Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, May 29, 1866

At the Cabinet-meeting word was received of the death of Lieutenant-General Scott at West Point at the advanced age of eighty. He was great in stature, and had great qualities with some singular weaknesses or defects. Vanity was his great infirmity, and that was much exaggerated by political or party opponents. He had lofty political aspirations in former years, but they had expired before him. Courteous, deferential, and respectful to his official superiors always, he expected and required the same from others. Though something of a politician, I do not think his judgment and opinion in regard to public affairs were always correct or reliable. In the early stages of the late Civil War I thought, and still think, his counsels were not wise, and yet they received extraordinary favor and had great weight with President Lincoln. My impressions are that Mr. Seward persuaded the President that the opinions and advice of General Scott were of more value than those of any others or all others, and Seward was before Mr. Lincoln's inauguration thought to be the coming man. This he used and contrived by flattery to infuse into General S. the advice on public affairs which he wished to have commended to the President when he made military inquiries.

The course of the General at the beginning of our troubles was equivocal and unreliable. He began right and with good advice to Mr. Buchanan to garrison the forts of the South. A small military force in different localities would have served as rallying-points, strengthened the union sentiment and checked disunion. But he seemed to have doubted his own advice, halted, and after Congress convened in 1860 would fall into Mr. Seward's views and was ready to let the "wayward sisters go in peace." He, in those days, imbibed an impression, common among the politicians in Washington, that Mr. Lincoln, the newly elected President, was unequal to the position, for he had not figured on the national arena. It was supposed, therefore, that one of his Cabinet would be the managing man of the incoming administration, and that Mr. Seward, his principal competitor in the Republican nominating convention, who was to be the Secretary of State, would be that manager. This was the expectation of Mr. Seward himself, as well as of General Scott and others. He had been a conspicuous party leader for twenty years, with a reputation much overrated for political sagacity, and with really very little devotion to political principles, which he always subordinated to his ambition. It was not surprising that General Scott viewed him as the coming man, and as Mr. Seward was a man of expedients more than principle, he soon made it obvious that he intended to have no war, but was ready to yield anything—the Constitution itself if necessary to satisfy the Secessionists. The General under this influence abandoned his early recommendations and ultimately advised surrendering all the forts.

The Senate, after many caucuses on the part of the Republican members, have an amendment of the Constitution modified from that reported by the construction, or obstruction, committee. This amendment may be less offensive than that which passed the House by excluding one of the States from any voice or participation, but it ought not to receive the sanction of the Senate. Yet I have little doubt that it will and that the canvassing has been a process of drilling the weak and better-minded members into its support. Disgraceful as it may seem, there is no doubt that secret party caucus machinery has been in operation to carry through a Constitutional Amendment. Senators have committed themselves to it without hearing opposing arguments, or having any other discussion than that of a strictly party character in a strictly private meeting. Of course this grave and important matter is prejudged, predetermined. Eleven States are precluded from all representation in either house, and, of the Senators in Washington, all not pledged to a faction are excluded from the caucus when the decision is made. This is the statesmanship, the legislation, the enlightened political action of the present Congress. Such doctrines, management, and principles, or want of principles, would sooner or later ruin any country.

I happen to know that Fessenden had long interviews with Stanton last week, though I know not the subject matter of their conferences. Fessenden sometimes hesitates to support a wrong measure. Seward has a personal party in Congress,—men who seldom act on important questions in opposition to him and his views. All of these men vote in opposition to the President's policy. Raymond alone vacillates and trims, but this is with an understanding, for Raymond and Seward could, if necessary, carry others with them, provided they were earnestly disposed.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 514-7

Congressman Albert G. Brown’s Speech on the Slavery Question, August 29, 1850

SPEECH IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AUGUST 29, 1850.

MR. BROWN said he designed to make a few remarks only in reply to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. McClernand], and the gentleman from New York [Mr. Brooks], who had just taken his seat. Both these gentlemen had taken a position which had been assumed since the beginning of the session by many gentlemen from the Northern States, and had put forth views which they seemed to regard as likely to obtain the favor of the South. If these gentlemen (said Mr. B.) were right in supposing that we of the South are mere shadows, occupied only in the pursuit of shadows, then they might succeed in the object at which they aim. But if we are real, substantial men, things of life and not shadows, then they will find themselves mistaken in their views. What was it the South had demanded? She had asked to be permitted to go into these newly-acquired territories, and to carry her property with her, as the North does; and he desired to tell his friends from Illinois and from New York, that she would be satisfied with nothing less than this. It was in vain to tell the people of the South that you will not press the proviso excluding slavery, because circumstances are such as to exclude slavery without the operation of this provision, and therefore it is not necessary to adopt it. He would tell gentlemen who use this argument, that the southern people care not about the means by which slavery is to be excluded. They will not inquire whether nature is unpropitious to the existence of slavery there, while they know that the whole course and desire of the North has been with a view to its exclusion from the shores of the Pacific. It was only necessary to look at the history of the last few years to satisfy ourselves that it has been the purpose of the North to produce this exclusion.

The honorable gentleman from Illinois had administered a welldeserved rebuke to the factious spirit of free soil, as manifested in the proposition of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Root]; for that he (Mr. B.) felt as profoundly grateful as any other man. It was a spirit which ought to be rebuked everywhere. It deserved the universal execration of all good men. But it was his duty to say to his honorable friend, that so much of his remarks as were directed against the proviso, on the ground that it was not necessary to our exclusion, failed to excite his (Mr. B.'s) gratitude, as they would fail to elicit the gratitude of the southern people. The gentleman from Illinois would not be informed that he had Mr. B.'s highest respect as a gentleman, and his sincere personal regard—but, as a southern man, he felt bound to say at all times, and on all occasions, to all persons, friends and foes, that he and his section demanded as a right an equal participation in all these territories, and they could not feel grateful to any man who placed his opposition to the proviso on no higher grounds than that they were excluded by other means. If his honorable friend had placed his opposition to the proviso on the grounds that the South had rights, and that those rights ought to be respected, then Mr. B. and the whole South would have felt a thrill of gratitude which none of them would be slow to express. If the proviso was wrong, it ought to be opposed on the high ground of principle, and not on the feeble assumption that it was unnecessary. To oppose it on the ground that it was not necessary, was to say in effect that it would be sustained if it was necessary.

The gentleman from New York had just informed the House that he was elected as a Wilmot proviso man, and now he rises and makes it his boast that he is backing out from the position he then assumed.

Mr. BROOKS (Mr. Brown yielding) said, that although this proviso was made a test, he had told the people who elected him that he would not pledge himself to vote for it; that he was willing to remain at home, but that, if he was elected, he must go as an independent man.

Mr. BROWN resumed. The gentleman from New York had certainly taken high ground. But, if he was not mistaken, that gentleman was the editor of a daily paper in New York (the Express), and in that journal, unless he was again mistaken, the Wilmot proviso had been supported. The gentleman, therefore, had not left much room for doubt as to his real sentiments. There was very little occasion for him now to come forward and to say whether he was for or against the proviso. But he desired to ask that gentleman, whether he was for or against this proviso when its adoption was deemed necessary for the exclusion of slaves from the new territories? If he was then in favor of the proviso, the fact that he is now opposed to it, because he is satisfied that the

South cannot carry her slaves thither on account of the hostility of the climate and soil, and other more potential causes, his position was one not calculated to excite the gratitude of the friends of the South.

Mr. BROOKS (Mr. Brown yielding) said, he had not changed one principle, but he had been converted to the gentleman's doctrine of nonintervention, or non-action. It had always been his opinion that the power of the general government ought never to be exercised, whether in favor of or against slavery. If the South should suffer from her inability to carry her slave property into these territories, the North would suffer still more if she was permitted to do so, because her citizens would not consent to go to these territories if slavery existed there.

Mr. HOLMES. I congratulate the whole country that the gentleman from New York has given up his adhesion to the Wilmot proviso.

Mr. BROWN (resuming). The conversion of the gentleman from New York to the doctrine of non-intervention had come about as much too late as his abandonment of the Wilmot proviso. They were both too late to do any good. If the gentleman had kept his hands off slavery before the last presidential election, then, indeed, the southern people might have had some reason for gratitude. But, instead of doing that, the gentleman adheres to the proviso until it is too late for non-intervention to do any good, and then he forsakes the former and becomes a convert to the latter.

