorbed into and assimilated with the mass of our people.
Those countries were acquired, moreover, in the most peaceful and friendly
manner, and for a satisfactory consideration.
Now, without any right or any necessity, it is hard to tell
what we do not claim in all the continent south of us, and the adjacent
islands. Cuba is to be the first fruit of our grasping enterprise, and that is
to be gotten at all hazards, by peaceful purchase if we can, by war and
conquest if we must.2 But Cuba is only an outpost to the Empire of
Islands and continental countries that are to follow. A leading Senator3
has lately declared (in debate on the Thirty Million bill4) that we
must not only have Cuba, but all the islands from Cape Florida to the Spanish
Main, so as to surround the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea, and make them our
"mare clausum" like the Mediterranean, in old times, when the Roman
Emperor ruled both its shores, from the pillars of Hercules to the Hellespont.5
This claim of mare nostrum implies, of course, that we must own the continent
that bounds our sea on the west, as well as the string of islands that inclose
it on the east — that is, Mexico, Central America, and all South America, so
far south at least as the Orinoco.6 In that wide compass of sea and
land there are a good many native governments, and provinces belonging to the
strongest maritime powers, and a narrow continental isthmus which we ourselves,
as well as England and France, are wont to call the highway of nations. To
fulfill the grand conception, and perfect our tropical empire, we must buy or
conquer all these torrid countries, and their mongrel populations. As to buying
them, it strikes me that we had better waite [sic] awhile, at least until the
Government has ceased to borrow money to pay its current expenses. And as to
conquering them, perhaps it would be prudent to pause and make some estimate of
costs and contingencies, before we rush into war with all maritime Europe and
half America.
I am not one of those who believe that the United States is
not an independent and safe nation, because Cuba is not a part of it. On the
contrary, I believe that we are quite capable of self-defense, even if the
"Queen of the Antilles" were a province of England, France or Russia;
and surely, while it remains an appendage of a comparatively feeble nation,
Cuba has much more cause to fear us than we have to fear Cuba. In fact,
gentlemen, I cannot help doubting the honesty of the cowardly argument by which
we are urged to rob poor old Spain of this last remnant of her Western empire,
for fear that she might use it to rob us.
But suppose we could get, honestly and peaceably, the whole
of the country — continental and insular — from the Rio Grande to the Orinoco,
and from Trinidad to Cuba, and thus establish our mare clausum, and shut the
gate of the world across the Isthmus, can we govern them wisely and well? For
the last few years, in the attempt to govern our home Territories of Kansas and
Utah, we have not very well maintained the dignity and justice of the nation,
nor secured the peace and prosperity of the subject people.7 Can we
hope to do better with the various mixed races of Mexico, Central and South
America, and the West India Islands? Some of those countries have been trying
for fifty years to establish republican governments on our model, but in every
instance have miserably failed; and yet, there was no obstacle to complete
success but their own inaptitude.
For my part, I should be grieved to see my country become,
like Rome, a conquering and dominant nation; for I think there are few or no
examples in history, of Governments whose chief objects were glory and power,
which did ever secure the happiness and prosperity of their own people. Such
Governments may grow great and famous, and advance a few of their citizens to
wealth and nobility; but the price of their grandeur is the personal
independence and individual freedom of their people. Still less am I inclined
to see absorbed into our system, "on an equal footing with the original
States," the various and mixed races (amounting to I know not how many
millions) which inhabit the continent and islands south of our present border.
I am not willing to inoculate our body politic with the virus of their
diseases, political and social — diseases which, with them, are chronic and
hereditary, and with us could hardly fail to produce corruption in the head and
weakness in the members.
Our own country, as it is, in position, form and size, is a
wonder which proclaims a wisdom above the wit of man. Large enough for our posterity,
for centuries to come: All in the temperate zone, and therefore capable of a
homogeneous population, yet so diversified in climates and soils, as to produce
everything that is necessary to the comfort and wealth of a great people: Bounded
east and west by great oceans, and bisected in the middle by a mighty river,
which drains and fructifies the continent, and binds together the most southern
and northern portions of our land by a bond stronger than iron. Beside all
this, it is new and growing — the strongest on the continent, with no neighbor
whose power it fears, or of whose ambition it has cause to be jealous. Surely
such a country is great enough and good enough for all the ends of honest
ambition and virtuous power.
It seems to me that an efficient home-loving Government,
moderate and economical in its administration, peaceful in its objects, and
just to all nations, need have no fear of invasion at home, or serious
aggression abroad. The nations of Europe have to stand continually in defense
of their existence; but the conquest of our county by a foreign power is simply
impossible, and no nation is so absurd as to entertain the thought. We may
conquer ourselves by local strifes and sectional animosities; and when, by our
folly and wickedness, we have accomplished that great calamity, there will be
none to pity us for the consequences of so great a crime.
