Showing posts with label Missouri Compromise. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Missouri Compromise. Show all posts

Tuesday, March 4, 2025

John J. Crittenden’s Address on the Life and Death of Henry Clay, Delivered at Louisville, September 29, 1852

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,—I am very sensible of the difficulty and magnitude of the task which I have undertaken.

I am to address you in commemoration of the public services of HENRY CLAY, and in celebration of his obsequies. His death filled his whole country with mourning, and the loss of no citizen, save the Father of his Country, has ever produced such manifestations of the grief and homage of the public heart. His history has indeed been read "in a nation's eyes." A nation's tears proclaim, with their silent eloquence, its sense of the national loss. Kentucky has more than a common share in this national bereavement. To her it is a domestic grief,—to her belongs the sad privilege of being the chief mourner. He was her favorite son, her pride, and her glory. She mourns for him as a mother. But let her not mourn as those who have no hope or consolation. She can find the richest and the noblest solace in the memory of her son, and of his great and good actions; and his fame will come back, like a comforter, from his grave, to wipe away her tears. Even while she weeps for him, her tears shall be mingled with the proud feelings of triumph which his name will inspire; and Old Kentucky, from the depths of her affectionate and heroic heart, shall exclaim, like the Duke of Ormond, when informed that his brave son had fallen in battle, "I would not exchange my dead son for any living son in Christendom." From these same abundant sources we may hope that the widowed partner of his life, who now sits in sadness at Ashland, will derive some pleasing consolations. I presume not to offer any words of comfort of my own. Her grief is too sacred to permit me to use that privilege. You, sons and daughters of Kentucky, have assembled here to commemorate his life and death. How can I address you suitably on such a theme? I feel the oppressive consciousness that I cannot do it in terms adequate to the subject, or to your excited feelings. I am no orator, nor have I come here to attempt any idle or vainglorious display of words; I come as a plain Kentuckian, who, sympathizing in all your feelings, presents you with this address, as his poor offering, to be laid upon that altar which you are here erecting to the memory of Henry Clay. Let it not be judged according to its own value, but according to the spirit in which it is offered. It would be no difficult task to address you on this occasion in the extravagant and rhetorical language that is usual in funeral orations; but my subject deserves a different treatment—the monumental name of Henry Clay rises above all mere personal favor and flattery; it rejects them, and challenges the scrutiny and the judgment of the world. The noble uses to which his name should be applied, are to teach his country, by his example, lessons of public virtue and political wisdom; to teach patriots and statesmen how to act, how to live, and how to die. I can but glance at a subject that spreads out in such bright and boundless expanse before me.

Henry Clay lived in a most eventful period, and the history of his life for forty years has been literally that of his country. He was so identified with the government for more than two-thirds of its existence, that, during that time, hardly any act which has redounded to its honor, its prosperity, its present rank among the nations of the earth, can be spoken of without calling to mind involuntarily the lineaments of his noble person. It would be difficult to determine whether in peace or in war, in the field of legislation or of diplomacy, in the springtide of his life, or in its golden ebb, he won the highest honor. It can be no disparagement to any one of his contemporaries to say that, in all the points of practical statesmanship, he encountered no superior in any of the employments which his constituents or his country conferred upon him.

For the reason that he had been so much and so constantly in the public eye, an elaborate review of his life will not be expected of me. All that I shall attempt will be to sketch a few leading traits, which may serve to give those who have had fewer opportunities of observation than I have had something like a just idea of his public character and services. If, in doing this, I speak more at large of the earlier than of the later periods of his life, it is because, in regard to the former, though of vast consequence, intervening years have thrown them somewhat in the background.

Passing by, therefore, the prior service of Mr. Clay in the Senate for brief periods in 1806 and 1810-11, I come at once to his Speakership in the House of Representatives, and his consequent agency in the war of 1812.

To that war our country is indebted for much of the security, freedom, prosperity, and reputation which it now enjoys. It has been truly said by one of the living actors in that perilous era, that the very act of our going to war was heroic.1 By the supremacy of the naval power of England the fleets of all Europe had been swept from the seas; the banner of the United States alone floated in solitary fearlessness. She seemed to encircle the earth with her navies, and to be the undisputed mistress of the ocean. We went out upon the deep with a sling in our hands. When, in all time, were such fearful odds seen as we had against us?

The events of the war with England, so memorable, and even wonderful, are too familiar to all to require any particular recital on this occasion. Of that war,—of its causes and consequences,—of its disasters, its bloody battles, and its glorious victories by land and sea, history and our own official records have given a faithful narrative. A just national pride has engraven that narrative upon our hearts. But even in the fiercest conflicts of that war, there was nothing more truly heroic than the declaration of it by Congress.

Of that declaration, of the incidents, personal influences, and anxious deliberations which preceded and led to it, the history is not so well or generally known. The more it is known the more it will appear how important was the part that Mr. Clay acted, and how much we are indebted to him for all the glorious and beneficial issues of the declaration of that war, which has not inappropriately been called the Second War of Independence.

The public grounds of the war were the injustice, injury, and insults inflicted on the United States by the government of Great Britain, then engaged in a war of maritime edicts with France, of which the commerce of the United States was the victim, our merchant ships being captured by British cruisers on every sea, and confiscated by her courts, in utter contempt of the rights of this nation as an independent power. Added to this, and more offensive than even those outrages, was the arrogation, by the same power, of a right to search American vessels for the purpose of impressing seamen from vessels sailing under the American flag. These aggressions upon our national rights constituted, undoubtedly, justifiable cause of war. With equal justice on our part, and on the same grounds (impressment of seamen excepted), we should have been warranted in declaring war against France also; but common sense (not to speak of policy) forbade our engaging with two nations at once, and dictated the selection, as an adversary, of the one that had power, which the other had not, to carry its arbitrary edicts into full effect. The war was really, on our part, a war for national existence.

When Congress assembled, in November, 1811, the crisis was upon us. But, as may be readily imagined, it could be no easy matter to nerve the heart of Congress, all unprepared for the dread encounter, to take the step, which there could be no retracing, of a declaration of war.

Nor could that task, in all probability, ever have been accomplished, but for the concurrence, purely accidental, of two circumstances: the one, the presence of Henry Clay in the chair of the popular branch of the national legislature; and the other, that of James Monroe, as Secretary of State, in the executive administration of the government.

Mr. Monroe had returned but a year or two before from a course of public service abroad, in which, as minister plenipotentiary, he had represented the United States at the several courts, in succession, of France, Spain, and Great Britain. From the last of these missions he had come home, thoroughly disgusted with the contemptuous manner in which the rights of the United States were treated by the belligerent powers, and especially by England. This treatment, which even extended to the personal intercourse between their ministers and the representatives of this country, he considered as indicative of a settled determination on their part, presuming upon the supposed incapacity of this government for war, to reduce to system a course of conduct calculated to debase and prostrate us in the eyes of the world. Reasoning thus, he had brought his mind to a serious and firm conviction that the rights of the United States, as a nation, would never be respected by the powers of the Old World until this government summoned up resolution to resent such usage, not by arguments and protests merely, but by an appeal to arms. Full of this sentiment, Mr. Monroe was called, upon a casual vacancy, when it was least expected by himself or the country, to the head of the Department of State. That sentiment, and the feelings which we have thus accounted for, Mr. Monroe soon communicated to his associates in the cabinet, and, in some degree it might well be supposed, to the great statesman then at the head of the government.

The tone of President Madison's first message to Congress (November 5, 1811), a few months only after Mr. Monroe's accession to the cabinet, can leave hardly a doubt in any mind of such having been the case. That message was throughout of the gravest cast, reciting the aggressions and aggravations of Great Britain, as demanding resistance, and urging upon Congress the duty of putting the country "into an armor and attitude demanded by the crisis and corresponding with the national spirit and expectations."

It was precisely at this point of time that Mr. Clay, having resigned his seat in the Senate, appeared on the floor of the House of Representatives, and was chosen, almost by acclamation, Speaker of that body. From that moment he exercised an influence, in a great degree personal, which materially affected, if it did not control, the judgment of the House. Among the very first acts which devolved upon him by virtue of his office was the appointment of the committees raised upon the President's message. Upon the select committee of nine members to which was referred "so much of the message as relates to our foreign relations," he appointed a large proportion from among the fast friends of the administration, nearly all of them being new members and younger than himself, though he was not then more than thirty-five years of age. It is impossible, at this day, to call to mind the names of which this committee was composed (Porter, Calhoun, and Grundy being the first named among them), without coming to the conclusion that the committee was constituted with a view to the event predetermined in the mind of the Speaker. There can be no question that when, quitting the Senate, he entered the representative body, he had become satisfied that, by the continued encroachments of Great Britain on our national rights, the choice of the country was narrowed down to war or submission. Between these there could be no hesitation in such a mind as that of Mr. Clay which to choose. In this emergency he acted for his country as he would in a like case for himself. Desiring and cultivating the good will of all, he never shrank from any personal responsibility, nor cowered before any danger. More than a year before his accession to the House of Representatives he had, in a debate in the Senate, taken occasion to say that "he most sincerely desired peace and amity with England; that he even preferred an adjustment of all differences with her to one with any other nation; but, if she persisted in a denial of justice to us, he trusted and hoped that all hearts would unite in a bold and vigorous vindication of our rights." It was in this brave spirit, animated to increased fervency by intervening aggressions from the same quarter, that Mr. Clay entered into the House of Representatives.

Early in the second month of the session, availing himself of the right then freely used by the Speaker to engage in discussion while the House was in committee of the whole, he dashed into the debates upon the measures of military and naval preparation recommended by the President and reported upon favorably by the committee. He avowed, without reserve, that the object of this preparation was war, and war with Great Britain.

In these debates he showed his familiarity with all the weapons of popular oratory. In a tempest of eloquence, in which he wielded alternately argument, persuasion, remonstrance, invective, ridicule, and reproach, he swept before him all opposition to the high resolve to which he exhorted Congress. To the argument (for example) against preparing for a war with England, founded upon the idea of her being engaged, in her conflict with France, in fighting the battles of the world, he replied, that such a purpose would be best achieved by a scrupulous observance of the rights of others, and by respecting that public law which she professed to vindicate. "Then," said he, "she would command the sympathies of the world. But what are we required to do by those who would engage our feelings and wishes in her behalf? To bear the actual cuffs of her arrogance, that we may escape a chimerical French subjugation. We are called upon to submit to debasement, dishonor, and disgrace; to bow the neck to royal insolence, as a course of preparation for manly resistance to Gallic invasion! What nation, what individual, was ever taught, in the schools of ignominious submission, these patriotic lessons of freedom and independence?" And to the argument that this government was unfit for any war but a war against invasion,-so signally since disproved by actual events,-he exclaimed, with characteristic vehemence, "What! is it not equivalent to invasion, if the mouths of our outlets and harbors are blocked up, and we are denied egress from our own waters? Or, when the burglar is at our door, shall we bravely sally forth and repel his felonious entrance, or meanly skulk within the cells of the castle? What! shall it be said that our amor patriæ is located at these desks? that we pusillanimously cling to our seats here, rather than vindicate the most inestimable rights of our country?" Whilst in debate upon another occasion, at nearly the same time, he showed how well he could reason upon a question which demanded argument rather than declamation. To his able support of the proposition of Mr. Cheves to add to our then small but gallant navy ten frigates, may be ascribed the success, though by a lean majority, of that proposition. Replying to the objection, urged with great zeal by certain members, that navies were dangerous to liberty, he argued that the source of this alarm was in themselves. “Gentlemen fear," said he, "that if we provide a marine it will produce collision with foreign nations, plunge us into war, and ultimately overturn the Constitution of the country. Sir, if you wish to avoid foreign collision, you had better abandon the ocean, surrender all your commerce, give up all your prosperity. It is the thing protected, not the instrument of protection, that involves you in war. Commerce engenders collision, collision war, and war, the argument supposes, leads to despotism. Would the counsels of that statesman be deemed wise who would recommend that the nation should be unarmed; that the art of war, the martial spirit, and martial exercises, should be prohibited; who should declare, in a word, that the great body of the people should be taught that national happiness was to be found in perpetual peace alone?"