The gentleman from New York appeared to be greatly horrified at what he was pleased to call political associations on this floor—at the strange phenomenon of the two great extremes of the North and the South voting together. He would explain this apparent inconsistency. The South regarded the whole of the territory to latitude 42° and east of the Rio Grande as the property of Texas, and was not disposed to permit any portion of that territory to be surrendered for the purpose of being made free soil. This was the position occupied by the southern extreme. The northern extreme considers the title of the United States to all this territory as clear beyond dispute, and therefore are opposed to purchasing it. This is the reason why the two extremes are acting together on principles apparently antagonistical, for the purpose of defeating this bill. Is it remarkable that he (Mr. B.) and his southern associates, believing conscientiously that the title to the country, in the language of the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. Marshall], is in Texas, and that the United States has neither title nor color of title, should refuse to give it up? Is it strange that other gentlemen, believing, as they say they do, that the title of the United States is clear and indisputable, should refuse to pay Texas ten millions to withdraw an unfounded claim? Gentlemen may pretend to marvel at this singular political conjunction, but they all know perfectly well the motives which have produced it.

He, however, deemed that it would be found quite as remarkable a political phenomenon that the gentleman from New York, and many of his political friends from the South, should be found cheek-by-jowl with these same detested Free-Soilers on another question. We vote with them from exactly opposite motives, as the gentleman and the whole country very well know. But from what motive does the gentleman and his southern friends vote with them for the admission of California? Is there any opposite motive there? None, sir, none. There is one motive common to them all, and that is, the admission of a free state into the Union. The gentleman expresses special wonder that we are found voting with the Free-Soilers. Can he give any other reason than the one just assigned why he and his southern friends vote with them on another question?

Until the gentleman could assign some satisfactory reason why he and his party, North and South, were found in political fellowship with every Free-Soiler and Abolitionist in the land for the admission of California, it would be modest to suppress his wonder at the accidental association of Free-Soilers and southern gentlemen on the boundary of Texas.

The difference between us (said Mr. B.) is this: we act with them from extremely opposite motives; you from concurrent opinions and sentiments; and we will leave to posterity and the country to decide which stands most justified in the eyes of all honest and impartial men.

But his main object in rising to address the House was to say what were the demands of the South. She asks for an equal participation in the enjoyment of all the common property; and if this be denied, she demands a fair division. Give it to her, give it by non-intervention, by non-action, or by any other means, and she will be satisfied. This is her right, and she demands it. But if, instead of doing this, the North insists on taking away the territory and abridging the rights of the South, she will not submit to the wrong in peace, nor meanly kiss the hand that smites her. He uttered no threat, but it was his duty to say that the South could neither forget nor forgive a wrong like this. She cannot forget that these new territories were purchased in part by her blood and treasure, and she will not forgive the power that snatches them from her. He had never undertaken to say what course the South would feel it her duty to pursue on the consummation of her unjust exclusion from these territories, but he would say, that the act of her exclusion would sink like a poisonous arrow into the hearts of her people, and it would rankle there, and in the hearts of their children, as long as the union of these states continued. The consummation of northern policy may not produce an immediate disunion of these states; but it will produce a disunion of northern and southern hearts; and he left it to others to say whether a political union under such circumstances could be long maintained, or whether it was worth maintaining.

It can excite no feeling of gratitude that the gentleman from New York [Mr. Brooks] says he is now opposed to the Wilmot proviso. He is for the spirit of the proviso. He would be for its letter, if it was necessary for our exclusion. He consents to abandon it simply because it is useless. There was a day when it was potential. Then the gentleman was for it. Now, when he supposes our exclusion almost perfect, and the means at hand for its entire consummation, he magnanimously abandons the proviso. Wonderful liberality! Amazing generosity to the South! If the gentleman is not canonized as the most generous man of his age, surely gratitude will have failed to perform her office.

We of the South well understand the means employed for our exclusion. This proviso, once so much in favor with the gentleman from New York, now so graciously abandoned, performed its office. It was held in terrorem over California: southern property, termed as property always is, was kept out of the country. The column of southern emigration was checked at the onset—whilst every appliance was resorted to to swell the column of northern emigration. Every means was resorted to which political ingenuity could devise and federal power make effective, to hurry on this emigration, and then, with indecent haste, the emigrants, yet without names or habitations in the country, were induced to make a pretended state constitution, and insert in it the Wilmot proviso. The gentleman need not be told how far the federal administration was responsible for these things. He need not be reminded that he and his quondam proviso friends were prominent actors in all these scenes. Need he be told that the proviso was the SHIBBOLETH of their power? It was used so long as it was effective. It was used for our prostration, and now it is thrown aside for no better reason than that it is useless— that it is no longer necessary.

Does not the gentleman from New York know very well that the California constitution is no constitution until adopted by Congress? Does he not know that that constitution contains the proviso? Does he not know that the proviso is powerless in that constitution until sanctioned by Congress? And does he not mean to vote for that constitution, with the full intent and purpose of giving vitality to that proviso? With how much of liberality—with how much of justice to the South, does the honorable gentleman come forward to assure us that he is against the proviso? The gentleman is opposed to ingrafting the proviso on the territorial bills for Utah and New Mexico; and we thank him for his opposition. But what reason does the gentleman give for this opposition? The decrees of God have already excluded us. He has no idea that slavery would ever penetrate the country opposed to the proviso, because it is unnecessary. If it was at all necessary for our exclusion, the honorable gentleman would be for it. He must excuse us if our gratitude fails to become frantic for this singular exhibition of forbearance and liberality.

Mr. Brown was willing to trust the rights of the South on the strict doctrine of non-intervention. If God, in his providence, had in fact decreed against the introduction of slavery into Utah and New Mexico, he and his people bowed in humble submission to that decree. We think the soil and climate are propitious to slave labor; and if they are not, we shall never seek the country with our slaves. All we ask of you is, that you will not interpose the authority of this government for us or against us. We do not fear the Mexican laws, if you will in good faith stand by the doctrine of non-intervention. We will risk the protection of the Federal Constitution, and the banner of the stars and stripes, for ourselves and our property. All we ask of you is, that you will in good faith stand neutral.

He had never announced his purpose of voting against the territorial government for Utah. He meant to vote for it, and he should vote for the territorial government for New Mexico if the boundary was so arranged as to respect the rights of Texas. He was opposed to the admission of California, because her constitution was a fraud—a fraud deliberately perpetrated for the purpose of excluding the South; but he was in favor of giving governments to Utah and New Mexico on the ground of strict non-intervention. He did not want to be cheated in this business, and he therefore proposed this question to the honorable gentleman from New York: Suppose we pass these Utah and New Mexican bills at this session without the Wilmot proviso; and suppose the Southern people commence moving into the territories with their slaves, and it becomes apparent that they are to be slave territories and ultimately slave states; and suppose that the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Root], at the opening of the next Congress, offers the Wilmot proviso with a view to check our emigration and to exclude us from the territories with our slaves, will the gentleman, if a member of Congress, then vote for the proviso?

Mr. BROOKS replied in the negative, as far as he was heard.

Mr. BROWN. Then if we take our slave property into the territories, we are assured that we are not to be disturbed in its peaceable and quiet enjoyment by any act of this government.

Mr. BROOKS said, that if he should be here he certainly should not vote to repeal any territorial bill for which he had voted. He only spoke for himself.

Mr. BROWN was gratified to hear this statement; whilst he could not insist on the gentleman answering for the North, he must express his regret that he did not feel authorized to answer at least for his political friends. The gentleman had answered manfully, and, he did not doubt, sincerely; and if the whole North, or a majority even, would answer in the same way, it would go far towards restoring harmony. He asked honorable gentlemen whether they were ready to pipe to the tune set them by the gentleman from New York? If they were, the whole South. would listen. It was a kind of music they liked to hear from the North. There was in it more of the gentle harp, and less of the war-bugle than they had been accustomed to from that quarter.

Mr. BROOKS said, it appeared after all that there was no essential difference between them.

Mr. BROWN. So far as this Congress is concerned, we ask nothing more than that we shall be treated as equals, and that no insulting discrimination should be made in the action of Congress against slave property. If the gentleman agrees to this, there can be no essential difference between us.

