The weather is pleasant here today . . .

 . . . and the town is full of lively rumors of battles and successes. It is reported that Secretary Stanton is steadily improving. The president’s boy, Willie Lincoln, is very sick of fever, and was so sick yesterday that his father could not be seen. Mr. Lincoln is one of the most warm-hearted men in the country, and the dangerous illness of any member of his family at once unfits him for the ordinary duties of life. His anxiety does him honor, for no one would like to see the president so much of an executive that he would suppress the feelings of the father.

VAN.

SOURCE: Springfield Weekly Republican, Springfield, Illinois, Saturday February 15. 1862, p. 4, col. 5

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: April 14, 1865

Bright and cool.

Gen. Weitzel and his corps having been ordered away, Major Gen. Ord has succeeded to the command at Richmond, and his corps has been marching to Camp Lee ever since dawn. I saw no negro troops among them, but presume there are some.

Gen. Weitzel's rule became more and more despotic daily; but it is said the order dictating prayers to be offered by the Episcopal clergy came from Mr. Stanton, at Washington, Secretary of War. One of the clergy, being at my house yesterday, said that unless this order were modified there would be no services on Sunday. To-day, Good Friday, the churches are closed.

The following circular was published a few days ago:

TO THE PEOPLE OF VIRGINIA.

 

The undersigned, members of the Legislature of the State of Virginia, in connection with a number of the citizens of the State, whose names are attached to this paper, in view of the evacuation of the City of Richmond by the Confederate Government, and its occupation by the military authorities of the United States, the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, and the suspension of the jurisdiction of the civil power of the State, are of opinion that an immediate meeting of the General Assembly of the State is called for by the exigencies of the situation.

 

The consent of the military authorities of the United States to the session of the Legislature in Richmond, in connection with the Governor and Lietenant-Governor, to their free deliberation upon public affairs, and to the ingress and departure of all its members under safe conducts, has been obtained.

 

The United States authorities will afford transportation from any point under their control to any of the persons before mentioned.

 

The matters to be submitted to the Legislature are the restoration of peace to the State of Virginia, and the adjustment of questions involving life, liberty, and property, that have arisen in the State as a consequence of the war.

 

We therefore earnestly request the Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, and members of the Legislature to repair to this city by the 25th April (instant).

 

We understand that full protection to persons and property will be afforded in the State, and we recommend to peaceful citizens to remain at their homes and pursue their usual avocations, with confidence that they will not be interrupted.

 

We earnestly solicit the attendance in Richmond, on or before the 25th of April (instant), of the following persons, citizens of Virginia, to confer with us as to the best means of restoring peace to the State of Virginia. We have procured safe conduct from the military authorities of the United States for them to enter the city and depart without molestation: Hon. R. M. T. Hunter, A. T. Caperton, Wm. C. Rives, John Letcher, A. H. H. Stuart, R. L. Montague, Fayette McMullen, J. P. Holcombe, Alexander Rives, B. Johnson Barbour, James Barbour, Wm. L. Goggin, J. B. Baldwin, Thomas S. Gholson, Waller Staples, S. D. Miller, Thomas J. Randolph, Wm T. Early, R. A. Claybrook, John Critcher, Wm. Towns, T. H. Eppes, and those other persons for whom passports have been procured and especially forwarded that we consider it to be unnecessary to mention.

 

A. J. Marshall, Senator, Fauquier; James Neeson, Senator, Marion; James Venable, Senator elect, Petersburg; David I. Burr, of House of Delegates, Richmond City; David J. Saunders, of House of Delegates, Richmond City; L. S. Hall, of House of Delegates, Wetzel County; J. J. English, of House of Delegates, Henrico County; Wm. Ambers, of House of Delegates, Chesterfield County; A. M. Keily, of House of Delegates, Petersburg; H. W. Thomas, Second Auditor of Virginia; St. L. L. Moncure, Chief Clerk Second Auditor's office; Joseph Mayo, Mayor of City of Richmond; Robert Howard, Clerk of Hustings Court, Richmond City; Thomas U. Dudley, Sergeant Richmond City; Littleton Tazewell, Commonwealth's Attorney, Richmond City; Wm. T. Joynes, Judge of Circuit Court, Petersburg; John A. Meredith, Judge of Circuit Court, Richmond; Wm. H. Lyons, Judge of Hustings Court, Richmond; Wm. C. Wickham, Member of Congress, Richmond District; Benj. S. Ewell, President of William and Mary College; Nat. Tyler, Editor Richmond Enquirer; R. F. Walker, Publisher of Examiner; J. R. Anderson, Richmond; R. R. Howison, Richmond; W. Goddin, Richmond; P. G. Bayley, Richmond; F. J. Smith, Richmond; Franklin Stearns, Henrico; John Lyons, Petersburg; Thomas B. Fisher, Fauquier; Wm. M. Harrison, Charles City; Cyrus Hall, Ritchie; Thomas W. Garnett, King and Queen; James A. Scott, Richmond.

 

I concur in the preceding recommendation.

J. A. CAMPBELL.

Approved for publication in the Whig, and in handbill form.

 

G. WEITZEL, Major-Gen. Commanding.

RICHMOND, VA., April 11th, 1865.

To-day the following order is published:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA,       

RICHMOND, VA., April 13th, 1865.

 

Owing to recent events, the permission for the reassembling of the gentlemen recently acting as the Legislature of Virginia is rescinded. Should any of the gentlemen come to the city under the notice of reassembling, already published, they will be furnished passports to return to their homes.

 

Any of the persons named in the call signed by J. A. Campbell and others, who are found in the city twelve hours after the publication of this notice, will be subject to arrest, unless they are residents of the city.

 

E. O. C. ORD, Major-Gen. Commanding.

Judge Campbell informs me that he saw Gen. Ord yesterday, who promised to grant me permission to take my family to the Eastern Shore of Virginia, and suggesting some omissions and alterations in the application, which I made. Judge C. is to see him again to-day, when I hope the matter will be accomplished.

