Showing posts with label John H Dahlgren. Show all posts
Showing posts with label John H Dahlgren. Show all posts

Wednesday, April 1, 2020

Major-General William T. Sherman to Major-General Henry W. Halleck, December 13, 1864 – 11:50 p.m.

ON BOARD DANDELION,                                   
Ossabaw Sound, December 13, 186411.50 p.m.               
(Received 15th.)
General H. W. HALLECK, Washington:

To-day, at 5 p.m., General Hazen's division of the Fifteenth Corps carried Fort McAllister by assault, capturing its entire garrison and stores. This opened to us the Ossabaw Sound, and I pulled down to this gunboat to communicate with the fleet. Before opening communication we had completely destroyed all the railroads leading into Savannah and invested the city. The left is on the Savannah River, three miles above the city, and right on the Ogeechee, at King's Bridge. Were it not for the swamps we could march into the city, but as it is I would have to assault at one or two places over narrow causeways, leading to much loss; whereas in a day or two, with my communications restored and the batteries in position within short range of the city, I will demand its surrender. The army is in splendid order, and equal to anything. Weather has been fine, and supplies abundant. Our march was most agreeable, and we were not at all molested by guerrillas. We reached Savannah three days ago, but owing to Fort McAllister we could not communicate; but now we have McAllister we can go ahead. We have already captured two boats in the Savannah River, and prevented their gun-boats from coming down, and, if General Foster will prevent the escape of the garrison of Savannah and its people by land across South Carolina, we will capture all. I estimate the population at 25,000 and the garrison at 15,000; General Hardee commands. We have on hand plenty of meat, salt, and potatoes; all we need is bread, and I have sent to Port Royal for that. We have not lost a wagon on the trip, but have gathered in a large supply of negroes, mules, horses, &c., and our teams are in far better condition than when we started. My first duty will be to clear the army of surplus negroes, mules, and horses, and suppose General Saxton can relieve me of these.

I am writing on board a dispatch-boat, down Ossabaw, at midnight, and have to go back to where I left my horse, eight miles up, in a row boat, and thence fifteen miles over to our lines by daylight, so that I hope this will be accepted as an excuse for this informal letter; but I know you are anxious to hear of our safety and good condition. Full and detailed reports of the events of the past mouth will be prepared at a more leisure moment, and in the meantime I can only say that I hope by Christmas to be in possession of Savannah, and by the new year to be ready to resume our journey to Raleigh. The whole army is crazy to be turned loose in Carolina; and with the experience of the past thirty days I judge that a month's sojourn in South Carolina would make her less bellicose.

The editors in Georgia profess to be indignant at the horrible barbarities of Sherman's army, but I know the people don't want our visit repeated. We have utterly destroyed over 200 miles of railroad, and consumed stores and provisions that were essential to Lee's and Hood's armies.. A similar destruction of roads and resources hence to Raleigh would compel General Lee to come out of his intrenched camp. I hope General Thomas has held Hood. My last accounts are of the fight at Franklin, but rebel papers state that Decatur, Ala., has been evacuated. This I regret, though it is not essential to the future. If Hood is making any real progress I would not hesitate to march hence, after taking Savannah, for Montgomery, which would bring him out of Tennessee; but it seems to me that winter is a bad time for him. I will try and see Admiral Dahlgren and General Foster before demanding the surrender of Savannah, which I do not propose to make till my batteries are able to open. The quick work made with McAllister, and the opening communication with our fleet, and consequent independence for supplies, dissipated all their boasted threats to head me off and starve the army. The efforts thus far have been puerile, and I regard Savannah as already gained.

Yours, truly,
W. T. SHERMAN,    
Major-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 44 (Serial No. 92), p. 701-2

Major-General Henry W. Halleck to Major-General William T. Sherman, December 16, 1864

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,                     
Washington, December 16, 1864. (Via Hilton Head.)
Major-General SHERMAN:

GENERAL: Lieutenant-General Grant informs me that in his last dispatch sent to you he suggested the transfer of your infantry to Richmond. He now wishes me to say that you will retain your entire force, at least for the present, and with such assistance as may be given you by General Foster and Admiral Dahlgren, operate from such base as you may establish on the coast. General Foster will obey such instructions as may be given by you. Should you have captured Savannah, it is thought that by transferring the water batteries to the land side, that place may be made a good depot and base for operations on Augusta, Branchville, or Charleston. If Savannah should not be captured, or if captured and not deemed suitable for this purpose, perhaps Beaufort would serve as a depot. As the rebels have probably removed their most valuable property from Augusta, perhaps Branchville would be the most important point at which to strike, in order to sever all connection between Virginia and the Southwestern Railroad. General Grant's wishes, however, are that this whole matter of your future action should be entirely left to your discretion. We can send you from here a number of complete batteries of field artillery, with or without horses, as you may desire. Also, as soon as General Thomas can spare them, all the fragments, convalescents, and furloughed men of your army. It is reported that Thomas defeated Hood yesterday near Nashville, but we have no particulars nor official reports, telegraphic communication being interrupted by a heavy storm. Our last advices from you was General Howard's note announcing his approach to Savannah.