Now, Mr. Speaker, to the subject of the Texas boundary. Is there one man in this House, or throughout the nation, who does not know that but for the question of slavery, there would be no such question as that of the Texas boundary? Suppose, sir, that Texas and New Mexico were both as clearly slaveholding countries as North and South Carolina, how long, sir, do you think it would take this Congress to fix a boundary between them? Not one hour—certainly not one day. Of what consequence could it be to the North, whether Texas extended to the 32d or to the 42d degree, or to any intermediate point? Take out the question of slavery, and of what consequence is it where the boundary of Texas may be fixed? Does any man suppose that the money-loving men of the North would vote ten millions of dollars from a common treasury to buy a slip of soil from a slaveholding State, simply to give it to a slaveholding Territory? No, no. We all understand this matter. If the country is left in the possession and ownership of Texas, it must be slave territory, and if it is given up to New Mexico, you mean that it shall become free territory, and you do not intend to leave any stone unturned to accomplish this end. We know this, and we govern ourselves accordingly. Let northern gentlemen speak out on this subject.

The thin covering, that they want to do justice between Texas and New Mexico, furnishes a poor disguise to the real purpose. We all know that slavery restriction is the lever with which you are lifting the title of Texas off this country, and giving it up to New Mexico; and we all know that you are attempting to do this without right, or color of right, to perform such an act.

Mr. MCCLERNAND (Mr. Brown yielding) said, that Texas claimed the Rio Grande for its whole extent to be her western boundary. By the resolutions annexing Texas to the United States, slavery is interdicted north of 36° 30' within her professed limits. The amendment proposed by the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Boyd) provides that slavery may exist in any portion of the territory west of the boundary of Texas, as proposed by the Senate bill, between 32° and 38° north latitude, east of the Rio Grande. That is, the amendment provides that slavery may exist in any part of said territory, according as the people inhabiting it may determine for themselves when they apply for admission into the Union. So that to the extent of so much of said territory now claimed by Texas, lying between 36° 30′ and 38° north latitude, the South, according to the test of my able and worthy friend from Mississippi, stands upon a better footing under the amendment proposed than she does under the resolutions of Texas annexation.

Mr. BROWN resumed. If we are left in that condition in which we were by the annexation resolutions, we are satisfied. What we ask in regard to Utah, New Mexico, and California, is, that the North will not, by means direct or indirect, disturb us then in the quiet enjoyment of our property. What we ask in regard to Texas is, that you will abide by the resolutions of annexation. We are satisfied with the contract, and we are opposed to making any other. This contract gives us all south of 36° 30' as slave territory, and dedicates all north of that line to free soil. We stand by this. If gentlemen want to buy from Texas her territory north of 36° 30′, let them do it. They had his full consent to give her ten, twelve, or fifteen millions of dollars. He should interpose no objection. But when it came to selling out slaveholding Texas with a view of enabling the North to make New Mexico a non-slaveholding state the more readily, he felt it his duty to interpose by all the means in his power. He never meant to give his vote for any proposition or combination of propositions which looked to the deprivation of Texas of one inch of her rightful soil. He wanted to deal fairly by all parts of the country. He trusted he should be as ready to act fairly by the North as by the South, but he invoked the vengeance of Heaven if ever he gave his vote for any bill or proposition to buy the soil of a slave state to convert it into free soil.

SOURCE: M. W. Cluskey, Editor, Speeches, Messages, and Other Writings of the Hon. Albert G. Brown, A Senator in Congress from the State of Mississippi, p. 208-14

Senator Henry Clay to Leslie Combs, December 22, 1849

WASHINGTON, December 22, 1849.

MY DEAR SIR,—I received your favor of the 17th instant, and thank you for its details. It seems that I have lost my negro man by the small-pox. I hope the measures taken will arrest its progress.

My object in writing you now is one of great importance, and I wish you to lead off in it. It will do the country good, and do you good.

The feeling for disunion among some intemperate Southern politicians, is stronger than I hoped or supposed it could be. The masses generally, even at the South, are, I believe, yet sound; but they may become influenced and perverted. The best counter-action of that feeling is to be derived from popular expressions of public meetings of the people. Now, what I should be glad to see, is such meetings held throughout Kentucky; for, you must know, that the disunionists count upon the co-operation of our patriotic State. Can't you get up a large powerful meeting of both parties, if possible, at Lexington, at Louisville, etc., to express, in strong language, their determination to stand by the Union? I hope the Legislature, and the Convention also, if it has not adjourned, may do the same. If you remain silent and passive, there is danger that the bad feeling may yet reach you. Now is the time for salutary action, and you are the man to act. I inclose some resolutions, which, or some similar to them, I should be happy to see adopted.

Prudence and propriety will suggest to you, that too free a use of my name should not be made in getting up this movement. You well know the persons to consult with; and I wish you would keep me advised of what you do.

SOURCE: Calvin Colton, Editor, The Private Correspondence of Henry Clay, p. 593

 

Daniel Webster to Mr. F. S. Lathrop & Others, November 14, 1850

Boston, November 14, 1850.

GENTLEMEN,—I am under great obligations for the letter received from you, expressing your approbation of the sentiments contained in my letter to the Union meeting at Castle Garden.

The longer I live, the more warmly am I attached to the happy form of government under which we live. It is certain that, at the present time, there is a spirit abroad which seeks industriously to undermine that government. This, of course, will be denied, and denied by those whose constant effort is to inspire the North with haterd towards the South, and the South with hatred toward the North; and it is time for all true patriots to make a united effort, in which I shall most cordially join, not only to resist open schemes of disunion, but to eradicate its spirit from the public mind.

I have the honor to be, gentlemen, with great regard, your obliged fellow-citizen and humble servant,

DAN'L WEBSTER.

TO MESSRS. F. S. LATHROP, CHAS. G. CARLETON, PETER S. DUNEE, GENARD HALLOCK, Committee, New York.

SOURCE: Fletcher Webster, Editor, The Private Correspondence of Daniel Webster, Vol. 2, p. 404

Senator John C. Calhoun to James H. Hammond,* February 14, 1849

Washington 14th Feb. 1849

MY DEAR SIR, I have no copy with me of your letter, refered to in the enclosed, and know not where one can be got except from yourself. If you have a spare copy, I would be obliged to you for enclosing it to me, and to return the letter of Mr Jackson with it.

I enclosed you a copy of our Address, which I hope you have received, and that it meets your approbation. I trust it will do something to Unite the South, and to prepare our people to meet and repel effectually and forever the aggressions of the North. Already the stand taken here and in Virginia, N. C. our State and Florida has made a deep impression on the North. Missouri is about to take a firm and decided stand and Kentucky will, I learn, put down effectually the attempt in favor of emancipation proposed to be made in the Convention to be held this year in that State. It is said, there will not be three members of the body in favour of it. But this and all other favourable symptoms, so far from relaxing, ought to add new energy to our efforts. Now is the time to vindicate our rights. We ought rather than to yield an inch, take any alternative, even if it should be disunion, and I trust that such will be the determination of the South.

_______________

* Original lent by Mr. E. S. Hammond.

SOURCE: J. Franklin Jameson, Editor, Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1899, Volume II, Calhoun’s Correspondence: Fourth Annual Report of the Historical Manuscripts Commission, Correspondence of John C. Calhoun, p. 762-3

Congressman Horace Mann, August 18, 1850

AUG. 18, 1850.

. . We are now debating the Civil and Diplomatic Appropriation Bill in the House. It is quite uncertain when any one of the exciting questions will be taken up. On those questions, the old parties are greatly divided; and many members act upon their own judgment, or with reference to the wishes of their constituents at home. There is a party, however, which is determined to support the Administration, without further inquiry. The truth is, the slave-power of the South and the money-power of the North have struck hands. The one threatens the Union: the other yields, professing to be in fear of disunion, but really for the purpose of obtaining the profits of trade and of getting a new tariff. The whole mercantile press of Boston is under the influence of this power. They either come out decidedly, and denounce every thing and everybody that stands in the way of getting more money, at what ever sacrifice of human liberty, like the "Courier," "Advertiser," and "Post," or like the other papers, the "Traveller," the "Mercantile Journal," &c., they maintain silence on the subject while the enemy is at work. The "Courier" is the most spiteful and virulent against me. They cannot reason me down; so they try to ridicule me down. They copy from the "Springfield Republican."

