John L. Dawson to Senator Robert M. T. Hunter, August 25, 1855

BROWNSVILLE, [PA.], August 25th, 1855.

DEAR HUNTER: I received your letter of the 20th instant this morning and have just shipped the box containing the map of "Superior" to the care of Gallaher Young & Co., Fredericksburg Va. I sent it from here to Pitts[burg]h to G. W. Cass who will forward it to you by Adams Express. The numbering of the Lots begins on Robertson Avenue: Odd numbers on the right, even numbers on the left. This reference will enable you to ascertain without difficulty the Nos. of your lots.

There was no map prepared, showing the general division. I had one coloured for you and one for myself by which I could distinguish your lots and my own. Gov[ernor] Bright had one also prepared, showing his lots. I consider your lots as of equal value with our division. The most valuable lots at the present time are these on Second Street, for the reason that nearly all of the improvements are on that street. The value of the lots will depend upon many future contingencies which no man can foresee, but at present I am of opinion that the most valuable improvements will be upon Left Hand river and between said river and Hollinshead Avenue. The Piers have not yet been divided. Quebec Pier is the only one improved and is in a good position. The next two piers below Quebec, and between it and Left Hand, will be still more valuable. The most of the lots and blocks will be ready for a final division this fall. The Superior City to which you refer as mentioned in Newtons advertisement is the Town site for which we are contending. It embraces 320 a[cres] and is very valuable. It is important that we establish our right to the same. Newton has taken a good many releases from the pre-emptors and will persevere, until he gets all. Bright seemed to think this of no consequence, but I urged him to procure all if possible. I sent you a "Superior Chronicle" containing a letter written by a Mr. Mitchell from St. Louis descriptive of the Town and its advantages, which I presume you have received. Mitchell bought a considerable interest and secured a pre-emption to 160 a[cres] in the vicinity of the town. His statements are to be relied upon. I repeat that is the prettiest site for a large City that I have ever seen. Its position geographical, commercial and political is great, and it is destined to be a great place, and no mistake. The pier will not cost more than 20 or 25 thousand dollars, and but little dredging will be necessary to make the harbor a good one.

What say you to the Canadian or British project of a ship canal directly to connect Lakes Huron and Ontario via Lake Semcoe and the Georgian Bay avoiding the circuit of Erie, Detroit River and St Clair and Flats and a great portion of Lake Huron, curtailing about 900 miles of Distance.

In politics I fear there is trouble ahead. The Southern Statesmen must act with great discretion and aid the democracy of the North in heading the Common enemy, headed by Chase[,] Seward and Co. The free soilers and abolitionists will not unite with the K[now] N[othings] and I therefore believe that we can elect our President. It is of the greatest important to you as well as to the party and the country that you take good care to have your friends from Virginia and elsewhere in the Cincinnati Convention. If the nomination should go South, the vote of Virginia will go far in giving it the proper direction. In a word it is an important movement and requiring our whole attention.

SOURCE: Charles Henry Ambler, Editor, Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1916, in Two Volumes, Vol. II, Correspondence of Robert M. T. Hunter (1826-1876), p. 169-70

Diary of Adam Gurowski, April 1861

COMMISSIONERS from the rebels; Seward parleying with them through some Judge Campbell. Curious way of treating and dealing with rebellion, with rebels and traitors; why not arrest them?

Corcoran, a rich partisan of secession, invited to a dinner the rebel commissioners and the foreign diplomats. If such a thing were done anywhere else, such a pimp would be arrested. The serious diplomats, Lord Lyons, Mercier, and Stoeckl refused the invitation; some smaller accepted, at least so I hear.

The infamous traitors fire on the Union flag. They treat the garrison of Sumpter as enemies on sufferance, and here their commissioners go about free, and glory in treason. What is this administration about? Have they no blood; are they fishes?

The crime in full blast; consummatum est. Sumpter bombarded; Virginia, under the nose of the administration, secedes, and the leaders did not see or foresee anything: flirted with Virginia.

Now, they, the leaders or the administration, are terribly startled; so is the brave noble North; the people are taken unawares; but no wonder; the people saw the Cabinet, the President, and the military in complacent security. These watchmen did nothing to give an early sign of alarm, so the people, confiding in them, went about its daily occupation. But it will rise as one man and in terrible wrath. Vous le verrez mess les Diplomates.

The President calls on the country for 75,000 men; telegram has spoken, and they rise, they arm, they come. I am not deceived in my faith in the North; the excitement, the wrath, is terrible. Party lines burn, dissolved by the excitement. Now the people is in fusion as bronze; if Lincoln and the leaders have mettle in themselves, then they can cast such arms, moral, material, and legislative, as will destroy at once this rebellion. But will they have the energy? They do not look like Demiourgi.

Massachusetts takes the lead; always so, this first people in the world; first for peace by its civilization and intellectual development, and first to run to the rescue.

The most infamous treachery and murder, by Baltimoreans, of the Massachusetts men. Will the cowardly murderers be exemplarily punished?

The President, under the advice of Scott, seems to take coolly the treasonable murders of Baltimore; instead of action, again parleying with these Baltimorean traitors. The rumor says that Seward is for leniency, and goes hand in hand with Scott. Now, if they will handle such murderers in silk gloves as they do, the fire must spread.

The secessionists in Washington—and they are a legion, of all hues and positions are defiant, arrogant, sure that Washington will be taken. One risks to be murdered here.

I entered the thus called Cassius Clay Company, organized for the defence of Washington until troops came. For several days patrolled, drilled, and lay several nights on the hard floor. Had compensation, that the drill often reproduced that of Falstaff's heroes. But my campaigners would have fought well in case of emergency. Most of them office-seekers. When the alarm was over, the company dissolved, but each got a kind of certificate beautifully written and signed by Lincoln and Cameron. I refused to take such a certificate, we having had no occasion to fight.

The President issued a proclamation for the blockade of the Southern revolted ports. Do they not know better?

How can the Minister of Foreign Affairs advise the President to resort to such a measure? Is the Minister of Foreign Affairs so willing to call in foreign nations by this blockade, thus transforming a purely domestic and municipal question into an international, public one?

The President is to quench the rebellion, a domestic fire, and to do it he takes a weapon, an engine the most difficult to handle, and in using of which he depends on foreign nations. Do they not know better here in the ministry and in the councils? Russia dealt differently with the revolted Circassians and with England in the so celebrated case of the Vixen.

The administration ought to know its rights of sovereignty and to close the ports of entry. Then no chance would be left to England to meddle.

Yesterday N—— dined with Lord Lyons, and during the dinner an anonymous note announced to the Lord that the proclamation of the blockade is to be issued on to-morrow. N——, who has a romantic turn, or rather who seeks for midi a' 14¾ heures, speculated what lady would have thus violated a secret d'Etat.

I rather think it comes from the Ministry, or, as they call it here, from the Department. About two years ago, when the Central Americans were so teased and maltreated by the fillibusters and Democratic administration, a Minister of one of these Central American States told me in New York that in a Chief of the Departments, or something the like, the Central Americans have a valuable friend, who, every time that trouble is brewing against them in the Department, gives them a secret and anonymous notice of it. This friend may have transferred his kindness to England.

How will foreign nations behave? I wish I may be misguided by my political anglophobia, but England, envious, rapacious, and the Palmerstons and others, filled with hatred towards the genuine democracy and the American people, will play some bad tricks. They will seize the occasion to avenge many humiliations. Charles Sumner, Howe, and a great many others, rely on England, on her antislavery feeling. I do not. I know English policy. We shall see.

France, Frenchmen, and Louis Napoleon are by far more reliable. The principles and the interest of France, broadly conceived, make the existence of a powerful Union a statesmanlike European and world necessity. The cold, taciturn Louis Napoleon is full of broad and clear conceptions. I am for relying, almost explicitly, on France and on him.

The administration calls in all the men-of-war scattered in all waters. As the commercial interests of the Union will remain unprotected, the administration ought to put them under the protection of France. It is often done so between friendly powers. Louis Napoleon could not refuse; and accepting, would become pledged to our side.

Germany, great and small, governments and people, will be for the Union. Germans are honest; they love the Union, hate slavery, and understand, to be sure, the question. Russia, safe, very safe, few blackguards excepted; so Italy. Spain may play double. I do not expect that the Spaniards, goaded to the quick by the former fillibustering administrations, will have judgment enough to find out that the Republicans have been and will be anti-fillibusters, and do not crave Cuba.

