Diary of Gideon Welles, Friday, June 22, 1866

When I went to Cabinet-meeting only Seward was there with the President. I was prompt to time; Seward was in advance. Directly on entering, the President handed me a message which he had prepared, with an accompanying letter from Seward, relative to the proposed Constitutional changes which Congress had requested him to forward to the State Executives. The whole was very well done. As Seward had sent off authenticated copies to the Governors, the ready, officious act was very well gotten over by a declaration in the message that it was a ministerial act which was not to be understood as giving the sanction of the Executive or of the Cabinet to the proceeding.

I made a complimentary remark on the message, with my regret that there had not been more time and consideration in sending off copies to the States. Seward was annoyed by the remark and said he had followed the precedent of 1865, but the President was, I saw, not at all displeased with my criticism.

Subsequently, when all the Cabinet were present except Stanton and Speed, the message and papers were read. McCulloch expressed his approval of the message and said he should have been glad to have had it more full and explicit. In this I concurred.

Dennison took exception, which served to show that he had been consulted by the Radicals and had advised or consented to the course previously adopted. He and Seward each made some remarks, and Dennison showed much indignation because Seward had used the word "trick" on the part of Congress in sending this resolution to the President. Seward disclaimed the word and denied he had used it. I was not aware he had done so.

Dennison proceeded to say that Bingham had introduced, or been the means of introducing, the resolution; had consulted with him; that his object was pure; that he approved it; that although the proposed Amendment was not in the precise shape he wished, he, nevertheless, gave it his support; that it had been approved by the Republicans of Ohio, and were he at home in October, he should vote for candidates who favored it.

I assured him that therein he and I differed, for that I would not vote for the Amendment, nor knowingly vote for any man who supported it.

Seward said he had no doubt that the Republicans of the Auburn district would oppose it very generally, and that if he was at home in November he expected to vote for men who would oppose it.

I took higher ground. I cared not what parties favored or what parties opposed it, my convictions and opinions were in my own keeping, and I would vote for no man of any party who favored that Amendment.

Dennison said that with the explanations of Mr. Seward he took no exceptions, but he expected to act with the Union Party of Ohio.

Harlan said he thought the views of each would be reconciled. I doubted if we were a unit. Party seemed to have a stronger hold than country.

When the others had left, the President told McCulloch and myself that he had struck from the message the concurrence of his Cabinet. This I regretted, but he said Dennison's assent, even with his explanation, was not full and gave him an opportunity to evade, if convenient hereafter; he, therefore, chose to stand uncommitted, or trammeled by others. Before sending off the message, which he had done while we were there, he had erased the words referred to.

Dennison has evidently been tampered with and has made up his mind to go with his party, though aware that the party organization is being committed against measures of the Administration. He certainly does not yet anticipate leaving the Cabinet on that account, but will soon come to it. How the President is to get along with such a Cabinet I do not see. McCulloch spoke of it and said there were four in opposition. "Yes," said the President, "from what we now see of Dennison, and if we count Stanton after his patched-up speech; but it is uncertain where he wishes to place himself." There is no uncertainty on the part of any but the President. Speed and Harlan should, from a sense of propriety and decent self-respect, resign. This the President has repeated to me many times. Why he should cling to Stanton, who is working insidiously against him, and to Seward, who works with and shields Stanton, either doing more against him than the two feeble men of whom he speaks so freely, I do not understand. Stanton he knows is not in accord with him, though he does not avow it, and if Seward is presumably friendly, the fact that all the influence which he can exercise is dumb or hostile is notorious.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, pp. 535-8

Diary of Gideon Welles, Saturday, June 23, 1866

The President sent me a note this A.M. to call upon him this evening at eight. Although under the doctor's care and ordered to remain perfectly quiet, I rode over at the time. Doolittle called and went with me. Seward soon came in, followed by McCulloch, Cowan, Browning, and Randall. We went into the library, where the proposed call for a national convention was finished up. Seward, who, with Weed and Raymond, drew up or arranged this call which Doolittle fathers, now suggested two or three verbal alterations, most of which were adopted. It is intended that these "suggestions" shall cover up Weed's tracks.

In all that was said and done Seward fully agreed. He intends to keep within the movement, which has become a New York scheme, in order to control it. His belief is that the Republicans, of New York at least, will respond promptly to the call and make the President's cause, which he means shall be his and the old Whigs', their own. How this is to be done, and the course of the Senators and Representatives of that State be sustained by the Administration, he does not disclose. The Democrats, who in their way are the chief supporters of the President's measures, are snubbed. I perceive Seward is satisfied with both the President's and his and Weed's positions. The President, I think, is aware of this discrepancy, yet tries to believe all is right.

Seward remarked that McCulloch and myself had been uneasy because there had not been an earlier demonstration made and the President's policy distinctly stated, but he had been satisfied it was best to delay. I said that by the delay many of our friends had got committed against us, particularly on those Constitutional changes, — men whom we could by a plain, frank course have kept with us. He said they would come right, but we must give Congress an opportunity to show its hand. They had had seven months and had done nothing that they were satisfied with themselves. We have done nothing which it was our duty to have done, and are we and sound principles benefited by the Seward policy of delay?

Throughout the preliminary proceeding of this call there was a disinclination to make the proposed Constitutional changes an issue, yet it is the real question. This shirking from an open, honest course I can trace chiefly to Seward, though others have become complicated with him. Even the President himself has incautiously and without sufficient consideration used some expression in relation to the basis of representation which embarrasses him; and so of Doolittle and some others. Seward's confidants are fully committed, and hence he and they cannot act freely; consequently the great and important question is omitted in the call, which should have made the invasion of organic law prominent above all other points. He also, whilst conforming to the President's policy, strives to preserve Stanton as an ally, who intrigues with the Radicals.

