Showing posts with label USS Ironsides. Show all posts
Showing posts with label USS Ironsides. Show all posts

Saturday, September 18, 2021

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, January 24, 1865

President sent for me this evening. Found Stanton with him, having a dispatch from General Grant desiring him to request me to remove Commander Parker, the senior officer on the upper James. After some conversation, informing them that we had two gunboats above, and that the Atlanta and Ironsides had been ordered thither, I mentioned that Farragut was here, and the President sent for him. On hearing how matters stood, he at once volunteered to visit the force. The President was pleased with it, and measures were at once taken.

I rode down to Willard's after parting at the Executive Mansion and had a few additional words with Admiral Farragut and invited Mrs. F. to stop at our house during the Admiral's absence.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 230

Wednesday, August 22, 2018

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: October 8, 1863

The President, accompanied by two of his aids, set off quietly day before yesterday for the Southwest — to Bragg's army, no doubt, where it is understood dissensions have arisen among the chieftains.

By telegraph we learn that one of Bragg's batteries, on Lookout Mountain, opened fire on the Federals in Chattanooga on the 5th inst., which was replied to briskly.

Night before last an attempt was made to destroy the enemy's steamer Ironsides at Charleston, but failed. The torpedo, however, may have done it some injury.

From Lee and Meade we have nothing.

A rather startling letter was read by the Secretary of War to-day from ——, Lieut.-Gen. Bragg's ——d in command. It was dated the 26th of September, and stated that Chickamauga was one of the most complete victories of the war, but has not been “followed up.” On the 21st (day after the battle), Gen. Bragg asked Gen. ——'s advice, which was promptly given: “that he should immediately strike Burnside a blow; or if Burnside escaped, then to march on Rosecrans's communications in the rear of Nashville.” Gen. Bragg seemed to adopt the plan, and gave orders accordingly. But the right wing had not marched more than eight or ten miles the next day, before it was halted, and ordered to march toward Chattanooga, after giving the enemy two and a half days to strengthen the fortifications. Bragg's army remains in front of the enemy's defenses, with orders not to assault him. The only thing Bragg has done well (says Gen. ——) was to order the attack on the 19th of September; everything else has been wrong: and now only God can save us or help us — while Bragg commands. He begs that Gen. Lee be sent there, while the Army of Virginia remains on the defensive, to prosecute offensive measures against Rosecrans. He says Bragg's army has neither organization nor mobility; and B. cannot remedy the evil. He cannot adopt or adhere to any course, and he invokes the government to interpose speedily. This letter is on file in the archives.

The question now is, who is right? If it be ——, Bragg ought certainly to be relieved without delay; and the President cannot arrive in the field a moment too soon. As it is, while others are exulting in the conviction that Rosecrans will be speedily destroyed, I am filled with alarm for the fate of Bragg's army, and for the cause! I am reluctant to attribute the weakness of personal pique or professional jealousy to ——; yet I still hope that events will speedily prove that Bragg's plan was the best, and that he had really adopted and advised to the wisest course.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2p. 65-6

Thursday, March 22, 2018

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: September 2, 1863

We have no news of any importance from any of the armies. Gen. Bragg, however, telegraphs, August 31st, that he is concentrating his forces to receive the enemy, reported to be on the eve of assailing his position. He says he has sent our paroled men to Atlanta (those taken at Vicksburg), and asks that arms be sent them by the eastern road. Col. Gorgas, Chief of Ordnance, says this is the first intimation he has had as to the disposition of the paroled prisoners. Does he understand that they are to fight before being exchanged?

Brig -Gen. G. J. Rains writes from Charleston that the grenades reported by the enemy to have been so destructive in their repulse at Battery Wagner, were his subterra shells, there being no hand-grenades used.

The other night Beauregard sent a steamer out with a torpedo to destroy the Ironsides, the most formidable of the enemy's ironclads. It ran within forty yards of the Ironsides, which, however, was saved by swinging round. The torpedo steamer's engine was so imperfect that it could not be worked when stopped, for several minutes, to readjust the arrangements for striking the enemy in his altered position. When hailed, “What steamer is that?” the reply was, The Live Yankee,” and our adventurers got off and back to the city without injury — and without inflicting any.