Judge Campbell left my application with Gen. Ord's youngest adjutant, to whom he said the general had approved it. But the adjutant said it would have to be presented again, as there was no indorsement on it. The judge advised me to follow it up, which I did; and stayed until the adjutant did present it again to Gen. Ord, who again approved it. Then the polite aid accompanied me to Gen. Patrick's office and introduced me to him, and to Lieut.-Col. John Coughlin, "Provost Marshal General Department of Virginia," who indorsed on the paper: "These papers will be granted when called for."

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 476-9

Diary of Corporal John Worrell Northrop: Saturday, June 12, 1864

Four days I have been ill. Among new men bloody flux and dysentery prevail; this is my trouble. I am better today; a fine breeze lifts me. From last date it has rained every day. We have news from my regiment. Adjutant Carpenter was killed in a charge, both Col. Grover and Lieut. Col. Cook are disabled; Capt. J. L. Goddard, of my company, in command. The movement of trains toward Americus is on account of wounded Confederates being taken to Americus from battlefields about Atlanta. All doctors absent; no sick call for a week. The dead are daily drawn out by wagon loads.

On the 8th a Catholic priest said to us he supposed we were badly treated, but there are as kind hearted people about here as anywhere; that officers have it their own way; thought our government unwilling to exchange, but if better provisions could not be made for us, something ought to be done. Priests, though frequently in, have little to say. They are said to be using their doctrinal influence to get men to swear allegiance to the Confederacy. I do not accept this as true, though one of Erin's sons frequently visited, who said to me that he refused to renounce Uncle Sam, yesterday went out with the priest and has not returned.

I am out of conceit with many reports which originate in camp. I have no faith in innocent liars who tell so much news. For instance: Lincoln is going to give two for one to get us out; "is going to throw the nigger overboard to please Rebels"; that Secretary Stanton has said that "none but dead beats and coffee boilers are taken prisoners, and the army is better off without them." Likely some Rebel started this story, but it had weight among some. Indignant crowds gather and vent their curses on Stanton. Grant is cursed by some, so is the President and the Cabinet; for these gossipers have but little depth of thought and are easily moved by groundless rumors. It is cheering to know many on whose eyes are no scales, logically rebutting these stories and laying the blame of our abuse on the Rebel authorities, where it belongs. A small ration of rice today.

SOURCE: John Worrell Northrop, Chronicles from the Diary of a War Prisoner in Andersonville and Other Military Prisons of the South in 1864, p. 73-4

General William T. Sherman to Senator John Sherman, November 8, 1885

ST. LOUIS, Nov. 8, 1885.

Dear Brother: . . . I have been importuned from every quarter to write or say something about the "Depew" revelations,¹ but have steadily refused anything for publication. But a few days ago Blaine wrote me confidentially, as he wanted information in the preparation of his second volume. I have answered him, sending copies of letters and papers from my private files, which I believe established these points. The attempt to send General Grant along with Lew Campbell to Mexico in October, 1866, had no connection with Congress's final quarrel with President Johnson, which did not happen till after January 14, 1865, and then only because Grant allowed Stanton to regain his office as Secretary of War, after forcing him to contend for it in the courts. Indeed, Grant served in Johnson's Cabinet during Stanton's suspension, viz., from August, 1867, to January, 1868, and was, to my personal knowledge, on friendly terms with Johnson. The real cause for their quarrel was that article in the "National Intelligencer," January 14, 1868, when four members of the Cabinet accused Grant of prevaricating and deceiving the President. I was present when Grant made his explanation of the whole case to Johnson, and I understood the latter to express himself as satisfied. But the newspapers kept it up, and made the breach final and angry.

I do not believe that Johnson ever contemplated the use of force against Congress, and am equally sure that Grant, at the time, had no fear or apprehension of such a thing....

Affectionately yours,

W. T. SHERMAN.

_______________

¹ This refers to an interview with Mr. Depew referring to the Johnson-Grant difficulty at the end of the war.

SOURCE: Rachel Sherman Thorndike, Editor, The Sherman Letters: Correspondence Between General and Senator Sherman from 1837 to 1891, p. 368-9

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, June 2, 1866

There was no Cabinet-meeting yesterday, and labor in the Department was suspended on account of the funeral of Lieutenant-General Scott.

Seward sends me a note in pencil, signed by his initials, with a telegraph from Dart, District Attorney of Western New York, stating that Captain Bryson wanted two tugs to assist him in guarding the river. Seward says, in pencil, that the President thinks I had better charter the steamers. He sent his clerk, Mr. Chew, with this note. The whole thing was one of those low, intriguing, petty, contemptible proceedings, shunning responsibility, to which Seward sometimes resorts. I am sorry to write so of one in his position and an associate, but I expressed the matter to Chew without hard words, showing Seward's weakness, [and saying] that this is a war on the Irish in which he, Stanton, and Grant fear to do their duty, but wish me to assume it.

I called on the President and spoke of the management of this Fenian movement a little earnestly, and a little freely. Reminded him that I had some weeks ago, when the subject was brought forward in Cabinet, suggested that the Irish population was an element in our politics, and, therefore, it seemed proper that there should be unity in the Cabinet and among high officials. I consequently proposed that General Grant, who was stationing the military forces on the frontiers West and South, should make a formal communication in accord with the Secretary of War, which all could approve and with which we should all be identified. Stanton was alarmed, I saw; did not think it necessary to take such steps; and from that time the subject has been dropped. I remarked to the President that the proceedings had been singular; that this Fenian movement had appeared to me to be a great bubble, nevertheless there was no denying the fact that large numbers were engaged in it; that they had large supplies of arms; that along our frontier from Eastport to Detroit there had been gatherings of armed men threatening to cross into Canada; that we had sent a naval force by request to Eastport; that our only gunboat on the Lakes had been detained by special request at Buffalo; and now the Secretary of State was calling on me to charter steamers and arm them; chartering vessels for military purposes belonged properly to the Army or War Department. By treaty stipulation we are to have but one naval vessel on the Lakes. Where, I asked him, were the revenue cutters which performed police duty? In all this time the War Department has done nothing. No proclamation has been issued. How and by what authority are we to capture or interfere with prisoners?