This movement is an important one, and it has annoyed and pained me that there should have been a sacrifice of principle to gratify any one. If it proves a failure, which I do not mean to anticipate, it will be mainly attributable to the intrigues by which Seward and Weed have been brought into it and finally controlled or shaped proceedings. The intrigue has been cunningly and artfully managed by them. They have mainly shaped the call, although it is in all respects not what they wished. The President, I think, flatters himself that he has arranged to bring them in, whereas the truth is, he would have found it difficult to keep them out. Their aim and purpose are to remain with the old Republican organization, of which the Radicals, or old Whigs, have possession, but which, by the assistance of the President's patronage and the hocus-pocus of New York politics, Seward and Weed will work into their own schemes in that State. I am apprehensive that this movement in the cause of the Administration will by their intrigues and deceptions be made secondary to their purpose.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, pp. 538-40

Diary of Gideon Welles, Tuesday, June 26, 1866

We had not a protracted Cabinet meeting nor any specially interesting topic. I had thought the subject of the call for the convention, which appeared in this morning's paper, might be alluded to either before or after the business session, but it was as studiously avoided as if we had been in a Quaker meeting. There is no free interchange nor concurrence of views. Stanton is insincere, more false than Seward, who relies on expedients. Blair tells me he likes the call and thinks it will be effective. This inspires me with more confidence, for I had doubted whether he and men of his traits and views would acquiesce in it, particularly in its omissions. He does not apprehend the difficulty from Seward and Weed which has troubled me, for he says the President will cast Seward off and Stanton also. I had long seen that this was a necessity, but continued delay has disheartened expectation. Whether Blair has any fact to authorize his assertion, I know not. I can suppose it certain as an alternative. Stanton is unfaithful and acting secretly with the Radicals. He has gone. Either Seward must be discarded or the people will discard both him and the President. The latter does not realize that he is the victim of a double game, adapted to New York intrigues.

The papers state that the Senate of Connecticut adopted the Constitutional Amendment at midnight yesterday. This does not surprise me, yet had the President showed his hand earlier, the result might have been different in that State. But Seward, Weed, Raymond, and company are satisfied with this Radical Amendment. The latter voted for it. Weed has given it a quasi indorsement, and I do not remember to have heard Seward say a word against it. He hastened off a notice to Connecticut and the other States as the Radicals wished, without consulting the President or any member of the Cabinet. There has not been in Connecticut, or elsewhere, any deliberate, enlightened, intelligent, or comprehensive discussion of this measure, but a paltry, narrow, superficial talk or rant, all of the shallowest and meanest partisan character.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, pp. 541-2

Diary of Gideon Welles, Saturday, June 30, 1866

Had a long talk this afternoon with the President on the condition of affairs and especially in regard to the proposed national convention. He does not like the composition of the Cabinet, yet does not, in my opinion, perceive the most questionable feature in it. Harlan and Speed, he does not conceal from me, are in the way. The course and position of Dennison do not suit him. Dennison, like others, has been drawn into the Radical circle against his better judgment, is committed to the Republican Party, and is appointing extreme Radicals to the local post-offices, carrying out the views of the Radical Members and strengthening them by displacing friends of the President. In this I do not think D. intends antagonism to the President, although it is that and nothing else. But he does not permit himself to believe that the President and the Party, which is now a mere machine of Thad Stevens, are not identical.

Seward knows the distinction and yet contrives to persuade the President to acquiesce, while favoring the Radicals. It is curious, but by no means pleasant, to witness this proceeding. The President, usually sagacious, seems not to discern the management and ultimate purpose of the Secretary of State, who is prompted by Stanton, one of the Radical chiefs. Stanton has an assumed frankness, but his coarse manner covers a good deal of subtle duplicity. Seward never differs with the President. If he has taken an opposite view from or with others, or before the President's opinion is known, it disappears forever when the sentiments of the latter are ascertained. His knowledge and estimate of men are weak and erroneous in the extreme.

The President understands the political dexterity of Seward and yet does not apprehend that it may ever operate adverse to himself, nor does Seward intend to antagonize his chief. Some recent proceedings, connected with the schemes of the Radicals, are to me inexplicable, and in our talk I so informed the President. I could not understand how all the Republican Members from New York, a considerable portion of whom are under the influence of Seward and Weed, should vote steadily with the Radicals and against him, if Seward and Weed are his true friends.

The New York Times, Raymond's paper controlled by Weed, declared that the President and Radicals were pretty much reconciled on the Constitutional changes, and by this representation multitudes were entrapped into the measure. Seward, hastily and without consulting the President, hastened to send certified copies of the Amendment by the first mail to the State Executives. These and other things I alluded to as very singular, and that I could hardly reconcile them to sincere and honest friendship. The President was puzzled; said it was strange.

I told him I could account for these proceedings readily, if it were to build up and sustain the Weed and Seward party in New York, but it certainly was not strengthening the Administration.

Raymond and Seward knew of the movements for the convention, and the Times in advance spoke of it as a move to unite the Republican Party while it would certainly injure the Administration. The effect was, when the call appeared, to cause distrust among Democrats, and to repel the World, the Herald, etc. It looks like design or stupidity. I knew they were not fools.

My efforts to incorporate with the call a clause adverting to the proposed Constitutional changes which made a convention advisable were resisted and defeated by the tools of Seward, because it would be agreeable to the Democrats and opposed to the Radicals. His friends were committed on that subject. They had adopted it and were, therefore, antagonistic to Johnson, yet they succeeded through the assistance of Radicals who care little for principles.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, pp. 543-5

The weather is pleasant here today . . .