There has been much shelling the last few days, but Sumter and Battery Wagner are still under the Confederate flag. How long this will continue no one knows. But it is hoped the great Blakely guns are there by this time, and that Gen. Rains's torpedoes may avail something for the salvation of the city.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2p. 31

Wednesday, February 22, 2017

Diary of Gideon Welles: Wednesday, April 15, 1863

No full reports yet from Du Pont. Am pained, grieved, distressed by what I hear; and that I hear from him so little. We learn that after all our outlay and great preparations, giving him about all our force and a large portion of the best officers, he intends making no farther effort, but will abandon the plan and all attempts to take it. A fight of thirty minutes and the loss of one man, which he witnessed, satisfies the Admiral.

The Ironsides, the flagship, was suspiciously remote from the fight, yet sufficiently near to convince the Admiral he had better leave the harbor. Down to the day of the conflict I had faith in him and his ability, though grieved at his delays. When here last fall, expressly to consult and concert measures for the capture of Charleston, he was as earnest and determined as any of us, did not waver a moment, and would not listen to a suggestion of Dahlgren as an assistant.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 273

Saturday, February 18, 2017

Diary of Gideon Welles: Sunday, April 12, 1863

An intense and anxious feeling on all hands respecting Charleston. Went early to the Department. About 11 A.M. a dispatch from the Navy Yard that the Flambeau had not arrived. The President and Stanton came in a little after noon and waited half an hour, but it was then reported the Flambeau was not yet in sight. I came home much dejected. Between 2 and 3 P.M. Commander Rhind of the Keokuk, Upshur, and Lieutenant Forrest called at my house with dispatches from Du Pont. They were not very full or satisfactory, — contained no details. He has no idea of taking Charleston by the Navy. In this I am not disappointed. He has been coming to that conclusion for months, though he has not said so. The result of this demonstration, though not a success, is not conclusive. The monitor vessels have proved their resisting power, and, but for the submarine obstructions, would have passed the forts and gone to the wharves of Charleston. This in itself is a great achievement.

Went to the Executive Mansion. Read the dispatches to and had full conversation with the President. Sumner came in and participated.

Rhind, an impulsive but brave and rash man, has lost all confidence in armored vessels. When he took command of the Keokuk his confidence was unbounded. His repulse and the loss of his vessel have entirely changed his views. It was, I apprehend, because of this change and his new appointment to armored vessels that he was sent forward with dispatches. He has, I see, been tutored. Thinks wooden vessels with great speed would do as well as ironclads. I agreed that speed was valuable, but the monitors were formidable. In this great fight the accounts speak of but a single man killed and some ten or twelve wounded. What wooden or unarmored vessels could have come out of such a fight with so few disasters. No serious injury happened to the flagship, the Ironsides, which, from some accident, did not get into the fight. We had expected Du Pont and the ironclads would pass Sumter and the forts and receive their fire, but not stop to encounter them.

Du Pont has been allowed to decide for himself in regard to proceedings, has selected, and had, the best officers and vessels in the service, and his force is in every respect picked and chosen. Perhaps I have erred in not giving him orders. Possibly the fact that he was assured all was confided to him depressed and oppressed him with the responsibility, and has prevented him from telling me freely and without reserve his doubts, apprehensions. I have for some time felt that he wanted the confidence that is essential to success. His constant call for more ironclads — for aid — has been a trial. He has been long, very long, getting ready, and finally seems to have come to a standstill, so far as I can learn from Rhind, who is, if not stampeded, disgusted, demoralized, and wholly upset. It is not fear, for he has courage, — to daring, to rashness, — and his zeal, temperament, and ardor are by nature enthusiastic. But these qualities are gone. Why Du Pont should have sent him home to howl, or with a howl, I do not exactly understand. If it was to strengthen faith in himself and impair faith in the monitors the selection was well made. Rhind had too much confidence in his vessel before entering the harbor, and has too little in any vessel now.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 267-9

Thursday, February 16, 2017

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, April 10, 1863

The President has not yet returned. The Cabinet did not convene to-day. Affairs look uncomfortable in North Carolina. The army there needs reinforcing, and had we Charleston we would send more vessels into those waters.

Neither the War Department nor army men entertain an idea that the Rebels have withdrawn any of their forces from the Rappahannock to go into North Carolina, but I have apprehensions that such may be the case. From what quarter but that can they have collected the large force that is now pressing Foster?