Wrote a respectful warning to the President concerning the unvoidable results of his proclamation in regard to the blockade; explained to him that this, his international demonstration, will, and forcibly must evoke a counter proclamation from foreign powers in the interest of their own respective subjects and of their commercial relations. Warned, foretelling that the foreign powers will recognize the rebels as belligerents, he, the President, having done it already in some way, thus applying an international mode of coercion. Warned, that the condition of belligerents, once recognized, the rebel piratical crafts will be recognized as privateers by foreign powers, and as such will be admitted to all ports under the secesh flag, which will thus enjoy a partial recognition.

Foreign powers may grumble, or oppose the closing of the ports of entry as a domestic, administrative decision, because they may not wish to commit themselves to submit to a paper blockade. But if the President will declare that he will enforce the closing of the ports with the whole navy, so as to strictly guard and close the maritime league, then the foreign powers will see that the administration does not intend to humbug them, but that he, the President, will only preserve intact the fullest exercise of sovereignty, and, as said the Roman legist, he, the President, "nil sibi postulat quod non aliis tribuit." And so he, the President, will only execute the laws of his country, and not any arbitrary measure, to say with the Roman Emperor, "Leges etiam in ipsa arma imperium habere volumus." Warned the President that in all matters relating to this country Louis Napoleon has abandoned the initiative to England; and to throw a small wedge in this alliance, I finally respectfully suggested to the President what is said above about putting the American interests in the Mediterranean under the protection of Louis Napoleon.

Few days thereafter learned that Mr. Seward does not believe that France will follow England. Before long Seward will find it out.

All the coquetting with Virginia, all the presumed influence of General Scott, ended in Virginia's secession, and in the seizure of Norfolk.

Has ever any administration, cabinet, ministry—call it what name you will—given positive, indubitable signs of want and absence of foresight, as did ours in these Virginia, Norfolk, and Harper's Ferry affairs? Not this or that minister or secretary, but all of them ought to go to the constitutional guillotine. Blindness—no mere short-sightedness-permeates the whole administration, Blair excepted. And Scott, the politico-military adviser of the President! What is the matter with Scott, or were the halo and incense surrounding him based on bosh? Will it be one more illusion to be dispelled?

The administration understood not how to save or defend Norfolk, nor how to destroy it. No name to be found for such concrete incapacity.

The rebels are masters, taking our leaders by the nose. Norfolk gives to them thousands of guns, &c., and nobody cries for shame. They ought to go in sackcloth, those narrow-sighted, blind rulers. How will the people stand this masterly administrative demonstration? In England the people and the Parliament would impeach the whole Cabinet.

Charles Sumner told me that the President and his Minister of Foreign Affairs are to propose to the foreign powers the accession of the Union to the celebrated convention of Paris of 1856. All three considered it a master stroke of policy. They will not catch a fly by it.

Again wrote respectfully to Mr. Lincoln, warning him against a too hasty accession to the Paris convention. Based my warning,

1st. Not to give up the great principles contained in Marcy's amendment.

2d. Not to believe or suppose for a minute that the accession to the Paris convention at this time can act in a retroactive sense; explained that it will not and cannot prevent the rebel pirates from being recognized by foreign powers as legal privateers, or being treated as such.

3d. For all these reasons the Union will not win anything by such a step, but it will give up principles and chain its own hands in case of any war with England. Supplicated the President not to risk a step which logically must turn wrong.

Baltimore still unpunished, and the President parleying with various deputations, all this under the guidance of Scott. I begin to be confused; cannot find out what is the character of Lincoln, and above all of Scott.

Governors from whole or half-rebel States refuse the President's call for troops. The original call of 75,000, too small in itself, will be reduced by that refusal. Why does not the administration call for more on the North, and on the free States? In the temper of this noble people it will be as easy to have 250,000 as 75,000, and then rush on them; submerge Virginia, North Carolina, etc.; it can be now so easily done. The Virginians are neither armed nor organized. Courage and youth seemingly would do good in the councils.

The free States undoubtedly will vindicate self-government. Whatever may be said by foreign and domestic croakers, I do not doubt it for a single minute. The free people will show to the world that the apparently loose governmental ribbons are the strongest when everybody carries them in him, and holds them. The people will show that the intellectual magnetism of convictions permeating the million is by far stronger than the commonly called governmental action from above, and it is at the same time elastic and expansive, even if the official leaders may turn out to be altogether mediocrities. The self-governing free North will show more vitality and activity than any among the governed European countries would be able to show in similar emergencies. This is my creed, and I have faith in the people.

The infamous slavers of the South would even be honored if named Barbary States of North America. Before the inauguration, Seward was telling the diplomats that no disruption will take place; now he tells them that it will blow over in from sixty to ninety days. Does Seward believe it? Or does his imagination or his patriotism carry him away or astray? Or, perhaps, he prefers not to look the danger in the face, and tries to avert the bitter cup. At any rate, he is incomprehensible, and the more so when seen at a distance.

Something, nay, even considerable efforts ought to be made to enlighten the public opinion in Europe, as on the outside, insurrections, nationalities, etc., are favored in Europe. How far the diplomats sent by the administration are prepared for this task?

Adams has shown in the last Congress his scholarly, classical narrow-mindedness. Sanford cannot favorably impress anybody in Europe, neither in cabinets, nor in saloons, nor the public at large. He looks and acts as a commis voyageur, will be considered as such at first sight by everybody, and his features and manners may not impress others as being distinguished and high-toned.

Every historical, that is, human event, has its moral and material character and sides. To ignore, and still worse to blot out, to reject the moral incentives and the moral verdict, is a crime to the public at large, is a crime towards human reason.

Such action blunts sound feelings and comprehension, increases the arrogance of the evil-doers.

The moral criterion is absolute and unconditional, and ought as such unconditionally to be applied to the events here. Things and actions must be called by their true names. What is true, noble, pure, and lofty, is on the side of the North, and permeates the unnamed millions of the free people; it ought to be separated from what is sham, egotism, lie or assumption. Truth must be told, never mind the outcry. History has not to produce pieces for the stage, or to amuse a tea-party.

Regiments pour in; the Massachusetts men, of course, leading the van, as in the times of the tea-party. My admiration for the Yankees is justified on every step, as is my scorn, my contempt, etc., etc., of the Southern chivalrous slaver.

Wrote to Charles Sumner expressing my wonder at the undecided conduct of the administration; at its want of foresight; its eternal parleying with Baltimoreans, Virginians, Missourians, etc., and no step to tread down the head of the young snake. No one among them seems to have the seer's eye. The people alone, who arm, who pour in every day and in large numbers, who transform Washington into a camp, and who crave for fighting, the people alone have the prophetic inspiration, and are the genuine statesmen for the emergency.

How will the Congress act? The Congress will come here emerging from the innermost of the popular volcano; but the Congress will be manacled by formulas; it will move not in the spirit of the Constitution, but in the dry constitutionalism, and the Congress will move with difficulty. Still I have faith, although the Congress never will seize upon parliamentary omnipotence. Up to to-day, the administration, instead of boldly crushing, or, at least, attempting to do it; instead of striking at the traitors, the administration is continually on the lookout where the blows come from, scarcely having courage to ward them off. The deputations pouring from the North urge prompt, decided, crushing action. This thunder-voice of the twenty millions of freemen ought to nerve this senile administration. The Southern leaders do not lose one minute's time; they spread the fire, arm, and attack with all the fury of traitors and criminals.

The Northern merchants roar for the offensive; the administration is undecided.

Some individuals, politicians, already speak out that the slaveocratic privileges are only to be curtailed, and slavery preserved as a domestic institution. Not a bit of it. The current and the development of events will run over the heads of the pusillanimous and contemptible conservatives. Slavery must perish, even if the whole North, Lincoln and Seward at its head, should attempt to save it.

Already they speak of the great results of Fabian policy; Seward, I am told, prides in it. Do those Fabiuses know what they talk about? Fabius's tactics—not policy—had in view not to expose young, disheartened levies against Hannibal's unconquered veterans, but further to give time to Rome to restore her exhausted means, to recover political influences with other Italian independent communities, to reconclude broken alliances with the cities, etc. But is this the condition of the Union? Your Fabian policy will cost lives, time, and money; the people feels it, and roars for action. Events are great, the people is great, but the official leaders may turn out inadequate to both.