 . . . and the town is full of lively rumors of battles and successes. It is reported that Secretary Stanton is steadily improving. The president’s boy, Willie Lincoln, is very sick of fever, and was so sick yesterday that his father could not be seen. Mr. Lincoln is one of the most warm-hearted men in the country, and the dangerous illness of any member of his family at once unfits him for the ordinary duties of life. His anxiety does him honor, for no one would like to see the president so much of an executive that he would suppress the feelings of the father.

VAN.

SOURCE: Springfield Weekly Republican, Springfield, Illinois, Saturday February 15. 1862, p. 4, col. 5

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: April 14, 1865

Bright and cool.

Gen. Weitzel and his corps having been ordered away, Major Gen. Ord has succeeded to the command at Richmond, and his corps has been marching to Camp Lee ever since dawn. I saw no negro troops among them, but presume there are some.

Gen. Weitzel's rule became more and more despotic daily; but it is said the order dictating prayers to be offered by the Episcopal clergy came from Mr. Stanton, at Washington, Secretary of War. One of the clergy, being at my house yesterday, said that unless this order were modified there would be no services on Sunday. To-day, Good Friday, the churches are closed.

The following circular was published a few days ago:

TO THE PEOPLE OF VIRGINIA.

 

The undersigned, members of the Legislature of the State of Virginia, in connection with a number of the citizens of the State, whose names are attached to this paper, in view of the evacuation of the City of Richmond by the Confederate Government, and its occupation by the military authorities of the United States, the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, and the suspension of the jurisdiction of the civil power of the State, are of opinion that an immediate meeting of the General Assembly of the State is called for by the exigencies of the situation.

 

The consent of the military authorities of the United States to the session of the Legislature in Richmond, in connection with the Governor and Lietenant-Governor, to their free deliberation upon public affairs, and to the ingress and departure of all its members under safe conducts, has been obtained.

 

The United States authorities will afford transportation from any point under their control to any of the persons before mentioned.

 

The matters to be submitted to the Legislature are the restoration of peace to the State of Virginia, and the adjustment of questions involving life, liberty, and property, that have arisen in the State as a consequence of the war.

 

We therefore earnestly request the Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, and members of the Legislature to repair to this city by the 25th April (instant).

 

We understand that full protection to persons and property will be afforded in the State, and we recommend to peaceful citizens to remain at their homes and pursue their usual avocations, with confidence that they will not be interrupted.

 

We earnestly solicit the attendance in Richmond, on or before the 25th of April (instant), of the following persons, citizens of Virginia, to confer with us as to the best means of restoring peace to the State of Virginia. We have procured safe conduct from the military authorities of the United States for them to enter the city and depart without molestation: Hon. R. M. T. Hunter, A. T. Caperton, Wm. C. Rives, John Letcher, A. H. H. Stuart, R. L. Montague, Fayette McMullen, J. P. Holcombe, Alexander Rives, B. Johnson Barbour, James Barbour, Wm. L. Goggin, J. B. Baldwin, Thomas S. Gholson, Waller Staples, S. D. Miller, Thomas J. Randolph, Wm T. Early, R. A. Claybrook, John Critcher, Wm. Towns, T. H. Eppes, and those other persons for whom passports have been procured and especially forwarded that we consider it to be unnecessary to mention.

 

A. J. Marshall, Senator, Fauquier; James Neeson, Senator, Marion; James Venable, Senator elect, Petersburg; David I. Burr, of House of Delegates, Richmond City; David J. Saunders, of House of Delegates, Richmond City; L. S. Hall, of House of Delegates, Wetzel County; J. J. English, of House of Delegates, Henrico County; Wm. Ambers, of House of Delegates, Chesterfield County; A. M. Keily, of House of Delegates, Petersburg; H. W. Thomas, Second Auditor of Virginia; St. L. L. Moncure, Chief Clerk Second Auditor's office; Joseph Mayo, Mayor of City of Richmond; Robert Howard, Clerk of Hustings Court, Richmond City; Thomas U. Dudley, Sergeant Richmond City; Littleton Tazewell, Commonwealth's Attorney, Richmond City; Wm. T. Joynes, Judge of Circuit Court, Petersburg; John A. Meredith, Judge of Circuit Court, Richmond; Wm. H. Lyons, Judge of Hustings Court, Richmond; Wm. C. Wickham, Member of Congress, Richmond District; Benj. S. Ewell, President of William and Mary College; Nat. Tyler, Editor Richmond Enquirer; R. F. Walker, Publisher of Examiner; J. R. Anderson, Richmond; R. R. Howison, Richmond; W. Goddin, Richmond; P. G. Bayley, Richmond; F. J. Smith, Richmond; Franklin Stearns, Henrico; John Lyons, Petersburg; Thomas B. Fisher, Fauquier; Wm. M. Harrison, Charles City; Cyrus Hall, Ritchie; Thomas W. Garnett, King and Queen; James A. Scott, Richmond.

 

I concur in the preceding recommendation.

J. A. CAMPBELL.

Approved for publication in the Whig, and in handbill form.

 

G. WEITZEL, Major-Gen. Commanding.

RICHMOND, VA., April 11th, 1865.

To-day the following order is published:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA,       

RICHMOND, VA., April 13th, 1865.

 

Owing to recent events, the permission for the reassembling of the gentlemen recently acting as the Legislature of Virginia is rescinded. Should any of the gentlemen come to the city under the notice of reassembling, already published, they will be furnished passports to return to their homes.

 

Any of the persons named in the call signed by J. A. Campbell and others, who are found in the city twelve hours after the publication of this notice, will be subject to arrest, unless they are residents of the city.