We have more definite yet not wholly reliable rumors from Charleston. A contest took place on the afternoon of the 7th, Tuesday, of three hours, from two till five. Two of our vessels are reported injured, — the Keokuk, said to be sunk on Morris Island, and the Ironsides, disabled. Neither is a turret vessel. On the whole, this account, if not what we wish, is not very discouraging. The movement I judged to have been merely a reconnoissance, to feel and pioneer the way for the grand attack. Fox persists that the ironclads are invulnerable. I shall not be surprised if some are damaged, perhaps disabled. In fact, I have supposed that some of them would probably be sunk, and shall be satisfied if we lose several and get Charleston. I hope we shall not lose them and fail to get the city.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 265-6

Saturday, January 14, 2017

John Hay to Abraham Lincoln, April 10, 1863

[Stono] River, S. C,
April 10,1863.
MY DEAR SIR:

I went yesterday morning to Charleston Harbor to deliver to Admiral Dupont the despatches with which the Navy Department had charged me. I found the Admiral on board the “Ironsides,” which, with the rest of the Monitor fleet, was lying inside the bar, at the point where they had anchored after the engagement of Tuesday. I delivered my despatches, and, while he was reading them, I had some conversation with Capt. Rodgers, fleet captain of the [South Atlantic Blockade] Squadron. He said that although the attack had been unsuccessful and the failure would of course produce a most unhappy effect upon the country, which had so far trusted implicitly in the invincibility of the Monitors, all the officers of the Navy, without exception, united in the belief that what they had attempted was impossible, and that we had reason for congratulation that what is merely a failure had not been converted into a terrible disaster. The matter has now been fairly tried. With favoring circumstances, with good officers, with good management, the experiment has completely failed. We sailed into the harbor not sanguine of victory. We fought only about forty minutes, and the unanimous conclusion of the officers of the Navy is that an hour of that fire would have destroyed us. We had reached and touched the obstructions. To have remained there long enough to have removed them would have ensured the destruction of some of the vessels. If the others had gone by the fort they would still have been the target of the encircling batteries. There was no sufficient land force to have taken possession of the city. There was no means of supplying them with ammunition and provision, for no wooden ship could live ten minutes in that fire. The only issue would have been the capture of the surviving and the raising of the sunken vessels. This would have lost us the command of the coast, an irremediable disaster. So the Admiral took the responsibility of avoiding the greater evil by saving the fleet, and abandoning an enterprise which we think has been fairly proved impossible.

The Admiral, who. had been listening and assenting to the latter portion of what Rodgers had been saying, added: — “And as if we were to have a visible sign that an Almighty hand was over us for our good, the orders you have given me show how vast was the importance of my preserving this fleet, whose power and prestige are still great and valuable, for the work which I agree with the President in thinking most momentous, the opening of the control of the Mississippi River. After a fight of forty minutes we had lost the use of seven guns. I might have pushed some of the vessels past Fort Sumter, but in that case we ran the enormous risk of giving them to the enemy, and thus losing the control of the coast. I could not answer for that to my conscience.”

The perfect approval of their own consciences which these officers evidently felt, did not prevent their feeling the deepest grief and sorrow for the unhappy results of the enterprise. Their whole conversation was as solemn as a scene of death. At one time I spoke of the estimation in which they were held by the government and the country, which, in my opinion, rendered it impossible that blame should be attached to them, and their eyes suddenly filled with tears. A first repulse is a terrible thing to brave and conscientious men accustomed only to victory.

I was several times struck by the identity of opinion and sentiment between Admiral Dupont and yourself. You had repeatedly uttered, during my last week in Washington, predictions which have become history.

When I left the harbor, they were preparing the torpedo raft for the destruction of the sunken Keokuk.

I have taken the liberty of writing thus at length, as I thought you should know the sentiments of these experienced officers in regard to this unfortunate matter. I hope, however, the news may be received that due honor may be given to those who fought with such bravery and discretion the losing fight.

Yours very respectfully,
[JOHN HAY.]

SOURCES: Clara B. Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary, Volume 1, p. 75-8; Michael Burlingame, Editor, At Lincoln’s Side: John Hay’s Civil War Correspondence and Selected Writings, p. 34-6 where the entire letter appears.