If our Government would devote all its energies to the
promotion of peace and friendship with all foreign countries, the advancement
of Commerce, the increase of Agriculture, the growth and stability of
Manufactures, and the cheapening, quickening and securing the internal trade
and travel of our country ; in short, if it would devote itself in earnest to
the establishment of a wise and steady policy of internal government, I think
we should witness a growth and consolidation of wealth and comfort and power
for good, which cannot be reasonably hoped for from a fluctuating policy,
always watching for the turns of good fortune, or from a grasping ambition to
seize new territories, which are hard to get and harder to govern.
The present position of the Administration is a sorrowful
commentary upon the broad democracy of its professions. In theory, the people
have the right and ability to do anything; in practice, we are verging rapidly
to the One-Man power.
The President, the ostensible head of the National
Democrats, is eagerly striving to concentrate power in his own hands, and thus
to set aside both the People and their Representatives in the actual affairs of
government. Having emptied the Treasury, which he found full, and living
precariously upon borrowed money, he now demands of Congress to entrust to his
unchecked discretion the War power, the Purse and the Sword. First, he asks Congress
to authorize him, by statute, to use the Army to take military possession of
the Northern Mexico, and hold it under his protectorate, and as a security for
debts due to our citizens8 — civil possession would not answer, for
that might expose him, as in the case of Kansas, to be annoyed by a factious
Congress and a rebellious Territorial Legislature.
Secondly: Not content with this, he demands the
discretionary power to use the Army and Navy in the South, also in blockading
the coast and marching his troops into the interior of Mexico and New Granada,
to protect our citizens against all evil-doers along the transit routes of
Tehuantepec and Panama.9 And he and his supporters in Congress claim
this enormous power upon the ground that, in this particular at least, he ought
to be the equal of the greatest monarch of Europe. They forget that our fathers
limited the power of the President by design, and for the reason that they had
found out by sad experience that the monarchs of Europe were too strong for
freedom.
Third: In strict pursuance of this doctrine, first publicly
announced from Ostend,10 he demands of Congress to hand over to him
thirty millions of dollars to be used at his discretion, to facilitate his
acquisition of Cuba.11 Facilitate how ? Perhaps it might be
imprudent to tell.
Add to all this, the fact (as yet unexplained) that one of
the largest naval armaments which ever sailed from our coast is now operating
in South America, ostensibly against a poor little republic far up the Plate
River,12 to settle some little quarrel between the two Presidents.13
If Congress had been polite enough to grant the President's demand of the sword
and the purse against Mexico, Central America and Cuba, this navy, its duty
done at the south, might be made, on its way home, to arrive in the Gulf very
opportunely, to aid the " Commander-in-Chief " in the acquisition of
some very valuable territory.
I allude to these facts with no malice against Mr. Buchanan,
but as evidences of the dangerous change which is now obviously sought to be
made in the practical working of the Government — the concentration of power in
the hands of the President, and the dangerous policy, now almost established,
of looking abroad for temporary glory and aggrandizement, instead of looking at
home, for all the purposes of good government — peaceable, moderate,
economical, protecting all interests alike, and by a fixed policy, calling into
safe exercise all the talents and industry of our people, and thus steadily
advancing our country in everything which can make a nation great, happy, and
permanent.
The rapid increase of the Public Expenditures (and that,
too, under the management of statesmen professing to be peculiarly economical)
is an alarming sign of corruption and decay.
That increase bears no fair proportion to the growth and
expansion of the country, but looks rather like wanton waste or criminal
negligence. The ordinary objects of great expense are not materially augmented
— the Army and Navy remain on a low peace establishment— the military defenses
are little, if at all, enlarged — the improvement of Harbors, Lakes and Rivers
is abandoned, and the Pacific Railroad is not only not begun but its very
location is scrambled for by angry sections, which succeed in nothing but
mutual defeat. In short, the money to an enormous amount (I am told at the rate
of $80,000,000 to $100,000,000 a year) is gone, and we have little or nothing
to show for it. In profound peace with foreign nations, and surrounded with the
proofs of National growth and individual prosperity, the Treasury, by less than
two years of mismanagement, is made bankrupt, and the Government itself is
living from hand to mouth, on bills of credit and borrowed money!
This humiliating state of things could hardly happen if men
in power were both honest and wise. The Democratic economists in Congress
confess that they have recklessly wasted the Public Revenue; they confess it by
refusing to raise the Tariff to meet the present exigency, and by insisting
that they can replenish the exhausted Treasury and support the Government, in
credit and efficiency, by simply striking off their former extravagances.