 

E. O. C. ORD, Major-Gen. Commanding.

Judge Campbell informs me that he saw Gen. Ord yesterday, who promised to grant me permission to take my family to the Eastern Shore of Virginia, and suggesting some omissions and alterations in the application, which I made. Judge C. is to see him again to-day, when I hope the matter will be accomplished.

Judge Campbell left my application with Gen. Ord's youngest adjutant, to whom he said the general had approved it. But the adjutant said it would have to be presented again, as there was no indorsement on it. The judge advised me to follow it up, which I did; and stayed until the adjutant did present it again to Gen. Ord, who again approved it. Then the polite aid accompanied me to Gen. Patrick's office and introduced me to him, and to Lieut.-Col. John Coughlin, "Provost Marshal General Department of Virginia," who indorsed on the paper: "These papers will be granted when called for."

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 476-9

Diary of Corporal John Worrell Northrop: Saturday, June 12, 1864

Four days I have been ill. Among new men bloody flux and dysentery prevail; this is my trouble. I am better today; a fine breeze lifts me. From last date it has rained every day. We have news from my regiment. Adjutant Carpenter was killed in a charge, both Col. Grover and Lieut. Col. Cook are disabled; Capt. J. L. Goddard, of my company, in command. The movement of trains toward Americus is on account of wounded Confederates being taken to Americus from battlefields about Atlanta. All doctors absent; no sick call for a week. The dead are daily drawn out by wagon loads.

On the 8th a Catholic priest said to us he supposed we were badly treated, but there are as kind hearted people about here as anywhere; that officers have it their own way; thought our government unwilling to exchange, but if better provisions could not be made for us, something ought to be done. Priests, though frequently in, have little to say. They are said to be using their doctrinal influence to get men to swear allegiance to the Confederacy. I do not accept this as true, though one of Erin's sons frequently visited, who said to me that he refused to renounce Uncle Sam, yesterday went out with the priest and has not returned.

I am out of conceit with many reports which originate in camp. I have no faith in innocent liars who tell so much news. For instance: Lincoln is going to give two for one to get us out; "is going to throw the nigger overboard to please Rebels"; that Secretary Stanton has said that "none but dead beats and coffee boilers are taken prisoners, and the army is better off without them." Likely some Rebel started this story, but it had weight among some. Indignant crowds gather and vent their curses on Stanton. Grant is cursed by some, so is the President and the Cabinet; for these gossipers have but little depth of thought and are easily moved by groundless rumors. It is cheering to know many on whose eyes are no scales, logically rebutting these stories and laying the blame of our abuse on the Rebel authorities, where it belongs. A small ration of rice today.

SOURCE: John Worrell Northrop, Chronicles from the Diary of a War Prisoner in Andersonville and Other Military Prisons of the South in 1864, p. 73-4

General William T. Sherman to Senator John Sherman, November 8, 1885

ST. LOUIS, Nov. 8, 1885.

Dear Brother: . . . I have been importuned from every quarter to write or say something about the "Depew" revelations,¹ but have steadily refused anything for publication. But a few days ago Blaine wrote me confidentially, as he wanted information in the preparation of his second volume. I have answered him, sending copies of letters and papers from my private files, which I believe established these points. The attempt to send General Grant along with Lew Campbell to Mexico in October, 1866, had no connection with Congress's final quarrel with President Johnson, which did not happen till after January 14, 1865, and then only because Grant allowed Stanton to regain his office as Secretary of War, after forcing him to contend for it in the courts. Indeed, Grant served in Johnson's Cabinet during Stanton's suspension, viz., from August, 1867, to January, 1868, and was, to my personal knowledge, on friendly terms with Johnson. The real cause for their quarrel was that article in the "National Intelligencer," January 14, 1868, when four members of the Cabinet accused Grant of prevaricating and deceiving the President. I was present when Grant made his explanation of the whole case to Johnson, and I understood the latter to express himself as satisfied. But the newspapers kept it up, and made the breach final and angry.

I do not believe that Johnson ever contemplated the use of force against Congress, and am equally sure that Grant, at the time, had no fear or apprehension of such a thing....

Affectionately yours,

W. T. SHERMAN.

_______________

¹ This refers to an interview with Mr. Depew referring to the Johnson-Grant difficulty at the end of the war.

SOURCE: Rachel Sherman Thorndike, Editor, The Sherman Letters: Correspondence Between General and Senator Sherman from 1837 to 1891, p. 368-9

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, June 2, 1866

There was no Cabinet-meeting yesterday, and labor in the Department was suspended on account of the funeral of Lieutenant-General Scott.

Seward sends me a note in pencil, signed by his initials, with a telegraph from Dart, District Attorney of Western New York, stating that Captain Bryson wanted two tugs to assist him in guarding the river. Seward says, in pencil, that the President thinks I had better charter the steamers. He sent his clerk, Mr. Chew, with this note. The whole thing was one of those low, intriguing, petty, contemptible proceedings, shunning responsibility, to which Seward sometimes resorts. I am sorry to write so of one in his position and an associate, but I expressed the matter to Chew without hard words, showing Seward's weakness, [and saying] that this is a war on the Irish in which he, Stanton, and Grant fear to do their duty, but wish me to assume it.