Tuesday, August 16, 2016

Diary of Sir Arthur James Lyon Fremantle: Sunday, June 14, 1863

I went to church at St Michael's, which is one of the oldest churches in America, and is supposed to have been built a hundred and fifty years ago. The Charlestonians are very proud of it, and I saw several monuments of the time of the British dominion.

This morning I made the acquaintance of a Mr Sennec, an officer in the Confederate States navy, who, with his wife and daughter, were about to face the terrors and dangers of running the blockade, Mr Sennec having got an appointment in Europe. The ladies told me they had, already made one start, but after reaching the bar, the night was not considered propitious, so they had returned. Mr Sennec is thinking of going to Wilmington, and running from thence, as it is more secure than Charleston.

I dined at Mr Robertson's this evening, and met a very agreeable party there — viz., two young ladies, who were extremely pretty, General Beauregard, Captain Tucker of the Chicora, and Major Norris, the chief of the secret intelligence bureau at Richmond.

I had a long conversation with General Beauregard, who said he considered the question of ironclads versus forts as settled, especially when the fire from the latter is plunging. If the other Monitors had approached as close as the Keokuk, they would probably have shared her fate. He thought that both flat-headed rifled 7-inch bolts and solid 10-inch balls penetrated the ironclads when within 1200 yards. He agreed with General Ripley that the 15-inch gun is rather a failure; it is so unwieldy that it can only be fired very slowly, and the velocity of the ball is so small that it is very difficult to strike a moving object. He told me that Fort Sumter was to be covered by degrees with the long green moss which in this country hangs down from the trees: he thinks that when this is pressed it will deaden the effect of the shot without being inflammable; and he also said that, even if the walls of Fort Sumter were battered down, the barbette battery would still remain, supported on the piers.

The Federal frigate Ironsides took up her position, during the attack, over 3000 lb. of powder, which was prevented from exploding owing to some misfortune connected with the communicating wire. General Beauregard and Captain Tucker both seemed to expect great things from a newly-invented and extradiabolical torpedo-ram.

After dinner, Major Norris showed us a copy of a New York illustrated newspaper of the same character as our “Punch.” In it the President Davis and General Beauregard were depicted shoeless and in rags, contemplating a pair of boots, which the latter suggested had better be eaten. This caricature excited considerable amusement, especially when its merits were discussed after Mr Robertson's excellent dinner.

General Beauregard told me he had been educated in the North, and used to have many friends there, but that now he would sooner submit to the Emperor of China than return to the Union.

Mr Walter Blake arrived soon after dinner; he had come up from his plantation on the Combahee river on purpose to see me. He described the results of the late Yankee raid up that river: forty armed negroes and a few whites in a miserable steamer were able to destroy and burn an incalculable amount of property, and carry off hundreds of negroes. Mr Blake got off very cheap, having only lost twenty-four this time, but he only saved the remainder by his own personal exertions and determination. He had now sent all his young males two hundred miles into the interior for greater safety. He seemed to have a very rough time of it, living all alone in that pestilential climate. A neighbouring planter, Mr Lowndes, had lost 290 negroes, and a Mr Kirkland was totally ruined.

At 7 P.M. Mr Blake and I called at the office of General Ripley, to whom Mr Blake, notwithstanding that he is an Englishman of nearly sixty years of age, had served as aide-de-camp during some of the former operations against Charleston. General Ripley told us that shelling was still going on vigorously between Morris and Folly Islands, the Yankees being assisted every now and then by one or more of their gunboats. The General explained to us that these light-draft armed vessels — river-gropers, as he called them — were indefatigable at pushing up the numerous creeks, burning and devastating everything. He said that when he became acquainted with the habits of one of these “critturs,” he arranged an ambuscade for her, and with the assistance of “his fancy Irishman” (Captain Mitchell), he captured her. This was the case with the steamer Stono, a short time since, which, having been caught in this manner by the army, was lost by the navy shortly afterwards off Sullivan's Island.

News has just been received that Commodore Foote is to succeed Dupont in the command of the blockading squadron. Most of these officers appeared to rejoice in this change, as they say Foote is younger, and likely to show more sport than the venerable Dupont.