What a magnificent chance-scarcely equal in history to become a great historical personality, to tower over future generations. But I do not see any one pointing out the way. Better so; the principle of self-government as the self-acting, self-preserving force will be asserted by the total eclipse of great or even eminent men.

The administration, under the influence of drill men, tries to form twenty regiments of regulars, and calls for 45,000 three years' volunteers. What a curious appreciation of necessity and of numbers must prevail in the brains of the administration. Twenty regiments of regulars will be a drop in water; will not help anything, but will be sufficient to poison the public spirit. Citizens and people, but not regulars, not hirelings, are to fight the battle of principle. Regulars and their spirit, with few exceptions, is worse here than were the Yanitschars.

When the principle will be saved and victorious, it will be by the devotion, the spontaneity of the people, and not by Lincoln, Scott, Seward, or any of the like. It is said that Seward rules both Lincoln and Scott. The people, the masses, do not doubt their ability to crush by one blow the traitors, but the administration does.

What I hear concerning the Blairs confirms my high opinion of both. Blair alone in the Cabinet represents the spirit of the people.

Something seems not right with Scott. Is he too old, or too much of a Virginian, or a hero on a small scale?

If, as they say, the President is guided by Scott's advice, such advice, to judge from facts, is not politic, not heroic, not thorough, not comprehensive, and not at all military, that is, not broad and deep, in the military sense. It will be a pity to be disappointed in this national idol.

Scott is against entering Virginia, against taking Baltimore, against punishing traitors. Strange, strange!

Diplomats altogether out of their senses; they are bewildered by the uprising, by the unanimity, by the warlike, earnest, unflinching attitude of the masses of the freemen, of my dear Yankees. The diplomats have lost the compass. They, duty bound, were diplomatically obsequious to the power held so long by the pro-slavery party. They got accustomed to the arrogant assumption and impertinence of the slavers, and, forgetting their European origin, the diplomats tacitly — but for their common sense and honor I hope reluctantly admitted the assumptions of the Southern banditti to be in America the nearest assimilation to the chivalry and nobility of old Europe. Without taking the cudgel in defence of European nobility, chivalry, and aristocracy, it is sacrilegious to compare those infamous slavers with the old or even with the modern European higher classes. In the midst of this slave-driving, slave-worshipping, and slave-breeding society of Washington, the diplomats swallowed, gulped all the Southern lies about the Constitution, state-rights, the necessity of slavery, and other like infamies. The question is, how far the diplomats in their respective official reports transferred these pro-slavery common-places to their governments. But, after all, the governments of Europe will not be thoroughly influenced by the chat of their diplomats.

Among all diplomats the English (Lord Lyons) is the most sphinx; he is taciturn, reserved, listens more than he speaks; the others are more communicative.

What an idea have those Americans of sending a secret agent to Canada, and what for? England will find it out, and must be offended. I would not have committed such an absurdity, even in my palmy days, when I conspired with Louis Napoleon, sat in the councils with Godefroi Cavaignac, or wrote instructions for Mazzini, then only a beginner with his Giovina Italia, and his miscarried Romarino attempt in Savoy.

Of what earthly use can be such politique provocatrice towards England? Or is it only to give some money to a hungry, noisy, and not over-principled office-seeker?

SOURCE: Adam Gurowski, Diary from March 4, 1861, to November 12, 1862, p. 22-36

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, April 16, 1866

Senator Doolittle came yesterday. I told him I had seen the President on Saturday and learned from him that he (D.) had been at the Mansion on Friday evening. I made known to him the feelings of the President and that he was not prepared for an open rupture, but Doolittle said that would not do. The President must act promptly. We were losing by delay. Wanted to know how Dennison stood and asked me to go with him and call on Dennison.

But the Governor was not in, and we went on to the President's, whose carriage was standing at the door. I said we must not deter the President from his ride, he took so little exercise. Patterson, his son-in-law, we met at the top of the stairs, who told us the President had company through the day, that Smythe had been there and it was, he thought, definitely settled that S. should be Collector at New York. Smythe, from what I hear of him, is better than some of the candidates, perhaps better than any. It has occurred to me that certain New York gentlemen were selecting for themselves, rather than the Administration.

Passing Montgomery Blair's with a view of calling on his father, the former came to the door and asked me in, while he sent for his father. As usual, the Judge was strong in his opinions against Seward, Stanton, and others. He predicts another revolution or rebellion as the inevitable consequence of measures now being pursued. Says there will be two governments organized here in Washington.

Maynard of Tennessee made a similar suggestion at my house two or three evenings since. He believes that the Senators and Representatives of the next Congress will appear from all the States, that those from the Rebel States will, with the Democratic Members from the loyal States, constitute a majority, that they will organize and by resolution dispense with the test oath and have things their own way. The extreme and reprehensible course of the Radicals is undoubtedly hurrying on a crisis, which will overwhelm them, if it does not embroil, perhaps subvert, the government, but the South is too exhausted and the Northern Democrats too timid, narrow-minded, and tired for such a step.

The Fenians are reported to be gathering in some force at Eastport in Maine. The Winooski, gunboat, was sent thither last week with orders to wait instructions. Seward advised that no instructions should, for the present, be sent, but on Saturday I forwarded general orders to preserve neutrality. This evening Seward called at my house and wanted instructions sent by telegraph. Told him I had already sent by mail, but would send a telegram also.

Sperry, Postmaster at New Haven, was at my house last evening, and is very full of Connecticut parties and Connecticut politics, with a professed desire to sustain the Administration, and the usual wish to make the Party in Connecticut and the Administration identical, a work which more distinguished men than he are laboring in vain to effect, not only in that State but elsewhere. What is irreconcilable cannot be made to harmonize. The organization, or those who control the organization, of the Union Party, are studiously, designedly opposed to the Administration, and it is their purpose to break it down, provided they cannot control it and compel unconstitutional action. They have no thought for the country, but are all for party. Sperry is for himself.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 483-5

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, April 17, 1866

Seward read the dispatches which he proposed to send to Mr. Motley,—the first, protesting against the sending of troops to Mexico by the Austrian Government, the second, in case they did send, after being thus notified, that he ask for his papers and withdraw from Vienna.

McCulloch favored the first paper, but objected to the last; deprecated war under any circumstances, and even at any time for so worthless a people as the Mexicans. Stanton was for both. Dennison was most emphatic for both and for maintaining the Monroe Doctrine. Was ready to fight the European Powers, if they presumed to interfere with the American states; considered the honor and welfare of the country involved in this. Speed concurred with McCulloch, Harlan with Dennison. I suggested it would have been better, and would now be better, to meet the real party if we were to do anything; that we should take the head of France rather than the tail of Austria. That I did not mean to object to the measures marked out by the Secretary of State, which I looked upon as a menace, but that to fire off an ultimatum to remote Austria, while we had done nothing of the kind as regards France, whose troops were on our Southwestern frontiers, did not strike me favorably.

Seward said he was only waiting Bigelow's dispatches to take the same course towards France, if she did not recede. Have a telegram this evening from Commander Cooper of the Winooski that the Ocean Spray had arrived at Eastport with five hundred stand of arms and asking if he should permit them to land. Within five minutes Colonel Seward came in with papers from the Secretary of State, consisting of a note from Sir Frederick Bruce, inclosing two telegrams from Eastport in regard to arms on the Spray, urging that the arms and the Fenians should not be permitted to meet. These had been sent to Stanton, who had returned them with a note [to the effect] that General Meade was on his way to Eastport, but he disliked to send an order by telegraph, for that would apprize the Fenians of his coming, and suggesting that the Navy could take some action. Seward wrote in pencil on the back of the envelope inclosing the papers, that I "could send orders to restrain action, or another to that effect."

I observe that these men are very chary about disturbing the Fenians, and I do not care to travel out of the line of duty to relieve them. I therefore sent word that I was content to leave the subject with Cooper till to-morrow, when General Meade would doubtless be at Eastport; if not, the civil authorities were there, with whom the Navy would coöperate, or whom they could assist.