While Mr. Clay, in the capitol, was, with his trumpet-tongue, rousing Congress to prepare for war, Mr. Monroe, then Secretary of State, gave his powerful co-operation, and lent the Nestor-like sanction of his age and experience to the bold measures of his young and more ardent compatriot. It was chiefly through their fearless influence that Congress was gradually warmed up to a war spirit, and to the adoption of some preparatory measures. But no actual declaration of war had yet been proposed. There was a strong opposition in Congress, and the President, Mr. Madison, hesitated to recommend it, only because he doubted whether Congress was yet sufficiently determined and resolved to maintain such a declaration, and to maintain it to all the extremities of war.

The influence and counsel of Mr. Clay again prevailed. He waited upon the President, at the head of a deputation of members of Congress, and assured him of the readiness of a majority of Congress to vote the war if recommended by him. Upon this the President immediately recommended it by his message to Congress of the first Monday of June, 1812. A bill declaring war with Great Britain soon followed in Congress, and, after a discussion in secret session for a few days, became a law. Then began the war.

When the doors of the House of Representatives were opened, the debates which had taken place in secret session were spoken of and repeated, and it appeared, as must have been expected by all, that Mr. Clay had been the great defender and champion of the declaration of war.

Mr. Clay continued in the House of Representatives for some time after the commencement of the war, and having assisted in doing all that could be done for it in the way of legislation, was withdrawn from his position in Congress to share in the deliberations of the great conference of American and British Commissioners held at Ghent. His part in that convention was such as might have been expected from his course in Congress—high-toned and high-spirited, despairing of nothing.

I need not add, but for form, that acting in this spirit, Mr. Clay, and his patriotic and able associates, succeeded beyond all the hopes at that time entertained at home, in making a treaty, which, in putting a stop to the war, if it did not accomplish everything contended for, saved and secured, at all points, the honor of the United States.

Thus began and ended the war of 1812. On our part it was just and necessary, and, in its results, eminently beneficial and honorable.

The benefits have extended to all the world, for, in vindicating our own maritime rights, we established the freedom of the seas to all nations, and since then no one of them has arrogated any supremacy upon that ocean given by the Almighty as the common and equal inheritance of all.

To Henry Clay, as its chief mover and author, belongs the statesman's portion of the glory of that war; and to the same Henry Clay, as one of the makers and signers of the treaty by which it was terminated, belong the blessings of the peacemaker. His crown is made up of the jewels of peace and of war.

Prompt to take up arms to resent our wrongs and vindicate our national rights, the return of peace was yet gladly hailed by the whole country. And well it might be. Our military character, at the lowest point of degradation when we dared the fight, had been retrieved. The national honor, insulted at all the courts of Europe, had been redeemed; the freedom of the seas secured to our flag and all who sail under it; and what was most influential in inspiring confidence at home, and assuring respect abroad, was the demonstration, by the result of the late conflict, of the competency of this government for effective war, as it had before proved itself for all the duties of a season of peace.

The Congress which succeeded the war, to a seat in which Mr. Clay was elected while yet abroad, exhibited a feature of a national jubilee, in place of the gravity and almost gloom which had settled on the countenance of the same body during the latter part of the war and of the conference at Ghent. Joy shone on every face. Justly has that period been termed "the era of good feeling." Again placed in the chair of the House of Representatives, and all important questions being then considered as in committee of the whole, in which the Speaker descends to the floor of the House, Mr. Clay distinguished himself in the debates upon every question of interest that came up, and was the author, during that and following Congresses, of more important measures than it has been the fortune of any other member, either then or since, to have his name identified with.

It would exceed the proper limits of this discourse to particularize all those measures. I can do no more than refer to a very few of them, which have become landmarks in the history of our country.

First in order of these was his origination of the first proposition for the recognition of the independence of the states of South America, then struggling for liberty. This was on the 24th of March, 1818. It was on that day that he first formally presented the proposition to the House of Representatives. But neither the President nor Congress was then prepared for a measure so bold and decisive, and it was rejected by a large majority of the House, though advocated and urged by him with all the vehemence and power of his unsurpassed ability and eloquence. Undaunted by this defeat, he continued to pursue the subject with all the inflexible energy of his character. On the 3d of April, 1820, he renewed his proposition for the recognition of South American independence, and finally succeeded, against strong opposition, not only in passing it through the House of Representatives, but in inducing that body to adopt the emphatic and extraordinary course of sending it to the President by a committee especially appointed for the purpose. Of that committee Mr. Clay was the chairman, and, at its head, performed the duty assigned them. In the year 1822 Mr. Clay's noble exertions on this great subject were crowned with complete success by the President's formal recognition of South American independence, with the sanction of Congress.

It requires some little exertion, at this day, to turn our minds back and contemplate the vast importance of the revolutions then in progress in South America, as the subject was then presented, with all the uncertainties and perils that surrounded it. Those revolutions constituted a great movement in the moral and political world. By their results great interests and great principles throughout the civilized world, and especially in our own country, might, and probably would, be materially affected.

Mr. Clay comprehended the crisis. Its magnitude and its character were suited to his temper and to his great intellect.

He saw before him, throughout the vast continent of South America, the people of its various states or provinces struggling to cast off that Spanish oppression and tyranny which for three hundred years had weighed them down and seeking to reclaim and re-establish their long-lost liberty and independence.

He saw them not only struggling but succeeding, and with their naked hands breaking their chains and driving their oppressors before them. But the conflict was not yet over; Spain still continued to wage formidable and desperate hostilities against her colonies to reduce them to submission. They were still struggling and bleeding, and the result yet depended on the uncertain issues of war.

What a spectacle was there presented to the contemplation of the world! The prime object of attention and interest there to be seen was man bravely struggling for liberty. That was enough for Henry Clay. His generous soul overflowed with sympathy. But this was not all; there were graver and higher considerations that belonged to the subject, and these were all felt and appreciated by Mr. Clay.

If South America was resubjugated by Spain, she would in effect become European and relapse into the system of European policy, the system of legitimacy, monarchy, and absolutism. On the other hand, if she succeeded in establishing her independence, the principle of free institutions would be established with it, and republics, kindred to our own, would rise up to protect, extend, and defend the rights and liberties of mankind.

It was not, then, a mere struggle between Spain and her colonies. In its consequences, at least, it went much further, and, in effect, was a contest between the great antagonist principles and systems of arbitrary European governments and of free American governments. Whether the millions of people who inhabited, or were to inhabit, South America, were to become the victims and the instruments of the arbitrary principle, or the supporters of the free principle, was a question of momentous consequence now and in all time to come.

With these views, Mr. Clay, from sympathy and policy, embraced the cause of South American independence. He proposed no actual intervention in her behalf, but he wished to aid her with all the moral power and encouragement that could be given by a welcome recognition of her by the government of the United States.

To him belongs the distinguished honor of being the first among the statesmen of the world to espouse and plead the cause of South America, and to propose and urge the recognition of her independence. And his own country is indebted to him for the honor of being the first nation to offer that recognition.

When the magnitude of the subject, and the weighty interest and consequences attached to it, are considered, it seems to me that there is no more palmy day in the life of Mr. Clay than that in which, at the head of his committee, he presented to the President the resolution of the House of Representatives in favor of the recognition of South American independence.

On that occasion he appears in all the sublimity of his nature, and the statesman, invested with all the sympathies and feelings of humanity, is enlarged and elevated into the character of the friend and guardian of universal liberty.

How far South America may have been aided or influenced in her struggles by the recognition of our government, or by the noble appeals which Mr. Clay had previously addressed, in her behalf, to Congress and to the world, we cannot say; but it is known that those speeches were read at the head of her armies, and that grateful thanks were returned. It is not too much to suppose that he exercised great and, perhaps, decisive influence in her affairs and destinies.

Years after the first of Mr. Clay's noble exertions in the cause of South America, and some time after those exertions had led the government of the United States to recognize the new States of South America, they were also recognized by the government of Great Britain, and Mr. Canning, her minister, thereupon took occasion to say, in the House of Commons, "there (alluding to South America) I have called a new world into existence!" That was a vain boast. If it can be said of any man, it must be said of Henry Clay, that he called that “new world into existence.”2

Mr. Clay was the father of the policy of internal improvement by the general government. The expediency of such legislation had, indeed, been suggested, in one of his later annual messages to Congress, by President Jefferson, and that suggestion was revived by President Madison in the last of his annual messages. The late Bank of the United States having been then just established, a bill passed, in supposed conformity to Mr. Madison's recommendation, for setting aside the annual bonus, to be paid by the bank, as a fund for the purposes of internal improvement. This bill Mr. Madison very unexpectedly, on the last day of the term of his office, returned to the House of Representatives without his signature, assigning the reasons for his withholding it,―reasons which related rather to the form than the substance,—and recommending an amendment to the Constitution to confer upon Congress the necessary power to carry out that policy. The bill of course fell through for that session. Whilst this bill was on its passage, Mr. Clay had spoken in favor of it, declaring his own decided opinion in favor of the constitutionality and expediency of the measure. Mr. Monroe, immediately succeeding Mr. Madison in the Presidency, introduced into his first annual message a declaration, in advance of any proposition on the subject, of a settled conviction on his mind that Congress did not possess the right to enter upon a system of internal improvement. But for this declaration, it may be doubted that the subject would have been again agitated so soon after Mr. Madison's veto. The threat of a recurrence to that resort by the new President roused up a spirit of defiance in the popular branch of Congress, and especially in the lion heart of Mr. Clay; and by his advice and counsel a resolution was introduced declaring that Congress has power, under the Constitution, to make appropriations for the construction of military roads, post-roads, and canals. Upon this proposition, in committee of the whole House, Mr. Clay attacked, with all his powers of argument, wit, and raillery, the interdiction in the message.

He considered that the question was now one between the executive on the one hand, and the representatives of the people on the other, and that it was so understood by the country; that if, by the communication of his opinion to Congress, the President intended to prevent discussion, he had “most wofully failed;" that in having (Mr. Clay had no doubt the best motives) volunteered his opinion upon the subject, he had "inverted the order of legislation by beginning where it should end;" and, after an able and unanswerable argument on the question of the power, concluded by saying, “If we do nothing this session but pass an abstract resolution on the subject, I shall, under all circumstances, consider it a triumph for the best interest of the country, of which posterity will, if we do not, reap the benefit." And the abstract resolution did pass by a vote of 90 to 75; and a triumph it was which Mr. Clay had every right to consider as his own, and all the more grateful to his feelings because he had hardly hoped for it.

Referring on the final success, at a distance of thirty-five years, of the principle thus established, in the recent passage by Congress of the act for the improvement of certain of the ports and harbors and navigable rivers of the country, let "posterity" not forget, on this occasion, to what honored name is undoubtedly due the credit of the first legislative assertion of the power.