SOURCE: Sir Arthur James Lyon Fremantle, Three Months in the Southern States: April-June, 1863, p. 200-3

Friday, July 29, 2016

Diary of Sir Arthur James Lyon Fremantle: Thursday, June 11, 1863

General Ripley took me in his boat to Morris Island. We passed Fort Sumter on our left, and got aground for five minutes in its immediate neighbourhood; then bearing off towards the right, we passed Fort Cummins Point, and (after entering a narrow creek) Fort Wagner on our left. The latter is a powerful, well-constructed field-work, mounting nine heavy guns, and it completely cuts across Morris Island at the end nearest to Fort Sumter. General Ripley pointed at Fort Wagner with some pride.

We landed near the house of the colonel who commanded the troops in Morris Island,* and borrowed his horses to ride to the further extremity of the island. We passed the wreck of the Keokuk, whose turret was just visible above the water, at a distance from the shore of about 1500 yards. On this beach I also inspected the remains of the so-called “Yankee Devil,” a curious construction, which on the day of the attack had been pushed into the harbour by one of the Monitors. This vessel, with her appendage, happened to be the first to receive the fire of Fort Sumter, and after a quarter of an hour Monitor and Devil got foul of one another, when both came to grief, and the latter floated harmlessly ashore. It seems to have been composed of double twenty-inch beams, forming a sort of platform or stage fifty feet long by twenty broad, from which depended chains with grappling irons to rake up hostile torpedoes. The machine was also provided with a gigantic torpedo of its own, which was to blow up piles or other obstacles.

Morris Island is a miserable, low, sandy desert, and at its further extremity there is a range of low sandhills, which form admirable natural parapets. About ten guns and mortars were placed behind them, and two companies of regular artillery were stationed at this point under the command of Captain Mitchell (the “patriot's” son), to whom I was introduced. He seemed a quiet, unassuming man, and was spoken of by General Ripley as an excellent officer. He told me he expected to be able to open fire in a day or two upon the Yankees in Folly Island and Little Folly; and he expressed a hope that a few shell might drive them out from Little Folly, which is only distant 600 yards from his guns. The enemy's large batteries are on Folly Island, 3400 yards off, but within range of Captain Mitchell's rifled artillery, one of which was a twelve-pounder, Whitworth.

A blockade-runner, named the Ruby, deceived by some lights on Folly Island, ran ashore at one o'clock this morning in the narrow inlet between Morris Island and Little Folly. The Yankees immediately opened fire on her, and her crew, despairing of getting her off, set her on fire — a foolish measure, as she was right under Captain Mitchell's guns — and whenever a group of Yankees approached the wreck, a shell was placed in their midst, which effectually checked their curiosity. The Ruby was therefore burning in peace. Her crew had escaped, all except one man, who was drowned in trying to save a valuable trunk.

After having conversed some time with Captain Mitchell and his brother officers, we took leave of them; and General Ripley, pursuing his tour of inspection, took me up some of the numerous creeks which intersect the low marshy land of James Island. In one of these I saw the shattered remains of the sham Keokuk, which was a wooden imitation of its equally short-lived original, and had been used as a floating target by the different forts.

In passing Fort Sumter, I observed that the eastern face, from which the guns (except those en barbette) had been removed, was being further strengthened by a facing of twelve feet of sand, supported by logs of wood. There can be no doubt that Sumter could be destroyed if a vessel could be found impervious enough to lie pretty close in and batter it for five hours; but with its heavy armament and plunging fire, this catastrophe was not deemed probable. General Ripley told me that, in his opinion, the proper manner to attack Charleston, was to land on Morris Island, take Forts Wagner and Cummins Point, and then turn their guns on Fort Sumter. He does not think much of the 15inch guns. The enemy does not dare use more than 35 lb. of powder to propel 425 lb. of iron; the velocity consequently is very trifling. He knows and admires the British 68-pounder, weighing 95 cwt., but he does not think it heavy enough effectually to destroy ironclads. He considers the 11-inch gun, throwing a shot of 170 lb., as the most efficient for that purpose.

In returning from Morris Island, we passed two steamers, which had successfully run the blockade last night, besides the luckless Ruby, which had also passed the blockading squadron before she came to grief. The names of the other two are the Anaconda and Racoon, both fine-looking vessels.