Yours, truly,
H. W. HALLECK,                
Major-General and Chief of Staff.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 44 (Serial No. 92), p. 728-9

Friday, March 15, 2019

Commandant Samuel F. DuPont to Gustavus V. Fox, December 21, 1861

Private
Dec. 21. Port Royal Str Wabash.
My Dear Sir

I have applied for an ordnance Lieut. Will you do me the favor to order Lt. A. S. Mackenzie late of the Hartford — You saw his mother in New York.

He had better call on the Bureau and get posted up and then on Dahlgren. I am worried a little about the Dept. for I want it right not only in itself — but in our records and archives.

Squally news yesterday from England. Let 'em come.

W haste
S. F. Dupont.

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 82

Thursday, December 27, 2018

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, April 8, 1864

Answered a letter from J. P. Hale, Chairman of Naval Committee, on the question of increasing the Marine Corps. In answering the inquiries of Mr. Hale, it is important to so word my communication as to leave the honorable gentleman some discretion, for he makes it a rule to oppose any measure which the Department strongly recommends. Mr. Rice, Chairman of the Naval Committee of the House, informs me of a conversation he had with Hale a few days since, when he lectured Hale severely for his course. Told him that, while professing to be a friend of the Administration, he exerted himself to see if he could not in some way find fault with it, as though he could gain popularity to himself personally while denouncing the Administration and especially that branch of it with which he was more particularly identified. Hale replied that he had the most implicit confidence in the integrity and fidelity of Gideon Welles, but that he had no confidence in Mr. Fox or Admiral Smith, etc., etc.

But little at the Cabinet. Neither Chase nor Blair attended. Seward says our friends in the British Ministry are to be defeated. Told him I regretted it, but that it was not an unmitigated evil. I had not the apprehensions from it which he seemed to entertain. I certainly felt disinclined to make concessions to retain them.

Called this evening on Admiral Dahlgren, who is inconsolable for the loss of his son. Advised him to get abroad and mingle in the world, and not yield to a blow that was irremediable.

Wise, who is Chief ad interim of the Ordnance Bureau, is almost insane for the appointment of Chief, and, like too many, supposes the way to promotion is by denouncing those who stand in his way, or whom he supposes stand in his way. Mr. Everett writes to old Mr. Blair against Dahlgren. Admiral Stringham and Worden called on me yesterday in behalf of Wise and both opposed D. They were sent by Wise.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 6-7

Wednesday, December 26, 2018

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: October 26, 1863

No news from our armies. The President was in Mobile two days-ago.

Gen. Rosecrans has been removed from his command, and Grant put in his place. Meade, it is said in Northern papers, will also be decapitated, for letting Lee get back without loss. Also Dalgren, at Charleston, has been relieved. And yet the Northern papers announce that Richmond will soon and suddenly be taken, and an unexpected joy be spread throughout the North, and a corresponding despondency throughout the South.

The weather is cloudy and cold. The papers announce that all clerks appointed since October 11th, 1862, by order of the Secretary of War, are liable to conscription. This cannot be true; for I know a Secretary who has just appointed two of his cousins to the best clerkships in the department—both of conscript age. But Secretaries know how to evade the law, and “whip the devil round the stump.”

How long will it be after peace before the sectional hatred intensified by this war can abate? A lady near by, the other night, while surveying her dilapidated shoes, and the tattered sleeping-gowns of her children, burst forth as follows: “I pray that I may live to see the United States involved in a war with some foreign power, which will make refugees of her people, and lay her cities in ashes! I want the people ruined who would ruin the South. It will be a just retribution!”

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2p. 82

Tuesday, November 6, 2018

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, March 26, 1864

I went early this A.M. to the President on the subject of procuring a transfer of seamen from the Army to the Navy. After reading the papers he said he would take the matter in hand, and before I left the room he rang for his man Edward and told him to go for the Secretary of War, but, stopping him before he got to the door, directed him to call the Secretary of State first. In this whole matter of procuring seamen for the Navy there has been a sorry display of the prejudices of some of the military authorities. Halleck appears to dislike the Navy more than he loves his country.

Olcott, the detective, is here. Has been called to W. by the War Department. He, like those of his employment, is full of mystery, discussed fraud, overwhelming villainy, etc.; but much of it is mere suspicion, or matter susceptible of explanation. Not but that there is great rascality, — sufficient without exaggerating or aggravating it. I did not care to see him and cautioned Fox not to let his judgment be biased by O. The whole of these harsh proceedings are repugnant to my feelings.

Had a conversation with Admiral Dahlgren concerning operations at Charleston, ironclads, army matters, etc. Gillmore has high qualities as an engineer, but very little as a general in command. Lacks administrative ability, powers of organization, and has not that talent which relies on itself and keeps its own counsel. From what D. says, I think Gillmore must have acquiesced at least in the newspaper assaults on D. and the Navy, which if so, is greatly to his discredit. Dahlgren would never have assented to or permitted such assaults on Gillmore.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 546-7

Monday, October 29, 2018

Diary of Gideon Welles: Thursday, March 24, 1864

Tom and Admiral Dahlgren returned from Fortress Monroe, but without the remains of young Dahlgren.