SOURCE: Mary Tyler Peabody Mann, Life of Horace Mann, p. 315-6

Senator John C. Calhoun to John H. Means,* April 13, 1849

Fort Hill 13th April 1849.

MY DEAR SIR, I am glad to learn by your letter and from other Sources, that a meeting is to be held next month in Columbia, to be composed of delegates from the different Commitees of correspondence. I regard it as a step of much importance and responsibility.

You ask my opinion as to the course the Meeting should take. Before I give it, I deem it due to candour and the occasion to State, that I am of the impression that the time is near at hand when the South will have to chose between disunion, and submission. I think so, because I see little prospect of arresting the aggression of the North. If anything can do it, it would be for the South to present with an unbroken front to the North the alternative of dissolving the partnership or of ceasing on their part to violate our rights and to disregard the stipulations of the Constitution in our favour; and that too without delay. I say without delay; for it may be well doubted whether the alienation between the two sections has not already gone too far to save the Union; but, if it has not, there can be none that it soon will, if not prevented by some prompt and decisive measure. It has been long on the increase and is now more rapidly increasing than ever. The prospect is as things now stand, that before four years have elapsed, the Union will be divided into two great hostile sectional parties.

But it will be impossible to present such a front, except by means of a Convention of the Southern States. That, and that only could speak for the whole, and present authoritatively to the North the alternative, which to choose. If such a presentation should fail to save the Union, by arresting the aggression of the North and causing our rights and the stipulations of the Constitution in our favour to be respected, it would afford proof conclusive that it could not be saved, and that nothing was left us, but to save ourselves. Having done all we could to save the Union, we would then stand justified before God and man to dissolve a partnership which had proved inconsistent with our safety, and, of course, distructive of the object which mainly induced us to enter into it. Viewed in this light, a Convention of the South is an indispensible means to discharge a great duty we owe to our partners in the Union; that is, to warn them in the most solemn manner that if they do not desist from aggression, and cease to disregard our rights and the stipulations of the Constitution, the duty we owe to ourselves and our posterity would compel us to dissolve forever the partnership with them. But should its warning voice fail to save the Union, it would in that case prove the most efficient of all means for saving ourselves. It would give us the great advantage of enjoying the conscious feeling of having done all we could to save it and thereby free us from all responsibility in reference to it, while it would afford the most efficient means of United and prompt action, and thereby of meeting the momentous occasion without confusion or disorder, and with certainty of success.

Thus thinking, my opinion is that the great object to be aimed at by the Meeting is to adopt measures to prepare the way for a Convention of the Southern States. What they should be the Meeting can best decide. It seems to me, however, that the organization of our own and the other Southern States is an indispensible step and for that and other purposes there ought to be an able Committee appointed having its center in Charleston, or Columbia, and vested with power to take such steps as may be deemed necessary to carry into effect that and the other measures which may be adopted by the Meeting.

I agree with you as to a non intercourse with the North in commerce and trade. Passing over the objection that it would be below the dignity of the occasion, it would be neither prudent nor efficient, most certainly as preceeding the meeting of a Southern Convention.

_______________

* From a draft in Calhoun's handwriting. John H. Means was an active secessionist, was chosen governor of South Carolina the next year, and was killed, a Confederate colonel, at the second battle of Bull Run.

SOURCE: J. Franklin Jameson, Editor, Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1899, Volume II, Calhoun’s Correspondence: Fourth Annual Report of the Historical Manuscripts Commission, Correspondence of John C. Calhoun, p. 764-6

Andrew Jackson’s Proclamation Regarding the Nullifying Laws of South Carolina, December 10, 1832

PROCLAMATION,

BY ANDREW JACKSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1832.

Whereas a convention, assembled in the State of South Carolina, have passed an ordinance, by which they declare, "that the several acts and parts of acts of the Congress of the United States, purporting to be laws for the imposing of duties and imposts on the importation of foreign commodities, and now having actual operation and effect within the United States, and, more especially" two acts for the same purposes, passed on the twenty-ninth of May, 1828, and on the fourteenth of July, 1832, "are unauthorized by the Constitution of the United States, and violate the true meaning and intent thereof, and are null and void, and no law," nor binding on the citizens of that State or its officers: and, by the said ordinance, it is further declared to be unlawful for any of the constituted authorities of the State, or of the United States, to enforce the payment of the duties imposed by the said acts within the same State, and that it is the duty of the legislature to pass such laws as may be necessary to give full effect to the said ordinance:

And, whereas, by the said ordinance, it is further ordained, that in no case of law or equity, decided in the courts of said State, wherein shall be drawn in question the validity of the said ordinance, or of the acts of the legislature that may be passed to give it effect, or of the said laws of the United States, no appeal shall be allowed to the Supreme Court of the United States, nor shall any copy of the record be permitted or allowed for that purpose; and that any person attempting to take such appeal, shall be punished as for a contempt of court:

And, finally, the said ordinance declares that the people of South Carolina will maintain the said ordinance at every hazard; and that they will consider the passage of any act by Congress, abolishing or closing the ports of said State, or otherwise obstructing the free ingress or egress of vessels to and from the said ports, or any other act of the Federal Government to coerce the State, shut up her ports, destroy or harass her commerce, or to enforce the said acts, otherwise than through the civil tribunals of the country, as inconsistent with the longer continuance of South Carolina in the Union; and that the people of the said State will thenceforth hold themselves absolved from all further obligation to maintain or preserve their political connection with the people of the other States, and will, forth with, proceed to organize a separate government, and do all other acts and things which sovereign and independent States may of right do:

And, whereas, the said ordinance prescribes to the people of South Carolina a course of conduct, in direct violation of their duty, as citizens of the United States, contrary to the laws of their country, subversive of its Constitution, and having for its object the destruction of the Union—that Union, which, coeval with our political existence, led our fathers, without any other ties to unite them, than those of patriotism and a common cause, through a sanguinary struggle to a glorious independence-that sacred Union, hitherto inviolate, which, perfected by our happy Constitution, has brought us, by the favor of Heaven, to a State of prosperity at home and high consideration abroad, rarely, if ever, equalled in the history of nations. To preserve this bond of our political existence from destruction, to maintain, inviolate, this state of national honor and prosperity, and to justify the confidence my fellow-citizens have reposed in me, I, ANDREW JACKSON, President of the United States, have thought proper to issue this, my PROCLAMATION, stating my views of the Constitution and laws, applicable to the measures adopted by the Convention of South Carolina, and to the reasons they have put forth to sustain them, declaring the course which duty will require me to pursue, and, appealing to the understanding and patriotism of the people, warn them of the consequences that must inevitably result from an observance of the dictates of the convention.

Strict duty would require of me nothing more than the exercise of those powers with which I am now, or may hereafter be invested, for preserving the peace of the Union, and for the execution of the laws. But the imposing aspect which opposition has assumed in this case, by clothing itself with State Authority, and the deep interest which the people of the United States must all feel, in preventing a resort to stronger measures, while there is a hope that any thing will be yielded to reasoning and remonstrance, perhaps demand, and will certainly justify, a full exposition to South Carolina and the nation, of the views I entertain of this important question, as well as a distinct enunciation of the course which my sense of duty will require me to pursue.

The ordinance is founded, not on the indefeasible right of resisting acts which are plainly unconstitutional, and too oppressive to be endured, but on the strange position that any one State may not only declare an Act of Congress void, but prohibit its execution—that they may do this consistently with the Constitution—that the true construction of that instrument permits a State to retain its place in the Union, and yet be bound by no other of its laws than those it may chose to consider as constitutional. It is true, they add, that, to justify this abrogation of a law, it must be palpably contrary to the Constitution; but it is evident that, to give the right of resisting laws of that description, coupled with the uncontrolled right to decide what laws deserve that character, is to give the power of resisting all laws. For, as by the theory, there is no appeal, the reasons alleged by the State, good or bad, must prevail. If it should be said that public opinion is a sufficient check against the abuse of this power, it may asked why it is not deemed a sufficient guard against the passage of an unconstitutional Act by Congress. There is, however, a restraint in this last case, which makes the assumed power of a State more indefensible, and which does not exist in the other. There are two appeals from an unconstitutional act passed by Congress one to the judiciary, the other to the people and the States. There is no appeal from the State decision in theory: and the practical illustration shows that the courts are closed against an application to review it, both judges and jurors being sworn to decide in its favor, But reasoning on this subject is superfluous when our social compact in express terms declares, that the laws of the United States, its Constitution, and treaties made under it, are the Supreme Law of the Land: and, for greater caution, adds, “that the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." And it may be asserted, without fear of refutation, that no federative government could exist without a similar provision. Look for a moment to the consequence. If South Carolina considers the revenue laws unconstitutional, and has a right to prevent their execution in the port of Charleston, there would be a clear constitutional objection to their collection in every other port, and no revenue could be collected any where; for all imposts must be equal. It is no answer to repeat that an unconstitutional law is no law, so long as the question of its legality is to be decided by the State itself; for every law operating injuriously upon any local interest will be perhaps thought, and certainly represented, as unconstitutional, and, as has been shown, there is no appeal.