I dined at Mr Robertson's, at the corner of Rutledge Street, and met Captain Tucker of the navy there. He is a very good fellow, and a perfect gentleman. He commands the Chicora gunboat, and it was he who, with his own and another gunboat (Palmetto State), crossed the bar last February, and raised the blockade for a few hours. He told me that several Yankee blockaders surrendered, but could not be taken possession of, and the others bolted at such a pace as to render pursuit hopeless, for these little gunboats are very slow. They made the attack at daylight, and though much fired at were never struck. They seem to have taken the Yankees by surprise, and to have created great alarm; but at that time the blockading squadron consisted entirely of improvised men-of-war. Since this exploit, the frigate Ironsides, and the sloop of war Powhattan, have been added to its strength.

It poured with rain during the evening, and we had a violent thunderstorm. General Beauregard returned to Charleston this afternoon.
_______________

* This must have been about the spot from whence Fort Sumter was afterwards bombarded. I cannot help thinking that the Confederates made a great mistake in not fortifying the further end of Morris Island and keeping a larger garrison there, for when the Federals landed, they met with no fortification until they reached Fort Wagner.

SOURCE: Sir Arthur James Lyon Fremantle, Three Months in the Southern States: April-June, 1863, p. 188-93

Sunday, July 5, 2015

Diary of Salmon P. Chase: Tuesday, September 16, 1862

Bannister at Breakfast. Went to Department, and from Department with Deputation of Friends from Mt. Pleasant, O., and Wilmington, Del., to the President and introduced them. Asked for Bishop McIlvain, the appointment of Revd. Mr. Telford as chaplain at Camp Chase — which the President directed.

Went to Navy Department and advised Expedition up the James River; and said if Gen. Wool or other good General could be sent I would go myself as Volunter Aid. Mr. Welles seemed pleased with the idea; and said the “Ironsides” and “Passaic” would be ready by the time troops could be, and might take Richmond as preliminary to Charleston. — Spoke to the Secretary of Commodore Barbheads remark to Harrington, that the Government ought to be superseded by McClellan. — Went to War Department. Surrender of Harpers Ferry is confirmed. McClellan's victory of Sunday was probably over the rear of Longstreet's Division, which made a stand.

Weed called with Morgan, who wished to enquire about Texas Bonds issued under authority of the Rebel Government. Told him they would not be recognized and promised him copies of papers relating to the subject, from files and records of the Department. Told Weed that we must have decided action and that he could ensure it. Was going to Meeting of Heads of Departments not to Cabinet. Went over to White House. Met Seward, who said the President was busy with Gen. Halleck and there would be no meeting.

Returned to Department. Rode out to Sigel's Camp, by way of Chain Bridge, with Harrington and Dr. Schmidt. Saw Sigel and Schurz. They want to have corps organized for operations in the field. Sigel said scouts returned from Drainesville report large rebel force at Leesburgh.

Home to late dinner. — Harrington with me. Sent message to War Department for news.

SOURCE: Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 84-5

Sunday, June 21, 2015

Diary of Salmon P. Chase, Saturday, September 13, 1862

Breakfasted alone. What has become of Mr. Skinner? Went to Department and attended to some matters of routine.

Went to Navy Department with Gov. Seward, according to appointment, about expedition to Charleston. Examined chart with Secretary Welles and Asst. Secy. Fox. Learned that the “Ironsides and Passaic will be ready for sea by the 1st. October; which is more than two weeks longer than Mr. Welles gave me to understand ten days ago. Fox thinks that James Island ought to have been held and that Hunter was wrong in withdrawing our force from it; but it is now commanded by our gunboats, so that a landing upon it is easy, and a force of 10,000 or 15,000 men would suffice for the reduction of Charleston. A land force, however, would have to act mainly independently of the naval, — and no naval force but ironclads could act with any efficiency because, the harbor being a cul de sac, wooden vessels entering it to bombard the town, would be exposed to fire from all sides, and could not pass and repass the enemy's batteries, as at Port Royal, and, by motion, make the enemy's fire comparatively ineffectual. Ironclads, however, such as the Passaic and the Ironsides could go right into the harbor, with little or no risks, and destroy the Forts, batteries and the town itself, if not surrendered. After all, it seemed to me that it would contribute greatly to the certainty of the result if a land force should be organized, and I determined to confer with the Secretary of War on the subject, as soon as possible. No time should be lost in making every arrangement for such overwhelming blows, just as soon as the ironclads are ready, as will effectually annihilate the possibility of rebel success.