We are running short of sailors and I have no immediate remedy. The army officers are not disposed to lose good men, and seem indifferent to the country and general welfare if their service can get along. Commodore Rowan writes that the times of the men are running out and no reenlistments; the army is paying enormous bounties. Between thirty and forty vessels are waiting crews.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 545-6

Wednesday, October 10, 2018

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, March 21, 1864

Wilson returned from New York on Saturday. Called to-day and made report in case of the contractors. Says the evidence is strong and conclusive against them; will be ready with charges and specifications in about a week. I told him it was my wish there should be a speedy trial; I also desired that the wives and counsel of the prisoners might visit them. Whiting, Solicitor of the War Department, called. My letter to the Secretary of War, requesting him to direct Whiting to give this Department his assistance and advice in criminal transactions was objectionable. The Secretary could not direct him, and he would not communicate with the Secretary because the word “direct” was in the note. Told him the mere misuse of a word should not be permitted to embarrass a public measure. That I was willing to substitute another word. He said he would prepare something to meet the case. Tells me that Seward refers questions to him, some affecting Navy captures. This is an eye-opener. The two are cunning, but they expose each other.

Tom1 has gone with Admiral Dahlgren to Fortress Monroe after the body of his son Ulric, expected from Richmond.
_______________

1 Thomas G. Welles, son of the Secretary.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 544

Thursday, August 9, 2018

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, March 7, 1864

Called yesterday to see Admiral Dahlgren. While there the President and Secretary of War came in with a telegram from General Butler, announcing that his son, Colonel Dahlgren, was alive and well with a force of about one hundred at King and Queen. Of course we were all gratified. The President was much affected.

To-day I have, or rather Fox, who has special charge of the matter, had, word from Olcott, the employé of the War Department, stating he had found evidence of enormous frauds by Scofield, Savage, and Raymond, and wanted the whole of them arrested, or he had them arrested. Wished a guard detailed to seize Savage's store, etc. When Fox brought me the papers, I said to him that the whole subject had been committed to him, and I could not undertake, with my other duties, to enter upon the details of frauds by these contractors. Besides I doubted the rightfulness of seizing men and their papers and valuables on mere suspicion. Advised him to consult legal gentlemen at the War Department, Olcott being a detective assigned by the Secretary of War.

A long letter from Chase in relation to permits and trade regulations, explaining his position, and showing not only some sensitiveness but a little irritation. His letter is based on a reply to two communications made by me on the 18th ult. in regard to the Ann Hamilton and the Princeton. I think him wrong in his conclusions as regards these vessels, and also mistaken as to the course and position of others. In the matter of the embargo first, and subsequently in that of communication and traffic in the Rebel regions, he took ground with me, but failed me and slid in with the others when action became necessary. I disliked the scheme of trade regulations, but it was concluded to have them, on the permits of the Treasury, War, and Navy Departments. Soon he deputed the subject of clearances to others, and Stanton deputed authority to grant permits to his officers, and abuse and demoralization followed.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 536-7

Wednesday, July 25, 2018

Diary of Gideon Welles: Wednesday, March 2, 1864

There are exciting rumors respecting army movements in front. From what I learn, Kilpatrick, with a large cavalry force, is to make a raid upon Richmond with a view of capturing the place. He is sanguine that he will be successful. I have my doubts, for there have been so many attempts upon the place that some precautionary measures must have been taken for defending it. However, I am glad the movement is to be made if there is a reasonable hope of success.

Rear-Admiral Dahlgren came suddenly upon us this evening. I sent him leave three weeks or more ago. He is looking well after his long and fatiguing service.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 534

Diary of Gideon Welles: Thursday, March 3, 1864

Governor Thomas of Maryland called on me to-day in behalf of Commodore Ringgold, who wants a vote of thanks on the recommendation of the President. He says that he and other Members of Congress — Senators and Representatives — have had an interview with the President, who is ready to send in the recommendation, if I will make it out. Told the Governor that it was all wrong; that I well understood Ringgold's intrigue; that the movement was contrary to the policy of the Department, was not to be thought of, would be injustice to others; and that it would be better to repeal the whole law than do anything of the kind. I promised him, however, to see the President, and did so.

I called on the President in the afternoon, who said he should be governed entirely by my views in the matter. The subject was therefore soon disposed of. I then brought up the subject of promoting Colonel Hawley. He said the measure was full now, but he hoped to be able to do justice to H. one of these days. I remarked that I had avoided pressing him on the subject of military appointments, but this was one for a meritorious man from my own State, that I had it much at heart, and had repeatedly brought it to his notice, etc., etc. He gave me credit for forbearance beyond others and assured me he should try not to forget this case when there was opportunity. I have no aid from the Members of Congress in this matter, and from some of them I apprehend there is opposition, or something akin to it. I regret that Hawley fails to appreciate Dahlgren and his service, and rightly to comprehend the whole question of naval and military operations at Charleston. But this partisan weakness shall not prevent me from doing him justice.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 534-5

Tuesday, July 17, 2018

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, February 27, 1864

A very busy day, and I am very indifferently well to discharge the mass of business; but got through with it before 5 P.m. Am surprised that I do not commit more serious mistakes. Received the charges and specifications against Wilkes. Convened the court, or ordered it to be convened, on the 9th. Am sorry to be compelled to do this, but there is no alternative.