Mr. Clay was, perhaps, the only man since Washington, who could have said, with entire truth, as he did, "I had rather be right than be President." Honor and patriotism were his great and distinguishing traits. The first had its spring and support in his fearless spirit; the second in his peculiar Americanism of sentiment. It was those two principles which ever threw his whole soul into every contest where the public interest was deeply involved, and above all, into every question which in the least menaced the integrity of the Union. This last was, with him, the Ark of the Covenant; and he was ever as ready to peril his own life in its defense as he was to pronounce the doom of a traitor on any one who would dare to touch it with hostile hands. It was the ardor of this devotion to his country, and to the sheet-anchor of its liberty and safety, the union of the States, that rendered him so conspicuous in every conflict that threatened either the one or the other with harm. All are familiar with his more recent, indeed, his last, great struggle for his country, when the foundations of the Union trembled under the fierce sectional agitation, so happily adjusted and pacified by the wise measures of compromise which he proposed in the Senate, and which were, in the end, in substance adopted. That brilliant epoch in his history is fresh in the memory of all who hear me, and never will be forgotten by them. An equally glorious success, achieved by his patriotism, his resoluteness, and the great power of his oratory, was one which few of this assembly are old enough vividly to remember; but which, in the memory of those who witnessed the effort, and the success of that greatest triumph of his master-spirit, will ever live the most interesting in the life of the great statesman. I mean the Missouri controversy. Then, indeed, did common courage quail, and hope seemed to sink before the storm that burst upon and threatened to overwhelm the Union.

Into the history of what is familiarly known as the "Missouri Question," it is not necessary, if time would allow, that I should enter at any length. The subject of the controversy, as all my hearers know, was the disposition of the House of Representatives, manifested on more than one occasion, and by repeated votes, to require-as a condition of the admission of the Territory of Missouri into the Union as a State-the perpetual prohibition of the introduction of slavery into the Territories of the United States west of the Mississippi. During the conflict to which this proposition gave rise in 1820, the debates were from the beginning earnest, prolonged, and excited. In the early stages of them Mr. Clay exerted to the utmost his powers of argument, conciliation, and persuasion, speaking, on one occasion, it is stated, for four and a half hours without intermission. A bill finally passed both houses, authorizing the people of the Territory of Missouri to form a constitution of State government, with the prohibition of slavery restricted to the territory lying north of 36 deg. 30 min. of north latitude. This was in the first session of the Sixteenth Congress, Mr. Clay still being Speaker of the House. On the approach of the second session of this Congress, Mr. Clay, being compelled by his private affairs to remain at home, forwarded his resignation as Speaker, but retained his seat as a member, in view of the pendency of this question. Mr. Taylor, of New York, the zealous advocate of the prohibition of slavery in Missouri and elsewhere in the West, was chosen Speaker to succeed Mr. Clay. This fact, of itself, under all the circumstances, was ominous of what was to follow. Alarmed, apparently, at this aspect of things, Mr. Clay resumed his seat in the House on the 16th of January, 1821. The constitution formed by Missouri and transmitted to Congress, under the authority of the act passed in the preceding session, contained a provision (superfluous even for its own object) making it the duty of the General Assembly, as soon as might be, to pass an act to prevent free negroes and mulattoes from coming to or settling in the State of Missouri "upon any pretext whatever." The reception of the constitution with this offensive provision in it was the signal of discord apparently irreconcilable, when, just as it had risen to its height, Mr. Clay, on the 16th of January, 1821, resumed his seat in the House of Representatives. Less than six weeks of the term of Congress then remained. The great hold which he had upon the affections, as well as the respect, of all parties induced upon his arrival a momentary lull in the tempest. He at once engaged earnestly and solicitously in counsel with all parties in this alarming controversy, and on the 2d of February moved the appointment of a committee of thirteen members to consider the subject. The report of that committee, after four days of conference, in which the feelings of all parties had clearly been consulted, notwithstanding it was most earnestly supported by Mr. Clay in a speech of such power and pathos as to draw tears from many hearers, was rejected by a vote of 83 nays to 80 yeas. No one, not a witness, can conceive the intense excitement which existed at this moment within and without the walls of Congress, aggravated as it was by the arrival of the day for counting the electoral votes for President and Vice-President, among which was tendered the vote of Missouri as a State, though not yet admitted as such. Her vote was disposed of by being counted hypothetically, that is to say, that with the vote of Missouri, the then state of the general vote would be so and so; without it, so and so. If her vote, admitted, would have changed the result, no one can pretend to say how disastrous the consequences might not have been.

On Mr. Clay alone now rested the hopes of all rational and dispassionate men for a final adjustment of this question; and one week only, with three days of grace, remained of the existence of that Congress. On the 22d of the month, Mr. Clay made a last effort, by moving the appointment of a joint committee of the two houses, to consider and report whether it was expedient or not to make provision for the admission of Missouri into the Union on the same footing of the original States; and, if not, whether any other provision, adapted to her actual condition, ought to be made by law. The motion was agreed to, and a committee of twenty-three members appointed by ballot under it. The report by that committee (a modification of the previously rejected report) was ratified by the House, but by the close vote of 87 to 81. The Senate concurred, and so this distracting question was at last settled, with an acquiescence in it by all parties, which has never been since disturbed.

I have already spoken of this as the great triumph of Mr. Clay; I might have said, the greatest civil triumph ever achieved by mortal man. It was one towards which the combination of the highest ability and the most commanding eloquence would have labored in vain. There would still have been wanting the ardor, the vehemence, the impetuousness of character of Henry Clay, under the influence of which he sometimes overleaped all barriers, and carried his point literally by storm. One incident of this kind is well remembered in connection with the Missouri question. It was in an evening sitting, whilst this question was yet in suspense. Mr. Clay had made a motion to allow one or two members to vote who had been absent when their names were called. The Speaker (Mr. Taylor), who, to a naturally equable temperament, added a most provoking calmness of manner when all around him was excitement, blandly stated, for the information of the gentleman, that the motion "was not in order." Mr. Clay then moved to suspend the rule forbidding it, so as to allow him to make the motion; but the Speaker, with imperturbable serenity, informed him that, according to the rules and orders, such a motion could not be received without the unanimous consent of the House. "Then," said Mr. Clay, exerting his voice even beyond its highest wont, “I move to suspend ALL the rules of the House! Away with them! Is it to be endured, that we shall be trammeled in our action by mere forms and technicalities at a moment like this, when the peace, and perhaps the existence, of this Union is at stake?"

Besides those to which I have alluded, Mr. Clay performed many other signal public services, which would have illustrated the character of any other American statesman. Among these we cannot refrain from mentioning his measures for the protection of American industry, and his compromise measure of 1833, by which the country was relieved from the dangers and agitations produced by the doctrine and spirit of "nullification." Indeed, his name is identified with all the great measures of government during the long period of his public life. But the occasion does not permit me to proceed further with this review of his public services. History will record them to his honor.

Henry Clay was indebted to no adventitious circumstances for the success and glory of his life. Sprung from an humble stock, “he was fashioned to much honor from his cradle;" and he achieved it by the noble use of the means which God and nature had given him. He was no scholar, and had none of the advantages of collegiate education. But there was a "divinity that stirred within him." He was a man of a genius mighty enough to supply all the defects of education. By its keen, penetrating observation, its quick apprehension, its comprehensive and clear conception, he gathered knowledge without the study of books; he could draw it from the fountain-head,— pure and undefiled; it was unborrowed; the acquisition of his own observation, reflection, and experience; and all his own. It entered into the composition of the man, forming part of his mind, and strengthening and preparing him for all those great scenes of intellectual exertion or controversy in which his life was spent. His armor was always on, and he was ever ready for the battle.

This mighty genius was accompanied, in him, by all the qualities necessary to sustain its action, and to make it most irresistible. His person was tall and commanding, and his demeanor—

"Lofty and sour to them that loved him not;

But to those men that sought him sweet as summer.”

He was direct and honest, ardent and fearless, prompt to form his opinions, always bold in their avowal, and sometimes impetuous or even rash in their vindication. In the performance of his duties he feared no responsibility. He scorned all evasion of untruth. No pale thoughts ever troubled his decisive mind.

Be just and fear not" was the sentiment of his heart and the principle of his action. It regulated his conduct in private and public life; all the ends he aimed at were his country's, his God's, and truth's.

Such was Henry Clay, and such, were his talents, qualities, and objects. Nothing but success and honor could attend such a character. We have adverted briefly to some portions of his public life. For nearly half a century he was an informing spirit, brilliant and heroic figure in our political sphere, marshaling our country in the way she ought to go. The "bright track of his fiery car" may be traced through the whole space over which in his day his country and its government have passed in the way to greatness and renown. It will still point the way to further greatness and renown.

The great objects of his public life were to preserve and strengthen the Union, to maintain the Constitution and laws of the United States, to cherish industry, to protect labor, and to facilitate, by all proper national improvements, the communication between all the parts of our widely-extended country. This was his American system of policy. With inflexible patriotism he pursued and advocated it to his end. He was every inch an American. His heart and all that there was of him were devoted to his country, to its liberty, and its free institutions. He inherited the spirit of the Revolution in the midst of which he was born; and the love of liberty and the pride of freedom were in him principles of action.

A remarkable trait in the character of Mr. Clay was his inflexibility in defending the public interest against all schemes for its detriment. His exertions were, indeed, so steadily employed and so often successful in protecting the public against the injurious designs of visionary politicians or party demagogues, that he may be almost said to have been, during forty years, the guardian angel of the country. He never would compromise the public interest for anybody, or for any personal advantage to himself.

He was the advocate of liberty throughout the world, and his voice of cheering was raised in behalf of every people who struggled for freedom. Greece, awakened from a long sleep of servitude, heard his voice, and was reminded of her own Demosthenes. South America, too, in her struggle for independence, heard his brave words of encouragement, and her fainting heart was animated and her arm made strong.

Henry Clay is the fair representative of the age in which he lived, an age which forms the greatest and brightest era in the history of man,-an age teeming with new discoveries and developments, extending in all directions the limits of human knowledge, exploring the agencies and elements of the physical world and turning and subjugating them to the uses of man, unfolding and establishing practically the great principles of popular rights and free governments, and which, nothing doubting, nothing fearing, still advances in majesty, aspiring to, and demanding further improvement and further amelioration of the condition of mankind.

With the chivalrous and benignant spirit of this great era Henry Clay was thoroughly imbued. He was, indeed, moulded by it and made in its own image. That spirit, be it remembered, was not one of licentiousness, or turbulence, or blind innovation. It was a wise spirit, good and honest as it was resolute and brave; and truth and justice were its companions and guides.

These noble qualities of truth and justice were conspicuous in the whole public life of Henry Clay. On that solid foundation he stood erect and fearless; and when the storms of state beat around and threatened to overwhelm him, his exclamation was still heard, “truth is mighty and public justice certain." What a magnificent and heroic figure does Henry Clay here present to the world! We can but stand before and look upon it in silent reverence. His appeal was not in vain; the passions of party subsided; truth and justice resumed their sway, and his generous countrymen repaid him for all the wrong they had done him with gratitude, affection, and admiration in his life and tears for his death.

It has been objected to Henry Clay that he was ambitious. So he was. But in him ambition was virtue. It sought only the proper, fair objects of honorable ambition, and it sought these by honorable means only,-by so serving the country as to deserve its favors and its honors. If he sought office, it was for the purpose of enabling him by the power it would give, to serve his country more effectually and pre-eminently; and, if he expected and desired thereby to advance his own fame, who will say that was a fault? Who will say that it was a fault to seek and desire office for any of the personal gratifications it may afford, so long as those gratifications are made subordinate to the public good?