An illustrious predecessor of the President is reported to
have declared "that those who live on borrowed money ought to break."
I do not concur in that harsh saying; yet I am clearly of opinion that the
Government, in common prudence (to say nothing of pride and dignity), ought to
reserve its credit for great transactions and unforeseen emergencies. In common
times of peace, it ought always to have an established revenue, equal, at
least, to its current expenses. And that revenue ought to be so levied as to
foster and protect the Industry of the country employed in our most necessary
and important manufactures.
Gentlemen, I cannot touch upon all the topics alluded to in
your letter and resolution. I ought rather to beg your pardon for the prolixity
of this answer. I speak for no party, because the only party I ever belonged to
has ceased to exist as an organized and militant body.
And I speak for no man but myself.
I am fully aware that my opinions and views of public policy
are of no importance to anybody but me, and there is good reason to fear that
some of them are so antiquated and out of fashion as to make it very improbable
that they will ever again be put to the test of actual practice.
Most respectfully,
EDWARD BATES.
_______________
2 This was the substance of the Ostend
Manifesto which Buchanan as Minister to Great Britain had joined Ministers John
Y. Mason and Pierre Soulé in promulgating. As Secretary of State under
President Polk, Buchanan had tried to buy Cuba. In his second, third, and
fourth annual messages he urged Congress to cooperate with him in securing it
by negotiation.
3 Robert Toombs of Georgia: Whig state
legislator, 1837-1840, 1841-1844; states' rights Democratic congressman,
1845-1853; U. S. senator, 1853-1861. He was later a leader in the Georgia
Secession Convention, and congressman, brigadier-general, and secretary of
State under the Confederacy.
4 January, 1859, Senate Reports, 35 Cong., 2
Sess., ser. no. 994, doc. no. 351. The bill purposed to appropriate $30,000,000
"to facilitate the acquisition of Cuba by negotiation." Senator
Slidell (infra, Nov. 24, 1859, note 89) introduced it on January 10. 1859
(Cong. Globe, 35 Cong., 2 Sess., 277) ; it was reported favorably by the
Committee on Foreign Relations of which he was chairman, on January 24, 1859
(ibid., 35 Cong., 2 Sess., 538) ; it was debated at great length on January 24,
February 9-10, February 15—17, February 21, and February 25 (ibid., 35 Cong., 2
Sess., 538-544, 904-909, 934-940, 960968, 1038, Appendix [155-169], 1058-1063,
1079-1087, 1179-1192, 1326-1363) ; but because of opposition, it was withdrawn
on February 26 (ibid., 35 Cong., 2 Sess., 13S51387). At the next session, on
December 8, 1859, Senator Slidell reintroduced this bill (ibid., 36 Cong., 1
Sess., 53), had it referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations on December
21 (ibid., 36 Cong., 1 Sess., 199), reported it out favorably to the Senate on
May 30, 1860, but because of opposition did not push it (ibid., 36 Cong., 1
Sess., 2456). He promised to call it up again at the next session, but when
that time arrived was too busy seceding to bother about Cuba.
5 On January 24, Toombs had said, "Cuba
has fine ports, and with her acquisition, we can make first the Gulf of Mexico,
and then the Caribbean Sea, a mare clausum. Probably younger men than you or I
will live to see the day when no flag shall float there except by permission of
the United States of America . . . that development, that progress throughout
the tropics [is] the true, fixed unalterable policy of the nation." Ibid.,
35 Cong., 2 Sess., 543.
6 I. e., as far as Venezuela.
7 Bitterness over the slavery question had
reached the point of armed conflict, raids, and murder in Kansas in 1855-1856,
and Utah was at this time subject to frequent Indian raids. It was in 1859,
too, that the Republicans tried to prohibit polygamy in Utah and the Democrats
succeeded, probably with slavery in other territories in mind, in preventing
Congressional legislation on the subject.
8 Dec. 6, 1858, James D. Richardson, Messages
and Papers of the Presidents, V, 514. See infra, Feb. 15, 1860.
9 J. D. Richardson, op. cit., V, 516-517.
10 Supra, April 20, 1859, note 2.
11 J. D. Richardson, op. cit., V, 508-511.
12 Rio de La Plata in South America.
13 An expedition of some 19 ships, 200 guns,
and 2.500 men which was sent against Paraguay because a vessel of that nation
had fired upon the United States steamer Water Witch. A mere show of force
sufficed to secure both an apology and an indemnity on February 10, 1859. The
President of Argentina was so interested and so pleased that he presented the
commander with a sword.
SOURCE: Howard K.
Beale, Editor, Annual Report of The American
Historical Association For The Year 1930, Vol. 4, The Diary Of Edward Bates,
pp. 1-9