The President said it would be well to communicate with Commander Bryson, of the naval steamer Michigan, and ascertain whether additional vessels were wanted. I said that we had revenue cutters on the Lakes, but none were at Buffalo, where they were most wanted; that the Michigan had been detained there now some weeks awaiting a cutter. He thought I had better see the Secretaries of Treasury and State.

McCulloch was confident there were cutters at Buffalo, but on sending for the clerk in charge he found he was mistaken. He said he had turned the whole subject of Fenianism over to Attorney-General Speed, who is devoted to Stanton and Seward.

Seward was in a fog. Did not want to issue a proclamation. I asked what the naval vessels were to do, what authority I had to charter steamers if there was not a state of war. If it was police duty, he or the Treasury should attend to it. I inquired about the military. He said Stanton wanted to keep clear of this question. I well knew this, and he wants me to do duties which belong to him and thus enlist the Irish element against the Administration.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 518-20

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, June 4, 1866

Bryson telegraphed yesterday that he had captured seven hundred Fenians crossing the river at Black Rock. I sent the telegram to the President and to Seward, and soon after called on the President. He seemed a little perplexed. Said we had an elephant on our hands. I asked whether they were prisoners of war and what was to be done with them. He thought we must wait and we should soon have inquiries.

Shortly after my return Seward sent his carriage for me. I went to his house. He and Speed were sitting on the back porch. Speed had a telegram from Dart, District Attorney, stating the capture and making inquiries. Seward asked about the prisoners and what accommodations the Navy had. I told him none whatever and that these men could hardly be considered prisoners of war, even if we had accommodations; that they ought, if prisoners of war, at once to be turned over to the custody of the military. He said that would not do. Stanton wanted nothing to do with them, — there was no military force there. I told him there were officers and they could call on the militia or call out volunteer companies in Buffalo. This would be necessary, for such a number could not be retained by the civil authorities without a guard. He said, "Let them run away." Speed said that would not do. There might be and probably would be extradition claims for the leaders. I asked them if they thought that these men were prisoners of war, for I did not. Nor did I know how far their capture would be justified.

Seward said the capture was all right; they should, perhaps, be considered prisoners of state; that he and Speed had talked over the matter before I came, and he had prepared a couple of telegrams. Fred Seward read one, which was signed by Speed. Seward proposed that I should telegraph Bryson that he, Seward, would take charge of them as prisoners of state. Said Dart must attend to them. I thought the marshal the proper person. He said that was the same thing. Asked how much it would cost to feed them, whether it could be done for a dollar each day. I told him it would cost more than that, for he could not confine them in Buffalo jail, or any inclosure, but must have a guard. I did not see how he could get along without military help, which would necessarily be attended with expense. He said he would send word to Meade.

I again adverted to the matter of a proclamation when such movements were being made upon the border, but Seward interrupted me, said no, that was not necessary. The thing was just right. He felt, he said, very happy over it. Wanted neither Speed nor myself should say anything about the matter until the regular Cabinet-meeting on Tuesday.

Governor Morgan at my house last evening introduced the subject of Reconstruction and the position of things in the Senate, remarking, as though casually, there really was now very little difference between the President and Congress. I promptly, and perhaps unwisely in my promptness, differed with him, and told him it was not wise to attempt to deceive ourselves in the matter, that the difference was broad, deep, and such as could not be reconciled.

He asked if I did not think the proposed amendment of the Constitution, of the Senate, an improvement on that which had passed the House; and whether that was not a step towards getting together. I told him that for myself, without speaking for others, I was opposed to the scheme for changing the Constitution now before Congress and opposed to any amendment while one third of the States were excluded from participating or giving their views, deprived, in fact, of their rightful representation; that I, therefore, did not feel as though there could be harmonious action, and it appeared to me a mistake to suppose that the President, a Constitutionalist, and the exclusionists, who were not, were likely to act together.

I have no doubt that Morgan came expressly to sound me and ascertain whether we would be united on the exclusion plan. Not unlikely Seward sent him. Morgan has evidently been trapped in the caucus into a pledge, direct or implied.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 520-2

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, June 5, 1866

At the Cabinet-meeting an hour or more was wasted in discussing a claim of Madame Bertinatti, a piece of favoritism in which the President has been imposed upon by Seward and Stanton. It seemed to me that it was brought forward and talked over for the express purpose of excluding more important subjects. There is in the Cabinet not that candor and free interchange of opinions on the great questions before the country that there should be. Minor matters are talked over, often at great length.

As McCulloch and myself came away, we spoke of this unpleasant state of things, and we came to the conclusion that we would, as a matter of duty, communicate with the President on this subject of want of frankness and freedom in the Cabinet, also in regard to his general policy and the condition of public affairs. The great mistake, I think, is in attempting to keep up the Republican organization at the expense of the President. It is that organization which the conspirators are using to destroy the Executive.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 522

Diary of Gideon Welles: Wednesday, June 6, 1866

Montgomery Blair still persists that Seward is false to the President and that he and Stanton have an understanding. There are many strange things in Seward's course, and he is a strange man. I am inclined to think he is less false to the President than adhesive to the Secretary of State. He does not like Johnson less, but Seward more. Seward is afraid of the Democrats and does not love the Republicans. But he feels that he is identified with the Republicans, thinks he has rendered them service, and considers himself, under the tutoring of Thurlow Weed, as more than any one else the father of the party. The managers of the party dislike him and distrust him, fear that he will by some subtlety injure them, and do not give him their confidence. The Democrats look upon him as a puzzle, a Mephistopheles, a budget of uncertainties, and never have and never will trust him.