Sedgwick calls about the prize law which Judge Sprague and Dana have got up. In the main it is pretty well done, but needs some amendments.

Seward told me in a whisper that we had met a serious reverse in Florida. It is [not] mentioned in the papers. This suppressing a plump and plain fact, already accomplished, because unfortunate, is not wise. The Florida expedition has been one of the secret movements that have been projected, I know not by whom, but suspect the President has been trying a game himself. He has done such things, and, I believe, always unfortunately. I may be wrong in my conclusions, but his secretary, John Hay, was sent off to join the forces at Port Royal, and this expedition was then commenced. Admiral Dahlgren went off on it without orders from me, and had only time to advise me he was going. Though he has general directions to cooperate with the army, he would not have done this but from high authority.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 531-2

Saturday, May 26, 2018

Diary of Gideon Welles: Wednesday, February 3, 1864

Had a brief talk to-day with Chase on financial matters. He seems embarrassed how to proceed, but, being fertile in resources, listening to others still more fertile, and having resorted to expedients in one instance, he will probably experience little difficulty in finding another. There will, however, come a day of reckoning, and the nation will have to pay for all these expedients. In departing from the specie standard and making irredeemable paper its equivalent, I think a great error was committed. By inflating the currency, loans have been more easily taken, but the artificial prices are ruinous. I do not gather from Chase that he has any system or fixed principles to govern him in his management of the Treasury. He craves even beyond most others a victory, for the success of our arms inspires capitalists with confidence. He inquired about Charleston; regretted that Farragut had not been ordered there. I asked what F. could do beyond Dahlgren at that point. Well, he said, he knew not that he could do more, but he was brave and had a name which inspired confidence. I admitted he had a reputation which Dahlgren had not, but no one had questioned D.'s courage or capacity and the President favored him. The moral effect of taking Charleston was not to be questioned; beyond that I knew not anything could be gained. The port was closed.

The conversation turned upon army and naval operations. He lamented the President's want of energy and force, which he said paralyzed everything. His weakness was crushing us. I did not respond to this distinct feeler, and the conversation changed.

Almost daily we have some indications of Presidential aspirations and incipient operations for the campaign. The President does not conceal the interest he takes, and yet I perceive nothing unfair or intrusive. He is sometimes, but not often, deceived by heartless intriguers who impose upon him. Some appointments have been secured by mischievous men, which would never have been made had he known the facts. In some respects he is a singular man and not fully understood. He has great sagacity and shrewdness, but sometimes his assertion or management is astray. When he relies on his own right intentions and good common sense, he is strongest. So in regard to friends whom he distrusts, and mercenary opponents, in some of whom he confides. A great and almost inexcusable error for a man in his position.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 520-1

Sunday, February 11, 2018

Major-General William T. Sherman to Major-General Henry W. Halleck, December 13, 1864 – 11:50 p.m.

ON BOARD DANDELION,           
Ossabaw Sound, December 13, 1864 11.50 p.m. 
(Received 15th.)
General H. W. HALLECK, Washington:

To-day, at 5 p.m., General Hazen's division of the Fifteenth Corps carried Fort McAllister by assault, capturing its entire garrison and stores. This opened to us the Ossabaw Sound, and I pulled down to this gunboat to communicate with the fleet. Before opening communication we had completely destroyed all the railroads leading into Savannah and invested the city. The left is on the Savannah River, three miles above the city, and right on the Ogeechee, at King's Bridge. Were it not for the swamps we could march into the city, but as it is I would have to assault at one or two places over narrow causeways, leading to much loss; whereas in a day or two, with my communications restored and the batteries in position within short range of the city, I will demand its surrender. The army is in splendid order, and equal to anything. Weather has been fine, and supplies abundant. Our march was most agreeable, and we were not at all molested by guerrillas. We reached Savannah three days ago, but owing to Fort McAllister we could not communicate; but now we have McAllister we can go ahead. We have already captured two boats in the Savannah River, and prevented their gun-boats from coming down, and, if General Foster will prevent the escape of the garrison of Savannah and its people by land across South Carolina, we will capture all. I estimate the population at 25,000 and the garrison at 15,000; General Hardee commands. We have on hand plenty of meat, salt, and potatoes; all we need is bread, and I have sent to Port Royal for that. We have not lost a wagon on the trip, but have gathered in a large supply of negroes, mules, horses, &c., and our teams are in far better condition than when we started. My first duty will be to clear the army of surplus negroes, mules, and horses, and suppose General Saxton can relieve me of these.

I am writing on board a dispatch-boat, down Ossabaw, at midnight, and have to go back to where I left my horse, eight miles up, in a row boat, and thence fifteen miles over to our lines by daylight, so that I hope this will be accepted as an excuse for this informal letter; but I know you are anxious to hear of our safety and good condition. Full and detailed reports of the events of the past mouth will be prepared at a more leisure moment, and in the meantime I can only say that I hope by Christmas to be in possession of Savannah, and by the new year to be ready to resume our journey to Raleigh. The whole army is crazy to be turned loose in Carolina; and with the experience of the past thirty days I judge that a month's sojourn in South Carolina would make her less bellicose.