Speed and Stanton expressed an opinion, in which others of the Cabinet concurred, that property once taken and used by the Rebel Government became forfeited to the original owner and was legal capture. I had so previously decided last fall on the question of twenty-two rollers and machinery captured at Charlotte and now at Norfolk.

Thad Stevens yesterday introduced a resolution directing that three copies of Forney's Chronicle should be sent to our legations and consuls abroad and be paid for out of the contingent of the House, — a monstrous proposition made in wanton recklessness and supported by sixty votes. Forney in return puffs Stevens as the "Great Commoner."

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 485-7

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: February 5, 1865

Clear and cold. Our commissioners are back again! It is said Lincoln and Seward met them at Fortress Monroe, and they proceeded no further. No basis of negotiation but reconstruction could be listened to by the Federal authorities. How could it be otherwise, when their armies are marching without resistance from one triumph to another—while the government "allows" as many emissaries as choose to pass into the enemy's country, with the most solemn assurances that the Union cause is spreading throughout the South with great rapidity—while the President is incapacitated both mentally and physically by disease, disaster, and an inflexible defiance of his opponents—and while Congress wastes its time in discussions on the adoption of a flag for future generations!

This fruitless mission, I apprehend, will be fraught with evil, unless the career of Sherman be checked; and in that event the BATTLE for RICHMOND, and Virginia, and the Confederacy, will occur within a few months—perhaps weeks. The sooner the better for us, as delay will only serve to organize the UNION PARTY sure to spring up; for many of the people are not only weary of the war, but they have no longer any faith in the President, his cabinet, Congress, the commissaries, quartermasters, enrolling officers, and most of the generals.

Judge Campbell was closeted for hours last night with Mr. Secretary Seddon at the department. I have not recently seen Mr. Hunter.

We have news from the Eastern Shore of Virginia. My wife's aunt, Miss Sally Parsons, is dead—over 90 years of age. The slaves are free, but remain with their owners—on wages. The people are prosperous, getting fine prices for abundant crops. Only a few hundred Federal troops are in the two counties; but these, under the despotic orders of Butler, levy heavy "war contributions" from the unoffending farmers.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 409-10

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: February 6, 1865

Bright and frosty. As I supposed, the peace commissioners have returned from their fruitless errand. President Lincoln and Mr. Seward, it appears, had nothing to propose, and would listen to nothing but unconditional submission. The Congress of the United States has just passed, by a two-thirds vote, an amendment to the Constitution abolishing slavery.

Now the South will soon be fired up again, perhaps with a new impulse and WAR will rage with greater fury than ever. Mr. Stephens will go into Georgia, and reanimate his people. Gen. Wise spoke at length for independence at the Capitol on Saturday night amidst applauding listeners, and Governor Smith speaks to-night.

Gen. Breckinridge is here and will take his seat to-morrow. Every effort will be made to popularize the cause again.

Hon. Mr. Foote is at Washington, in prison.

Gen. Wise's brigade has sent up resolutions consenting to gradual emancipation—but never to reunion with the North.

There is a more cheerful aspect on the countenances of the people in the streets. All hope of peace with independence is extinct and valor alone is relied upon now for our salvation. Every one thinks the Confederacy will at once gather up its military strength and strike such blows as will astonish the world. There will be desperate conflicts!

Vice-President Stephens is in his seat to-day, and seems determined.

Mr. Hunter is rolling about industriously.

Gen. Lee writes that desertions are caused by the bad management of the Commissary Department, and that there are supplies enough in the country, if the proper means were used to procure them.

Gen. Taylor sends a telegram from Meridian, Miss., stating that he had ordered Stewart's corps to Augusta, Ga., as Sherman's movement rendered a victory necessary at once. The dispatch was to the President, and seems to be in response to one from him. So we may expect a battle immediately near Augusta, Ga. Beauregard should have some 20,000 men, besides Hardee's 15,000—which ought to be enough for victory; and then good-by to Sherman!

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 410-1

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: February 7, 1865

A snow four inches in depth on the ground, and snowing. Last night Governor Smith, President Davis, Senator Oldham (Texas), Rev. Mr. Duncan, Methodist preacher, and a Yankee Baptist preacher, named Doggell, or Burroughs, I believe, addressed a large meeting in the African Church, on the subject of the Peace Mission, and the ultimatum of the United States authorities. The speakers were very patriotic and much applauded. President Davis (whose health is so feeble he should have remained away) denounced President Lincoln as "His Majesty Abraham the First"—in the language of the press—and said before the campaign was over he and Seward might find "they had been speaking to their masters," when demanding unconditional submission. He promised the people great successes, after our destined reverses had run out, provided they kept from despondency and speculation, and filled the ranks of the army. He denounced the speculators, and intimated that they might yet be called upon to "disgorge their earnings."

A grand assemblage is called for next Thursday, to meet in the Capitol Square.

Congress will soon be likely to vote a negro army, and their emancipation after the war—as Lee favors it.

There was some fighting near Petersburg yesterday and, the day before; but the press is reticent—a bad sign.

There is a rumor that Charleston has been evacuated!

Gen. Lee again writes that desertions occur to an alarming extent, for want of sufficient food. And he says there is enough subsistence in the country, but that the Commissary Department is inefficiently administered.

Gen. Breckinridge is in his office to-day.

A scramble is going on by the young politicians for the position of Assistant Secretary of War, and Mr. Kean is supposed to be ahead in the race. When a ship is thought to be sinking, even the cook may be appointed captain! Anything, now, to keep out of the field—such is the word among the mere politicians.

It is rumored that Gen. Pegram (since confirmed) was killed in the enemy's attack on our right near Petersburg, and that seven brigades were engaged and repulsed the enemy. Still, there is no official confirmation—and the silence of Gen. Lee is interpreted adversely.

Senator Haynes, of Tennessee, and Senator Wigfall, of Texas, denounced the President yesterday as mediocre and malicious— and that his blunders had caused all our disasters.

Our commissioners were not permitted to land at Fortress Monroe, but Lincoln and Seward came on board.

Judge Campbell is still acting as Assistant Secretary; but he looks very despondent. If Beauregard gains a victory —.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 411-2

Diary of Adam Gurowski, March 1861

For the first time in my life I assisted at the simplest and grandest spectacle—the inauguration of a President. Lincoln's message good, according to circumstances, but not conclusive; it is not positive; it discusses questions, but avoids to assert. May his mind not be altogether of the same kind. Events will want and demand more positiveness and action than the message contains assertions. The immense majority around me seems to be satisfied. Well, well; I wait, and prefer to judge and to admire when actions will speak.

I am sure that a great drama will be played, equal to any one known in history, and that the insurrection of the slave-drivers will not end in smoke. So I now decide to keep a diary in my own way. I scarcely know any of those men who are considered as leaders; the more interesting to observe them, to analyze their mettle, their actions. This insurrection may turn very complicated; if so, it must generate more than one revolutionary manifestation. What will be its march—what stages? Curious; perhaps it may turn out more interesting than anything since that great renovation of humanity by the great French Revolution.

The old, brave warrior, Scott, watched at the door of the Union; his shadow made the infamous rats tremble and crawl off, and so Scott transmitted to Lincoln what was and could be saved during the treachery of Buchanan.

By the most propitious accident, I assisted at the throes among which Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet was born. They were very painful, but of the highest interest for me, and I suppose for others. I participated some little therein.

A pledge bound Mr. Lincoln to make Mr. Seward his Secretary of State. The radical and the puritanic elements in the Republican party were terribly scared. His speeches, or rather demeanor and repeated utterances since the opening of the Congress, his influence on Mr. Adams, who, under Seward's inspiration, made his speech de lana caprina, and voted for compromises and concessions, all this spread and fortified the general and firm belief that Mr. Seward was ready to give up many from among the cardinal articles of the Republican creed of which he was one of the most ardent apostles. They, the Republicans, speak of him in a way to remind me of the dictum, "omnia serviliter pro dominatione," as they accuse him now of subserviency to the slave power. The radical and puritan Republicans likewise dread him on account of his close intimacy with a Thurlow Weed, a Matteson, and with similar not over-cautious-as they call them-lobbyists.