That Henry Clay's object in desiring office was to serve his country, and that he would have made all other considerations subservient, I have no doubt. I knew him well; I had full opportunity of observing him in his most unguarded moments and conversations, and I can say that I have never known a more unselfish, a more faithful or intrepid representative of the people, of the people's rights, and the people's interests, than Henry Clay. It was most fortunate for Kentucky to have such a representative, and most fortunate for him to have such a constituent as Kentucky, fortunate for him to have been thrown, in the early and susceptible period of his life, into the primitive society of her bold and free people. As one of her children, I am pleased to think that from that source he derived some of that magnanimity and energy which his after-life so signally displayed. I am pleased to think, that, mingling with all his great qualities, there was a sort of Kentuckyism (I shall not undertake to define it) which, though it may not have polished or refined, gave to them additional point and power, and free scope of action.

Mr. Clay was a man of profound judgment and strong will. He never doubted or faltered; all his qualities were positive and peremptory, and to his convictions of public duty he sacrificed every personal consideration.

With but little knowledge of the rules of logic, or of rhetoric, he was a great debater and orator. There was no art in his eloquence, no studied contrivances of language. It was the natural outpouring of a great and ardent intellect. In his speeches there were none of the trifles of mere fancy and imagination; all was to the subject in hand, and to the purpose; and they may be regarded as great actions of the mind, rather than fine displays of words. I doubt whether the eloquence of Demosthenes or Cicero ever exercised a greater influence over the minds or passions of the people of Athens and of Rome, than did Mr. Clay's over the minds and passions of the people of the United States.

You all knew Mr. Clay; your knowledge and recollection of him will present him more vividly to your minds than any picture I can draw of him. This I will add: He was, in the highest, truest sense of the term, a great man, and we ne'er shall look upon his like again. He has gone to join the mighty dead in another and better world. How little is there of such

a man that can die? His fame, the memory of his benefactions, the lessons of his wisdom, all remain with us; over these death has no power.

How few of the great of this world have been so fortunate as he? How few of them have lived to see their labors so rewarded? He lived to see the country that he loved and served advanced to great prosperity and renown, and still advancing. He lived till every prejudice which, at any period of his life had existed against him, was removed; and until he had become the object of the reverence, love, and gratitude of his whole country. His work seemed then to be completed, and fate could not have selected a happier moment to remove him from the troubles and vicissitudes of this life.

Glorious as his life was, there was nothing that became him like the leaving of it. I saw him frequently during the slow and lingering disease which terminated his life. He was conscious of his approaching end, and prepared to meet it with all the resignation and fortitude of a Christian hero. He was all patience, meekness, and gentleness; these shone round him like a mild, celestial light, breaking upon him from another world,

"And, to add greater honors to his age

Than man could give, he died fearing God."

_______________

1 Hon. Mr. Rush.

2 See Mr. Rush's letter to Mr. Clay, vol. i. Collins's Life of Henry Clay.

SOURCE: Ann Mary Butler Crittenden Coleman, Editor, The Life of John J. Crittenden: With Selections from His Correspondence and Speeches, Vol. 2, p. 39-57

Saturday, December 28, 2024

Francis Mallory to Senator Robert M. T. Hunter, May 11, 1856

NORFOLK, [VA.], May 11, 1856.

DEAR HUNTER: I have just returned from a visit to my old (Hampton) county and hope things will end there as we desire. Booker is warm in your favor and out against Buch[ana]n talking publickly of his Tariff vote in '42 and Missouri Compromise opinions. I shall attend the convention there on next Thursday and so told Booker who seemed much pleased at my promise. I shall be an outsider but will try my best. Drop B[ooker] a Line the moment you get this. It will encourage him much. Your letter to him had a fine effect.

He is fond of you but has been much courted by Wise. High minded honorable and brave as he is these little attentions are always agreeable especially to a country gentleman living a secluded life. He still praises W[ise] but thinks him out of the question this time. I want you to ask him to go and say you will leave him to act according to his own judgment content with any action he may take &c. Wednesday the convention for the Norfolk district comes off. But for the Wise men who still look to W[ise] as residuary Legatee of B[uchanan] we should have no difficulty. No one is opposed to you but the idea is afloat that B[uchanan] is the strong candidate and as office here controls every thing they profess preference for him because he is as they think the strong man. Simkins has softened down very much and so has Blow. If either of them go from the lower end I have a strong hope of getting him right. If they get in their men I will work day and night to operate on them and if I can wield a little influence in Washington I may succeed. I have just had a conversation with Simkins the Leader of the Wise party here as to the proceedings in Portsmouth and he asked me to draw up the resolutions (this of course confidential) and state his positions: 1st Compliment Pierce and endorse his admin [istratio]n, 2d support nominee of Cin[cinnat]i Convention, 3d Express no preference, 4th Leave delegates free to act according to circumstances. We shall carry a true man I think from the upper counties and will at least divide the district.

I told Banks to get old Frank Rives (who he says is all right) to work on Boykin of Isle of Wight and Atkinson and he writes me that it has been done. Boykin wants office and is slippery. He is weak in intellect and his attachments by no means stable. He wants to go as a Delegate. I cant advocate him but I know, I think, how and who can manage him. He is more tractable than Blow or Smith. The son I can do nothing with. He wanted the Collectorship here and is sound against Pierce. He will make a hard fight for Delegate but we have quietly operated against him on the ground, that the Elector comes from Portsmouth, Smith's place of residence and that she is not entitled to [a] Delegate and none of the Norfolk City Delegation will support him. Pierce's office holders give us no aid whatever. They are afraid to take position. When I was Navy Ag[en]t I ruled my party in the District and so could Loyall have done, but he is effete, selfish and timid. Sawyer has no power, even with his subordinates. Will the above positions (I mean the resolutions) suit you or would it answer to make an issue for Pierce direct. The result would be doubtful in as much as the floating vote in Conventions generally sides with the moderate party whether they be so in fact or in fraud. Drop me a line the moment you get this and draft me a resolution or two. You need not be afraid of my indiscretion. You fellows in Congress did not know me half as well as I did you. If I talk at random sometimes, so also can I be silent and prudent when there is necessity. If I had position in the Line or on the staff I could win the victory here. If I can do any good I will speak at both Conventions. I care not who gets the nomination for Delegates I mean to commence operations on him and if it be any but Smith (who hates me) I hope to succeed. I am far from giving up the fight for these ten districts for none will be pledged or committed.

Send me the names of your friends in Gloucester that will be in Hampton that I may know who to approach. My Brother Chas. K. Mallory, a lawyer, residing in Hampton is a warm and active friend. It will be hard if him and Booker acting together can not carry things to suit us.

Tell Muscoe our inspection law has so far put a stop to slave stealing in lower Virginia. It works beautifully tho' the Senate did it much damage by its amendments. I have got things quite snug for him in the lower end of his district in view of Bayly's departure.

My son has just returned. Many thanks for your kindness, and please thank Pierce for me.

If you wish me to hear from you before the Conventions meet, write the moment you get this, which is nearly as hard to decipher as your own. The Baltimore Boats leave in the afternoon and arrive here next morning. This you will get Tuesday morning. If the positions in the resolutions suit you, telegraph me in the words "All right," if not "make an issue direct for P[ierce] or H[unter]" as the case may be and sign it. T. M. provided you cant mail your letter by the 1 P. M. [boat] for Baltimore or 1½ P. M. or that which carries the mail through to Norfolk which can be known by enquiring at the City p[ost] office. If the vote of V[irgini]a depends on these two districts I dont think you have much to fear let things take what shape they may just now. It is easier to vanquish men in detail than attacking numbers. I shall act as we Doctors say "pro re natu."

SOURCE: Charles Henry Ambler, Editor, Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1916, in Two Volumes, Vol. II, Correspondence of Robert M. T. Hunter (1826-1876), p. 189-91

Thursday, August 1, 2024

Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, December 10, 1819

MONTICELLO, December 10, 1819.

DEAR SIR,—I have to acknowledge the receipt of your favor of November the 23d. The banks, bankrupt law, manufactures, Spanish treaty, are nothing. These are occurences which, like waves in a storm, will pass under the ship. But the Missouri question is a breaker on which we lose the Missouri country by revolt, and what more, God only knows. From the battle of Bunker's Hill to the treaty of Paris, we never had so ominous a question. It even damps the joy with which I hear of your high health, and welcomes to me the consequences of my want of it. I thank God that I shall not live to witness its issue. Sed hæc hactenus.

I have been amusing myself latterly with reading the voluminous letters of Cicero. They certainly breathe the purest effusions of an exalted patriot, while the parricide Cæsar is lost in odious contrast. When the enthusiasm, however, kindled by Cicero's pen and principles, subsides into cool reflection, I ask myself, what was that government which the virtues of Cicero were so zealous to restore, and the ambition of Cæsar to subvert? And if Cæsar had been as virtuous as he was daring and sagacious, what could he, even in the plenitude of his usurped power, have done to lead his fellow citizens into good government? I do not say to restore it, because they never had it, from the rape of the Sabines to the ravages of the Cæsars. If their people indeed had been, like ourselves, enlightened, peaceable, and really free, the answer would be obvious. "Restore independence to all your foreign conquests, relieve Italy from the government of the rabble of Rome, consult it as a nation entitled to self-government, and do its will." But steeped in corruption, vice and venality, as the whole nation was, (and nobody had done more than Cæsar to corrupt it,) what could even Cicero, Cato, Brutus have done, had it been referred to them to establish a good government for their country? They had no ideas of government themselves, but of their degenerate Senate, nor the people of liberty, but of the factious opposition of their Tribunes. They had afterwards their Tituses, their Trajans and Antoninuses, who had the will to make them happy, and the power to mould their governmant into a good and permanent form. But it would seem as if they could not see their way clearly to do it. No government can continue good, but under the control of the people; and their people were so demoralized and depraved, as to be incapable of exercising a wholesome control. Their reformation then was to be taken up ab incunabulis. Their minds were to be informed by education what is right and what wrong; to be encouraged in habits of virtue, and deterred from those of vice by the dread of punishments, proportioned indeed, but irremissible; in all cases, to follow truth as the only safe guide, and to eschew error, which bewilders us in one false consequence after another, in endless succession. These are the inculcations necessary to render the people a sure basis for the structure of order and good government. But this would have been an operation of a generation or two, at least, within which period would have succeeded many Neros and Commoduses, who would have quashed the whole process. I confess then, I can neither see what Cicero, Cato and Brutus, united and uncontrolled, could have devised to lead their people into good government, nor how this enigma can be solved, nor how further shown why it has been the fate of that delightful country never to have known, to this day, and through a course of five and twenty hundred years, the history of which we possess, one single day of free and rational government. Your intimacy with their history, ancient, middle and modern, your familiarity with the improvements in the science of government at this time, will enable you, if any body, to go back with our principles and opinions to the times of Cicero, Cato and Brutus, and tell us by what process these great and virtuous men could have led so unenlightened and vitiated a people into freedom and good government, et eris mihi magnus Apollo. Cura ut valeas, et tibi persuadeas carissimum te mihi esse.

SOURCE: H. A. Washington, Editor, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson: Being his Autobiography, Correspondence, Reports, Messages, Addresses, and other Writings, Official and Private, Vol. 7, p. 148-9

Senator John C. Calhoun’s Speech on the Oregon Bill, June 27, 1848

[Delivered in the United States Senate, June 27th, 1848.]