The President believes Seward a true supporter of his Administration. I think he means to support it. The President finds him a convenience, but does not always rely upon his judgment. His trust in Seward begets general distrust of the Administration. It is remarkable that none of Seward's devoted friends—men who under Weed breathe through his nostrils—sustain the President on his great measures. Raymond has been a whiffler on public measures, but no others have ever doubted, or dared express a doubt of, the Radical policy. This puzzles me.

Stanton is very anxious to retain his place, and yet he has a more intimate relation with the Radical leaders than with the President or any member of the Cabinet. His opinion and judgment, I think, the President values more than he does Seward's, yet he distrusts him more,—feels that he is insincere. But Stanton studies to conform to the President's decisions and determinations when he cannot change them, apparently unaware that he occupies an equivocal position, both with the President and the public.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 523 

Diary of Gideon Welles: Thursday, June 7, 1866

The President has finally issued a proclamation in regard to the Fenians. It should have appeared earlier, but Seward has counseled delay. Speed put out a preliminary order, which appeared to me to be designedly mischievous. I so said to the President, who remarked that it had struck him as offensive, and he so told Speed before it was published, yet it was not altered. The effect will be likely to throw the Irish against the Administration, or make them, at all events, indifferent towards it, whereas this all might have been different.

It is one of many little things which impresses me there is intended mischief towards the President. Speed acts with Seward and Stanton thoroughly, and his peculiarly worded order, if not suggested by them, is just what they wished.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 523-4

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, June 8, 1866

But little of importance at the Cabinet. I had some conversation with the President after adjournment, and in the evening McCulloch and myself called upon him by appointment. Our conversation was frank, extending more than an hour. We all concurred that it was not possible to go on much longer with a view of preserving the integrity of the Republican Party, for the Radicals are using the organization to injure the President. There is direct antagonism between the leaders who control Congress and the Administration. The Democrats in Congress are more in harmony with the Administration than are the Radicals;— then why repel the Democrats and favor the Radicals?

We McCulloch and myself spoke of the want of cordial and free intercourse among the members of the Cabinet, that important questions touching differences in the Republican Party were never discussed at our meetings, that it was obvious we did not concur in opinion, and, therefore, the really important topics were avoided. The President admitted and lamented this, as he has done to me repeatedly. He expressed his surprise that Harlan and Speed should, with these understood views, desire to remain. I asked if there were not others among us as objectionable and more harmful. McCulloch said he could not believe Seward was faithless, that he fully agreed with him whenever they had conversed. I admitted the same as regarded Seward and myself, still there were some things I could not reconcile. He is not treacherous to the President, but is under the influence of Stanton and acts with him. His intimates, as well as Stanton's, in Congress, voted steadily with the Radicals; his speech at Auburn was a whistle for the Republicans to keep united and repelled Democrats. The President was reluctant to give up Seward, whose equivocal course is characteristic, but evidently had some doubts as to his sincerity and ulterior purpose. He suggested that Seward should be called in to a conference and come to an explicit understanding. This we all concurred in, though I remarked we should have fair words and no decisive action. But it was left to the President to invite a meeting.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 524-5

Diary of Gideon Welles: Wednesday, June 13, 1866

Dined this evening at Tassara's, the Spanish Minister. The banquet was given in honor of Dulce, late Governor-General of Cuba. Seward and Stanton were the only Cabinet-members besides myself who were present. Sir Frederick Bruce, Montholon, Baron Gerolt, etc., etc., were present. General Dulce does not speak nor understand English, and therefore all conversation was through an interpreter. As I sat at his right, and could not talk Spanish, we were not very sociable. He is a quiet, gentlemanly man with little of the look of a Spanish grandee.

I was sorry to hear Seward and Stanton chuckling over an allowance which they had succeeded in getting for Mrs. Bertinatti, the wife of the Italian Minister. They evidently thought it an adroit piece of management, and I judge the President has been misled in regard to it. Mrs. B. was a Rebel Mrs. Bass, of Mississippi, and her claim unjust. I apprehended it should not have been allowed.

The President has made the annual Executive appointments of midshipmen. In this he exhibited more painstaking than Mr. Lincoln, and gave less authority to me, which I did not regret. Usually Mr. Lincoln specified two or three special cases and then turned over the residue to me. Mr. Johnson desired me to go over the applicants twice with him in detail, got, as far as he could, particulars, and retained the whole schedule of names for more than a week, occasionally speaking of some one or more to me. His aim seemed to be to confer the appointment on the poor and deserving, regardless of locality, names, and influence. His selections were probably good ones, but some of them would have been different had the choice devolved on me.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 526

Diary of Gideon Welles: Thursday, June 14, 1866

The House yesterday passed the Senate proposition to change the Constitution. It was before that body about two hours and was passed under the previous question. Such a reckless body, ready to break up the foundations of the government, has never been assembled, and such legislation, regardless of the organic law, would not only destroy public confidence but ruin the country. All is for party, regardless of right or of honest principle.

Representations are sent out that Congress has made great concessions in adopting the Senate's proposition, that they have yielded about everything, and that the President is pretty well satisfied with the question as now presented. There is design in all this, and some professed friends of the President are among the most active in it. The New York Times, and papers strongly under the influence of Seward and Weed, as well as their partisans, maintain these views. Thurlow Weed has been here within a few days and is always on errands of mischief. All looks to me like a systematic plan to absorb the President, or to destroy him. He still leans on Seward and seems under his influence, though with doubts and occasional misgivings. Seward himself defers to Stanton, - is becoming afraid of him. That Seward is cheated I cannot believe, and if he is not cheated I am constrained to believe the President is. And who is to undeceive him? I have on more than one occasion suggested my doubts, but while he has received my suggestions attentively he has pondered in obvious distress, and the subject is of so delicate a nature that I cannot do more.