The editors in Georgia profess to be indignant at the horrible barbarities of Sherman's army, but I know the people don't want our visit repeated. We have utterly destroyed over 200 miles of railroad, and consumed stores and provisions that were essential to Lee's and Hood's armies. A similar destruction of roads and resources hence to Raleigh would compel General Lee to come out of his intrenched camp. I hope General Thomas has held Hood. My last accounts are of the fight at Franklin, but rebel papers state that Decatur, Ala., has been evacuated. This I regret, though it is not essential to the future. If Hood is making any real progress I would not hesitate to march hence, after taking Savannah, for Montgomery, which would bring him out of Tennessee; but it seems to me that winter is a bad time for him. I will try and see Admiral Dahlgren and General Foster before demanding the surrender of Savannah, which I do not propose to make till my batteries are able to open. The quick work made with McAllister, and the opening communication with our fleet, and consequent independence for supplies, dissipated all their boasted threats to head me off and starve the army. The efforts thus far have been puerile, and I regard Savannah as already gained.

Yours, truly,
W. T. SHERMAN,    
Major-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 44 (Serial No. 92), p. 701-2

Wednesday, January 10, 2018

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, October 24, 1863

General Terry and Colonel Hawley from Morris Island, before Charleston, called on me. Both are prejudiced against Dahlgren, and the two are acting in concert. They come from Gillmore and have a mission to perform, which they at once proceeded to execute by denouncing Dahlgren as incompetent, imbecile, and insane. They represent him to be totally unfit for his position, and have many severe censures, some of which I think are unmerited and undeserved. They submit the correspondence between Gillmore and Dahlgren. I am satisfied they are, at least in some respects, in error, and Dahlgren has been feeble from illness. He is proud and very sensitive and the strictures of the press he would feel keenly. Those of his subordinates who belonged to the Du Pont clique do not love him, nor do some of his professional brethren become reconciled to his advancement. His honors, as I anticipated they would, beget disaffection and have brought him many unpleasant responsibilities. His cold, selfish, and ambitious nature has been wounded, but he is neither a fool nor insane as those military gentlemen represent and believe. Both Dahlgren and Gillmore are out of place; they are both intelligent, but they can better acquit themselves as ordnance officers than in active command.

After maturely considering the subject of the proposed purchase of a naval vessel by the Venezuelan Government or the unaccredited Minister, I wrote Mr. Seward my doubts, informed him that the whole responsibility must rest with him, and inclosed a letter to Stribling, stating it was written at the special request of the Secretary of State, which letter he may or may not use.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 474-5

Sunday, October 8, 2017

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, October 3, 1863

Mr. Seward called early this morning and read me the draft of a proclamation for Thanksgiving. I complimented the paper as very well done, and him for his talent in the preparation of such papers, which pleased him; but he made a remark to which I did not respond as favorably. He said it had been formerly claimed that Thanksgivings were a State institution, a State prerogative; he thought it a good time and opportunity to extinguish that claim and make such days national. I remarked there might be propriety, as at this time, in designating a day to be observed throughout the whole country, but there were occasions when a people in one State or section had reasons for special thanks, which reasons might not exist in other sections, as for a bountiful harvest in some latitudes when there might be famine and drought in others; that the most which could be done was recommendatory, and the practice was, I believed, now voluntary everywhere, but that until comparatively recently the observance of Thanksgiving and also of Fast was in my State compulsory, and "all servile labor and vain recreation" on those days were "by law prohibited"; that it would hardly do to make this institution national with mandatory orders, such as some States had ordered.

I called on the President this afternoon relative to certain proposed instructions which he, at the suggestion of Mr. Seward, wished should be issued to naval officers. He had been bored with troublesome company and was weary and exhausted. As I opened my portfolio the quantity of papers disturbed him. I stated briefly the case, which, being one of Seward's, he did not distinctly remember, and remarked the subject was, I thought, more important than he apprehended, that I had given it much time and thought, and it had increased in magnitude the more I had considered it. He became interested, recalled the case, and desired me to leave the papers with him and he would read them by himself. His mind was still confused and he wished to understand the subject more fully. Mr. Seward, whose inconsiderate and imprudent promises have involved him in difficulty, and who in consequence aims to involve the Administration in a most unwise and injudicious proceeding, will have an opportunity to read and digest my report. It will, I think, do him good and Lord Lyons no harm. Fox and Faxon both urge me to send a duplicate to the State Department, that the papers may be placed on file.

[The correspondence follows.]

Memoranda submitted for the consideration of the President, upon the proposed Instructions to Naval Officers:—

It is suggested at the instance it would seem of the British Government, or at least in conformity with its views and wishes, that our Naval Officers in command of the vessels composing our Navy, and at present engaged in belligerent operations, shall be instructed by the government in the following terms: —

“1. — You will avoid the reality, and as far as possible the appearance, of using any neutral port to watch neutral vessels and then to dart out and seize them on their departure.”

“2. — You will not, in any case, detain the crew of a captured neutral vessel, as prisoners of war, or otherwise, except the small number necessary as witnesses in the prize court.”

In considering the expediency of issuing at this time these instructions to our Naval commanders, it is proper, in the first place, to bear in mind, that if issued by us they will be, so far as is known, without any precedent in the history of the Naval service of any country engaged in war.