Some days previous to the inauguration, Mr. Seward brought Mr. Lincoln on the Senate floor, of course on the Republican side; but soon Mr. Seward was busily running among Democrats, begging them to be introduced to Lincoln. It was a saddening, humiliating, and revolting sight for the galleries, where I was. Criminal as is Mason, for a minute I got reconciled to him for the scowl of horror and contempt with which he shook his head at Seward. The whole humiliating proceeding foreshadowed the future policy. Only two or three Democratic Senators were moved by Seward's humble entreaties. The criminal Mason has shown true manhood.

The first attempt of sincere Republicans was to persuade Lincoln to break his connection with Seward. This failed. To neutralize what was considered quickly to become a baneful influence in Mr. Lincoln's councils, the Republicans united on Gov. Chase. This Seward opposed with all his might. Mr. Lincoln wavered, hesitated, and was bending rather towards Mr. Seward. The struggle was terrific, lasted several days, when Chase was finally and triumphantly forced into the Cabinet. It was necessary not to leave him there alone against Seward, and perhaps Bates, the old cunning Whig. Again terrible opposition by Seward, but it was overcome by the radicals in the House, in the Senate, and outside of Congress by such men as Curtis Noyes, J. S. Wadsworth, Opdyke, Barney, &c., &c., and Blair was brought in. Cameron was variously opposed, but wished to be in by Seward; Welles was from the start considered sound and safe in every respect; Smith was considered a Seward man.

From what I witnessed of Cabinet-making in Europe, above all in France under Louis Philippe, I do not forebode anything good in the coming-on shocks and eruptions, and I am sure these must come. This Cabinet as it stands is not a fusion of various shadowings of a party, but it is a violent mixing or putting together of inimical and repulsive forces, which, if they do not devour, at the best will neutralize each other.

Senator Wilson answered Douglass in the Senate, that "when the Republican party took the power, treason was in the army, in the navy, in the administration," etc. Dreadful, but true assertion. It is to be seen how the administration will act to counteract this ramified treason.

What a run, a race for offices. This spectacle likewise new to me.

The Cabinet Ministers, or, as they call them here, the Secretaries, have old party debts to pay, old sores to avenge or to heal, and all this by distributing offices, or by what they call it here—patronage. Through patronage and offices everybody is to serve his friends and his party, and to secure his political position. Some of the party leaders seem to me similar to children enjoying a long-expected and ardently wished-for toy. Some of the leaders are as generals who abandon the troops in a campaign, and take to travel in foreign parts. Most of them act as if they were sure that the battle is over. It begins only, but nobody, or at least very few of the interested, seem to admit that the country is on fire, that a terrible struggle begins. (Wrote in this sense an article for the National Intelligencer; insertion refused.) They, the leaders, look to create engines for their own political security, but no one seems to look over Mason and Dixon's line to the terrible and with-lightning-like-velocity-spreading fire of hellish treason.

The diplomats utterly upset, confused, and do not know what god to worship. All their associations were with Southerners, now traitors. In Southern talk, or in that of treacherous Northern Democrats, the diplomats learned what they know about this country. Not one of them is familiar, is acquainted with the genuine people of the North; with its true, noble, grand, and pure character. It is for them a terra incognita, as is the moon. The little they know of the North is the few money or cotton bags of New York, Boston, Philadelphia,—these would-be betters, these dinner-givers, and whist-players. The diplomats consider Seward as the essence of Northern feeling.

How little the thus-called statesmen know Europe. Sumner, Seward, etc. already have under consideration if Europe will recognize the secesh. Europe recognizes faits accomplis, and a great deal of blood will run before secesh becomes un fait accompli. These Sewards, Sumners, etc. pay too much attention to the silly talk of the European diplomats in Washington; and by doing this these would-be statesmen prove how ignorant they are of history in general, and specially ignorant of the policy of European cabinets. Before a struggle decides a question a recognition is bosh, and I laugh at it.

The race, the race increases with a fearful rapidity. No flood does it so quick. Poor Senators! Some of them must spend nights and days to decide on whom to bestow this or that office. Secretaries or Ministers wrangle, fight (that is the word used), as if life and death depended upon it.

Poor (Carlylian-meaning) good-natured Senator Sumner, in his earnest, honest wish to be just and of service to everybody, looks as a hare tracked by hounds; so are at him office-seekers from the whole country. This hunting degrades the hounds, and enervates the patrons.

I am told that the President is wholly absorbed in adjusting, harmonizing the amount of various salaries bestowed on various States through its officeholders and office-seekers.

It were better if the President would devote his time to calculate the forces and resources needed to quench the fire. Over in Montgomery the slave-drivers proceed with the terrible, unrelenting, fearless earnestness of the most unflinching criminals.

After all, these crowds of office-hunters are far from representing the best element of the genuine, laborious, intelligent people,—of its true healthy stamina. This is consoling for me, who know the American people in the background of office-hunters.

Of course an alleviating circumstance is, that the method, the system, the routine, oblige, nay force, everybody to ask, to hunt. As in the Scriptures, "Ask, and you will get; or knock, and it will be opened." Of course, many worthy, honorable, deserving men, who would be ornaments to the office, must run the gauntlet together with the hounds.

It is reported, and I am sure of the truth of the report, that Governor Chase is for recognizing, or giving up the revolted Cotton States, so as to save by it the Border States, and eventually to fight for their remaining in the Union. What logic! If the treasonable revolt is conceded to the Cotton States, on what ground can it be denied to the thus called Border States? I am sorry that Chase has such notions.

It is positively asserted by those who ought to know, that Seward, having secured to himself the Secretaryship of State, offered to the Southern leaders in Congress compromise and concessions, to assure, by such step, his confirmation by the Democratic vote. The chiefs refused the bargain, distrusting him. All this was going on for weeks, nay months, previous to the inauguration, so it is asserted. But Seward might have been anxious to preserve the Union at any price. His enemies assert that if Seward's plan had succeeded, virtually the Democrats would have had the power. Thus the meaning of Lincoln's election would have been destroyed, and Buchanan's administration would have been continued in its most dirty features, the name only being changed.

Old Scott seems to be worried out by his laurels; he swallows incense, and I do not see that anything whatever is done to meet the military emergency. I see the cloud.

Were it true that Seward and Scott go hand in hand, and that both, and even Chase, are blunted axes!

I hear that Mr. Blair is the only one who swears, demands, asks for action, for getting at them without losing time. Brave fellow ! I am glad to have at Willard's many times piloted deputations to the doors of Lincoln on behalf of Blair's admission into the Cabinet. I do not know him, but will try to become nearer acquainted.

But for the New York radical Republicans, already named, neither Chase nor Blair would have entered the Cabinet. But for them Seward would have had it totally his own way. Members of Congress acted less than did the New Yorkers.

The South, or the rebels, slave-drivers, slave-breeders, constitute the most corrosive social decompositions and impurities; what the human race throughout countless ages successively toiled to purify itself from and throw off. Europe continually makes terrible and painful efforts, which at times are marked by bloody destruction. This I asserted in my various writings. This social, putrefied evil, and the accumulated matter in the South, pestilentially and in various ways influenced the North, poisoning its normal healthy condition. This abscess, undermining the national life, has burst now. Somebody, something must die, but this apparent death will generate a fresh and better life.

The month of March closes, but the administration seems to enjoy the most beatific security. I do not see one single sign of foresight, this cardinal criterion of statesmanship. Chase measures the empty abyss of the treasury. Senator Wilson spoke of treason everywhere, but the administration seems not to go to work and to reconstruct, to fill up what treason has disorganized and emptied. Nothing about reorganizing the army, the navy, refitting the arsenals. No foresight, no foresight! either statesmanlike or administrative. Curious to see these men at work. The whole efforts visible to me and to others, and the only signs given by the administration in concert, are the paltry preparations to send provisions to Fort Sumpter. What is the matter? what are they about?

SOURCE: Adam Gurowski, Diary from March 4, 1861, to November 12, 1862, p. 13-21

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, April 3, 1866

The proclamation announcing peace in all the Rebel States but Texas appeared in the National Republican this morning. I was at first a little startled by it, apprehending it would cause some difficulty with our volunteer officers, who, by law, ceased to act on the return of peace. This provision towards that class of officers was one of those headless moves of J. P. Hale, made in the spirit of a demagogue under professed apprehension that Mr. Lincoln, or whoever might be President, would use the Navy to make himself dictator. The proclamation does not include Texas; therefore the Rebellion is not declared wholly suppressed. When I spoke of the subject to-day in Cabinet, I found that none of the members had been apprised of the fact, except Seward, and he not until five o'clock the preceding evening, when he was compelled to send to Hunter, Chief Clerk, at Georgetown. A sudden determination seems to have influenced the President. He did not state his reasons, but it is obvious that the Radicals are taken by surprise and view it as checkmating some of their legislation.

