But little of
importance at the Cabinet. I had some conversation with the President after
adjournment, and in the evening McCulloch and myself called upon him by
appointment. Our conversation was frank, extending more than an hour. We all
concurred that it was not possible to go on much longer with a view of
preserving the integrity of the Republican Party, for the Radicals are using
the organization to injure the President. There is direct antagonism between
the leaders who control Congress and the Administration. The Democrats in
Congress are more in harmony with the Administration than are the Radicals;—
then why repel the Democrats and favor the Radicals?
We McCulloch and
myself spoke of the want of cordial and free intercourse among the members of
the Cabinet, that important questions touching differences in the Republican
Party were never discussed at our meetings, that it was obvious we did not
concur in opinion, and, therefore, the really important topics were avoided.
The President admitted and lamented this, as he has done to me repeatedly. He
expressed his surprise that Harlan and Speed should, with these understood
views, desire to remain. I asked if there were not others among us as
objectionable and more harmful. McCulloch said he could not believe Seward was
faithless, that he fully agreed with him whenever they had conversed. I
admitted the same as regarded Seward and myself, still there were some things I
could not reconcile. He is not treacherous to the President, but is under the
influence of Stanton and acts with him. His intimates, as well as Stanton's, in
Congress, voted steadily with the Radicals; his speech at Auburn was a whistle
for the Republicans to keep united and repelled Democrats. The President was
reluctant to give up Seward, whose equivocal course is characteristic, but
evidently had some doubts as to his sincerity and ulterior purpose. He
suggested that Seward should be called in to a conference and come to an
explicit understanding. This we all concurred in, though I remarked we should
have fair words and no decisive action. But it was left to the President to
invite a meeting.
SOURCE: Gideon
Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and
Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 524-5
No comments:
Post a Comment