From the Navy Department, we went to Head Quarters where we found Genl. [Cullom1] who said: “We have got whipped again. We have just received a telegram that the rebels have defeated our people in Fayette County, Va., and are driving them down the Kanawha. The trouble is that our men won't fight.” The style of remark did not suit me, but it is too common among our generals. In my opinion, the soldiers are better than the officers. — Genl. Halleck came in, and we asked the situation. There was nothing new, he said, except confirmation that Burnside drove the rebels out of Frederick yesterday, and had renewed the fight to-day. Heavy firing had been heard from the direction of Harpers Ferry and the Frederick and Hagerstown roads. We left Head Quarters, and I returned to the Department.

Gave O'Harra and Pitt Cooke letter of introduction to Genl. Mitchell. Visited Mr. Clarke's sealing and trimming machine for the ones and twos and found them a perfect success; and the ones and twos are sealed and trimmed by machinery, attended by the most part by women, with such prodigious advantage to the Government, that it seems difficult to imagine that coining, except in large masses, can be of much utility hereafter.

Jay Cooke writes that he has visited New-York and conversed with Bankers; and thinks that $10,000,000 in Gold will be gladly deposited at 4%. I think that, in this way, all the Gold needed can be obtained at very small cost and without affecting the market in any way. If it succeeds, it will form not the least remarkable chapter in the history of the financial success which has attended me thus far.

Wrote to Katie and Nettie, and to Horton — to Katie, advising her not to return immediately, — to Horton about Pope.

In the evening, went to Willard's to call on Genl. Schenck, but did not see him. Met Weed, and went to his room and talked of sundry matters. He says I have done as well in the New York appointments as was possible, and advises care as to the securities taken; which advice I think very good. He thinks the time has come for vigorous measures South; and is for freeing the slaves, and arming them as far as useful, without noise or excitement. He saw Hunter in New-York; who says that if he had been sustained, he would have emasculated the rebellion in South Carolina before now — which he seemed to believe and which I believe absolutely.

Went to War Department. Telegraph men told me that telegraph was built to Point of Rocks and several miles beyond the Monocacy towards Frederick, and that heavy continuous firing was heard, by the operator of the former place, from the direction of Harpers Ferry, till between three and four this afternoon; and that firing, though not so heavy, was also heard from the direction of Middleton, between Frederick and Hagerstown. There was also a rumor that we had captured a large wagon-train, with considerable number of prisoners. The inference from the firing heard is that an attack has been made on Harpers Ferry by a large rebel force, and a stout defense with unknown result; and that a less important conflict has taken place between the advance under Burnside and the rebel rear falling back towards Hagerstown on Harpers Ferry, (probably the former) and that the rebels have been worsted.

Telegram from Gov. Curtin yesterday states that a reliable gentleman of Maryland who had opportunities to converse freely with officers of the rebel army, says that the rebel force in Maryland is 190,000, and the other side of the Potomac 250,000—in all 440,000. This is a specimen of information collected and believed!

Came home and Cooke called with Mr. Davis, General Birney's partner, who wants him made a Major General with command of Kearney's corps. I think this should be done. We must advance all our Republican officers who have real merit, so as to counterpoise the too great weight already given to Democratic officers, without much merit. They have been more pushed than the Republicans and we have been more than just — more than generous even — we have been lavish towards them. It is time to change the policy.
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1 Name inserted from Warden's excerpt, 473.

SOURCE: Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 78-80

Monday, March 17, 2008

From Charleston

Captain Paine of the 100th New York, with nine of his men were captured by the rebels on the night of the 4th, while on a scout near Light House Creek.

Sunday week there was a terific engagement between the gunboat Ottawa, a monitor, The Ironsides, and our works on Morris Island and the rebel forts. The rebel guns were finally silenced. The boat belonging to the Ironsides, on picket duty last Wednesday night was run down by a rebel steamer and part of the crew drowned.

- Published in The Union Sentinel, Osceola, Iowa, August 15, 1863