The returns from Connecticut leave no doubt of the election of Hawley, though by a very small majority, some six or eight hundred. This is well,—better than a larger majority, and serves as a warning to the extremists. There is no denying that the policy of the President would have been sustained by a large majority of the people of Connecticut, were that the distinct issue. But this was avoided, yet Forney, in his Chronicle, asserts that the President is defeated, and his veto has been vetoed by the State. An idle falsehood. Mere partisanship will not control, and there has been much of it in this election. Each of the parties shirked the real, living issues, though the Democrats professed to respect them because the Republicans were divided upon the issues, and to press them destroyed or impaired that organization.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 473-4

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, April 10, 1866

Though not well to-day nor for several days past, I went to Department and to Cabinet meeting. Quite a discussion on the Mexican question. Seward proposes to give Austria notice that she must not assist the Imperialists in Mexico. Some of us asked why notice to that effect had not already been served upon the French. He said the French had been notified, but there had not been sufficient time to receive an answer. I had little faith in French promises, as I have often said when this subject has been up. Dennison to-day expressed similar opinion and has always been ardent on this matter of French occupancy in Mexico. Seward showed some irritability, as I have seen him on one or two occasions when this subject has been discussed.

The President inquired privately in regard to the Chattanooga,—when she would probably be ready, what Mr. Seward thought of it, etc. I told him all was right, that the vessel would probably sail soon after the 1st prox.

The Civil Rights Bill passed the House yesterday by a vote of nearly three to one. The party drill was very effective. Only Raymond of the Radicals voted to sustain the veto. He has been general manager in the House, but could not carry a single member with him if he tried, nor could Seward help him, or he did not. All of Stanton's pets were active in opposing the veto. Bingham, who had been vehement in denouncing the bill as a bundle of unconstitutional outrages, had besought a veto, urged objections, was quieted, paired off; did not vote; listened to Stanton and could not shake off the fetters of party. Not a word escaped the President to-day on the subject, but it was evident he felt deeply. I, for one, would not introduce the topic, for I could not, unasked, state my opinions, which would be in opposition, and almost discourteous, to some of my associates. Oh, Bingham! Bingham!

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 479-80

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, March 17, 1866

This being St. Patrick's Day, considerable apprehensions were entertained by the Englishmen here that there would be more active demonstration by the Fenians. Sir Frederick Bruce did not hesitate to say to me on Thursday evening at the Marquis Montholon's party when I met him, that he had great anxiety and should feel relieved after Saturday. But the day has passed off peaceably. We have had no telegraphs of riot or disorder on the frontier or in Canada. There is less disturbance in our own country than is usual on this anniversary.

By special invitation from Secretary Seward himself, I went this evening to meet a Belgian delegation at his house. Mrs. Welles and Edgar went with me. McCulloch, Dennison, and Speed were similarly invited, as were others. I found we were after-dinner guests, appendages to the special party, called in to set off the Secretary's party. The evening was cold, fires low or out, and though the persons assembled put on the best face, it was an uncomfortable affair, and I for one in no very good humor, believing I had been uselessly put to inconvenience without cause.

Am having sharp questions and importunities in regard to the Connecticut election, and do not choose to answer them or to be mixed up in the contest, which has been badly shaped. The fault is as much here in Washington as elsewhere. Foreseeing the issues which the Radicals in Congress were forming, I suggested near the commencement of the session to the President, that unless the lines were sharply drawn, they would have him at disadvantage. We now see it in the result in New Hampshire, and similar consequences may be expected in Connecticut. General Hawley's sympathies and feelings are with the Radicals in the differences between the President and Congress, or rather with Congress than the President. English, on the other hand, is wholly with the President, and totally, earnestly opposed to the Congressional policy. The election of English would secure a friend to the President, but English and those who support him opposed his (the President's) election and most of them opposed the War. Hawley, while not in full accord with the President on present questions, and I am afraid not on the rights of the States, supported his election, and was an earnest soldier from the beginning of the War until the whole Rebel force surrendered and dispersed. While I think well of both candidates, I have a particular personal regard for Hawley now, as well as intimate party relations in the past.

The President and very many of his friends would be pleased to have English succeed. But they do not comprehend the whole circumstances, personal and political, for they cannot know them. It is not a personal question. The organization is a revival of ante-War differences. It commenced and has gone on under the old party banners. A stand for the Administration should have been made last autumn, but the nominations from Governor down have been made by parties as organized years ago. It is too late to change front, or get up a new arrangement. Such an issue should have commenced last December, and the President himself should have led in the fight by announcing the policy of his Administration and rallying his friends to its support. He would have had the State, the country, and Congress with him, but he hesitated, was reluctant to encounter those who elected him, and then postponed too long for us to begin in Connecticut, for this election takes place in three weeks.

As things are, I cannot take an active part in this contest. Were Hawley more emphatic and unequivocally with the President, I should enter earnestly, heartily, into the struggle, although I did not advise his nomination, or wish it to be made. I think, when elected, he will give the Administration fair support, but he is an ardent partisan. A doubt on the subject of his course paralyzes my zeal and efforts. I am unwilling to believe that Hawley dissembles.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 454-6

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, March 26, 1866

Senator Doolittle called at my house last evening on the subject of the Civil Rights Bill, which it is now well understood, outside, will meet an Executive veto. Doolittle has an elaborate bill of his own which he proposes to submit. Something, he thinks, must be done. His bill is, perhaps, somewhat less offensive than the one which has been passed by both houses, but the whole thing is wrong and his plan has the same objectionable machinery as the other. I frankly told him that the kind of legislation proposed, and which Congress was greedy to enact, was not in my view correct, was sapping the foundation of the government and must be calamitous in its results. We went together to Senator Morgan's and talked over the subject an hour or more with him.

The President convened the Cabinet this A.M. at ten and read his message returning the Civil Rights Bill with his veto. Before reading it he desired the members to express their opinions. Seward said he had carefully studied the bill and thought it might be well to pass a law declaring negroes were citizens, because there had been some questions raised on that point, though there never was a doubt in his own mind. The rest of the bill he considered unconstitutional in many respects, and having the mischievous machinery of the Fugitive Slave Law did not help commend it.

McCulloch waived remark; had not closely scrutinized the bill, and would defer comment to Stanton, merely remarking that he should be gratified if the President could see his way clear to sign the bill.

Stanton made a long argument, showing that he had devoted much time to the bill. His principal point was to overcome the obnoxious features of the second section, which he thought should be construed favorably. He did not think judges and marshals, or sheriffs and local officers should be fined and imprisoned; did not think it was intended to apply to officers, but merely to persons. The bill was not such a one as he would have drawn or recommended, but he advised that under the circumstances it should be approved.

The President having previously been put in possession of my views, I briefly remarked that my objections were against the whole design, purpose, and scope of the bill, that it was mischievous and subversive.

Mr. Dennison thought that, though there might be some objection to parts, he, on the whole, would advise that the bill should receive Executive approval.

Mr. Harlan had not closely read the bill, but had met difficulties in the second section, and in one or two others which had been measurably removed by Stanton's argument. He thought it very desirable that the President and Congress should act in concert if possible.

Speed was ill and not present.