If this doctrine had been established at an earlier day, the Union would have been dissolved in its infancy. The excise law in Pennsylvania, the embargo and non-intercourse law in the eastern States, the carriage tax in Virginia, were all deemed unconstitutional, and were more unequal in their operation than any of the laws now complained of; but, fortunately, none of those States discovered that they had the right now claimed by South Carolina. The war into which we were forced, to support the dignity of the nation and the rights of our citizens, might have ended in defeat and disgrace, instead of victory and honor, if the States, who supposed it a ruinous and unconstitutional measure, had thought they possessed the right of nullifying the act by which it was declared, and denying supplies for its prosecution. Hardly and unequally as those measures bore upon several members of the Union, to the legislatures of none did this efficient and peaceable remedy, as it is called, suggest itself. The discovery of this important feature in our Constitution was reserved to the present day. To the statesmen of South Carolina belongs the invention, and upon the citizens of that State will unfortunately fall the evils of reducing it to practice.

If the doctrine of a State veto upon the laws of the Union carries with it internal evidence of its impracticable absurdity, our constitutional history will also afford abundant proof that it would have been repudiated with indignation, had it been proposed to form a feature in our government.

In our colonial State, although dependent on another power, we very early considered ourselves as connected by common interest with each other. Leagues were formed for common defence, and before the Declaration of Independence, we were known in our aggregate character as THE UNITED COLONIES OF AMERICA. That decisive and important step was taken jointly. We declared ourselves a nation by a joint, not by several acts; and when the terms of our confederation were reduced to form, it was in that of a solemn league of several States, by which they agreed that they would, collectively, form one nation for the purpose of conducting some certain domestic concerns, and all foreign relations. In the instrument forming that Union, is found an article which declares that "every State shall abide by the determinations of Congress on all questions which by that confederation should be submitted to them."

Under the confederation, then, no State could legally annul a decision of the Congress, or refuse to submit to its execution; but no provision was made to enforce these decisions. Congress made requisitions, but they were not complied with. The government could not operate on individuals. They had no judiciary, no means of collecting revenue.

But the defects of the confederation need not be detailed. Under its operation, we could scarcely be called a nation. We had neither prosperity at home nor consideration abroad. This state of things could not be endured, and our present happy Constitution was formed; but formed in vain, if this fatal doctrine prevails. It was formed for important objects that are announced in the preamble made in the name and by the authority of the people of the United States, whose delegates framed, and whose conventions approved it. The most important among these objects, that which is placed first in rank, on which all the others rest, is "to from a more perfect Union" Now, is it possible that, even if there were no express provision giving supremacy to the Constitution and Laws of the United States over those of the States, it can be conceived, that an instrument made for the purpose of "forming a more perfect Union" than that of the confederation, could be so constructed by the assembled wisdom of our country as to substitute for that confederation a form of government dependent for its existence on the local interest, the party spirit of a State, or of a prevailing faction in a State? Every man of plain unsophisticated understanding, who hears the question, will give such an answer as will preserve the Union. Metaphysical subtlety, in pursuit of an impracticable theory, could alone have devised one that is calculated to destroy it.

I consider, then, the power to annual a law of the United States, assumed by one State, INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE EXISTENCE OF THE UNION, CONTRADICTED EXPRESSLY BY THE LETTER OF THE CONSTITUTION, UNAUTHORIZED BY ITS SPIRIT, INCONSISTENT WITH EVERY PRINCIPLE ON WHICH IT WAS FOUNDED, AND DESTRUCTIVE OF THE GREAT OBJECT FOR WHICH IT WAS FORMED.

After this general view of the leading principle, we must examine the particular application of it which is made in the ordinance.

The preamble rests its justification on these grounds: It assumes, as a fact, that the obnoxious laws, although they purport to be laws for raising revenue, were, in reality, intended for the protection of manufactures, which purpose it asserts to be unconstitutional—that the operation of these laws is unequal—that the amount raised by them is greater than is required by the wants of the government—and, finally, that the proceeds are to be applied to objects unauthorized by the Constitution. These are the only causes alleged to justify an open opposition to the laws of the country, and a threat of seceding from the Union, if any attempt should be made to enforce them. The first virtually acknowledges that the law in question was passed under a power expressly given by the Constitution, to lay and collect imposts; but its constitutionality is drawn in question from the motives of those who passed it. However apparent this purpose may be in the present case, nothing can be more dangerous than to admit the position that an unconstitutional purpose, entertained by the members who assent to a law enacted under a constitutional power, shall make that law void; for how is that purpose to be ascertained? Who is to make the scrutiny? How often may bad purposes be falsely imputed? in how many cases are they concealed by false professions? in how many is no declaration of motive made? Admit this doctrine, and you give to the States an uncontrolled right to decide, and every law may be annulled under this pretext. If, therefore, the absurd and dangerous doctrine should be admitted, that a State may annul an unconstitutional law, or one that it deems such, it will not apply to the present case.

The next objection is, that the laws in question operate unequally. This objection may be made with truth, to every law that has been or can be passed. The wisdom of man never yet contrived a system of taxation that would operate with perfect equality. If the unequal operation of a law makes it unconstitutional, and if all laws of that description may be abrogated by any State for that cause, then indeed is the Federal Constitution unworthy of the slightest effort for its preservation. We have hitherto relied on it as the perpetual bond of our Union.

We have received it as the work of the assembled wisdom of the nation, have trusted to it as to the sheet anchor of our safety, in the stormy times of conflict with a foreign or domestic foe. We have looked to it with sacred awe, as the palladium of our liberties; and, with all the solemnities of religion, have pledged to each other, our lives and fortunes here, and our hopes of happiness hereafter, in its defence and support. Were we mistaken, my countrymen, in attaching this importance to the Constitution of our country? Was our devotion paid to the wretched, inefficient, clumsy contrivance, which this new doctrine would make it? Did we pledge ourselves to the support of an airy nothing—a bubble that must be blown away by the first breath of disaffection? Was this self-destroying, visionary theory, the work of the profound statesmen, the exalted patriots, to whom the task of constitutional reform was entrusted? Did the name of Washington sanction, did the States deliberately ratify, such an anomaly in the history of fundamental legislation? No. We were not mistaken! The letter of this great instrument is free from this radical fault: its language directly contradicts the imputation: its spirit—its evident intent, contradicts it. No, we did not err! Our Constitution does not contain the absurdity of giving power to make laws, and another power to resist them. The sages, whose memory will always be reverenced, have given us a practical, and, as they hoped, a permanent constitutional compact. The father of his country did not affix his revered name to so palpable and absurdity. Nor did the States, when they severally ratified it, do so under the impression that a veto on the laws of the United States was reserved to them, or that they could exercise it by application. Search the debates in all their conventions—examine the speeches of the most zealous opposers of federal authority—look at the amendments that were proposed. They are all silent—not a syllable uttered, not a vote given, not a motion made to correct the explicit supremacy given to the laws of the Union over those of the States—or to show that implication, as is now contended, could defeat it. No, we have not erred! The Constitution is still the object of our reverence, the bond of our Union, our defence in danger, the source of our prosperity in peace. It shall descend, as we have received it, uncorrupted by sophistical construction, to our posterity; and the sacrifices of local interests, of State prejudices, of personal animosities, that were made to bring it into existence, will again be patriotically offered for its support.

The two remaining objections, made by the ordinance to these laws, are, that the sums intended to be raised by them are greater than are required, and that the proceeds will be unconstitutionally employed. The Constitution has given expressly to Congress the right of raising revenue, and of determining the sum the public exigencies will require. The States have no control over the exercise of this right, other than that which results from the power of changing the representatives who abuse it, and thus procure redress.