At the very time that the House was adopting this Constitutional change, Green Clay Smith was nominated Governor of Montana. Smith professes to be with the President, but went with the Radicals on the test oath, and is made Governor.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 526-7

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, June 15, 1866

Nothing special at Cabinet. On Tuesday Seward submitted a correspondence between Schenck and Romero, the Mexican Minister. It was a very improper proceeding, and R. evidently thought it wrong in giving a copy to the Secretary of State. Seward mentioned it as of little moment, — a sort of irregularity. Stanton said there was nothing wrong so far as Schenck was concerned, but that it was a questionable proceeding on the part of Romero. I declared my entire disapproval of the whole transaction and that it was one of the many indications of ignoring and crowding on the Executive.

The others were silent, but, after a little earnest talk, Seward said he would give the subject further consideration. To-day he brought forward the correspondence with an indorsement disapproving it and said he should communicate it to Romero.

Senator Doolittle took breakfast with me this morning. We went over the political questions and discussed what had best be done. Both were satisfied that the time had arrived when the Administration must take a stand. The game of the Radicals and of certain conspicuously professed friends of the President, that the Republican Party must be sustained and kept united at any sacrifice, even the surrender of the Constitution in some of its important features, and to the jeopardy of the Union itself, must be checked, and the opposition to any such policy made clearly manifest. We called on the President and made known our opinions. He concurred and thought a prompt call for a national convention of friends of the Union should be issued. Doolittle agreed to undertake to draw up such a call, but desired that I would also place on paper my views. He proposed that the call should be signed by the members of the Cabinet, or such of them as approved the measure. I told them that I, personally, had no objection, but I questioned its propriety and effect.

McCulloch, with whom I had a brief interview after Cabinet-meeting, told me that the elder Blair was preparing the call. I saw Judge Blair this evening and found him much engaged, yet not altogether satisfied. He expresses apprehension that Seward has control of the President and has so interwoven himself into the mind and course of the President as not to be shaken off, and if so that the Democrats must go forward independent of both President and Congress. Says the Democratic leaders, many of whom he has seen, such as Dean Richmond, Dawson, and others, say they will go in under the President's lead provided he will rid himself of Seward, but they have no confidence in him, would rather give up Johnson than retain Seward. Governor Andrew of Massachusetts takes a similar view. B. says his father has had a talk with the President; that he himself has written him fully; that he advised the President not to dismiss Harlan unless Seward also went; that the President expressed doubts whether the Senate would confirm two Cabinet officers; that he was told there would be no difficulty; if there were, he would let the assistants carry on the Departments, and assign General Grant ad interim to the War; that Grant had been consulted and assented to the arrangement.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 527-9

Diary of Gideon Welles: Wednesday, May 23, 1866

Fox called on me last evening and unexpectedly bade me farewell. Said he would not trust himself to call at the Department to-day. He was very much affected, said words were wanting to express his high respect and admiration for me and the qualities which I possessed for the position which I filled. Spoke of over five years' intercourse, during which there had not been one unpleasant word, nor, as he was aware, an unpleasant thought between us. I have not time now to speak of F. and his qualities, but shall do so. He has been useful to the country and to me, relieving me of many labors and defending me, I believe, always. His manner and ways have sometimes given offense to others, but he is patriotic and true.

The President and his Cabinet were serenaded this evening. I am opposed to these methods of calling out public men; have respectfully suggested to both Presidents Lincoln and Johnson that it was not advisable to address gatherings at such times, and was determined not to break over the rule myself. I had, therefore, given the subject no attention and was embarrassed when a crowd of perhaps a thousand appeared before my door with a band of music. Declining to make remarks, I stated that I approved the policy of the Administration and was for the union of the States and the rights of the States.

I understand Stanton read off a long address and McCulloch and Dennison each made speeches. The latter acquitted himself with credit, and Stanton read his prepared address from his door, a man standing each side of him with a lighted candle. Dennison made a soothing speech for the party; said everything was lovely. Speed ran away, and Harlan would not show himself.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 512-3

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, May 29, 1866

At the Cabinet-meeting word was received of the death of Lieutenant-General Scott at West Point at the advanced age of eighty. He was great in stature, and had great qualities with some singular weaknesses or defects. Vanity was his great infirmity, and that was much exaggerated by political or party opponents. He had lofty political aspirations in former years, but they had expired before him. Courteous, deferential, and respectful to his official superiors always, he expected and required the same from others. Though something of a politician, I do not think his judgment and opinion in regard to public affairs were always correct or reliable. In the early stages of the late Civil War I thought, and still think, his counsels were not wise, and yet they received extraordinary favor and had great weight with President Lincoln. My impressions are that Mr. Seward persuaded the President that the opinions and advice of General Scott were of more value than those of any others or all others, and Seward was before Mr. Lincoln's inauguration thought to be the coming man. This he used and contrived by flattery to infuse into General S. the advice on public affairs which he wished to have commended to the President when he made military inquiries.