The Senate to-day deprived Stockton of New Jersey of his seat. It was a high-handed, partisan proceeding, in which Sumner, Fessenden, Morrill, and others exhibited a spirit and feeling wholly unworthy of their official position. While I have no special regard for Stockton and his party in New Jersey, I am compelled to believe they have in this instance certainly been improperly treated and for a factious purpose, and I apprehend that I can never think so well of some of the gentlemen who have been conspicuous in this proceeding. Had Stockton acted with Sumner and Fessenden against the veto, he never would have been ousted from his seat. Of this I have no doubt whatever, and I am ashamed to confess it, or say it. I am passing no judgment on his election, for I know not the exact facts, but the indecent, unfair, arbitrary conduct of the few master spirits is most reprehensible.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 463-5

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, March 30, 1866

Mr. Seward brought up in the Cabinet to-day the subject of the purchase of the Danish islands in the West Indies, particularly St. Thomas. For a year or so the question has been under consideration. The Danes wish to sell and first edged in the matter gently. The Secretary of State did not give the matter earnest attention, but the Navy Department in our war, feeling the want of a station in the West Indies, has favored the subject. My Report of 1865 roused the Secretary of State, and he began when the War was over to press the purchase, first talking round about the French islands. Finally he visited St. Thomas in a public ship. I do not think there has been over-much shrewdness in the transaction on our part as yet. It would have been better for Seward to have remained away from the islands, but should we acquire it his visit will undoubtedly become historical, and it will not afflict him, perhaps, if the country pays largely for the record of his name and visit.

He proposes to offer ten millions for all the Danish islands. I think it a large sum. At least double what I would have offered when the islands were wanted, and three times as much as I am willing the Government should give now. In fact I doubt if Congress would purchase for three millions, and I must see Seward and tell him my opinion.

I again brought the subject of Semmes's trial before the Cabinet. The question should be disposed of, for we are detaining our officers and others as witnesses. Speed has recommended that the trial should go forward under the mixed commission, and to-day recommended it anew. Said it would be an interesting trial. Stanton said he did not advise it for mere curiosity, but if the proceedings were to take place he would wish thorough work should be made and the extreme penalty of the law inflicted. Governor Dennison was very prompt and decided in the expression of his wish that Semmes should be tried and punished.

I repeated what I have frequently stated, that the Navy Department would have nothing to do with trying him for treason, piracy, or any offense which could be reached by the civil courts, but he was charged with, and I suppose was guilty of, violating the usages and laws of war. The truth was, however, on investigating the subject, the points had been narrowed down and mitigated, so that I believed his offense was really less aggravated than had been charged and believed.

The President was evidently not prepared to decide what course to take. I submitted Semmes's application for a parole, which was favorably indorsed by Judge-Advocate General Bolles. As the session of the Cabinet was somewhat protracted and Stanton was wishing a special interview, I proposed to the President to call to-morrow, which seemed to relieve and gratify him.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 466-7

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, March 31, 1866

I had an interview with the President concerning Semmes, as understood yesterday. Showed him the papers, and, after some conversation, he proposed to see Judge-Advocate-General Bolles, Solicitor of the Navy Department; said he would on the whole prefer him to the Attorney-General in this matter, and named Monday next.

By the President's request I went into the library and was introduced to Doctor Norris, with whom the President desired me to have some conversation. Doctor N. said he believed that the President and I had had some consultation in relation to a sea voyage for Robert, the President's son. He supposed I knew the circumstances. I told him I was aware of the young man's infirmity, that he had once spoken to me himself on the subject in a manner to touch my sympathy in his behalf. That I had also conversed with his father, as he seemed to be aware, and as he (the father) had doubtless advised him. He said that was so, and proceeded to tell me that R. had been beguiled into intemperance after he became of age, through his generous qualities, goodness of heart, and friendly disposition. He, therefore, thought it possible to reclaim him.

I had very little expectation of such a result, but it is important, for his father's sake and for the country's, that the President should in these days be relieved of the care and anxiety which his excesses and passions involve. To send him abroad in a public ship is the best disposition that can be made of him, and a voyage to the East Indies would be better than any other, and such a voyage was now in preparation. Doctor Norris thought this desirable.

I subsequently saw the President and told him what had taken place and that I could make the arrangement with little trouble to him. It seemed to give him consolation.

Letters from Connecticut do not speak with confidence of the result of the election next Monday. But my impressions are that the Union Party with Hawley will be successful. The battle will not be on the strict political issues before the country. On these issues, if well defined and the candidates were squarely presented, I have no doubt that the Administration would be triumphantly sustained. It would be union against disunion, the President versus Congress under the lead of Stevens. But politics and parties have become strangely mixed. Hawley, I am apprehensive, leans to the Congressional policy at present, but I trust observation and reflection will bring him right.

The true Union men who sustain the President feel that the defeat of Hawley would be a triumph to Toucey, Seymour, Eaton, and others who opposed the Government in war and whom they, for that reason, detest, and they will band together to support Hawley from matters of the past rather than issues of the present. Moreover Hawley has popular qualities. For ten years he has fought the Union battles in our political contests and in the field, and though he may be touched with Radicalism, he has good reasoning faculties and a sense of right within him on which I rely. The people have correct instincts in these matters, and I therefore feel pretty sure he will succeed. The worst is, should that be the case, the curse of party will claim that it is a triumph over the Administration. No harm will come of it, perhaps, but it is annoying and vexatious to have results to which men have contributed turned against themselves. But it cannot be helped. The distinction cannot now be drawn. Parties are in a transition state.

Sumner tells me this P.M. that his committee will go against the use of naval vessels for the French Exhibition. This will be counter to Banks, who laid himself out largely in this matter, and Sumner will not be grieved to have Banks disappointed. There is obviously no special love between these two gentlemen. They are opposites in many respects. Banks has thought to gain popularity in this move, which was concocted by himself and Seward, to use naval vessels and naval appropriations for a purpose not naval. To make their scheme appear less expensive, I am told that General Butler has succeeded in inducing the Secretary of the Treasury to interfere in the matter of the Grey Jacket, condemned as prize. If so, I regret it. McCulloch has been imposed upon. Butler is reckless, avaricious, unscrupulous. He knows there is neither law nor justice in his course on this question, but he has the promise of large fees. For three months he has been annoying me on this subject. He then went to the Attorney General and for a time made some headway. Failing there, he has now imposed upon McCulloch, who has been deceived by Butler's cunning and browbeaten by his audacity.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 467-70 

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: January 17, 1865

Cloudy, and spitting snow.

Mr. Foote's release from custody has been ordered by Congress. The news of the fall of Wilmington, and the cessation of importations at that port, falls upon the ears of the community with stunning effect.

Again we have a rumor of the retirement of Mr. Seddon.

There are more rumors of revolution, and even of displacement of the President by Congress, and investiture of Gen. Lee. It is said the President has done something, recently, which Congress will not tolerate. Idle talk!

Mr. Foote, when arrested, was accompanied by his wife, who had a passport to Tennessee. He said to the Provost Marshal, Doggett, Fredericksburg, that he intended to accompany his family, passing through Washington, and to endeavor to negotiate a peace. He deposited a resignation of his seat in Congress with a friend, which he withdrew upon being arrested. He was arrested and detained "until further orders," by command of the Secretary of War.

Lieut.-Gen. Hood has been relieved, and ordered to report here. The rumor gains belief that Gen. Breckinridge has been offered the portfolio of the War Department by the President. This may be the act alluded to which Congress will not agree to, perhaps, on the ground that Gen. B. remained in the United States Senate long after secession. The general is understood to be staying at G. A. Myers's house, which adds strength to the rumor, for Myers has a keen scent for the sources of power and patronage.

The Surgeon-General states that, during the years 1862 and 1863, there were 1,600,000 cases of disease in hospitals and in the field, with only 74,000 deaths. There have been 23,000 discharges from the armies since the war began.

The Provost Marshal at Fredericksburg telegraphs that his scouts report the enemy have arrested Mrs. Foote, and threaten to rescue Mr. Foote. The Secretary and the President concur in ordering his discharge. The President says that will not be permission for him to pass our lines. He will come here, I suppose.

Mentioning to R. Tyler the fact that many of the clerks, etc. of the War Department favored revolution and the overthrow of the President, he replied that it was a known fact, and that some of them would be hung soon. He feared Mr. Hunter was a submissionist.

The Northern papers say Mr. G. B. Lamar has applied to take the oath of allegiance, to save his and other property.

The Examiner to-day has another article calling for a convention to abolish the Constitution and remove President Davis.

Mr. Seward, United States Secretary of State, escorted Mrs. Foote to her hotel, upon her arrival in Washington.

The following official telegram was received at the War Department last night:

HEADQUARTERS, January 15th, 1865.

HON. J. A. SEDDON.

Gen. Early reports that Gen. Rosser, at the head of three hundred men, surprised and captured the garrison at Beverly, Randolph County, on the 11th instant, killing and wounding a considerable number and taking five hundred and eighty prisoners. His loss slight.