I called on the President and spoke of the management of this Fenian movement a little earnestly, and a little freely. Reminded him that I had some weeks ago, when the subject was brought forward in Cabinet, suggested that the Irish population was an element in our politics, and, therefore, it seemed proper that there should be unity in the Cabinet and among high officials. I consequently proposed that General Grant, who was stationing the military forces on the frontiers West and South, should make a formal communication in accord with the Secretary of War, which all could approve and with which we should all be identified. Stanton was alarmed, I saw; did not think it necessary to take such steps; and from that time the subject has been dropped. I remarked to the President that the proceedings had been singular; that this Fenian movement had appeared to me to be a great bubble, nevertheless there was no denying the fact that large numbers were engaged in it; that they had large supplies of arms; that along our frontier from Eastport to Detroit there had been gatherings of armed men threatening to cross into Canada; that we had sent a naval force by request to Eastport; that our only gunboat on the Lakes had been detained by special request at Buffalo; and now the Secretary of State was calling on me to charter steamers and arm them; chartering vessels for military purposes belonged properly to the Army or War Department. By treaty stipulation we are to have but one naval vessel on the Lakes. Where, I asked him, were the revenue cutters which performed police duty? In all this time the War Department has done nothing. No proclamation has been issued. How and by what authority are we to capture or interfere with prisoners?

The President said it would be well to communicate with Commander Bryson, of the naval steamer Michigan, and ascertain whether additional vessels were wanted. I said that we had revenue cutters on the Lakes, but none were at Buffalo, where they were most wanted; that the Michigan had been detained there now some weeks awaiting a cutter. He thought I had better see the Secretaries of Treasury and State.

McCulloch was confident there were cutters at Buffalo, but on sending for the clerk in charge he found he was mistaken. He said he had turned the whole subject of Fenianism over to Attorney-General Speed, who is devoted to Stanton and Seward.

Seward was in a fog. Did not want to issue a proclamation. I asked what the naval vessels were to do, what authority I had to charter steamers if there was not a state of war. If it was police duty, he or the Treasury should attend to it. I inquired about the military. He said Stanton wanted to keep clear of this question. I well knew this, and he wants me to do duties which belong to him and thus enlist the Irish element against the Administration.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 518-20

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, June 4, 1866

Bryson telegraphed yesterday that he had captured seven hundred Fenians crossing the river at Black Rock. I sent the telegram to the President and to Seward, and soon after called on the President. He seemed a little perplexed. Said we had an elephant on our hands. I asked whether they were prisoners of war and what was to be done with them. He thought we must wait and we should soon have inquiries.

Shortly after my return Seward sent his carriage for me. I went to his house. He and Speed were sitting on the back porch. Speed had a telegram from Dart, District Attorney, stating the capture and making inquiries. Seward asked about the prisoners and what accommodations the Navy had. I told him none whatever and that these men could hardly be considered prisoners of war, even if we had accommodations; that they ought, if prisoners of war, at once to be turned over to the custody of the military. He said that would not do. Stanton wanted nothing to do with them, — there was no military force there. I told him there were officers and they could call on the militia or call out volunteer companies in Buffalo. This would be necessary, for such a number could not be retained by the civil authorities without a guard. He said, "Let them run away." Speed said that would not do. There might be and probably would be extradition claims for the leaders. I asked them if they thought that these men were prisoners of war, for I did not. Nor did I know how far their capture would be justified.

Seward said the capture was all right; they should, perhaps, be considered prisoners of state; that he and Speed had talked over the matter before I came, and he had prepared a couple of telegrams. Fred Seward read one, which was signed by Speed. Seward proposed that I should telegraph Bryson that he, Seward, would take charge of them as prisoners of state. Said Dart must attend to them. I thought the marshal the proper person. He said that was the same thing. Asked how much it would cost to feed them, whether it could be done for a dollar each day. I told him it would cost more than that, for he could not confine them in Buffalo jail, or any inclosure, but must have a guard. I did not see how he could get along without military help, which would necessarily be attended with expense. He said he would send word to Meade.

I again adverted to the matter of a proclamation when such movements were being made upon the border, but Seward interrupted me, said no, that was not necessary. The thing was just right. He felt, he said, very happy over it. Wanted neither Speed nor myself should say anything about the matter until the regular Cabinet-meeting on Tuesday.

Governor Morgan at my house last evening introduced the subject of Reconstruction and the position of things in the Senate, remarking, as though casually, there really was now very little difference between the President and Congress. I promptly, and perhaps unwisely in my promptness, differed with him, and told him it was not wise to attempt to deceive ourselves in the matter, that the difference was broad, deep, and such as could not be reconciled.

He asked if I did not think the proposed amendment of the Constitution, of the Senate, an improvement on that which had passed the House; and whether that was not a step towards getting together. I told him that for myself, without speaking for others, I was opposed to the scheme for changing the Constitution now before Congress and opposed to any amendment while one third of the States were excluded from participating or giving their views, deprived, in fact, of their rightful representation; that I, therefore, did not feel as though there could be harmonious action, and it appeared to me a mistake to suppose that the President, a Constitutionalist, and the exclusionists, who were not, were likely to act together.

I have no doubt that Morgan came expressly to sound me and ascertain whether we would be united on the exclusion plan. Not unlikely Seward sent him. Morgan has evidently been trapped in the caucus into a pledge, direct or implied.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 520-2

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, June 5, 1866

At the Cabinet-meeting an hour or more was wasted in discussing a claim of Madame Bertinatti, a piece of favoritism in which the President has been imposed upon by Seward and Stanton. It seemed to me that it was brought forward and talked over for the express purpose of excluding more important subjects. There is in the Cabinet not that candor and free interchange of opinions on the great questions before the country that there should be. Minor matters are talked over, often at great length.