THERE is a very striking difference between the position on which the slaveholding and non-slaveholding States stand, in reference to the subject under consideration. The former desire no action of the Government; demand no law to give them any advantage in the territory about to be established; are willing to leave it, and other territories belonging to the United States, open to all their citizens, so long as they continue to be territories,—and when they cease to be so, to leave it to their inhabitants to form such governments as may suit them, without restriction or condition, except that imposed by the constitution, as a prerequisite for admission into the Union. In short, they are willing to leave the whole subject where the constitution and the great and fundamental principles of self-government place it. On the contrary, the non-slaveholding States, instead of being willing to leave it on this broad and equal foundation, demand the interposition of the Government, and the passage of an act to prevent the citizens of the slaveholding States from emigrating with their property into the territory, in order to give their citizens and those they may permit, the exclusive right of settling it, while it remains in that condition, preparatory to subjecting it to like restrictions and conditions when it becomes a State. The 12th section of this bill is intended to assert and maintain this demand of the non-slaveholding States, while it remains a territory, not openly or directly,—but indirectly, by extending the provisions of the bill for the establishment of the Iowa Territory to this, and by ratifying the acts of the informal and self-constituted government of Oregon, which, among others, contains one prohibiting the introduction of slavery, It thus, in reality, adopts what is called the Wilmot proviso, not only for Oregon, but, as the bill now stands, for New Mexico and California. The amendment, on the contrary, moved by the Senator from Mississippi, near me (Mr. Davis), is intended to assert and maintain the position of the slaveholding States. It leaves the territory free and open to all the citizens of the United States, and would overrule, if adopted, the act of the self-constituted Territory of Oregon and the 12th section, as far as it relates to the subject under consideration. We have thus fairly presented the grounds taken by the non-slaveholding and the slaveholding States,—or, as I shall call them for the sake of brevity,—the Northern and Southern States, in their whole extent for discussion.

The first question which offers itself for consideration is—Have the Northern States the power which they claim, to prevent the Southern people from emigrating freely, with their property, into territories belonging to the United States, and to monopolize them for their exclusive benefit?

It is, indeed, a great question. I propose to discuss it calmly and dispassionately. I shall claim nothing which does not fairly and clearly belong to the Southern States, either as members of this Federal Union, or appertain to them in their separate and individual character; nor shall I yield any thing which belongs to them in either capacity. I am influenced neither by sectional nor party considerations. If I know myself, I would repel as promptly and decidedly any aggression of the South on the North, as I would any on the part of the latter on the former. And let me add, I hold the obligation to repel aggression to be not much less solemn, than that of abstaining from making aggression; and the party which submits to it when it can be resisted, to be not much less guilty and responsible for consequences than that which makes it. Nor do I stand on party grounds. What I shall say in reference to this subject, I shall say entirely without reference to the Presidential election. I hold it to be infinitely higher than that and all other questions of the day. I shall direct my efforts to ascertain what is constitutional, right and just, under a thorough conviction that the best and only way of putting an end to this, the most dangerous of all questions to our Union and institutions, is to adhere rigidly to the constitution and the dictates of justice.

With these preliminary remarks, I recur to the question—Has the North the power which it claims under the 12th section of this bill? I ask at the outset, where is the power to be found? Not, certainly, in the relation in which the Northern and Southern States stand to each other. They are the constituent parts or members of a common Federal Union; and, as such, are equals in all respects, both in dignity and rights, as is declared by all writers on governments founded on such union, and as may be inferred from arguments deduced from their nature and character. Instead, then, of affording any countenance or authority in favor of the power, the relation in which they stand to each other furnishes a strong presumption against it. Nor can it be found in the fact that the South holds property in slaves. That, too, fairly considered, instead of affording any authority for the power, furnishes a strong presumption against it. Slavery existed in the South when the constitution was framed, fully to the extent, in proportion to the population, that it does at this time. It is the only property recognized by it; the only one that entered into its formation as a political element, both in the adjustment of the relative weight of the States in the Government, and the apportionment of direct taxes; and the only one that is put under the express guaranty of the constitution. It is well known to all conversant with the history of the formation and adoption of the constitution, that the South was very jealous in reference. to this property; that it constituted one of the difficulties both to its formation and adoption; and that it would not have assented to either, had the convention refused to allow to it its due weight in the Government, or to place it under the guaranty of the constitution. Nor can it be found in the way that the territories have been acquired. I will not go into particulars, in this respect, at this stage of the discussion. Suffice it to say, the whole was acquired either by purchase, out of the common funds of all the States, the South as well as the North, or by arms and mutual sacrifice of men and money;—which, instead of giving any countenance in favor of the power claimed by the North, on every principle of right and justice, furnishes strong additional presumption against it.

But, if it cannot be found in either,—if it exists at all,—the power must be looked for in the constitutional compact, which binds these States together in a Federal Union; and I now ask, can it be found there? Does that instrument contain any provision which gives the North the power to exclude the South from a free admission into the territories of the United States with its peculiar property, and to monopolize them for its own exclusive use? If it in fact contains such power, expressed or implied, it must be found in a specific grant, or be inferred by irresistible deduction, from some clear and acknowledged power. Nothing short of the one or the other can overcome the strong presumption against it.

That there is no such specific grant may be inferred, beyond doubt, from the fact that no one has ever attempted to designate it. Instead of that, it has been assumed—taken for granted without a particle of proof—that Congress has the absolute right to govern the territories. Now, I concede, if it does in reality possess such power, it may exclude from the territories whom or what it pleases, and admit into them whom or what it pleases; and of course may exercise the power claimed by the North to exclude the South from them. But I again repeat, where is this absolute power to be found? All admit that there is no such specific grant of power. If, then, it exists at all, it must be inferred from some such power. I ask where is that to be found? The Senator from New-York, behind me (Mr. Dix), points to the clause in the constitution, which provides that "Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory and other property belonging to the United States." Now, I under take to affirm and maintain, beyond the possibility of doubt, that, so far from conferring absolute power to govern the territories, it confers no governmental power whatever; no, not a particle. It refers exclusively to territory, regarded simply as public lands. Every word relates to it in that character, and is wholly inapplicable to it considered in any other character than property. Take the expression "dispose of" with which it begins. It is easily understood what it means when applied to lands; and is the proper and natural expression regarding the territory in that character, when the object is to confer the right to sell or make other disposition of it. But who ever heard the expression applied to government? And what possible meaning can it have when so applied? Take the next expression, "to make all needful rules and regulations." These, regarded separately, might, indeed, be applicable to government in a loose sense, but they are never so applied in the constitution. In every case where they are used in it, they refer to property, to things, or some process, such as the rules of Court, or of the Houses of Congress for the government of their proceedings,—but never to government, which always implies persons to be governed. But if there should be any doubt in this case, the words immediately following, which restrict them to making “rules and regulations respecting the territory and other property of the United States," must effectually expel it. They restrict their meaning, beyond the possibility of doubt, to territory regarded as property.

But if it were possible for doubt still to exist, another and conclusive argument still remains to show that the framers of the constitution did not intend to confer by this clause governmental powers. I refer to the clause in the constitution which delegates the power of exclusive legislation to Congress over this District and "all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same may be for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock yards, and other needful buildings." The places therein referred to are clearly embraced by the expression, "other property belonging to the United States," contained in the clause I have just considered. But it is certain, that if it had been the intention of the framers of the constitution to confer governmental powers over such places by that clause, they never would have delegated it by this. They were incapable of doing a thing so absurd. But it is equally certain, if they did not intend to confer such power over them, they could not have intended it over territories. Whatever was conferred by the same words, in reference to one, must have been intended to be conferred in reference to the other, and the reverse. The opposite supposition would be absurd. But, it may be asked why the term—territory—was omitted in the delegation of exclusive legislation to Congress over the places enumerated? Very satisfactory reasons may, in my opinion, be assigned. The former were limited to places lying within the limits and jurisdiction of the States, and the latter to public land lying beyond both. The cession and purchase of the former, with the consent of the State within which they might be situated, did not oust the sovereignty or jurisdiction of the State. They still remained in the State, the United States acquiring only the title to the place. It, therefore, became necessary to confer on Congress, by express delegation, the exercise of exclusive power of legislation over this District and such places, in order to carry out the object of the purchase and session was simply intended to withdraw them from under the legislatures of the respective States within which they might lie, and substitute that of Congress in its place, subject to the restrictions of the constitution and the objects for which the places were acquired, leaving, as I have said, the sovereignty still in the State in which they are situated, but in abeyance, as far as it extends to legislation. Thus, in the case of this District—since the retrocession to Virginia of the part beyond the Potomac,—the sovereignty still continues in Maryland in the manner stated. But the case is very different in reference to territories, lying as they do beyond the limits and jurisdictions of all the States. The United States possess not simply the right of ownership over them, but that of exclusive dominion and sovereignty; and hence it was not necessary to exclude the power of the States to legislate over them, by delegating the exercise of exclusive legislation to Congress. It would have been an act of supererogation. It may be proper to remark in this connection, that the power of exclusive legislation, conferred in these cases, must not be confounded with the power of absolute legislation. They are very different things. It is true that absolute power of legislation is always exclusive, but it by no means follows that exclusive power of legislation or of government is likewise always absolute. Congress has the exclusive power of legislation, as far as this Government is concerned, and the State legislatures as far as their respective governments are concerned;—but we all know that both are subject to many and important restrictions and conditions which the nature of absolute power excludes.

I have now made good the assertion I ventured to make, that the clause in the constitution relied on by the Senator from New-York, so far from conferring the absolute power of government over the territory claimed by him, and others who agree with him, confers not a particle of governmental power. Having conclusively established this, the long list of precedents, cited by the Senator to prop up the power which he sought in the clause, falls to the ground with the fabric which he raised; and I am thus exempted from the necessity of referring to them, and replying to them one by one.

But there is one precedent, referred to by the Senator, unconnected with the power, and on that account requiring particular notice. I refer to the ordinance of 1787, which was adopted by the old Congress of the Confederation while the convention that framed the constitution was in session, and about one year before its adoption, and of course on the very eve of the expiration of the old Confederation. Against its introduction, I might object that the act of the Congress of the Confederation cannot rightfully form precedents for this Government; but I waive that. I waive also the objection that the act was consummated when that Government was in extremis, and could hardly be considered compos mentis. I waive also the fact that the ordinance assumed the form of a compact, and was adopted when only eight States were present, while the articles of confederation required nine to form compacts. I waive also the fact, that Mr. Madison declared that the act was without shadow of constitutional authority;—and shall proceed to show, from the history of its adoption, that it cannot justly be considered of any binding force.

Virginia made the cession of the territory north of the Ohio, and lying between it and the Mississippi and the lakes, in 1784. It now contains the States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and a very considerable extent of territory lying north of the latter. Shortly after the cession, a committee of three was raised, of whom Mr. Jefferson was one. They reported an ordinance for the establishment of the territory, containing, among other provisions, one, of which Mr. Jefferson was the author, excluding slavery from the territory after the year 1800. It was reported to Congress, but this provision was struck out. On the question of striking out, every Southern State present voted in favor of it; and, what is more striking, every Southern delegate voted the same way, Mr. Jefferson alone excepted. The ordinance was adopted without the provision. At the next session, Rufus King, then a member of the old Congress, moved a proposition, very much in the same shape as the sixth article (that which excludes slavery) in the ordinance no action on it. A committee was moved the next or the subsequent year, which reported without including or noticing Mr. King's proposition. Mr. Dane was a member of that committee, and proposed a provision the same as that in the ordinance as it passed, but the committee reported without including it. Finally, another committee was raised, at the head of which was Mr. Carrington of Virginia, and of which Mr. Dane was also a member. That committee reported without including the amendment previously proposed by him. Mr. Dane moved his proposition, which was adopted, and the report of the committee thus amended became the ordinance of 1787.