Congress may, undoubtedly, abuse this discretionary power, but the same may be said of others with which they are vested. Yet the discretion must exist somewhere. The Constitution has given it to the representatives of the people, checked by the representatives of the States, and by the executive power. The South Carolina construction gives it to the legislature or the convention of a single State, where neither the people of the different States, nor the States in their separate capacity, nor the Chief Magistrate, elected by the people, have any representation. Which is the most discreet disposition of the power? I do not ask you, fellow-citizens, which is the constitutional disposition—that instrument speaks a language not to be misunderstood. But if you were assembled in general convention, which would you think the safest depository of this discretionary power, in the last resort? Would you add a clause, giving it to each of the States; or would you sanction the wise provisions already made by your Constitution? If this should be the result of your deliberations, when providing for the future, are you—can you be—ready to risk all that we hold dear, to establish, for a temporary and a local purpose, that which you must acknowledge to be destructive, and even absurd, as a general provision? Carry out the consequences of this right vested in the different States, and you must perceive that the crisis your conduct presents at this day, would recur whenever any law of the United States displeased any of the States, and that we should soon cease to be a nation.

The ordinance, with the same knowledge of the future that characterizes a former objection, tells you that the proceeds of the tax will be unconstitutionally applied. If this could be ascertained with certainty, the objection would, with more propriety, be reserved for the law so applying the proceeds, but surely cannot be urged against the laws levying the duty.

These are the allegations contained in the ordinance. Examine them seriously, my fellow-citizens—judge for yourselves. I appeal to you to determine whether they are so clear, so convincing, as to leave no doubt of their correctness: and even if you should come to this conclusion, how far they justify the reckless, destructive course, which you are directed to pursue. Review these objections, and the conclusions drawn from them, once more. What are they? Every law, then, for raising revenue, according to the South Carolina ordinance, may be rightfully annulled, unless it be so framed as no law ever will or can be framed. Congress have a right to pass laws for raising revenue, and each State has a right to oppose their execution—two rights directly opposed to each other; and yet is this absurdity supposed to be contained in an instrument drawn for the express purpose of avoiding collisions between the States and the General Government, by an assembly of the most enlightened statesmen and purest patriots ever embodied for a similar purpose.

In vain have these sages declared that Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises—in vain have they provided that they shall have power to pass laws which shall be necessary and proper to carry those powers into execution; that those laws and that Constitution shall be the "supreme law of the land; and that the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." In vain have the people of the several States solemnly sanctioned these provisions, made them their paramount law, and individually sworn to support them whenever they were called on to execute any office. Vain provisions! ineffectual restrictions! vile profanation of oaths! miserable mockery of legislation! If a bare majority of the voters in any one State may, on a real or supposed knowledge of the intent with which a law has been passed, declare themselves free from its operation—say here it gives too little, there too much, and operates unequally—here it suffers articles to be free that ought to be taxed, there it taxes those that ought to be free—in this case the proceeds are intended to be applied to purposes which we do not approve—in that the amount raised is more than is wanted. Congress, it is true, are invested by the Constitution with the right of deciding these questions according to their sound discretion. Congress is composed of the representatives of all the States and of all the people of all the States; but we, part of the people of one State, to whom the Constitution has given no power on the subject, from whom it has expressly taken it away—we, who have solemnly agreed that this Constitution shall be our law—we, most of whom have sworn to support it—we, now abrogate this law, and swear, and force others to swear, that it shall not be obeyed—and we do this, not because Congress have no right to pass such laws; this we do not allege; but because they have passed them with improper views. They are unconstitutional from the motives of those who passed them, which we can never with certainty know, from their unequal operation; although it is impossible from the nature of things that they should be equal—and from the disposition which we presume may be made of their proceeds, although that disposition has not been declared. This is the plain meaning of the ordinance in relation to laws which it abrogates for alleged unconstitutionality. But it does not stop there. It repeals, in express terms, an important part of the Constitution itself, and of laws passed to give it effect, which have never been alleged to be unconstitutional. The Constitution declares that the judicial powers of the United States extend to cases arising under the laws of the United States, and that such laws, the Constitution and treaties shall be paramount to the State constitutions and laws. The judiciary act prescribes the mode by which the case may be brought before a court of the United States, by appeal, when a State tribunal shall decide against this provision of the Constitution. The ordinance declares there shall be no appeal; makes the State law paramount to the Constitution and laws of the United States; forces judges and jurors to swear that they will disregard their provisions; and even makes it penal in a suitor to attempt relief by appeal. It further declares that it shall not be lawful for the authorities of the United States, or of that State, to enforce the payment of duties imposed by the revenue laws within its limits.

Here is a law of the United States, not even pretended to be unconstitutional, repealed by the authority of a small majority of the voters of a single State. Here is a provision of the Constitution which is solemnly abrogated by the same authority.

On such expositions and reasonings, the ordinance grounds not only an assertion of the right to annul the laws of which it complains, but to enforce it by a threat of seceding from the Union, if any attempt is made to execute them.

This right to secede is deduced from the nature of the Constitution, which, they say, is a compact between sovereign States, who have preserved their whole sovereignty, and, therefore, are subject to no superior; that, because they made the compact, they can break it when, in their opinion, it has been departed from by the other States. Fallacious as this course of reasoning is, it enlists State pride, and finds advocates in the honest prejudices of those who have not studied the nature of our government sufficiently to see the radical error on which it rests.

The people of the United States formed the Constitution, acting through the State Legislatures in making the compact, to meet and discuss its provisions, and acting in separate conventions when they ratified those provisions; but the terms used in its construction, show it to be a government in which the people of all the States collectively are represented. We are ONE PEOPLE in the choice of the President and Vice President. Here the States have no other agency than to direct the mode in which the votes shall be given. The candidates having the majority of all the votes, are chosen. The electors of a majority of States may have given their votes for one candidate, and yet another may be chosen. The People, then, and not the States, are represented in the executive branch.

In the House of Representatives there is this difference, that the people of one State do not, as in the case of President and Vice President, all vote for the same officers. The people of all the States do not vote for all the members, each State electing only its own representatives. But this creates no material distinction. When chosen, they are all representatives of the United States, not representatives of the particular State from which they come. They are paid by the United States, not by the State; nor are they accountable to it for any act done in the performance of their legislative functions; and, however they may in practice, as it is their duty to do, consult and prefer the interests of their particular constituents when they come in conflict with any other partial or local interest, yet it is their first and highest duty, as representatives of the United States, to promote the general good.

The Constitution of the United States, then, forms a government, not a league; and whether it be formed by compact between the States, or in any other manner, its character is the same. It is a government in which all the people are represented, which operates directly on the people individually, not upon the States: they retained all the power they did not grant. But each State having expressly parted with so many powers as to constitute, jointly with the other States a single nation, cannot from that period possess any right to secede, because such secession does not break a league, but destroys the unity of a nation; and any injury to that unity is not only a breach which would result from the contravention of a compact, but it is an offence against the whole Union. To say that any State may at pleasure secede from the Union, is to say that the United States are not a nation; because it would be a solecism to contend that any part of a nation might dissolve its connexion with the other parts, to their injury or ruin, without committing any offence. Secession, like any other revolutionary act, may be morally justified by the extremity of oppression; but to call it a constitutional right is confounding the meaning of terms; and can only be done through gross error, or to deceive those who are willing to assert a right, but would pause before they made a revolution, or incur the penalties consequent on a failure.

Because the Union was formed by a compact, it is said the parties to that compact may, when they feel themselves aggrieved, depart from it: but it is precisely because it is a compact that they cannot. A compact is an agreement or binding obligation. It may, by its terms, have a sanction or penalty for its breach, or it may not. If it contains no sanction, it may be broken with no other consequence than moral guilt: if it have a sanction, then the breach incurs the designated or implied penalty. A league between independent nations, generally, has no sanction other than a moral one; or, if it should contain a penalty, as there is no common superior, it cannot be enforced. A government, on the contrary, always has a sanction, expressed or implied; and, in our case, it is both necessarily implied and expressly given. An attempt by force of arms to destroy a government, is an offence, by whatever means the constitutional compact may have been formed; and such government has the right, by the law of self defence, to pass acts for punishing the offender, unless that right is modified, restrained, or resumed, by the constitutional act. In our system, although it is modified in the case of treason, yet authority is expressly given to pass all laws necessary to carry its powers into effect, and under this grant provision has been made for punishing acts which obstruct the due administration of the laws.