As McCulloch and myself came away, we spoke of this unpleasant state of things, and we came to the conclusion that we would, as a matter of duty, communicate with the President on this subject of want of frankness and freedom in the Cabinet, also in regard to his general policy and the condition of public affairs. The great mistake, I think, is in attempting to keep up the Republican organization at the expense of the President. It is that organization which the conspirators are using to destroy the Executive.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 522

Diary of Gideon Welles: Wednesday, June 6, 1866

Montgomery Blair still persists that Seward is false to the President and that he and Stanton have an understanding. There are many strange things in Seward's course, and he is a strange man. I am inclined to think he is less false to the President than adhesive to the Secretary of State. He does not like Johnson less, but Seward more. Seward is afraid of the Democrats and does not love the Republicans. But he feels that he is identified with the Republicans, thinks he has rendered them service, and considers himself, under the tutoring of Thurlow Weed, as more than any one else the father of the party. The managers of the party dislike him and distrust him, fear that he will by some subtlety injure them, and do not give him their confidence. The Democrats look upon him as a puzzle, a Mephistopheles, a budget of uncertainties, and never have and never will trust him.

The President believes Seward a true supporter of his Administration. I think he means to support it. The President finds him a convenience, but does not always rely upon his judgment. His trust in Seward begets general distrust of the Administration. It is remarkable that none of Seward's devoted friends—men who under Weed breathe through his nostrils—sustain the President on his great measures. Raymond has been a whiffler on public measures, but no others have ever doubted, or dared express a doubt of, the Radical policy. This puzzles me.

Stanton is very anxious to retain his place, and yet he has a more intimate relation with the Radical leaders than with the President or any member of the Cabinet. His opinion and judgment, I think, the President values more than he does Seward's, yet he distrusts him more,—feels that he is insincere. But Stanton studies to conform to the President's decisions and determinations when he cannot change them, apparently unaware that he occupies an equivocal position, both with the President and the public.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 523 

Diary of Gideon Welles: Thursday, June 7, 1866

The President has finally issued a proclamation in regard to the Fenians. It should have appeared earlier, but Seward has counseled delay. Speed put out a preliminary order, which appeared to me to be designedly mischievous. I so said to the President, who remarked that it had struck him as offensive, and he so told Speed before it was published, yet it was not altered. The effect will be likely to throw the Irish against the Administration, or make them, at all events, indifferent towards it, whereas this all might have been different.

It is one of many little things which impresses me there is intended mischief towards the President. Speed acts with Seward and Stanton thoroughly, and his peculiarly worded order, if not suggested by them, is just what they wished.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 523-4

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, June 8, 1866

But little of importance at the Cabinet. I had some conversation with the President after adjournment, and in the evening McCulloch and myself called upon him by appointment. Our conversation was frank, extending more than an hour. We all concurred that it was not possible to go on much longer with a view of preserving the integrity of the Republican Party, for the Radicals are using the organization to injure the President. There is direct antagonism between the leaders who control Congress and the Administration. The Democrats in Congress are more in harmony with the Administration than are the Radicals;— then why repel the Democrats and favor the Radicals?

We McCulloch and myself spoke of the want of cordial and free intercourse among the members of the Cabinet, that important questions touching differences in the Republican Party were never discussed at our meetings, that it was obvious we did not concur in opinion, and, therefore, the really important topics were avoided. The President admitted and lamented this, as he has done to me repeatedly. He expressed his surprise that Harlan and Speed should, with these understood views, desire to remain. I asked if there were not others among us as objectionable and more harmful. McCulloch said he could not believe Seward was faithless, that he fully agreed with him whenever they had conversed. I admitted the same as regarded Seward and myself, still there were some things I could not reconcile. He is not treacherous to the President, but is under the influence of Stanton and acts with him. His intimates, as well as Stanton's, in Congress, voted steadily with the Radicals; his speech at Auburn was a whistle for the Republicans to keep united and repelled Democrats. The President was reluctant to give up Seward, whose equivocal course is characteristic, but evidently had some doubts as to his sincerity and ulterior purpose. He suggested that Seward should be called in to a conference and come to an explicit understanding. This we all concurred in, though I remarked we should have fair words and no decisive action. But it was left to the President to invite a meeting.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 524-5

Diary of Gideon Welles: Wednesday, June 13, 1866

Dined this evening at Tassara's, the Spanish Minister. The banquet was given in honor of Dulce, late Governor-General of Cuba. Seward and Stanton were the only Cabinet-members besides myself who were present. Sir Frederick Bruce, Montholon, Baron Gerolt, etc., etc., were present. General Dulce does not speak nor understand English, and therefore all conversation was through an interpreter. As I sat at his right, and could not talk Spanish, we were not very sociable. He is a quiet, gentlemanly man with little of the look of a Spanish grandee.

I was sorry to hear Seward and Stanton chuckling over an allowance which they had succeeded in getting for Mrs. Bertinatti, the wife of the Italian Minister. They evidently thought it an adroit piece of management, and I judge the President has been misled in regard to it. Mrs. B. was a Rebel Mrs. Bass, of Mississippi, and her claim unjust. I apprehended it should not have been allowed.

The President has made the annual Executive appointments of midshipmen. In this he exhibited more painstaking than Mr. Lincoln, and gave less authority to me, which I did not regret. Usually Mr. Lincoln specified two or three special cases and then turned over the residue to me. Mr. Johnson desired me to go over the applicants twice with him in detail, got, as far as he could, particulars, and retained the whole schedule of names for more than a week, occasionally speaking of some one or more to me. His aim seemed to be to confer the appointment on the poor and deserving, regardless of locality, names, and influence. His selections were probably good ones, but some of them would have been different had the choice devolved on me.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 526

Diary of Gideon Welles: Thursday, June 14, 1866

The House yesterday passed the Senate proposition to change the Constitution. It was before that body about two hours and was passed under the previous question. Such a reckless body, ready to break up the foundations of the government, has never been assembled, and such legislation, regardless of the organic law, would not only destroy public confidence but ruin the country. All is for party, regardless of right or of honest principle.