It may be inferred from this brief historical sketch, that the ordinance was a compromise between the Southern and Northern States, of which the terms were, that slavery should be excluded from the territory upon condition that fugitive slaves, who might take refuge in the territory, should be delivered up to their owners, as stipulated in the proviso of the sixth article of the ordinance. It is manifest, from what has been stated, that the South was unitedly and obstinately opposed to the provision when first moved; that the proposition of Mr. King, without the proviso, was in like manner resisted by the South, as may be inferred from its entire want of success, and that it never could be brought to agree to it until the provision for the delivery up of fugitive slaves was incorporated in it. But it is well understood that a compromise involves not a surrender, but simply a waiver of the right or power; and hence in the case of individuals, it is a well-established legal principle, that an offer to settle by compromise a litigated claim, is no evidence against the justice of the claim on the side of the party making it. The South, to her honor, has observed with fidelity her engagements under this compromise; in proof of which, I appeal to the precedents cited by the Senator from New-York, intended by him to establish the fact of her acquiescence in the ordinance. I admit that she has acquiesced in the several acts of Congress to carry it into effect; but the Senator is mistaken in supposing that it is proof of a surrender, on her part, of the power over the territories which he claims for Congress. No, she never has, and I trust never will, make such a surrender. Instead of that, it is conclusive proof of her fidelity to her engagements. She has never attempted to set aside the ordinance, or to deprive the territory, and the States erected within its limits, of any right or advantage it was intended to confer. But I regret that as much cannot be said in favor of the fidelity with which it has been observed on their part. With the single exception of the State of Illinois—be it said to her honor—every other State erected within its limits has pursued a course, and adopted measures, which have rendered the stipulations of the proviso to deliver up fugitive slaves nugatory. Wisconsin may, also, be an exception, as she has just entered the Union, and has hardly had time to act on the subject. They have gone further, and suffered individuals to form combinations, without an effort to suppress them, for the purpose of enticing and seducing the slaves to leave their masters, and to run them into Canada beyond the reach of our laws—in open violation, not only of the stipulations of the ordinance, but of the constitution itself. If I express myself strongly, it is not for the purpose of producing excitement, but to draw the attention of the Senate forcibly to the subject. My object is to lay bare the subject under consideration, just as a surgeon probes to the bottom and lays open a wound, not to cause pain to his patient, but for the purpose of healing it.

I come now to another precedent of a similar character, but differing in this—that it took place under this Government, and not under that of the old Confederation; I refer to what is known as the Missouri Compromise. It is more recent and better known, and may be more readily despatched.

After an arduous struggle of more than a year, on the question whether Missouri should come into the Union with or without restrictions prohibiting slavery, a compromise line was adopted between the North and the South; but it was done under circumstances which made it nowise obligatory on the latter. It is true, it was moved by one of her distinguished citizens (Mr. Clay); but it is equally so, that it was carried by the almost united vote of the North against the almost united vote of the South; and was thus imposed on the latter by superior numbers in opposition to her strenuous efforts. The South has never given her sanction to it, or assented to the power it asserted. She was voted down, and has simply acquiesced in an arrangement which she has not had the power to reverse, and which she could not attempt to do without disturbing the peace and harmony of the Union—to which she has ever been averse. Acting on this principle, she permitted the Territory of Iowa to be formed, and the State to be admitted into the Union, under the compromise, without objection; and this is now quoted by the Senator from New-York to prove her surrender of the power he claims for Congress.

To add to the strength of this claim, the advocates of the power hold up the name of Jefferson in its favor, and go so far as to call him the author of the so-called Wilmot proviso, which is but a general expression of a power of which the Missouri compromise is a case of its application. If we may judge by his opinion of that case, what his opinion was of the principle, instead of being the author of the proviso, or being in its favor, no one could be more deadly hostile to it. In a letter addressed to the elder Adams in 1819, in answer to one from him, he uses these remarkable expressions in reference to the Missouri question:

"The banks, bankrupt law, manufactures, Spanish treaty, are nothing. These are occurrences, which, like waves in a storm, will pass under the ship. But the Missouri question is a breaker on which we lose the Missouri country by revolt, and what more, God only knows."

To understand the full force of these expressions, it must be borne in mind that the questions enumerated were the great and exciting political questions of the day, on which parties divided. The banks and bankrupt law had long been so. Manufactures, or what has since been called the protective tariff, was at the time a subject of great excitement, as was the Spanish treaty, that is, the treaty by which Florida was ceded to the Union, and by which the western boundary between Mexico and the United States was settled, from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific ocean. All these exciting party questions of the day Mr. Jefferson regarded as nothing, compared to the Missouri question. He looked on all of them as in their nature fugitive; and, to use his own forcible expression, "would pass off under the ship of State like waves in a storm." Not so this fatal question. It was a breaker on which it was destined to be stranded. And yet his name is quoted by the incendiaries of the present day in support of, and as the author of, a proviso which would give indefinite and universal extension of this fatal question to all the territories! It was compromised the next year by the adoption of the line to which I have referred. Mr. Holmes of Maine, long a member of this body, who voted for the measure, addressed a letter to Mr. Jefferson, inclosing a copy of his speech on the occasion. It drew out an answer from him which ought to be treasured up in the heart of every man who loves his country and its institutions. It is brief. I will send it to the Secretary to be read. The time of the Senate cannot be better occupied than in listening to it:

To John Holmes.

 

MONTICELLO, April 22, 1820.

 

I thank you, dear sir, for the copy you have been so kind as to send me of the letter to your constituents on the Missouri question. It is a perfect justification to them. I had for a long time ceased to read newspapers, or pay any attention to public affairs, confident they were in good hands, and content to be a passenger in our bark to the shore from which I am not far distant. But this momentous question, like a fire-bell in the night, awakened and filled me with terror. I considered it at once as the knell of the Union. It is hushed, indeed, for the moment. But this is a reprieve only, not the final sentence. A geographical line, coinciding with a marked principle, moral and political, once conceived and held up to the angry passions of men, will never be obliterated; and every new irritation will mark it deeper and deeper. I can say, with conscious truth, that there is not a man on earth who would sacrifice more than I would to relieve us from this heavy reproach, in any practicable way. The cession of that kind of property (for so it is misnamed) is a bagatelle, which would not cost me a second thought, if in that way a general emancipation and expatriation could be effected; and gradually, and with due sacrifices, I think it might be. But, as it is, we have the wolf by the ears, and we can neither hold him nor safely let him go. Justice is in one scale, and self-preservation in the other. Of one thing I am certain, that as the passage of slaves from one free State to another would not make a slave of a single human being who would not be so without it, so their diffusion over a greater surface would make them individually happier, and proportionally facilitate the accomplishment of their emancipation, by dividing the burden on a greater number of coadjutors. An abstinence, too, from this act of power, would remove the jealousy excited by the undertaking of Congress to regulate the condition of th e different descriptions of men composing a State. This certainly is the exclusive right of every State, which nothing in the constitution has taken from them, and given to the General Government. Could Congress, for example, say that the non-freemen of Connecticut shall be freemen, or that they shall not emigrate into any other State?

 

I regret that I am now to die in the belief that the useless sacrifice of themselves by the generation of 1776, to acquire self-government and happiness to their country, is to be thrown away by the unwise and unworthy passions of their sons, and that my only consolation is to be, that I shall not live to weep over it. If they would but dispassionately weigh the blessings they will throw away against an abstract principle, more likely to be effected by union than by scission, they would pause before they would perpetrate this act of suicide on themselves, and of treason against the hopes of the world. To yourself, as the faithful advocate of the Union, I tender the offering of my high esteem and respect.

 

THOMAS JEFFERSON.

Mark his prophetic words! Mark his profound reasoning!

"It [the question] is hushed for the moment. But this is a reprieve only, not a final sentence. A geographical line coinciding with a marked principle, moral and political, once conceived, and held up to the angry passions of men, will never be obliterated, and every new irritation will mark it deeper and deeper."

Twenty-eight years have passed since these remarkable words were penned, and there is not a thought which time has not thus far verified, and, it is to be feared, will continue to verify until the whole will be fulfilled. Certain it is, that he regarded the compromise line as utterly inadequate to arrest that fatal course of events, which his keen sagacity anticipated from the question. It was but a “reprieve.” Mark the deeply melancholy impression which it made on his mind:

"I regret that I am to die in the belief that the useless sacrifice of themselves by the generation of 1776, to acquire self-government and happiness for themselves, is to be thrown away by the unwise. and unworthy passions of their sons, and that my only consolation is to be, that I shall not live to weep over it."

Can any one believe, after listening to this letter, that Jefferson is the author of the so-called Wilmot proviso, or ever favored it? And yet there are at this time strenuous efforts making in the North to form a purely sectional party on it, and that, too, under the sanction of those who profess the highest veneration for his character and principles! But I must speak the truth: while I vindicate the memory of Jefferson from so foul a charge, I hold he is not blameless in reference to this subject. He committed a great error in inserting the provision he did in the plan he reported for the government of the territory, as much modified as it was. It was the first blow-the first essay "to draw a geographical line coinciding with a marked principle, moral and political." It originated with him in philanthropic, but mistaken views of the most dangerous character, as I shall show in the sequel. Others, with very different feelings and views, followed, and have given to it a direction and impetus, which, if not promptly and efficiently arrested, will end in the dissolution of the Union, and the destruction of our political institutions.

I have, I trust, established beyond controversy, that neither the ordinance of 1787, nor the Missouri compromise, nor the precedents growing out of them, nor the authority of Mr. Jefferson, furnishes any evidence whatever to prove that Congress possesses the power over the territory, claimed by those who advocate the 12th section of this bill. But admit, for the sake of argument, that I am mistaken, and that the objections I have urged against them are groundless give them all the force which can be claimed for precedents and they would not have the weight of a feather against the strong presumption which I, at the outset of my remarks, showed to be opposed to the existence of the power. Precedents, even in a court of justice, can have but little weight, except where the law is doubtful, and should have little in a deliberative body in any case on a constitutional question, and none, where the power to which it has been attempted to trace it does not exist, as I have shown, I trust, to be the case in this instance.

But, while I deny that the clause relating to the territory and other property of the United States, confers any governmental, or that Congress possesses absolute power over the territories, I by no means deny that it has any power over them. Such a denial would be idle on any occasion, but much more so on this, when we are engaged in constituting a territorial government, without an objection being whispered from any quarter against our right to do so. If there be any Senator of that opinion, he ought at once to rise and move to lay the bill on the table, or to dispose of it in some other way, so as to prevent the waste of time on a subject upon which we have no right to act. Assuming, then, that we possess the power, the only questions that remain are whence is it derived? and, what is its extent?

As to its origin, I concur in the opinion expressed by Chief Justice Marshall, in one of the cases read by the Senator from New-York, that it is derived from the right of acquiring territory; and I am the more thoroughly confirmed in it from the fact that I entertained the opinion long before I knew it to be his. As to the right of acquiring territory, I agree with the Senator from New-York, that it is embraced, without going further, both in the war and treaty powers. Admitting, then, what has never been denied, and what it would be idle to deny in a discussion which relates to territories acquired both by war and treaties, that the United States have the right to acquire territories, it would seem to follow, by necessary consequence, that they have the right to govern them. As they possess the entire right of soil, dominion, and sovereignty over them, they must necessarily carry with them the right to govern. But this Government, as the sole agent and representative of the United States—that is, the States of the Union in their federal character—must, as such, possess the sole right, if it exists at all. But, if there be any one disposed to take a different view of the origin of the power, I shall make no points with him,—for whatever may be its origin, the conclusion would be the same, as I shall presently show.

But it would be a great error to conclude that Congress has the absolute power of governing the territories, because it has the sole or exclusive power. The reverse is the case. It is subject to many and important restrictions and conditions, of which some are expressed and others implied. Among the former may be classed all the general and absolute prohibitions of the constitution; that is, all those which prohibit the exercise of certain powers under any circumstances. In this class is included the prohibition of granting titles of nobility; passing ex post facto laws and bills of attainder; the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, except in certain cases; making laws respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting its free exercise; and every other of like description, which conclusively shows that the power of Congress over the territories is not absolute. Indeed, it is a great error to suppose that either this or the State Governments possess, in any case, absolute power. Such power can belong only to the supreme ultimate power, called sovereignty, and this, in our system, resides in the people of the several States of the Union. With us, governments, both federal and State, are but agents, or, more properly, trustees, and, as such, possess, not absolute, but subordinate and limited powers; for all powers possessed by such governments must, from their nature, be trust powers, and subject to all the restrictions to which that class of powers are.