It would seem superfluous to add any thing to show the nature of that union which connects us; but as erroneous opinions on this subject are the foundation of doctrines the most destructive to our peace, I must give some further development to my views on this subject. No one, fellow-citizens, has a higher reverence for the reserved rights of the States, than the magistrate who now addresses you. No one would make greater personal sacrifices, or official exertions, to defend them from violation; but equal care must be taken to prevent on their part an improper interference with, or resumption of, the rights they have vested in the nation. The line has not been so distinctly drawn as to avoid doubts in some cases of the exercise of power. Men of the best intentions and soundest views may differ in their construction of some parts of the Constitution: but there are others on which dispassionate reflection can leave no doubt. Of this nature appears to be the assumed right of secession. It rests, as we have seen, on the alleged, undivided sovereignty of the States, and on their having formed in this sovereign capacity a compact which is called the Constitution, from which, because they made it, they have the right to secede. Both of these positions are erroneous, and some of the arguments to prove them so have been anticipated.

The States severally have not retained their entire sovereignty. It has been shown that in becoming parts of a nation, not members of a league, they surrendered many of their essential parts of sovereignty. The right to make treaties, declare war, levy taxes, exercise exclusive judicial and legislative powers, were all of them functions of sovereign power. The States, then, for all these important purposes, were no longer sovereign. The allegiance of their citizens was transferred, in the first instance, to the government of the United States—they became American citizens, and owed obedience to the Constitution of the United States, and to laws made in conformity with the powers it vested in Congress. This last position has not been, and cannot be denied. How then can that State be said to be sovereign and independent, whose citizens owe obedience to laws not made by it, and whose magistrates are sworn to disregard those laws, when they come in conflict with those passed by another? What shows conclusively that the States cannot be said to have reserved an undivided sovereignty, is, that they expressly ceded the right to punish treason—not treason against their separate power—but treason against the United States. Treason is an offence against sovereignty, and sovereignty must reside with the power to punish it. But the reserved rights of the States are not less sacred, because they have for their common interest made the General Government the depository of these powers. The unity of our political character (as has been shown for another purpose) commenced with its very existence. Under the royal government, we had no separate character our opposition to its oppression began as UNITED COLONIES. We were the UNITED STATES under the confederation, and the name was perpetuated, and the union rendered more perfect, by the Federal Constitution. In none of these stages did we consider ourselves in any other light than as forming one nation. Treaties and alliances were made in the name of all. Troops were raised for the joint defence. How, then, with all these proofs, that under all changes of our position we had, for designated purposes and with defined powers, created national governments—how is it, that the most perfect of those several modes of union should now be considered as a mere league, that may be dissolved at pleasure? It is from an abuse of terms. Compact is used as synonymous with league, although the true term is not employed, because it would at once show the fallacy of the reasoning. It would not do to say that our Constitution was only a league; but, it is labored to prove it a compact, (which in one sense it is,) and then to argue that as a league is a compact, every compact between nations must of course be a league, and that from such an engagement every sovereign power has a right to recede. But it has been shown, that in this sense the States are not sovereign, and that even if they were, and the National Constitution had been formed by compact, there would be no right in any one State to exonerate itself from its obligations.

So obvious are the reasons which forbid this secession, that it is necessary only to allude to them. The Union was formed for the benefit of all. It was produced by mutual sacrifices of interests and opinions. Can those sacrifices be recalled? Can the States who magnanimously surrendered their title to the territories of the west, recall the grant? Will the inhabitants of the inland States agree to pay the duties that may be imposed without their assent by those on the Atlantic or the Gulf, for their own benefit? Shall there be a free port in one State, and onerous duties in another? No one believes that any right exists in a single State to involve all the others in these and countless other evils, contrary to the engagements solemnly made. Every one must see that the other States, in self-defence, must oppose at all hazards.

These are the alternatives that are presented by the Convention: a repeal of all the acts for raising revenue, leaving the government without the means of support; or an acquiescence in the dissolution of the Union by the secession of one of its members. When the first was proposed, it was known that it could not be listened to for a moment. It was known if force was applied to oppose the execution of the laws, that it must be repelled by force—that Congress could not, without involving itself in disgrace, and the country in ruin, accede to the proposition; and yet, if this is not done in a given day, or if any attempt is made to execute the laws, the State is, by the ordinance, declared to be out of the Union. The majority of a convention assembled for the purpose have dictated these terms, or rather this rejection of all terms, in the name of the people of South Carolina, It is true that the Governor of the State speaks of the submission of their grievances to a convention of all the States; which, he says, they "sincerely and anxiously seek and desire." Yet this obvious and constitutional mode of obtaining the sense of the other States on the construction of the federal compact, and amending it, if necessary, has never been attempted by those who have urged the State on this destructive measure. The State might have proposed the call for a general convention to the other States; and Congress, if a sufficient number of them concurred, must have called it. But the first magistrate of South Carolina, when he expressed a hope that, "on a review by Congress and the functionaries of the General Government of the merits of the controversy," such a convention will be accorded to them, must have known that neither Congress nor any functionary of the General Government has authority to call such a convention, unless it be demanded by two-thirds of the States. This suggestion, then, is another instance of the reckless inattention to the provisions of the Constitution with which this crisis has been madly hurried on; or of the attempt to persuade the people that a constitutional remedy had been sought and refused. If the Legislature of South Carolina "anxiously desire" a general convention to consider their complaints, why have they not made application for it in the way the Constitution points out? The assertion that they "earnestly seek" it, is completely negatived by the omission.

This, then, is the position in which we stand. A small majority of the citizens of one State in the Union have elected delegates to a State convention: that convention has ordained that all the revenue, laws of the United States, must be repealed, or that they are no longer a member of the Union. The Governor of that State has recommended to the Legislature the raising of an army to carry the secession into effect, and that he may be empowered to give clearances to vessels in the name of the State. No act of violent opposition to the laws has yet been committed, but such a state of things is hourly apprehended, and it is the intent of this instrument to PROCLAIM not only that the duty imposed on me by the Constitution "to take care that the laws be faithfully executed," shall be performed to the extent of the powers already vested in me by law, or of such other as the wisdom of Congress shall devise and entrust to me for that purpose; but to warn the citizens of South Carolina, who have been deluded into an opposition to the laws, of the danger they will incur by obedience to the illegal and disorganizing ordinance of the convention—to exhort those who have refused to support it to persevere in their determination to uphold the Constitution and laws of their country, and to point out to all, the perilous situation in which the good people of that State have been led—and that the course they are urged to pursue is one of ruin and disgrace to the very State whose rights they affect to support.

Fellow-citizens of my native State!—Let me not only admonish you, as the first magistrate of our common country, not to incur the penalty of its laws, but use the influence that a father would over his children, whom he saw rushing to certain ruin. In that paternal language, with that paternal feeling, let me tell you, my countrymen, that you are deluded by men who are either deceived themselves, or wish to deceive you, Mark under what pretences you have been led on to the brink of insurrection and treason, on which you stand! First, a diminution of the value of your staple commodity, lowered by over production in other quarters, and the consequent diminution in the value of your lands, were the sole effect of the tariff laws. The effect of those laws are confessedly injurious, but the evil was greatly exaggerated by the unfounded theory you were taught to believe, that its burdens were in proportion to your exports, not to your consumption of imported articles. Your pride was roused by the assertion that a submission to those laws was a state of vassalage, and that resistance to them was equal, in patriotic merit, to the opposition our fathers offered to the oppressive laws of Great Britain. You were told that this opposition might be peaceably—might be constitutionally made—that you might enjoy all the advantages of the Union and bear none of its burdens.