Representations are sent out that Congress has made great concessions in adopting the Senate's proposition, that they have yielded about everything, and that the President is pretty well satisfied with the question as now presented. There is design in all this, and some professed friends of the President are among the most active in it. The New York Times, and papers strongly under the influence of Seward and Weed, as well as their partisans, maintain these views. Thurlow Weed has been here within a few days and is always on errands of mischief. All looks to me like a systematic plan to absorb the President, or to destroy him. He still leans on Seward and seems under his influence, though with doubts and occasional misgivings. Seward himself defers to Stanton, - is becoming afraid of him. That Seward is cheated I cannot believe, and if he is not cheated I am constrained to believe the President is. And who is to undeceive him? I have on more than one occasion suggested my doubts, but while he has received my suggestions attentively he has pondered in obvious distress, and the subject is of so delicate a nature that I cannot do more.

At the very time that the House was adopting this Constitutional change, Green Clay Smith was nominated Governor of Montana. Smith professes to be with the President, but went with the Radicals on the test oath, and is made Governor.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 526-7

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, June 15, 1866

Nothing special at Cabinet. On Tuesday Seward submitted a correspondence between Schenck and Romero, the Mexican Minister. It was a very improper proceeding, and R. evidently thought it wrong in giving a copy to the Secretary of State. Seward mentioned it as of little moment, — a sort of irregularity. Stanton said there was nothing wrong so far as Schenck was concerned, but that it was a questionable proceeding on the part of Romero. I declared my entire disapproval of the whole transaction and that it was one of the many indications of ignoring and crowding on the Executive.

The others were silent, but, after a little earnest talk, Seward said he would give the subject further consideration. To-day he brought forward the correspondence with an indorsement disapproving it and said he should communicate it to Romero.

Senator Doolittle took breakfast with me this morning. We went over the political questions and discussed what had best be done. Both were satisfied that the time had arrived when the Administration must take a stand. The game of the Radicals and of certain conspicuously professed friends of the President, that the Republican Party must be sustained and kept united at any sacrifice, even the surrender of the Constitution in some of its important features, and to the jeopardy of the Union itself, must be checked, and the opposition to any such policy made clearly manifest. We called on the President and made known our opinions. He concurred and thought a prompt call for a national convention of friends of the Union should be issued. Doolittle agreed to undertake to draw up such a call, but desired that I would also place on paper my views. He proposed that the call should be signed by the members of the Cabinet, or such of them as approved the measure. I told them that I, personally, had no objection, but I questioned its propriety and effect.

McCulloch, with whom I had a brief interview after Cabinet-meeting, told me that the elder Blair was preparing the call. I saw Judge Blair this evening and found him much engaged, yet not altogether satisfied. He expresses apprehension that Seward has control of the President and has so interwoven himself into the mind and course of the President as not to be shaken off, and if so that the Democrats must go forward independent of both President and Congress. Says the Democratic leaders, many of whom he has seen, such as Dean Richmond, Dawson, and others, say they will go in under the President's lead provided he will rid himself of Seward, but they have no confidence in him, would rather give up Johnson than retain Seward. Governor Andrew of Massachusetts takes a similar view. B. says his father has had a talk with the President; that he himself has written him fully; that he advised the President not to dismiss Harlan unless Seward also went; that the President expressed doubts whether the Senate would confirm two Cabinet officers; that he was told there would be no difficulty; if there were, he would let the assistants carry on the Departments, and assign General Grant ad interim to the War; that Grant had been consulted and assented to the arrangement.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 527-9

Diary of Gideon Welles: Wednesday, May 23, 1866

Fox called on me last evening and unexpectedly bade me farewell. Said he would not trust himself to call at the Department to-day. He was very much affected, said words were wanting to express his high respect and admiration for me and the qualities which I possessed for the position which I filled. Spoke of over five years' intercourse, during which there had not been one unpleasant word, nor, as he was aware, an unpleasant thought between us. I have not time now to speak of F. and his qualities, but shall do so. He has been useful to the country and to me, relieving me of many labors and defending me, I believe, always. His manner and ways have sometimes given offense to others, but he is patriotic and true.

The President and his Cabinet were serenaded this evening. I am opposed to these methods of calling out public men; have respectfully suggested to both Presidents Lincoln and Johnson that it was not advisable to address gatherings at such times, and was determined not to break over the rule myself. I had, therefore, given the subject no attention and was embarrassed when a crowd of perhaps a thousand appeared before my door with a band of music. Declining to make remarks, I stated that I approved the policy of the Administration and was for the union of the States and the rights of the States.

I understand Stanton read off a long address and McCulloch and Dennison each made speeches. The latter acquitted himself with credit, and Stanton read his prepared address from his door, a man standing each side of him with a lighted candle. Dennison made a soothing speech for the party; said everything was lovely. Speed ran away, and Harlan would not show himself.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 512-3

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, May 29, 1866

At the Cabinet-meeting word was received of the death of Lieutenant-General Scott at West Point at the advanced age of eighty. He was great in stature, and had great qualities with some singular weaknesses or defects. Vanity was his great infirmity, and that was much exaggerated by political or party opponents. He had lofty political aspirations in former years, but they had expired before him. Courteous, deferential, and respectful to his official superiors always, he expected and required the same from others. Though something of a politician, I do not think his judgment and opinion in regard to public affairs were always correct or reliable. In the early stages of the late Civil War I thought, and still think, his counsels were not wise, and yet they received extraordinary favor and had great weight with President Lincoln. My impressions are that Mr. Seward persuaded the President that the opinions and advice of General Scott were of more value than those of any others or all others, and Seward was before Mr. Lincoln's inauguration thought to be the coming man. This he used and contrived by flattery to infuse into General S. the advice on public affairs which he wished to have commended to the President when he made military inquiries.