It should be observed, in the second place, that such instructions would impose upon our naval officers restrictions and limitations in the performance of their duties which are in nowise imposed upon them by any established principle or fixed rules of international law.

It must be borne in mind, in the third place, as being alike important and extraordinary, that this government is so urged to issue to its naval commanders these stringently restrictive instructions, without having the slightest guarantee that similar restrictions will be imposed in neutral ports upon the predatory sea-rovers under the rebel flag, whom neutral powers, under the lead of Great Britain, have already regarded and treated, in these ports, as having belligerent rights.

It should not be forgotten, in the fourth place, that this government is now urged to issue these instructions without any assurance by Great Britain, or any other neutral power, that if issued and acted upon by us in this war with the rebels, who have no Navy and no commerce, they will be held by Great Britain, or any other power, to constitute for it a precedent or a rule of action in its exercise of belligerent rights in any war, civil or international, in which it may hereafter engage; nor is the slightest intimation given that such instructions to our naval commanders now will induce, or tend to induce Great Britain, or any other neutral power, to abandon or to modify in our favor any course of action or policy in the present war, of which we have complained, or have had reason to complain.

In the fifth place, these proposed instructions seem to stand upon an unsound principle. It is a fundamental principle of public law that the neutral sovereign himself — and not the belligerent cruiser who lawfully resorts to the ports or waters within his jurisdiction — is the guardian of this neutrality, and of all its immunities and privileges. In his own prize courts he must, in every case where he can obtain jurisdiction, do justice, upon the claim of any party injured by the infraction of his neutral privilege. In the prize courts of the belligerent government, he, the neutral sovereign, can alone be heard, even to claim such redress for such violation of his neutrality. So, too, neutrality having its duties as well as its rights, the public law holds the neutral government, and it alone, responsible to all concerned, for any violation of neutrality within the limits of its jurisdiction. In the absence of treaty stipulations to the contrary, every neutral government exercises the right to determine and prescribe for itself, upon its responsibility, the conditions of ingress, egress, sojourn and conduct within its ports and territorial waters, upon which alone it will permit belligerent cruisers to resort to those places and enjoy such, and only such, of their accommodations as it may see fit to afford. Now, in defiance of this fundamental principle that the neutral government is always the judge of the conditions upon which the hospitality of its ports may be enjoyed by belligerent cruisers, it is proposed in these instructions that we, being belligerents, should gratuitously proceed beyond the requirements of public law and belligerent usage and establish for all our ships of war, certain additional restrictive conditions, within which only they shall use any neutral port. What assurance have we that any neutral government desires us now, or will desire us hereafter to take such action, restricting ourselves in her ports, in the exercise, outside of her limits, of our belligerent rights, either of search or of capture? Will any one neutral power — will Great Britain herself, at this time — give us assurance that in any future war which may happen, it, being then neutral, will by municipal regulation, adopt the stringent terms of the proposed instructions, and make them an indispensable condition precedent to the use of all her ports by any belligerent cruiser? If not, then why should we, as belligerents, be expected now to put such a gratuitous disability upon all our cruisers, in all the neutral ports of the world? Is it not enough that our cruisers should in all neutral ports obey all the law, public and municipal, which they find in force there, and in case of its violation, by accident and against our fixed policy, afford, in the proper manner, through the judicial tribunals or otherwise, prompt and adequate reparation?

In the sixth place, it seems to follow from these views, that to instruct our cruisers, as above proposed, is no part of our business as belligerents? Therefore such action by us at this time would probably be to some neutral powers, and ought to be to all powers which are really and earnestly neutral, unwelcome. It behooves us then to consider upon what instance or urgency it is that we are to take this action, thus modifying our relations as they stand under the public law, to every neutral port, and to every ship claiming to be neutral, but being in fact engaged in illicit navigation or commerce. No one neutral power has any just ground to ask from us such wide-reaching action. There should be a neutral unanimity in the request if we are to grant it; and even then such unanimous request should be accompanied by stipulations of reciprocity of the rule in all future wars. Such conditions seem to be required in order to justify us in acceding to a proposition which goes to the curtailment of our rights in law as belligerents, at a moment when we have the most arduous blockade to enforce which any nation ever undertook to make effectual, and the most adventurous and persistent illicit trade to suppress, against which any nation ever attempted practically and not merely on paper, to guard.