The course of the General at the beginning of our troubles was equivocal and unreliable. He began right and with good advice to Mr. Buchanan to garrison the forts of the South. A small military force in different localities would have served as rallying-points, strengthened the union sentiment and checked disunion. But he seemed to have doubted his own advice, halted, and after Congress convened in 1860 would fall into Mr. Seward's views and was ready to let the "wayward sisters go in peace." He, in those days, imbibed an impression, common among the politicians in Washington, that Mr. Lincoln, the newly elected President, was unequal to the position, for he had not figured on the national arena. It was supposed, therefore, that one of his Cabinet would be the managing man of the incoming administration, and that Mr. Seward, his principal competitor in the Republican nominating convention, who was to be the Secretary of State, would be that manager. This was the expectation of Mr. Seward himself, as well as of General Scott and others. He had been a conspicuous party leader for twenty years, with a reputation much overrated for political sagacity, and with really very little devotion to political principles, which he always subordinated to his ambition. It was not surprising that General Scott viewed him as the coming man, and as Mr. Seward was a man of expedients more than principle, he soon made it obvious that he intended to have no war, but was ready to yield anything—the Constitution itself if necessary to satisfy the Secessionists. The General under this influence abandoned his early recommendations and ultimately advised surrendering all the forts.

The Senate, after many caucuses on the part of the Republican members, have an amendment of the Constitution modified from that reported by the construction, or obstruction, committee. This amendment may be less offensive than that which passed the House by excluding one of the States from any voice or participation, but it ought not to receive the sanction of the Senate. Yet I have little doubt that it will and that the canvassing has been a process of drilling the weak and better-minded members into its support. Disgraceful as it may seem, there is no doubt that secret party caucus machinery has been in operation to carry through a Constitutional Amendment. Senators have committed themselves to it without hearing opposing arguments, or having any other discussion than that of a strictly party character in a strictly private meeting. Of course this grave and important matter is prejudged, predetermined. Eleven States are precluded from all representation in either house, and, of the Senators in Washington, all not pledged to a faction are excluded from the caucus when the decision is made. This is the statesmanship, the legislation, the enlightened political action of the present Congress. Such doctrines, management, and principles, or want of principles, would sooner or later ruin any country.

I happen to know that Fessenden had long interviews with Stanton last week, though I know not the subject matter of their conferences. Fessenden sometimes hesitates to support a wrong measure. Seward has a personal party in Congress,—men who seldom act on important questions in opposition to him and his views. All of these men vote in opposition to the President's policy. Raymond alone vacillates and trims, but this is with an understanding, for Raymond and Seward could, if necessary, carry others with them, provided they were earnestly disposed.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 514-7

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, May 4, 1866

The subject of Reconstruction was not discussed to-day in Cabinet. Seward, while the President was engaged with some one, remarked on the publication which had been made of our last meeting, saying that he concluded the report had been made by Stanton, for the

papers had said it was from a Cabinet Minister, and there was no interest felt as regarded any one else but Stanton. There were, he remarked, some other indications. All this was said playfully as he walked the room and took snuff. But I could see it was not play for Stanton, whose countenance betrayed his vexation. Seward saw it also, and when Stanton said that Seward was the only one who would do this,—draw up and publish proceedings in Cabinet, the subject was dropped.

As we came out at the close of the meeting, McCulloch said to me that he had hoped there would have been some call for a decided expression from Stanton, for the newspapers and many honest men were disputing in regard to the truth of the report of his views in the Cabinet exposition, and he (McC.) thought it wrong that a Cabinet Minister should occupy a false or an equivocal position on such a question, at such a time. In all of which I concurred.

There is no doubt that the Radicals are surprised and many of them incredulous at the enunciation of Stanton's remarks and position in the Cabinet. I apprehend that no one was more astounded at the publication than Stanton himself. It ended any double course, if one had been pursued. Sumner has repeatedly assured me, most emphatically, that Stanton was with him and opposed to the President's policy. Others have said the same. These men were deceived and have been until now, and they cannot believe they have been duped.

The President has not been unaware of the conflicting statements in regard to Stanton, and for this reason adopted the course of calling out the individual opinions of each member of his Cabinet and then took the opportunity of throwing them in a condensed form before the public. This gives the attitude and views of the Administration and of each member of it on the subject of the report of the Reconstruction Committee in advance of the debate in Congress, and prevents misrepresentations and false assumptions in regard to them. It has been the policy of the Radical leaders to claim that the Cabinet was divided, that Stanton and others were with them, and hence their papers and orators have eulogized and magnified Stanton into enormous proportions. All this has now terminated. I did not understand Stanton as expressing himself quite so decidedly as he is represented to have done in the report, though it appeared to me he meant to be understood as represented. No doubt he dissembles. He said he did not approve the Directory plans in many respects, and if he were compelled to act upon them as now presented he should avow himself opposed; and he thought Congress and the President not so far apart that they could not come together.

I followed in direct antagonism and objected unequivocally to the whole programme. I had no faith in Constitutional amendments at this time, in the present existing state of affairs, with eleven States unrepresented and without any voice in the deliberations; nor could I admit that Congress could prescribe terms to the States on which they should be permitted to enjoy their Constitutional right of representation, or that Congress should usurp and take to itself the pardoning power, which is a prerogative of the Executive, nor were they to prosecute and punish the people without trial. I, therefore, antagonized Stanton purposely. He saw and felt it. Hence I think he hardly committed himself so fully as represented. But he does not deny it. Will he?

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 499-501

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, May 8, 1866

The subject of admitting Colorado was to-day before the Cabinet. The bill has passed both houses after having been once rejected. Congress in 1863 authorized the formation of a State constitution, and the people refused to take upon themselves local State government. Subsequently the people formally adopted it by a small majority in a vote of some six thousand, and elected Senators, who are here anxious to get their seats. After the proposition and Senators were rejected, it was ascertained the latter would vote with the Radicals, and that their votes would contribute to overrule and defeat the Executive. This new light led Senators to revise their votes. The Constitution restricts suffrage to the whites, but Senators and others who insist on negro suffrage where the blacks are numerous, and in States where Congress has no right to intervene, voted for Colorado.