Among them, they are restricted to the nature and the objects of the trust; and hence no government under our system, federal or State, has the right to do any thing inconsistent with the nature of the powers intrusted to it, or the objects for which it was intrusted; or to express it in

more usual language, for which it was delegated. To do either would be to pervert the power to purposes never intended, and a violation of the constitution,—and that in the most dangerous way it could be made, because more easily done and less easily detected. But there is another and important class of restrictions which more directly relate to the subject under discussion. I refer to those imposed on the trustees by the nature and character of the party, who constituted the trustees and invested them with the trust powers to be exercised for its benefit. In this case it is the United States, that is, the several States of the Union. It was they who constituted the Government as their representative or trustee, and intrusted it with powers to be exercised for their common and joint benefit. To them in their united character the territories belong, as is expressly declared by the constitution. They are their joint and common owners, regarded as property or land; and in them, severally, reside the dominion and sovereignty over them. They are as much the territories of one State as another of Virginia as of New-York; of the Southern as the Northern States. They are the territories of all, because they are the territories of each; and not of each, because they are the territories of the whole. Add to this the perfect equality of dignity, as well as of rights, which appertain to them as members of a common federal Union,—which all writers on the subject admit to be a fundamental and essential relation between States so united,—and it must be manifest that Congress, in governing the territories, can give no preference or advantage to one State over another, or to one portion or section of the Union over another, without depriving the State or section over which the preference is given, or from which the advantage is withheld, of their clear and unquestionable right, and subverting the very foundation on which the Union and Government rest. It has no more power to do so than to subvert the constitution itself. In deed, the act itself would be subversion. It would destroy the relation of equality on the part of the Southern States, and sink them to mere dependants of the Northern, to the total destruction of the federal Union.

I have now shown, I trust, beyond controversy, that Congress has no power whatever to prevent the citizens of the Southern States from emigrating with their property into the territories of the United States, or to give an exclusive monopoly of them to the North. I now propose to go one step further, and show that neither the inhabitants of the territories nor their legislatures have any such right. A very few words will be sufficient for the purpose; for of all the positions ever taken, I hold that which claims the power for them to be the most absurd. If the territories belong to the United States—if the ownership, dominion and sovereignty over them be in the States of this Union, then neither the inhabitants of the territories, nor their legislatures, can exercise any power but what is subordinate to them but if the contrary could be shown, which I hold to be impossible, it would be subject to all the restrictions, to which I have shown the power of Congress is; and for the same reason, whatever power they might hold, would, in the case supposed, be subordinate to the constitution, and controlled by the nature and character of our political institutions. But if the reverse be true—if the dominion and sovereignty over the territories be in their inhabitants, instead of the United States—they would indeed, in that case, have the exclusive and absolute power of governing them, and might exclude whom they pleased, or what they pleased. But, in that case, they would cease to be the territories of the United States the moment we acquired them and permitted them to be inhabited. The first half-dozen of squatters would become the sovereigns, with full dominion and sovereignty over them; and the conquered people of New Mexico and California would become the sovereigns of the country as soon as they became the territories of the United States, vested with the full right of excluding even their conquerors. There is no escaping from the alternative, but by resorting to the greatest of all absurdities, that of a divided sovereignty—a sovereignty, a part of which would reside in the United States, and a part in the inhabitants of the territory. How can sovereignty—the ultimate and supreme power of a State—be divided? The exercise of the powers of sovereignty may be divided, but how can there be two supreme powers?

We are next told that the laws of Mexico preclude slavery; and assuming that they will remain in force until repealed, it is contended that, until Congress passes an act for their repeal, the citizens of the South cannot emigrate with their property into the territory acquired from her. I admit the laws of Mexico prohibit, not slavery, but slavery in the form it exists with us. The Puros are as much slaves as our negroes, and are less intelligent and well treated. But, I deny that the laws of Mexico can have the effect attributed to them. As soon as the treaty between the two countries is ratified, the sovereignty and authority of Mexico in the territory acquired by it becomes extinct, and that of the United States is substituted in its place,―carrying with it the constitution, with its overriding control, over all the laws and institutions of Mexico inconsistent with it. It is true, the municipal laws of the territory not inconsistent with the condition and the nature of our political system would, according to the writers on the laws of nations, remain, until changed,—not as a matter of right, but merely of sufferance, and as between the inhabitants of territory, in order to avoid a state of anarchy, before they can be brought under our laws. This is the utmost limit to which sufferance goes. Under it the peon system would continue; but not to the exclusion of such of our citizens as may choose to emigrate with their slaves or other property, that may be excluded by the laws of Mexico. The humane provisions of the laws of nations go no further than to protect the inhabitants in their property and civil rights, under their former laws, until others can be substituted. To extend them further and give them the force of excluding emigrants from the United States, because their property or religion are such as are prohibited from being introduced by the laws of Mexico, would not only prevent a great majority of the people of the United States from emigrating into the acquired territory, but would give a higher authority to the extinct power of Mexico over the territory than to our actual authority over it. I say the great majority, for the laws of Mexico not only prohibit the introduction of slaves, but of many other descriptions of property, and also the Protestant religion, which Congress itself cannot prohibit. To such absurdity would the supposition lead.

I have now concluded the discussion, so far as it relates to the power; and have, I trust, established beyond controversy, that the territories are free and open to all of the citizens of the United States, and that there is no power, under any aspect the subject can be viewed in, by which the citizens of the South can be prevented from emigrating with their property into any of them. I have advanced no argument which I do not believe to be true, nor pushed any one beyond what truth would strictly warrant. But, if mistaken,—if my arguments, instead of being sound and true, as I hold them beyond controversy to be, should turn out to be a mere mass of sophisms, and if in consequence, the barrier opposed by the want of power, should be surmounted, there is another still in the way, that cannot be. The mere possession of power is not, of itself, sufficient to justify its exercise. It must be, in addition, shown that, in the given case, it can be rightfully and justly exercised. Under our system, the first inquiry is: Does the constitution authorize the exercise of the power?

If this be decided in the affirmative, the next is: Can it be rightfully and justly exercised under the circumstances? And it is not, until this, too, is decided in the affirmative, that the question of the expediency of exercising it, is presented for consideration.

Now, I put the question solemnly to the Senators from the North Can you rightly and justly exclude the South from territories of the United States, and monopolize them for yourselves, even if, in your opinion, you should have the power? It is this question I wish to press on your attention with all due solemnity and decorum. The North and the South stand in the relation of partners in a common Union, with equal dignity and equal rights. We of the South have contributed our full share of funds, and shed our full share of blood for the acquisition of our territories. Can you, then, on any principle of equity and justice, deprive us of our full share in their benefit and advantage? Are you ready to affirm that a majority of the partners in a joint concern have the right to monopolize its benefits to the exclusion of the minority, even in cases where they have contributed their full share to the concern? But, to present the case more strongly and vividly, I shall descend from generals to particulars, and shall begin with the Oregon Territory. Our title to it is founded first, and in my opinion, mainly on our purchase of Louisiana; that was strengthened by the Florida treaty, which transferred to us the title also of Spain; and both by the discovery of the mouth of the Columbia river by Capt. Gray, and the exploration of the entire stream, from its source down to its mouth, by Lewis and Clark. The purchase of Louisiana cost fifteen millions of dollars; and we paid Spain five millions for the Florida treaty; making twenty in all. This large sum was advanced out of the common funds of the Union: the South, to say the least, contributing her full share. The discovery was made, it is true, by a citizen of Massachusetts; but he sailed under the flag and protection of the Union, and of course, whatever title was derived from his discovery, accrued to the benefit of the Union. The exploration of Lewis and Clark was at the expense of the Union. We are now about to form it into a territory; the expense of governing which, while it remains so, must be met out of the common fund, and towards which the South must contribute her full share. The expense will not be small. Already there is an Indian war to be put down, and a regiment for that purpose, and to protect the territory, has been ordered there. To what extent the expense may go we know not, but it will, not improbably, involve millions before the territory becomes a State. I now ask, Is it right, is it just—after having contributed our full share for the acquisition of the territory, with the liability of contributing, in addition, our full share of the expense for its government—that we should be shut out of the territory, and be excluded from participating in its benefits? What would be thought of such conduct in the case of individuals? And can that be right and just in Government, which every right-minded man would cry out to be base and dishonest in private life? If it would be so pronounced in a partnership of thirty individuals, how can it be pronounced otherwise in one of thirty States?

The case of our recently acquired territory from Mexico is, if possible, more marked. The events connected with the acquisition are too well known to require a long narrative. It was won by arms, and a great sacrifice of men and money. The South, in the contest, performed her full share of military duty, and earned a full share of military honor; has poured out her full share of blood freely, and has and will bear a full share of the expense; has evinced a full share of skill and bravery, and if I were to say even more than her full share of both, I would not go beyond the truth; to be attributed, however, to no superiority in either respect, but to accidental circumstances, which gave both its officers and soldiers more favorable opportunities for their display. All have done their duty nobly, and high courage and gallantry are but common attributes of our people. Would it be right and just to close a territory thus won against the South, and leave it open exclusively to the North? Would it deserve the name of free soil, if one half of the Union should be excluded and the other half should monopolize it, when it was won by the joint expense and joint efforts of all? Is the great law to be reversed—that which is won by all should be equally enjoyed by all? These are questions which address themselves more to the heart than the head. Feeble must be the intellect which does not see what is right and just, and bad must be the heart, unless unconsciously under the control of deep and abiding prejudice, which hesitates in pronouncing on which side they are to be found. Now, I put the question to the Senators from the North: What are you prepared to do? Are you prepared to prostrate the barriers of the constitution, and in open defiance of the dictates of equity and justice, to exclude the South from the territories and monopolize them for the North? If so, vote against the amendment offered by the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. Davis), and if that should fail, vote against striking out the 12th section. We shall then know what to expect. If not, place us on some ground where we can stand as equals in rights and dignity, and where we shall not be excluded from what has been acquired at the common expense, and won by common skill and gallantry. All we demand is to stand on the same level with yourselves, and to participate equally in what belongs to all. Less we cannot take.

I turn now to my friends of the South, and ask: What are you prepared to do? If neither the barriers of the constitution nor the high sense of right and justice should prove sufficient to protect you, are you prepared to sink down into a state of acknowledged inferiority; to be stripped of your dignity of equals among equals, and be deprived of your equality of rights in this federal partnership of States? If so, you are woefully [sic] degenerated from your sires, and will well deserve to change condition with your slaves;—but if not, prepare to meet the issue. The time is at hand, if the question should not be speedily settled, when the South must rise up, and bravely defend herself, or sink down into base and acknowledged inferiority; and it is because I clearly perceive that this period is favorable for settling it, if it is ever to be settled, that I am in favor of pressing the question now to a decision—not because I have any desire whatever to embarrass either party in reference to the Presidential election. At no other period could the two great parties into which the country is divided be made to see and feel so clearly and intensely the embarrassment and danger caused by the question. Indeed, they must be blind not to perceive that there is a power in action that must burst asunder the ties that bind them together, strong as they are, unless it should be speedily settled. Now is the time, if ever. Cast your eyes to the North, and mark what is going on there; reflect on the tendency of events for the last three years in reference to this the most vital of all questions, and you must see that no time should be lost.