It is true — and this idea appears to have occurred strongly to your mind — that the issuing of such instructions by us and obedience to them by our ships of war, would constitute no infraction of public law, because it is the unquestionable right of any government engaged in war to surrender such portions as it sees fit of its belligerent rights and privileges; and no other injury is, by such surrender, inflicted upon neutrals than that which may be found in its manifest tendency to enfeeble and thus prolong the war. It should, however, be remarked that the second of these proposed instructions is in a direction and of a tendency opposed not only to the universal and traditional policy of belligerent governments, as expressed in their statutes, in the rulings of their prize courts and their instructions to cruisers, but also to what is often insisted upon, especially by neutrals in cases of capture, as a duty of captors. No adjudged case, it is believed, can be found in which the prize court, especially in Great Britain, has ever held that the captor erred in sending in with his prize too many of the officers, crew or passengers found on board at the time of her capture. Certainly no adjudged case can be found in which the right of the captor, thus to send in with his prize as many of the persons found on board of her as he may see fit to send, has been questioned. The allegation that any person found at the time of capture on board of any lawfully captured ship has any right, in law, immediately after the capture, to leave the ship against the will of the captor, or that the captor is bound in law to give his consent to such leaving, is believed to be wholly novel. It is undoubtedly true, in general, that the temptation and inclination of captors are to err in the other direction, and to retain too few rather than too many of the persons so captured. In so doing captors subject themselves to the frequent complaints and censures of the prize court, and not infrequently to its penalties. In fact to instruct a naval commander never to detain any neutral person found on board the captured neutral ship, unless such person be necessary as a witness; is to subject the commander to the harsh necessity of judging upon the spot in a case perhaps very complicated and important, just how many and what persons may be necessary as witnesses, with the certainty of being censured by his government for violation of his orders if he detain too many, and of being censured and perhaps mulcted by the prize court for insufficient performance of his duty if he detains too few. It is unnecessary to say that no principle or rule of international law places a lawfully commissioned, honest and faithful capturing officer in so critical a position. It is the clear belligerent right of his government to shield him, while lawfully engaged in his duties, from so severe and perilous a responsibility. Our gallant naval officers, it is therefore suggested, might justly feel that the public service in their hands and the public right were cramped and weakened, and themselves embarrassed, if not aggrieved, by such an instruction.

In regard to the first of the proposed instructions, it is not deemed necessary to discuss elaborately, in this paper, the extent to which its terms augment and aggravate the restrictions which international law, particularly as expounded and applied by the highest authorities of Great Britain, both judicial and juridical, impose upon the conduct of commanders of public ships of war of a belligerent government lawfully sojourning within neutral ports. It is proper, however, to state that this important point has been maturely considered, and the leading British authorities examined and collated with care. Citations from these authorities, with brief comments upon them, will be found in the accompanying appendix.

Suffice it here to say that while these British authorities emphatically lay down the rule that no acts of war, either immediate or proximate, are permitted by the public law to belligerent vessels in waters within neutral jurisdiction; it is yet with the utmost reserve, circumspection and tenderness, that they enter upon or even approach the delicate question of the extent to which the belligerent cruiser, whether a public ship or a privateer duly commissioned and lawfully sojourning in neutral ports or waters, may, under international law, in the absence of municipal regulation to the contrary, avail itself in its act of departure, and after its departure from such places, of any facilities or remote and indirect aids lawfully obtained there, for the prosecution of its belligerent operations against the adverse belligerents, or for the exercise of its belligerent rights upon neutral ships outside the neutral jurisdiction. Of these facilities and indirect aids, lawfully obtainable by peaceable means, in the neutral ports and waters, information often is, and always may be, the most important. In the absence of municipal regulation to the contrary, such cruiser lawfully sojourning in the neutral port has a perfect right in public law, in order to obtain such information, to watch in a peaceable manner, most vigilantly, all vessels in the port, or coming into it or going out of it; and to dart out of the port just when he pleases, with the purpose to act upon such information in the exercise of his belligerent rights upon the high seas, outside of the neutral jurisdiction, upon all neutral commercial vessels, in the form of search and of capture, if such search shall discover a probable case of navigation or trade, illicit as against his government. In so doing, such cruiser has but made an unforbidden passage over neutral territorial waters, in order to exercise in a lawful place his belligerent right. This under the public law, in the absence of municipal restraint, he has a perfect right to do.

If the Sovereign of the neutral port fails to prohibit such cruiser from using his port as a station for the habitual doing of these things — as distinguishable from a place of occasional visit and reasonable sojourn — then the adverse belligerent sovereign certainly, if the same privilege be refused to him and other neutral governments, perhaps, may with reason complain of the neutral sovereign's conduct, in allowing his port to be so used, as "noxious" and "unfriendly," and even perhaps unneutral. But they have no right in law to complain of the lawfully commissioned belligerent cruiser for availing himself of the liberty thus allowed him; and they are bound to consider that if the neutral sovereign does not prohibit the continuance of such practices — nor demand reparation for them — by such belligerent, then he intends to allow; and it is for this very reason that in such case they have sometimes charged him, and him only, with noxious and unfriendly conduct.

Such being the public law, it seems certain that the Naval vessels of the United States are not bound by that law, in the absence of municipal regulations, to govern for themselves their conduct as belligerents, by the proposed stringently restrictive instructions. This being the fact, if there were any one neutral government specially urging such instructions, and if it should happen that the subjects of such neutral government were, in its own ports and therefore under its own eyes, engaged in furnishing upon a large scale to the rebels, not only the munitions of war, but vessels, armament and even crews, for harassing and burning upon the high seas, our commercial ships, could it be considered our duty or our wise policy to issue, at the instance mainly of that power and in response to its almost exclusive complaint, such instructions so restricting our belligerent rights in our use of every neutral port? But the wisdom of your policy in restricting our Navy in the use of its belligerent rights within the most vigorous limits of established public law, is manifest, and is in conformity, not only with the judgment of your wisest predecessors, but also with the traditional practice of the United States, and with their permanent interests, as appreciated by the great popular instinct of the present time. Indeed the enlargement of neutral immunities, in proper methods and by the common consent of nations, is an object worthy of your statesmanship, even in the present crisis. Especially is this the case when, as in this instance, you seek to combine with such liberal policy, a palpable proof to every government claiming to be neutral, of your desire to pursue toward it and toward all, to every proper and rightful extent, a course of conciliation.