Seward, McCulloch, and myself were against admitting the State. She had a population of less than twenty thousand, as claimed by some, and not exceeding thirty or thirty-five thousand, as insisted by the most strenuous for admission. As a principle I have uniformly opposed recognizing and admitting States with a population below the ratio for one Representative. This has always ruled. The slaveholders thrust in Florida and Arkansas as an offset to Free States; and Kansas was authorized under peculiar and extraordinary circumstances to form a constitution with, I think, less than sixty thousand. There was, perhaps, some excuse for admitting and authorizing Colorado to frame a constitution when the difficulties of the country and the attempts of the Rebels to lessen the number of States was before us. But the people then refused self-government.

I therefore had no difficulty in coming to my conclusions on general principles. Stanton thought it might in this instance be well enough to let them in and avoid further trouble. Harlan argued for admission with some ability and tact, but did not meet the great underlying principle. He thought it expedient, and with so much effect as to cause Dennison to doubt, who was at first opposed to the bill. The question was deferred.

The subject of sending naval vessels to attend the laying of the Atlantic telegraph was considered. Seward, Dennison, and Harlan in the affirmative. McCulloch and Stanton opposed. I felt very indifferent; had advised Field to go to Congress. Told him I should not act without authority from Congress or an order from the Executive. Stated to the President that we could, without any difficulty or much additional expense, detail a vessel, Mr. Seward having said we did not require all the four ordered to the fishing-ground. Although my faith in the success of the ocean telegraph is not great, yet, in view of the fact that Congress had once ordered a vessel and of our present ability to spare one, and the further fact that a vessel had been ordered to assist or be present at laying the Russian telegraph, it might be expedient to show a friendly feeling as regards this, and I would assent, though unwilling to advise it.

The President thought it would be well for Congress to take up the subject, or, at all events, that we should delay a day or two before deciding. This I approved as the better course. Stanton, who had seen my previous indifference, immediately slapped me on the shoulder and said I could decide readily with the President. I said I could, for he usually was not far wrong. Stanton was vexed.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 502-4

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, April 20, 1866

The subject of advertising came up. Dennison had made inquiry and ascertained that the Intelligencer had the largest circulation. Stanton said President Lincoln had ordered him to publish in the Chronicle. There was evidently a wish to get along without action. I advised that there should be uniformity in the Departments as to the papers employed. The President said certainly it was best there should be general accord.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 490

General William T. Sherman to Senator John Sherman, November 17, 1875

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES,

ST. LOUIS, Mo., Nov. 17, 1875.

Dear Brother: . . . Belknap has acted badly by me ever since he reached Washington. . .

General Grant promised me often to arrange and divide our functions, but he never did, but left the Secretary to do all those things of which he himself, as General, had complained to Stanton. I don't think I ever used the expression often imputed to me of saying that the Secretary of War is only a clerk to the President. It is the opinion of many lawyers that the Secretary of War himself has no right to issue a military order to officers and soldiers that his office is civil etc., etc. The President is constitutional commander-in-chief, and when the Secretary issues his order he ought to recite the fact; whereas orders are issued by the Adjutant-General by order of the Secretary of War. This is done daily, and I cannot command unless orders come through me, which they do not, but go straight to the party concerned. This is the real question at issue between us. Congress ought to clearly define the relation between the Secretary of War and a General of the army. It is not the case now, but the Secretary of War exercises all the functions of the Commander-General under a decision of the Attorney-General. . . .

Yours, etc.,

W. T. SHERMAN.

SOURCE: Rachel Sherman Thorndike, Editor, The Sherman Letters: Correspondence Between General and Senator Sherman from 1837 to 1891, p. 346

John Tyler to Governor John Letcher, January 31, 1861

To the Governor of the State of Virginia:

DEAR SIR,

SHERWOOD FOREST,

January 31, 1861.

I received your communication notifying me of my appointment by the concurrent vote of the two houses of the General Assembly, as a commissioner to the President of the United States, with instructions respectfully to request the President to abstain, pending the proceedings contemplated by the action of the General Assembly, from any and all acts calculated to produce a collision of arms between the States which have seceded or shall secede, and the government of the United States, on the afternoon of Monday, the 21st instant, by the mail of that day, and in disregard of a severe state of indisposition under which I had labored for some time previous, I resolved at all hazards to myself personally to carry out, so far as I could, the patriotic wishes of the Legislature. By the earliest conveyance, I reached Richmond on the evening of the succeeding day (Tuesday, 22d), and having had an interview with your excellency and my co-commissioner, proceeded by the morning train of cars the next day (Wednesday, 23d) for the city of Washington, which I reached on the afternoon of the same day. I am thus particular in giving precise dates, so that the Legislature may perceive that with all possible promptitude and dispatch I obeyed their wishes; and also to show that I was duly sensible of the importance of time in the whole proceeding. Immediately after reaching Washington, I addressed a note (marked No. 1) to the President of the United States, informing him of my arrival and asking an early hour to be designated by him, to enable me to place him in possession of the wishes and feelings of the Legislature of Virginia, and the instructions which, in the form of her legislative resolves, all having direct reference to the disturbed and painful condition of public affairs, I was desirous of laying before him. He responded promptly by note, and left it optional with myself to select 8 o'clock of that evening, or an early hour the next morning, for the time of the proposed conference. My note (No. 2), for reasons therein set forth, informed him that I would wait upon him in the morning of the ensuing day. My note announcing my arrival, if the objects which had brought me to Washington had any consideration in the mind of the President would, I did not doubt, suspend any hostile movement against any seceding State in the interval of time between its date and the hour at which I should wait upon him the next morning, and supersede the necessity of a night visit.