I am thus brought to the question, How can the question be settled? It can, in my opinion, be finally and permanently adjusted but one way, and that is on the high principles of justice and the constitution. Fear not to leave it to them. The less you do the better. If the North and South cannot stand together on their broad and solid foundation, there is none other on which they can. If the obligations of the constitution and justice be too feeble to command the respect of the North, how can the South expect that she will regard the far more feeble obligations of an act of Congress? Nor should the North fear that, by leaving it where justice and the constitution leave it, she would be excluded from her full share of the territories. In my opinion, if it be left there, climate, soil, and other circumstances would fix the line between the slaveholding and non-slaveholding States in about 36° 30'. It may zigzag a little, to accommodate itself to circumstances—sometimes passing to the north, and at others passing to the south of it; but that would matter little, and would be more satisfactory to all, and tend less to alienation between the two great sections, than a rigid, straight, artificial line, prescribed by an act of Congress.

And here, let me say to Senators from the North;—you make a great mistake in supposing that the portion which might fall to the south of whatever line might be drawn, if left to soil, and climate, and circumstances to determine, would be closed to the white labor of the North, because it could not mingle with slave labor without degradation. The fact is not so. There is no part of the world where agricultural, mechanical, and other descriptions of labor are more respected than in the South, with the exception of two descriptions of employment—that of menial and body servants. No Southern man—not the poorest or the lowest will, under any circumstance, submit to perform either of them. He has too much pride for that, and I rejoice that he has. They are unsuited to the spirit of a freeman. But the man who would spurn them feels not the least degradation to work in the same field with his slave; or to be employed to work with them in the same field or in any mechanical operation; and, when so employed, they claim the right—and are admitted, in the country portion of the South of sitting at the table of their employers. Can as much, on the score of equality, be said of the North. With us the two great divisions of society are not the rich and poor, but white and black; and all the former, the poor as well as the rich, belong to the upper class, and are respected and treated as equals, if honest and industrious; and hence have a position and pride of character of which neither poverty nor misfortune can deprive them.

But I go further, and hold that justice and the constitution are the easiest and safest guard on which the question can be settled, regarded in reference to party. It may be settled on that ground simply by non-action—by leaving the territories free and open to the emigration of all the world, so long as they continue so, and when they become States, to adopt whatever constitution they please, with the single restriction, to be republican, in order to their admission into the Union. If a party cannot safely take this broad and solid position and successfully maintain it, what other can it take and maintain? If it cannot maintain itself by an appeal to the great principles of justice, the constitution, and self-government, to what other, sufficiently strong to uphold them in public opinion, can they appeal? I greatly mistake the character of the people of this Union, if such an appeal would not prove successful, if either party should have the magnanimity to step forward, and boldly make it. It would, in my opinion, be received with shouts of approbation by the patriotic and intelligent in every quarter. There is a deep feeling pervading the country that the Union and our political institutions are in danger, which such a course would dispel, and spread joy over the land.

Now is the time to take the step, and bring about a result so devoutly to be wished. I have believed, from the beginning, that this was the only question sufficiently potent to dissolve the Union, and subvert our system of government; and that the sooner it was met and settled, the safer and better for all. I have never doubted but that, if permitted to progress beyond a certain point, its settlement would become impossible, and am under deep conviction that it is now rapidly approaching it, and that if it is ever to be averted, it must be done speedily. In uttering these opinions I look to the whole. If I speak earnestly, it is to save and protect all. As deep as is the stake of the South in the Union and our political institutions, it is not deeper than that of the North. We shall be as well prepared and as capable of meeting whatever may come, as you.

Now, let me say, Senators, if our Union and system of government are doomed to perish, and we to share the fate of so many great people who have gone before us, the historian, who, in some future day, may record the events ending in so calamitous a result, will devote his first chapter to the ordinance of 1787, lauded as it and its authors have been, as the first of that series which led to it. His next chapter will be devoted to the Missouri compromise, and the next to the present agitation. Whether there will be another beyond, I know not. It will depend on what we may do.

If he should possess a philosophical turn of mind, and be disposed to look to more remote and recondite causes, he will trace it to a proposition which originated in a hypothetical truism, but which, as now expressed and now understood, is the most false and dangerous of all political errors. The proposition to which I allude, has become an axiom in the minds of a vast many on both sides of the Atlantic, and is repeated daily from tongue to tongue, as an established and incontrovertible truth; it is,—that "all men are born free and equal." I am not afraid to attack error, however deeply it may be intrenched, or however widely extended, whenever it becomes my duty to do so, as I believe it to be on this subject and occasion.

Taking the proposition literally (it is in that sense it is understood), there is not a word of truth in it. It begins with "all men are born," which is utterly untrue. Men are not born. Infants are born. They grow to be men. And concludes with asserting that they are born “free and equal,” which is not less false. While infants they are incapable of freedom, being destitute alike of the capacity of thinking and acting, without which there can be no freedom. Besides, they are necessarily born subject to their parents, and remain so among all people, savage and civilized, until the development of their intellect and physical capacity enables them to take care of themselves. They grow to all the freedom of which the condition in which they were born permits, by growing to be men. Nor is it less false that they are born "equal." They are not so in any sense in which it can be regarded; and thus, as I have asserted, there is not a word of truth in the whole proposition, as expressed and generally understood.

If we trace it back, we shall find the proposition differently expressed in the Declaration of Independence. That asserts that "all men are created equal." The form of expression, though less dangerous, is not less erroneous. All men are not created. According to the Bible, only two—a man and a woman—ever were—and of these one was pronounced subordinate to the other. All others have come into the world by being born, and in no sense, as I have shown, either free or equal. But this form of expression being less striking and popular, has given way to the present, and under the authority of a document put forth on so great an occasion, and leading to such important consequences, has spread far and wide, and fixed itself deeply in the public mind. It was inserted in our Declaration of Independence without any necessity. It made no necessary part of our justification in separating from the parent country, and declaring ourselves independent. Breach of our chartered privileges, and lawless encroachment on our acknowledged and well-established rights by the parent country, were the real causes,—and of themselves sufficient, without resorting to any other, to justify the step. Nor had it any weight in constructing the governments which were substituted in the place of the colonial. They were formed of the old materials and on practical and well-established principles, borrowed for the most part from our own experience and that of the country from which we sprang.

If the proposition be traced still further back, it will be found to have been adopted from certain writers on government who had attained much celebrity in the early settlement of these States, and with those writings all the prominent actors in our revolution were familiar. Among these, Locke and Sydney were prominent. But they expressed it very differently. According to their expression, "all men in the state of nature were free and equal." From this the others were derived; and it was this to which I referred when I called it a hypothetical truism;—to understand why, will require some explanation.

Man, for the purpose of reasoning, may be regarded in three different states: in a state of individuality; that is, living by himself apart from the rest of his species. In the social; that is, living in society, associated with others of his species. And in the political; that is, living under government. We may reason as to what would be his rights and duties in either, without taking into consideration whether he could exist in it or not. It is certain, that in the first, the very supposition that he lived apart and separated from all others would make him free and equal. No one in such a state could have the right to command or control another. Every man would be his own master, and might do just as he pleased. But it is equally clear, that man cannot exist in such a state; that he is by nature social, and that society is necessary, not only to the proper development of all his faculties, moral and intellectual, but to the very existence of his race. Such being the case, the state is a purely hypothetical one; and when we say all men are free and equal in it, we announce a mere hypothetical truism; that is, a truism resting on a mere supposed state that cannot exist, and of course one of little or no practical value.

But to call it a state of nature was a great misnomer, and has led to dangerous errors; for that cannot justly be called a state of nature which is so opposed to the constitution of man as to be inconsistent with the existence of his race and the development of the high faculties, mental and moral, with which he is endowed by his Creator.

Nor is the social state of itself his natural state; for society can no more exist without government, in one form or another, than man without society. It is the political, then, which includes the social, that is his natural state. It is the one for which his Creator formed him,—into which he is impelled irresistibly,—and in which only his race can exist and all its faculties be fully developed.

Such being the case, it follows that any, the worst form of government, is better than anarchy; and that individual liberty, or freedom, must be subordinate to whatever power may be necessary to protect society against anarchy within or destruction without; for the safety and well-being of society is as paramount to individual liberty, as the safety and well-being of the race is to that of individuals; and in the same proportion the power necessary for the safety of society is paramount to individual liberty. On the contrary, government has no right to control individual liberty beyond what is necessary to the safety and well-being of society. Such is the boundary which separates the power of government and the liberty of the citizen or subject in the political state, which, as I have shown, is the natural state of man—the only one in which his race can exist, and the one in which he is born, lives, and dies.

It follows from all this that the quantum of power on the part of the government, and of liberty on that of individuals, instead of being equal in all cases, must necessarily be very unequal among different people, according to their different conditions. For just in proportion as a people are ignorant, stupid, debased, corrupt, exposed to violence within, and danger from without, the power necessary for government to possess, in order to preserve society against anarchy and destruction, becomes greater and greater, and individual liberty less and less, until the lowest condition is reached, when absolute and despotic power becomes necessary on the part of the government, and individual liberty extinct. So, on the contrary, just as a people rise in the scale of intelligence, virtue, and patriotism, and the more perfectly they become acquainted with the nature of government, the ends for which it was ordered, and how it ought to be administered, and the less the tendency to violence and disorder within, and danger from abroad,—the power necessary for government becomes less and less, and individual liberty greater and greater. Instead, then, of all men having the same right to liberty and equality, as is claimed by those who hold that they are all born free and equal, liberty is the noble and highest reward bestowed on mental and moral development, combined with favorable circumstances. Instead, then, of liberty and equality being born with men,—instead of all men and all classes and descriptions being equally entitled to them, they are high prizes to be won, and are in their most perfect state, not only the highest reward that can be bestowed on our race, but the most difficult to be won, and when won, the most difficult to be preserved.

They have been made vastly more so by the dangerous error I have attempted to expose,—that all men are born free and equal,—as if those high qualities belonged to man without effort to acquire them, and to all equally alike, regardless of their intellectual and moral condition. The attempt to carry into practice this, the most dangerous of all political errors, and to bestow on all—without regard to their fitness either to acquire or maintain liberty—that unbounded and individual liberty supposed to belong to man in the hypothetical and misnamed state of nature, has done more to retard the cause of liberty and civilization, and is doing more at present, than all other causes combined. While it is powerful to pull down governments, it is still more powerful to prevent their construction on proper principles. It is the leading cause among those which have placed Europe in its present anarchical condition, and which mainly stands in the way of reconstructing good governments in the place of those which have been overthrown,—threatening thereby the quarter of the globe most advanced in progress and civilization with hopeless anarchy,—to be followed by military despotism. Nor are we exempt from its disorganizing effects. We now begin to experience the danger of admitting so great an error to have a place in the declaration of our independence. For a long time it lay dormant; but in the process of time it began to germinate, and produce its poisonous fruits. It had strong hold on the mind of Mr. Jefferson, the author of that document, which caused him to take an utterly false view of the subordinate relation of the black to the white race in the South; and to hold, in consequence, that the latter, though utterly unqualified to possess liberty, were as fully entitled to both liberty and equality as the former; and that to deprive them of it was unjust and immoral. To this error, his proposition to exclude slavery from the territory northwest of the Ohio may be traced, and to that the ordinance of 1787,—and through it the deep and dangerous agitation which now threatens to ingulf, and will certainly ingulf, if not speedily settled, our political institutions, and involve the country in countless woes.

SOURCE: Richard K. Crallé, Editor, Speeches of John C. Calhoun Delivered in the House of Representatives and in the Senate of the United States, Vol. 4, p. 479-512