In these views, it is respectfully suggested that, if you are urged by neutral governments to cause these instructions to be issued, the inquiry may properly be made of them, whether they, or any of them, are willing to adopt an identical rule of action in any future war, international or domestic, in which they may be engaged. In that event, the instructions proposed might, perhaps, upon the assurance to that effect, well receive your favorable consideration.

If a negative answer on the other hand should be given to such an inquiry, then it may be well to request any neutral government which presses this policy upon you, to produce from the records of its own practice as a belligerent any precedent of identical, or even similar instructions issued within the present century, to the commanders of its ships of war. Such precedents might doubtless have considerable weight in inducing you to adopt a policy in the same direction. Should no such precedent be forthcoming at your request, then it may be proper in response to any government, — the British Government for instance — which may especially desire that these proposed instructions should be issued, or that our belligerent rights as they exist under the public law should be further restrained by our own action, to request that any such restraining instructions which may have been within recent memory issued by such government, when a belligerent, to its naval officers, should now be furnished to you for your consideration. In such case it will be easy for the government of the United States to prove that it desires while maintaining its own belligerent rights not to be surpassed by any other government in a just and friendly respect for all the rights and lawful interests of neutrals.

Commander Shufeldt called on me. Thinks the capture  of Charleston impracticable by the force now there. Says Dahlgren has been a good deal ill, and there has been much to discourage him. The Army, he says, fails to do justice to the Navy, without which they would be speedily driven away. There have been some mistakes, errors which seem to have caused irritation between the two branches of the service. Dahlgren has not spared himself, and his long and arduous labors have been such as would wear down a more robust man. More than exhausting physical labor have been the mental anxieties he has endured, — the loss of his two fleet captains, jealousies as to his professional advancement without corresponding sea service or naval achievement in battle, the morbid hostility of such of the Du Pont clique as remain in the squadron, army antagonism, and ignorance and prejudice fostered by it.


SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 452-67

Thursday, October 5, 2017

Diary of Gideon Welles: Thursday, October 1, 1863

Complaints of slow progress at Charleston reach us. Censure is thrown upon Dahlgren which is not altogether just. His undue promotion requires extraordinary ability and effort to lift him above the rivalries and jealousies of his contemporaries in the profession. He has prudence, caution, intelligence, but not the dash and fearless daring to distinguish himself which would reconcile them to the favoritism he has experienced. Then, worse than this, the Navy, and he as commander in a conjoint movement, encounter the army jealousy. All failures, or any want of success, is imputed to the Navy, though entirely blameless, and though the fault, if any, is with the military. Without the Navy, Morris Island could not be retained by the army, and all proceedings would terminate, yet the Navy gets no credit. Its services are not properly appreciated, and General Gillmore, though a good engineer, is, I apprehend, not adapted to full command, — cannot manage men, and has the infirmities which belong to engineers and those who are trained to secondary and scientific positions. They can criticize, and blame others without the faculty of accomplishing great results themselves.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 449

Tuesday, August 29, 2017

Diary of Gideon Welles: Thursday, September 17, 1863

Unpleasant rumors of a disagreement between Dahlgren and Gillmore and that the latter had requested to be relieved of his present command. This, I think, must be a mischievous rumor, — perhaps a speculative one.

A new panic is rising respecting the ironclads in England, and some of our sensation journals fan the excitement. It does not surprise me that the New York Times, Raymond's paper, controlled by Thurlow Weed, and all papers influenced by Seward should be alarmed. The latter knows those vessels are to be detained, yet will not come out and state the fact, but is not unwilling to have apprehension excited. It will glorify him if it is said they are detained through protest from our minister. If he does not prompt the Times, he could check its loud apprehensions. I am under restrictions which prevent me from making known facts that would dissipate this alarm. The Evening Post, I am sorry to see, falls in with the Times and its managers, and unwittingly assists those whom it does not admire. Both these journals are importunate, and insist that the Roanoke shall be returned to New York. But the Navy Department is not under newspaper control, though they have the cooperation of distinguished men. To station a steam frigate in New York would involve the necessity of stationing one also in the Delaware, and another at Boston. There would be no limit to the demand for naval defenses, yet it is claimed the coast defenses belong exclusively to the military.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 434-5

Friday, August 25, 2017

Diary of Gideon Welles: Wednesday, September 16, 1863

Dispatches and also a private letter from Dahlgren speak of the assault and repulse at Sumter. Neither is clear and explicit. I should judge it had been a hasty and not very thoroughly matured movement.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 434

Sunday, July 30, 2017

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, August 17, 1863

Wrote Dahlgren, who has serious apprehensions about Laird's ironclad steamers, which troubled Du Pont, that I thought he might feel assured they would not disturb him. Seward says Mr. Adams has made a vigorous protest, and informed the British Government if the Rebel ironclads are permitted to come out it will be casus belli. If he has taken that position, which I have always urged, and we persist in it, all will be well.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 406