On the next morning, at the hour of ten, I repaired to the President's mansion, and met from him a warm and cordial reception. I lost no time in handing to him your letter of appointment, attested by the seal of the State, and legislative resolutions. He said that they were the first full copies of the resolutions which he had seen, and after reading them he remarked, that he considered them very important, and was good enough to add, that being borne by myself, he should feel it his duty to make them the subject of a special message to Congress. Either I suggested or he voluntarily remarked, most probably the latter, that he should accompany them with a strong recommendation to Congress, with whom, he said, rested the entire power over the subject of war or peace, to abstain from all action of a hostile character, until Virginia should have had a fair opportunity to exert all her efforts to preserve the public peace and restore harmony to the Union. I said to him, that my mission was to him; that he was commander-in-chief of the army and navy—could regulate the movement of soldiers and ships in peace and war, and that everything that Virginia desired was that the statu quo should be observed. I represented to him that the people of Virginia were almost universally inclined to peace and reconciliation. That I need not inform him of the sacrifices the State had made for the Union in its initiation, or of her instrumentality in the creation of the Constitution. That her efforts to reconstruct or preserve depended for their success on her being permitted to conduct them undisturbed by outside collision. He replied, that he had in no measure changed his views as presented in his annual message; that he could give no pledges; that it was his duty to enforce the laws, and the whole power rested with Congress. He complained that the South had not treated him properly; that they had made unnecessary demonstration by seizing unprotected arsenals and forts, and thus perpetrating acts of useless bravado, which had quite as well been let alone. I suggested to him, that while these things were, I admitted, calculated to fret and irritate the northern mind, that he would see in them only the necessary results of popular excitement, which, after all, worked no mischief in the end, if harmony between the States was once more restored; that the States wherein the seizures had been made, would account for all the public property; and that in the mean time the agency for its preservation was only changed. He repeated his sense of the obligations which rested upon him; could give no pledges but those contained in his public acts, and recurred again to the proceedings of the Legislature and his intention to send them to Congress in a special message, accompanied with a strong recommendation to avoid the passage of any hostile legislation. I asked if I might be permitted to see the sketch of the message, to which he unhesitatingly replied that he would take pleasure in showing it to me next morning. Much more occurred in the course of our interview, which lasted for an hour and a half; all, however, relating exclusively to the above topics, and I left him entirely satisfied with the results of my interview. The President was frank and entirely confiding in his language and whole manner. A moment's reflection satisfied me that if the message contained the recommendation to Congress to abstain from hostile legislation, I was at liberty to infer a similar determination on his part of a state of quietude.

Friday, 25.—I waited on him again the following morning, and he lost no time in reading me so much of the sketch of the proposed message as related to the recommendation to Congress. I suggested no change or alteration, believing it to be amply sufficient, and I became only anxious for its presentation to Congress. He said he should have it all prepared to be submitted to his Cabinet on that day, and would send it in the next day. On the afternoon of the same day—Friday, 25—I was waited upon by the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, who stated that they had called upon me at the request of the President, to express his regret that in consequence of the adjournment over to Monday, he would not be able to send in his message until Monday. While in conversation with those gentlemen, which chiefly turned on the condition of public affairs, I was startled by the receipt of a telegraphic despatch from Judge Robertson, my co-commissioner, dated at Charleston, South Carolina, enquiring into the foundation of a rumor which had reached that place, that the steamship Brooklyn, with troops, had sailed for the South from Norfolk. I immediately handed over the despatch to the gentlemen, with the suitable enquiries. The Attorney General said, in substance: "You know, sir, that I am attached to the law department, and not in the way of knowing anything about it." The Secretary of State said that he had heard and believed that the Brooklyn had sailed with some troops, but he did not know either when she sailed or to what point she was destined. I then said, "I hope that she has not received her orders since my arrival in Washington." On this point the gentlemen could give me no information, but expressed no doubt but that the President would give me the information if requested. I excused myself to them, and immediately withdrawing to the adjoining room, I addressed to the President note No. 3, which Mr. Staunton, the Attorney General, kindly volunteered to bear in person, and without loss of time, to the President. In a short time afterwards, Mr. Staunton returned, to inform me that he had carried the note to the President's house, but for a reason not necessary here to state, he could not see the President, but had placed it in the hands of his servant, to be delivered at the earliest opportunity. The reply of the President, No. 2, reached me at half after eleven o'clock that night. In the interim, I had despatched by telegraph, to Judge Robertson, the information I had collected, and upon the opening of the telegraph office the next morning (Saturday), the material parts of the President's reply relating to the sailing of the Brooklyn, viz: that she had gone on an errand "of mercy and relief," and that she was not destined to South Carolina. The orders for the sailing of the ship, as will be seen, were issued before I reached Washington. After receiving the letter, and willingly adopting the most favorable construction of its expressions, I resolved to remain in Washington until after Monday, when the message would go to the two houses. I listened to its reading in the Senate with pleasure, and can only refer to the newspapers for its contents, as no copies were printed and obtainable by me, before I left Washington, on Tuesday morning, the 29th instant. On Monday afternoon I bade my adieu to the President in the accompanying letters, marked No. 4, to which I received his reply, marked No. 3.

The morning newspapers contained the rumor that the proceeding had been adopted of mounting guns on the land side of Fortress Monroe, and in my letter I deemed it no way inappropriate to call the attention of the President to those rumors.

Thus has terminated my mission to the President under the legislative resolutions. I trust that the result of the Brooklyn's cruise may terminate peacably. No intimation was given me of her having sailed in either of my interviews with the President, and all connected with her destination remains to me a State secret. I had no right to require to be admitted into the inner vestibule of the Cabinet, however much I might complain should the results prove the errand of the ship from the first to have been belligerent and warlike.

I am, dear sir,

Respectfully and truly yours,

JOHN TYLER.

Governor LETCHER.

SOURCES: Journal of the Senate of the Commonwealth of Virginia Begun and Held at the Capitol in the City 0f Richmond, on Monday, the Seventh Day of January, in the Year One Thousand Eight Hundred and Sixty-One—Being The Eighty-Fifth Year Of The Commonwealth. Extra Session, Doc. No. 13, p. 5-7; Lyon Gardiner Tyler, The Letters and Times of the Tylers, Volume 2, p. 587-90