The course of the General at the beginning of our troubles was equivocal and unreliable. He began right and with good advice to Mr. Buchanan to garrison the forts of the South. A small military force in different localities would have served as rallying-points, strengthened the union sentiment and checked disunion. But he seemed to have doubted his own advice, halted, and after Congress convened in 1860 would fall into Mr. Seward's views and was ready to let the "wayward sisters go in peace." He, in those days, imbibed an impression, common among the politicians in Washington, that Mr. Lincoln, the newly elected President, was unequal to the position, for he had not figured on the national arena. It was supposed, therefore, that one of his Cabinet would be the managing man of the incoming administration, and that Mr. Seward, his principal competitor in the Republican nominating convention, who was to be the Secretary of State, would be that manager. This was the expectation of Mr. Seward himself, as well as of General Scott and others. He had been a conspicuous party leader for twenty years, with a reputation much overrated for political sagacity, and with really very little devotion to political principles, which he always subordinated to his ambition. It was not surprising that General Scott viewed him as the coming man, and as Mr. Seward was a man of expedients more than principle, he soon made it obvious that he intended to have no war, but was ready to yield anything—the Constitution itself if necessary to satisfy the Secessionists. The General under this influence abandoned his early recommendations and ultimately advised surrendering all the forts.

The Senate, after many caucuses on the part of the Republican members, have an amendment of the Constitution modified from that reported by the construction, or obstruction, committee. This amendment may be less offensive than that which passed the House by excluding one of the States from any voice or participation, but it ought not to receive the sanction of the Senate. Yet I have little doubt that it will and that the canvassing has been a process of drilling the weak and better-minded members into its support. Disgraceful as it may seem, there is no doubt that secret party caucus machinery has been in operation to carry through a Constitutional Amendment. Senators have committed themselves to it without hearing opposing arguments, or having any other discussion than that of a strictly party character in a strictly private meeting. Of course this grave and important matter is prejudged, predetermined. Eleven States are precluded from all representation in either house, and, of the Senators in Washington, all not pledged to a faction are excluded from the caucus when the decision is made. This is the statesmanship, the legislation, the enlightened political action of the present Congress. Such doctrines, management, and principles, or want of principles, would sooner or later ruin any country.

I happen to know that Fessenden had long interviews with Stanton last week, though I know not the subject matter of their conferences. Fessenden sometimes hesitates to support a wrong measure. Seward has a personal party in Congress,—men who seldom act on important questions in opposition to him and his views. All of these men vote in opposition to the President's policy. Raymond alone vacillates and trims, but this is with an understanding, for Raymond and Seward could, if necessary, carry others with them, provided they were earnestly disposed.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 514-7

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, May 4, 1866

The subject of Reconstruction was not discussed to-day in Cabinet. Seward, while the President was engaged with some one, remarked on the publication which had been made of our last meeting, saying that he concluded the report had been made by Stanton, for the

papers had said it was from a Cabinet Minister, and there was no interest felt as regarded any one else but Stanton. There were, he remarked, some other indications. All this was said playfully as he walked the room and took snuff. But I could see it was not play for Stanton, whose countenance betrayed his vexation. Seward saw it also, and when Stanton said that Seward was the only one who would do this,—draw up and publish proceedings in Cabinet, the subject was dropped.

As we came out at the close of the meeting, McCulloch said to me that he had hoped there would have been some call for a decided expression from Stanton, for the newspapers and many honest men were disputing in regard to the truth of the report of his views in the Cabinet exposition, and he (McC.) thought it wrong that a Cabinet Minister should occupy a false or an equivocal position on such a question, at such a time. In all of which I concurred.

There is no doubt that the Radicals are surprised and many of them incredulous at the enunciation of Stanton's remarks and position in the Cabinet. I apprehend that no one was more astounded at the publication than Stanton himself. It ended any double course, if one had been pursued. Sumner has repeatedly assured me, most emphatically, that Stanton was with him and opposed to the President's policy. Others have said the same. These men were deceived and have been until now, and they cannot believe they have been duped.

The President has not been unaware of the conflicting statements in regard to Stanton, and for this reason adopted the course of calling out the individual opinions of each member of his Cabinet and then took the opportunity of throwing them in a condensed form before the public. This gives the attitude and views of the Administration and of each member of it on the subject of the report of the Reconstruction Committee in advance of the debate in Congress, and prevents misrepresentations and false assumptions in regard to them. It has been the policy of the Radical leaders to claim that the Cabinet was divided, that Stanton and others were with them, and hence their papers and orators have eulogized and magnified Stanton into enormous proportions. All this has now terminated. I did not understand Stanton as expressing himself quite so decidedly as he is represented to have done in the report, though it appeared to me he meant to be understood as represented. No doubt he dissembles. He said he did not approve the Directory plans in many respects, and if he were compelled to act upon them as now presented he should avow himself opposed; and he thought Congress and the President not so far apart that they could not come together.

I followed in direct antagonism and objected unequivocally to the whole programme. I had no faith in Constitutional amendments at this time, in the present existing state of affairs, with eleven States unrepresented and without any voice in the deliberations; nor could I admit that Congress could prescribe terms to the States on which they should be permitted to enjoy their Constitutional right of representation, or that Congress should usurp and take to itself the pardoning power, which is a prerogative of the Executive, nor were they to prosecute and punish the people without trial. I, therefore, antagonized Stanton purposely. He saw and felt it. Hence I think he hardly committed himself so fully as represented. But he does not deny it. Will he?

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 499-501