Eloquent appeals to your passions, to your state pride, to your native courage, to your sense of real injury, were used to prepare you for the period when the mask which concealed the hideous features of DISUNION should be taken off, It fell, and you were made to look with complacency on objects which, not long since, you would have regarded with horror. Look back at the arts which have brought you to this state—look forward to the consequences to which it must inevitably lead. Look back to what was first told you, as an inducement to enter into this dangerous course. The great political truth was repeated to you, that you had the revolutionary right of resisting all laws that were palpably unconstitutional, and intolerably oppressive—it was added that the right to nullify a law rested on the same principle, but that it was a peaceable remedy! This character which was given to it, made you receive, with too much confidence, the assertions that were made of the unconstitutionality of the law, and its oppressive effects. Mark, my fellow-citizens, that, by the admission of your leaders, the unconstitutionality must be palpable, or it will not justify either resistance or nullification! What is the meaning of the word palpable, in the sense in which it is here used?—that which is apparent to every one; that which no man of ordinary intellect will fail to perceive. Is the unconstitutionality of these laws of that description? Let those among your leaders who once approved and advocated the principle of protective duties, answer the question; and let them choose whether they will be considered as incapable, then, of perceiving that which must have been apparent to every man of common understanding, or as imposing upon your confidence, and endeavoring to mislead you now.

In either case, they are unsafe guides in the perilous path they urge you to tread. Ponder well on this circumstance, and you will know how to appreciate the exaggerated language they address to you. They are not champions of liberty, emulating the fame of our revolutionary fathers; nor are you an oppressed people, contending, as they repeat to you, against worse than colonial vassalage. You are free members of a flourishing and happy Union. There is no settled design to oppress you. You have indeed felt the unequal operation of laws which may have been unwisely, not unconstitutionally passed: but that inequality must necessarily be removed. At the very moment when you were madly urged on the unfortunate course you have begun, a change in public opinion had commenced. The nearly approaching payment of the public debt, and the consequent necessity of a diminution of duties, had already produced a considerable reduction, and that too on some articles of general consumption in your State. The importance of this change was understood, and you were authoritatively told, that no further alleviation of their burdens was to be expected, at the very time when the condition of the country imperiously demanded such a modification of the duties, as should reduce them to a just and equitable scale. But, as if apprehensive of the effect of this change, in allaying your discontents, you were precipitated into the fearful state in which you now find yourselves.

I have urged you to look back to the means that were used to hurry you on to the position you have now assumed; and forward to the consequences it will produce. Something more is necessary. Contemplate the condition of that country of which you still form an important part! Consider its government, uniting in one bond of common interests and general protection, so many different States; giving to all their inhabitants the proud title of AMERICAN CITIZENS; protecting their commerce, securing their literature and their arts, facilitating their intercommunication, defending their frontiers, and making their name respected in the remotest parts of the earth! Consider the extent of its territory, its increasing and happy population, its advance in arts, which render life agreeable, and the sciences, which elevate the mind! See education spreading the lights of religion, humanity, and general information into every cottage in the wide extent of our Territories and States! Behold it as the asylum where the wretched and the oppressed find a refuge and a support! Look on this picture of happiness and honor, and say WE, TOO, ARE CITIZENS OF AMERICA; Carolina is one of these proud States: her arms have defended, her best blood has cemented this happy Union! And then add, if you can, without horror and remorse, this happy Union we will dissolve this picture of peace and prosperity we will deface this free intercourse we will interrupt—these fertile fields we will deluge with blood—the protection of that glorious flag we renounce—the very names of Americans we discard. And for what, mistaken men!—for what do you throw away these inestimable blessings—for what would you exchange your share in the advantages and honor of the Union? For the dream of a separate independence—a dream interrupted by bloody conflicts with your neighbors, and a vile dependence on a foreign power. If your leaders could succeed in establishing a separation, what would be your situation? Are you united at home—are you free from the apprehension of civil discord, with all its fearful consequences? Do our neighboring republics, every day suffering some new revolution or contending with some new insurrection—do they excite your envy? But the dictates of a high duty oblige me solemnly to announce, that you cannot succeed.

The laws of the United States must be executed. I have no discretionary power on the subject—my duty is emphatically pronounced in the Constitution. Those who told you that you might peaceably prevent their execution, deceived you they could not have been deceived themselves. They know that a forcible opposition could alone prevent the execution of the laws, and they know that such opposition must be repelled. Their object is disunion; but be not deceived by names; disunion by armed force, is TREASON. Are you really ready to incur its guilt? If you are, on the heads of the instigators of the act be the dreadful consequences—on their heads be the dishonor, but on yours may fall the punishment—on your unhappy State will inevitably fall all the evils of the conflict you force upon the government of your country. It cannot accede to the mad project of disunion of which you would be the first victims—its first magistrate cannot, if he would, avoid the performance of his duty—the consequence must be fearful for you, distressing to your fellow-citizens here, and to the friends of good government throughout the world. Its enemies have beheld our prosperity with a vexation they could not conceal—it was a standing refutation of their slavish doctrines, and they will point to our discord with the triumph of malignant joy. It is yet in your power to disappoint them. There is yet time to show that the descendants of the Pinckneys, the Sumpters, the Rutledges, and of the thousand other names which adorn the pages of your revolutionary history, will not abandon that Union, to support which so many of them fought and bled and died. I adjure you, as you honor their memory as you love the cause of freedom, to which they dedicated their lives—as you prize the peace of your country, the lives of its best citizens, and your own fair fame, to retrace your steps. Snatch from the archives of your State the disorganizing edict of its convention—bid its members to re-assemble and promulgate the decided expressions of your will to remain in the path which alone can conduct you to safety, prosperity and honor—tell them that, compared to disunion, all other evils are light, because that brings with it an accumulation of all—declare that you will never take the field unless the star spangled banner of your country shall float over you that you will not be stigmatized when dead, and dishonored and scorned while you live, as the authors of the first attack on the Constitution of your country! Its destroyers you cannot be. You may disturb its peace—you may interrupt the course of its prosperity—you may cloud its reputation for stability—but its tranquility will be restored, its prosperity will return, and the stain upon its national character will be transferred, and remain an eternal blot on the memory of those who caused the disorder.

Fellow-citizens of the United States! The threat of unhallowed disunion the names of those, once respected, by whom it is uttered—the array of military force to support it—denote the approach of a crisis in our affairs on which the continuance of our unexampled prosperity, our political existence, and perhaps that of all free governments, may depend. The conjunction demanded a free, a full, and explicit enunciation, not only of my intentions but of my principles of action; and as the claim was asserted of a right by a State to annul the laws of the Union and even to secede from it at pleasure, a frank exposition of my opinions in relation to the origin and form of our government, and the construction I give to the instrument by which it was created, seemed to be proper. Having the fullest confidence in the justness of the legal and constitutional opinion of my duties which has been expressed, I rely with equal confidence on your undivided support in my determination to execute the laws—to preserve the Union by all constitutional means—to arrest, if possible, by moderate but firm measures, the necessity of a recourse to force; and, if it be the will of Heaven that the recurrence of its primeval curse on man for the shedding of a brother's blood should fall upon our land, that it be not called down by any offensive act on the part of the United States.

Fellow citizens! The momentous case is before you. On your undivided support of your government depends the decision of the great question it involves, whether your sacred Union will be preserved, and the blessings it se cures to us as one people shall be perpetuated. No one can doubt that the unanimity with which that decision will be expressed, will be such as to inspire new confidence in republican institutions, and that the prudence, the wisdom and the courage which it will bring to their defence, will transmit them unimpaired and invigorated to our children.

May the Great Ruler of nations grant that the signal blessings with which He has favored ours, may not, by the madness of party or personal ambition, be disregarded and lost: and may His wise Providence bring those who have produced this crisis, to see the folly, before they feel the misery of civil strife: and inspire a returning veneration for that Union which, if we may dare to penetrate His designs, He has chosen as the only means of attaining the high destinies to which we may reasonably aspire.

In testimony whereof, I have caused the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed, having signed the same with my hand.

Done at the city of Washington this 10th day of December, in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-two, and of the Independence of the United States the fifty-seventh.

ANDREW JACKSON.

By the President:
        EDW. LIVINGSTON, Secretary of State.

SOURCES: Jonathan Phillips, Editor, Messages of the Presidents of the United States, from the Formation of the General Government, Down to the Close of the Administration of President Van Buren; Concluding with the Inaugural Address of President William H. Harrison, p. 499-512; The Statutes at Large and Treaties, of the United States of America, From December 3, 1855 to March 3, 1859, and Proclamations since 1791, Volume 11 (1856-1857), 34th and 35th Congress. U.S. Statutes at Large, Volume 11 (1856-1857), p. 771-81