 

R. E. LEE.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 389-90

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, March 6, 1866

The Secretary of the Treasury is embarrassed by the test oath. He finds it difficult to procure good officers for collectors and assessors in the Rebel States and still more difficult to get good subordinates. When he attempts to reason with Members of Congress, they insist that their object is to exclude the very men required and say they want Northern men sent into those States to collect taxes. As if such a proceeding would not excite enmities and the foreign tax-gatherer be slain!

I advised McCulloch to address a strong and emphatic letter to the President, stating the difficulties, which letter the President could communicate to Congress. A direct issue would then be made, and the country could see and appreciate the difficulties of the Administration. Dennison took the same view, and stated some of his difficulties, and I suggested that he should also present them to the President. Seward was not prepared to act. Harlan was apprehensive that a confession of the fact that it was not possible to procure men of integrity who could take the test oath, would operate injudiciously just at this time. There is, he thinks, a growing feeling for conciliation in Congress, and such a confession would check this feeling. The suggestion was adroitly if not ingenuously put. Stanton half-responded to Harlan; doubted the expediency of a letter from McCulloch; said it was unnecessary; that he paid officers who could not take the oath; thought the Secretary of the Treasury might also; but concluded by saying he had not examined the question. Finally the subject was postponed to Friday. Stanton said it had presented itself to him in a new form during the discussion, and he required a little time for examination and reflection before submitting his views.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 445

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, March 9, 1866

Senator Grimes, after an interview this A.M. on naval matters, got on to the subject of our public affairs generally, and particularly the differences between the President and the party in Congress. He disclaims Stevens and Sumner, and spoke of each in severe and denunciatory terms, the former as a pretty unscrupulous old fellow, unfit to lead any party, Sumner as a cold-blooded, selfish, dangerous man. When I spoke of him as honest but theoretical and yet, I believe, truthful, Grimes was disinclined to award him these traits, and I perceive has a strong prejudice—perhaps I should better define it by saying hate of the Massachusetts Senator, who, though a student learned in books, Grimes asserts is not a statesman or wise legislator.

With very respectable talents, Grimes is of a suspicious and somewhat jealous nature, inclining to be misanthropic. He must be classed as of the Radical school, but recognizes no Radical leader, has no respect for them; abhors Stevens as a debauchee in morals and politics. He is intimate with Fessenden, who is dyspeptic and has similar traits, and the two hunt in couples. They were both former admirers of Seward, but now and for some time past they dislike him, think his influence on Johnson pernicious.

When I saw during the fall that the extremists were gathering up their strength against the President, it was a question with me how these two Senators would go. Their natural tendency would, I knew, incline them to the opposition. They are both intense on the negro. But neither of them liked Sumner or Stevens, who were in the extreme advance. The President was originally of a different school of politics, and there is not, therefore, that intimacy between them which begets zeal, but during the War they have been bound by a common interest. They had no personal opposition to the President and, I think, no feeling against him except that which minds like theirs would have against the elevation above them of an old associate Senator whom they had regarded as an equal rather than a superior. Though differing with him in fundamental principles of our government, they respected his honesty.

Grimes says he came here at the commencement of the present session kindly disposed to the President and not very hostile to his policy. But he soon found that certain obnoxious Democrats had free access to the White House, and that pardoned Rebels hung around there. He was not satisfied with this state of things, and spoke of it, and was asked why he and others remained away. Soon after he was invited to breakfast with the President, and spent two hours with him discussing all subjects in full and most satisfactorily. Allusion was made to Fessenden, and he expressed a wish that the two should come together and interchange opinions. The President requested him to speak to Fessenden and invite an interview. As the next day was Sunday, Grimes inquired if it would be agreeable for the President to see him on the Sabbath. The President assented, and F. spent several hours most satisfactorily at the White House and went over general measures now prominent.

On the following day appeared the celebrated letter of "a conversation of the President with a distinguished Senator." Grimes says on reading it he asked Fessenden if that was his conversation. F. after reading the letter said he had had no such conversation, and they soon ascertained that Dixon was the Senator. The two, finding that they were not the only confidants of the President, thereupon left him, and allied themselves to the Radicals. They had ascertained that the President conversed freely with others, was not likely to commit himself to their keeping exclusively, and therefore should have their opposition or at all events could not rely on their support.

I inquired of Grimes what there was offensive in the letter, or the President's policy, or wherein he was inconsistent; said that doubtless many, who, like him and Fessenden, had peculiar views of their own, had called on the President and he had frankly conversed with each of them, notwithstanding their different shades of opinion, and each, perhaps, had construed the friendly courtesy and kindly greeting as favoring his tenet, while the aim had been to commit himself to none, but to be friendly and conciliatory with all.

I asked Grimes where all this was to end; what we were to expect when Members of Congress made it a point to disagree, organized a joint committee of the two houses to get round constitutional difficulty, which committee was to establish a policy for Congress and the country, arrogated to itself and stimulated Congress to arrogate or usurp executive powers, were passing declaratory resolutions which had no force, but were designed to irritate and be offensive, with other extraordinary proceedings. I told him the country had a present and a future before it, and its fate was to some extent in the hands of men in responsible positions and for which they were accountable. The country, I said, appeared to me to be in peril; that we must either reunite or diverge still farther soon. We cannot remain inactive, must either advance or recede.

I could perceive he was disturbed, but soon remarked that the Southern people were a damned set of traitors, as bad now as at any time during the Rebellion, and he had no confidence in them.

I admitted they were bad, malignant, foolish to a great extent, but asked when they would be better, and if no better, were we to be forever a disunited country. Their indebtedness in various forms under their sham organization could not be less than twenty-five hundred millions; the property in slaves which was extinguished by emancipation could not be less than twenty-five hundred millions more; other individual losses were immense. To all this they were compelled to submit, and besides this they were to pay their proportion of our debt incurred in whipping them. Now was it strange that they were sore and complaining, and were we doing right in excluding them from all participation in the government, to which they were entitled under the Constitution? We must adopt conciliatory measures or national calamities would soon be upon us, and we ought not to shut our eyes to the facts.

He admitted something must be done, but said that he had confidence that all would come right. He guessed we were nearer now than some apprehended. This he said with a smile and manner that impressed me as coming from one who thinks he and his associates have the reins in their hands and intend to guide the government car safely. But the subject should not be trifled with.

McCulloch inquired of Stanton if he had reached a solution of the difficulty in regard to the oath. Stanton replied that he had given it considerable thought and come to the conclusion that it would be best for McCulloch to prepare a letter setting forth the difficulties of the case. This letter, I remarked, had better be addressed to the President. Stanton did not respond favorably to this suggestion. He thought it would do as well to send it to one of the committee. This was also Harlan's view. Dennison took very decided ground with me.

The rumors that the Fenians had seized Navy Island and that ten thousand volunteers had been called out by the Canadian authorities were current this morning. Seward was unwell and not at the Cabinet-meeting. The British and Canadian Governments were each much excited. The last arrival brings information that the habeas corpus is suspended in Ireland and the propriety of some governmental action here was discussed.

Stanton thought a proclamation should be issued and decisive measures taken, as was done by Van Buren in his day. Regretted Seward was not present, for we knew not what appeals had been made by the British Government. The propriety of taking some action was generally concurred in, and Stanton rather pressed it. I proposed that General Grant should be consulted, sent to the frontiers, and perhaps it would be well to address a communication on the subject which would form the basis of government action. Stanton could see no necessity for bringing Grant out; a proclamation from the President to put down these Fenian organizations was what was required. I assented, but stated that the occasion and condition of the country and of our public affairs were such that I thought it would be wise to have the public authorities fully heard, and all of them. The Irish element, I stated, was a strong one and clannish, and if a movement against an organization of theirs was to be made, I wished to see others besides the President moving, and especially did I desire, under existing circumstances, when the militia might be called to act, that General Grant should be consulted. Harlan thought a circular from the Attorney-General exhorting vigilance on the part of attorneys and marshals would be sufficient; the circular could be got into print. While I did not object to that process, I expressed my conviction that it would be wise to have General Grant identified with the Administration in these movements. Dennison and McCulloch concurred with me.

After the others left, the President expressed his satisfaction with the direction I had indicated and the bearing it seemed to have on others.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 447-51